They’re not entirely wrong. It’s impossible to be a complete developmental determinist given the confluence of factors related to both the drafting team and the mental makeup of the player. These are intuitively important but difficult to decipher without being involved in the draft process with a team.

But what’s frustrating is that “crapshoot” canonically implies utter randomness, as if the entire evaluative and developmental process is entirely unpredictable. It ignores that certain loci of traits are associated with differing rates of development, a principle that forms the basis of my current draft research.

Moreover, even if we know that college production does not exactly scale to pro production, there’s a mountain-load of evidence that suggests stronger age-adjusted production yields better professional results.

This makes the Egor case seemingly open and shut.

At first glance, this is an unmitigated disaster. Egor had a sorta defensible 4.7 BPM… but he was infamously stat-padding against inferior competition. 26 of his 33 games came against top-100 opponents, and in these games, he had a disastrous 1.8 BPM. Against these opponents, he could not score (46.6% TS), he could not rebound (0.7% OREB), and he could not secure the ball (25.2% TO). Re-read those stats. 46% TS and 25% TO is just preposterous. His role is listed here as “scoring PG”, yet it seems that he cannot efficiently score or prevent turnovers?

It’s fair to ask what Egor can reliably do on offense when he isn’t playing shitty teams. Nothing indicates that he can be productive in the NBA.

My initial view on Egor

Full transparency: I ranked Egor 31st on my board. Many analytically-inclined individuals had him far lower. 1.8 BPM vs t100 without scoring upside or outlier athleticism should be a death knell.

Many have lambasted the Nets’ draft, calling it the worst of all time. To me, the bigger issue is accumulating five first-round picks in a single draft: it implicitly punts the value of these picks as they are all competing for the same scant playing time/resources. Even more concerning is that all five of the selected players are fairly low-floor. A few of them will likely bust pretty hard.

Still, it’s nice that there was a coherent vision of accumulating smart, tall guys with reasonable feel. Even if it seemed like they just multiplied height and assist rate, and then took the first 4 guys they saw. While the players they selected were not particularly inspiring, Sam Presti has consistently demonstrated that this size x passing formula has high reward (and also high risk).

Based on some recent conversations and philosophical changes spurred by my year-round historical research, I believe that the incongruence between Egor’s draft capital and my estimated draft capital projection was too large. To be clear, this belief has little to do with his tepid Summer League production, though there were some reasons for cautious optimism. While I still believe the Nets reached to some degree on Egor, and that he has many red flags, I now view him as a strong mid-first option, pumping him up a dozen or so spots on my board.

Here’s why.

The Problem with BPM

Beyond his TO issues, Egor has a terrible BPM, terrible TS%, and terrible 3P%. Altogether, it led to atrocities like the following:

Are these three separate issues? Not quite.

The most underrated part of his profile: Egor’s 3P misery collapsed the rest of his statistical profile.

Egor took tons of 3s. Half his shots came from 3. And yes, he shot an absurdly bad 27.3% from 3. But he was completely fine inside the arc.

This is a legitimately great scoring profile inside the arc. Not only was Egor doing it with over 80% of his two point scoring being un-assisted (anything over 60% un-assisted is notable to me), but he shot 55% on twos. While Egor has picked up a label as a “comp dropper”, his inside-the-arc percentages vs top 100 teams (52.5%) and top 50 teams (55.0%) were perfectly reasonable. Egor was self-creating a huge proportion of his two point makes and converted them at a fairly good rate.

Sure, the vast majority of this scoring came in the PnR with the help of a screen, 150 total 2P attempts is on the lower side, and he has less than optimal burst off the dribble. These are all important considerations, and it would be unwise to treat Egor as a future inside-the-arc scoring maestro. But the fact of the matter is that he was highly efficient without a strong assisted shooting profile, and considering his transition woes, this production almost entirely came in the half-court. There comes a point where efficient HC shotmaking on a strongly unassisted shooting profile must be respected.

And yet, despite his strong inside-the-arc efficiency… Egor shot 46.6% true shooting versus top 100 teams. This is what happens when you shoot 27% from three and those shots make up half your shooting profile. 3P bricklaying should not be excused completely, but we cannot simultaneously champion a high 3PR shot profile and demonize high 3PR shooting profiles with less success.

Egor is a great inside-the-arc scorer, and while he takes many 3s, he fails to convert them at a high rate. This should be the Egor scoring evaluation, rather than taking on overlapping metrics at face value.

Egor shot 22% from 3 and took over half his shots from three vs top 100 comp; it’s immensely obvious that his TS% and BPM were going to tank. BPM is famously prone to react strongly to small sample three point shotmaking. The high volume three point misses strongly diluted his 3P%, TS%, and BPM.

This dilution even applies to offensive rebounding, though to a lesser degree. There is a known and strongly intuitive negative relationship between offensive rebounding and 3PR. When you are hanging out on the perimeter, you will be less likely to be in the proper position to secure offensive rebounds. See: known super-athlete Anthony Edwards and his preposterously low 2% OREB.

So while it’s fair to point out Egor’s relative “softness” via OREB and FTR, it must be done with the contextualization of highly perimeter-oriented scoring style. When 63% of your halfcourt twos come from the PnR and half of your shots are threes, you are not in a position to offensively rebound, nor are you in optimal position to draw fouls. It should also be noted that 15% DREB is far more compelling.

Still, as I will note a multitude of times in this piece, Egor’s softness is concerning. His putrid offensive rebounding may be the single biggest road block to his reaching higher outcomes. 0.7% OREB vs top 100 teams is awful, and even 3PR-maxxed PGs like LaMelo and Kasparas were o-rebounding far better. Decent rebounding priors, elite size, and reasonable blocks/defensive rebounding give Egor some outs to neutralizing his functional timidness.

So will Egor’s shooting improve?

This is the million-dollar question. Sure, Egor’s high volume three point inaccuracy tanked his 3P%, BPM, and TS% to a significant extent, but my point is asymmetry: that strong three point accuracy is going to skyrocket these metrics. How likely is this?

Well, three point volume is a helluva indicator, and Egor had a massive 50 3PR. I don’t find it instructive to call Egor a non-shooter when he is legit taking half his shots from beyond the arc.

Unfortunately, the rest of his shooting indicators aren’t particularly encouraging.

Egor shot 69.5% from the line this year, which is okay. Coupling all his shooting samples together, he’s at 74% FT (260 attempts). Egor shot 27% 3P on 154 3PA at BYU. This is quite bad, but it’s notable that Egor took nearly as many C&S 3s as dribble jumper 3s, and he shot 24% on dribble jumper 3s, which are more prone to variance. This would typically be more encouraging had Egor not shot 30% on C&S 3s.

What’s more concerning is that Egor shot 31.5% 3P on 615 3PA across all samples.

This is a meaningful, multi-year sample of 3P badness. In theory, it’s more than enough attempts for Egor’s 3P% to have stabillized, which makes that 31% 3P look even more damning. If Egor shoots 31% from 3 across his NBA career, I cannot stress enough that his career will be replacement level at best.

The most intuitive refutation, however, is that 3P% cannot reasonably stabilize with a teenage sample. The sole utility of this giant sample is proving that Egor is a bad shooter right now. Shooting development is fickle and hard to understand, and some even view 3PR as the pre-emptive indicator of shooting upside. Contrary to my pre-draft estimation, Egor’s youth, size, and huge 3P tendency gives him a coinflip chance at worst to become a reasonably good shooter. This may seem low, but as I will outline later, this outcome would drastically change his NBA outlook.

The other two indicators of touch are FTs and runners. Egor’s 74% FT is uninteresting at first glance, but 74% FT in conjunction with his age/size/3PR strengthens his shooting outlook even more.

Runners were harder to come by. Egor rarely took runners (3.9% frequency), though he made them at a reasonable clip (0.83 points per shot is ~60th percentile). Prior to BYU, in 17 games with Real Madrid’s U18 team across two seasons, he made just one total runner. Egor’s runner infrequency is especially interesting for two reasons:

1. A gargantuan 44% of Egor’s scoring possessions came as PnR BH (98th percentile frequency). This playtype is especially conducive to runners (fairly intuitive).
2. BYU was one of the best teams in the country at taking (86th percentile) and making (92nd percentile) runners.

A low runner frequency is usually of slight concern for any ball-handler, but this was an offensive context plump for runner liberality. It is a serious red flag that he was unable to get to that runner, and even watching his few runners, it’s clear he’s not comfortable transitioning mid-dribble into the shot.

This lack of dynamic comfort is also seen in his lack of functional pullup two fluidity. Sure, he has a fairly fluid shot when OTD from 3. But he shot 6/22 on pullup 2s, and it’s clear that he favors pausing his dribble near the highpost and doing a turnaround into the pullup rather than fluidly pulling up.

Egor’s ineptitude in fluidly taking pullup twos with his lack of runner volume in a runner-conducive context is reasonable evidence for his touch discomfort in dynamic environments.

The last piece of data is secondary, but I’ve heard from quite a few sources that Egor shot pretty well during workouts. Again, this is anything but a dynamic ecosystem, but it’s a positive datapoint.

Overall, there’s reason to be cautiously optimistic, but there are many warts that diminish Egor’s shooting projection. It’s hard to tell how his shooting development will progress, but I am cautiously optimistic that legitimate strides will be made given his age and volume.

A Brief Note on Turnovers

This is more of a stylistic concern, but not all turnover-prone players should be billed as the same. Consider the following:

There is a clear discrepancy between the badness of Egor’s TO rate and the goodness of his A:TO. Egor was converting passes far more than he was committing TOs, while Kasparas Jakucionis had a slightly lower TO rate but far lower A:TO.

So while Kasparas, Fears, and Demin were all very turnover-prone, Demin was by far the most functionally turnover-avoidant.

We should also understand the issues with TO rate, which is estimated with the following formula:

TO%: 100 * TO / (FGA + 0.44 * FTA + TOV)

It’s basically estimating the share of a player’s scoring possessions that end in a TO.

By virtue of his three-point heavy shooting profile, Egor wasn’t getting to the line particularly much, nor was he scoring with volume inside the arc. This underestimates the value of the denominator here, as there are fewer than expected total possessions. At the same time, Egor’s relative timidness inside the arc is both a product of his pass-heavy nature and his lack of physicality and comfort getting downhill, especially without a screen. Ultimately, his shot diet likely inflated his TO rate to some degree.

While I understand the logic of the formula, Egor’s softness leaking into adjacent parts of his profile demonstrates the issue with taking metrics at face-value. We know that he rarely gets to the line, but his softness has artifically inflated his TO rate. This fits into my larger point that the downstream effects of Egor’s 3P heavy shooting profile are far-ranging and need to be more thoroughly considered.

So is it fair to call Egor “turnover-prone”? Perhaps, but the turnovers are largely a product of his super-high passing volume. His decision-making is fine, and there aren’t nearly as many head-scratching turnovers (or more generally, bad pass turnovers) in comparison to someone like his new teammate, Danny Wolf.

The number I care most about is 1.9 A:TO. As a raw ratio, A:TO is the strongest indication of scalability, and converting nearly two assists for every turnover bodes very well historically, particularly for size. The TO rate is not nearly as important. I am far more worried about Kasp or Wolf’s turnover issues, considering they convert far fewer assists per turnover.

Egor is an insane passer

This is probably the single most underrated and most publicized aspect of Egor’s game. He can really pass. The list of guys who can run PnRs and pass as proficiently as Egor historically is very, very low. The only 6’8+ player in Bart with even career 30% AST% and reasonable PnR BH scoring frequency is Scottie Barnes.

In my database of draft measurements, there has never been a prospect listed as a point guard that comes even close to Egor’s dimensions. Forget point guards, there has never been even a shooting guard that has matched Egor’s height in the history of the NBA Combine. This is the type of historical context that makes me uneasy fading Egor.

Another comparison I’ve seen is Josh Giddey. This one isn’t that bad. Let’s take some time to flesh it out.

Per RealGM, Giddey was at 36.3% AST, and Egor was at 35.3% AST. Giddey was 23.7% TO rate, and Egor was 21.9% TO rate. I’m not sure why RealGM has a lower TO rate than Barttorvik for Egor, but probably dissimilar formulas.

Giddey had a strong edge in rebounding, but Egor clears him in steals. Coincidentally, Egor (84/152, 55% 2P) and Giddey (84/165, 51% 2P) made the same number of twos in the same number of games, but Egor was more efficient.

The parallels don’t stop there. Giddey shot 29% from 3P, 69% FT, and 25.6 FTR. Egor was 27% 3P, 70% FT, and 26.8 FTR. It’s notable that Giddey had such a poor FTR considering his two-point scoring rate was far higher.

I’m not sure if the NBL is even better than the Big 12, and if so, it’s probably not worth sweating. Egor and Giddey both played ~900 minutes, so this is a fairly ethical comparison altogether (see: dunk volume).

Giddey’s rebounding is a large edge, and he was a more efficient passer. But Demin’s combination of wingspan and steal rate is a massive ceiling-raising edge, and he scores far more efficiently inside the arc with better 3PR. Demin offers a much higher ceiling, but Giddey’s floor is probably safer with his elite positional rebounding. These are at least similar caliber of prospects to me. I would prefer Demin, as Giddey’s 3PR+FTR strongly dampens his ceiling.

Giddey ranks 6th in the 2021 class in BPM at 1.3, but much of this is spurred by his career 7.5 rebounds/game. Demin doesn’t have this strength to fall back on, so he really needs to shoot to tap into his upside.

So many good names here. My absolute favorite integration is size x feel, and we approximate this with height/block/2P% to filter out the unphysical players, while A:TO / steal takes care of feel. If we raise the height filter to 6’8, we get:

Some may immediately point out BPM, but I urge them to use their brains: the box-score stats that are fed into BPM can be evaluated by our own eyes, and Demin is generally in the same ballpark as these guys. Still, Demin is the worst prospect here, given that he has by far the worst block and rebounding rates, but he grades fairly well outside of his softness.

The bottom-line is that Egor has legitimate ceiling-raising traits, which is important considering his age-adjusted production according to general impact metrics are poor on the surface.

Underrated Trait #1: Foul Avoidance

Egor’s reaction speed is pretty fire. I assume all readers are familiar with his spectacular passing, but even on defense, Egor has some impressive blocks.

This is a cool clip. Egor’s huge size forced the long initial inbounds pass, and his quick reaction speed helped him get the perimeter block. Despite not being in position to farm blocks, Egor racked up a solid 1.7% block rate.

What’s especially notable is his micro-foul rate.

As always, Egor comfortably cleared these thresholds. 1.7% block, 2.5% steal, 1.8 FC/40, and 6’9. No one has come close to Egor’s combination of stocks+foul avoidance at wing size.

This guy is 6’9 with a 6’10 WS and he can match up against guards. His stocks are solid. He’s at a very reasonable 0.3 blocks/foul. He has the height and instincts to guard up, and he did average ~ 3% BLK/20% DREB in ANGT. There’s enough evidence that if he ever gains enough mass to consistently guard NBA-caliber forwards, he could be a real demon defender. This defensive upside needs to be noted!

Even if we drop the height filter on this query, and throw on an A:TO filter to grab “guards”, it’s a fairly limited group of guys:

By integrating A:TO, steals, and foul rate, this is pretty much the ultimate “high feel” list. It’s just unfathomable that Egor is a whole 3 inches taller than the next closest player. Shai/Haliburton are two of the next three tallest players here. Funny how they find their way into a query yet again.

Remember at the beginning when I noted that “certain loci of traits are associated with differing rates of development”? I think I’ve formed an admissible case that Egor encompasses a particular loci of traits associated with strong feel, reaction time, and potentially, continued strong development.

A better way to explain this is by introducing my new evaluatory framework: outlier cognition per mass. I’ve really grown to value dudes with huge height, length, or weight that can react quickly and process the floor. I will likely write something about this in the future, but something like “cognition-mass index”. BMI, but for cognition. Unsurprisingly, Egor’s immensely feel and huge frame scores quite well within this paradigm.

Overall, beyond this philosophical commentary, my point is that Egor avoids fouls like a guard despite being wing-sized. While this indicates underrated switchable upside, I consider this more importantly a proxy for strong cognition. All signs point to Egor’s cognition-mass index being especially high. We should take note.

Underrated Trait #2: Luck-Adjusted Impact

This is short, but Egor’s offensive impact was strong despite being turnover prone with low true shooting. Here, we luck-adjust for 3P%, but 1.6% TO swing against baseline is notable. For reference, this is versus t200 opponents:

4.0 net rating against baseline is huge. Again, A-B is useful for comparing Egor versus his backups, but A – Baseline shows how much better the team was with Egor. He had a legit positive effect on offense, and if he trims the turnovers/makes 3s at a higher rate, his offensive impact will only increase.

Real On/Off and RAPM tell a similar story. It’s clear that Egor’s TO tendencies are mitigated on a team-wide level, given his strong assist volume, and he had a strong effect on an already good BYU offense.

It’s also interesting how Egor coincided with a drop in 2P rim%, even with real on-off (which adjusts for teammates), but I didn’t pick up on anything when watching. This is something to sorta keep an eye on in the league.

Overall, this is to say that Egor had an inflationary effect on BYU’s offense even with his current warts. This is a good sign indeed, as he has much room to grow as a ball-handler.

A Cause for Concern

To me, the biggest cause for concern is Egor’s athletic profile. He’s not particularly quick (11.31 lane agility + 3.33 sprint), and he is a straight up bad vertical athlete (awful 26.5 inch standing vert + 32.5 max vert). Coupled with his skinny frame, he has the quintessential bust athletic profile: the low BMI bad athlete.

The low BMI, bad athlete is a devastating, ceiling dropping archetype. See for yourself:

Egor falls comfortably within these thresholds. We can see this softness reflected in his oreb, FTR, and perhaps even in his lack of runner volume. This is concerning, and he will need significant mass gains.

Two reasons why this isn’t as much cause for concern:

1. This anthropometric sample is pretty incomplete and is skewed towards less heralded prospects. For many years prior to 2024, prospects who accrued significant draft capital did not participate in combine testing.
   • For instance, we don’t have Giddey’s testing but he’d probably be somewhere here (BMI probably hits a tad above 23 but still).
2. If Egor can accumulate minutes at the 1 or 2, his large size advantage will be more than enough to overcome BMI issues. In other words, positional size will deter disadvantages conferred by his BMI.

He’s also clearly cognizant of all this:

The Elephant in the Room: Positionality

What position does Egor play in the league?

Obviously, Egor could play as a guard. It’s probably not worth discussing too much since he primarily played the 1 at BYU. Egor would need to cut down on TOs and shoot, but it’s a fairly straightforward outcome.

I have seen concern about Egor’s guard viability, on the premise that Egor cannot get downhill without a screen. He’s definitely not the most imposing athlete, but:

1. I question the independent value of getting downhill without a screen in such a PnR centric league.
2. Damn near most of his offense either came out of the PnR or spotting up from 3. Are we sure that scoring out of PnR on a PnR-heavy team means that he is reliant on a screen? Causation seems strong.

However, Egor does not need to play the 1/2 to provide meaningful value. He could be a really good wing.

It goes without saying that Egor needs to make 3s at a far higher clip than he did this season. If Egor cannot make open C&S threes at a reasonable frequency, it is likely over. He needs legit shooting development, and we’re betting a lot on 50 3PR to clutch up as a shooting indicator.

If Egor can make 3s at a reasonable frequency, then he offers real positional versatility. The second coin toss is physicality: Egor needs to bulk up a bit and guard wings with consistency.

And, if Egor can make 3s AND guard wings, he offers basically no lineup friction. You can fit him into so many lineups.

My working theory is that cognitive load per position is rising league-wide, so having someone like Egor may end up more of a necessity in a decade. Even with the current league in mind, Egor would have a huge cognitive advantage at the 3 (the 3 probably has the lowest cognitive load by position), a large size and cognitive advantage at the 2, and an overwhelming size advantage at the 1; this would give him pretty strong staying power.

To be clear, this sort of frictionless upside would only come if he’s able to make 3s AND guard wings.

Conclusion

So, how likely is Frictionless Egor?

Based off the evidence I’ve provided, I would equate the probabilities of making 3s and guarding wings (at reasonable frequency) to ~ 60% each. So, by my shoddy odds, there’s a ~ 36% chance at this frictionless utopia, which is easy for me to swallow and rank top 20 at the absolute worst.

The odds of either 3s or guarding wings coming around is 84%, which is nice. That being said, there’s 40% chance that shooting does not come around, which would be pretty disastrous.

There’s also the point that the shooting thresholds for guards are much higher than for wings, as there is legit off-the-dribble necessity. So the odds of him playing as a guard are probably somewhere near 50%, if not closer to 36%.

Here’s the takeaway: Egor is a pretty high variance player. I’ve called other players in this class high variance but I honestly think that title should go to Egor. He could reasonably be out of the league by the end of his rookie contract. Egor needs to shoot, and he needs to shoot at high volume. And he needs to rely on skill and weight gain to overcome the poor BMI x athlete tag.

Previously, I was over-indexing on Egor’s strong downside. There are quite a few ways this could go badly. But I didn’t fully consider the uniqueness of Egor’s game. He has some (dare I say) generational strengths that I’ve demonstrated with some pretty generous Bart query thresholds. The league is built on outliers, and I do not feel comfortable ranking a fairly well-rounded freshman with huge strengths outside the top 20.

That being said, I sympathize with Nets fans and their front office, as they have invested significant draft capital into a guy who could be pretty bad. I would personally have been more risk-averse with this selection, but the upside is high enough for it to be reasonable. This is not a particularly popular take on Draft Twitter, but Egor’s positional versatility is that compelling.

Also, this is a half-serious point but if a conglomerate like Draft Twitter is so opposed to a single player/concept, then it is probably a good idea to zag a bit to account for the effects of overconfidence bias and consensus bias.

Moreover, one should be wary of a massive delta between perception and draft capital barring a catastrophic pick by “unwell”-intentioned front offices (i.e., anything the Raiders did in the last quarter century, or Nico selecting OMP). I do not believe the Nets to be in this tier of franchise ineptitude. That’s not to say that we should become mock draft warriors, but it’s a sensible sanity check for select prospects. The draft is a tad bit more of a crapshoot than we’d like to believe.

Ultimately, so many of the warts Draft Twitter has ascribed to Egor are by virtue of his 3P bricklaying. He has real red flags, and his floor is far lower than I’d usually be comfortable selecting in the top 10. But Egor is tall and smart, he can accumulate 3s and stocks without fouling, and he can efficiently self-create inside the arc. He passes like very few we’ve seen with his size. He managed to raise the offensive ceiling for a dominant BYU offense. The upside is hard to ignore with Egor, and his unorthodoxy is riveting.

He just needs to make those damn threes.

The post The Case for Egor Demin appeared first on Swish Theory.

In the previous article I wrote analyzing Tre Johnson, I alluded to the changing perspective of front offices and fans alike regarding the draft. The 2024 cycle was an emphatic indication of the sea change in teams’ approach to the event. With players from Reed Sheppard to Zach Edey being selected with high picks, it became apparent that teams were prioritizing cerebral players with analytically sound profiles over those with traits more traditionally associated with high upside.

What drove me to write about Kon was how representative his journey was of this shifting dynamic. Widely recognized as a subpar athlete by NBA standards, due to the optics of Knueppel’s game, I doubt he would have ever been considered worthy of a top-5 pick even as recently as a decade ago. However, because of his stellar efficiency and deserved reputation as an intelligent player, the Hornets’ selection of Knueppel was seen as a no-brainer.

My intent with writing this piece was to figure out one thing: has the pendulum swung too far? At what point is it acceptable to go against conventional draft logic and select a player whose deficiencies would have been considered disqualifying in previous eras? By investigating both contextual and individual statistics, in tandem with tape dating back 2 years, I found myself in firm disagreement with the direction the Hornets ultimately went in.

The Beginning

Standing slightly over 6’6 in shoes with a 6’6.25″ wingspan, Kon Knueppel may have left this draft with the highest approval rating of any non-Cooper Flagg prospect. Knueppel’s playstyle eschewed norms typically associated with star level production, he relied on technique and guile in lieu of dynamic physical traits. His fundamentally sound game, paired with an inscrutable demeanor, and an overwhelming amount of team success quickly earned Knueppel fans. And Kon would finish with one of the most impressive underclassman seasons from a perimeter player in recent memory, inserting himself into the group below along with fellow one-and-done Jase Richardson.

What makes Kon such a compelling case study isn’t just his ascension from fringe top-40 recruit at the beginning of his final AAU campaign, to top-5 draft pick 2 years later, but the rapid and tangible development he made in that span.

To gain a complete understanding of Kon’s game we must begin with his time spent on the grassroots circuit. Knueppel’s scoring and scoring efficiency have remained constants over the course of his career, having led his EYBL age group in scoring for 3 consecutive years and never once dipped under 60% True Shooting. However, outside of the high-volume flamethrowing from deep, Knueppel’s utilization at Duke held a faint resemblance to his time playing AAU.

During Kon’s time playing his AAU team, Phenom University, he served as the focal point of a motion offense. PhenomU would run concepts broadly similar to Duke, but with drastically different objectives. PhenomU frequently schemed looks for Knueppel to post-up in the middle of the floor, where his combination of size, strength, and touch were enough to overwhelm opponents at the high-school level. Actions like ‘Cross Punch’..

Outside of these schemed looks Knueppel was the frequent recipient of opportunistic buckets made possible by the Motion Offense and the miscommunication it brought about in opposing defenses.

And although these principles aren’t incompatible with quality offense at the collegiate or professional level, they did leave Knueppel unrefined in certain areas which became significantly more relevant during his time at Duke. One example would be Kon’s relative inefficiency attacking closeouts, where he was comfortable settling for short range jumpers and would seldom applied pressure on the rim.

Starting at Duke

Kon’s shift in usage once arriving at Duke was abrupt and apparent, the aforementioned post-ups and cuts were largely replaced with PNR ballhandling reps, as evinced below.

And for someone who came into the season a vocal proponent of Kon, frankly, the beginning of his Duke career was largely underwhelming. Duke almost exclusively schemed two plays for Knueppel, the first of which being ‘Zipper Stagger PNR‘, which exposed his inexperience operating out of ballscreens,

and the second play which comprised the majority of Knueppel’s organized offense was ‘Pin Ricky Flare‘, where again Knueppel struggled to generate quality looks if he wasn’t provided the requisite space to attempt a 3.

There definitely wasn’t a singular culprit behind Knueppel’s ineffectiveness as a driver, but the most obvious contributing factor was the misalignment between Duke’s offensive approach and Knueppel’s habits inside the arc. As previously mentioned, when Kon was ran off the 3-point line in highschool he expressed no urgency in getting to the rim, and was perfectly content with taking longer 2PA. Duke was the first setting where this characteristic of Knueppel’s game was met with resistance. In Jon Scheyer’s short time at the helm, an early emphasis he has made known is his desire for his teams to maintain a modern shot profile. In every subsequent year of Scheyer’s tenure, Duke has reduced their volume of midrange attempts.

The clash between the playstyle Scheyer had implemented within his team, and Knueppel’s personal style of play lead to ugly moments early on. With Knueppel’s ballhandling skills being fairly underdeveloped for his new, more perimeter oriented role, Kon attempted to rely on his physicality on create space and find finishing windows on drives. Knueppel’s forays towards the rim often lacked pace, and oftentimes Kon would over-penetrate and place himself in compromising positions inside the paint.

At roughly the halfway mark of the season, Knueppel’s statistical profile was far from the stellar marks he would finish the season with.

The Transformation

The defining change in Kon’s game this past season was undoubtedly his ability and effectiveness getting to the rim. Not only did his rim-rate increase by 8% from his final season of AAU to this past season, the complexion of these rim attempts also radically changed. Hand-tracking Knueppel’s rim-finishes reveals a player progressing from a forward to an out and out guard.

Knueppel having his playtype distribution significantly altered, while being forced to largely abandon his most reliable interior counters, AND STILL maintaining the efficiency he’d displayed at previous levels is borderline miraculous. And the catalyst for this improvement were the gains Knueppel made as a ballhandler.

While I still wouldn’t view Knueppel as an elite ballhandler by any means, the strides he made in this area, in conjunction with his physicality, made him a potent driver by season’s end.

For large swaths of the season, Knueppel’s inability to handle ball pressure or digs on his drives consistently prevented him from creating quality paint touches.

And I have a theory as to what was behind Knueppel’s leap as a ballhandler and driver. Kon seems to have married the technical gains he made, specifically developing better ball-control and an improvement altering ball-speeds, with the strong footwork foundation he already possessed from all the years spent playing out of the post. Post footwork translating to other facets of the game is an axiom espoused by coaches everywhere, and Knueppel seems to be the most recent testament to this. As the season progressed Knueppel was more capable of keeping his dribble alive inside the arc, making him a more potent scorer and playmaker.

Towards the end of the season, Knueppel started to thrive in the same actions that he’d previously been out of his depth in. Below is a succession of ‘Zipper Stagger PNR‘ plays conducted sublimely by Kon. Even when he isn’t able to finish the play with a basket it is abundantly clear the process is better.

When faced with slightly more exotic coverages Knueppel showed to be up to the task. Compare the clips compiled below, in the initial play versus Kansas. Knueppel is hedged as he runs the ballscreen and immeditely swings the ball at the first sign of ball pressure. The subsequent plays Knueppel keeps his dribble alive, turns the corner, and either draws a foul at the rim or finds an open teammate.

Knueppel’s enhanced foul-drawing compared to previous seasons was evident,

but what I found most impressive about this was how the in-season free-throw rate progression was equally significant.

What this shows is Knueppel recognized the respect he had as a shooter and parlayed the hard closeouts he was receiving into rim-attacks.

As delved further and further into Kon’s career, his self-awareness and work ethic became increasingly apparent. To acclimate this quickly when confronted with change is impressive from any player, never mind a freshman being thrust into the greatest pressure cooker program in college basketball.

A point raised by the always insightful Mike Gribanov (@mikegrib8 on X) was how notable it was for a team to achieve the level of success 2024-25 Duke did while primarily featuring underclassmen. Especially considering how veteran-laden the current college basketball landscape is, I wanted to establish a frame of reference for exactly how rare it was for a player to produce at the level Kon did this past season without the benefit of having experienced teammates. Using KenPom’s ‘Experience Rankings’, which weighs the age of their roster by minutes played, along with some other offensive efficiency and self creation metrics yielded the list below.

Unsurprisingly these thresholds produced a list of offensively slanted perimeter players, but at first glance what caught my eye was how size seemed to have a polarizing effect on this group’s NBA translation. The majority of players who returned overly positive EV from the query seemed to be clustered on the shorter end of the height distribution. However, height having a negative correlation with an all-in-one metric like Estimated Wins goes against all I know about these catch all stats, so I looked elsewhere. And what emerged as the obvious contributing factor to this relationship was the share of a player’s shots which were assisted.

Here lie my Koncerns

To see the strength of the relationship between this group of players’ NBA impact and their pre-NBA self-creation burdens I ran a simple linear regression.

While the  r² here is moderately strong, again there are only so many conclusions to be drawn from what was already a small and fairly curated sample. Where the value lies in this cursory analysis is in illuminating how misleading scoring efficiency can be. The list above is littered with players who couldn’t shoulder a higher creation burden and were too deficient in other areas to warrant serious consideration for playing time. Herein lies the challenge in projecting Kon Knueppel, will he be able to become a load-bearing player for an elite offense and/or round out his game enough defensively to avoid being placed in basketball purgatory?

The Case for Helio-Kon

A case frequently made in support of Kon’s primary upside was his potential to develop into a high volume foul-drawer. We’ve already addressed the strides he’s made in this department, so could this trend continue in the league? In short, I am skeptical Knueppel is next in line of the Morey-ball disciples. Of course the absence of dunks in Kon’s resume has been discussed ad-nauseam (this past season Knueppel actually doubled the number of dunks he’d made over the course of his entire AAU career, with 2), its how often Kon has his shot-blocked at the rim that is my greatest cause for concern. Knueppel had 7% of his FGA blocked at Duke, per Synergy, which isn’t a particularly disqualifying number on its own, but puts him in a precarious position when compared to his now peers in the NBA.

Again, this is not an exhaustive sample we’re drawing from, but there’s no recent precedent for a player with Knueppel’s lack of vertical explosion becoming a formidable rim-pressure guard. In fact I think Knueppel, and the majority of the Duke players this past season, saw their driving efficacy greatly augmented by the presence of Khaman Maluach. Individually, Duke did not roster any players known for their prowess getting downhill, and Maluach was chiefly responsible for providing rim-pressure for the team. Clips like the ones below are examples of the attention Maluach demanded on the interior. In each clipped possession there’s a freeze frame on Maluach’s defender showing the defense’s approach, they were almost never willing to send help on Knueppel’s drives should they risk giving up an easy putback or dumpoff to Maluach.

Duke lead the nation this past season in Wide Open threes, and while their connective passing and willingness to forgo good shots for great ones definitely deserves credit, the attention Maluach demanded as a roller greatly simplified reads for Duke ballhandlers.

Again my friend and tan incredible draft mind in his own right @NileHoops beat me to the presses in writing about the inflation in perception many Duke prospects were granted due to Maluach’s gravity, and I would strongly recommend reading his draft notes here on the matter: https://medium.com/@Nile/nile-presents-2025-nba-draft-master-notes-part-2-of-3-626ef75aefbb.

Knueppel’s statistical fluctuations corroborate this relationship. Per Hoop -Explorer Knueppel’s AST% and rim-rate declined substantially in minutes without Maluach versus the minutes he shared with the superstar big.

This effect reverberated throughout the Duke squad, with the team’s mid-range frequency skyrocketing while their PNR frequency plummeted. Recall earlier when Jon Scheyer’s mid-range aversion was mentioned, without Maluach on the court Duke was forced into taking shots they were explicitly advised against.

Debunking the notion that Knueppel will develop into a prolific driver and free-throw grifter at the next level doesn’t necessarily preclude offensive primacy. After all, many of the players presented early as potential analogues found their way by becoming elite pull-up shooters. Knueppel’s shooting profile definitely makes this the likeliest outcome, but there’s still evidence his stellar touch indicators may belie how long a process it will be for Knueppel to reach these heights.

While Knueppel shot 12/30 on pull-up 3s in his final year of AAU, 10 of these makes came in transition or semi-transition, where he had a cleaner platform to self-organize for these attempts.

In the half-court Knueppel’s issues regaining balance on the move and creating space in close quarters were more evident. Even at lower levels Knueppel struggled getting his shot off cleanly under duress, the aforementioned 7% blocked FGA rate at Duke was identical in AAU.

And of course this isn’t to say Knueppel will be easily neutralized as a shooter at the next level, these are somewhat granular issues I fully believe will be addressed and ameliorated in the long run. But my thinking is the tandem of weaker change-of-direction ability and a drastically slower pace (Duke was 266th in Adjusted Tempo) was behind Knueppel’s precipitous fall from a 42% (30/72) off-the-dribble 3P shooter during AAU, to only making 1/18 3PA off the bounce in college. And the acclimatization period Knueppel would need to round his shooting into form could muddle his long-term offensive projection.

The Defense

As limiting as Knueppel’s change-of-direction is offensively, I think it could be truly debilitating on defense. For as much as Duke’s offensive scheme placed Knueppel in an uncomfortable situation early, the defensive scheme greatly compensated for his flaws. Duke’s conservative switching scheme paired with their ++ positional size (1st in the country in average height and 10th in effective height) masked Knueppel’s deficiencies. The team’s penchant for dragging out possessions with their constant switching, along with the deterrence afforded by their backline size, left a minimal amount of ground for Knueppel to cover in any given possession. I think plays like the clips below are responsible for some overstating Knueppel’s defensive ability, in these possessions Kon is guarding under circumstances where Duke’s already effectively ‘won’ the possession by merit of these players either attacking Knueppel in isolation or driving into a congested paint.

The areas where Knueppel’s difficulties changing speed and direction manifested most consistently were guarding capable pull-up shooters. Knueppel’s inability to mirror these smaller players forced him to give them a cushion, without the length to compensate for the distance he provided Knueppel was prone to ceding acres of space on these attempts.

Maybe even more glaring than Knueppel’s issues guarding pull-up shooters was his total inability to navigate screens. Kon almost never remained attached when tasked with working over screens, and when a teammate wasn’t in position to immediately switch onto Knueppel’s assignment an immense pressure was placed on help defenders to correct for the breakdown. Screen navigation for Kon is another struggle which has persisted since high school.

Predictably Knueppel’s issues changing direction were reflected in his agility testing. Although Kon’s jumps impressed relative to expectations, his 3/4 court sprint and lane agility only added to what was already a bleak defensive projection.

Final Takeaways

My intention with writing this piece is not to pan the Hornets for selecting Kon, but in the wake of Summer League I think now is an appropriate time to adjust expectations before a few inconsequential games dilute any evaluation. As it stands currently, there’s an overwhelming amount of data suggesting that even projecting Kon as a neutral defender may be unrealistic. The most likely outcome seems to be that Kon will be left in limbo defensively, he’ll unable to guard backcourt players because of his poor footspeed, and with no supplementary rim-protection or rebounding skills to speak of Kon will bleed possessions as a frontcourt defender. In search of players at Kon’s size who were also lacking in athletic traits yielded a mixed bag. There’s a handful of positive defenders here, even amongst the highlighted players who hit these thresholds in their pre-draft season. But outside of Cameron Johnson and Khris Middleton, who only hit this threshold in their freshman year (and Middleton was 0.3 DRBD% away from falling out entirely), there’s no other players who would be considered top 5 in their respective draft.

The list of players with Kon’s offensive resume to justify such high draft capital is even slimmer.

While it may seem encouraging that Desmond Bane is included in this group because Kon was frequently compared to him throughout the cycle, Bane’s dunks only bottomed out when he was thrust into a primary role. Bane saw his PNR volume almost quadruple from his Junior to Senior year, and this shit in usage coincided with the lowest number of dunks in his college career.

As heavily as I rely on these statistical queries to inform my opinion, I think its necessary to include all players’ seasons as a reminder of the developmental dichotomy. It seems as often as players undergo these outlier developmental arcs there are as many, if not more, players whose weaknesses crystallize much quicker than we’re willing to acknowledge. In Kon’s case, there’s little reason to believe an athletic transformation is on the horizon. And if he’s going to be a defender who needs specific lineup configurations to stay on the floor will his offense warrant those accommodations? The in-season improvement previously outlined gives me more confidence in Kon eventually ‘guard-ifying’ his shot profile and becoming a more capable creator off the bounce. But the idea that the self-sustainability of Kon’s offense can be reasonably doubted is enough to preclude from being a top 5 pick.

The post Summer League Primer: A Comprehensive Kon Knueppel Scouting Report appeared first on Swish Theory.

That’s what this annual column is for (see 2022, 2023 and 2024 versions): How did I evaluate this NBA draft cycle, how does it compare to years’ past and how will I adjust for 2025-26? Where does my process fit into the greater universe of basketball understanding, and how can it get better? These are questions I believe more should ask.

I published the below graphic at the end of my last piece with The Stepien before it shut down. It is easy to get bogged down with the evaluatory framework I outline on the far right. You read consensus views from major outlets, then either take them at face value or come up with a shortcut reason why this is not the case. Many use the middle approach, relative scouting, ordering by category / archetype (i.e. primaries first) and then comparing within that group. I have aimed for something I like to call absolute scouting, that is, looking at a player’s current ability while assessing with an eye to what they may become. This process can be amplified by the other two, but is ultimately the “truest” evaluatory framework, giving the player himself center stage.

But even within absolute scouting there are endless approaches. This column tracks the evolution of my evaluatory framework to better project NBA careers at the time of the draft.

Forbidden Knowledge

My thesis last year went something like this: if a player is productive on the court, making things happen almost by accident, exhibits high feel, and also demonstrates a high level of athleticism, that is the type of prospect I would want to invest in. The draft is about chasing outliers, and outliers tend to show themselves in those three arenas.

This strategy led to some major out-of-consensus calls. The highest profile call was placing Zach Edey #1 atop my 2025 NBA draft board. Edey was productive in a way I expected to translate at the next level, particularly his rim volume, offensive rebounding and screen-setting. He has made significant improvements to both his feel and athleticism over his college career, items you could notice even evolving over the course of his rookie season, and despite a nagging foot injury. Finding a way to be useful for an above-average Grizzlies team while drastically shifting from his college role, I still have high hopes for the big.

I also had Jonathan Mogbo as a clear-cut lottery talent, finishing as my #5 prospect, then drafted by the Toronto Raptors to kick off the second round. Mogbo finished #18 in the class in minutes played, able to get rotation and occasional starter playing time. While only 22nd in the class in points scored, Mogbo is #8 in the class in rebounds, #7 in assists, #5 in steals and #12 in blocks after his rookie season. While still a bad player overall – he was one of the worst finishers in the league, exchanging his lob finishes in college for off-the-dribble lays too far from the hoop – Mogbo has quickly proven he can do as many non-scoring things on the court as anyone in the class. In some ways, he’s adapted from mid major to NBA competition better than I expected. I’d still bet on him, particularly given his immediately above-average defense and the weakness of the 2025 class otherwise. Should the passing continue to click and his teammates become more comfortable finding him on lobs, the path to offensive value is there. He came out of the gate as one of the NBA’s most bothersome defenders.

My other two big swings near the top were Oso Ighodaro and Terrence Shannon Jr. as late lottery bets, consistent rotation players. While minutes for both were up and down, both showed enough for me to remain encouraged.

The Ten Dimensions

This year, however, I wanted to become more literal in assessing player value. This led me to inspecting the game by “dimensions of impact,” where I categorize each type of contribution into ten groupings. I based these on how one interacts with the ball and court in literal manners, inspecting each realm in close detail, creating clear as possible delineations among categories.

The ten categories within three skill groupings:

• On-Ball Interactions: Three point shooting, midrange shooting, rim finishing, handle, passing
• Off-Ball Interactions: Grabbing/deflecting the ball, ground coverage, positioning
• Physical Force: Pace-force, strength-force

However, no two traits have the same impact of the game; I would have to weight each area of impact. I constructed these weights and inputted values for each player on my board with endless tinkering, informed by tape watch, statistical assessment, philosophical inquiries into how the game is won. The heaviest weights went to three point shooting and positioning, two areas of impact I only added more and more weight to as I back-tested to current and historical NBA players.

But this has limits, too. Namely, skills on the court interact with each other in varied and unusual ways. Even though both combinations provide additional value, a player’s ability to finish at the rim is more advantageous when mixed with a strong handle than if it were mixed with great rebounding. While rim touch + rebounding equals putback potential, handle + rim touch means an extremely deadly drive threat. A team is able to scale that up and gain secondary benefits off of that more than the other combo. There are synergies and frictions across skillsets that make performance better or worse. You can’t just add up skills.

How Good Are You?

My solution? To throw away the ladder, yet again, to construct a new one. Having advanced my ability to inspect skillsets by interaction type, how each player impacts the game became much clearer. But basketball evaluation is even more mystical than that, especially in the absence of a well-constructed statistical model.

So, my answer was simple: ask myself, “how good is this player, on offense and defense?”

I decided to use Estimated Plus-Minus projection as my peg, not taken too literally but a useful impact curve where one can ascertain, as long as with context on role, a rough approximation of how good a player is. Not perfect, but more dynamic than skillset grading.

I’ve said it before, but draft projection is primarily an exercise in imagination. Even if I graded each player’s current skillset perfectly, there are more complex interactions between qualities shown today as it relates to future skill development. For example, a high feel, coordinated player may be more likely to develop a shot than one who doesn’t have those underlying foundations.

It is also extremely difficult to anticipate where development may arise, to the point of it being easier to rather say, here are the way this player might improve, and here are the odds of each happening. I back into this assessment by projecting into multiple scenarios: the future has not been set.

A New Dynamic

My philosophy has generally been extremely pro-risk, for two simple salary arbitrages, in addition to the fact that I can’t get fired: 1.) a team gets its most value out of paying only a max contract amount to a player worth far more, and 2.) if a player doesn’t work out, his minutes go to zero, limiting the downside impact. These are two HUGE incentives, as it is very difficult to compete if you aren’t getting plus-max value out of one player, making even multiple busts less damaging.

However, my strategy did evolve somewhat towards the end of this cycle. I changed my board to become dynamic, first ranking the top of my board by 80th percentile outcomes only – still keeping it high risk for the players whose talent makes it worthwhile. Then, towards the end of the lotto, the assessment becomes 50/50 between a player’s 80th percentile outcome and 50th percentile outcome. By pick 30, my calculation will only be considering median outcome, omitting the ceiling factor at all.

I made this change for an obvious reason I had been ignoring: it is simply impossible to develop an entire roster of projects at the same time. If a player isn’t deemed as high ceiling, he simply will not get the developmental reps to push through to those higher percentile outcomes. In this way, it is more worthwhile to take the bird-in-hand once you get past the obvious star bets. My changed formula accounts for this.

In addition, I should not be ranking my board, as an outsider not working for a team, based on salary arbitrage opportunities, rather than by how I expect the long-term results to shake out.

The Winners and Losers

My outlier calls this year included four bigs or big wings with shooting questions: South Carolina’s Collin Murray-Boyles, Georgetown’s Thomas Sorber, Creighton’s Ryan Kalkbrenner and Arkansas’ Adou Thiero. They went #9 to Toronto, #15 to Oklahoma City, #34 to Charlotte and #36 to Los Angeles Lakers, respectively, but I would have taken all four much higher.

Collin Murray-Boyles is perhaps my boldest take, finishing #2 on my Big Board. “CMB” is a tank at Draymond Green dimensions, and has shown a non-shooting skillset, defensive acumen and physicality that indeed do remind one of the Hall of Famer. Draymond is one-of-one as a processor, but Murray-Boyles has lightning quick reaction time and excellent understanding of the floor, too. He does not have the vertical pop of Charles Barkley, but CMB does mimic him in carving out space around the basket, constantly. The most important commonality is the physicality and processing speed, and CMB is far ahead of his age for both.

For a glimpse into the degree of impact CMB had on South Carolina’s woeful squad, I calculated the number of points at the rim SC would score or allow when Murray-Boyles was on or off. South Carolina scored THIRTEEN more points at the rim when he was on than off, and allowed SEVEN fewer points at the rim in the same scenarios. That offensive figure is more than double the second most among his 2025 comps, and defensive figure third to stalwarts Thomas Sorber and Amari Williams.

CMB has perhaps the best hands in the class, and they synergize nicely with not just his defensive but also his offensive game. Murray-Boyles learned how to better manipulate the ball when driving to the basket over the season, using his intelligence for when to attack to find seams just large enough to let his stellar touch take over. CMB was in the 85th percentile for layup efficiency, and top ten in the country in rim finishing among anyone with 150+ makes. Only Derik Queen was close among underclassmen, and CMB is six months younger despite being the higher grade.

Murray-Boyles is able to conduct traffic, palming the ball in the high post, one spin away from the hoop. He will operate more out of the short roll in the NBA, and thankfully with better shooters (even with the Raptors’ subpar personnel, they exceed his 31.6% three-point shooting college team). He is better than a connective passer, able to hit small windows and create advantages with his sense of timing, leading his teammate into space.

CMB provides rim protection, elite rebounding, on-ball disruption (he is particularly strong blitzing and recovering) and leads the defense when guarding away from the ball. He is the best defensive prospect in a class full of very strong bets in Cooper Flagg, Thomas Sorber, Noah Penda, or perhaps second to Joan Beringer. He does that while being one of the best driving big men in the country, putting up a very strong 0.92ppp on over 100 drives. He thrived out of isos as the season went on, scoring nearly five points per game out of the play type over South Carolina’s final six games. Check out the versatility in the clips below.

It is rare to find obvious defensive disruptors of this level who also have this kind of offensive potential. He almost certainly won’t be a very useful three point shooter, but he has nearly everything else (I’m even hopeful about the midrange).

On the downside, I thought players like Ace Bailey, Egor Demin, Nolan Traore, Hansen Yang and Will Riley went over-drafted. A common theme for these players is being young and high-risk while needing a good amount of touches to approach their ceiling. With my new system, their upside outcomes do not quite drag them up the list high enough to use the 80th percentile calculation, rather being graded on their less thrilling median outcomes.

Four of the five are skinny for NBA players at their heights, with the exception of the slow-footed Hansen Yang. Returning again to our synergies, a weaker frame mixes extremely poorly with on-ball potential, unless you’re a Haliburton-esque conductor, or Shai-esque scorer, both nearly perfect at capitalizing on space creation specificity. This does not mean the path is closed – I’m especially still high on Ace Bailey as a late lottery option – but not the bets I would make with the group compared to where they were drafted unless you can spot the magic. All five have magical moments, no doubt, but lack consistency and are likely to face struggles as they adjust to NBA physicality.

CMB is, on the other hand, extremely difficult to tilt off his spot, making those on-ball reps more consistent and allowing him to explore the studio space in a safer manner. I was also high on Javon Small, Max Shulga and Joan Beringer, all with BMIs higher than all but Yang from the group of players I was lower on. Small’s physicality allows him to drive and dunk through traffic, set up offense without being knocked off his spot. Shulga is broad-shouldered, allowing him to wall off drives and switch up. Joan Beringer, despite being one of the youngest in the class, has been able to bulk up some, on his way to becoming one of the NBA’s best rim protectors. If I have one regret so early, it would be not ranking Beringer in my top ten. The defensive instincts and physical tools give him an extremely lofty ceiling, even with mediocre offense, and he already seems good enough to say his defensive floor is safe, too.

An Eye to 2026

2025 was a fantastic class to evaluate, extremely deep in starter bets. I ended up ranking Jase Richardson around 20, and even so would not be surprised at all if he carved out a starter spot, overcoming his 178-pound frame by being so effective and technical playing off the ball. He was a painful player to rank even that low, given how high his feel for the game is and proven technique, though I remain concerned about his lack of a right and limited defensive ceiling.

2026 promises to be thrilling at the top, as Cameron Boozer, Darryn Peterson and AJ Dybantsa all vie for the top spot. My early leanings rank them in that order, with Boozer vs. Darryn vs. Flagg being very tough to discern.

My biggest adjustment will be getting more accustomed to projecting peak impact, but I want to tweak my ratings system to become even more risk-averse as you go down. I will do so by implementing a 20th percentile outcome which becomes the ranking priority starting at pick 30. With each round of new tape or statistical analysis, making those projections gets a little easier.

As usual, I expect that evaluation criteria to evolve over time.

The post Lessons from the 2025 NBA Draft Cycle appeared first on Swish Theory.

The larger lesson I’ve come away with from this Finals isn’t a novel insight by any means; it was an emphatic reinforcement of what makes exercises like rankings (which I admittedly find great joy in) a futile exercise. In the modern NBA, fit is everything, a fairly banal observation, I know, but in an era where punitive salary cap clauses place a premium on continuity, differentiating between players who can or cannot augment in-house personnel is paramount. Currently, the NBA is approaching a saturation point of talent, where there truly aren’t many players incapable of contributing in any setting. And as the skill level reaches a crescendo, drowning out the noise and identifying the players tailor-made for your current setting is key. And in this class, I’m not sure if there is a player more representative of this idea than Tre Johnson.

In the 2025 draft class, there may not be a more known commodity than Tre Johnson. In 2022 Johnson debuted at 3rd overall in 247’s initial rankings for the 2024 High School class and never dropped below 6th for 247. In RSCI (Recruiting Services Consensus Index), Johnson finished 5th overall. As stat tracking in the amateur hoops space has become more prevalent over the past few years, players are entering college with increasingly robust statistical profiles. This, paired with more accessible game film, makes this current crop of one-and-done prospects maybe the most thoroughly scouted group of players to enter the NBA. Take the evaluation of Tre Johnson below, from 247’s Adam Finklestein.

Written over eighteen months ago, if you were to remove the date, this scouting report could easily be mistaken for a write-up on Tre’s game from his lone season at Texas. If you were to analyze Tre’s game on a more micro-level, Finkelstein’s analysis could be used as support for the validity of ‘prospect determinism’, an idea dictating that players, even as early as high school, are more fully formed than we are willing to acknowledge. Coming into the season, I had made two fairly innocuous posts observing a perceived weakness (Half-Court finishing), and strength (Isolation scoring) in Johnson’s game.

Lo and behold, Johnson remained a subpar finisher in the half-court (46.5% with a 17% rim-frequency) and saw no issues translating as an Isolation scorer. Per Synergy, Johnson was 11th in the country in ISO PPP (.827) of anyone with 100 or more possessions, and the second most efficient freshman of anyone with this high of volume in the past decade (trailing only Dennis Smith Jr). Even with his ineffectiveness at the rim, Johnson’s individual scoring prowess put him in rare air amongst freshmen to have entered the league.

Keep in mind the query above was not conducted on a pool of only drafted players, but on every season of every player to enter the league since 2010. 12 of the 14 players in the query were, or are projected to be, top 10 picks, all were high pedigree prospects. However, even with Johnson’s impeccable resume as a scorer, plenty of evidence calls his lofty draft status into question. The issue of Tre Johnson’s defense is well known by now, and it has been widely recognized as an acceptable risk to take considering the caliber of offensive player Johnson profiles to be. Defenses lapses shown below have been met with a degree of hand-waving.

Texas made it a point to keep Johnson from the action defensively, typically assigning him to smaller, lower usage, perimeter players to suppress his fouling and keep him on the floor. And for as frequently as Johnson’s impressive anthropometric profile is cited as a reason for optimism in his defensive projection long-term, I was only slightly less underwhelmed by his individual defense when he was involved in possessions.

A fundamental belief of mine is that players’ offensive and defensive profiles shouldn’t be assessed independently; often, issues that manifest on one end are related to a player’s behavior on the other. In Tre Johnson’s case, the absence of rim pressure and defensive activity amount to one of the worst cases of applied physicality we’ve seen from any well-regarded prospect in recent memory. In the query below I included all players which met these thresholds in any of their college seasons, no matter the minutes share they played, and included the 14 with the most accumulated ‘Estimated Wins’ to this point of their career (disclaimer these numbers are from roughly the midpoint on the 2024-25 season so may not be exact for active players). The average Estimated Win Total for Top 10 picks since 2008 is 32.4; this group comes in well short of this mark at an average of 18.6 Total Win Shares.

Adjusting parameters in the query in order to cast a wider net and to explicitly search for players whose defensive struggles can’t be attributed to size alone, yielded an even more concerning list. On the left are players within the query with the highest Estimated Win Total. Understanding that a cumulative metric like Estimated Wins could potentially omit recent success cases, on the right are all the players within the query who have been drafted within the past 5 years. The players highlighted below are those who met the query in their pre-NBA season. Virtually all of the players who were selected with high picks, like Tre, were underclassmen whose physical limitations were dismissed as a byproduct of age. And while it’s early enough for these players to shift the perception of their careers, I believe it’s fair to say they have not yet returned value to their drafting team commensurate with the draft capital spent on them.

So, with evidence mounting indicating that, in all likelihood, Tre will be facing an uphill battle on the road to justifying a top 10 pick, what reason is there for optimism? What context would be most amenable to Tre’s skillset, and under what circumstances could a team transform Tre Johnson into an indispensable building block of their roster despite all the evidence to the contrary?

The Two Houstons

The seeds of this piece were planted the weekend of April 4th, after possibly the best stretch of basketball (or at least my personal favorite) so far this year. On that Friday, the recently crowned champion Oklahoma City Thunder were defeated by the Houston Rockets 125-111, and on the next day, a star-studded Duke squad was toppled in a shocking upset by the Houston Cougars 70-67. Both Houston squads came into their respective contests heavily doubted; the Cougars were 5-point underdogs while the Rockets’ spread was set at +6.5 points.

In the Rockets’ case, their victory has probably already been lost to time as an April regular-season win, even over the eventual champions, hardly qualifies as more than a footnote of the NBA season. But the narrative surrounding the Houston Cougars I found much more interesting and in a way was the true catalyst for this piece. For as much respect as I have for the Houston Cougars basketball program I, like many others, was confused as to how a team with no highly regarded NBA talent could have bested a team with three players who could very well be drafted inside of the top 10. Most (well-adjusted) people probably attributed Duke’s late-game collapse to their lack of experience. Per KenPom, Duke was 268th in minutes continuity this season. After a few early-season struggles versus staunch competition, Duke had laid waste to practically every opponent before Houston and as a result they just didn’t have the calluses which can only be formed in tightly contested matchups. This rationale, although flawed, probably does apply, but it still left me searching for a more definitive answer. How were two ostensibly overmatched teams able to overcome a perceived gap in talent and beat two championship-caliber squads? My attempt to find a satisfactory answer to this question has probably transformed the way I think about the game more than any previous exercise.

Anyone lucky enough to watch both games probably recognized the parallels between the two winning teams. Both squads weaponized their physicality via their relentless defense and commitment to the offensive glass to carve out extra possessions.

However, the similarities between these two squads are not confined to their defense and presence on the offensive glass. Further examination shows two almost mirrored stylistic profiles.

The players of both teams also had their individual stat profile curated similarly, with their teams opting for a more egalitarian approach offensively as shown by the tight usage spread between their players.

Even though the significance of these parallels may not be clear at the moment, I believe that because of the Houston Rockets current roster construction, they have positioned themselves to benefit from a market inefficiency which has been exploited by the Houston Cougars for years. And the environment they are cultivating is the exact context where a player like Tre Johnson could be optimized.

The Blueprint

Before delving into the specifics of the relationship between Tre Johnson’s skillset and each of the Houston based teams, I think it is necessary to discuss how the Houston Cougars became such a resounding success, what elements of the Cougars program they should look to replicate, and why the Rockets should consider the Cougar model a roadmap for their own success.

The success Houston has experienced under Kelvin Sampson has been nothing short of unprecedented. Prior to Sampson taking the reins at the onset of the 2014-15 season, the Cougars had been to the NCAA tournament three times in 25 years and were unable to win a tournament game in any of their appearances. When Sampson arrived in Houston, the program was entering its first season in the American Athletic Conference, a league composed of an eclectic group of Conference USA castoffs and Big East schools taking temporary shelter within the conference. Amid the chaos of the ad-hoc league, the Cougars quickly established themselves at the top of the food chain and never looked back.

What is most interesting about Houston’s meteoric rise into the upper echelon of college basketball, is how they managed to attain and sustain their success. Simply put, Houston may be the greatest endorsement for the importance of establishing an identity in basketball, and a cursory glance at their statistical profile would confirm as much.

As we’d mentioned at the onset of the section, Houston’s elite offensive rebounding is no surprise and a consistently low TO% is a staple of any high-performing offense. The success in these two categories making for quality offense shouldn’t come as any surprise. After all, these are pillars of Dean Oliver’s 4 Factors of Basketball Success. BUT what is especially interesting to me is how poorly the Cougars fare in Oliver’s other 2 Factors, Free Throw Rate and Shooting. For being a consistently elite offense for nearly a decade, the Cougars have been comparatively underwhelming with regards to their scoring efficiency. To establish a frame of reference for exactly how rare this confluence of factors was, I conducted a quick query of exactly how often good offenses played this slow with a shot profile as inconducive to success as the Cougars seemingly were.

Since 2008, 53 teams met the query above, with only the 9 pictured meeting these thresholds more than once. The Houston Cougars attained these marks 6 (!!) times. So, how does a team whose offense frequently unfold like the clip below, where the paint isn’t touched ONCE throughout the entire possession, consistently perform to the level Houston does?

What Houston has done to find success at the highest level is implicitly acknowledge the limitations their overwhelming strengths (offensive rebounding) impose on their offense, and they’ve addressed these limitations by strictly and increasingly adhering to the ‘Hands and Gloves’ philosophy.

Houston’s Hands and Gloves

Hands and Gloves is a term coined by the always insightful @nilehoops to describe the symbiotic relationship between players whose skillsets are more based in their physical advantages and players whose strengths are typically utilized in more offensively demanding roles. At the risk of further butchering the definition, here is the quote from Nile’s article articulating the concept.

In the case of the Houston Cougars, they take this concept to the extreme. Despite often ranking in the bottom half of the country in 3PA rate, the Cougars have rostered a bevy of high-volume long-range gunners. Many of which were analytical darlings despite their paltry efficiency scoring inside the arc.

Now the picture is starting to become clearer: in the Cougars’ case, their commitment to maintaining a standard of physicality and rebounding efficacy on the court at all times reduced the potency of their downhill scoring. I agree wholeheartedly with their (assumed) assertion and think the opportunity cost of drives is significantly underdiscussed in the sport. For a team like Houston, where possessions are in short supply, they can ill-afford to risk accumulating turnovers on meandering drives into a congested paint. In addition to the rim aversion present in the majority of guards’ profiles, the lack of playmaking also stands out. Despite almost all the players above being smaller guards (Quentin Grimes and Jherrod Stiggers being the tallest at 6’5), there isn’t a single player with a positive AST%:USG% ratio, again emphasizing how narrowly defined their roles are. The responsibility of ameliorating spacing issues and maintaining the turnover margin falls squarely on these players’ shoulders, with little else outside of this being asked for them offensively. What makes the players pictured above especially unique in the ‘Hands and Gloves’ framework is not just the duty they are tasked with, but the degree of difficulty under which they are asked to execute.

After taking note of these trends within Houston’s teambuilding, I wanted to see if the relationship between a team’s environmental factors was more universal. Specifically, I wanted to see if teams lacking in schemed advantages (as represented by AST%) and multiple spacing options (3Pr) were more prone to placing a heavy burden on the shotmaking talent they did have on their roster. The query below is what I’ve termed a ‘Scoring Stress Test’.

As Mr. Oliver’s 4 Factors would dictate, what these teams sacrificed in their shot quality, they were forced to compensate for in other areas, specifically the TO Margin and Offensive Rebounding. The theory I had posited earlier also seems to be confirmed to an extent, as this query houses some of the best off-the-dribble shotmaking talent of the Bart Torvik era. Below are each team’s leaders in shot attempts for the season in the previous query. Each player is one of the more prolific shotmakers in the country in their respective season, and I do not think it’s coincidental that the two largest players have seen their shotmaking ability translate seamlessly to the NBA.

Now that we’ve established the necessity of high-volume pull-up shooters to teams who find success without traditional markers of an efficient offense, it’s time to discuss this idea’s implications for the Houston Rockets.

Houston Rockets: Closing the Gap

At the time of writing this, the Houston Rockets have just completed a trade for Kevin Durant, sending the Phoenix Suns Jalen Green and the 10th pick in this year’s draft. This trade has been universally praised and for good reason. Kevin Durant is still one of the most efficient scorers in the world, and while Jalen Green is still a promising young player, the value and fit were too good to turn down. With the transaction, the Rockets stand to make a leap not only because of who was traded, but the kind of players that were involved in the deal.

Circling back to the similarities present in each of the Houston teams’ statistical profiles, I want to focus specifically on the sections outlined below.

It is my belief that by trading Jalen Green and acquiring Kevin Durant, the Rockets will make a major competitive leap due to their improvement in these 4 statistical categories. More specifically, the improvement in these statistics will result in the Rockets’ profile bearing an even closer resemblance to the 2024-25 Houston Cougars.

Along with their suffocating defense, the defining trait of the Houston Cougars may be their pace. Consistently ranking near the bottom of the nation, the Cougars would not be able to control the pace to the degree they do without the interplay between their offensive and defensive philosophies. In studies on whether offense or defense has more influence on a team’s style of play, the overwhelming conclusion reached has been that offense has a greater impact on the pace of play. The most evident way Houston goes about suppressing pace is through their offensive rebounding. The two frames below are a perfect contrast in the effect offensive rebounding has on pace and may shed some light on the resurgence of double big lineups.

In both frames, we have the Alabama Crimson Tide, #1 in the country in Adjusted Tempo and the antithesis of Houston’s playstyle. In the first frame, the Crimson Tide are playing Illinois, a similarly modern team that deploys multiple floor spacers along with a stretch big. Illinois runs a ‘Middle PNR’ in 5-out spacing with the ballhandler being Kylan Boswell, who historically speaking, is an extremely ineffective downhill driver. As soon as Boswell steps inside the free-throw line…

…the possession is over. Zero pressure has been placed on the fairly diminutive Bama backcourt to contribute on the glass and they are granted a free release into transition, which culminates in Labaron Philon Free Throws.

Compare this to Houston’s matchup with Alabama earlier in the season, where they are running a similar ballscreen action for an equally limited driver in Emanuel Sharp. Because of their physical frontcourt personnel, Alabama is forced to commit their entire lineup to crashing the glass.

The threat Houston presents on the offensive glass flips the dynamic Alabama saw in the Illinois game. Now, HOUSTON is able to set up their halfcourt defense unencumbered. This forces Alabama to play off kilter and Mark Sears logs a turnover.

Offensive rebounding’s effect on transition play is a fairly well-known concept, and this is an element the Houston Rockets have in spades. The difference in these teams’ ability to establish a pace of play actually lies in their shot profile.

Previously, I’d mentioned the tradeoff the Cougars willingly made between their rim pressure, as represented by their free throw rate and 2P%, and their offensive rebounding and turnover economy. However, there is another, subtler, edge the Cougars gain from removing ‘no-hope’ drives, as you saw from Kylan Boswell in the first clip. By playing a more static style and concentrating on off-the-dribble jumpers and post-ups, the Cougars seldom have their shot blocked. This style of play also rarely puts the defense into rotation, resulting in few drive and kick opportunities and leading to their low C&S (Catch-and-Shoot) frequency over the years. The lack of ‘easy’ jump shots places an acute pressure on their perimeter players to be multifaceted shooters, hence the disproportionate number of off-the-bounce shotmakers on the Kelvin Sampson Cougars.

The relevance of the ‘Average Defensive Poss. Length Percentile’ column in the graphic above is intertwined with the Cougars’ seemingly suboptimal shot diet. In the Cougars’ preferred game state, the margin for error is very thin; along with the turnover variance that comes with drives, blocked shots are a massive variable that cannot be accepted given the constraints of their deliberate style. The devastating effect blocked shots can have on your defense isn’t a phenomenon only present in the NCAA, as Owen Phillips of the F5 pointed out earlier this year. In the past NBA regular season, only Live Ball Turnovers were more detrimental to defenses.

Ultimately, the foundation for the Rockets should be their offensive rebounding and their defense. But because of their proclivity for low-quality rim attempts, there was no top defense more consistently put in disadvantageous situations than Houston.

For context, the r² between Defensive Possession Length and Defensive Rating is -0.47, which by basketball standards is a fairly strong correlation, and the relationship between the two variables is equally intuitive. The more often a defense can prevent early advantages, the lower the offense’s shot quality should be. This is a large part of why we saw higher and higher pick-up points in the NBA this past season and an increased emphasis on turnover generation. The days of thinking of offense and defense discretely are long gone, and the fact that the Rockets mustered a top-5 defense IN SPITE OF their offense actively sabotaging them is highly impressive. And although this was probably not the impetus of the trade, the Rockets may have removed the greatest inhibiting factor to their defense, challenging the Thunder for top unit in the league.

For all the potential Jalen Green has shown as a dynamic and versatile scorer, his personal scoring hierarchy was incompatible with the shape this Rockets roster was taking. Although a score-first guard certainly CAN thrive in the Rockets’ system, it would have to be similar to how the Houston Cougars’ backcourt options have found success: erasing turnovers and relying on prolific pull-up shooting. So far in his career, though, Green has not shown any significant growth in his ability to take care of the ball, as evidenced by his playmaking profile from Databallr.

In Lehman’s terms, Green’s ineffectiveness as a volume scorer has not been offset by sound decision-making as a passer. On top of this, since entering the league Green has finished 1st, 1st, and 4th in Blocked FGAs at the rim. Again, this is in no way an indictment on Jalen Green’s future, but in the interest of maximizing fit for both team AND player, this separation is certainly best for both parties.

Finding the Fit for Tre Johnson

First, for any readers wondering where the previously advertised scouting report is, I’d like to formally apologize for the digression. What first drew me to the idea of writing about Tre through this lens was how specific and pronounced his gifts are. Of course, the shooting is the main draw. I have repeatedly and emphatically stated Tre’s lone season at Texas very well could be the best shooting season from a freshman in the past 15 years. But history would dictate that no prospect with Tre’s negative intersection of applied physicality and defensive instincts could possibly return top-5 pick value. So what is the sell? In short, I believe Tre Johnson could be the ultimate ‘Glove’, and by selecting Johnson a team could take their first step in recreating the revolutionary blueprint laid out by Kelvin Sampson and the Houston Cougars.

The case for Tre Johnson being drafted inside the top 10 is two-pronged. Naturally, it all begins with the shooting, as anyone reading this probably noticed, the archetype most frequently grouped with Johnson in the piece’s initial queries was movement shooter. In an attempt to gauge exactly how much margin for error Johnson’s pairing of feel and touch would give him I conducted the query below, with Ben Taylor’s ‘Offensive Load’ stat used to paint a more complete picture of players’ offensive burden.

Again, Johnson’s profile compares favorably to elite shooters of past drafts, but in Johnson’s case, there’s reason to believe there’s a reservoir of untapped potential compared to past players in a similar mold. Comparing Johnson’s three-point rate and volume to the other players above with the lowest 3Pr in their pre-draft year, Luke Kennard and Tyler Herro, shows the potential trajectory Johnson’s shot distribution could take in the league.

Like Johnson, Kennard and Herro’s college teams struggled to scheme easy opportunities for players. Kennard’s Duke squad was 280th in Assist%, and Herro’s Kentucky team were 194th. When Johnson is dropped into a roster with more connective playmaking talent, he should easily be able to convert some of his contested mid-range attempts into threes.

The Nembhard Corollary

In my opinion there hasn’t been a more fascinating player in the past 5 draft classes than Andrew Nembhard. Nembhard was undoubtedly an elite college point guard, but as a prospect, his statistical profile was fairly non-descript. And compared to other players who are inevitably mentioned as testaments to 2nd round value, its difficult to find the evidence Nembhard was capable of producing to the level he has in the league. What I eventually decided was that the basis of Nembhard’s unexpected success is his exceptional positional size, and in Tre’s case, I believe the same principle applies. When compared to the players in the previous query, Tre ranks first in every measurement and athletic test despite being the youngest of the group.

This should be the foundation of any optimist’s case for Tre Johnson. A suboptimal Texas context, with no significant passing talent to speak of, masked Johnson’s true shooting potential. And when Tre is surrounded by more cerebral, defensively minded, glass-cleaning frontcourt players who can assume some facilitating responsibilities, his potential will be fully actualized.

Currently there’s plenty of evidence that Tre could quickly become a context-changing shooter. Dating back to 2022, Tre has shot 51.8% (29/56) on 3PA coming off screens. Even though Tre is not the most well-rounded athlete, movement shooting is where his athleticism is most functional, and because of the degree of difficulty in his attempts it’s easy to see him placing immense pressure on the defense in this way.

As the season progressed and Johnson became the focal point of opposing defenses (to an absurd degree at times), a common counter was to utilize Johnson as a screener. This is one of my favorite schematic wrinkles, especially in a context where Tre is sharing the court with other non-spacers, utilizing his scoring gravity to trigger mismatches for interior-based scorers should prove effective.

Reorienting Tre’s usage to more of a movement shooter will require more ‘0.5’ decision making, which Tre doesn’t have much experience with at the time. Johnson is much more of a reactive decision maker. Although these aren’t especially challenging reads, I expect this to be a focus early on.

As his processing becomes better aligned with this usage, it will be key for Tre to trim fat from his shot diet as well. Even giving him the benefit of the doubt when accounting for Texas’ personnel, to maximize his potency as a shooter, Tre will need to take these spot-ups instinctively.

In the end, these are quirks in Tre’s game which I anticipate will be ironed out in short order. There’s no real precedent for this precocious a shooting talent failing to translate as a scorer, and frankly, I do not think the shooting on its own is Tre’s ‘superpower’ as a prospect. In my opinion Tre’s penchant for taking care of the ball at such a high usage is truly special amongst scoring prospects.

Above is another ‘Stress Test’ query, but on a player level. On the surface these players do not seem to have much in common, and I’d understand someone’s skepticism in seeing a group featuring one player who is currently playing in China (Tremont Waters) and another who has been above league average TS% 3 times over the course of a 14 year career (Alec Burks) and any desirable company for a prospect. I would argue that this group has the distinction of some of the most resilient scorers in the Bart Torvik era. All of these players demonstrated an ability to manufacture offense independent of their context, and for the players who failed to find NBA success there were typically extenuating circumstances at play. In Tremont Waters’ case his height and inability to shoot early on prevented him from sticking in the league, but even this past season he spearheaded the #1 offense in China. Alec Burks is a more nuanced case, in my opinion Burks came into the league just a few years too late for his game to translate. As downhill guard without exceptional vertical athleticism or the perimeter shooting to keep him afloat, Burks struggled mightily acclimating to the popularization of 3-point shooting that swept the league.

While I don’t foresee Tre experiencing an outlier developmental arc like Donovan Mitchell or SGA due to the previously alluded to physical deficiencies, I am bullish he will become one of the more successful alums on this list for two reasons. First of all, Tre did not have the benefit of being part of a high-level offensive rebounding team, placing an outsized pressure on him to create without logging turnovers. And secondly, I believe Tre’s scoring portability and unique playmaking strengths are tailor-made for the direction the league is headed.

There are 5 games of Tre’s season I found particularly instructive of how his creation situates him to find success at the next level, Texas’ contests with the Tennessee Volunteers and Texas A&M. These teams were two of the best defenses in the country, but interestingly made up 4 of Texas’ 7 best relative performances this season.

Both these teams had stylistic parallels in their aggressive, swarming defense. Tennessee with their frenetic switching, hedging ballscreen coverages, and aggressive gap help. Texas A&M also switched but frequently opted to extend their pressure past half-court to slow down opposing offenses. Both rank near the bottom in the country in opponent 3Pr, willing to cede late clock 3s in order to cut off the paint entirely. This philosophy should sound fairly familiar: aggressive help, comfort giving up 3s, and relentless ball pressure were the defining traits of both NBA finalists! And it was versus these coverages that Tre’s calm under pressure, shrewd interior passing, and dynamic shooting truly shined.

The relevance of Tre’s size amongst shooting-oriented prospects was on full display versus these teams. Johnson was able to make teams play for late and/or lazy switches with his high and dynamic release.

Despite the congested paint, Johnson consistently made high-value passes without turning the ball over.

Johnson’s ability to pass over and around the defense while avoiding turnovers forced Tennessee to tone down their aggression in ballscreen coverages as well. In the first clip for instance, from Texas’ first matchup versus Tennessee, where the Volunteers maintained their hard-hedging ballscreen coverage. Johnson’s ability to keep his dribble alive and see over the lifted bigs allowed him to manipulate and beat the backline defenders in rotation

This occurred to the point where, when the teams rematched in the SEC tournament, Tennessee softened their ballscreen coverage greatly and reduced the nail-help to prevent the defense from becoming overextended. Johnson still managed to find a way.

This is an extremely small sample, of course, and even though the scheme has similar tenets to NBA defenses, these certainly aren’t NBA defenders. But these kind of plays and performances, while always captured in the box score, are what make Johnson the ideal ‘glove’ player in the NBA. With offensive rebounding becoming increasingly prevalent in the league’s meta…

Precise interior playmaking will become a necessity for perimeter players. And Johnson proved himself to be extremely adept with these naturally high-risk passes all season.

Conclusion

It doesn’t take a veteran scout to recognize the flaws in Tre’s game, and typically, any player who requires so many caveats and accommodations should probably not receive the level of investment Tre Johnson inevitably will. But what Tre is representative of, in my mind, is a departure from teambuilding dogma. A player who possesses outlier talent in the areas Tre does can be essential to forming an identity like the Houston Cougars and Rockets have sculpted over the years. What this exercise has taught me is there is a universality to basketball, and any team whose success is rooted in generating turnovers, rebounding, and maximizing the possession battle will require maximal turnover economy and close-quarters scoring from their backcourt. And a guard like Tre Johnson, who has met this criteria at such an early age, would be a defensible choice for any team keeping this roster building strategy in mind. In all likelihood I do not ever see Tre being the best, or even second-best player on a title-winning team, but he does make the acquisition and integration of perennially undervalued interior players a much simpler endeavor. And that may be where the edge lies in drafting Tre Johnson.

The post Finding the Fit: Tre Johnson, a Tale of Two Houstons, and Winning Ugly appeared first on Swish Theory.

To put it simply, a flaw in the subcategories for one player can be irrelevant for another: each prospect is unique and individual, and their path to NBA success can pull from vastly different traits. If you were grading skills broadly, you could theoretically have two players listed as ‘B’ in driving, but they could both be very different types of drivers.

One skill I always find particularly intriguing is ‘Feel’. The term can sometimes be hard to define, and each person likely has different types of ‘feel plays’ they value more than others. Generally, rotations and defensive positioning are seen as the primary barometers for feel, and I don’t disagree with this. Modern basketball offenses are so diverse, full of inversion and misdirection at a pace we’ve never seen before. Merely being able to master one position or one defensive role likely isn’t enough to stick for non-centers.

I am going to be exploring feel and what I deem to be ‘valuable’ types of offensive feel through Javon Small, who I believe to be the smartest player in the draft class. Small is currently 14^th on my big board at the time of writing and someone I’d happily use a mid to late first-round pick on. He is the best off-ball player in the class and a superb passer, something I’ll analyse and chart at length later in this article.

At times, I am of the opinion that Feel can be oversimplified. Similarly to driving, feel is complex and can be quite role-dependent. I would also like to share how I scout passing and all the different facets of passing that matter to me, noting why all passing is not the same, and why versatility matters. We can sometimes see a flashy pass and get enamoured, but you want to study the body of work and post the flashy stuff if you think it matters or is part of something bigger.

AST:TO is often used as a broad indicator of offensive feel. I am of the opinion that turnovers are bad and having a wildly negative AST-TO ratio is probably a bad sign unless you are a nuclear shooter or hyper athletic lob-threat. But does having a high AST-TO automatically mean you have feel on a basketball court? Quite often, players who are incredibly high in this stat can simply be table-setters on teams running high-powered offenses full of off-screen plays. I am not suggesting these skills aren’t valuable, but more that it can be worth contextualizing the types of assists players are getting. More filtering is needed to truly grasp a players “feel”, whether that be more granular stats or film analysis.

To me, defensive feel is much easier to define than offensive feel. I think there are two main reasons for this, the first being that bad defensive positioning is just so glaringly obvious on tape to the naked eye. If the tag man falls asleep on a Spain PNR, a layup is given up. If someone crashes on a drive and doesn’t rotate back out quickly enough to defend ball reversals, a wide-open jump shot will be given up. If a player panics as his defense is rotating, he may over-commit and end up fouling a mediocre three-point shooter.

The other reason is that scheme and surrounding personnel can play a large role. Teams that run the Princeton Offense naturally create opportunities for back cuts. Iverson Loop is a favourite set play of mine that will almost always create a wide-open backdoor layup. These are ‘cuts’, but created via schematic or tactical brilliance. Also, playing with an elite passer such as Nikola Jokic or Trae Young will give you more opportunities to showcase off-ball feel than if you are on a poor roster.

The balance comes with the fact that you cannot completely ignore good cutting because it comes within the context of a good scheme. Peja Stojakovic was a terrific off-ball mover when playing in Rick Adelman’s high-powered offense alongside two elite passers in Chris Webber and Vlade Divac. The fact that the corner offense was so meta for its time doesn’t change the fact; it’s just worth keeping in mind when studying this stuff. A good cut also doesn’t get you an assist or at times even the ball thrown your way, sometimes it will create space for someone else such as with a 45 cut.

This piece serves as more of a philosophical dive than a true draft profile, but for the sake of being complete I will say that Small is a plus playmaker, a very good off-ball mover who should shoot well at the next level. His three-point percentage is slightly lower than I’d expect it to be in the NBA, largely because, as a first-option, over half of his attempts were off-the-dribble three-pointers. The likely biggest weakness on offense is that he doesn’t like to challenge rim protectors. He has a decent floater in his arsenal but will often prefer to pass out of those situations.

Literature on Feel

Feel, being as complex as it is, requires study beyond the tape. Part of growing as an analyst in Basketball is reading pieces that challenge you, but also help you learn. As a guy who never played the sport, my background is unique and self-created. Other guys have different paths and skillsets. One of the best pieces ever written on feel is by my good friend Evan Zaucha, who now works at a high level in the sport.

Evan is a neuroscientist who pondered whether feel can be improved upon, and turned this late-night pondering into one of the greatest articles ever written on basketball.

This article is well worth your time and changed the way I look at the game of basketball. Evan makes several conclusions in the article, but there are two tha I’m really going to focus on:

• Ev concludes Feel is one of the 2 hardest skills to develop, alongside dribbling, with a general conclusion that mental skills are harder to develop than technical skills.
• Ev breaks down ‘feel’ into three parts: Processing Speed, Pattern Recognition and Visual Processing.

I’m not going to regurgitate a watered-down version of Zaucha’s masterpiece, but for the sake of moving things along in my own piece let’s just quickly explore these three through a play from my timeline where Louisville runs ‘Horns Out Knicks Spain’.

The pattern recognition aspect is Chucky Hepburn identifying the play, snaking to the right after the screen flip and seeing the defense angle their bodies to his left. He’s been running PNRs all his life and Kelsey would have installed this particular play in practice. In addition to this, he also sees his back screener angle his screen to the right-hand side.

Things are not always so simple, though, and players often have to react to what the defense does, not what they think they’re going to do.

The visual processing in this instance is seeing that #11 from Notre Dame has jumped into the paint to defend him as opposed to sticking with the back screener (a possible surprise). He continues processing by throwing it to the back screener, who leaked out of the paint for three. The processing speed is a constant throughout the play because if Hepburn picks up his dribble or stops after seeing the guard in the paint, Notre Dame would be able to recover out to the ‘leaker’ in the Spain PNR. Windows can shut it in an instant in basketball, so being able to do these things consistently is a true barometer of high-end ‘feel’.

These descriptions are similar to how the great NFL analysts will discuss quarterback play. You have a route combination to beat a specific coverage; if they’re vanilla, you know what you’ve got and don’t have to hesitate. If the coverage is disguised, you have to adjust on the fly, whether that’s taking a checkdown or something else. The speed you do that and how quickly you can move your feet (in the case of Hepburn above, it was his handle) will impact how likely you can adjust on the fly.

Another article that changed the way I scouted was Jake Rosen’s piece on how to look for processing speed on a court, in which the majority of ways Jake identified processing speed were off the ball. This largely tracks, as cutting is the most commonly identified type of intelligent ‘feel’ play. The one on-ball skill that Jake noted can be used to spot processing speed is when a playmaker is going through their progressions. You might run a double drag and your defender gets caught under the screen, so you know you have a clear run to the rim. But there will be other occasions where things are not that simple and you have to go further into your script, if not play in a way that wasn’t on your original script.

To Quote Rosen:

“The easiest way to detect fraudulent processors is when the first read is forced. Whether it’s a drop off to the roll man, or a lob for a scripted ATO play, blindly following the first read is a huge red flag. Not only does it show they didn’t read the defense on that particular play, it also means they were too overwhelmed with the idea of going through progressions”

There is nothing wrong with hitting a first read if it’s there. The issue is, defenses are getting longer and longer, and defensive tactics are becoming more aggressive. The picture you have in your head when you start the pick-and-roll will sometimes be completely different to what you see a couple of seconds later. NBA analyst Polarfall always likes to differentiate the very best playmakers from people who make ‘pre-planned’ decisions. You may go into a Double Drag wanting to get an easy layup, but you need to be able to read if you aren’t going to get that and have already made the decision to hit the popping big man before the defense has time to adjust.

That is the main change I have noticed as I’ve covered this game tactically for the last decade. Things can get complex quickly, and, more and more often, players are more comfortable temporarily leaving players open to overload certain areas of the court. Teams will try and counter this with stuff like 45 cuts, Stampede Action and Dead Corner concepts, but great passing is a way to cut through all of this, as if you’re against a truly elite processor, there isn’t always a ton you can do.

Passing Versatility

I’ve outlined some of the pieces that impacted the way I watch film and process playmaking on the court – now lets look through this lens with Javon Small. Small is a player projected in the mid-second round, but I’d feel comfortable taking him quite a bit earlier. I believe he can be a rotation player on a very good team due to his mix of playmaking, off-ball interest, feel, shooting, and capable paint scoring.

Something I always take note of is the variety of assists a player gets. I think even the top-end playmakers, such as Nikola Jokic, Steve Nash, and Luka Doncic, have passes or deliveries they lean on disproportionately. Even still, these 3 guys stand out as being capable of making a variety of passes, adapting to the playfinishing personnel they have on the court with them. To further explain this theory, I hand-tracked all of Javon Small’s assists from the past season. If an assist contributed to two categories in a relevant way (IE, if Small came off a screen, then drove and kicked it), I added a number to both categories.

As you can see, there is a lot of variety here. I believe this is important because at the NBA levels, some passers have very specific tendencies, and these can be game planned for. For example, the old Brooklyn Nets teams had D’Angelo Russell and Spencer Dinwiddie as their lead guards. Russell had a very strong preference towards interior passing, whereas Spencer Dinwiddie had a heavy bias towards drive-and-kick passing. Being able to hit the whole floor in the half-court is extremely important, even though Russell was still a plus playmaker in the grand scheme of things.

It is also worth noting that passing variety on its own isn’t a reliable indicator of feel. You could theoretically be able to make every pass in the book and make it accurately, but still be a low feel or poor processing player. Instead, I feel the ability to make different types of passes elevates the value of feel, which is why I talked about contextualizing AST:TO Ratio earlier. Small’s AST:TO Ratio moves me because of the difficulty and variety of the passes he executes in a high-level on-ball role.

Something I feel is essential when scouting a prospect is to consider the surrounding context. This does not mean I would completely overlook a prospects’ flaws because they’re in a bad context, but, rather, you weigh it in as part of the evaluation. With regard to passing variety what you should contextualise is that sometimes your front-court options will dictate the types of passes you throw.

For example, when scouting Kasparas Jakucionis it is painfully obvious that Illinois did not have a consistent lob-threat due to the fact that their center, Ivisic, was more of a stretch-five. This does not necessarily mean Kasparas cannot throw lob passes or prefers not to, but it’s a variable to consider. In the case of Small, West Virginia’s bigs largely preferred passes to be thrown as they were rolling; they didn’t have much of a true vertical threat. Still, having watched Small, I don’t believe he had an aversion to throwing lob passes, but instead was adapting to his personnel – those he did throw were accurate and the right read.

Effectively, passing variety shows you can solve problems in a variety of ways, which can increase a playmaking ceiling down the line. You can still be a positive playmaker without it, but the more passes you’re capable of, the more ways you can solve problems in the half-court.

Javon Small

As I’ve mentioned, I believe Small to be an incredibly smart player who can do anything on the floor. West Virginia were a good team last year, and Small played a large part in that stepping up to the plate after Tucker DeVries’ season-ending injury early in the season. Darian DeVries is one of the best offensive minds in college basketball, and Small’s passing was a great mesh with this, opening a whole realm of possibilities.

Something I’d like to note is I always try and make sure I’m being realistic and balanced. At times it can be tempting to find a clip of a prospect doing something once or twice and labelling it as a ‘flash’. It’s something I try and fight doing because you could find a clip of Dwight Howard hitting a three or Andre Roberson hitting a movement three if you looked hard enough. I have chosen to highlight Javon Small’s passing because after a full scout I believe it to be a difference making skill that can help a team, not because I’m trying to force anything.

What you will notice with a lot of these plays, is just how active Javon Small is off-the-ball. He takes great pride in moving to create advantages for his team-mate and it means there is passing potential off the catch due to his movement to take movement threes.

Below is the quintessential Javon Small play.

West Virginia runs ‘Point Over’. He cuts backdoor, loops back around, gets top locked. Many players just stop here or continue to try and get open in the same way, but Small keeps it moving and clears out eventually receiving the ball on a handoff, then making a quick dumpoff pass to Amani Hansberry who largely prefers to receive the ball in face-up situations. This is a great example of how he never stop moving and makes passes quickly.

Making passes in one motion after receiving the ball is a very common play-type for Small. Below he comes off the screen in a ‘Garfunkel’ set and makes the dumpoff pass to Hansberry at the baseline quickly enough so Hansberry can score without resistance.

After Tucker DeVries went down. Small became the fulcrum of the half-court offense – other guys stepped up where needed, but he was the advantage creator. They also sought to weaponize him off-ball largely due to his willingness to do it, but also to avoid predictability and stagnation.

Part of how they’d do this was by using Floppy Action and other double staggers.

On the play above, Javon Small makes the bounce pass to Amani Hansberry after coming off the double stagger. Hansberry likes these bounce passes as they’re a good way for him to quickly get into floaters and quick jumpers.

The play below is a good example of his good visual processing.

Small comes off the screen and is getting blitzed. More often than not Small expects to dump the ball off inside the paint, but on this occasion, his screener is a 6-foot guard. Small sees him moving to the corner so he stops and throws a pass over his head with the left hand, choosing a whipped pass to give a closeout the least chance of happening.

A concept that Polar introduced to NBA Twitter was the concept of ‘proactive passing’. The idea behind this is that you at first react to what is happening, but then throw a pass in anticipation of the defenses next move. I refer to any pass where it’s thrown as the defense is rotating (as opposed to afterwards) as a proactive pass. Small makes a lot of these:

Here they run their ‘turn’ series for him. The main option is for him to drive to the rim himself as the roll didn’t really get open. But watch how he reads #23 – the defender is in a position to clog the lane, but Small sees his back turned to Toby Okani so he throws the pass in anticipation. Effectively, he throws him open on this play )to use American Football terminology). He also correctly chooses the bounce pass as it’s Okani’s preference and allows him to pick up and finish off the glass in one motion.

Holding Defenders

Small does a great job holding defenders in a variety of ways. Sometimes it’s with his eyes, sometimes he extends windows for his roll men to give them more space and further stretch the defense.

I’m normally quite a harsh analyst on passing because I think at times basic passes can become highlight plays because of some finesse or trickery on them. But Small made so many proactive passes this season into tight windows and did a great job at both understanding and predicting defenders, like this play against Kansas:

WVU open the game by running a Shallow Double Drag which is designed to clear nail help and create a 2v2 in the PNR game. Kansas decide to hedge on the screen. Small’s roll-man is briefly covered by #3 but he waits for the mesh point and throws a beautiful wraparound pass to Eduardo Andre as Hunter Dickinson is rotating back. He stayed patient and made the pass right as he predicted that #3 would want to recover out to the shooter.

Dickinson is technically still right in front of him when he decides to make the pass. Proactive Passing doesn’t mean the pass has to be instant – windows are always opening and closing on a basketball court – it’s just all about having a feel for timing.

Small’s bounce passing was consistently accurate, managing to maintain the leverage of his roll-men quite often.

Again, you see his ability to make proactive quick passes as defenders are getting into position. He has a great feel for finding the timing on his passes, as the ball is quite often past defenders before they’ve even reacted. His processing speed and pass selection are both top notch. From a fit perspective, it’s easy to envision him thriving alongside someone with short roll ability or a powerful driver from the mid-range area.

Here’s a play where all of this comes together and we see his ability to hold defenders still.

WVA runs a Drag PNR into a give and go designed to punish the drop defense. The shallow lift in the roll and replace action isn’t open, but Small stays patient by pulling a favorable switch further away from the action. Watch him fake the swing pass to the right to pull the recovery defender out of the paint, then hit Eduardo Andre inside. You can even see him get #14 to jump – it’s these subtle manipulations that can win in the half-court. He kept the swing pass open for the whole possession and kept leveraging the threat of it to eventually generate an interior read.

As Rosen discussed, staring down the first read all the time isn’t a good sign, as it showcases rigidity in decision making. Current NBA Basketball isn’t akin to following an instruction manual. Superhuman athletes roam the court and coaches are trying wackier defensive tactics than ever before. Gone are the days of teams running flat 1-4 PNRs with both corners and the slot occupied with spacers. The court is more positionally fluid than ever, so being able to read on the fly is as important as it’s ever been.

Effectively, you’re going to see weird stuff so you can’t rely on making pre-planned reads. These plays often stand out as containing unique angles, misdirects, or anything that elicits surprise in the viewer. In essence, a prospect being able to break your camera is a good sign.

Below is one of my favourite passes of the cycle.

This looks a simple read in the PNR, but Small actually makes two moves here: before the bounce pass, he gets the defender to jump at the idea of the high pass. He chains it together so quickly that it’s quite hard to see on the video without really slowing it down. He extends the window for his roller because if he’d thrown it earlier, #10 has a better chance at making a play.

Small also loves throwing wraparound passes. You’ve seen one or two so far, and it’s something he’s good at and feels comfortable doing. He’s ambidextrous on these passes, though ultimately he is probably slightly more comfortable using his left hand.

Modern Concepts and Athleticism

Something I love about Javon Small is how he’s already executing some of the modern concepts and tactics that we are seeing rise in the NBA, particularly in regards to throw-and-gos. These are not new to basketball, but teams such as the Cleveland Cavaliers have made them a feature of their half-court offense in recent years. Kenny Atkinson in particular preaches fast-paced principles and pass-and-move concepts, as opposed to set plays. Below is an example.

The play basically dies, which happens often against Kelvin Sampson’s defense. But Javon Small simply flows into a give and go with Amani Hansberry to get things moving again. It’s effective because Hansberry’s man is sagging off, as he’s not a great shooter. Small gets into the teeth of the defense before jumping and hangs in the air so he can allow things to develop more and make the right read.

There are a few things I note here. Caitlin Cooper has long been a proponent of jump passing and nearly every fellow Film writer I know including myself owns a T-Shirt to celebrate this. Caitlin noted that jump passing is important for Haliburton because he “jumps because he has an idea, not because he has run out of ideas”. I noticed on film while watching Javon Small that he likes a Jump Pass. In the case above the Jump Pass gave him a little time to read the low-man and pick between the 45 cutter or the corner shooter. He does similar on the play below, where he uses a jump to create time to read the low-man, then decides a kick-out is a better option than dishing into the paint.

Some may have preferred him to make the interior pass, but he underestimated the length Colorado threw at him early in the play and adjusted on the fly. Small uses the jump pass to open up two-options for himself, before ultimately deciding to read #6 inside the paint. As noted before, he chains this together rapidly and is capable of making quick adjustments with his handle. He turned what was a misread into something valuable, like he does again here:

WVU runs a Gut Chicago set on the BLOB play. There isn’t much open at first, so Small lofts a pass to his center and runs a give-and-go, creating a lob opportunity and an easy bucket. As noted in the pass tracking, Small didn’t throw a ton of lob passes – largely because the opportunities were not always there – but he is someone I project to be capable of throwing them.

I mentioned the Cavs above. Their backup guards (Ty Jerome in particular) were excellent at always keeping things moving and making quick decisions. Some call this ‘0.5 decision making’. It’s very easy to project Small doing this stuff at the NBA level, largely because he has already done it at the collegiate level. I’ve pondered whether I’ve been too optimistic on how easy these instant decision concepts are to install. Sure, you can tell any of your players to do these throw-and-gos, but the ability to do it at game speed and move quickly is the differentiator. Because of this, feel is crucial to how much value you generate from these concepts, especially on the cutting side.

Javon Small also shows great core strength on many of his passes. It should be noted that Javon Small is very athletic, full stop. Among point guards all time his combine score ranks in the 96th percentile per Nick Kalinowski (KaliDrafts).

Small shows this hand width and core strength on tape by making some crazy one-handed passes:

Javon snakes the PNR, stops and throws a great one-handed pass to Toby Okani before the defense can even react. This showcased nearly everything we’ve touched upon so far – pattern recognition by reading his defender and snaking, adapting to the changes in coverage and seeing the soft spot in the defense while doing it quickly (Zaucha). He doesn’t stare down the obvious read which is the roll, instead realizing a later progression is going to be open (Rosen). Finally, he makes a jump pass because he had an idea he wanted to execute. The one-handed pass shows core strength. This is everything I’ve discussed all coming together at once, and these weren’t one-off passes either. His handle and processing speed are on full display again in the clip below:

Cutting

Small is an exceptional cutter, able to make them quickly but also uses a lot of veteran tricks to maximize himself. Here’s a play that exemplifies this while also touching upon the jump passing we detailed above.

WVU go with a basic 5-out look and show as if they’re gonna run ‘Doom’ action (Double Zoom). Javon Small is on the weak side and briefly pushes off on his man to get a little separation, then cuts backdoor. He hangs in the air and throws a great dump-off pass. Again, he uses the Jump Pass as he had an idea as opposed to running out of them. These veteran tricks are all over the film and mesh with his passing and court mapping.

He did the same in an early-season matchup against Gonzaga:

Darian DeVries spammed this ‘Peja’ action (Back Screen into a Handoff) for his son Tucker while at Drake. WVU look to set this up on the SLOB play. Watch Small push his man (who is expecting Peja action) downhill to create a blockade then cut backdoor to generate the free-throw attempts. Small’s defender is basically only thinking about top-locking Tucker DeVries and Javon makes him pay with some smart and effective movement.

Yes it’s a defensive lapse, but good cutting will create these. You won’t create a defensive lapse out of thin air.

Small also had a couple of plays where he saw things instantly on SLOB plays as the inbounder and created points.

WVU are trying to set up some form of an away screen for Sencire Harris. He gets top locked and Small responds almost instanteously by throwing to Eduardo Andre and going for a backdoor cut which works as #3 is playing conservative defense on Andre. Again, these things look simple, but Small thinks so quickly and was doing this sort of stuff on a nightly basis.

Conclusion: Revisiting Feel, Passing and Processing Speed

I’ve explored the thoughts of others throughout this piece and deep-dived the passing variety and effectiveness of Javon Small.

Small’s offensive feel was just seriously impressive. Not many small guards engage off-ball, but Small not only engages but simply sees things so quickly. A lot of how much this might matter will depend on the shot. I believe Small’s percentages are largely tanked by the fact over 65 percent of his attempts were off-the-dribble 3s. It’s unlikely he’s going to be playing as big a role as he played at WVU so I expect the shooting numbers to stabilise a little.

The major question I have for Small is how much he can challenge bigs as a scorer. There were times he could drive and somewhat get swallowed up and almost be reliant on a cut to make stuff happen. This isn’t necessarily a gigantic deal because players should be moving anyway but working out how he wants to challenge bigs will be the major question I’d ask. But the processing, passing variety and general feel should translate immediately.

He seems pretty scalable because of his passing variety. The only real instance I can think of where he might not fit would be on a team that runs very little pick-and-roll, but even then I think his cutting, off-ball movement and smarts mean he will find opportunities to score and create from the second-side quite often.

Javon Small, with all his passing talent, indeed had a strong A:TO. However, I noted earlier that I like to contextualise Feel and analyze AST:TO in a more comprehensive way. A:TO has its value and is probably a good filter generally. But ultimately it’s worth your time to dive deeper and find other ways to filter guys out, whether that is with more statistics or with film watching. I hope sharing how I scout passing , feel and playmaking can help with that.

The reason I like to do that is to put it simply, it’s very hard to make it in the NBA. Having feel alone will not keep you on a court. The types of ways you can ‘feel’ the game matter as does the rest of your game. Zaucha’s three cornerstones of feel showcase that it can be complex to understand how feel works and how impactful it will be. Small understands the game, can adapt to defensive wrinkles and can adapt to them quickly. This is all fuelled by an impressive handle; feel cannot stand alone without technique.

Diving into the film allows you to gauge how much the feel might matter at the next level. Many high AST-TO guards get drafted, it just isn’t always enough. That is what I mean by ‘contextualising feel’. I sought to add to this by showcasing how I scout passing and the types of ‘high processing speed’ passes I look for and how to spot them.

In the modern NBA, spacing is said to be at an all-time high. This is largely because we shoot more threes than ever and have true five-out stuff. The 2002 Sacramento Kings broke the NBA with their spacing which was Chris Webber and Vlade Divac both being able to shoot mid-rangers. But the more i watch the less I become sure that space is actually always there. Part of this is because NBA defenses want you to shoot mid-range shots, but defenses are also just long and smart. What has stood out to me in these Finals is how compacted things are; things are played in a phone booth when it comes down to it. Even though we utilise the three-point line more than ever, traffic is there. Things are clogged, and you need to find solutions within the space you are given. It’s why I often fade hyper-athletic, speedy prospects because I think agility and finesse can be extremely important in these phone booths.

It’s not as simplistic as saying processing is the only way to beat it. There are sub-optimal processors who can attack these compact defenses we see and do a good job of it. In the case of Javon Small, and just Javon Small, I think his answer to this problem is that his handle, his instant processing and his ability to throw a variety of passes can unlock doors. That’s the problem he might solve for you. I try and treat every prospect as unique, and the solutions they provide for one team will not necessarily be the same they can provide for another. As I have displayed by contextualizing the stats with tape and scheme analysis, Javon Small can provide a lot of solutions for a lot of teams.

Favourite Fits: Clippers, Pacers, Timberwolves, Hawks

The post Javon Small: Scouting and Contextualising Feel, Passing and Processing Speed appeared first on Swish Theory.

The draft is one of three paths to building a team, and arguably the most important for teams in smaller markets deemed less attractive to free agents and disgruntled stars who may demand trades, but only if they hand-pick their next team. This is due to the team-controlled 7-years and the value of finding impact players on rookie deals during this upcoming salary crunch around the league.

My Scouting Process is simple: Film, Data, Communication.

Watch as much tape as you can on as many prospects as you can, go to as many games in person that you can, evaluate as much relevant data on these prospects’ basketball player development journey from youth to pro as you can, look for the winning traits that translate to winning basketball at every level, like defensive instincts for forcing turnovers, quick processing decision-making feel on and off the ball, offensive rebounding, dribble, pass, shoot feel for the game, developable ball skills relative to height/position like shooting, handle, passing, and the scoring versatility, creator upside, compared to play-finishing skill-set each player possesses, which helps outline all the potential roles that player could fill.

Some skills like handle, 3pt shooting versatility, defensive versatility can help players reach higher impact than expected, as they each create advantages that make it easier to do other things; the handle creates opportunities to score and pass, the 3pt shot drags defenses out of the paint with gravity, and the defensive malleability allows one to understand and execute different defensive schemes in different roles guarding different positions, sometimes all in one possession.

Quick effective team-first decision-making may be the most important skill of all separating players at this level of athletic greatness; the mind may be the most powerful muscle separating the average rotation player and the winning players.

General big boards help build a consensus view of how this class is built via a list of the best players available. Every team, however, has their own big board filled out differently. While this consensus list is helpful to target value at different slots in the draft, a more useful tool could be filling out a big board based on a specific team, where team-centric needs, roles, situations are addressed more directly.

From there, learning from other scouts, hearing their points of view on their findings, understanding others’ perspectives through their lens, helps any evaluator cover up blind spots and round out the scouting perspective, to help see the glass half full on prospects who you may have undervalued at first.

The 2025 NBA Swish Theory Draft Guide is a helpful place to start for understanding how great draft minds view this class via ranking the Top-59 on a general big board, with filters available to target the talent and player archetypes your team needs most.

As far as my Draft Process, here are my goals for ranking any big board:

First, I’m looking for potential Superstars, guys who can be legitimate franchise cornerstones for a decade anchoring the team to 50 wins without any help.

Second, I’m targeting Offensive Engines and Defensive Cornerstones; offensive players whose mere existence creates a reliable option to run team offense as a scorer and distributor on a night-to-night basis and defensive players with outlier DPOY potential. Scoring creators who consistently create good offense for their team through reliable decision making and star-stopping defenders who are so elite, smart, versatile that they actually slow down opposing stars.

Third, I’m hunting for All-Star/All-Defense level talent, scorers and stoppers who project to potentially become Top-30 offensive players or Top-10 defensive players in the league one day, who will likely be High End Starters on championship teams.

Fourth, I’m searching for High End Starters, players who have a realistic path to impact the game at a higher rate than the average rotation player, who have likely floors as fringe 5th starters, 6th man, role players on winning teams. These are likely “good basketball” players who can bring two-way (scoring and defensive) versatility.

Fifth, I’m interested in finding Role Players whose floor is fighting for rotation spots, those who have elite skills in one role on both ends like rim-rolling and rim-protecting, or those who can hold their own on both ends of the floor with dribble-pass-shoot and switchable defensive skills, like defensive connectors who can hit the open three and make the smart pass.

Lastly, I’m looking into Potential Pros, players who have NBA length, athleticism, body strength, or outlier skill advantages like quick first step burst, playmaking vision, decision making feel, 3pt shooting, to take a swing late on unique talents.

Orlando needed shooting.

Arguably, the team needed pull-up 3pt shooting most, someone who can draw two out to the perimeter to create space for others, and ideally also possesses reliable point guard duties; either from a guard, a wing, a center, someone who can run the show when Paolo and Franz aren’t taking the lead. Someone who can set those two big wing stars and depth of play-finishers up for off-ball opportunities, cuts, rim-rolls, closeout-attacks, instead of asking them to create from scratch every time down.

Enter Desmond Bane.

Orlando addressed its biggest need (pull-up shooting), its secondary needs (C&S shooting, connective playmaking, halfcourt initiating), AND didn’t have to sacrifice the team identity (defense) to do it. The Magic somehow landed the ultimate complementary third star to its young core without taking a step back in the short term to do so.

So, what else does this Magic roster need to continually search for perfect floor balance lineups and variety of depth options?

As Chet Holmgren and Myles Turner battle it out in the NBA Finals, another apparent team need could be a reliable two-way starting center, ideally a unicorn 3&D tough shot making big man, who don’t exactly grow on trees.

Take Porzingis as an example, sliding right in next to Boston’s big wing stars, cleanly transitioning from an All-Star post-up extraordinaire with the Wizards to a glorified 3&D role with postup mismatch opportunities on a much more crowded Boston team.

Launching an offensive attack with that level of overqualified talent in a role where less is needed allows the player to maximize their winning impact; maintain energy for both ends of the floor; prepare, know, and thrive in their predetermined role.

Otherwise, endlessly hunting defensive connectors seems to be this Magic team’s priority, searching for two-way versatility, quick processing team-first decision makers, players with few holes who can dribble-pass-shoot and switch on defense.

Now that Orlando has addressed its primary shooting/scorer/playmaking concern, the question remains: what finishing touches does this roster need to start contending?

PG: Jalen Suggs, Anthony Black, Cory Joseph
SG: Desmond Bane, Gary Harris, Jett Howard
SF: Franz Wagner, Tristan Da Silva, Caleb Houstan
PF: Paolo Banchero, Jonathan Isaac
C: Wendell Carter Jr., Goga Bitadze, Mo Wagner

2025 NBA Draft Prospects – Offensive Scoring Creator vs Play-Finishers/Connectors


When reviewing the Cerebro Sports data on 2025 NBA Draft Prospects (only including NCAA), an interesting result pops up when playing around with the numbers.

If I wanted to find two-way versatility, I could look for players who can fill roles as a defensive playmaker/offensive connector/3pt shooter/playfinisher, aka someone who brings plus defense, makes team-first passes, hits open 3pt shots, rebounds, scores 2s effeciently, and helps force turnovers with steals and blocks without fouling, then I can use that idea to filter through Cerebro’s data.

Setting 4 filters to average or above (At the Rim, Defensive Impact, 3pt Effectiveness, Floor General Skills), we can find players who rate average or better compared to the draft class in these categories.

The Results? only 4 players are average or better at defense, 3pt shooting, passing, and the rest of those attributes baked into Cerebro’s formulas
:
Cooper Flagg, VJ Edgecombe, Danny Wolf, and Max Shulga

These next two data viz show the Best Offensive Engine Scoring Creator 2025 NBA Draft prospects via Cerebro Sports NCAA Data:

Pure Scoring Prowess (PSP), Floor General Skills (FGS), and 3PT Effectiveness (3PE)

2025 NBA Draft – Cerebro Scoring Creators Scatter

and the same data by position:
better passing = bigger square // better scoring = darker color

Top Prospects in Floor General Skills (FGS):

1) Ryan Nembhard 96
2) Kam Jones 82
3) Javon Small 79
4_ Egor Demin 78
5) Mark Sears 76
T-6) Kobe Sanders / Kasparas Jakucionis 74
8) Walter Clayton Jr. 73
T-9) Nique Clifford / Cooper Flagg / Max Shulga 72
T-12) Jeremiah Fears / Dylan Harper 71
14) Danny Wolf 69
T-15) VJ Edgecombe / Johni Broome / Sion James 67


Top Prospects in Pure Scoring Prowess (PSP):

1) Ryan Kalkbrenner 93
2) Eric Dixon 88
3) Vladislav Goldin 84
4) Nique Clifford 83
T-5) Maxime Raynaud / John Tonje / Dylan Harper 82
T-8) Collin Murray-Boyles / Kam Jones 81
T-10) Cooper Flagg / Johni Broome 80
12) Tre Johnson 79
T-13) Walter Clayton Jr. / Chaz Lanier 78
T-15) Asa Newell / Rasheer Fleming / Adou Thiero / Javon Small 76


Top Prospects in 3PT Effectiveness (3PE):

1) Chaz Lanier 93
T-2) Eric Dixon / Koby Brea 90
3) Walter Clayton Jr. 88
4) Tre Johnson 87
T-5) Javon Small / John Tonje / Kon Knueppel / Tyrese Proctor 83
T-9 Mark Sears /Max Shulga 81
11) Alijah Martin 80
T-12) Rasheer Fleming / Will Richard 79
14) Maxime Raynaud 77

Prospects who ranked best in both passing and scoring:

Kam Jones, Nique Clifford, Dylan Harper, Cooper Flagg, Walter Clayton Jr., Javon Small, Mark Sears, Johni Broome, Tre Johnson, Collin Murray-Boyles, Kasparas Jakucionis, Max Shulga, Kon Knueppel, Danny Wolf, Jeremiah Fears, VJ Edgecombe, Alijah Martin, Hunter Sallis, Jamir Watkins

Prospects who ranked best in all three of passing, scoring, and shooting:

Alijah Martin, Cooper Flagg, Danny Wolf, Dylan Harper, Hunter Sallis, Jamir Watkins, Javon Small, Jeremiah Fears, Johni Broome, Kam Jones, Kasparas Jakucionis, Kobe Sanders, Kon Knueppel, Liam McNeeley, Mark Sears, Max Shulga, Tre Johnson, Tyrese Proctor, VJ Edgecombe, Walter Clayton Jr., Will Riley

Poetic to see former Creighton teammates bookending these scoring creator stats with Ryan Nembhard leading all prospects in Floor General Skills by a mile and Ryan Kalkbrenner dominating yet another category, this time in Pure Scoring Prowess.

Players who rank highly in Scoring but not shooting or passing could be promising play-finishers, like Kalkbrenner, Eric Dixon, Vlad Goldin

Players who rank highly in 3pt shooting and Passing could be good offensive connectors, if not better, such as those who rate 65 or higher in both FGS and 3PE:
Walter Clayton Jr., VJ Edgecombe, Sion James, Ryan Nembhard, Max Shulga, Mark Sears, Kobe Sanders, Kasparas Jakucionis, Kam Jones, Javon Small, Dylan Harper, Danny Wolfl, Cooper Flagg

2025 NBA Draft Prospects – Defense/Hustle/At The Rim

Some promising Defense/Hustle/Rim Stats are deflections, blocks, steals, rebounds, charges, loose ball recoveries, shot contests, and fouls.

These next two data viz show the Best Defensive 2025 NBA Draft prospects via Cerebro Sports NCAA Data utliziing stats like these for At The Rim (ATR), Defensive Statistical Impact (DSI), and Overall Impact (C-RAM).

This first visualization shows a player’s overall impact by circle size, defensive impact vertically focusing on steals, blocks, fouls, rebounds, and at the rim impact horizontally which accounts for rebounding, blocks, and 2P%.

bigger circle = better Overall Impact (C-Ram)

the same data by position:
better Defensive Statistical Impact = bigger square // better At The Rim = darker color

Top Prospects in At The Rim (ATR):

1) Ryan Kalkbrenner 87
2) Johni Broome 85
T-3) Khaman Maluach / Maxime Raynaud 82
T-5) Danny Wolf / Rasheer Fleming 80
T-7 Collin Murray-Boyles / Thomas Sorber 79
T-9 Amari Williams / Derik Queen / Nique Clifford / Vladislav Goldin 78
T-13 Asa Newell / Yanic Konan Niederhauser 77

Top Prospects in Defensive Statistical Impact (DSI):

1) Ryan Kalkbrenner 101
2) Johni Broome 97
3) Thomas Sorber 95
4) Chris Manon 94
5) Rasheer Fleming 91
T-6) Cooper Flagg / VJ Edgecombe 90
T-8 Asa Newell / Yanic Konan Niederhauser 88
T-10) Collin Murray-Boyles / Adou Thiero / Max Shulga 87
14) Alijah Martin 86
T- 15) Will Richard / Maxime Raynaud 85

With some overlap in these two defensive statistics, Ryan Kalkbrenner and Johni Broome rank 1 and 2 respectively in both. Multiple first round prospects rank highly in both, including Thomas Sorber, Cooper Flagg, Asa Newell, VJ Edgecombe, Collin Murray Boyles, and Rasheer Fleming.

Chris Manon, VJ Edgecombe, Max Shulga, Alijah Martin, Will Richard rank Top-5 in DSI among guards. Nique Clifford ranks 78 in At The Rim activity while every other guard ranks 70 or below.

The NBA Combine provides measurables on most prospects like height, wingspan, weight that can be used to compare size, reach, and effective length.

I created a Data Viz of the 2025 NBA Draft Prospects by their Wingspan/Height Plus Minus compared with their Stocks Per Foul rate, where Stocks = STL + BLK

Top-5 Wingspan/Height Plus Minus

+9 Cedric Coward / Rasheer Fleming
+8.75 Thomas Sorber
+7 Amari Williams
+6.75 Drake Powell

Top-5 Stocks Per Foul

2.29 Ryan Kalkbrenner
1.58 Thomas Sorber
1.46 Cooper Flagg
1.45 Johni Broome
1.29 Alex Toohey

*Note, Cerebro Sports, CBB Analytics, and NBA Combine Data only consists of NCAA Players. International players data is from Basketball Reference.

With the 25th pick in the first round and the 46th and 57th picks in the second round of the 2025 NBA Draft, prospects and picks galore in the war chest, and young talent on good contracts filling up the roster, the Magic’s options this off-season feel endless. That doesn’t always end up translating to something big happening, but Orlando’s process keeps them prepared and flexible today and through the future to continually have the option to do something, which is the important part of making big splash trades – to stay ready for opportunities when value can be found.

In the past, Orlando has sold its second round picks for Cash Considerations; unless one or both are dealt in trades, don’t be surprised if that happens again, especially given how little opportunity there is for young prospects on this win-now roster.

One guess would be Orlando sells off one or both of the second round picks for cash. Another option could be packaging the 25th with the 2nd rounders to trade out of the draft for futrue assets or move up in the draft if there’s one particular prospect target in mind and they feel good about landing him at a slightly higher slot.

The Top-60 Prospects ranked below in tier are viewed as the same level as all prospects within the same tier, but factors like team/situation/role come into play as the tie-breaker. These players are ranked as such for this Magic team based on need, fit, opportunity, investment, and mostly just trying to answer questions like…

Which prospect has the most potential and the best chance of realistically reaching that potential in Orlando given the roster construction around Paolo Banchero, Franz Wagner primarily and Jalen Suggs, Anthony Black secondarily as the young core?

Which prospect can help this team win now and in the future *and* fit within the current roster construction over the long haul the best?

The Official 2025 NBA Draft Orlando Magic Team-Centric Big Board

Tier 1a – Ceiling: All-NBA Superstar, Floor: All-Star/All-Defense

1. Cooper Flagg
   The Runaway #1 Pick for a reason, Flagg is the most versatile basketball prospect this game has seen since LeBron.
   
   Any team can ask Cooper to do just about anything, and Flagg will either be good, great, or elite at it, able to slide into a multitude of different roles on both ends. An all-time great defensive prospect with Montverde at the high school level went on to produce an all-time great offensive season in his one and only year with Duke at the collegiate level.
   
   The Magic would obviously love to add a star like Flagg, who projects to play like a Supercharged Franz, and maybe even the one true Swish Army Knife of them all.
   
   
   
   
   Tier 1b – Ceiling: All-NBA Superstar, Floor: Offensive Engine/All-Star
   
2. Dylan Harper
   
   Harper would be taken more seriously in #1 pick talks in just about any other draft class. Dylan looks like a primary scoring creator, a true offensive engine for a team with the dynamic athleticism to give one hopes of positive defensive development. Harper’s a walking bucket tall point-guard who any team would love to have star in their backcourt operating the offense going forward.
   
   Orlando would be lucky to add a natural scoring creator point guard like Harper with how much talent they already have; after news of San Antonio being open to moving the #2 pick, should The Magic seriously look to to secure Harper as the third star to run the show? After trading for Bane, this feels highly unlikely.
   
   
   
   
   Tier 2 – Ceiling: Offensive Engine/All-Star, Defensive Anchor/All-Defense, Floor: High End Starter
   
3. Danny Wolf
   
   Many times this season, Wolf was a one-man offense for Dusty May’s Michigan team, as we discussed on the Learning Basketball Podcast.
   
   Running P&R as a near 7ft ball-handler with powerful rim-roller Vlad Goldin (#36 on this board) provides a proof of theory offensive role that will translate to the league. Danny ran 231 pick-and-rolls as his team’s ball-handler where his 0.94 PPP on P&R including passes ranked in the 65th percentile among all players.
   
   Shooting:
   33% 3P% on 51 Pull-Up 3PA
   34% 3P% on 62 C&S 3PA
   37% 3P% on 30 guarded C&S 3PA
   58% 2P% on 207 Layups
   
   Synergy Scoring Playtpes
   1.14 PPP on 43 Putbacks
   1.09 PPP on 44 Cuts
   1.03 PPP on 31 ISOs (82nd Percentile)
   1.02 PPP on 66 Spot Ups
   0.94 PPP on 33 P&R Roll Man
   
   Danny Wolf is a versatile scorer, a good shooter on and off the ball, an offensive orchestrator who can run either end of a pick-and-roll or spot-up off of a pick-and-pop or space the floor off a drive, a potential offensive playmaking hub who can initiate a team’s offense as a primary scoring creator option. Wolf’s sound footwork, big size, impressive mobility should help him hold his own on defense guarding big 4s and small 5s.
   
   Plus defender, great passer, good shooter, tight handle, two-way feel, unique style, special talent, at 6’11”.
   
   Orlando adding a versatile scoring big man who can run point guard duties and threaten defenses from deep would fill almost all the needs for this offense, freeing up the backcourt to continue to be filled with 3pt shooting scorers and defensive connectors between Bane, Suggs, and AB.
   
   
   
   
   
   
4. Tre Johnson
   
   Tre just posted one of the best shooting seasons any prospect has shown in years. His shot profile is as efficient and versatile as they come. His handle is tight enough to help him get to his spots and create any shot he wants, which he usually can make. His solid feel when defenses send help has shown promising playmaking skills to create for others off of the scoring gravity he brings. This combination could become a lethal scorer with passing chops as a primary option.
   
   Between Tre’s shooting/scoring gravity, the spacing he would breathe into Orlando’s offense, is just about the best possible fit the offense could ask for, someone who draws two on the ball, can hit the open three, and can make good reads to set up others.
   
   After adding Bane, trading up for Tre or anyone who isn’t more of a traditional point guard or D&3 big seems unlikely.
   
   
   
   
   
5. Kon Kneuppel
   
   Arguably the most complete offensive guard in the class, Kon’s combination of ball-skills from his handle, vision, shooting touch on and off ball, feel running the offense, ability to operate high volume of pick-and-rolls, should create a sum-of-its parts scoring creator at any level, a reliable offensive engine for any team.
   
   The biggest question mark will be defensively, if Kon can hold his own, but the toughness at his size is promising, the will to win is certainly there.
   
   Flanking Kon with plus-defenders where he’s the worst defender on the floor would be ideal, and elite team defenses like Orlando or Houston could use an offensive engine to make the halfcourt flow hum a little smoother.
   
   
   
   
6. VJ Edgecombe
   
   Outlier athlete who will be one of the NBA’s best athletes on Day 1, incredible defensive playmaker, unstoppable first step downhill burst, promising 3pt shooting development, improved decision-maker as season went on. This uber athlete with a high two-way 3&D floor and intriguing potential as a drive-and-kick scoring threat is a prospect any team would like to take a swing on.
   
   VJ would slide right into Orlando’s elite defensive turnover-forcing culture, and only be asked to hit the 3ball and run some secondary offense, allowing him to grow into his own as an on-ball threat and utilizing his off-ball skills immediately.
   
   
   
   
   
   This back half of the lottery is around where the fit in Orlando starts to get murky. Since this range of prospects are likely to be selected Top-14, Orlando would want to stay away from this 7-14 draft range if they deemed someone in a lower tier of prospect to be a better fit for this Magic team, like Walter Clayton Jr. or Jeremiah Fears. They would theoretically want to trade down from the back half of the lottery to secure them, or in reality probably have to trade up from 25.
   
   
7. Noa Essengue
   
   The downhill force forward with graceful footwork has shown an impressive development curve at one of the youngest ages in the draft class. Already showing defensive versatilty with high-impact in many facets, and transition tenacity as an off-ball mover in fast breaks, rebounds, and cuts, the question remains is how much brighter can Noa’s ever-growing star get.
   
   Can he refine the halfcourt on-ball skills to become a true two-way assassin? Could he define a handful of go-to moves for himself to at least score consistently in addition to his defense and fast break fuel?
   
   His potential is sky-high if he continues developing at this rate. In Orlando, the fit would be tough to find minutes at forward without a 3pt shot, but the energy would be appreciated on any team. Filling a role as a play-finishing center until he develops more ball-skills would be interesting to see play out here; maybe he can become a point-center in transition along with a playfinisher in the halfcourt.
   
   
   
   
8. Asa Newell
   
   Newell offers one of the more stable packages of any draft prospect: a lengthy big wing defender who can switch 3-5, use his high-point athletic gifts to block shots at the rim and time up offensive rebounds, and hit the open catch-and-shoot threes out of pick-and-pop, with the ability to attack closeouts with post-up counter-move footwork.
   
   Newell could slide into Orlando’s front court depth as a capable small-ball 5 or backup 4, a versatile defender who can hit the open three and provide two-way winning impact around the rim and on the glass.
   
   Asa’s defensive versatility, 3pt shooting, offensive rebounds impress most, and he also proved to be an efficient scorer off those putbacks on a high volume of scoring as a lead option for Georgia.
   
   
   
   
9. Khaman Maluach
   
   The most efficient rim-finisher the college game has seen… ever? Maluach lobs are automatic alley-oops. Khaman has great hands catching lob passes, though sometimes struggles with tougher passes inside the paint. He shows shooting touch potential to develop as a pick-and-pop threat, and otherwise is a lethal rim-roller right away. Defensively a smart big man, uses hands and strength effectively, and has potential to be elite on that end as well.
   The defense and rim-rolling would be bring a defined two-way role, but the 3pt shooting development could be a big holdup to his playing time. Khaman would bring two-way winning impact without the jumper just as a rim-rolling defensive anchor, so that alone is worth a look next to Orlando’s creators.
   
   Khaman has the highest offensive rebounde percentage of the class while also rating well in Hakeem %, which combines Block % and Steal % to essentially show what percentage of a team’s turnovers any given player forced.
   
   
   
   
10. Thomas Sorber
    
    Thomas Sorber is an absolute tank.
    Sorber’s smoothie of size, skills, smarts blends into an incredibly intimidating presence that could one day anchor an NBA defense and offer a connective playmaking hub on offense.
    
    Sorber’s 2025 NBA Draft Rank Tank Bonafides:
    
    #1 Body Weight (263)
    #2 Stocks Per Foul (+1.58)
    #3 in Wingspan/Height +/- (+8.75)
    
    Thomas Sorber ranks 3rd in DSI and 7th in ATR via Cerebro., making him one of the top defensive prospects in the class.
    
    Sorber’s cerebral two-way feel for the game wreaks havoc defensively, protects the rim as a defensive anchor, and brings a postup playmaking hub on the offense end. Without a 3pt shot, it would be challenging to win minutes on the Magic, but Thomas Sorber’s potential as a defensive anchor down low is too much to deny.
    
    
    
    
11. Collin Murray-Boyles
    
    CMB shows incredible defensive instincts, two-way feel for the game, graceful downhill strides as powerful 4/small 5 defensive playmaker. A head of steam often opens up Collin’s drives to the rack, with good feel to make smart reads and playmaking vision to execute the passes.
    
    Murray Boyles’ defensive mind is what stands out for him as a prospect, his ability to use his big hands to perfectly time up deflections, force stops, and then grab and go downhill off the turnover.
    
    The fit in Orlando is not great with Paolo at the 4 and CMB’s lack of perimeter shooting, but as a small 5 and backup 4 he would certainly be a winning player on almost any team, despite the worrisome jump shot mechanics.
    
    
    
    
12. Ace Bailey
    
    Bailey is a tough-shot making big wing 3pt sniper who flashes defensive potential. While the unrefined handle and lack of playmaking vision is worrisome as a primary initator for team offense, Bailey’s shooting ability, rebounding activity, and defensive athleticism should all still translate to the next level.
    
    Ace in Orlando’s frontcourt would provide a capable 3pt shooter to stretch the floor, an glass-cleaning rebounder, and potentially an impactful big wing help defender. If Bailey’s able to create his own shot without needing the handle, the two-way potential as a D&3 Big Wing Scorer rises even higher, but that may require outlier development.
    
    
    
    
    
13. Derik Queen
    
    A one-of-a-kind tank big who uses size and graceful strides to finesse his way to the rack like the a bull in a china shop who somehow didn’t break a single dish. Queen’s passing flashes are impressive, showing incredible vision for a player his size, and a handle good enough to help create advantages on the go.
    
    With Paolo in Orlando, the fit for Queen may be tough due to some overlaps in skillsets that aren’t additive to each other, similarly to CMB, but talent can sometimes find a way. Perhaps having either one on the floor at all times could carve out a role as a small-5 or backup-4, and certainly help replicate the offense when Paolo is out due to injury.
    
    Queen’s defensive effort, maximizing his athleticism, and working on the perimeter jumpshot are question marks, but who’s to say Queen can’t become a high-volume foul-drawing downhill force playmaking hub who can score at the rim and create paint-and-spray offense for any team?
    
    The downhill force of players like Collin Murray Boyles and Derik Queen can best be captured in a data viz like this one below comparing Points in the Paint and Free Throw Attempts per game, along with other stats like 3pt assists, to show the results of players who successfully penetrate the paint. Players who bend defenses in the paint are able to attack the rim, draw fouls, and kickout for threes or throw lobs at the rim to the man in the dunker spot.
    
    CMB ranks 9th in FTA and 5th in Points in the Paint per gameQueen ranks 8th in FTA and 7th in Points in the Paint per game
    
    
    
    
    Prospects listed 14-22 could all be good fits in Orlando to help bring depth of talent who fill needs and fit the identity. Trading up for a target or sitting and hoping a bpa from this list is there at 25 are fine strategies for good players.
    
    
    Tier 3 – Ceiling: High-End Starter, Floor: 5th Starter/Role Player/6th Man
    
14. Walter Clayton Jr.
    
    A 3pt sniper point guard who can beat you off screens, handoffs, pullups. Runs the offense as an initiator, slides right into Orlando’s handoff-heavy system, fills the high-volume 3pt shooter on and off ball as a point guard who can run some offense and set up Orlando’s elite frontcourt scorers and depth of play-finishers in the best possible position to succeed using shooting gravity and quick decision making feel.
    
    As for Orlando’s big board needs, Clayton has a case to be ranked as high as 7 here, but I and many others view everyone ranked between 7 and 14 as a higher tier level of nba prospect. This works out for the Magic, however, since Orlando doesn’t pick until 25, where Clayton might still be available.
    
    An answer to one of the team’s biggest needs could fall right into their laps.
    
    With the addition of Bane, losing the 16th pick, filling a shooting need, ending up with WCJ is less likely to happen, but not out of the question.
    
    As a draft thought exercise, if they moved up to 7, would they do so just to secure Walter Clayton Jr.? Would they move back to the mid-first range where they were before to select Walter closer to where he’s projected? Or is there someone else listed above they’d target in a trade to move up in the draft, like hoping Tre, Kon, or VJ are still there at 7?
    
    Walter Clayton Jr. ranks in 3rd in 3PA/gm volume and 6th in FT%, two positive indicators for future outside shooting development.
    
    
    
15. Jeremiah Fears
    
    Fears quick first step burst is practically impossible to cut off from penetrating the paint, an elite skill advantage that Fears will need to rely on at the next level, along with his impressive decelerating body control weaving in and out of defenses.
    
    Fears shows the killer pull-up 3pt shot and an uncanny ability to draw fouls on drives with a paint-and-spray attitude at a point guard scoring creator looking for the best shot for his team.
    
    Orlando could use his skill-set immediately, as Fears could slide right into the scoring point guard role for this Magic team. Unfortunately, he’ll likely not be available by pick 25. Could Orlando move back up in the draft to land a Fears or Clayton?
    
    
    
16. Ryan Kalkbrenner
    
    Kalkbrenner provides a stable two-way option late in the first round as a traditional rim-protecting big man who can also step out for three.
    
    Ryan will provide team-first winning impact to just about any squad as a playable rotation big with high two-way impact upside as a 3&D center if the shot proves reliable.
    Kalkbrenner sneakily could solve a big need for Orlando at Center, perhaps finally finding its utility big man to do a lot of things well, protect the rim, rebound, score against postup mismatches, and hit the open three around Orlando’s starting frontcourt of Franz and Paolo.
    
    Kalkbrenner being available at 25 for Orlando would be a steal for a reliable D&3 backup big with two-way starter potential.
    
    Kalkbrenner’s 2025 NBA Draft Ranks
    #1 Stocks Per Foul (+2.29)
    #4 Body Weight (257 lbs)
    T-#26th in Wingspan/Height +/- (+5 in)
    
    
    
    
    
17. Cedric Coward
    
    Tied with Rasheer Fleming for having the longest Wingspan to Height Plus Minus in the class (+9 in!), Cedric brings the lengthy measureables to the equation as a 6’5” guard 3pt specialist, a classic energetic D&3 archetype who slides right into a two-way role for any team.
    
    Orlando can’t have enough two-way floor-spacers around its star scorers, especially filling up the backcourt rotation, as KCP and Gary Harris have shown filling D&3 roles through previous seasons. Cedric could be a clean fit to replace that role in the long term for this team as a high-end two-way starter or positive impact role player, though Bane’s addition might prove playmaking and big man needs to be more dire.
    
    
    
    
18. Jase Richardson
    
    Versatile scorer with incredible shooting touch and quick processing skills, positive defensive energy, and strong connector capabilities create a strong two-way presence in Jase Richardson.
    
    While reportedly undersized at the combine, Jase could fill many holes for Orlando’s backcourt as a shooter, scorer, plus-defender who makes team-first decisions with the ball, and shares NBA legacy with his brother Jaxon and father Jason “J-Rich, Magic Legend” Richardson.
    
    
    
19. Carter Bryant
    
    Good defensive feel and capable 3pt shooting 6’7” forward with scoring chops could provide any team with a good basketball player who brings two-way impact.
    
    Orlando could use all the good basketball players they can get around its stars, especially if they fill a D&3 role with scoring being gravy on top, adding Carter could be a fine play for role player depth.
    
    
    
    
    
20. Rasheer Fleming
    
    Tied with Cedric Coward for the longest Wingspan to Height Plus Minus in the class (9in !), Rasheer Fleming offers another D&3 prospect, this time as a 6’8” wing.
    
    With Orlando’s frontcourt depth, there might not be much opportunity to develop. However, there’s always room to try D&3 prospects around the team’s creators, and a role could be found with the second unit and as an injury replacement starter when one of the stars go down. With Black, Da Silva, Isaac on the bench, Fleming does bring a different 3&D dynamic, but would have to compete for playing time.
    
    
    
    
21. Liam McNeeley
    
    High school hoops legend with a knockdown 3pt shot and the aggressive mentality to dunk on drives when attacking closeouts. Liam could fill a role as a 3pt shooter off the ball and a shooting threat off handoffs and screens, someone who can reboudn, handle, and pass well enough to keep the ball moving and make the right decision for the team, and even initiate some offense as a secondary creator at times.
    
    Orlando would be a clean fit for the 3pt shooter as a 6th man who spread the floor, attacks closeouts, runs a few DHOs/P&Rs, and mostly spreads the floor.
    
    The defense leaves a lot to be desired, but the functional size is there for Liam (6’7”, 215) to be a big guard who plays with a contagious fire, can light it up from deep, dunk on your head, and excite any crowd with intensity.
    
    
    
    
    
22. Nique Clifford
    
    If scoring versatility is the game, Nique Clifford is the name. Clifford can beat defenses in a multitude of ways to put the ball in the rack rather efficiently. He can provide plus-defense for his team on and off the ball. He’s a walking bucket who put himself on the map at Colorado.
    
    With Orlando drafting Tristan Da Silva last year, and Nique bringing similar scoring versatility to the table, maybe that’s a sign that he’s a good target as a potential backup 2-guard to Bane, since you can’t really have enough good basketball players who can score in a variety of ways, make big defensive plays, and make team-first decisions with the ball.
    
    An all-around portfolio, Nique Clifford ranks 4th in PSP, 9th in FGS, and 1st amongst guards in At The Rim.
    
    
    
    
23. Kasparas Jakučionis
    
    A tall point-guard pick-and-roll assassin with a go-to stepback pull-up three who uses body control, fundamental footwork, and impressive finishing at the rim to draw defenders into the paint for kickouts, whistles, and shots at rim. Kasparas can help generate offense on a whim.
    
    While Orlando has Franz in place filling a highly similar role, it’s not actually the worst idea to have a backup Franz in case of emergency. Kasparas is much smaller, but brings a similar playstyle that would help replicate Orlando’s offensive identity whether Franz shares the court or not.
    
    With both being better on pull-ups than catch-and-shoots, they might be better staggered, but that could provide Orlando with one reliable “point-forward” at all times. Despite that, the lack of defense and C&S 3pt shot make this a questionable fit.
    
    
    
    
24. Noah Penda
    
    An energetic defensive play-finisher that moves around the court so frenetically he looks like he snuck a diet Dew into his pregame Gatorade bottle, Penda is a strong playfinisher, smart connective passer, and active off-ball mover, rebounder, defender.
    
    Penda will likely be a high-end starter for a winning team, even if its as the 5th starter piece of the perfectly balanced lineup, but the lack of offensive juice could limit his lineup options in Orlando, providing a tough opportunity to develop.
    
    Could he be in winning lineups? Yes. Would he be able to play with Franz and Paolo as the longterm C? Maybe not. A winning depth piece that could be a value pick depending on the slot, but might be a tough fit for playing time in a crowded Orlando frontcourt. As a longterm backup 4 plug-and-play big, there is potential here for Penda’s play-finishing.
    
    
    
    
25. Adou Theiro
    
    Explosive NBA athlete who forces turnovers everywhere defnsively as a dynamic 6’6” wing who flies off the page anytime he opens a book. Raw offense but shows enough all-around potential to carve out a two-way role with patient development. Energetic defense, fast break missile launches, espn top-10 slams should quickly make him an exciting household name for fans.
    
    While the upside would be an intriguing upside play, its hard to see his opportunity to develop with the starting unit in Orlando. If he’s got the highest ceiling available at 25, maybe the team takes a swing on talent the later the draft goes, but finding a player who can fill roles and needs for this Magic team that just made moves to win now should take priority.
    
    
    
    
    Tier 4 – Ceiling: 5th Starter/Role Player/6th Man, Floor: Fringe Rotation Player
    
26. Will Riley
    
    Raw intriguing talent as as 3pt shooter and connective passer who can make impact plays off ball and who rated highly in BPM throughout the season, even overtaking Kasparas some in ball duties for Illinois as the season went on.
    
    This would be a dice roll on talent, impact, upside for Orlando, which isn’t a bad choice this late in the draft. While one could attempt to address a need at PG, C, or general shooting, this is a bet on talent, in-house development. Since Orlando has stated win-now goals, this idea is less likely to happen than the team taking one of the shooters or play-finishers over the next stretch, but hitting on an exciting 3pt connector late in the draft could be a huge swing for the Magic.
    
    
    
27. Javon Small
    
    A tough small guard who does just about everything well, Small has earned a look to be an NBA rotation guard, and few players fit the ilk of Orlando’s team identity better.
    
    Small gives no ground defensively, can guard multiple positions from the backcourt, and then he can turn around and initiate offense as the point guard running different playtypes, hit the jumper on and off the ball from deep, and score within different playtypes as well.
    
    Versatile scoring creator, capable 3pt shooter, and positive impact defender is just the type of guard Orlando covets around its stars.
    
    With Bane’s arrival to a backcourt already featuring Suggs, Small would make an interesting understudy to them both.
    
    
    
    
    
    
28. Sion James
    
    NBA Athlete who filled his role so well it expanded as the Duke season went on.
    
    Attacks closeouts, provides effort hustle plays defensively, at 6’6” can play 1-3 with tenacious on-ball defense, has a quick first step burst and explosive verticality and good feel for where to be and what to do.
    
    Sion could immediately help a winning team filling a small role, and in Orlando he’d get to do just that. Capable C&S 3pt shooter who can bend the defense, penetrate the paint, keep the ball moving, and defend his own would be more than welcome in O-Town.
    
    
    
    
    
    
29. Kam Jones
    
    Versatile old-school scoring guard who can get buckets, get in the paint, get to the line, and get his teammates open. Questionable defender at the next level, but the buckets should look smooth doing it.
    
    Kam could address some of Orlando’s offensive woes, while Orlando’s elite team defense could cover up some of Kam’s defensive holes. The Magic could add one of college basketball’s best scorers last year late in the first round or potentially even in the second round, where either way Jones could fill a role as a scorer, shooter, connective passer, and secondary playmaker creating offense for the team.
    
    Kam has the best combination of AST% and TO% of any draft prospect:
    
    
    
30. Nolan Traore
    
    Traore’s combination of quick first step burst, connective playmaking, defensive footwork, and perimeter shooting flashes earned him the nod here for the 30th spot on this Magic-centric big board over prospects like Koby Brea’s 3pt shooting and Vlad Goldin’s sound rim-protecting rim-rolling presence, or the two-way high floor throwback scoring of Johni Broome.
    
    If The Magic are taking gambles this late in the draft, maybe they should take a swing on a shooter like Brea who might launch 8 3PA per game one day? If the team wants two-way winning players to fill out the rotation to help compete today, a bet on Broome, Traore, or Goldin is probably better.
    
    Both choices depend on how many picks Orlando keeps (down to 3), how much contribution they expect from rookies right away (probably a lot), and what kind of risks the team is willing to take when it comes being patient with draft picks compared to the value of adding more proven talent through other avenues of team-building. (Bane says its time to win)
    
    
    
31. Johni Broome
32. Ben Saraf
33. Vlad Goldin
34. Maxime Raynaud
35. Hansen Yang
36. Koby Brea
37. Mark Sears
38. Egor Demin
39. Amari Williams
    
    Tier 5 – Ceiling: Raw Potential NBA Pro, Floor: International Pro
40. Joan Beringer
41. Eric Dixon
42. Chaz Lanier
43. Drake Powell
44. Jamir Watkins
45. Arthur Kaluma
46. RJ Luis Jr.
47. Max Shulga
48. Alijah Martin
49. Ryan Nembhard
50. Tyrese Proctor
51. Alex Toohey
52. Yanic Konan Niederhauser
53. Hugo Gonzalez
54. Dink Pate
55. Rocco Zikarsky
56. Kobe Sanders
57. Hunter Sallis
58. Will Richard
59. John Tonje
60. Chris Manon

So – which prospect has the most potential and best chance of realistically reaching that potential in Orlando, given the roster construction around Paolo Banchero, Franz Wagner primarily and Desmond Bane, Jalen Suggs, Anthony Black secondarily as the young core?

For the sake of this exercise, let’s assume Orlando keeps at least two of its three picks, both in the range of its current slots (25 + 46-57)

As of today, 13 players have been invited to the NBA Green Room for Draft night, with expectations to be selected relatively high, and Noa Essengue likely to receive an invite once he finishes playing overseas.

Those 13 Green Room names (Cooper Flagg, Dylan Harper, Ace Bailey, VJ Edgecombe, Tre Johnson, Khaman Maluach, Jeremiah Fears, Kon Knueppel, Kasparas Jakucionis, Egor Demin, Carter Bryant, Derik Queen, Asa Newell) are likely to be taken by the 25th overall pick where Orlando sits, but that might not be a bad thing for every name here, and there’s always a few surprise names who slip every year.

The ideal players slipping among this group (other than Flagg) would be skilled scorers like Tre Johnson or Kon Knueppel, or the explosive defender VJ Edgecombe, but that was much likelier to possibly happen at 16, not 25.

With his quick first step burst, 3pt shooting potential, natural point guard feel, Jeremiah Fears is one of the more interesting names to watch if he’s still available at the 25th slot, but another to unlikely be available outside of the lottery.

Later in the mid-first round draft range, prospects like Liam McNeeley, Jase Richardson, Carter Bryant, and Cedric Coward could all fit nicely in Orlando’s backcourt. All these guards space the floor and offer varying levels of scoring, defense, and shooting skills, which all help balance out and contribute quickly to Orlando’s paint-and-spray big wing attack. Nique Clifford another name to watch as a scorer, passer, and plus-defender.

If Danny Wolf is still available, that’s the big name to watch for Orlando: A point-center/forward (✓), a 3pt shooter on and off ball (✓), with size and footwork to guard big 4s and small 5s (✓), who shows incredibly unique two-way feel for the game at nearly 7ft tall (✓) , and is, you guessed it, a Michigan Man. (✓)

Wolf is a proven offensive orchestrator who can run pick-and-rolls with ease, slide into the short-roll playmaker on the next set, spread the floor for three the next possession, and play connector playmaking hub the next play. The Magic need a point-something who can hit the open three, play connector next to the stars, yet also initiate the offense so those stars don’t have to every time down the floor. Finding a unique big man who can fill those roles in an already formidable frontcourt and 1-4 starting unit set would be a worthwhile experiment on a high-risk high-reward high-feel high-potential swing.

Another name that makes too much sense for the Orlando Magic if he’s sitting there at 25?

UF’s own NCAA Champion, Walter Clayton Jr., who has as worthy of a case as just about any prospect to be this Magic team’s primary target.

Clayton lights up the gym from deep like its nothing, an efficient high-volume 3pt sniper who can shoot on and off ball, run some P&R offense, and flow right into Orlando’s handoff heavy system, fitting seamlessly with a big shot pedigree that may even remind one of Jalen Suggs.

A huge value play at 25 would be Ryan Kalkbrenner, the smart rim-protecting presence out of Creighton who flashes C&S 3pt shooting potential as a pick-and-pop rim-rolling threat. Orlando’s constant hunt for its longterm reliable big man continues, and a potential D&3 bet could be a nice play for a 3pt shooting shot-swatting big man that can be harder to find that one might think.

Assuming all the names above are off the board, then a few late-first round/fringe second round targets to watch could be complete role players: guards like Kam Jones, Javon Small, and Nolan Traore; bigs like Vlad Goldin, Wolf’s Michigan teammate and strong rim-rolling rim-protector, or intriguing big man playmakers Maxime Raynaud and Hansen Yang.

Some of the above names could slip to Orlando’s late second round slots, but given the lack of depth in this class due to all the NIL dropouts, its no guarantee. Packaging two seconds or the 25th pick to move around in the draft, maybe to an earlier second round pick to secure the guy you want and add a future pick is always good value play for a team that just needs to leave this draft with one good basketball player somewhere between 25-57. Even moving back from 25 to the 30s wouldn’t lose much potential value on a pick, especially if the team can use good process to add a future pick on top of it.

With Orlando’s final pick(s) in the 45-57 range, if none of the players listed above are available, the Magic could take a swing on a backup point guard like Mark Sears or Ryan Nembhard, or a potential 3pt shooter like Koby Brea, Arthur Kaluma, Eric Dixon, Chaz Lanier or Tyrese Proctor

Orlando Magic Draft Targets Within Range:

25
Danny Wolf, Walter Clayton Jr., Ryan Kalkbrenner, Jeremiah Fears, Nique Clifford, Liam McNeeley, Jase Richardson, Cedric Coward, Carter Bryant, Kam Jones, Javon Small, Nolan Traore, Vlad Goldin, Johni Broome


45-57
anyone listed above who is still available + Hansen Yang, Maxime Raynaud, Eric Dixon, Koby Brea, Mark Sears, Ryan Nembhard, Chaz Lanier, Arthur Kaluma, Tyrese Proctor


After the Bane trade, it seems less likely that Orlando will invest in another 2-guard; however, with Gary Harris and Jett Howard as the lone SG depth on the roster, maybe finding a high-end two-way wing is still a priority.

The top-2 goals this summer for Orlando now:

1) Target and acquire a long-term starting Center, or a prospect who can become a D&3 big with a little scoring juice
2) Round out rotation with playable depth for a playoff run, between a natural point guard or a 2/3 size wing who can shoot and defend

Of course, the Magic just made their big move. They probably don’t feel pressure to do anything else if they feel this roster is ready to contend already, but if any question remains about the shooting, the center play, the depth, paths to upgrade exist.

Magic fans have been counting down the days for something big to happen like this for years; a consolidation trade to bring this team closer to contending. The team made its goals clear: proven offensive talent was needed, and acquired.

They took their big swing to first address this need by dishing out four first rounders, a pick swap,, Cole + KCP for Bane.

Are the Magic finished making moves?

Maybe Orlando somehow trades into the Top-10 for Tre Johnson, VJ Edgecombe, or Kon Knueppel to help balance the offense, but now that the team has packaged some picks and rotation players for a more proven offensive talent, it seems likelier the team will stay put at 25 to target a good player on a rookie deal, or package its picks to move around the draft for their target.

When it comes to draft night trades, there are plenty of reasons to make deals.

Here’s 5:

1) Front offices are filled with humans, and deadliens create urge for humans. Teams wait for dates like the trade deadline and draft night to make moves for many reasons, one being to evaluate every possible deal and ounce of leverage before settling on a trade packge. But on those nights, anything can happen – some teams are on edge, some desperate, some excited to make a splash, whether that be a big draft night selection or a midnight trade to excite fans with something new over the off-season; as draft day approaches, unpredictable chaos and impulse decisions await.

2) Consensus big boards allow teams to view draft slot ranges where prospects are most expected to land between, so given the knowledge of other team needs/connections/identity, this opens up opportunities to trade up in the draft to secure a coveted prospect, or move back in the draft to add draft capital if your coveted prospect isn’t likely to be considered anytime around the slot you currently possess.

3) Trading out of the draft for additional future picks is almost always a good decision, even if taking on salary to do so. This generally smart draft process acquires extra draft capital for the price of today’s, just because other teams (owners) generally prefer to have the draft pick *that* night, and are willing to pay extra to do it.

4) Pre-agency: Star players, draft picks, and every nba player in between share the same agencies; all sides talk every possibility long before they happen. If a team believes a major splash is available, their best chance to take the dive is on draft night, the last night where the picks posses the most value they’ll ever have because that pick can still potentially be *anything*, before the car is driven off the lot and becomes an actual player the next day, losing value just by going from potential to reality.

5) Christmas Morning: Fans love a good trade, a fresh face, a new name to see on posters, sides of buildings, tv commercials. Draft Day should be a national holiday, as watching the first team go On The Clock feels like waking up on Christmas Morning, where any team’s fans can still get any gift. Few feelings are as fun for a fan like watching a midnight move go down or a surprise draft pick get made (#ThankYouBane), but few feelings are as sad for fans as seeing their favorite players sent out the door. (#RIPOrlandipo)

The Magic went into the summer shopping these trade pieces first:

Draft Picks: 16, 25, 45, 57, PHX 2026 Swap, Future 1sts
Prospects like Tristan Da Silva and Jett Howard
Rotation Players on Good Contracts like Jonathan Isaac, Cole Anthony, Wendell Carter Jr., Kentavious Caldwell Pope, Goga Bitadze

I would have bet a combination of 16, 25, Tristan Da Silva, Cole Anthony, and Jonathan Isaac or some mix of good role players on good salaries would be enough of well-rounded offer to pry one of these proven talents away from a rebuilding team.

Turns out the Magic could keep Black, Suggs, Da Silva, Isaac, 25 if they just sent out 4 future first rounders that have a good chance to be in the back half of the first round.


Magic Fans’ prayers have been answered.

Desmond Bane instantly provides Orlando with the high-volume 3pt sniper they’ve always wanted, a tough defender, a team-first connector passer who can run some offense and score in a variety of ways.

Suggs – Bane – Franz – Paolo – Wendell – Black – Da Silva – Isaac – Goga

Orlando’s got a young prime rotation to build around, an elite defense, two stars, five ball-handlers, and multiple all-defensive candidates too boot.

Now the team just needs to dot some ‘i’s, cross some ‘t’s, and hopefully draft another exciting prospect to add to the deep young core like Walter Clayton Jr., Danny Wolf, Ryan Kalkbrenner, Cedric Coward, Javon Small, on draft night

I guess we’ll just have to wait and find out what happens next on June 25th at 8:00pm EST.

The 2025 NBA Draft Countdown Clock BEGINS!

The post The Official 2025 NBA Draft Orlando Magic Team-Centric Big Board appeared first on Swish Theory.

VJ Edgecombe

Valdez (VJ) Edgecombe has been a projected top 5 pick wire to wire in this class. Despite a rocky start to the season, Edgecombe’s status as a blue chip recruit seemed well deserved after a freshman season that placed him in exclusive company.

As much as Bart Torvik queries have become a fraught subject amongst the draft community, when taking an Occam’s Razor approach it is apparent there’s not really a precedent for a player with Edgecombe’s intersection of feel, athleticism, and production becoming an abject failure in the league (barring unforeseen circumstances taking place in the case of Zhaire Smith).

So if Edgecombe has the pedigree and production, what consternation is there with his current standing near the top of the draft? To start, one may point to VJ’s suboptimal finishing at the rim. While Edgecombe ended the season at a solid 60% at the rim, his rim efficiency was largely inflated by his dynamic vertical athleticism and transition frequency. Just under 48% of Edgecombe’s rim-attempts came in transition, while in the halfcourt Edgecombe finished only 49% at the rim and a disconcerting 44% on half-court layups. However, this is not a novel insight; most publications and scouts have noted VJ’s half-court limitations for some time, with his unrefined ballhandling typically being pointed to as the culprit of his unimpressive rim-finishing. Per @henrynbadraft, Edgecombe’s relative weakness at the rim has been present since his time on the grassroots circuit. In the query below of top-50 RSCI players’ AAU statistics over the past 3 years, along with Edgecombe, these were the only players to have <53% on two-point attempts (2PA), <0.6 2PA/TSA (true shot attempt), and <0.1 FTA/TSA.

Of the 5 players here (excluding Edgecombe) to play over a 50% minutes share, their average rim-rate was 20.9% as a freshman. With the exception of VJ, these players were either three-point specialists or jumpshot-oriented creators. With VJ not falling into either bucket he was placed in a precarious position, how does one deploy a blue-chip recruit without a clearly defined offensive skillset? Early in the season, the fit could best be described as ‘trying to fit a square peg into a round hole’. Baylor runs a notoriously ballscreen-heavy offense, finishing this season in the 81st percentile in ‘Pick-and-Roll’ frequency, and over the last 5 years Baylor has never finished lower than the 77th percentile in this playtype.

Operating core ballscreen actions in the middle third of the floor, Edgecombe greatly struggled generating deep, quality paint touches. When asked to create from a standstill against a set defense as frequently as Edgecombe was, his high center of gravity caused issues changing direction off a live dribble, withstanding contact on drives, and altering stride length, all of which are critical components of any downhill driving game. The convergence of Edgecombe’s physical and skill limitations as a primary ballhandler is evident from the clips below.

When you pair this schematic emphasis on running ballscreens with one of the slowest paces in the country (Baylor finished 320/364 teams in Adjusted Tempo) you are left with a team uniquely suited to exacerbating Edgecombe’s weaknesses and suppressing his strengths. I believe this combination is the primary cause of Baylor’s offense being BETTER with Edgecombe on the bench. Per Hoop-Explorer, Baylor’s offense was 7.6 points better per 100 possessions. While the 479 possessions Edgecombe wasn’t on the floor isn’t the most robust sample, the underlying numbers fall in line with what the film suggests. Baylor’s shot quality suffered with Edgecombe running 24% of the team’s PNR actions per Synergy. Not only was Baylor less capable of generating threes and free-throw attempts, the QUALITY of three-point attempts was lower with Edgecombe on the floor, with the team shooting almost 2 less corner threes per 100 possessions.

Even if Edgecombe’s outlook as a downhill creator is replete with red flags, there are still other avenues Edgecombe could take to develop into a star-level offensive player. After all, despite getting off to a rough start shooting this season, Edgecombe’s shooting priors are near stellar. Coming into the year, Edgecombe had shot 39.1% on 274 threes and 79.9% on 134 free-throw attempts. These numbers indicate that Edgecombe developing into a potent off-the-dribble is well within the realm of possibility. And when looking at historical precedent, significant pull-up shooting development may be the most integral component to Edgecombe returning top-5 value. Below are all the players drafted in the lottery since 2010 who were: 6’5 or shorter, with 5 or fewer unassisted two-point makes per 100 possessions, and 30% or more of their two’s assisted (per Bart Torvik)

Virtually all of these players who returned positive expected value based on their draft slot developed into highly effective shooters off the dribble. And where it currently stands, Edgecombe is behind the curve in this respect. Compared to the players in the previous query, Edgecombe finished his pre-NBA season with the lowest volume AND tied for the 2nd worst efficiency on these pull-up twos.

Edgecombe’s lack of comfort shooting off the dribble is apparent on film, and another facet of his game limited by his handle. VJ cannot self-organize off multiple dribbles and take pull-up jumpers on balance currently, and the line between midrange attempts and floaters is frequently blurred when Edgecombe takes these shots.

Again, VJ’s issues shooting off the dribble date back to his pre-NCAA career and are rooted in his biomechanical issues. Edgecombe being a ‘high-hipped’ athlete who struggles decelerating is preventing him from leveraging his impressive straight-line speed to create space off the dribble. VJ’s proclivity for over-striding on drives limits how effectively he can generate power when he transitions into a pull-up jumper.

My current hypothesis is Edgecombe’s difficulty controlling his stride length while driving is what’s responsible for the discrepancy between VJ’s dynamism leaping off 2 feet, where he’s arguably the most explosive player in this draft class, versus 1 foot, where he’s struggled greatly relative to expectations. Baylor’s coaching staff made schematic changes for Edgecombe to improve his on-ball efficacy, from using guard-to-guard Ghost Screens to clear driving lanes…

…to using actions such as ’77 Shallow’ in order to simultaneously beat hedging ballscreen coverages and remove nail-help to aid Edgecombe’s drives.

However, neither adjustment bolstered Edgecombe’s efficiency to the desired extent. So this begs the question, if there’s reason for concern with regards to Edgecombe’s effectiveness as a pull-up shooter AND attacking the basket, is there any reason to believe Edgecombe’s profile warrants his lofty draft projection? As previously mentioned, Edgecombe’s deployment in an extremely ballscreen heavy offense was far from ideal, however his playtype distribution does not paint the full picture of how inconducive Baylor’s offense was for Edgecombe specifically.

The 3-man lineup of VJ Edgecombe, Norchad Omier, and Josh Ojianwuna makes up 22.5% of VJ Edgecombe’s total possessions played this season, however this lineup was on the floor for 26.9% of PNR possessions ran by Edgecombe this season. In Offensive Rating, this 3-man lineup was 22nd out of 25 Baylor lineups that played over 350 possessions, with this 3-man unit’s only saving grace being their relative strength on the offensive glass.

This lineup’s spacing issues only amplified Edgecombe’s aforementioned struggles as a primary ballhandler. Take the clips below, for example. This group of clips displays Baylor running ‘RAM PNP’, a staple of their ballscreen offense, where a player receives an off-ball screen before setting the middle ballscreen and ‘popping’ to the 3-point line. In the first clip, Baylor has the 2 bigs involved in the action, with Norchad Omier first receiving the off-ball screen before setting a ballscreen for Edgecombe. Notice how compacted the spacing is inside the arc, with Omier’s defender completely disregarding the popping Omier.

However, in the following clips, a ‘small’ sets the middle ballscreen for Edgecombe. Even in the first possessions with the action taking place against the same opponent in Tennessee, the improvement in shot quality is apparent.

The double-big lineups’ impact on tape was corroborated by VJ’s PNR data, as well.

Ultimately, this is a minuscule sample of possessions Edgecombe played with the double big lineup, and I do not want to make it seem as though these suboptimal lineups are totally responsible for VJ’s issues as a PNR ballhandler. However, I do think this data is key to realizing that Edgecombe’s outlook as a creator isn’t entirely doomed. Of players with ≥ 150 PNR + Passes possessions, Edgecombe was ranked in the 40th percentile in PPP, but in lineups with only one big Edgecombe’s 0.944 PPP was in the 66th percentile. Over the course of the season Baylor substituted these 3-man ballscreen actions with ‘Empty’ PNRs to ‘clear up’ the picture for Edgecombe on drives and place less strain on his handle. In these less complex ballscreen actions, Edgecombe’s processing (which well outpaces the functionality of his handle at this point) was able to truly shine.

My case for optimism in Edgecombe’s creation ability is relative to the position taken by his greatest detractors. The likelihood of VJ becoming a high-level PNR operator is slim-to-none in my opinion, but this doesn’t preclude the possibility of him becoming a highly valuable offensive player. The use case for VJ Edgecombe offensively just requires a degree of creativity.

For as many questions as I’ve raised regarding the functionality of VJ’s athleticism, there have only been a few players his size to reach certain athletic benchmarks. Below is a query I’ve run on players since 2010, where ‘Team Stock%’ is the share of a team’s steals+blocks a player logged. I decided to use this instead of steal and block rate to account for some noise introduced by team stylistic tendencies.

The only other players to appear alongside Edgecombe are players whose role I’ve termed ‘Utility Guards’, those with the size of perimeter players who can fulfill responsibilities typically associated with frontcourt players. This sort of role is where I see Edgecombe being best utilized. As VJ transitions to the NBA and his on-ball burden lessens, I would hope that Edgecombe is integrated as a stylistic wrinkle versus a featured piece. There may not be a team better at deploying their guards in such a manner than the Boston Celtics. With the acquisition of Jrue Holiday, the Celtics could place teams in conflict without deliberately involving Holiday in actions. By simply stationing Holiday in the Dunker Spot, the Celtics were afforded the luxury of having a player who could function as an outlet for their jumbo creators on drives and consistently win the rebounding battle versus like-sized perimeter players.

In the original ‘Utility Guard’ query I provided, pre-NBA 3-point volume and efficiency were listed. The relevancy of these stats outside of the obvious is the prevalence of the most consistent counter used to neutralize this archetype. I am currently writing this article as the Eastern Conference Finals takes place, and much has been made of Josh Hart’s ineffectiveness in the series, with the Knicks coaching staff going as far as removing Hart from the starting lineup. What has plagued Hart and many of these Swiss army knife players (at least offensively) is the lack of consistent spacing they provide. Opponents have experienced success defending these players with Centers and ignoring them on the perimeter. What makes the prospect of Edgecombe in this role especially tantalizing is the confidence I have in his ability as a spot-up shooter.

Granted, a significant portion of these attempts are from the high-school line, and Edgecombe has shot a paltry 24.4% (19/79) on off-the-dribble 3PA in the same timeframe. But at the same stage of their careers, Edgecombe is significantly further along as a spacer than players of a similar archetype, while also possessing the explosiveness to take advantage of opportunities as a screener like Gary Payton II in the clip below…

Or exploit cross-matches versus bigs in space, as he does to Henri Veesaar in the play below.

And as previously mentioned, Baylor’s PNR-heavy style being centered around smaller guards who couldn’t create advantages eradicated opportunistic scoring from Edgecombe’s shot diet. The few chances Edgecombe has had to attack from the weakside or get downhill versus a tilted floor, he delivered.

Obviously, there’s only so much accommodating a team would want to subject themselves to when it comes to a player drafted as high as VJ will be. However, a player capable of providing lineup and stylistic flexibility without compromising spacing or rebounding is scarcely made available at a rookie deal price point. This archetype’s dependence on high-leverage creators is undeniable, but this era of the NBA reflects the appeal of a prospect like VJ Edgecombe. Sacrificing the size traditionally associated with certain roles in favor of skill can pay massive dividends.

Miles Byrd

Any reservations to be had with Miles Byrd are fairly straightforward; a glance at a query of players with Byrd’s combination of size and scoring inefficiency yields a list almost bereft of long-tenured NBA contributors.

It wouldn’t be entirely off-base to say the only reason the majority of this list was even able to enter the draft pool was due to exceptional high school pedigrees. The obvious throughline between success cases of this query is their high-level defensive aptitude. There is definitely reason to believe Byrd’s defensive capabilities are enough to buoy his NBA prospects, as of the players in the above query, Byrd has the highest Block and Steal rate. To my surprise, however, Byrd’s impact on San Diego State’s defensive efficiency was muted relative to his statistical production on this end of the floor. Per Hoop-Explorer, San Diego State’s defense was only 2.5 points per 100 possessions better with Byrd On Court vs Off. Perhaps most unexpectedly though, SDSU’s Defensive Turnover Rate remained unchanged regardless of whether Byrd was playing or not!

Watching the tape, it is fairly easy to draw conclusions as to what could be behind the discrepancy between Byrd’s stellar event creation numbers, and the On-Off Splits. San Diego State runs an aggressive switching scheme, which incentivizes players to sacrifice ‘sound’ positioning in favor of forcing opponents into congested areas of the floor where they are more prone to committing turnovers. Byrd’s tape is littered with possessions where he is overhelping, or even throwing himself out of position by jumping passing lanes and attempting to create havoc.

Referencing SDSU’s defensive resume, there are two statistics that are key to elucidating Byrd’s directive schematically.

San Diego State was in the Bottom 10 in Opponent 3-point Rate, while leading the nation in Block Rate. It seems Head Coach Brian Dutcher was comfortable with trading off 3-point attempts as long as they were able to pack the paint and prevent their deep-lying shell from being compromised. This philosophy has been a defining trait of the Dutcher era, with SDSU ranking in the top 200 in opponent 3-point rate once in his 7 years at the helm, and outside the top 300 three times, including this year. SDSU’s Block% is relevant to their scheme and Byrd’s defensive evaluation because it empowered Byrd to take risks on the perimeter. If Byrd made an ill-advised gamble and provided the opponent a numerical advantage to attack, they still had to contend with a formidable frontcourt led by Magoon Gwath who finished 4th in the country in Block%.

Synthesizing this information initially led me to take a skeptical approach to Byrd’s defensive translatability. And prompted a less charitable interpretation of instances where Byrd’s point-of-attack defense faltered…

…or Byrd’s lack of strength seemed to be insulated by SDSU’s constant switching.

And while these were valid concerns at the time, taking a more holistic approach to Miles Byrd’s defensive profile incited me to revise my approach. But before delving deeper into the defensive side of things, I believe Byrd’s offense deserves further attention.

The Case for Miles Byrd’s Offense

Of the 68 teams in the NCAA Tournament field, San Diego State was 61st in Adjusted Offensive Rating, surpassing only the four 16 seeds in the field, Bryant, Troy, and Robert Morris in offensive efficiency. Historically speaking, San Diego State under Bryan Dutcher has never been a system conducive to high-octane offenses. A look at SDSU’s offensive statistical profile over the years portrays a team that plays a deliberate style without generating high-quality, schemed looks.

Too often, there’s a false equivalency drawn between slow offense and bad offense. That’s far from the case in my opinion, one only need to look as far as the NCAA and NBA champions in the 2023-24 season, the UConn Huskies and Boston Celtics. Both teams played a laborious style, but with intent. UConn’s meticulously schemed motion offense was incredibly efficient, creating clean looks for their bevy of shooters. Boston’s dominant run through this past season was defined by their relentless matchup hunting and isolation game. San Diego State, though, according to their own coach, is willing to play a much more laissez-faire approach to offense. On the Basketball Immersion Podcast, Dutcher discussed his philosophy on his offense in relation to his defense as “We spend a lot of time on defense. You’re good at what you work at…we might spend 50-60% of practice on defense…Offensively, we play with great freedom. We play with freedom within framework, we have things we try to accomplish but we like high IQ guys that can break out of that at any moment and just make plays.”

Although in many areas of the game flexibility is an admirable trait, in this instance, SDSU’s willingness to grant players freedom offensive autonomy has resulted in a consistently undesirable shot profile. Below is SDSU’s shot profile data under Brian Dutcher, with Near Proximity field goal attempts being defined as layups, dunks, and tip-ins.

Even with the offensive context being subpar, anyone who has read this far is probably looking for a better explanation for Miles Byrd’s offensive shortcomings than ‘the spacing and system were terrible.’ After all, this could be applied to a litany of former prospects. Despite a team’s structural issues, a player shouldn’t be entirely absolved of the product right? In Byrd’s case, though, despite the uninspiring raw efficiency, he finished in the 87th percentile in Offensive On-Off, per cbbanalytics. San Diego State was 8.9 points per 100 possessions better with Byrd on the court, due to his contribution in a few areas.

First, Miles Byrd is a stellar example of the importance of interior passing. Ranking in the 92nd percentile in Rim-Assists/40 minutes and the 96th percentile in the percent of total assists at the rim, on a per-touch basis Byrd was extremely efficient as a playmaker. Without running a high volume of PNR, Byrd routinely displayed a diverse passing vocabulary in the few opportunities he had attacking a tilted defense.

Even though I would consider Byrd’s handle a weakness at the moment, his penchant for playmaking manifested in his schemed possessions as well. The glut of actions drawn up for Byrd were ‘Spanoulis’ or ‘Zoom Chicago’, but he did operate and was effective in a limited sample as a PNR ballhandler, finishing in the 84th percentile in PNR PPP.

What Byrd’s projection on this end will be reduced to, though, will be how consistent a spacer he will become. Ending the season shooting only 30.3% from 3 on a robust 11.7 3PA/100, I am more optimistic Byrd will develop into an effective spacer than the raw numbers indicate. A significant portion of the optimism lies in Byrd’s stellar three-point volume and career 82.8% FT%, while also being rooted in the circumstances brought on by SDSU’s offense. On Guarded 3PA Byrd shot 37.2% (32/86), which was significantly better than the 23.1% (12/52) Byrd shot on Unguarded 3PA. My hypothesis as to how this could have been possible is that half of Byrd’s 3PA were classified as ‘Long Threes’ which per cbbdata are 3PA from 25+ feet. Already lacking in physical strength, oftentimes Byrd was placed in the position of HAVING to take long 3PA when his teammates were incapable of penetrating and breaking the defensive shell on the initial action.

What may be the strongest evidence for optimism in Byrd’s offensive profile is how extensive a creation burden he was tasked with. Over the course of researching relevant data for this piece, I’d realized Byrd’s self-created shot volume stood out amongst similarly sized players from previous drafts. This past season, only 22.9% of Miles Byrd’s two-point attempts were assisted and he produced 7.42 Unassisted 2PA per 100, a shot distribution more in line with guards trusted with generating half-court offense. To gauge how Byrd’s creation compared to similarly sized players, I conducted a (slightly overfitted) query…

….which yielded this list of 72 players since 2010

50th percentile EPM in the NBA this year (regular season) is -1.71 and slightly over half of this list’s 3 Year Peak EPM surpasses this number. Considering the draft capital (or lack thereof) spent on these players, a majority of them outperformed the expected value attributed to their draft slotting. Notably in the mix here are some of the most impressive recent ‘margin wins’ in Naji Marshall, Herb Jones, and Aaron Wiggins. And while there are some significant disappointments (like a Jarrett Culver or Johnny Davis), even some widely considered ‘busts’ such as Evan Turner managed to contribute in the league for a significant period of time. Two shared traits with players unable to stick in the league were:

1. Lacking a complementary offensive skillset (perimeter shooting, connective passing, and other play-finishing traits)
2. An inability to contribute defensively.

As previously outlined, I’m of the mind that San Diego State’s offensive ecosystem deprived Byrd of opportunities to display the former, and in the next section I plan on quelling concerns of the latter issue.

Tying it all together

For all the aforementioned reasons, Miles Byrd and VJ Edgecombe’s profiles are not without their flaws. There are probably plenty of issues with their skill sets that I haven’t mentioned that would make teams wary of drafting them. What these two have in common, and what has been particularly enamoring, is the seamlessness with which they fit into the modern game. Particularly defensively, Edgecombe and Byrd embody traits that I believe are necessary to play in today’s style.

After this season, Miles Byrd found himself in rare company with his defensive production. The list of non-bigs who managed to contribute to elite defense to the degree Byrd did, while maintaining a baseline level of feel, is exceedingly small.

Taking account of the right-most column, zone-heavy teams seem disproportionately represented amongst this group of players, making Byrd’s inclusion even more compelling. Per Synergy, San Diego State only logged 2 (!!) possessions of zone defense this entire season. Circling back to the initial concerns raised about SDSU’s defense and how relevant Byrd’s responsibilities within the scheme would be to what he’ll be asked to do at the next level, I believe SDSU’s scheme is one of the college defenses most analogous to the NBA systems currently in vogue.

Earlier, I had mentioned SDSU’s willingness to switch in conjunction with their tendency to show help early and often as a potential crutch for Miles Byrd, an obstacle in properly evaluating his defense. Originally, I’d thought if I were unable to assess Byrd’s ability to perform in ONE isolated defensive role, whether it be screen navigation, POA defense, or weakside rim-protection, then I’d be unable to determine which defensive role best suited him. The direction defenses in the NBA are heading, though, proves this is an antiquated way of evaluating defensive talent. In the same way competency in dribbling, passing, and shooting has become requisite for incoming NBA players, we have now arrived in an era where personnel need to demonstrate a degree of proficiency in each facet of defense to contribute to elite ’16 game’ basketball.

Of course, no team has exemplified this philosophy more than the prohibitive favorites for this year’s championship, the Oklahoma City Thunder. By compiling a roster full of players who are not only physically capable of executing a variety of defensive roles, but can simultaneously diagnose complex rotations, the Thunder have architected a defense with a singular identity amongst the NBA elite. Similar to San Diego State, the Thunder have no issues helping off of shooters, switching early and often, varying ballscreen coverages, and breaking with conventional defensive principles like helping off the ball-side corner.

While the other participant in this year’s NBA Finals doesn’t play as frenetic a defensive scheme, the Indiana Pacers mirror Oklahoma City in their utilization of early pick-up points in order to extend their pressure and convert a perceived weakness, their size, into a strength.

This kind of defense, which is becoming more and more commonplace, is where both Edgecombe and Byrd should thrive. Both have routinely shown their chops in each ‘phase’ of defense. Role notwithstanding, both were exemplary as point-of-attack defenders.

As previously discussed, SDSU’s scheme gave Byrd carte blanche to trust his instincts and range as a help defender, to consistently great results. Byrd’s activity was pervasive in every area, changing the geometry of the court by altering drive angles as a nail-defender…

…and keeping his team’s defense out of rotation with his sticky screen navigation.

Edgecombe’s deployment wasn’t nearly as fluid as Byrd’s, as Baylor played significantly more zone defense than SDSU (Baylor finished in the 91st percentile in zone frequency), making their defensive identity this season much more conservative. Coming into this season as the 234th-ranked team in average height per KenPom, Baylor didn’t have the luxury of rangy defenders to execute longer, more exotic rotations, so their prerogative was to stay out of rotation entirely and maintain shell integrity. This confined Edgecombe to playing a much more static role than Byrd. Even with a more parochial role, Edgecombe’s hand speed and lateral quickness mirroring players on the perimeter shone.

The instances of cognitive athleticism Byrd and Edgecombe show in the clips above are what make them especially suited for modern defenses. Oklahoma City has become the blueprint by acquiring players with traditionally valued athletic traits, decision making, and reaction times to dial their defensive aggression to the point where they are dictating terms of play to the offense. Recently, a major shift in NFL defenses was made when teams realized offenses struggled playing against 2-high safety alignments, where big-play opportunities were limited and offenses would have to slowly matriculate the ball down the field. I do not find the recent schematic changes made by the OKC Thunder all that different. The Thunder defense, by swarming to the ball and congesting driving lanes, have turned the long-held ‘drive and kick’ logic on its head. Similar to San Diego State, OKC concedes a high volume of 3PA defensively, especially relative to contemporary elite defenses. However, this is by design, by selling out on drives and forcing the ball to travel east-west versus north-south, both teams force longer possessions. In Oklahoma City’s case, the number of defensive playmakers they roster makes each drive by the opponent a tenuous proposition. When a team rosters so many chaos agents on defense, there’s the opportunity cost assumed with each successive drive, that the chance of the driver committing a turnover increases.

The emphasis on turnover generation in convergence with the break from traditional defensive philosophies resulted in NBA defense being ‘up’ this year, with drive volume, secondary assists (an assist made without the passer dribbling before the assist), and offensive rating all declining. While I understand this is a somewhat strained assumption, especially on such a small sample, I truly believe the sustained intensity and creativity we’re seeing in defenses is responsible for this phenomenon.

In SDSU’s case, Miles Byrd was disruptive enough on his own to mimic this effect on opposing offenses. By covering large swaths of ground and making multiple efforts after the initial rotation, Byrd was largely responsible for preventing flow to build within an offense.

By now I am probably starting to sound like a broken record with the continued use of terms like ‘ground-coverage’ and ‘event creation’, but it truly can’t be overstated how essential this is becoming as we transition into what has been aptly termed ‘The Weakest Link Era’ (a phrase coined by the inimitable Owen Phillips). So far, I’ve outlined the kind of player required to play this work-intensive style of defense, but the fact of the matter is that to play this way throughout the regular season and playoffs, you need MORE of this kind of player.

NBA basketball has never been more physically demanding, so it follows that to play a style hinged on range and effort, you’ll need a rotating cast of players to complement your core group. In Oklahoma City’s case, their depth is not only complementary, but ameliorates the weaknesses of many players in their rotation. So many members of the Thunder either currently possess or were at an earlier point designated as half-court deficient players; however, their greatest strength defensively allows them to play in the game states most conducive to efficient offense.

This applies to Miles Byrd and VJ Edgecombe because, irrespective of their offensive limitations, their penchant for creating turnovers will greatly augment the offense of a team, especially one already rostering players with similar defensive talents. The effect both Byrd and Edgecombe had on their respective teams’ transition numbers is instructive as to their value-add offensively.

In Byrd’s case, these transition numbers are especially notable: this is how a player shooting 38% from the field becomes the most impactful player to his team’s offense. San Diego State’s rim rate went from 122nd in the country with Byrd on the court to 293rd with him off. Without Byrd providing a spark in transition, the Aztecs were incapable of generating quality rim attempts in the half-court.

Conclusion

As it currently stands, the NBA is in a transitionary period. Slowly but surely, fans, analysts, and teams alike are acknowledging this era is a far departure from the star-centric league most of us grew to know and love. Now, as depth and flexibility become the focus, and while salary cap restrictions are more punitive than ever, it is paramount that teams get the most out of whatever draft capital they possess to maintain a standard of competitiveness. Otherwise, teams will routinely subject themselves to the whims of the ever-temperamental lottery gods (my condolences go out to fans of the Wizards, Jazz, and Pelicans alike). As I’ve mentioned repeatedly, Miles Byrd and VJ Edgecombe are far from perfect prospects, for as much as I’ve lauded their defensive acumen, even in this area their physical strength could become a significant obstacle which prevents them from being All-Defense caliber performers.

In Edgecombe’s case in particular, I would be surprised if he ended up returning top-4 value, and personally have him ranked 7th at the time of writing. I see VJ developing in a way where he could disappoint relative to expectations on his rookie contract. However, the style both players allow you to play, and the confidence I have in the depth they will provide, anchors my belief that both players have productive NBA careers ahead of them.

The post Contextualizing Production: VJ Edgecombe and Miles Byrd appeared first on Swish Theory.

Listed at 6’10”, Rutgers Scarlet Knights, Freshman, 18.9 on draft day

Ace Bailey is a dynamo, a blistering midrange scorer where he shot 46% with only 27% of his makes assisted.

Much of the damage was done on midrange pull-ups: he was 40 for 110 there (36%). His very high volume of 3.7 midrange pullup attempts per game places him 32nd in the country as an 18-year-old, exceeding the figures of teammate and presumptive #2 pick Dylan Harper who ranked 235th and shot only 28%. Cooper Flagg also took about half the midrange pullup attempts per game of Ace, and similarly shot a decent bit worse than him there at 33%.

In the first clip above, one of my favorites of the cycle, seen from a better angle, Ace goes from this positioning:

To this tiptoeing the sideline:

Then gathering from his low stance to rise and fire over the help:

I harp on small space coordination for a reason: it is one of the traits I identified as characteristic of all the NBA’s recent greatest improvers (players like Pascal Siakam and Devin Booker). I wrote the following: “On offense, small space coordination not only means being nimble enough to create an initial advantage, but, arguably more important, the ability to dance through traffic. We return to a similar concept as the previous sections – the ability to finish a play.”

Small space coordination leads to improvement because it gets you reps others cannot receive. It opens up creative pathways to score and allows you to pick your spots more accurately. Ace Bailey, with his nimble footwork, will be able to experiment with scoring techniques others could only imagine.

In the midrange one has to not only deal with their immediate defender but some level of help as well. This dual focus makes small space coordination all the more important, squeezing through gaps closing in on two sides. This is not like three point shooting where shooting over a closeout rules supreme.

What else does Ace exhibit in his midrange game? Most notable, fluidity and creativity. Take as another example from the above highlight reel his midrange make against Kennesaw State.

Ace gathers with a pro hop, attacking at an oblique angle to the basket from the wing to the paint:

But instead of rising up out of this gather, he expertly ducks and turns back the direction he came:

This leaves the defender completely in the dust where he now has a fairly uncontested turnaround.

If you put all of the shotmakers of Ace’s ilk in this situation, it is highly unlikely anyone else would have come up with the same solution. For someone broadly considered with worse feel for the game than his peers (as shown by his 0.6 assist to turnover ratio), Ace has plenty of moments of genius in a pinch.

This is to speak nothing of his actual shooting form. That analysis is more subjective, but still worthwhile. Bailey’s strength comes from his ability to keep his form regardless of the angle he’s firing from, working well with his proclivity for quick fadeaways.

Just look at that follow through and holding of pose in spite of his lower body being angled off to his left.

Finally, Ace is great at simply throwing it up there. He was elite with both floaters (14 for 23, 61%) and barely missed any of the few hooks he attempted (7 for 9, 78%). The fact that he is able to guide the ball to the rim from unstructured shooting forms is a great sign for his touch. Check out the final minute of the highlight reel above for some examples, in addition to this impressive make.

Bailey has all the tools as a midrange shotmaker: the height and speedy and high release to get his shot off with ease. The creativity to find unusual finishing patterns. The touch from any kind of angle. Expect him to be shooting through narrow midrange windows his whole career, handle pending.

#2: Tre Johnson

Listed at 6’6”, Texas Longhorns, Freshman, 19.3 on draft day

Tre Johnson is the first 2x superlative winner in this series after being our #1 three point prospect.

His shooting form once again stands out, as does his versatility of set up.

The makes in the above video display finishes in the following manners:

• Drift forward left
• Fade back right
• Quick stop moving right
• Spin fade right
• Drift forward right
• Up and under floater
• Up and under floater
• Quick stop floater

Johnson is particularly adept at drifting just as much as necessary to counterbalance his forward momentum, often slowing just in time as he rises up.

This mixes well with his stutter rip tendency / ability, creating the seam needed to hit with a quick burst, then counterbalanced after a single hard dribble.

Statistically, Tre was a better pull-up three point shooter (at 38%) than pull-up two point shooter (36%) on equally heavy volume at just under 100 attempts each. I attribute much of the worse two point shooting to variance, as the technique is there, but he does force some difficult shots to suppress the efficiency.

With Johnson’s ability to push for difficult attempts, it can be easy to write him off as low feel. Indeed, I do have a concern there (it was especially difficult to see him repeatedly wave for the ball at 0:25 above), especially given his upright driving nature. But, moreso than Bailey, Johnson has so many tools in his repertoire it would be impossible to get here without study and dedication.

I am particularly impressed by Johnson’s ability to pair a midrange fadeaway with an up-and-under floater. You have to leap to contest the 6’6” Johnson’s attempt (he shot 50% in the post), leaving you vulnerable to a fake and pivot forward. His touch does the rest of the work – Johnson shot 23 for 55 on floaters.

While I remain very pessimistic on Johnson’s defensive ability, particularly his poor rebounding, his nuclear scoring ability seems likely to translate in some form. He has too many weapons at his disposal, with balance and technique providing the base. His ability to both quickly organize off of movement and finish with just the right drift can make up for his lack of separation when he hangs onto the ball for longer. The habits may need some refining, and the on-court product might be rough at first, but Johnson remains a compelling lottery bet regardless.

#3: Tahaad Pettiford

Listed at 6’1”, Auburn Tigers, Freshman, 19.9 on draft day

Shooting 43% with Auburn on 40 pull-up twos and, more importantly, 52% on 35 floaters, Pettiford was an easy third option here. Evident in the tape is his consistent ability to not only separate off the dribble, but flow perfectly into his pull-up following these dramatic moves.

The first clip above displays this as well as any. Tahaad pulls off a two-step step-back and knocks it down clean. This reveals not only great balance but precision of footwork.

Just as important, Pettiford has an extra quick release, rising off the ground in an instant. You could call Pettiford’s ability to adapt to his smaller stature a cauterized wound – a consistent physical deficit that you have learned to overcome in a way where it’s no longer harmful. Think of Alperen Sengun becoming a plus defender despite his lack of foot speed, or Pettiford’s high-arching floaters. Cauterizing one’s wound most often requires a high degree of both adaptability and creativity.

Pettiford is comfortable pulling up from both directions, and looks about as adept with right hand floaters as his dominant left. The road is uphill for guards of Pettiford’s size – we are likely to find his 6’1” listing as generous – but his cauterized wound of size is compensated by an elite adaptability of shooting. Pettiford is worse at the rim than he is on floaters, but is likely to be operating much more outside of the paint anyways. There is more space out there for him to grab in a flurry of footwork.

While I generally shy away from small guards who are highly likely to be -1 or worse per 100 possessions on defense, Pettiford is still worth a first round flyer due to his ability to work between the paint and three point line and pass outside in. His assist rate of 23% is unusually high for players at his level of shotmaking, where only 11% of his midrange makes were assisted. Compare that to Ace Bailey at 27%, Tre Johnson at 18% or Tyler Herro at 21%. There’s a chance Pettiford can make the poor defense worth it, especially as a bench sparkplug.

Value Analysis

Midrange scoring is fairly obviously less important than three point shooting, but it is a mistake to either shrug it off as a viable weapon to keep defenses honest or assume a player’s skillset or ability is basically the same as the three. It is very difficult to create plus efficiency offense from midrange, with the highest volume midrange shooters averaging around 0.8 to 1.05 points per shot. But not all shots are created the same, and the midrange can be a fantastic counter for the elite of the elite who can hit the majority of open midrange looks. If you have to be covered in midrange as aggressively as at the rim or from three, it can pinch in or disorganize the defense in a similar manner.

The post 2025 NBA Draft Superlatives: Midrange Scorers appeared first on Swish Theory.

1. Utah Jazz – Cooper Flagg, Duke

If you can believe it, I came away from my most recent Duke watch even higher on Cooper Flagg. “There is an easy case to be made for Flagg ending up a consistent top 5 player” is what I wrote in my Flagg scouting report from January, and that may have been an undersell. While he is not perfect – namely his rim efficiency drops against good teams – Flagg’s advancement as an on-ball creator and overall scorer throughout the season only increases his primary odds. He quickened his release in a more stable way, figured out how to hunt short midrange looks and pass succinctly out of those drives. Considering his wiring as a problem-solver with a second-to-none motor, layered on top of an excellent existing skillset at age 18, Flagg may have MVP upside if things click.

Matt Powers

2. Washington Wizards – Dylan Harper, Rutgers

Dylan Harper arrived on Rutgers campus this fall with much fanfare, with the expectations that himself and fellow 5-star recruit Ace Bailey would lead Rutgers to their first tournament appearance since 2022. While the team fell short of these lofty expectations, Harper turned in one of the more impressive floor-raising seasons of any freshman in recent memory. In spite of a flawed supporting cast, Harper was able to lead Rutgers to a top-40 offense while shouldering the lion’s share of playmaking and scoring responsibilities. Harper suffered an illness induced mid-season swoon, but still managed to finish 70% at the rim on substantial volume while avoiding turnovers on these drives. Harper’s turnover economy should also ease any concerns Wizard’s fans may have of Harper’s ability to scale next to other ballhandlers they may acquire in the future. While some consternation related to Harper’s shooting potential is valid, his ability to consistently shoot off the catch, dating back to his high-school days, serves as further evidence Harper can quickly acclimate to a more complimentary role offensively.

Ahmed Jama

3. Charlotte Hornets – Collin Murray-Boyles, South Carolina

At 6’8”, Collin-Murray Boyles is a premier defensive prospect who leverages his feel, hand-eye coordination, and strength on both sides of the court. With a 4.7 BLK% and 2.8 STL% for his college career, Murray Boyles’ ground coverage, length, and feel enable him to consistently force possessions to end, something that the Hornets greatly need. It isn’t just the event creation; he’s a fantastic defensive rebounder, where he posted a 21.3 DREB% over his two years at South Carolina.

On offense, Collin-Murray Boyles can act as a face-up scorer, roller, and elite playmaker as a passer, where he often makes layered reads on the short-roll and out of the post. His defensive value gives him a positive intersection of skills that would allow him to boost Charlotte’s transition offense (worst in the league in efficiency and 6th lowest in volume), acting as a passing outlet and downhill scorer off of steals, blocks, and defensive rebounds. With large creators that have shooting gravity like Lamelo Ball and Brandon Miller, Collin Murray Boyles’ shooting issues would be insulated to a degree, and he would get them better shots through effective screen assists and high-leverage passing. Having a player like Murray-Boyles operate in the short-roll and play out of DHOs would take the Hornets’ offense to another tier, especially since he would have gravity as a scorer both with his face-up game and downhill pressure.

Murray-Boyles is the best player available to me due to his tremendous defensive value, collegiate production for an underclassman, and high degree of feel relative to his age, but it’s his synergistic fit with the Hornets that will draw out the best of his strengths that makes me excited to draft him at this slot.

Roshan Potluri

4. New Orleans Pelicans – VJ Edgecombe, Baylor

VJ Edgecombe is an undeniable athlete with a steep development curve. Edgecombe is a blur in the open floor with a smooth jumper off the catch and a tenacious defensive mindset. His ability to create buckets off the bounce was on full display playing for the Bahamas Men’s International Team this past summer. While that creation equity did not translate directly to the college level, his growth as a ball handler and athletic upside gives plenty of reason for hope. He shouldn’t be asked to do too much too soon in New Orleans with the existing talent on the roster, and his defensive impact and open court ferocity should fit right in.

Tyler Wilson

5. Philadelphia Sixers – Noa Essengue, ULM

At pick 5, Noa Essengue would be a tremendous fit with the Philadelphia 76ers while taking the best prospect available. Essengue dominated the German BBL as a teenager for Ratiopharm Ulm, overwhelming teams on both sides of the floor with his size, length, and ground-coverage, enabling him to post a 61.8 TS%, 13.4 TOTAL REB%, 0.98 A/TO, above 2 BLK%, and 2 STL%. Even as the second youngest prospect in the 2025 NBA Draft, he was able to post a 17.9 PER in a competitive professional league. For the same reasons that he was productive in the BBL, he can provide value on his rookie deal on the 76ers while being an appealing upside bet for the team due to his intersection of measurables, coordination, feel, and touch. On offense, Noa Essengue is a legitimate threat in transition and can provide value as a vertical threat and off-the-catch driver. Even with his sinewy frame, he applies immense physicality downhill, which shows up on the stat sheet in his bonkers 72 FTR. Essengue’s 3-point shot is still a work in progress, but he’s always had touch, and there has been real growth over the years in his mechanics and energy transfer.

Essengue is also a very versatile defender, stifling opponents with his lateral agility and length at the POA, nail, and backline. The combination of production for age, defensive versatility, outlier tools (9’3.25 standing reach at 6’ 10), feel, and touch makes him an intriguing upside bet in the top five.

Roshan Potluri

6. Brooklyn Nets – Ace Bailey, Rutgers

In the midst of a team-building crossroads, Brooklyn goes for an upside star swing on forward Ace Bailey of Rutgers. The 6’10 Bailey has solid physical tools that he displays on both ends, but really pops offensively with his dazzling scoring ability, including a tantalizing pull-up shot-making package, particularly in the midrange, where he has the ability to rise and fire over the top of defenders with seeming ease. In isolation, Ace is, pardon the pun, an “ace” in the department, as he is relatively unbothered by defenders once he gets to his preferred spots, and is already very adept at attempting-and converting-shots that would be deemed extremely difficult by most. He is also a player who can get hot in a hurry, and when he is in a rhythm, is a tough cover for many defenders, nearly regardless of size. Defensively, Bailey competes and makes the most of his length to bother opposing players, and his effort shines through on that end pretty consistently. His defensive awareness off the ball could improve, but for the “offensive finisher” archetype, he is much more of a two-way player. Overall, as a prospect Bailey’s ceiling is very high. There is a lot of room for growth with his handle and passing to fully realize his complete creation potential, and his offensive awareness regarding what constitutes a good shot could use some extensive refining, but as it stands right now, Bailey will be able to make an immediate impact on a young Nets team that is trying to find its way.

Corban Ford

7. Toronto Raptors – Khaman Maluach, Duke

Masai tends to prefer length with developable ball skills in his draft prospects, and Maluach leaves nothing to be desired when it comes to measurables. Standing 7’2” with a 7’5” wingspan and 9’8” standing reach, Khaman can touch the rim without jumping. Maluach has Olympic experience with the South Sudan team, and is coming off a sensational freshman season on a dominant Duke team. Khaman brings a stabilizing presence down low with one of the highest floors in the draft as a rim-roller; no prospect was as efficient of a lob threat rim-finisher as Khaman. Maluach flashes shooting touch on tough shots when given opportunity and brings great defensive intensity, footwork, and hands on both side of the floor. This move could help build the front court of the future alongside Scottie Barnes with another defensive anchor and a rim roller option to toss lobs to in P&R.

Ryan Kaminski

8. San Antonio Spurs – Kon Knueppel, Duke

Kon Knueppel’s jumper is about as fundamentally gorgeous as they come. On a loaded Duke roster Kon thrived hunting his shot off ball, hitting over 40% of his threes on over 10 attempts per 100 possessions. Knueppel is not a bouncy athlete, but is tough as nails with a strong lower half that allows for more positional versatility than at first glance. San Antonio desperately needs shooting to surround the Fox/Wemby pick and roll, and Kon is far and away the best possible fit in this class. Playing off of that gravity should allow for Kon to make an immediate impact and allow for a longer time horizon in the development of his off the bounce creation.

Tyler Wilson

9. Houston Rockets – Jeremiah Fears, Oklahoma

There’s a strong chance Houston trades this pick in real life, but for the purposes of this mock draft, they’ll be happy to add a creator like Fears with potential to remedy many of their offensive issues. Fears’s unique blend of burst, handling skill and shooting touch makes him a genuine primary handler bet, something the Rockets desperately need. Houston has the defensive infrastructure to help minimize his weaknesses on that end.

Ben Pfeifer

10. Portland Trailblazers – Derik Queen, Maryland

Queen isn’t a perfectly snug fit in Portland, but the Blazers couldn’t pass on the clear best player available left on the board. Elite movement skills, handling and touch help Queen dominate as an advantage creator with the feel and mobility to project more passing and defensive growth. Adding another shaky outside shooter will present some challenges, but Queen’s star ceiling is worth tinkering around.

Ben Pfeifer

11. Dallas Mavericks – Kasparas Jakucionis, Illinois

After parting with their franchise centerpiece and losing star Kyrie Irving for nearly the entirety of next season, the Dallas Mavericks fill a desperate playmaking need with the selection of Kasparas Jakucionis out of Illinois. The broad-framed, 6’6 guard has great positional size to go along with superb floor-mapping skill, and he makes the most of these tools along with his impeccable footwork to dictate the game at his own pace, stymying defenders while creating opportunities for his teammates. As a scorer, Jakucionis is adept playing out of the pick and roll, getting to the lane and finishing with touch and craft. His frame comes into play here as well, as he is able to seek out contact and still convert, and he generates free throw attempts in bunches. As a shooter, his form is solid and looks sound overall, even if the three point shooting numbers stand to improve overall. Defensively, Jakucionis is proficient, especially with his physical tools, where his quick feet and prodding hands help him hold up on most assignments. He can be prone to blow-bys by quicker players, and the physicality he brings on the offensive end isn’t quite the same on the defensive side, but he is by no means a liability on that end. All in all, Kasparas Jakucionis’ playmaking, shooting upside, and overall potential is a great fit on a Dallas team that needs to balance immediate contributions alongside future promise.

Corban Ford

12. Chicago Bulls – Tre Johnson, Texas

The Chicago Bulls should consider drafting Tre Johnson with the 12th pick in the 2025 NBA Draft due to his elite scoring ability and potential to address their need for a dynamic offensive guard. At 6’6” with a 7’0” wingspan, Johnson, a Texas freshman, led the SEC in scoring with 19.9 points per game, showcasing his three-level scoring prowess, including 39.2% three-point shooting and crafty footwork reminiscent of Devin Booker. His ability to create shots off the dribble, in isolation 81% of his 97-rim attempts were unassisted and he shot 59% on those, and off screens makes him a potential go-to scorer for a Bulls team transitioning to a youth-focused rebuild after trading Zach LaVine and DeMar DeRozan. While his shot selection and defensive consistency need refinement, his size, high basketball IQ, and playmaking flashes (second on Texas in assists) suggest he can develop into a versatile two-way wing. With Nikola Vucevic’s future uncertain and a need for a franchise cornerstone, Johnson’s upside as a high-volume scorer makes him a strong fit at pick 12, especially in a draft with a perceived drop-off after the top four.

Larry Golden

13. Atlanta Hawks – Ryan Kalkbrenner, Creighton

The Atlanta Hawks are in desperate need of an interior presence, not only to shore up their rim-protection, but to provide Trae Young a release valve. The lack of interior size and a viable finisher has restricted Trae’s potency as a scorer and limited Atlanta’s offense. Ryan Kalkbrenner has been one of the most effective and prolific interior scorers in the collegiate ranks over the past few years, finishing just under 70% at the rim on over 1300 career attempts. Kalkbrenner’s offensive value isn’t limited to his presence around the rim, Kalkbrenner’s punishing screens have been the bedrock in many ways for Creighton’s motion-heavy offense. As much of a boon as Kalkbrenner’s offensive capabilities have been, there is perhaps no area where his impact is more acutely felt than the defensive end. Creighton’s personnel outside of Kalkbrenner consists of offensively slanted players, placing immense pressure on Kalkbrenner to not only alter shots around the rim but suppress opponent’s rim attempts entirely. This is an objective Kalkbrenner has carried out year in and year out during his tenure at Creighton. And while Kalkbrenner’s raw block numbers and block rate are particularly eye-popping for a rim-protector, in each of the past 3 seasons Creighton has allowed less shots at the rim on lower efficiency with Kalkbrenner on the court versus off-court. The clear pathways for Kalkbrenner to be a positive player on both ends of the court make him a clear cut top-20 player, with a skillset tailormade to help the Atlanta Hawks immediately.

Ahmed Jama

14. San Antonio Spurs – Jase Richardson, Michigan State

Jase Richardson is a double dip on shotmaking for San Antonio here in the late lottery. A French connection (Penda, Essengue) is intriguing here if available, but with the arrival of Fox, ascendance of Stephon Castle, and the organizational commitment to Jeremy Sochan there is no greater long term need for this team than shooting the basketball. Richardson posted a 55/41/84 shooting split while canning over 40% of his mid range jumpers. He’s a great shooter both on and off the ball, plays tough defense and has intriguing upside as a pick and roll ball handler. Richardson is a skeleton key for the Spurs’ backcourt, fitting seamlessly with just about any lineup construction newly minted head coach Mitch Johnson decides to throw out there.

Tyler Wilson

15. Oklahoma City Thunder – Carter Bryant, Arizona

Carter Bryant displayed an advanced application of tools, volume shooting, and baseline feel as a 19-year-old last season. At 6-foot-8 and 225 lbs with a 7-foot wingspan, he already has an NBA-ready frame and utilized it to produce a 5.8% block rate and 2.8% steal rate, showcasing legitimate point-of-attack utility and secondary rim protection. On the other end, he shot 37% from three on a massive 59 three-point rate, finished 71% of his rim attempts, and dunked 17 times, building out the perfect playfinishing profile. 69.5% on 59 free throws is a slightly worrying shooting indicator, but 88% on 58 free throws over a two-year EYBL sample suggests this is more of a sample size issue. While Bryant’s usage and self-creation rates suffered from scaling down at Arizona, both of those marks were much higher in EYBL, potentially hinting at some latent creation value. On an Oklahoma City Thunder team that emphasizes ball skills, that would be put to the test, but he fits perfectly within their defensive playmaking, rim protection from all positions, and volume shooting.

Maurya Kumpatla

16. Orlando Magic – Danny Wolf, Michigan

Have you seen this guy play basketball? Danny Wolf is a grab-and-go seven-foot offensive hub diming up defenses on fast breaks and pick and rolls. Wolf flashes exciting handles, natural point center vision, and incredible feel for the game, hitting highlight pull-up threes and tough finishing touch shots at the rim. Danny makes good reads as a primary decision maker reacting to defenses, averaging 1.01 PPP on “P&R including passes” that ranks in the 84th percentile of all college players.

Ryan Kaminski

17. Minnesota Timberwolves – Labaron Philon, Alabama

Philon was an easy pick for me here. I have him ranked a fair bit higher. I believe he has some untapped potential on offense, but generally he brings the type of quick decisionmaking that the Wolves need structurally to make their front-court work. He’s a nice connective piece with upside which makes him an easy pick here.

Joe Hulbert

18. Washington Wizards – Adou Thiero, Arkansas

Adou Thiero is a high volume, punishing driver with ridiculous transition scoring dominance, paired with long arms and elite run/jump athleticism. By all accounts, he is the most functional athlete in this draft class. Despite questionable shooting upside, Adou’s reaction time on defense is notable, and he should emerge as one of the league’s best defenders somewhat quickly. His strong applied physicality, defensive event maxxing, and reasonable 12% assist rate/1 A:TO indicate some semblance of latent feel, which is uncommon for wings of Adou’s athletic caliber. Washington zags from its contemporaneous strategy of targeting high-risk teenagers and takes a young junior that will set the tone for the Wizards’ revamped defense.

Avinash Chauhan

19. Brooklyn Nets – Asa Newell, Georgia

For a team currently bereft of high-end talent or foundational prospects, the Brooklyn Nets should prioritize acquiring young, malleable pieces who can accentuate the skillset of whatever star they eventually bring into the fold. Asa Newell brings a swiss army knife skillset to whatever frontcourt he joins. Newell made major strides this past season as a shooter, elevating his free-throw percentage by over 20 percentage points, and showing softer touch around the basket than he had at any point of his high-school tenure with a vaunted Montverde Academy. Newell finished 13th in the country in Offensive Box Plus-Minus, and was second amongst freshmen. Despite his subpar 3-point efficiency and playmaking numbers, Newell’s effectiveness as an interior scorer and offensive rebounder should ease his transition to the NBA and make him one of the more reliable bets in this range of the draft

Ahmed Jama

20. Miami Heat – Kam Jones, Marquette

This pick mostly leans into the type of thing Miami would do, which I don’t want to be seen entirely as a negative. Kam Jones drastically improved his playmaking this year, it was probably the biggest skill increase in the entire class. This increases his upside. I have concerns about the free throw rate, but Jones is the type of guard the Heat have targeted for the last decade, a slasher who knows how to play the game in the half-court.

Joe Hulbert

21. Utah Jazz – Noah Penda, Le Mans

Over the last two seasons, Noah Penda has hovered around 8% OREB, 16% assist, 4% block, and 3% steal, with 1.6 A:TO and 0.4 FTR. The only high major players to even hit career 7o/15a/3b/2.5s/1.5 a:to are Otto Porter Jr. and Draymond Green. Enough said. Penda is a large bodied driver with legit handling ability, and he’s made real strides as a shooter. He projects as a high feel, two-way connector with as good of a shot as any to land on a few All-Defense teams. Despite the usage of connector as a sort of euphemism, this sort of oreb/assist/stock wing with legit high end feel doesn’t come along every draft. This is exactly the sort of low friction, high EV mold that the Jazz should be looking to target in the middle of the first round.

Avinash Chauhan

22. Atlanta Hawks – Thomas Sorber, Georgetown

The Atlanta Hawks get a lottery-caliber big/forward at pick 22 with Thomas Sorber. While Thomas Sorber played more as a center for Georgetown his freshman season, he’s got the processing, touch, coordination, and mobility to scale down as a forward. He has his limitations as a ground-bound player, impacting his rim finishing and causing him to become more creative in finding finishing angles. However, his fundamentals and his ability to carve space with his body are quite advanced for a freshman, which enabled him to finish 65% of his non-dunk rim attempts despite the vertical challenges for his size. He does this by using his body to create highway screens or to seal and get into post position (70% PPP percentile in post-ups). Although he shot a paltry 16.2% on threes, I have confidence he can become a catch-and-shoot threat on his rookie scale deal due to his comfort with jumpers inside the arc, 72.4% from the FT line, and his lack of hesitancy to take open threes. Sorber is also a fantastic defender who can protect the rim to a high degree (opposing team’s rim FG% falls by 14% with Sorber on the floor and 7.6 BLK%) while also being able to switch in space (2.7 STL%).

For these reasons, Sorber is optimized more as a forward. Playing as a forward and his fit with the Hawks as a short-roll passer, positive rebounder, defender, and play finisher gives me optimism that Sorber would be a tremendous match for the Hawks.

Roshan Potluri

23. Indiana Pacers – Nique Clifford, Colorado State

The Pacers can always use more quality wing play and Clifford brings that. He’s improved his offensive skillset over the years, diversifying his attack and adding new skills to his box of tools. He’ll add much needed size and defensive prowess to Indiana’s perimeter defense as well.

Ben Pfeifer

24. Oklahoma City Thunder – Miles Byrd, San Diego State

The Thunder net their second wing of the draft in Miles Byrd, who stands at 6-foot-6 with a 7-foot wingspan. Byrd was one of the best wing defenders in college basketball last season, applying his length to produce a 4.9% block rate and 4.3% steal rate while grading out as the best defender on a top-20 defense. Alongside his high steal rate, his high feel is evidenced by an 18.5% assist rate and 1.7 assist-to-turnover ratio, rounding him out as a quintessential “Presti-player”. While his shot hasn’t come around yet (30% 3PT), high volume (12 attempts per 100 possessions and 57 three-point rate), great touch (83% FT), and impressive midrange shotmaking (38% on non-rim 2s) at a true sophomore age promise three-point shooting down the line. The main issue lies in his closeout attacking, where his handle easily clears the threshold but terrible finishing (55%) crushes any potential there and limits his overall offensive ceiling.

Maurya Kumpatla

25. Orlando Magic – Tahaad Pettiford, Auburn

Tahaad Pettiford brings downhill explosiveness, quick first step burst, soft finishing touch, pull-up 3pt shooting range, and two-way feel to a team that needs it. A guard that can penetrate the paint, attack the rim, kick out to shooters, score and shoot the rock who can hold his own defensively would see a warm welcome in Orlando. He’ll have opportunity to develop as Orlando continues building a perennial playoff contender, where maybe the Magic won’t need to make a splashy trade if they can nail the right complementary guard to their core in the draft.

Ryan Kaminski

26. Brooklyn Nets – Ben Saraf, ULM

Saraf is a downhill menace at 6’5” who can apply both rim pressure (6.3 rim attempts per 36 minutes) and midrange pressure (3.8 pull-up twos per 36 minutes) while being one of the best distributors in class. Saraf looks like an ideal back up point guard in waiting, with outside shooting concerns holding back his starter likelihood. But productivity across the court – his 4% offensive rebound rate, 2.7% steal rate and 1.3% block rate are all strong for a guard – signal he knows how to play. A proven contributor at only recently turned 19 for the second-place team in the highly competitive German league.

Matt Powers

27. Brooklyn Nets – Bogoljub Markovic, KK Mega

Another up-and-coming bet from the European leagues, Markovic can stretch the floor to complement Saraf’s probing. At 6’11” with a pristine shooting form, Markovic cashed 40% of his catch and shoot three point attempts. That’s bankable at the next level, especially for a Brooklyn Nets team that was in the 97th percentile for catch and shoot frequency. Markovic has questionable ball skills, a good passer but poor decisionmaker at this current stage. But it is encouraging how open he is to trying things: while the creation outcome is unlikely, we cannot rule it out. His primary defensive contribution will be rebounding, at a 22% rate this season, and general effort, hampered by a mere +1 wingspan. The Nets have time to let young players experiment, and Markovic has as interesting of a foundation as anyone left on the board.

Matt Powers

28. Boston Celtics – Nate Bittle, Oregon

Nate Bittle is 7 feet tall with a reported 7’5 WS, he can shoot threes, and he was named to the Big Ten’s All-Defense team. 7 footers who make assists more than turnovers with non-terrible steal rates are rare enough, but I’ll save you the querying: there has never been a single 7-foot prospect who rebounds, blocks, avoids turnovers, and shoots the way Bittle does. The league is built on outliers!

Sure, this phrase is often weaponized as copium for some iteration of a highly unaesthetic, high-friction archetype that hemorrhages points through either 3 or D. But in this case, a 7 footer with these extreme strengths projects to be an incredibly low-friction bet that should be able to contribute regardless of context. It seriously doesn’t take much imagination to project Bittle’s offensive viability, especially on a team like the Celtics who have personnel (two of the league’s best 7 foot+ shooters in Luke Kornet and Kristaps Porzingis) and schematic precedent to maximize Bittle’s goodness.

Avinash Chauhan

29. Phoenix Suns – Darrion Williams, Texas Tech

Phoenix desperately needs good basketball players in any form and Darrion Williams fits that description. Williams presents one of the better dribble-pass-shoot bets on the wing in this class, bringing the on-and-off-ball versatility Phoenix would covet. He’s a sturdy defender as well who would likely be one of the Suns’ better players as a rookie.

Ben Pfeifer

30. Los Angeles Clippers – Alex Condon, Florida

The Los Angeles Clippers should consider drafting Alex Condon in the 2025 NBA Draft due to his versatile skillset and fit with their roster needs. At 6’11”, Condon offers the flexibility to play both power forward and center, addressing the team’s lack of frontcourt depth beyond Ivica Zubac. His modern big-man skills— including low-post scoring, developing three-point shooting, and exceptional playmaking with a 2.2 assist-to-turnover ratio—complement the Clippers’ need for a dynamic, facilitating big who can operate in dribble handoffs and keep the offense flowing alongside stars like James Harden and Norman Powell. Defensively, his lateral quickness and rim protection potential make him a solid fit for switching schemes, while his high basketball IQ and work ethic suggest he can develop into a reliable rotation player. With the Clippers aiming to bolster their frontcourt for a championship push, Condon’s two-way upside makes him a compelling mid-to-late first-round target.

Larry Golden

31. Minnesota Timberwolves – Sion James, Duke

Joe Hulbert

32. Boston Celtics – Liam McNeeley, Connecticut

Larry Golden

33. Charlotte Hornets – Javon Small, West Virginia

Ahmed Jama

34. Charlotte Hornets – Walter Clayton Jr., Florida

Ahmed Jama

35. Philadelphia Sixers – Hugo Gonzalez, Real Madrid

Tyler Wilson

36. Brooklyn Nets – Johni Broome, Auburn

Matt Powers

37. Detroit Pistons – Isaiah Evans, Duke

Roshan Potluri

38. San Antonio Spurs – Yaxel Lendeborg, UAB

Maurya Kumpatla

39. Toronto Raptors – Nolan Traore, Saint-Quentin

Ryan Kaminski

40. Washington Wizards – Rasheer Fleming, Saint Joseph’s

Joe Hulbert

41. Golden State Warriors – Rocco Zikarsky, Brisbane

Tyler Wilson

42. Sacramento Kings – Boogie Fland, Arkansas

Larry Golden

43. Utah Jazz – Drake Powell, North Carolina

Corban Ford

44. Oklahoma City Thunder – Max Shulga, VCU

Roshan Potluri

45. Chicago Bulls – Will Riley, Illinois

Avinash Chauhan

46. Orlando Magic – Vladislav Goldin, Michigan

Ryan Kaminski

47. Milwaukee Bucks – Koby Brea, Kentucky

Larry Golden

48. Memphis Grizzlies – Egor Demin, BYU

Matt Powers

49. Cleveland Cavaliers – Cedric Coward, Washington State

Maurya Kumpatla

50. New York Knicks – Mark Sears, Alabama

Tyler Wilson

51. Los Angeles Clippers – Tyrese Proctor, Duke

Corban Ford

52. Phoenix Suns – Eric Dixon, Villanova

Avinash Chauhan

53. Utah Jazz – Alex Toohey, Sydney

Larry Golden

54. Indiana Pacers – Jamir Watkins, Florida State

Ben Pfeifer

55. Los Angeles Lakers – Joan Beringer, Olimpija

Roshan Potluri

56. Memphis Grizzlies – Karter Knox, Arkansas

Matt Powers

57. Orlando Magic – Otega Oweh, Kentucky

Ryan Kaminski

58. Cleveland Cavaliers – Hunter Sallis, Wake Forest

Corban Ford

59. Houston Rockets – AK Okereke, Cornell

Maurya Kumpatla

The post 2025 NBA Mock Draft 3.0 appeared first on Swish Theory.

This series will inspect all ten categories by highlighting three standout performers for each trait. My hope is that my process for evaluating this trait will improve with the exercise, inspecting my own criteria, while also recognizing just how rare each trait is.

First up, perhaps the most important category of all: three point shooting.

Note the rankings relate to who will have the most three point success in the NBA more than the most three point talent (eliminating specialists like the incredible shooter Koby Brea).

#1: Tre Johnson

Listed at 6’6”, Texas Longhorns, Freshman, 19.3 on draft day

Tre Johnson’s greatness as a three-point shooter is perhaps the most self-evident of the draft, as it takes only one shot of his to react, “Oh, he can shoot.” The aesthetics are stellar: Johnson has an appropriately wide base, hopping light into the shot before rising up with intention.

Look at how he perfectly squares from a 90-degree gather in one of the clips above:

He perfectly angles his shooting pocket:

And snaps his wrist hard while releasing high:

It is hard to ask for more in a shooting form, with his fluidity especially notable given his 6’6” height.

He meets very high thresholds for outside shooting, statistically. High major freshmen with his level of three point volume and efficiency are rare, as all 6’3” or above NCAA players with his profile have stuck in the NBA.

His flexibility of gather, skilled in footwork, allows him to be successful in all kinds of actions:

• 17 for 31 (55%) on threes running off of screens
• 23 for 52 (44%) on threes in transition
• 12 for 28 (43%) on threes out of pick and roll
• 5 for 12 (42%) off of handoffs

The two lagging in efficiency are spot ups (24 for 71, 34% from three) and isos (7 for 25, 28% from three). He was surprisingly just as efficient on guarded catch and shoot (42%) than unguarded (39%), with the open ones actually dragging down his spot up efficiency. Given his fundamentals and success hitting the difficult ones, I’m not too worried about him figuring out the simple. In fact, he was 44% on unguarded threes in his final high school season.

I have gotten higher on Tre Johnson over this process, as his elite three-point versatility matches his elite three-point efficiency. The isolations are the one concern, as he struggles to create space, but hopefully will represent only a small volume of his NBA looks. His ability to counter when the defense commits in pick-and-roll (39th %ile efficiency, including passes) is also a concern for his overall shotmaking difficulty, but he has the talent and range to overcome it. While that lack of quick burst and the defense hold back his ceiling, his combination of nuclear shooting off of movement and strong passing instincts makes him impossible to pass up in the lottery.

#2: Walter Clayton Jr.

Listed at 6’3”, Florida Gators, Senior, 22.3 on draft day

Walter Clayton Jr.’s appeal is also immediately clear in the tape, but for a different reason: the degree of difficulty. In particular, Clayton Jr. is elite from NBA distance, having to be covered far beyond the NCAA three-point line.

This is a major defensive breakdown:

As is this:

Also obvious from the tape is how comfortably Clayton Jr. gathers both left to right and right to left off of movement or the dribble. His core strength allows him to stay square with torque when rising up in an instant. He is an extremely confident shooter, ensuring he commits to every shot with intent.

Perhaps even at a better level than Johnson, Clayton Jr. can re-square his shoulders rapidly. Because he is smaller but a good leaper, he can spring in any direction to counter-balance his motion. It’s a delight to watch.

Despite what had to be among the most difficult three-point diets in the NCAA, Clayton Jr.’s three-point percentage was very good at 38.6% on 303 attempts, seventh most in the country. He also shot a stellar 87.9% from the line on 481 career free throw attempts. After this past season, there is plenty of evidence that Clayton Jr. is an elite shooter.

Clayton’s core strength and comfortability moving laterally, confidence in his shot all allow him to be successful in a variety of play types. In fact, Clayton was 71st percentile efficiency or better in seven different play types:

• 42% on 45 threes in transition
• 40% on 75 threes spotting up
• 39% on 23 threes off of screens
• 36% on 14 threes in isolation
• 36% on 42 threes off of handoffs
• 35% on 102 threes as pick and roll ball handler

Walter Clayton Jr. is an obvious bet to be a nuclear NBA shooter, due to his ability to pull up quickly from distance as well as off of movement. His resume is excellent, leading a great Florida team through the NCAA tournament. Difficulty means streakiness, but Clayton is on far more often than he is off, and when he is on, he can drive a scoring run single-handedly.

The downsides come elsewhere, namely in his somewhat below-average handle and passing for a 6’3″player, which keeps him from having creation equity. He can sometimes fall asleep on defense (such as in the final moments of the NCAA championship game) but makes up for it with elite recovery tools (displayed in the few moments after, in addition to strong 2.5% steal and 1.8% block rates over his college career).

Because Clayton Jr. is 6’3”, a good leaper and capable of getting threes up with volume like no other in this class, he resembles a first-round pick. Even if the non-shooting traits lag, they are good enough to stay on the floor to allow his shooting to shine.

#3: Kon Knueppel

Listed at 6’7”, Duke Blue Devils, Freshman, 19.9 on draft day

Kon Knueppel’s excellence might not be as obvious as that of Clayton Jr. or Johnson. He shines through technique, consistency, and, well, track record.

We have enough data on Knueppel to suggest he is an elite shotmaker. Let’s start with catch and shoot. Knueppel has now had three consecutive seasons of shooting over 40% on catch-and-shoot threes, giving him a career 42% mark on 419 catch-and-shoot looks.

Despite the dip in his form, Knueppel has an otherwise compact motion, easily repeatable. My favorite thing about the form is he “finishes heavy,” that is, exaggerates the end of his form to get extra lift but also gain consistency of motion.

He typically fully lands back on the ground while still holding his follow-through:

This consistency of technique, in addition to a low center of gravity, permits Kon to rise up off the catch even off of movement.

The pull-up figures are iffier, with little success at Duke. But looking at the EYBL statistics and tape gives one much more comfort.

When given more of a green light to let it fly – two pull-ups threes per game in Phenom 16-17U compared to 0.5 at Duke – he looks much more comfortable and flowy off the dribble. In fact, he was capable of shooting out of complex set ups like at the 0:50 mark of his highlight video above.

If Knueppel had been enabled to be an off-the-dribble gunner, I have no doubt his efficiency would have risen at Duke. Knueppel reminds me of Desmond Bane here: Bane has the instinct to put the ball on the floor even just once to induce a defender fly-by. With a similar high feel for picking his spots, I expect Knueppel to do the same with success.

Not too much commentary needed here; Knueppel is among the elite free-throw shooters. Of NCAA players with at least 100 free throw attempts, Knueppel ranked fifth in free throw percentage, the only one in the top ten 6’7″ or above.

Even with the poor pull-up shooting, Knueppel hit some gaudy marks for a high-major freshman. Since 2008, there have been only four other high-major freshmen in his vicinity: Tre Johnson, Ben McLemore, Jared McCain, and Tyler Herro. Kon meets the below thresholds with ease.

I’ve only gotten higher on Kon Knueppel with each subsequent watch. While my initial instinct was to fade him given the athletic limitations (the track record for players who miss most of their dunk attempts is not good), likely not 6’7”. However, his instincts for rotations and how to wall off drives keep him relevant on that end.

A minimum level of defensive contribution is all that is needed for Knueppel’s three point shooting to potentially take over games (not to mention his passing acumen). While not as much of an aesthetic/degree of difficulty play as Tre or Clayton, Knueppel has the track record and eye for technique / when to shoot that gives a high level of faith in his three ball being excellent. With his integration of other skills, draft Kon in the top 10.

Value Analysis

Three point shooting is the most prized ability in the titular “three point era,” and for a reason. Shooting from outside the furthest ring of the defense can be the most reliable way to generate looks. Our three three point shooters are able to do just that, bombing away even with small creases — all three are reliable to get a high volume of attempts in a variety of ways.

Simply, beating three levels of defense (perimeter defenders, help defenders, rim protectors) is the most valuable thing you can do on the court. Especially as three point volume is almost always scalable. If you want more threes, you can have them: the quality of the looks will decline, but it is unlike midrange or rim attempts which require a higher level of passing and/or dribbling to get there. For our three shooters, the area over which you have to cover them with their deep range and quick triggers is massive.

As this series goes on, I will try to note the relative value of each trait, and why. Threes are our first trait, but, from my analysis, also the single most valuable. Next up, we move slightly closer to the basket – the oft-theorized midrange.

The post 2025 NBA Draft Superlatives: Three Point Shooters appeared first on Swish Theory.