With the conference finals underway and the lottery concluded, NBA draft season is fully underway. To me what has become more compelling than the weekly mocks and trade scuttlebutt that marks draft season are the narratives crafted around virtually every prospect. Seemingly every year a brief assessment of a prospect’s pre-NBA context becomes widely accepted truth amongst those who come to the draft later in the cycle. While I take zero umbrage with anyone who simplifies their approach to “Prospect X had zero spacing” or “the guards on Prospect Y’s team couldn’t get him the ball”, the goal of this piece is to analyze the influence a player’s team may have on their production. The hope being that by examining a player’s performance through the lens of their team, we can learn to properly weigh external factors and adjust expectations accordingly.
VJ Edgecombe
Valdez (VJ) Edgecombe has been a projected top 5 pick wire to wire in this class. Despite a rocky start to the season, Edgecombe’s status as a blue chip recruit seemed well deserved after a freshman season that placed him in exclusive company.
As much as Bart Torvik queries have become a fraught subject amongst the draft community, when taking an Occam’s Razor approach it is apparent there’s not really a precedent for a player with Edgecombe’s intersection of feel, athleticism, and production becoming an abject failure in the league (barring unforeseen circumstances taking place in the case of Zhaire Smith).
So if Edgecombe has the pedigree and production, what consternation is there with his current standing near the top of the draft? To start, one may point to VJ’s suboptimal finishing at the rim. While Edgecombe ended the season at a solid 60% at the rim, his rim efficiency was largely inflated by his dynamic vertical athleticism and transition frequency. Just under 48% of Edgecombe’s rim-attempts came in transition, while in the halfcourt Edgecombe finished only 49% at the rim and a disconcerting 44% on half-court layups. However, this is not a novel insight; most publications and scouts have noted VJ’s half-court limitations for some time, with his unrefined ballhandling typically being pointed to as the culprit of his unimpressive rim-finishing. Per @henrynbadraft, Edgecombe’s relative weakness at the rim has been present since his time on the grassroots circuit. In the query below of top-50 RSCI players’ AAU statistics over the past 3 years, along with Edgecombe, these were the only players to have <53% on two-point attempts (2PA), <0.6 2PA/TSA (true shot attempt), and <0.1 FTA/TSA.
Of the 5 players here (excluding Edgecombe) to play over a 50% minutes share, their average rim-rate was 20.9% as a freshman. With the exception of VJ, these players were either three-point specialists or jumpshot-oriented creators. With VJ not falling into either bucket he was placed in a precarious position, how does one deploy a blue-chip recruit without a clearly defined offensive skillset? Early in the season, the fit could best be described as ‘trying to fit a square peg into a round hole’. Baylor runs a notoriously ballscreen-heavy offense, finishing this season in the 81st percentile in ‘Pick-and-Roll’ frequency, and over the last 5 years Baylor has never finished lower than the 77th percentile in this playtype.
Operating core ballscreen actions in the middle third of the floor, Edgecombe greatly struggled generating deep, quality paint touches. When asked to create from a standstill against a set defense as frequently as Edgecombe was, his high center of gravity caused issues changing direction off a live dribble, withstanding contact on drives, and altering stride length, all of which are critical components of any downhill driving game. The convergence of Edgecombe’s physical and skill limitations as a primary ballhandler is evident from the clips below.
When you pair this schematic emphasis on running ballscreens with one of the slowest paces in the country (Baylor finished 320/364 teams in Adjusted Tempo) you are left with a team uniquely suited to exacerbating Edgecombe’s weaknesses and suppressing his strengths. I believe this combination is the primary cause of Baylor’s offense being BETTER with Edgecombe on the bench. Per Hoop-Explorer, Baylor’s offense was 7.6 points better per 100 possessions. While the 479 possessions Edgecombe wasn’t on the floor isn’t the most robust sample, the underlying numbers fall in line with what the film suggests. Baylor’s shot quality suffered with Edgecombe running 24% of the team’s PNR actions per Synergy. Not only was Baylor less capable of generating threes and free-throw attempts, the QUALITY of three-point attempts was lower with Edgecombe on the floor, with the team shooting almost 2 less corner threes per 100 possessions.
Even if Edgecombe’s outlook as a downhill creator is replete with red flags, there are still other avenues Edgecombe could take to develop into a star-level offensive player. After all, despite getting off to a rough start shooting this season, Edgecombe’s shooting priors are near stellar. Coming into the year, Edgecombe had shot 39.1% on 274 threes and 79.9% on 134 free-throw attempts. These numbers indicate that Edgecombe developing into a potent off-the-dribble is well within the realm of possibility. And when looking at historical precedent, significant pull-up shooting development may be the most integral component to Edgecombe returning top-5 value. Below are all the players drafted in the lottery since 2010 who were: 6’5 or shorter, with 5 or fewer unassisted two-point makes per 100 possessions, and 30% or more of their two’s assisted (per Bart Torvik)
Virtually all of these players who returned positive expected value based on their draft slot developed into highly effective shooters off the dribble. And where it currently stands, Edgecombe is behind the curve in this respect. Compared to the players in the previous query, Edgecombe finished his pre-NBA season with the lowest volume AND tied for the 2nd worst efficiency on these pull-up twos.
Edgecombe’s lack of comfort shooting off the dribble is apparent on film, and another facet of his game limited by his handle. VJ cannot self-organize off multiple dribbles and take pull-up jumpers on balance currently, and the line between midrange attempts and floaters is frequently blurred when Edgecombe takes these shots.
Again, VJ’s issues shooting off the dribble date back to his pre-NCAA career and are rooted in his biomechanical issues. Edgecombe being a ‘high-hipped’ athlete who struggles decelerating is preventing him from leveraging his impressive straight-line speed to create space off the dribble. VJ’s proclivity for over-striding on drives limits how effectively he can generate power when he transitions into a pull-up jumper.
My current hypothesis is Edgecombe’s difficulty controlling his stride length while driving is what’s responsible for the discrepancy between VJ’s dynamism leaping off 2 feet, where he’s arguably the most explosive player in this draft class, versus 1 foot, where he’s struggled greatly relative to expectations. Baylor’s coaching staff made schematic changes for Edgecombe to improve his on-ball efficacy, from using guard-to-guard Ghost Screens to clear driving lanes…
…to using actions such as ’77 Shallow’ in order to simultaneously beat hedging ballscreen coverages and remove nail-help to aid Edgecombe’s drives.
However, neither adjustment bolstered Edgecombe’s efficiency to the desired extent. So this begs the question, if there’s reason for concern with regards to Edgecombe’s effectiveness as a pull-up shooter AND attacking the basket, is there any reason to believe Edgecombe’s profile warrants his lofty draft projection? As previously mentioned, Edgecombe’s deployment in an extremely ballscreen heavy offense was far from ideal, however his playtype distribution does not paint the full picture of how inconducive Baylor’s offense was for Edgecombe specifically.
The 3-man lineup of VJ Edgecombe, Norchad Omier, and Josh Ojianwuna makes up 22.5% of VJ Edgecombe’s total possessions played this season, however this lineup was on the floor for 26.9% of PNR possessions ran by Edgecombe this season. In Offensive Rating, this 3-man lineup was 22nd out of 25 Baylor lineups that played over 350 possessions, with this 3-man unit’s only saving grace being their relative strength on the offensive glass.
This lineup’s spacing issues only amplified Edgecombe’s aforementioned struggles as a primary ballhandler. Take the clips below, for example. This group of clips displays Baylor running ‘RAM PNP’, a staple of their ballscreen offense, where a player receives an off-ball screen before setting the middle ballscreen and ‘popping’ to the 3-point line. In the first clip, Baylor has the 2 bigs involved in the action, with Norchad Omier first receiving the off-ball screen before setting a ballscreen for Edgecombe. Notice how compacted the spacing is inside the arc, with Omier’s defender completely disregarding the popping Omier.
However, in the following clips, a ‘small’ sets the middle ballscreen for Edgecombe. Even in the first possessions with the action taking place against the same opponent in Tennessee, the improvement in shot quality is apparent.
The double-big lineups’ impact on tape was corroborated by VJ’s PNR data, as well.
Ultimately, this is a minuscule sample of possessions Edgecombe played with the double big lineup, and I do not want to make it seem as though these suboptimal lineups are totally responsible for VJ’s issues as a PNR ballhandler. However, I do think this data is key to realizing that Edgecombe’s outlook as a creator isn’t entirely doomed. Of players with ≥ 150 PNR + Passes possessions, Edgecombe was ranked in the 40th percentile in PPP, but in lineups with only one big Edgecombe’s 0.944 PPP was in the 66th percentile. Over the course of the season Baylor substituted these 3-man ballscreen actions with ‘Empty’ PNRs to ‘clear up’ the picture for Edgecombe on drives and place less strain on his handle. In these less complex ballscreen actions, Edgecombe’s processing (which well outpaces the functionality of his handle at this point) was able to truly shine.
My case for optimism in Edgecombe’s creation ability is relative to the position taken by his greatest detractors. The likelihood of VJ becoming a high-level PNR operator is slim-to-none in my opinion, but this doesn’t preclude the possibility of him becoming a highly valuable offensive player. The use case for VJ Edgecombe offensively just requires a degree of creativity.
For as many questions as I’ve raised regarding the functionality of VJ’s athleticism, there have only been a few players his size to reach certain athletic benchmarks. Below is a query I’ve run on players since 2010, where ‘Team Stock%’ is the share of a team’s steals+blocks a player logged. I decided to use this instead of steal and block rate to account for some noise introduced by team stylistic tendencies.
The only other players to appear alongside Edgecombe are players whose role I’ve termed ‘Utility Guards’, those with the size of perimeter players who can fulfill responsibilities typically associated with frontcourt players. This sort of role is where I see Edgecombe being best utilized. As VJ transitions to the NBA and his on-ball burden lessens, I would hope that Edgecombe is integrated as a stylistic wrinkle versus a featured piece. There may not be a team better at deploying their guards in such a manner than the Boston Celtics. With the acquisition of Jrue Holiday, the Celtics could place teams in conflict without deliberately involving Holiday in actions. By simply stationing Holiday in the Dunker Spot, the Celtics were afforded the luxury of having a player who could function as an outlet for their jumbo creators on drives and consistently win the rebounding battle versus like-sized perimeter players.
In the original ‘Utility Guard’ query I provided, pre-NBA 3-point volume and efficiency were listed. The relevancy of these stats outside of the obvious is the prevalence of the most consistent counter used to neutralize this archetype. I am currently writing this article as the Eastern Conference Finals takes place, and much has been made of Josh Hart’s ineffectiveness in the series, with the Knicks coaching staff going as far as removing Hart from the starting lineup. What has plagued Hart and many of these Swiss army knife players (at least offensively) is the lack of consistent spacing they provide. Opponents have experienced success defending these players with Centers and ignoring them on the perimeter. What makes the prospect of Edgecombe in this role especially tantalizing is the confidence I have in his ability as a spot-up shooter.
Granted, a significant portion of these attempts are from the high-school line, and Edgecombe has shot a paltry 24.4% (19/79) on off-the-dribble 3PA in the same timeframe. But at the same stage of their careers, Edgecombe is significantly further along as a spacer than players of a similar archetype, while also possessing the explosiveness to take advantage of opportunities as a screener like Gary Payton II in the clip below…
Or exploit cross-matches versus bigs in space, as he does to Henri Veesaar in the play below.
And as previously mentioned, Baylor’s PNR-heavy style being centered around smaller guards who couldn’t create advantages eradicated opportunistic scoring from Edgecombe’s shot diet. The few chances Edgecombe has had to attack from the weakside or get downhill versus a tilted floor, he delivered.
Obviously, there’s only so much accommodating a team would want to subject themselves to when it comes to a player drafted as high as VJ will be. However, a player capable of providing lineup and stylistic flexibility without compromising spacing or rebounding is scarcely made available at a rookie deal price point. This archetype’s dependence on high-leverage creators is undeniable, but this era of the NBA reflects the appeal of a prospect like VJ Edgecombe. Sacrificing the size traditionally associated with certain roles in favor of skill can pay massive dividends.
Miles Byrd
Any reservations to be had with Miles Byrd are fairly straightforward; a glance at a query of players with Byrd’s combination of size and scoring inefficiency yields a list almost bereft of long-tenured NBA contributors.
It wouldn’t be entirely off-base to say the only reason the majority of this list was even able to enter the draft pool was due to exceptional high school pedigrees. The obvious throughline between success cases of this query is their high-level defensive aptitude. There is definitely reason to believe Byrd’s defensive capabilities are enough to buoy his NBA prospects, as of the players in the above query, Byrd has the highest Block and Steal rate. To my surprise, however, Byrd’s impact on San Diego State’s defensive efficiency was muted relative to his statistical production on this end of the floor. Per Hoop-Explorer, San Diego State’s defense was only 2.5 points per 100 possessions better with Byrd On Court vs Off. Perhaps most unexpectedly though, SDSU’s Defensive Turnover Rate remained unchanged regardless of whether Byrd was playing or not!
Watching the tape, it is fairly easy to draw conclusions as to what could be behind the discrepancy between Byrd’s stellar event creation numbers, and the On-Off Splits. San Diego State runs an aggressive switching scheme, which incentivizes players to sacrifice ‘sound’ positioning in favor of forcing opponents into congested areas of the floor where they are more prone to committing turnovers. Byrd’s tape is littered with possessions where he is overhelping, or even throwing himself out of position by jumping passing lanes and attempting to create havoc.
Referencing SDSU’s defensive resume, there are two statistics that are key to elucidating Byrd’s directive schematically.
San Diego State was in the Bottom 10 in Opponent 3-point Rate, while leading the nation in Block Rate. It seems Head Coach Brian Dutcher was comfortable with trading off 3-point attempts as long as they were able to pack the paint and prevent their deep-lying shell from being compromised. This philosophy has been a defining trait of the Dutcher era, with SDSU ranking in the top 200 in opponent 3-point rate once in his 7 years at the helm, and outside the top 300 three times, including this year. SDSU’s Block% is relevant to their scheme and Byrd’s defensive evaluation because it empowered Byrd to take risks on the perimeter. If Byrd made an ill-advised gamble and provided the opponent a numerical advantage to attack, they still had to contend with a formidable frontcourt led by Magoon Gwath who finished 4th in the country in Block%.
Synthesizing this information initially led me to take a skeptical approach to Byrd’s defensive translatability. And prompted a less charitable interpretation of instances where Byrd’s point-of-attack defense faltered…
…or Byrd’s lack of strength seemed to be insulated by SDSU’s constant switching.
And while these were valid concerns at the time, taking a more holistic approach to Miles Byrd’s defensive profile incited me to revise my approach. But before delving deeper into the defensive side of things, I believe Byrd’s offense deserves further attention.
The Case for Miles Byrd’s Offense
Of the 68 teams in the NCAA Tournament field, San Diego State was 61st in Adjusted Offensive Rating, surpassing only the four 16 seeds in the field, Bryant, Troy, and Robert Morris in offensive efficiency. Historically speaking, San Diego State under Bryan Dutcher has never been a system conducive to high-octane offenses. A look at SDSU’s offensive statistical profile over the years portrays a team that plays a deliberate style without generating high-quality, schemed looks.
Too often, there’s a false equivalency drawn between slow offense and bad offense. That’s far from the case in my opinion, one only need to look as far as the NCAA and NBA champions in the 2023-24 season, the UConn Huskies and Boston Celtics. Both teams played a laborious style, but with intent. UConn’s meticulously schemed motion offense was incredibly efficient, creating clean looks for their bevy of shooters. Boston’s dominant run through this past season was defined by their relentless matchup hunting and isolation game. San Diego State, though, according to their own coach, is willing to play a much more laissez-faire approach to offense. On the Basketball Immersion Podcast, Dutcher discussed his philosophy on his offense in relation to his defense as “We spend a lot of time on defense. You’re good at what you work at…we might spend 50-60% of practice on defense…Offensively, we play with great freedom. We play with freedom within framework, we have things we try to accomplish but we like high IQ guys that can break out of that at any moment and just make plays.”
Although in many areas of the game flexibility is an admirable trait, in this instance, SDSU’s willingness to grant players freedom offensive autonomy has resulted in a consistently undesirable shot profile. Below is SDSU’s shot profile data under Brian Dutcher, with Near Proximity field goal attempts being defined as layups, dunks, and tip-ins.
Even with the offensive context being subpar, anyone who has read this far is probably looking for a better explanation for Miles Byrd’s offensive shortcomings than ‘the spacing and system were terrible.’ After all, this could be applied to a litany of former prospects. Despite a team’s structural issues, a player shouldn’t be entirely absolved of the product right? In Byrd’s case, though, despite the uninspiring raw efficiency, he finished in the 87th percentile in Offensive On-Off, per cbbanalytics. San Diego State was 8.9 points per 100 possessions better with Byrd on the court, due to his contribution in a few areas.
First, Miles Byrd is a stellar example of the importance of interior passing. Ranking in the 92nd percentile in Rim-Assists/40 minutes and the 96th percentile in the percent of total assists at the rim, on a per-touch basis Byrd was extremely efficient as a playmaker. Without running a high volume of PNR, Byrd routinely displayed a diverse passing vocabulary in the few opportunities he had attacking a tilted defense.
Even though I would consider Byrd’s handle a weakness at the moment, his penchant for playmaking manifested in his schemed possessions as well. The glut of actions drawn up for Byrd were ‘Spanoulis’ or ‘Zoom Chicago’, but he did operate and was effective in a limited sample as a PNR ballhandler, finishing in the 84th percentile in PNR PPP.
What Byrd’s projection on this end will be reduced to, though, will be how consistent a spacer he will become. Ending the season shooting only 30.3% from 3 on a robust 11.7 3PA/100, I am more optimistic Byrd will develop into an effective spacer than the raw numbers indicate. A significant portion of the optimism lies in Byrd’s stellar three-point volume and career 82.8% FT%, while also being rooted in the circumstances brought on by SDSU’s offense. On Guarded 3PA Byrd shot 37.2% (32/86), which was significantly better than the 23.1% (12/52) Byrd shot on Unguarded 3PA. My hypothesis as to how this could have been possible is that half of Byrd’s 3PA were classified as ‘Long Threes’ which per cbbdata are 3PA from 25+ feet. Already lacking in physical strength, oftentimes Byrd was placed in the position of HAVING to take long 3PA when his teammates were incapable of penetrating and breaking the defensive shell on the initial action.
What may be the strongest evidence for optimism in Byrd’s offensive profile is how extensive a creation burden he was tasked with. Over the course of researching relevant data for this piece, I’d realized Byrd’s self-created shot volume stood out amongst similarly sized players from previous drafts. This past season, only 22.9% of Miles Byrd’s two-point attempts were assisted and he produced 7.42 Unassisted 2PA per 100, a shot distribution more in line with guards trusted with generating half-court offense. To gauge how Byrd’s creation compared to similarly sized players, I conducted a (slightly overfitted) query…
….which yielded this list of 72 players since 2010
50th percentile EPM in the NBA this year (regular season) is -1.71 and slightly over half of this list’s 3 Year Peak EPM surpasses this number. Considering the draft capital (or lack thereof) spent on these players, a majority of them outperformed the expected value attributed to their draft slotting. Notably in the mix here are some of the most impressive recent ‘margin wins’ in Naji Marshall, Herb Jones, and Aaron Wiggins. And while there are some significant disappointments (like a Jarrett Culver or Johnny Davis), even some widely considered ‘busts’ such as Evan Turner managed to contribute in the league for a significant period of time. Two shared traits with players unable to stick in the league were:
- Lacking a complementary offensive skillset (perimeter shooting, connective passing, and other play-finishing traits)
- An inability to contribute defensively.
As previously outlined, I’m of the mind that San Diego State’s offensive ecosystem deprived Byrd of opportunities to display the former, and in the next section I plan on quelling concerns of the latter issue.
Tying it all together
For all the aforementioned reasons, Miles Byrd and VJ Edgecombe’s profiles are not without their flaws. There are probably plenty of issues with their skill sets that I haven’t mentioned that would make teams wary of drafting them. What these two have in common, and what has been particularly enamoring, is the seamlessness with which they fit into the modern game. Particularly defensively, Edgecombe and Byrd embody traits that I believe are necessary to play in today’s style.
After this season, Miles Byrd found himself in rare company with his defensive production. The list of non-bigs who managed to contribute to elite defense to the degree Byrd did, while maintaining a baseline level of feel, is exceedingly small.
Taking account of the right-most column, zone-heavy teams seem disproportionately represented amongst this group of players, making Byrd’s inclusion even more compelling. Per Synergy, San Diego State only logged 2 (!!) possessions of zone defense this entire season. Circling back to the initial concerns raised about SDSU’s defense and how relevant Byrd’s responsibilities within the scheme would be to what he’ll be asked to do at the next level, I believe SDSU’s scheme is one of the college defenses most analogous to the NBA systems currently in vogue.
Earlier, I had mentioned SDSU’s willingness to switch in conjunction with their tendency to show help early and often as a potential crutch for Miles Byrd, an obstacle in properly evaluating his defense. Originally, I’d thought if I were unable to assess Byrd’s ability to perform in ONE isolated defensive role, whether it be screen navigation, POA defense, or weakside rim-protection, then I’d be unable to determine which defensive role best suited him. The direction defenses in the NBA are heading, though, proves this is an antiquated way of evaluating defensive talent. In the same way competency in dribbling, passing, and shooting has become requisite for incoming NBA players, we have now arrived in an era where personnel need to demonstrate a degree of proficiency in each facet of defense to contribute to elite ’16 game’ basketball.
Of course, no team has exemplified this philosophy more than the prohibitive favorites for this year’s championship, the Oklahoma City Thunder. By compiling a roster full of players who are not only physically capable of executing a variety of defensive roles, but can simultaneously diagnose complex rotations, the Thunder have architected a defense with a singular identity amongst the NBA elite. Similar to San Diego State, the Thunder have no issues helping off of shooters, switching early and often, varying ballscreen coverages, and breaking with conventional defensive principles like helping off the ball-side corner.
While the other participant in this year’s NBA Finals doesn’t play as frenetic a defensive scheme, the Indiana Pacers mirror Oklahoma City in their utilization of early pick-up points in order to extend their pressure and convert a perceived weakness, their size, into a strength.
This kind of defense, which is becoming more and more commonplace, is where both Edgecombe and Byrd should thrive. Both have routinely shown their chops in each ‘phase’ of defense. Role notwithstanding, both were exemplary as point-of-attack defenders.
As previously discussed, SDSU’s scheme gave Byrd carte blanche to trust his instincts and range as a help defender, to consistently great results. Byrd’s activity was pervasive in every area, changing the geometry of the court by altering drive angles as a nail-defender…
…and keeping his team’s defense out of rotation with his sticky screen navigation.
Edgecombe’s deployment wasn’t nearly as fluid as Byrd’s, as Baylor played significantly more zone defense than SDSU (Baylor finished in the 91st percentile in zone frequency), making their defensive identity this season much more conservative. Coming into this season as the 234th-ranked team in average height per KenPom, Baylor didn’t have the luxury of rangy defenders to execute longer, more exotic rotations, so their prerogative was to stay out of rotation entirely and maintain shell integrity. This confined Edgecombe to playing a much more static role than Byrd. Even with a more parochial role, Edgecombe’s hand speed and lateral quickness mirroring players on the perimeter shone.
The instances of cognitive athleticism Byrd and Edgecombe show in the clips above are what make them especially suited for modern defenses. Oklahoma City has become the blueprint by acquiring players with traditionally valued athletic traits, decision making, and reaction times to dial their defensive aggression to the point where they are dictating terms of play to the offense. Recently, a major shift in NFL defenses was made when teams realized offenses struggled playing against 2-high safety alignments, where big-play opportunities were limited and offenses would have to slowly matriculate the ball down the field. I do not find the recent schematic changes made by the OKC Thunder all that different. The Thunder defense, by swarming to the ball and congesting driving lanes, have turned the long-held ‘drive and kick’ logic on its head. Similar to San Diego State, OKC concedes a high volume of 3PA defensively, especially relative to contemporary elite defenses. However, this is by design, by selling out on drives and forcing the ball to travel east-west versus north-south, both teams force longer possessions. In Oklahoma City’s case, the number of defensive playmakers they roster makes each drive by the opponent a tenuous proposition. When a team rosters so many chaos agents on defense, there’s the opportunity cost assumed with each successive drive, that the chance of the driver committing a turnover increases.
The emphasis on turnover generation in convergence with the break from traditional defensive philosophies resulted in NBA defense being ‘up’ this year, with drive volume, secondary assists (an assist made without the passer dribbling before the assist), and offensive rating all declining. While I understand this is a somewhat strained assumption, especially on such a small sample, I truly believe the sustained intensity and creativity we’re seeing in defenses is responsible for this phenomenon.
In SDSU’s case, Miles Byrd was disruptive enough on his own to mimic this effect on opposing offenses. By covering large swaths of ground and making multiple efforts after the initial rotation, Byrd was largely responsible for preventing flow to build within an offense.
By now I am probably starting to sound like a broken record with the continued use of terms like ‘ground-coverage’ and ‘event creation’, but it truly can’t be overstated how essential this is becoming as we transition into what has been aptly termed ‘The Weakest Link Era’ (a phrase coined by the inimitable Owen Phillips). So far, I’ve outlined the kind of player required to play this work-intensive style of defense, but the fact of the matter is that to play this way throughout the regular season and playoffs, you need MORE of this kind of player.
NBA basketball has never been more physically demanding, so it follows that to play a style hinged on range and effort, you’ll need a rotating cast of players to complement your core group. In Oklahoma City’s case, their depth is not only complementary, but ameliorates the weaknesses of many players in their rotation. So many members of the Thunder either currently possess or were at an earlier point designated as half-court deficient players; however, their greatest strength defensively allows them to play in the game states most conducive to efficient offense.
This applies to Miles Byrd and VJ Edgecombe because, irrespective of their offensive limitations, their penchant for creating turnovers will greatly augment the offense of a team, especially one already rostering players with similar defensive talents. The effect both Byrd and Edgecombe had on their respective teams’ transition numbers is instructive as to their value-add offensively.
In Byrd’s case, these transition numbers are especially notable: this is how a player shooting 38% from the field becomes the most impactful player to his team’s offense. San Diego State’s rim rate went from 122nd in the country with Byrd on the court to 293rd with him off. Without Byrd providing a spark in transition, the Aztecs were incapable of generating quality rim attempts in the half-court.
Conclusion
As it currently stands, the NBA is in a transitionary period. Slowly but surely, fans, analysts, and teams alike are acknowledging this era is a far departure from the star-centric league most of us grew to know and love. Now, as depth and flexibility become the focus, and while salary cap restrictions are more punitive than ever, it is paramount that teams get the most out of whatever draft capital they possess to maintain a standard of competitiveness. Otherwise, teams will routinely subject themselves to the whims of the ever-temperamental lottery gods (my condolences go out to fans of the Wizards, Jazz, and Pelicans alike). As I’ve mentioned repeatedly, Miles Byrd and VJ Edgecombe are far from perfect prospects, for as much as I’ve lauded their defensive acumen, even in this area their physical strength could become a significant obstacle which prevents them from being All-Defense caliber performers.
In Edgecombe’s case in particular, I would be surprised if he ended up returning top-4 value, and personally have him ranked 7th at the time of writing. I see VJ developing in a way where he could disappoint relative to expectations on his rookie contract. However, the style both players allow you to play, and the confidence I have in the depth they will provide, anchors my belief that both players have productive NBA careers ahead of them.
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