An aspect of NBA Draft Scouting I feel often goes under the radar is the ‘macro’ side of the game. This is something I believe to be the case when pre-NBA Tape is being analysed, but also when people try and project a players’ role in the NBA. Building a basketball team is about building a team that fits together, the goal isn’t just to collect good players and hope for the best. Similarly, I believe when analysing a prospects’ game, the rest of the team needs to be analysed and understood. This allows you to come to a conclusion as to whether the weaknesses will be alleviated with different pieces around them at the next level.

On the pre-NBA point, Mega Basket for the most part are a team built to develop prospects and showcase them in order to be able to keep running. They are a Youth Academy in a league where most teams are acquiring NBA veterans. Mega Basket by contrast had only one player over 30 years old on their roster last season. From an actual on-court perspective, Mega Basket were a team that had shaky perimeter spacing. Andrija Jelavic who will get draft buzz next year was their starting power forward. He’s a willing shooter, but shot only 28 percent from beyond the arc on the season.

From a personnel perspective, Mega Basket underwent some form of turmoil during the season when Nikola Topic left the team at Christmas. With Topic, Djurisic largely was utilised as a wing-driver and off-ball scorer. His game involves Stampede Driving (Catch and Go) and running Pick-And-Rolls after coming off a pin-down.

What was rather surprising to me, was that Djurisic’s role didn’t drastically change after the departure of Topic. Sure, he touched the ball slightly more and there was more urgency to get him touches. But he was still doing the same stuff as before. He just had more responsibility. Nikola Topic’s minutes were divided up between Stefan Miljenovic and Omer Can Ilyasoglu, leaving Djurisic free to play in his comfort zone as opposed to being crowbarred into something he’s not because he’s the best player.

Generally speaking, I project Djurisic to be a wing scorer who compromises nail help with his driving gravity and makes creative passes from the second-side. I believe the Macro to be advantageous to Djurisic as he has a good deal of experience playing in his likely NBA role, and at such a young age at a good-level of basketball. However, I also believe that the poor spacing made it difficult on him as I project him to be a drive-first wing. Interior windows were smaller than they may end up being in the NBA.

His 4.4 3PA per 36 would rank around 150th in the NBA. Some names around there include Josh Giddey, Jaden McDaniels and Jonathan Isaac. I believe him to have larger driving gravity than those names to make up for it. It must also be noted there are some very good NBA wings who shoot fewer 3s than that, so it’s not the be-all-end-all. Mega Basket were in a position where they probably could have done with him shooting more, but Djurisic drives were also arguably their scariest proposition outside of set plays.

Driving

The biggest strength of Nikola Djurisic is his driving game. His handle is good and he’s able to get where he wants to a lot of the time. He’s utilised as a slasher in the Mega Basket system, and he generally looks to drive rather than shoot when he comes off a ball-screen, though I don’t see these splits as egregious or anything.

I normally divide drives into two types. Those that take advantages, and those that create advantages. Djurisic’ is excellent at punishing tilted floors with his driving game which projects well for him being a play finisher.

Double Stagger Screen- Drive Right- Cross Over Left and get the half-dunk. Djurisic’s ability to cover a lot of ground really pops both in transition and against titled floors. Creating advantages via scheme or capitalising on the gravity of another star is obviously the easiest way to get this to pop.

His ground coverage is impressive, but what I find even more impressive is that he’s seemingly in control a lot of the time when he drives to the basket. Take the play below as an example.

Mega Basket go to Pistol Action. The opposition are going no middle and funnelling Djurisic towards the help. He breezes past his man and shows a good second-level move on his off-hand to get a layup as opposed to a floater. Something I noted throughout my scouting was how much better Djurisic got as the season went on. This was partially because Mega got better as a team and things were sped up as they got familiar with the playbook. But he just seemingly got much more comfortable as a driver.

He’s nifty in transition, and seems to have a plan. This was admittedly a sketchy take early on in the season, but he got much more comfortable as the season progressed, as if he had a better understanding of where his team-mates were going to be and where help might come from. This fuels his very impressive 0.46 Free-Throw rate.

He ends up missing the shot, but I love the process here. This was from early in the season. He attacks quickly and covers a great deal of ground. He’s good at stepping around help in the paint, it just slightly lets him down on this occasion. The reason I mention this being early in the season is because it felt as if his head was often in the right place, but he just lacked control. This was not really the case as the season went on.

This was from the February game against Zadar. It may look like a simple transition play, but the speed to adapt to the baseline being taken away into a eurostep and layup high off the glass is extremely impressive stuff. Transition isn’t the same as half-court basketball but these skills are still very valuable.

I’ve mentioned Stampeding the Catch a few times already. This is a niche strategy that has started to rise in the NBA. It involves a player attacking straight off the catch while the ball is coming to them. There are really two usages. One is to get a primary downhill momentum 30-feet or more from the basket (such as in Flip Action). The other is more of a half-court punishment to rightfully loading up help on star players. From the perspective of the player attacking, it requires a good handle and the ability to read defenses quickly.

Aggressive Nail Help is becoming more and more common, with 1 v 1 defense across the board genuinely becoming more of a dying art at the NBA level. In terms of off-ball counters, NBA defenses are comfortable leaving above average shooters open if it keeps their defenders out of rotation. Stampeding is a way of getting right back into the teeth of a defense. Djurisic is excellent at doing this due to his handle, his passing and an emerging floater and pull-up game.

Mega Basket are in their motion offense, the ball handler draws the nail help and swings it to Djurisic who takes it straight off the catch and draws a foul. Note how the closeout was denying Djurisic the middle of the floor. This is a common NBA strategy. For the most part, Djurisic is very comfortable driving baseline which i think adds value to him as a supporting wing player. He may see slightly softer closeouts because of his driving prowess and needing to earn the respect for his jump shot. But I’m a believer in his pull-up game (more on that later).

His interior passing is also a good mesh with stampeding, as he’s able to read the floor before he takes the ball off the catch and work out where help is going to come from. Here he makes a nifty dump-off pass after attacking from the left corner.

He seemed to be pretty self-aware of the fact that his team needed his drives into the paint to create good shots at the rim on a consistent basis, especially if they were not running set plays. On the play below, Djurisic has an opportunity to shoot, but punishes the closeout and makes a nifty shovel pass. Uros Plavsic robs him of an assist on this play.

Something i want to be clear about, is Djurisic’s driving game is not limited to off-ball drives or niche tactics. It’s just an area I think worth noting when projecting his fit with other players. Djurisic improved drastically throughout the season and by the end of the season he was flashing some immense reps as a driver.

Here they deny him the baseline which is probably because he’s more comfortable as a passer when driving to the right hand-side. So he drives and explodes off the low angle when he meets resistance in the paint. It’s impressive how quickly Djurisic is able to react to paint defense, and his size opens up extra finishing angles for him. He became more adept at finishing off the glass as the season progressed.

I’ve mentioned Djurisic getting valuable reps in his potential NBA usage, the play below is another example of this.

Iverson Action. Djurisic reads his defender going under, so he rejects the action and takes it straight off the catch, using a double clutch and a eurostep to turn a floater into a layup. This was a playoff game and despite slightly reduced minutes he played very well in these games, showcasing the season-wide improvement he had.

Generally speaking, the Double Clutch seems to be becoming a favourite of his. This is testament to his handle in general. This play from the Playoffs might be his best finish of the year. Drive -> Hard Step to force the big to his right -> crossover -> double clutch to secure the ball -> finish off the glass. Absolute poetry in motion, showcasing the development all coming together.

Delay sets are a staple of modern NBA offense, here’s Djurisic showcasing his driving chops in ‘Miami’ action, which is a handoff into a ball screen.

He takes the handoff, then just makes one subtle step and eye movement inside, which changes his defenders trajectory. He then takes a wide east-west step. After this he puts his man in jail, fakes a jump pass to freeze the big man then explodes off his planted foot in the same motion and finishes off the glass. He’s one of those players who just does a lot of subtle things when he drives that turn decent shots into good shots.

These ‘Zoom’ sets such as Miami and Chicago are staples of NBA offenses, and Djurisic’s handle and passing definitely open them up to be more fruitful. They’re often a go-to action in the NBA as a way of keeping lower usage players involved, but many of the players being given the reps out of these aren’t as dynamic of drivers as Djurisic. On the play below he quickly splits the PNR in Miami Action and draws a foul.

The poise Djurisic played with as the season went on was very encouraging. Early in the year it just felt like he was always trying to drive as opposed to reading the defense. With Mega Basket’s spacing concerns, this just exacerbated his turnover issues. But by the playoffs he was consistently showing a high-level driving game.

He comes off the screen, and within a second he has the big in hell. Pushing left, then spinning him around, then exploding from a low position for a layup. Mega Basket used a lot of clearout and roll and replace concepts to make drives easier for Djurisic, but with him being this coordinated it honestly isn’t something that’s necessarily always needed.

On this occasion, Djurisic is able to get low and explode off the ground. I would however say this is the aspect of his handle most in need of improvement. He’s able to get low, but there are times when he can really overestimate how good a driving angle he has available to him.

Mega Basket reset after an offensive rebound. Djurisic has a ball screen available to him, but chooses to try and drive. He gets low, but not to much effect. It’s good defense, but rejecting the ball screen wasn’t the move here, the perimeter defender was in a better position to defend his left side as opposed to the ball-screen side.

Shooting, Runners and why Driving is still a factor

Slightly transitioning into the next section on his shooting, I believe part of these driving issues come because of his shot prep.

On this play, stampeding probably isn’t the best option. His defender is parallel to the sideline and he’s got enough space to shoot. He has to at least sell the fact he might take a jump shot. Instead he barrels into a drive, tries to get low and turns the ball over. These issues definitely decreased in frequency as the season progressed, but he does have a slight tendency to get himself into trouble by trying to get low to the ground. It’s good he’s able to get low, but overestimating driving angles is a downside of his approach.

I’ve said previously, but Djurisic took 4.4 3s per 36, which would rank around 150th in the NBA. Part of this is because Mega Basket needed him to do this as even outside of Djurisic they weren’t much of a volume or efficiency 3-point shooting team because of non-shooting centers and streaky stretch 4s. But there is no doubt he is a guy who looks to drive first.

How worried you are by these forced drives depends on how much you believe in Djurisic’s pull-up game. Even as a Djurisic believer, I have to admit that with Djurisic’ shooting, you are buying a lot into process because the results are obviously not fully there. You’re buying into his space creation and perhaps a slight change in approach when it comes to driving vs shooting.

Across the board, his shooting percentages became more respectable this year, jumping from 22 percent to 30 percent from three. His pull-up game got more prevalent as the year progressed. Per my hand-tracking via Synergy, In the first 18 games of the season, he took 2.1 dribble jumpers per game making 28 percent of them. Over the last 18 games, he was taking 3.7 per game, making 37 percent of them.

Synergy has odd definitions on these, but it matched the eye test. He seemed more comfortable taking these shots as the year progressed.

Mega Basket swing the ball to the top of the key, the ’45’ cut creates a one on one for Djurisic. He didn’t create an advantage on the drive, so moves into his step-back. It’s a bit slow at first but the east-west creation at the end to the sustain the advantage is good.

Part of the reason his pull up game may have improved as the season progressed is his driving gravity opened up opportunities for him.

Mega Basket run ‘Delay Chicago Leak’ for a popping big. Jelavic dives to the rim which leaves Djurisic open. His man is clearly worried about a paint attack so Djurisic drops him deeper and then steps into a pull-up jumper. He got good separation on this shot and it’s why the process might be worth buying into.

The playoffs were difficult for Mega Basket. They played well, but the nature of this team is that they are always going to have roster turnover. So to me, it’s encouraging that Djurisic started to flash more in these games.

Crvena Zvezda are in a no middle defense. Djurisic drives to the baseline, sees a roaming defender and steps nicely into a step-back jumper. Mega Basket’s spacing on this play isn’t exactly great. It’s effectively 3-out-2-in with a 31 percent three-point shooter in the weakside corner. The spacing in the NBA should be better for him, but this doesn’t always necessarily lead to better results. With Djurisic, I’m more buying the flashes of space creation with such tough spacing as a platform for more growth.

With the shooting, you’re heavily buying two things, one is the space creation process as I mentioned above.

The other, is banking on his decision making becoming more streamlined at the next level. It’s clear he prefers to drive to the basket. But the question mark is whether this is definitively who he is, or if this is who he needed to be for Mega Basket to be the best version of themselves. Though they’re a developmentally-based team, basketball players still want to win games. He would sometimes stampede out of decent looks for Mega Basket, and that’s something teams may be slightly put off by, especially for a lower usage guy.

One notable thing from the Combine game, was how Djurisic got a heavy dosage of his probable early-NBA usage.

Here, his team run ‘Wide Reject Exit’. The shot prep is good and allows him to turn a disrupted pass into a clean look from beyond the arc. The process here looks pretty smooth.

The final thing to note in his shooting profile, is that a runner and floater game started to emerge as the season progressed.

The sample size isn’t huge, but the ones Djurisic did make were pure. His general comfort dribbling around the mid-range areas is hopefully an indicator that this floater game is here to stay.

Passing

Djurisic’ passing game and your read on it probably guages whether you have him as a borderline lottery pick, or as a second-rounder. Djurisic’ passing tape is the ultimate goldmine for a ‘risk v reward’ discussion. His passing generally meshes alongside his driving game, and he makes some absolutely beautiful passes. He manipulates defenders with his eyes, makes one-handed passes, bounce passes, floated lob passes. Whatever type of pass you like, he’s probably pulled one off.

Mega Basket run ‘Knicks Ricky’ which is a step up ball screen for Djurisic, who has initially come off a different screen in a different direction. Djurisic goes to use the screen, draws the trap and makes a quick wraparound pass to the roller who draws the foul. He’s able to think quickly and do things quickly.

It felt on film as if Djurisic was more creative as a passer when driving right as opposed to left. The sample sizes aren’t large enough to make definitive sweeping statements, but he appears much more comfortable making advanced reads when he was moving to the right hand side. On the left, we were sometimes accustomed to results such as below.

Mega Basket run ‘Strong Spain’. Djurisic comes off the ball-screen and ends up picking up his dribble. He then tries a very difficult pass with his off-hand. He overestimated the window completely. Going quicker into a pull-up jumper here may have helped, but he also should make the pass to the strong-side corner. But at the same time, the player spaced in the corner isn’t a good shooter.

This play illustrates my point, from both sides. At first, Djurisic uses a ball screen to his left, but Partizan send a trap at him. He gets stuck and resets. Next time, he rejects the screen and makes a nice pass with his off-hand which should really end in a wide open corner three.

This assist is one of his best on the year. Mega Basket run ‘Double Zoom’ action to get him downhill. He gets pushed away from the basket but makes a great pass with his left hand while he is falling over. He is capable of passing with his left hand, it just shows up a lot more when he is driving on his strong hand- this isn’t exactly abnormal.

He’s shown great potential at working with a roller. Mega’s center play was sometimes inconsistent and he probably deserved more assists, but some of his passes were very creative and well-timed. I loved this floated lob pass.

Mega Basket run a Roll and Replace type action with a player leaking out of the paint while the PNR goes. Djurisic makes a nice floated pass for an alley-oop. The pass was one that should have been made, but I liked the adjustment when the nail help disrupted him, he floated it with his wrist while low to the ground.

I think a team should tap into his connective passing if they draft him.

He likely won’t see the paint this packed in the NBA, but he’s very capable of extending windows with his handle and making nifty passes. This one was a great behind the back pass, and he had a similar one in the second combine game he played in. In an NBA where a lot of stuff can become heliocentric, I think his ability to deliver multiple outcomes off the second side is extremely valuable.

I’ve made it clear he’s a creative passer. The disagreements some may have, is whether his game is inherently too risky. He turned it over 3.2 times per game which was among the highest in the BAL.

This play is a good example of Djurisic’s risk taking. He comes off a wide-ball screen on an empty-side. The roller is open, but Djurisic tries a bounce pass. In my view, the center should catch this ball. But the other view is that this type of pass probably wasn’t necessary to produce a good result.

Djurisic’ passing depends on the team and the fit. As a believer in the passing, I think the creativity is welcomed and stops the ‘Academy Brain’ type plays that can make half-court offense predictable and easier for the defense to stop. However, some teams and scouts simply are less forgiving to players that needlessly turn the ball over.

It does appear his approach to the game is to take risks and do high risk-high reward type plays. But there is a possible chance this scales down when he has better spacing and is asked to do less. Upon speaking to people who are less high on Djurisic than me, I think this is normally the point where we start to lose each other.

Defense

This section isn’t going to be as long as the others. This isn’t because I’m overlooking defense or because he is outrageously good or outrageously bad. There just doesn’t feel like a great deal to say.

This also isn’t my selling point. I project him to be a passable defender at my highest level of evaluation. His feel is enough for me to think he won’t be a liability off-ball which means he isn’t going to overly compromise your scheme.

One reason for my hesitance to talk in great depth about the defense is because of the role he was utilised in.

Mega Basket were an aggressive defense that overloaded the strong-side of the court and liked to mix in traps at the top of the key. Djurisic wasn’t consistently utilised on the ball, so he spent the majority of the time playing as the weakside low-man. This is quite a tough ask for a 20-year old wing with just 6’7 wingspan. NBA Teams will often use half-court offense to isolate and pick their preferred choice at low-man, but it’s also highly unlikely an NBA team would leave Djurisic in that role early in his NBA Career.

Within this role, his job was to split the difference between protecting the rim and playing to the corner. The results were inconsistent. Sometimes such as on the play below, he was able to execute every part of his job as a low-man.

Here, Djurisic contains the baseline drive and rotates all the way out to the corner, blocking the shot. But there were plenty of other occasions where his help inside was minimal or he left the corner wide open.

I’d say the part of the defense I’d bank on most is the feel.

This clip is from the second combine game. His team overload the strong side which is largely what Djurisic played with in Serbia. He shows good reading of the game to sink at the right time and take away the layup. It’s simple stuff but when he knows his role, I think he can make good plays. It just needs to be way more consistent.

I also like the play below, where he blows up Bilbao Action.

But again later in the play, the resistance isn’t exactly domineering. He’s in the right place, but Vojvodina still get the exact shot they want. Knowing where to be and disrupting the shot are separate things.

On the perimeter, he lacks discipline at times. He can surrender decent driving angles to his matchups. This was extra problematic at times because he was often isolated on a side, which meant there wasn’t always help to bail him out. But we also didn’t see a great deal of him on ball because of the nature of Mega Basket’s defensive scheme. Whether they were hiding him or preserving him is in the eye of the beholder. The likely answer is it’s a bit of both.

My Ideal Fits and Development Plan

A lot has to go right for a prospect to work out in the NBA. It isn’t always as simple someone being ‘destined’ to make it at the next level. It’s something I feel needs more discourse. In my eyes, building a winning team isn’t about just stashing as many theoretical primaries as you can, it’s about fitting things together and answering hypothetical questions about the pieces you do have.

Nikola Djurisic is a prospect I’d feel comfortable taking in the mid-teens in the right situation. But I’m unsure giving a player a ‘grade’ really matters in the grand scheme of things, because his fit on one team might not be as good as a fit on another.

The asterisk to the ‘fit’ debate is that of course, rosters can change. But generally speaking, front offices will always try and build around what they do have, even if popular opinion deems the core to not be worth it. Their job often depends on it.

Here are some things I’d like to see in the team that Djurisic gets drafted by

• Have at least average team three-point volume
• Have a player who draws nail help
• Have size in the frontcourt

The three-point volume is important because even if Djurisic becomes a more consistent shooter, he’s a guy whose best skill is the ability to drive and be creative as a passer. Ensuring he doesn’t just need to become a spot-up play finisher is important. If a team is in need of three-point volume, I have concerns that his game would become heavily geared towards shooting and the stuff I consider to be his swing skills will not be given room to flourish and grow.

I’ve mentioned part of my process is answering ‘hypothetical’ questions. The part of the game I spend a lot of time on is the ability to beat specific defensive coverages. For example, I want to know how my roster or primary ball handler would react to a trap or a hedge. Can the wings shoot, if not, can they drive to the rim and get the defense back into rotation. Does my big man have a good understanding of where to make himself available for a pass? Can my big play on the short roll? These are the types of questions I seek to answer when analysing rosters, because sometimes you cannot X’s and O’s your way out of a situation.

I bring this up, because of my desire to see Djurisic alongside a team that draws nail help. It’s very specific and niche, but the type of thing I care about. Djurisic is an excellent driver and finisher who can punish the defense and get them back into rotation. If a team just wants someone to spot-up, there are better options. But if a team has a primary who plays more in isolation, I feel the off-the-catch game is a nice supporting feature.

Though I’d say I’m not a doomer on Djurisic’ defense, I have to admit the lack of size is a potential issue. So I feel a team with a smaller front-court might not get the most out of him.

This section might feel a little niche to some, but I just think it’s important to outline what you are scared of with a prospect, and more often than not I end up scared of the developmental situation a player ends up in as opposed to flaws in their own talent.

The three teams I feel he fits with are Memphis, Portland and New York.

Memphis

Memphis have reportedly worked out Nikola Djurisic. I feel he’d be a great fit. Memphis overhauled their offensive scheme this year, moving from a more rigid and traditional system to one that inverted the floor more often and utilised creative sets to generate three-pointers. They likely did this because they felt their rigidity worked against them in playoff settings.

A lot of their sets are for Desmond Bane and other shooters to emerge at the top of the key for three-pointers, but they are also adding Ja Morant to the mix whose gravity as a driver is incredible. Djurisic would slot in well in this ecosystem, utilising his driving ability to finish plays later in the clock and punish early loading up on Ja Morant. Sure, schemes can change. But Morant and Bane are locked in, and regardless of how they run offense, space is going to be there for off-ball players to exploit off the catch

Portland

Portland’s young core is intriguing. Scoot Henderson’s rookie year was up and down but I still buy the driving talent and gravity this will create. In Shaedon Sharpe and Anfernee Simons they have two off-ball threats, and Duop Reath might be the most underrated player in the entire NBA as of now. Djurisic is a guy who needs some work, and I feel Portland is perhaps the best fit for him to iron out some of his kinks. Chauncey Billups is a creative tactician who can draw up some sets for him to work on the empty-side alongside the young core they have in place.

Of the three teams I’ve named, this is the only one where Djurisic would be entering a rebuild. The reason I love this fit is because he has a great opportunity for play time, and if Scoot Henderson pans out I feel he’s a player who can fit alongside him.

New York

I think of the three teams I’ve named, the Knicks might be my favourite. Firstly, they have arguably the premier primary player at drawing nail help in the NBA in Jalen Brunson. Tom Thibodeau is underrated as an offensive coach, but more often than not he does like players who can create something from nothing, or at least from the more traditional sense. Djurisic’s driving game could pop in the future alongside Jalen Brunson.

I also think Tom Thibodeau gives his players defensive structure. He can alter his at-the-level coverages but for the most part, his wings do the same thing each game. They hustle, tag the roll and fly out to corner shooters on the weakside. Djurisic has a decent feel for the game defensively, and I think giving him a very specific role will be beneficial to his overall development. Thibodeau can be willing to play defensive neutrals or even negatives if they give him something unique offensively, and Djurisic definitely fits the bill here.

If Djurisic does choose to stay overseas, I like this fit the most of the three. The Knicks are largely locked in with a lot of their core, and bringing him into the fold in say 2026 after two more seasons of developing as a lead guy could be hugely beneficial to the Knicks and Djurisic.

Conclusion and Developmental Thoughts

Overall, I’ve probably made it clear I’m a believer in Nikola Djurisic. I buy the driving game as being a difference maker at the next level, and the pull-up game is one I’d buy into. The biggest concern offensively is probably the spot-up shooting. Though I’ve said ideally I want him to drive to the rim at the next level, at some point he will have to shoot. Part of the work needs to come in his shot approach, at times he decides to drive from good shooting windows. This is partially what makes him valuable as a driver, but balancing it will be key. I also believe his athleticism is hugely undersold.

The passing is good, it’s whether the playmaking potential will be anchored down by the turnovers. He may turn the ball over at a lower rate in a lower usage role, but the creativity does seem to be part of who he is as a basketball player. Your read on this probably signifies how much you believe in him, because the driving game looks to be good. It will also be interesting early on to see the types of closeouts he receives. Guys low in the rotation normally aren’t featured on the scouting report, but I expect people to work out early on that he prefers to drive. Teams may want him to work more on his shot approach and be selective with drives.

Though a ‘grade’ can be different for each team, I’d say generally speaking I believe Djurisic should be a first-round pick. I think his experience in an off-ball role gives him an advantage over many others who will be adapting from being primaries into lower usage players. Defensively, I think you are banking on him not being a negative. The main work needs to come on the perimeter, where he does have a tendency to surrender good driving angles to his opponents. I’d also recommend streamlining his role, giving him a specific duty like Mega Basket did, albeit a different one as I question the viability of him as a low-man helper against NBA level athletes.

The post Scouting Report: Assessing Fit and Maximising Nikola Djurisic in the NBA appeared first on Swish Theory.

I watch an unholy amount of film; I’m what you might call a Sicko. So believe me when I say I’m not being hyperbolic. The 2023-24 Utah Jazz offensive process is one of the best I’ve seen from a basketball team. This is a roster with some talent, but I believe Hardy’s coaching is milking every ounce of that talent from the roster which is not always the case in basketball.

I normally judge offenses in four ways. I don’t have a weighted formula but these are the things I look at:

• Creativity of plays and their fit with the personnel
• Spacing concepts and cutting
• Execution of counters when first option is taken away
• Speed of action

An offense normally won’t tick all four of these in my mind. Sometimes this is because teams are simply loaded with talent and may not need to extend extra labour into their offensive process. Other times, we have to remember that practice only happens for a finite amount of time and coaching is hard. With this Jazz team, I firmly believe they tick all four of the things I look for regularly.

The pace stat is mostly useless to me; it’s just an indicator of how much a team runs. Speed of action is much more important and that’s not something that is tracked by any of the statistical services I have subscriptions for. It’s something I try and gauge from watching as much of a team’s half-court offense as possible. The Utah Jazz excel at all of this.

Statistically, you might not be blown away. This is an offense ranking 17th in offensive efficiency and 23rd in half-court efficiency. But the process is excellent and the Jazz are running some modern concepts and arguably setting some metas for how modern basketball offenses will work. It’s an ideal environment for developing players, so it’s no shock many are having the best spells of their careers in Utah.

Since December 7th, when Will Hardy called a Jazz performance, and I quote, ‘ A Masterpiece of Dog Shit’. The Utah Jazz are 8th in offensive efficiency and 11th in halfcourt offensive efficiency

I’ll get into more detail in the skeleton of this article, but Hardy and his staff have an excellent understanding of the way modern defenses are playing. Teams are loading up with nail help, and often using a ‘roaming’ center on a non-shooter or an offensive player they deem low usage. Hardy’s concepts exploit these, and their set plays help maximize a roster that is mostly made up of young players, some veterans, and players who other teams did not see value in. In a way, the Utah Jazz offense unites the roster and creates some fascinating questions about what they might do next in their rebuild.

Flare Screens

I’m going to give flare screens their own section in this article because they’re often Utah’s first read in the half-court. Normally, they are ‘top flares’ such as the one below.

They’ll push these at will, especially for Lauri Markkanen. Per Synergy, the only team that ends up with more shots off-screen is the Golden State Warriors. I will asterisk this with the fact Synergy will only track this if the off-screen play leads to an instant shot. Utah runs many more screens that don’t instantly lead to a shot. This is their most common. Nothing elaborate, but something easy and low maintenance for their best player. This matters. Only Stephen Curry and Klay Thompson attempt more shots off-screen per game than Lauri Markkanen.

Flare screens are probably the most important screens in modern basketball, especially in the context of the play above. Pistol action is by far the most common action in NBA basketball. Teams need to first cover the baseline but then be ready for the normal ‘chase’ action that follows when a player receives a handoff. To attempt to do this, teams will load up with nail help and slant toward one side of the floor. This quick top flare puts that to the test because it punishes any over-help, and Lauri’s prowess means they have to pay legitimate attention to it. This leads to less coverage of the initial pistol actions.

I mentioned in my rubric for evaluating offenses the importance of flowing into stuff quickly when the flare doesn’t directly lead to a shot. Utah does this well: think of the flare like an opening move in chess.

The Thunder cover things well, so the Jazz quickly flow into a middle pick-and-roll. This is largely where Collin Sexton‘s value shows because he’s an excellent and willing driver.

I liked the read below too, where Lauri Markkanen dives to the rim and disrupts the low-man help after initially not getting open on the flare screen.

Markkanen vacating the perimeter means there’s no nail help to disrupt Sexton, and he takes it to the paint for an easy score. This pre-action frees things up and creates lanes for players that maybe aren’t as good at creating them as the top stars in the NBA.

As always with Utah, the off-ball reads are crisp, like below.

Collin Sexton slips backdoor while the Rockets try and switch the action. To quote my good friend, Nekias Duncan- ‘The best way to beat a switch is to slip’.

Something unique about Utah is that their ATOs aren’t unique or special plays. They generally just run their half-court concepts but from a different angle with the out-of-bounds pass. The only exception I found on film was their Iverson set.

Here, the Jazz flow into the top-flare action from a ‘get’ action on the SLOB play. On this occasion, they use it to switch hunt and Keyonte gets a decent driving lane before Chet Holmgren happens.

I’ve mentioned counters and speed of action multiple times so far. I liked this double backdoor counter the Jazz used in their top flare progressions.

The two backdoor cuts open up a potential open side for a driver, but it also draws the help defense from the other side, which Collin Sexton punishes with that San Antonio Spursian lift from the corner.

In recent games, Will Hardy has felt more comfortable adding extra layers onto the Jazz’ core stuff. This opening play against the Denver Nuggets was a great way of using the flare screen as pre-action.

The Jazz run ‘Top Flare Reject Ram Spain Shallow Brush‘. It’s a mouthful but don’t panic. They don’t use the top flare as Denver has it scouted. Markkanen screens for John Collins and he enters a PNR with Kris Dunn. Collin Sexton also looks as if he’s going to screen KCP, but when KCP turns his eyes to the ball handler, Sexton sets a little brush screen for Lauri to pop for a three-pointer. Utah in particular loves brush screens, and you can see this basic concept is just a starting point for their offense. They’re beginning to add and flow into more stuff as the year progresses.

Top flares are Utah’s most common type, but they run the more traditional flare screens too. They do these both as freelance off-ball reads and as part of more intricate set plays. Here’s a basic off-ball Indiana read alongside an empty PNR, a Utah staple.

They’ll often use these as quick hitters for Markkanen, notably on an empty side. He’s good at cutting backdoor if they over-commit; that’s been a notable development of his in Utah.

As Lauri has been cutting more in Utah, teams respect that side of his game a lot more. This has been a notable change from his time in Chicago. Watch the play below as an example of how Utah uses that against teams.

We see the return of the brush screening concept as Utah runs ‘Stack Out Flip Flare‘ with a brush screen counter. The stack out is their go-to if teams are tightly defending Markkanen or Olynyk. Here they have Markkanen go off a flare screen after flipping the ball back to Collin Sexton. Note how far into the paint Toronto’s low-man is playing when Markkanen clears through the paint. He punishes this by setting a quasi brush-screen for Jordan Clarkson to pop open for a three-pointer.

Finally, just watch this play for an indicator of how annoying it is to defend the Utah Jazz when their five-out stuff is humming.

Lauri Markkanen starts the play by coming off a wide ball screen, then Collin Sexton flares for him as he’s ghosting the pick-and-roll. Admittedly, Dallas didn’t have the most fearsome defenders at the top of the key, but this just showcases how Utah dissuades nail help with constant screening and moving.

I also liked this intriguing read.

Utah goes into the elbow with the ball. It initially looks as if Markkanen is going to be part of a double screening action. Instead, Utah flows Markkanen into a top flare to an empty side. Watch Jordan Clarkson. Kenrich Williams is ball-watching so he screens Markkanen’s man which essentially creates a defacto switch that Markkanen can punish.

They may not have the talent level of other teams, but they out-work you and never stand in place. The flare screen isn’t all they do, but it’s the springboard for the majority of their half-court plays and it’s always in their arsenal, almost built into their overall DNA.

Blind Handoffs and Skip Passes

The blind pass isn’t necessarily a new tactic or phenomenon. The Golden State Warriors have used it for Draymond Green for many years as teams often would sit off him to cover all the back cuts and zipper cuts through the paint. There has also been ‘Blind Pig’ action. The way Utah and Miami have used this action is relatively unique. They’ll sometimes have Walker Kessler in the corner, which isn’t scaring a defense. But the blind handoff creates potentially easy openings into dribble handoffs. Take the play below as an example.

Utah moves the ball up the floor and Walker Kessler is spaced in the corner. When it comes down to it, even John Collins will get given space as teams don’t fully respect the shooting. Keyonte George drives and kicks it to Walker Kessler. Watch Jordan Clarkson sink to the corner as the pass is traveling to Kessler. This is the ‘blind’ handoff. It is designed to punish off coverage as Walker Kessler isn’t a natural spacer. It’s a way Utah can be five-out all the time and not become stale and predictable with their spacing concepts. On this occasion, it doesn’t lead to much of note, but I just want you guys to have the idea of this concept in your head.

Here they use the skip handoff as a get-out-of-jail-free card during part of something more exotic- Horns Chin.

The Houston Rockets were switching in this game, so the Jazz went to Horns Chin. Note how Walker Kessler is in the corner at the start of the play which means Sengun can somewhat play off him. The Jazz use this play to get Lauri post position on a smaller player, so Sengun tags across. If this was a shooter in the corner it would be more problematic at first glance, but Fontecchio dives to the corner and gets a really good look from beyond the arc. Switching is common with teams that are wing-heavy like Houston, and Hardy comes ready with the right plays to punish it.

This action isn’t perfect. Something I noted in the film was that this action became less fruitful if the Jazz are playing slowly.

Here, Utah isn’t running anything, so Kessler receives a cross-court pass. But because the defense wasn’t moved at all, the possession ended in chaos. The effectiveness of this mirrors the effectiveness of the Utah Jazz. If they’re moving and running stuff at speed, it’s genuinely a very effective spacing concept.

They’ll use this concept for Collins too. Below they mesh the skip pass concept with a pistol top flare.

The skip pass is their way of involving players that, respectfully, the defense isn’t paying much attention to. And as it will continue to be shown throughout this article, Utah meshes all their core stuff together.

This concept isn’t just reserved for non-shooters, they’ll often use skip passes to just keep the offense moving. Thinking Basketball did a great vid on this give-and-go resetting the dribble concept. But it’s a way for them to push for easy and quick offense and to not let defenses off the hook. There’s nowhere to hide in a sense.

I’ve mentioned layers, and Utah ran a blind pass concept in their recent game against the Houston Rockets. I’d label it ’77 Double Ghost Fake Veer Blind DHO’. A mouthful again, but simple and beautiful to watch.

Utah runs a double-drag variant, with both Jordan Clarkson and Lauri Markkanen ghosting their picks. Jordan Clarkson then looks as if he’s going to set a ball screen for Markkanen to come back for a catch-and-shoot (veer action). Only it’s all a disguise and Walker Kessler is used as a blind hub, and Clarkson darts for an open three-pointer. I’ve seen the ‘Double Ghost’ concept before, but this was a new variant and the fact that Will Hardy dialed it up in a key moment shows how well the Jazz execute the concept. Kessler in the corner isn’t threatening, but they can make it one with their actions and concepts.

Shallow Series

Now that we’ve dove into the Jazz main concepts (please keep them in mind), it’s time to dive into their most used set plays and reads. We start with the 77 Shallow series. This is a play-type that’s taken over this year. It’s like a cross-breed between a double drag and a Spain pick-and-roll. In this play, there are two ‘screeners’, with one of them sitting lower than the other. In a traditional double drag the screens are mostly parallel to each other and set. The lower screener in shallow action doesn’t set a screen.

Two back-to-back uses of it in the Rockets game are a good illustration of what it is, and what it does.

John Collins is the first screener, triggering the drop defense. Lauri Markkanen is the lower screener and he cuts across the drop coverage and pops open for a three-pointer. It means the pick-and-roll action is essentially 2v2 which is a win for the offense in an era of nail help defense.

They come back to it on the next play.

This time, the Rockets are somewhat ready for the action. Jabari Smith stays tight to Markkanen and Sengun is ready to defend the downhill action. Collin Sexton sees this and rejects the screen and Utah gets a great look from beyond the arc.

They’ll sometimes run these on an empty side, which takes excellent defensive communication to contain.

This is particularly terrible defense, which jumped out on Lakers film, but the concept is difficult to defend while switching on an empty side because Markkanen is good at sealing his defender when they try and jump ahead and cut to the perimeter to stop him. Here he just sneaks backdoor for a lob.

They’ll often disguise the 77 Shallow with a ram screen.

This ram screen essentially speeds up the proceedings in the play, Indiana was likely expecting a top flare. But this is a good showcase of why this play is effective and is becoming a staple in NBA offense.

If Markkanen’s screen was parallel to Kessler’s, the lowest defender could contain the drive and then the on-ball defenders could recover out to Lauri when he pops. Because Lauri is in that shallow position, it means the containing defense has to be perfect because Obi Toppin is then responsible for not surrendering the middle and also defending Lauri. Switching may seem like it works, but switches early in a possession can hurt you later on when you’ve got Bennedict Mathurin on Walker Kessler. The ram screen is a nice wrinkle that makes the play more effective.

I noted earlier that the only ATO concept I’ve seen them run that isn’t part of their base offense is an Iverson set. But even when they run that, they’ll often flow into the base offense as shown below.

Utah goes to the Iverson action for Collin Sexton. They’ll often have Markkanen set a ram screen for a guard to ghost out. On this occasion, Markkanen flips his body position and they go into their shallow play. The Hornets cover it relatively well but still concede a very good look to Lauri Markkanen.

They’ve also added an intriguing variant to their shallow series where the second screener veers out to free up a shooter.

Like with the blind DHO earlier, the Jazz go to this in crunch time which shows how much they like it. You learn the most about teams in these moments. Walker Kessler comes off the ram screen, Jordan Clarkson then loops around and sets a screen on Markkanen’s defender. Houston switches the cross-screen when Lauri lifts, but they lose contain and Collin Sexton drills the floater when Sengun recovers to Walker Kessler.

This play signals the dilemma of defending Utah. They had to pay so much attention to the off-ball stuff that Collin Sexton got an easy look on the ball. Sexton’s play has been excellent, and likely the main difference in Utah racking up wins in comparison to their early-season form.

Strong Series

Utah runs a lot of double-stagger screens. This again is largely down to the fact their best player is an off-screen flier. But it is also a very good way to keep everyone involved and consistently pressure defenses. One of the things that stands out on film is just how many different reads Utah has in their series. The execution is consistently pretty good and there’s much more variety than always having someone come off a double stagger.

Utah loves ghost screens, and here Simone Fontecchio ghosts the initial strong stagger and we see them return to the skip pass concept. It’s a nice way to ensure less traffic for a young guard like Keyonte George to have to navigate.

They also like to push for the ‘Strong Dribble‘ variant. This is where a player comes off the double stagger screen, receives a pass, and immediately passes it back to the ball handler. They’ll often use this against teams that want to stay attached such as below.

They run ‘Strong Dribble Pop‘. Note how they create a great driving lane for Collin Sexton with this action. It’s why he’s having such a profitable season.

They also incorporate their brush screens into this concept.

Markkanen draws all the attention. He sees that the third defender has cleared out, so he pulls his defender into another defender (brush screen). It would be more effective with a better shooter than Collins, but this is a very effective option they could go to at any time with how much attention Lauri draws.

I also like the ‘Strong Dribble Veer‘ option they use. It’s an effective switch-beater.

The play effectively allows the Jazz to pick matchups, and Fontecchio’s slip means that Luka Doncic is involved in a pick-and-roll action as the ‘big’ defender. Fontecchio then ghosts out for an easy three, which epitomizes the Utah Jazz.

They’ll also run far split cuts on these strong staggers if they see defenses sitting under.

Here, Utah runs ‘split cuts’. The first screener Clarkson is cutting backdoor, with Agbaji coming off a single stagger. It created an empty-side look when the Lakers were defending relatively far into the paint. Utah gets a good look on the play.

These strong staggers require a lot of attention when you’ve got so many reads. Utah does a great job teaching their players to make ‘face cuts’ across the weak side such as below.

Lauri Markkanen is isolated on the weak side while everyone else is involved with the double stagger, so he makes a cut across the middle of the paint for an easy jump shot.

I’ve mentioned meshing before. Here’s another example of it all coming together:

Utah runs a wedge screen for Collin Sexton, which is completely inverting the offense. It brings Lauri Markkanen to the top of the key and he comes off a top flare. While all this is happening, Collin Sexton cuts right into the teeth of the defense. Per a league source, Utah does a lot of off-ball movement work in practice. It shows on film.

Perhaps my favourite play in Utah’s strong series is the Fake Slice STS (Screen the Screener) set that they run, here’s what it looks like.

Utah inbound the ball to the weak side elbow. Kris Dunn then sets a slice screen (back screen from the wing) for Markkanen. The alignment of players here matters a lot. In this game, the Rockets were switching 2-4 but not 1-4 because Jalen Green is a small guard. This means Dillon Brooks has to be responsible for covering Markkanen backdoor. He overplays on the fake screen and Markkanen comes off another screener and drills the three.

Houston did an OK Job defending this play after the original advantage was created by the slice screen. Most of the time it’s harder to cover.

Utah dialed this up in overtime of the aforementioned Rockets game. This time the entry is a little different with Collin Sexton coming off a zipper screen on the weak side. Markkanen uses the fake slice screen and when 2 defenders come to him, Walker Kessler slips backdoor for an easy dunk. With Utah’s size, merely switching things isn’t always an option and they do a good job milking that fact.

The same happens here against the Pistons.

Two again go to Markkanen which is common. Some teams will come into games with plans to blitz the ball out of the hands of good shooters. The problem with this play is that your help defense is disoriented and it’s not always that simple.

Here’s what the play looks like if the slice screen isn’t rejected.

The Thunder cover the slice screen relatively well but still concede a decent look to Collin Sexton. Chet Holmgren also has to drop deep, so a skip pass to Kessler may have also worked. It shows the attention Lauri garners when he tries to cut backdoor.

Here is another example of things all meshing together.

Utah looks as if they’re going to run a strong double stagger. But the second screener and the man closest to the ball is John Collins. Instead of running the staggers, Sexton throws the skip pass to John Collins and they flow into a Chicago action which creates a numbers advantage, getting Markkanen a great look.

Here’s everything coming together differently in a recent game vs the Hornets.

The Jazz use the skip pass to John Collins to open the play as Nick Richards is in drop. Note on the weakside, Utah is trying to set the flare screen for Markkanen. His man jumps out to the corner to stop the flare, so Markkanen comes back. But watch John Collins. He veers towards the weakside after skipping the ball back to Collin Sexton and Lauri gets a great look. Here they managed to combine their skip pass concept, a flare screen, and their strong series. This is a particularly great off-ball read.

As I’ve mentioned, the good offenses mesh things together. It’s not like playing Madden where plays you call are independent. Your concepts and philosophies should mix with your set plays, and off-ball reads should shine through.

Elbow/Horns/Stack Out

Utah runs a lot of offense through the elbow. In a recent press conference attended by Philadelphia 76ers beat reporter Daniel Olinger, Will Hardy said of elbow offense:

It’s hard to know where to help from there … and from an analytical standpoint, the most valuable shots are at the rim and corner threes, and if you put the ball in the middle of the floor, you now have 2 corner players

Utah doesn’t always have two in the corner in their elbow sets, but they commonly create high percentage looks from them. Perhaps my favourite is when they run ‘Twirl Action’. It’s an off-ball screening action where there is a double stagger screen and a player cuts off or rejects the first screen, and the first screener then comes off the second screener.

Writer’s Note- Not all of these plays necessarily catch the ball at the elbow, but due to their nature I still consider them part of Elbow Offense. NBA Spacing has evolved and catching the ball just outside the perimeter in 2024 likely matches catching it at the elbow in 2014.

The Jazz get the ball to Kelly Olynyk near the elbow. Jordan Clarkson cuts baseline and rejects the double stagger screens, with Ochai Agbaji coming off the screen for an easy look from beyond the arc. It can be difficult to defend on an empty side, so mixups are common.

Utah is also good at pushing into something else if the initial action doesn’t create an instant shot.

Cam Reddish forces Jordan Clarkson further out from the paint, so the Jazz go into a middle-pick-and-roll. Note Kelly Olynyk also setting a flare screen alongside the PNR (Indiana Action). This is likely considered a win for the defense but it’s still a pretty good look which shows how playing against the Jazz can be confounding.

Utah has counters upon counters in their offense.

This time the Jazz run ‘Stack Out Chin Twirl’. Jordan Clarkson cuts backdoor when Josh Green very aggressively tries to deny him the cut towards the ball handler. Dallas then top-locks Kris Dunn so the Jazz again go to a quasi-brush screening action to get John Collins a lob attempt. Though top-locking Kris Dunn is an odd decision, it’s just likely Dallas had twirl scouted and wanted to top-lock the final part of the action. But Utah was ready.

They also love to run ‘Peja’ or ‘Rip’ actions. These involve someone back screening before coming up for a shot or a dribble handoff.

Jordan Clarkson sets a back screen for Collin Sexton while Olynyk has the ball at the elbow. When Clarkson sees he’s still top-locked, he cuts backdoor and gets a good look. OKC isn’t the team to run this against given their tendency to want to swarm the paint, but against teams with more of an outside-oriented approach, this play could be very effective.

I’ve mentioned the word meshing a tonne in this article; let’s look at another example of it.

Utah gets Jordan Clarkson the ball at the elbow. Keyonte George then sets a back screen for Lauri Markkanen. The defense doesn’t do an amazing job covering it, but Jordan Clarkson instead hits Walker Kessler and goes into the ‘Blind’ dribble handoff option that’s part of the Jazz half-court offense. This was particularly effective because the Peja action occupied the low men and created an easy look for Jordan Clarkson.

Utah will also often use the elbow as a sort of safe space in their half-court stuff.

The Jazz go to Ram Ghost, but Keyonte George opts to pitch the ball to Kelly Olynyk. George then comes off a flare screen for an open three. This is an easy concept that I feel they should go to more often. The top flares don’t often come with any kind of pre-action but this is extremely effective.

Here’s another layer they added in a game vs the Charlotte Hornets.

Charlotte has Markkanen come off a ram screen and ghost it. The ball then is pitched to John Collins in the elbow. Collin Sexton sets a sort of freelance flare for Lauri Markkanen and comes up to receive the ball. Markkanen is tightly defended so to quote NFL lingo, it’s ‘free yards’ for Collin Sexton and easy labor. They then flow into a Spain pick-and-roll. On this occasion, the Hornets switch everything, but it puts Brandon Miller in a bad position against a very accomplished lob threat in John Collins.

They come back to it on the next play.

This time, note Miles Bridges tags into the paint more than he did on the first play. This time, Simone Fontecchio leaks out as the back screener. After some good ball movement and screening, Collin Sexton nails an above-the-break three-pointer.

Conclusion

Overall, I’ve been blown away by the Utah Jazz offense this season. Running offense is extremely hard, but Utah is one of those teams that are mastering the details other teams miss. They put a hell of a lot of time into perfecting their off-ball movement, and it means that they’re able to somewhat overachieve on the offensive side of the ball.

I’m not into many coaching cliches, but one I’ve seen trotted around is ‘You can stop plays but you can’t stop principles’. I don’t think it’s a bad quote but I feel it misses the point. Principles are everything, but your principles can be elevated by how tough your plays are to stop. The Jazz give their players live reps, as they don’t have many specific packages for out-of-bounds plays.

To revisit the earlier things I look for in scouting offense, it’s very hard to tick the boxes of all four. For the most part, the Utah Jazz do this. It’s a creative scheme using some unique and very new concepts, and it’s well executed with speed and has enough counters for the defense to know that stopping the first action may often mean little.

Regardless of the direction Utah chooses to go in, Will Hardy has proven himself extremely capable of maximizing a rebuilding squad. It wouldn’t surprise me if Hardy became one of the greatest coaches of his generation.

The post The Set Plays and Concepts Fuelling the Utah Jazz Resurgence appeared first on Swish Theory.

While Indiana’s current successes are not wholly tied to Bruce Brown, he exemplifies ‘why’ they have been successful. Anchored by a multitude of intelligent mistake-free ball handlers, Rick Carlisle has found the formula that has led Indiana to the first-ranked offense in both offensive efficiency and half-court offensive efficiency. This offense resembles a metaphorical ‘greatest hits’ of NBA modern offense, all of which will be explored here. Carlisle has long been an offensive mastermind, and this scheme shows he has kept evolving as the game does.

There is no correct way to run an offense. It depends on your personnel: good and bad plays come down to execution and personal preference. Indiana, however are running the majority of the core concepts you see in modern offense (Zoom, Pistol, Delay, Double Stagger screens, Empty Side Actions). While running such a diverse offense, they are still incredible at ball security, with only two teams turning it over fewer times per game. This points to the fact Indiana has managed to have four high-feel ball handlers on the same roster anchoring their scheme (Haliburton, Brown, Nembhard, McConnell).

Indiana’s offense somewhat reminds me of a quote from the late Johan Cruyff:

“Playing football is very simple, but playing simple football is the hardest thing there is.

A lot of what Indiana does schematically is replicable to an extent. But a big reason they are able to play as they do is because they have stacked together some of the better passers and processors in the NBA. Many believe offense is simple and just about quick decisions and letting hoopers get to their spots. What is often undersold is how difficult this can actually be to achieve. Replicating any perceived ‘simplicity’ of the Indiana Pacers motion offense undersells the execution of their modern concepts, and how rare it is to have stockpiled such a variety of smart ball handlers on one roster. Indiana runs their scheme so well that you are often lulled into thinking it is simple. The variety of cuts and freelance screens are created by their ball handlers and their offensive concepts. It’s a sort of Chicken or the Egg Phenomena in which I lean towards one side.

Early Offense and Spain PNRs

Indiana pushes the pace. Per NBA.com, they take the most shots in the ‘very early’ and ‘early’ ranges of the shot clock. This varies between 22 seconds and 15 seconds. They push for quick hitters out of ‘wide’ ball screens such as below.

This isn’t a novel concept, every team runs it. But pushing these early and often sets up quick advantages that have the defense in rotation early. Indiana are a nightmare to play against because of their early decisiveness.

This is where things get interesting. More often than not, NBA teams will take away this wide ball screen. Giving up early threes and allowing early passes is not something NBA teams want to do. Indiana will often counter this with ‘Wide Reject Spain’. This is one of the more common counters in the NBA but no one runs it better than Indiana.

The Pacers push the ball up and Jalen Smith makes a quick glance behind him to set up the wide ball screen. With Danuel House already top-locking Buddy Hield, the Pacers quickly flow into Wide Reject Spain with Buddy Hield setting a back screen on Jalen Smith’s man. Hield is particularly good on this set, and I’d bet very few guards in the NBA set more screens than him. The result is an easy look for TJ McConnell.

These sets become even more effective when Tyrese Haliburton is the ball handler. Haliburton’s blend of shotmaking and passing isn’t new information to anyone reading this. He’s shooting 54 percent on pull-up threes this season. Even if that regresses to last years measly 41 percent (sarcasm), he’s still one of the very best shotmakers in the game. Here he rejects the ‘reject Spain’ action, taking a filthy step back jumper to the defenders left. I’m unsure what you do with this.

A cruel wrinkle Indiana has started to show is using Haliburton as the back screener. You may be confused by the concept of taking Haliburton off the ball, but it genuinely tortures defenses. This is where Indiana’s pursuit of multiple ball handlers has really shown up, I don’t believe they’d have run this wrinkle last year. Below is how it looks.

Andrew Nembhard initiates the pick-and-roll. With Haliburton being the back screener, De’Anthony Melton has no intent of leaving him. Embiid has to go with the hyper-athletic Isaiah Jackson and the result is Nembhard being able to walk into a good look as there is absolutely no at the level help. Though Nembhard misses, this is still superb process as he’s an elite finisher at the rim and from short-mid-range areas (94th and 79th percentiles respectively).

In their recent demolition job of Philadelphia’s elite defense, they went to this set at the end of the game. This time without the Wide Reject window dressing.

Bruce Brown is the initiator this time. Haliburton sets the back screen and it causes the exact same problem as the previous play. The guard has to stay attached to Haliburton. On this occasion, Embiid ignores the roller and tries to close the gap. It doesn’t matter because Bruce Brown scores off the glass with a superb finish. Brown’s finishing numbers are down overall but he’s still an effective finisher. His addition has opened up more wrinkles such as this one.

They also have mixed ‘Wide Reject’ and ‘Spain’ into out of bounds plays such as below.

This play ends up becoming ‘Wide Reject Get Spain Leak’. They try and bring Buddy Hield off a wide ball screen. They’ll sometimes run ‘wide dribble’ where Hield flips it back to Haliburton. Charlotte knows this and denies it, so Haliburton chases his own handoff (Get Action) and they flow into a Spain PNR where Buddy Hield leaks out. This is a common read Rick Carlisle has used before. He’s had two lead guards with such gravity that the back screen often doesn’t need to be set for the play to work.

Indiana will also get into Spain Pick-And-Rolls out of double stagger screens. Like Wide ball screens, we should class Double Staggers as ‘the easy stuff’. Here’s just a very brief example of what allowing these easy quick hitters might look like. Indiana runs ‘Strong Dribble’.

As you can see, this isn’t exactly hard labour for the Pacers. The Wizards allow the free catch and the play gives Tyrese Haliburton easy momentum for a pick-and-roll. This isn’t exactly something you want to make Indiana not have to work hard for.

These are also commonly top-locked by teams because of Indiana’s shooting talent. They have many reads out of their staggers and though they don’t always lead to instantaneous shots, they are still effective. Here we see ‘Strong Reject Spain’.

DeAnthony Melton is glued to Haliburton, so he drifts inside and becomes the back screener in a Spain Pick-And-Roll set. Melton sees Embiid not showing any kind of help so he has to cover the driving lane which leaves Haliburton open. Notice the sheer panic when this happens. Haliburton’s a special shooter. He didn’t receive the ball on the Wide Reject Spains above but above is an example of what the defense thinks when he does receive the ball after leaking out.

In a recent game against the Sixers, they meshed this concept into something different. I label it ‘Strong Reject Wide Dribble Lob’. Naming doesn’t matter, but watch how mean this play is.

Haliburton is top-locked so he flows to the other side of the court. Obi Toppin who was an original screener, receives a wide ball screen. He flips it back to Bruce Brown (Dribble), but watch Haliburton. He this time sets a back screen for Obi Toppin who had ghosted after flipping the ball to Brown. It ends with a lob for Obi Toppin which only ever ends with one result. Though this isn’t a core or common play, it just shows the versatility and creativity Indiana has with their off-ball screening actions. It also showcases Haliburton’s work ethic, the ability to buy into off-ball screening. Not every star does this and it’s great to see Haliburton doing it. Using him as a screener as opposed to trying to force him onto the ball maintains the egalitarian motion offense Rick Carlisle is trying to run.

They also have another counter from their strong reject series. ‘Strong Reject Ram 77’

Buddy Hield is being top locked, so he goes under the screens and sets the first of two on ball screens (77). Though the play doesn’t instantly get a bucket, the constant activity occupies all defenders and allows Andrew Nembhard to create a bucket off the dribble. Also note Hield and Turner setting a freelance double stagger, and Obi Toppin making a great backcut. This Pacers team makes a lot of smart off-ball reads that make their offense even scarier and harder to defend. Others create advantages, but guys who can elongate and eventually hammer home these advantages matter. It’s another great counter when the easy stuff is taken away.

They have another counter from their strong series. It comes in the form of ‘Oklahoma’ Action. This is part of the double drag series that involves a double drag where after setting an on ball pick, the second screener turns round and sets a screen for the first screener.

Though this doesn’t necessarily fit the criteria for reject, it’s clear Hield is going to get any kind of a shot off the initial stagger screens. So he becomes the first screener in a double drag. Jalen Smith then turns and gives Hield an off-ball screen in Oklahoma Action. This is such a diverse offense with multiple counters. Taking away the ‘easy stuff’ is becoming more common, but Indiana’s mix of diverse counters and smart ball handlers means the second and third reads become easy stuff.

Indiana needs very little excuse to get into any actions they love. They will get into their Spain PNR straight from an out of bounds play like below.

The Pacers are capable of scoring on the easy stuff, but to them, the more complex plays become the easy stuff. They get into their core plays early and often and it’s why this offense is historically great.

Pistol, Doom and Zoom

If you’re trying to collect the greatest hits of any NBA Coach, Pistol and Zoom are always going to be on the agenda. Indiana loves guard screening more than any other team. Per a source with Second Spectrum, no team utilises more guard screens then Indiana. Every team in the NBA uses Pistol entries. And Indiana’s guard screens are not limited to pistol. But think as Pistol guard screening actions as just the tip of the Iceberg for Indiana.

Here’s the most basic look of it.

Pistol entry for Nembhard on an empty side. A simple ball reversal ends in Zoom (Chicago) action that eventually flows into an empty-side action. Per a Second Spectrum source, the Pacers rank inside the top 10 for the frequency of empty-side screening actions. They push them early and had the option twice on this one play.

They also utilise the base ‘Pistol Flare’ action.

This play works because it uses a very effective screen (more on that later) to clear out help defense and stop teams loading up on aggressive strong-side overloads. With the sheer pace that Haliburton operates at, instant advantages are created. Here the play ends with a Myles Turner three. He’s shooting 40 percent on these shots this year. The swinging hypothetical for this team feels as if it will be centered around Turner’s three-point efficiency.

The pistol touches aren’t anything groundbreaking, but like their wide and strong series I like some of their reads and counters. They like to run what I call ‘Doom’ Action, which is simply a cool name for Double Zoom Action. Meaning instead of one screen, you receive two before coming off the handoff. It can also be called Chicago Extra.

Tyrese Haliburton pitches the ball and then sets a screen for Buddy Hield to come off and collect a handoff. The concept doesn’t lead to an immediate shot but it more showcases their offensive philosophy. Constant motion in 5-out looks. No wasted seconds or waiting for stuff to develop. Just constant pass and move basketball. They’ll also get into the action out of ‘Flip’ as they do below.

Flip is a simple concept to get pretty much any player involved, and meshing it with a concept that gets Haliburton starting the play off-ball is excellent scheming. With many teams choosing to invert personnel and just trying to dictate where defenders have to be, you will see a rise in this doom look.

Zoom is a good platform to get the defense moving, but also to get your own players moving. Here’s a play showcasing how Indiana’s fundamentals fit into the actions overall effectiveness.

Constant ball reversals but action with a purpose. The purpose is quite simple. The Pacers are trying to stop gap help as often as possible. Zoom action quite often achieves this purpose, but mixing a flare screen in on the weakside makes the action even harder to defend because the first gap helper (Robert Covington) gets flared by Buddy Hield. It gives Bennedict Mathurin some extra space to work with.

Another way to dissuade gap help is by using the ‘weakside flip’

You can see the Jazz defense zeroed in on the Zoom Action. Teams like to try and congest the slot to deter Chicago Action. But you can see the low man (Keyonte George) is also expecting a flare. The weakside Flip of the screen from Bennedict Mathurin gives Haliburton an extra step which is a gigantic advantage for a player of Haliburton’s level.

Every NBA team runs pistol, it’s not a newsflash. But I hope explaining why it works somewhat adds to the discourse.

Flare Screens, Ghost Screens and other Tidbits

Rick Carlisle’s teams also use guard screens heavily. Sometimes this is to hunt specific matchups. But if you are playing for him, you are going to work offensively. There is no such thing as low usage in the way Rick Carlisle coaches. He expects you to do stuff. His teams utilise both actual guard screens and ‘ghost’ screens.

The Pacers run ‘Iverson Out’. Normally this is run with a big as the screener. But Rick Carlisle wants to get Zach LaVine in the action so Nesmith is the screener. Simple stuff, but has to be noted that Rick Carlisle teams do this at a well above average rate. He once countered a Ty Lue playoff adjustment where Lue put Ivica Zubac on Dorian Finney-Smith to have him as a constant weakside helper, by just running every pick and roll set with Finney-Smith as a screener. This is a philosophy of his, you work and you screen.

They love ghost screens as a team. Here they have two on one possession which ends with Bennedict Mathurin getting an empty side all to himself.

Note how Mathurin sets a ghost screen himself before getting one to give him a look from his area of the floor. It’s a further reminder of how these players put in work off the ball.

I also like how Indiana involves their guards in ‘double drag’ actions, known as 77 Action.

Here they use Tyrese Haliburton as the second screener. Like the Spain plays earlier, this does scare the defense. It’s opened up heavily by Indiana’s variety of smart ball handlers, but part of it is also Rick Carlisle’s philosophy. You will be involved.

They’ll mix ghost screens into their late-game offense.

The Pacers use Haliburton as a fake flex screener then have him dart to the top of the key. Buddy Hield ‘ghost screens’ for him and the initial separation eventually leads to an open bucket.

Here’s why ghost screens work. It attacks good defensive practices. Players will position themselves high to try and delay the ball handler.

Gordon Hayward is showing at the level, but when Hield ghosts the screen he has to go with him because of his shooting gravity. This creates a corner for Tyrese Haliburton. An easy answer is to switch this action but this is also a big reason Carlisle loves incorporating guard screens into his base motion offense. It’s not got the normal sluggishness of switch hunting if you mesh it into your plays.

This takes me to the final, and perhaps most important part of the article. The Indiana Pacers love flare screens. We have many screens in Basketball, dozens of them. But with the way modern NBA defenses are operating, the Flare Screen might be the most important one in the League. Let’s explain why.

Though there are 30 NBA teams who all have slightly different defensive philosophies, there are a few constants across most of the NBA. These are ‘No Middle’, and nail help. These go slightly hand in hand as it’s tough to deny the middle without nail help. But these are the cornerstones for most NBA teams. Flare screens are the most effective screen to attack these.

Indiana runs ‘iverson out’ for Tyrese Haliburton. He is important to explaining this play. More often than not, teams like to load up on empty-side actions because they are so difficult to defend. When you add someone such as Tyrese Haliburton to the equation it’s downright terrifying. Teams will load up on early help early in the shot clock as they do here.

There are four players watching a two-man action. This isn’t bad defense, it’s by design. It’s where no middle comes in. If Jordan Clarkson is on Bruce Brown like he would be in a traditional defense, Tyrese Haliburton is almost certainly going to get to the middle. No Middle has always been a preference for coaches such as Tom Thibodeau, but it feels as if it’s become the rule in modern NBA defense. It’s non negotiable. Below is why the flare can beat this.

If a defense is defending with a sort of zonal concept (overloading the strong side), then a flare screen can attack it. Myles Turner lingering inside the arc as opposed to being on the three-point line obviously helps, but it’s not required. It is almost a way to protect your core offense and empty-side actions. Remind the nearest nail helper that if he glances too far, he’s going to get flare screened.

In an era where teams genuinely are just loading up on primary guys and trying to rob you of vertical drives into the paint, the flare screen is more important than it’s ever been. The achilles heel of a flare screen comes with regards to how much skill the person catching the ball has as both a shooter and a driver. With Indiana having so many ball handlers, they’re extra effective.

Will Hardy’s Utah Jazz also use the concept, notably to support empty-side actions.

These are embedded into Indiana’s offense. They don’t just come during set plays. Below is an example.

Tyrese Haliburton goes into a pick-and-roll. Myles Turner sets a flare screen that would give Aaron Nesmith a wide-open three if Hali decided to use it. If you think I’m over exaggarating these flare screens, just know I’m not. Not every team does these, and there certainly aren’t many teams with them embedded into their basic off-ball reads. They’re automatic.

Aaron Nesmith in particular is a really active screener in freelance or broken situations. The play below illustrates this.

TJ McConnell pushes in early offense to no avail. Nesmith receives the ball, plays the skip pass then ghost screens for Tyrese Haliburton and pops off a flare screen to the empty corner. This leads to easy ball movement for a bucket on the inside. Ghost screens and flare screens are a major part of this offense and mixing them into the same play is never a bad idea.

On this play, Bennedict Mathurin uses the gravity of Tyrese Haliburton to his own advantage. He briefly sells a flare screen which forces Jordan Clarkson to stay inside (no middle), then he actually ghosts the screen and gets a wide open three. Again, watch the flare screen on the weak side of the play. It’s just automatic with this team.

As I’ve noted previously, Indiana have counters upon counters. They even have these for flare screens. It involves actually setting fake flare screens and incorporating them into their offense. Here’s an example.

The Pacers go into a pick-and-roll, and again you see the weakside flare screen designed to occupy any potential help defenders. The Wizards play it which gives the environment required for ‘veer’ action to work. On this occasion the flare was really a decoy designed to create space for the veer action. They’ll run this for both Buddy Hield and Bennedict Mathurin and it was part of their playbook last season.

Wrapping Up

Overall, the Pacers offense is pretty special. This is a team that has acquired an insane amount of high-feel players and built the correct system around them. It’s an offense that is basically running all the greatest hits of modern basketball offenses, but running them better than everyone else.

There is a common theorem amongst coaches regarding the attitude of ‘plays can be stopped, but concepts can’t’. I don’t fully agree with this sentiment, because sometimes you need to run the right plays for your concepts to shine through. Indiana are a team who support my theory on this. What they do might look easy to replicate, but the Cruyff-like simplicity with which they play does not correlate with it taking little effort. It is a result of having acquired an amount of feel across the roster that many teams have never had. This hasn’t happened by accident, it’s what they’ve built towards. Replicating this or trying to be a copycat, may end up being a fools’ errand.

The post Rick Plays the Hits: The Concepts Fueling the Indiana Pacers’ Leading Offense appeared first on Swish Theory.

Wes Unseld Jr. isn’t a coach who receives much national credit, or even attention. But over the past season he put the Wizards in a position to succeed, running one of the more creative offensive schemes in the entire NBA. This is while having a completely flawed roster lacking of high efficiency players and guys who are high-volume from either beyond the arc, or at the rim.

Though I believe ‘location based Field Goal Percentage’ to be a flawed way to analyse what a good offense is, the Wizards roster simply wasn’t built with the ability to generate shots at important areas. They were bottom five in the Cleaning The Glass ‘Location eFG’, a measure of shot location. Generally the teams that rank lowly here are teams with star players who are funneled off the three-point line and walled off from the rim, why Phoenix and Brooklyn are the bottom two; the Wizards certainly do not fit this category.

With this in mind, it may be reasonable to suggest that Unseld’s work with this Wizards offense has been nothing short of spectacular. It’s creative, well oiled and mixes in some absolutely incredible ATO plays at the right times. The numbers may not show this, but the process is excellent and made a completely flawed roster not be a complete eyesore to watch.

Stack Out

The Wizards’ main starting point to get Bradley Beal his touches was out of ‘Stack Out’. Here is the most basic outline of Stack Out.

It’s a screen in the middle of floor to get Beal ‘out’ of the arc. Horns Out would be a more rigid outline but they are admittedly similar. They often have an empty side pick-and-roll as the go-to option out of stack out. It’s an easy way to get Bradley Beal an advantageous position and a way the Wizards can force the ever-popular empty-side actions.

They’ll also use this to get Beal isolation opportunities, especially if a defender is playing tight to him like Matisse Thybulle does below.

This concept isn’t particularly groundbreaking or dripping with creativity, but some of their counters and wrinkles from Stack Out are excellent. This one is their most common- ‘Stack Out Elbow Chicago’.

Porzingis sets the screen for Beal to exit the play. Notice how the Hornets are tight to him. Jordan Goodwin instead pitches the ball to Porzingis and sets a screen for Beal to come off for a Dribble Handoff (Chicago Action). The Hornets switch it and the Wizards get a wide open corner three. The initial stack out entry didn’t really generate anything so they flipped into something else. It’s a great counter and wrinkle to a very simple core play.

Below, they run it for Kyle Kuzma in interesting circumstances.

The Knicks are ready for the action, with Randle essentially top locking Kuzma. Kuzma manages to wriggle free for a more horizontal cut than this action normally would have. But they once again flow into the elbow Chicago counter and get a great look for Kuzma from the mid-range. Good offenses can function when stuff doesn’t go to plan.

On this occasion, the Golden State Warriors scout every part of this play. The Stack Out is covered. The Chicago Action gets top locked. So the Wizards flow into a normal spread pick-and-roll. This is still excellent practice: every potential nail help defender was somewhat occupied trying to stop the initial action. It shows the importance of running creative plays and thinking every step through when installing your offense.

They also like to use stack out to set up double drags, usually with the initial passer being a screener.

Kuzma comes off the screen, and with Anthony Gordon trying to execute ‘No Middle’ Kuzma goes into a give-and-go with Daniel Gafford for an easy look at the rim. Double Drags often force opposition defenders to gather at the top of the key, and they execute an excellent counter.

Delay

Washington runs one of the more creative Delay packages in the NBA. They have a lot of size on the wings so they can execute a variety of counters. Porzingis’ natural exterior spacing and Daniel Gafford’s interior spacing also made the actions fruitful and make a great deal of sense. The Wizards’ Delay package is full of counters, interesting reads and these were ran smoothly by the players, which is something I look at when analysing offenses.

Delay is a five-out concept. It is defined by a big handling the ball at the top, with two players on either side of him. Below is the basic outline of delay.

The most common read from this is Delay Chicago. This involves a player coming off a screen before receiving a handoff from the player at the top of the key. They run it below to get Kendrick Nunn an easy driving lane.

This isn’t a particularly exotic read, every team in the NBA runs it. But it is generally the starting point for any Delay package. Washington probably runs this between 5-6 times a game if not more. What is more interesting is some of their direct counters from Delay Chicago.

Teams like to try and get ahead of Chicago action. Washington’s off-ball players are good at knowing when to cut backdoor.

Here, Anthony Gill cuts backdoor as Jonathan Kuminga tries to get ahead of the game. It seems simple but the speed with which it’s done is impressive.

Washington also ‘rejects’ the Delay Chicago action to push empty side actions for Bradley Beal, such as below.

Beal fakes a screen for Anthony Gill and punishes the pair of them punish the Nets trying to pre-switch it. Gill clears out and Beal darts to take the handoff. His speed of thought and action creates a switch and they end up with a good shot based off the threat of the Empty Side Action.

Below they create the empty side from Delay in a slightly different way.

Gafford initiates the action. The Clippers switch the action so Gafford keeps the handoff to himself and instead runs it through Monte Morris. They again get a great look on empty side actions. Pushing for the best actions when you have limited personnel is always a great strategy and this is another simple and well-oiled way Washington gets to it.

They also mix Delay-Chicago action into their Sideline Out of Bounds (SLOB) plays. Here they get into it through their Zipper SLOB series.

Gafford is a non threat moving away from the basket in out-of-bounds possessions to any defense, but they turn him into one by running a highly effective action. I’ll have more on Washington’s out-of-bounds plays later on.

Washington also regularly runs an action similar to Chicago called ‘Delay Weakside Flip’. This is run a lot by the Philadelphia 76ers. Here’s what it looks like.

Instead of the action happening on the sideline, a player cuts from the corner and flips themselves to set a screen for the nearest player to come towards the ball. The main reason this is effective is because it can be confusing for the low-man as most will be expecting a traditional Chicago Action out of a Delay formation.

Look at Doncic when this screen is set. Most teams would switch in this scenario because neither Avdija or Kispert are particularly scary on-ball players. Doncic is guarding no one because of the speed of action from Washington, and the advantage is hammered home by a great roll from Kyle Kuzma and a nice seal from Monte Morris to create the open three. It’s the type of attention to detail and off-ball execution that stands out when watching the Wizards.

On occasion, they’ll have their Delay-ball handler just keep the ball. This is more common with Porzingis or Kuzma, but below you can see Daniel Gafford do it.

I like the Wizards’ incorporation of flare screens into their Delay/5-out offense early in the shot clock. Teams often try and get ahead of the action and push high and wide in half-court defense. Flare screens can punish that.

Notice how high and engaged Zach LaVine and Patrick Williams are. They are expecting potential Chicago action and stacking bodies high is a good deterrent for running it. A simple flare screen punishes this and gets Avdija into space and creates an advantage for him which ends in an easy look at the rim.

Corey Kispert’s off-ball activity jumps off the screen and he is a legitimate difference maker in their Delay Package. Here he fakes a flare screen and then clears to the weak side which allows Kyle Kuzma an opportunity at an Empty-Pick-And-Roll.

Empty Side Actions are coveted by every NBA Team, but the Wizards do a good job generating them out of their base motion offense and it arguably makes the play even more effective.

Though the two final plays I have in this section aren’t technically in the Delay package, I’d argue they can be considered part of it just because of the outline and how potent Washington is from this outline. Here they run ‘Motion Weak Twirl’.

They open in the 5-out outline. Porzingis passes it to the strong side and cuts to the weak side which is why this is motion weak. They even mix in the weakside flip to manufacture the Twirl Action, which involves a player cutting off the first of two double stagger screen, and then the first screener coming off the second screener.

The play below is much easier, I’d just label it Pistol Strong. But they get into it in their five-out offense.

They get into an empty side action while also having a double stagger screen on the other side. Combining two of the most effective actions into the same play is always a good idea, and the simplicity of the play makes it surprising other teams don’t run it. Though this stuff isn’t Delay, I believe the potency of their Delay sets allows Unseld to be creative and add to the playbook as the year goes on.

Blind Pig

The Wizards do a great job of using ‘Blind Pig’ action to punish aggressive defense. Teams often feel the need to play up high against the Wizards because of their good early offense and also because of Porizngis’ outside spacing. Here, they get into it out of their Delay Package.

You can see the Suns switch the action on the perimeter. Deni reacts to this by flipping to the elbow and creating a wide open side for Bradley Beal to cut backdoor. This action punishes teams playing up on the perimeter. I’ve mentioned before this is a common deterrent to Chicago Action. I’d consider this a must-add action for any Head Coach running five-out offense.

They also mesh Blind Pig into other aspects of their offense such as below.

Washington are in a very loose outline with Porzingis and Beal at the elbows. Beal ghost screens onto an empty side. Dejounte Murray plays high and tries to deter the pass to Beal. Porzingis lifts and they go into Blind Pig action. I noted earlier Blind Pig action also works because of how high people play Porzingis. This play is an example of this. Porzingis will often just catch and shoot inside the arc and teams don’t want that as he’s a 79th percentile mid-range scorer.

The Wizards show a desire to run some of their core counters out of plays they don’t normally run.

Here they run ‘weave’ action which is a variety of handoffs above the key. Beal is aggressively pursued by Matisse Thybulle. The Wizards have Porzingis lift and run blind pig. On this occasion he is given cushion by PJ Tucker and takes it to the rim.

They also have used Blind Pig as a quick hitter when plays go stagnant. Below their initial action doesn’t achieve much so they try and run Beal off a Wide Ball Screen. When the defense denies they go straight into the Blind Pig.

Something I look for in offenses is how they cope when plays break down, and whether they are able to execute core counters out of normal motion offense. A popular coach speak is ‘you can stop plays but you can’t stop principles’. This is an example of this. Their principles are being well oiled off-ball and it’s why their plays work quite often. Talent limits the Wizards offensive ceiling overall but the Coaching Staff are providing solutions.

Gut

The Wizards love Gut action and get into it from many different scenarios. Gut action involves bringing an off-ball player through the paint, sometimes off a screen. It’s simple but extremely effective. It’s common for teams to have the player receive a hand-off (Gut DHO), but the handoff doesn’t need to occur for it to be labelled Gut action. Here’s what it looks like without a DHO at the end of it.

Beal comes up through the paint and goes into a pick and roll with Taj Gibson. It’s effective because it inverts the floor. Beal isn’t threatening inside the paint without the ball, so you can catch the defense off guard with them in positions they’re not traditionally expected to be in. Corey Kispert also lifts at the right time to disrupt the nearest nail help and they get an easy look at the rim. This is the most basic premise of Gut Action but it’s extremely effective.

They’ll also use this as a counter if Beal is being defended aggressively, such as below.

Utah defends Beal tightly and locks him from coming towards the ball. He responds by entering the paint and coming off a re-screen from Daniel Gafford in Gut Action. It’s the kind of quasi-offensive set in the midst of disrupted plays that shines out when watching the Wizards.

Here’s the more Traditional ‘Gut DHO’ that other teams around the league run.

The Wizards also run a set I’d argue to be their most proficient, ‘Fist Ghost Gut (Elbow) Chicago’. I have genuinely never seen them not create an insanely high percentage look on this play. I’d say it’s one of the most money sets in the entire NBA. Here’s what it looks like.

The Wizards go into a pick-and-roll, Daniel Gafford ghosts the ball screen while Bradley Beal cuts through the paint off a screen to take the handoff (Chicago Action). They end up with a really good look at the rim for their best player on this occasion. They’ll generally go to this if they’re desperate for a bucket.

Here against the Lakers, they mesh it with Stack Out for Kyle Kuzma and end up getting Daniel Gafford a lob. They also mix in an exit screen to occupy the low-man defenders even further. Get the defense off balance then give them something else to think about as they recover. It’s amazing offense.

Even when defenses play a part of it really well, it still scores. Here Josh Hart sticks to Beal, but Beal sells him with some off-ball movement and they get another easy look.

Sometimes NBA defenses will know what you want to do, so you need to have counters ready.

The Wizards hold up their fists to signal ‘strong’. This would be a double stagger screen. It is however a ploy to run their coveted gut action for Bradley Beal. The disguise just about generates him an extra step against Andrew Wiggins. You can see Monte Morris end up with a great look from beyond the arc. This particular read isn’t one I saw often but it’s an example of the off-ball prowess and attention to detail of the players and coaching staff.

They’d also sometimes mesh the gut concept as part of an off-ball action. On the play below they run an empty side pick-and-roll while simultaneously having Beal run gut action.

Sometimes naming can be a debate, but I’ll include some of the elbow touches they generate for Porzingis in this section because they come out of a very similar concept to gut. Here they run Porzingis off a screen to get him an elbow catch which he turns into two-points. He shot around 45 percent on these pull up twos this year.

The Wizards do a good job meshing some of their core concepts into their stars touches, though. I liked this ATO play they ran involving Porzingis at the elbow.

I’d label this ‘Gut/Pin Elbow Rip DHO’. It involves Porzingis getting one of his inside touches. They’d generally push him to mid-range because he has a very limited post game. They combine his touch with Delon Wright setting a back-screen then taking a hand-off (Rip DHO). It again ends in a good bucket. It’s another example of the Wizards mixing their core concepts and best options into other parts of their playbook.

Flip

The Wizards also like to use flip action at the top of the key. It’s probably their easiest way to generate easy driving angles for Kyle Kuzma and some of their other secondary guys. Here’s the most basic premise of it.

It’s a simple flip from one player to another while above the break like this. Generally the pitch almost creates some downhill momentum for the ball-handler. Here they do just enough to get Luka to bite and get an easy look at the rim. As you may expect, the Wizards can be more exotic out of this simple action. They have two plays specifically they will run, the first is below ‘Flip 77 Empty’.

They run this a little closer to the arc than they do with other actions, but it’s a good way to get Kyle Kuzma to an empty side and put his man through 2 screens. Empty side double drags are extremely difficult to defend and this is a way they can get into one out of their motion offense.

My personal favourite extension of Flip comes in ‘Flip Spain Empty’.

Delon Wright flips the ball to Deni Avdija and they run a pick-and-roll with the first screeners man getting backscreened (Spain). The initial flip gets Avdija some separation which messes up Doncic’s angles. Reggie Bullock isn’t even expecting to be back screened and they get the defense in rotation and eventually get a good look. The fact it’s run at an angle makes it even more effective.

And as a counter or wrinkle, they’ll sometimes run it with the back-screener occupying the weak-side dunker spot before darting across to set the backscreen, such as below.

Empty Side Actions

I have clipped empty-side actions on numerous occasions in this article. But this playbook is so diverse and there are more strategies they have to push for these. Empty-side actions are so fruitful because there isn’t a help defender or tag-man, so they can be very tough to defend.

They love to run double-drags to empty sides. This was common for them because they were an easy way to use Porzingis’ spacing. The most common way this is run is to have one screener roll and one pop, here’s what that looks like.

You can see when Kuzma pops, there isn’t a low-man there to help on the pick-and-roll. Delon Wright snakes the action and gets a clean look at the rim.

The Wizards will also mix guards into the action as screeners. They will sometimes do this to hunt certain switches, but generally they are more open to using guards as screeners than most teams.

Here against Portland they use Beal as one of the screeners. Using guards as screeners can be labelled as ‘Small’. Portland’s fear of his off-ball prowess means that when Drew Eubanks traps and Lillard goes to Beal, Gafford has a wide open roll. Using guards as screeners in these actions is a very effective wrinkle.

An effective way Washington stacks extra stuff on top of this action is to have an exit-action on the other side.

This iteration makes the responsibilites even more difficult as Will Barton comes off an exit screen to the corner while the double drag is being run. On this occasion Washington hits Barton for a wide-open corner three. Reggie Bullock gets frozen by the action as he needs to also stop the guard from turning the corner which is generally the defensive goal when defending a double drag.

For comparison’s sake, here’s what they play looks like if the Exit action occurs too early in the play.

Though the Wizards do score on the play, you can see that the exit action happens too early and doesn’t really disrupt the duties of the low-man like it does in the Mavericks clip.

They can also get into this action out of Pistol in early offense, with the play being called ‘Pistol Nash’. It’s Pistol with the initial ball handler becoming the first screener in a double drag.

Final Thoughts

Overall, the 2022-23 Washington Wizards taught me a lot about basketball. Though it may seem strange to praise the playbook of the 18th ranked half-court offense and the 21st ranked offense in the NBA, I really feel that Wes Unseld Jr. and his staff did a great job crafting this playbook. The roster was extremely flawed lacking rim pressure and consistent three-point threats. It was piled up with players with mismatching skillsets.

The job of a Head Coach isn’t just to win games, it’s never that simple. It’s to provide answers and solutions to problems. The Wizards staff certainly did this on the offensive end, designing a well-crafted offense with multiple reads and well executed counters. Some may suggest the offense was too cute at times. It’s a critique I understand but vehemently disagree with. Running simplistic stuff works when you have incredible offensive talent that fits easily. But it wouldn’t work with a Wizards roster that lacks on-ball consistency. Unseld frankly could have ran a bland offense, but he chose to try and answer some of the questions this questionable Wizards roster proposed to him.

The plays he designed worked well around the roster he had. He didn’t merely try and install stuff that looked good on a whiteboard. The stuff answered real questions.

This team are a great example of why I value process over results. Players can get results on their own, there is that much talent in the modern game. But a great coaching staff can install good processes that don’t always get results, for one reason or another.

The post Inside Wes Unseld Jr.’s Creative Playbook appeared first on Swish Theory.

The upcoming series between the Cleveland Cavaliers and the New York Knicks is projected to be one of the closer ones. In this series, I do schematic deep dives on either team, and explore the hypothetical questions that I believe to be the key points of interest for the opponents.

Cleveland Cavaliers Offensive Scheme

Empty Side

The Cavaliers run a three-out two-in offense with heavy motion from their guards. They push empty side pick-and-rolls as much as any other team in the NBA. They’ll push these early in transition.

Part of optimising their two inside big men is by rotating them as the empty side screener, though you’re more than likely going to see Mobley as the screener and Jarrett Allen in the dunker spot when they run this. Their overall philosophy in early offense is optional ball screens, giving Mitchell and Garland structure but not robbing them of freedom. The presence of Jarrett Allen at the dunker spot gives them easy buckets if the defense is collapsed. He’s in the 90^th percentile for half-court scoring efficiency.

Wedge Action

One of the Cavs’ most common actions out of their base offense is running wedge actions. This is simply an angled screen to the baseline. They run these for Evan Mobley to give him a chance to post-up or attack off the catch. Here they run Wedge Action to generate a look for Evan Mobley. He turns the ball over on this play (I’ll get to those issues later), but they get him in space on an empty side with ease.

The Cavaliers don’t do this as a one-shot type play though, they have many other options and counters from it. Here they run ‘wedge roll’ which is as it sounds. They then flow straight into a pick-and-roll.

Sometimes the mere threat of the option is enough to give them more cushion on pick-and-rolls. Here Darius Garland flows straight into a pick-and-roll and essentially ignores Okoro attempting to set the wedge screen for Allen, with the help defense occupied by the potential of this action.

Teams are hyper aware of the Cavaliers’ wedge actions and they fear them because empty side actions are the main way they try and ease spacing concerns. The play below illustrates a nice counter the Cavs have for it.

You see the Pacers sitting under Okoro for two reasons. One is because they don’t really respect him as a shooter, but the premiere reason is that they expect the wedge roll action to come. Garland sees this and pitches it to Mobley and Okoro screens Garland’s man as they flow into Delay Chicago action. It’s great offense and shows JB Bickerstaff’s attention to detail.

Flex and Rip Concepts

I’ve labelled this “flex concepts” because the Cavs don’t run the entirety of the flex offense, but they like to move their guards through the paint in screen-the-screener type actions which is the absolute epitome of what the flex offense is all about.

On this play, the Cavaliers don’t create an advantage out of the wedge action I mentioned above…

…so they pitch to the screener and go into a pick-and-roll with Darius Garland eventually setting a flex screen to get Evan Mobley to the low block. They initially didn’t get Mobley good post position but showed a multi-faceted approach to get it on a counter.

Such things don’t exist in Basketball analysis to my knowledge, but if there was a heat map that tracked players movements, I’m almost certain that the Cavaliers guards would touch the paint off-ball more than any other team due to their flex and rip concepts. These guards are deployed off-ball moving through the paint very regularly.

I enjoyed this play shown below.

They pitch to Isaac Okoro, but watch Donovan Mitchell and Darius Garland. They flow into an initial ‘floppy’ action (a double screen set for someone to emerge from the paint). After it doesn’t get an opening, Garland cuts to the other side on the flex scissors action and Okoro hits Evan Mobley for the dunk.

If one play summarised Cleveland’s Philosophy it’s this: these guards work for their touches out of flex concepts. This ties in with Bickerstaff’s overall philosophy. He loves the chin offense which is why he’s a perfect fit to coach a team with two bigs.

They often run these plays to try and alleviate spacing concerns. Mobley-Allen isn’t a great perimeter spacing duo as of now. So basic spread concepts aren’t really going to reap rewards. Here the Cavaliers run some flex action before flowing into an empty side pick and roll.

If you’re trying to get a big line-up to work, your guards have to do their due diligence off the ball as you ideally want to maximise the big men as elbow hubs. The Cavaliers do a great job of this when they run ‘Rip’ Action such as below. Rip action is merely a player back screening then receiving the ball.

With Ricky Rubio healthy, these sets have even more of a ceiling for the Cavaliers because his processing speed is borderline generational. Here they set up a Cross Screen for Lamar Stevens and Donovan Mitchell comes off a pindown after setting the cross screen, but Rubio sees the defense tilt away from Caris Levert in the corner and they get an easy look.

Pistol

Any team with two elite guards is going to run pistol action. While I wouldn’t call this Cleveland’s absolute staple, it’s another way they can create empty side actions and give high value touches to their lead guards. Below is the absolute most basic luck and their typical structure out of it.

Both of their lead guards in the same action. They go into a pick-and-roll. The opposite side spacing has their small forward and then Jarrett Allen at the dunker spot. They bail out to him on this play and he hits the floater. He’s in the 62^nd percentile for efficiency on these shots so it will be intriguing if teams live with this one and possibly sell out elsewhere.

They also use pistol to flow into delay action and to generate empty side actions like in the play below.

They look as if they’re going to flow into Delay Chicago after the initial pistol exchange. Instead, Levert cuts all the way to the weakside and they go into an empty-side pick and roll. Teams often blitz these so Mobley’s rolling can be highly fruitful on these actions.

Here things get a little more exotic, as they run Pistol Rip Empty Hawk.

Garland receives the ball from Mitchell. Mobley backscreens for Mitchell then comes up to set the screen (this creates the same advantage as ram action). They flow into an empty-side pick and roll and Mitchell cuts through the paint and comes off a double stagger which is Hawk action. It’s another illustration of Cavs guards moving off-ball, but also creating empty side actions out of multiple scenarios.

They run the same play against the Blazers here. This time Garland dribbles towards the empty side when he sees Nurkic in drop. The Hawk action occupies the defense and Garland scores the layup.

They also mix some ‘veer’ action into their pistol offense. This involves a screen for a ball handler, with the screener then darting elsewhere to set an off-ball screen in the same action or motion. Here they run it against the Orlando Magic.

On this occasion they do it to try and attack Bol Bol on the empty side pick-and-roll with a step up screen. Sometimes though they just do it to free up a shooter and create an advantage for Garland or Mitchell such as here.

Good offenses mesh all of their concepts together. I noted earlier how the Cavs like to use their guards on flex and rip concepts, here they tie this together with pistol.

They have the initial pistol action with Mitchell then going straight in a double drag action. This is deception for ‘rip’ action for Darius Garland who comes off a screen, then sets a backscreen of his own before darting for an open three. It’s a great example of how the Cavaliers Empty Side and Inside to out guard cutting concepts all meshing.

Ram

The Cavs also like to run ‘ram’ action, where a screener comes off a screen before screening for the ball-handler. They like to do this mixed with different secondary actions as a way of trying to freeze or occupy defenders. This is as they don’t have natural outside spacing with Mobley and Allen. They’ll often run this more against teams who play drop coverage. They run it here against the Rockets.

Mitchell is the initial screener for Jarrett Allen, and then exits to the perimeter off an Evan Mobley screen. The execution will need to be more flawless in the playoffs but the logic is to occupy the defense in a way Evan Mobley just being stationary on the perimeter wouldn’t occupy it.

They’ll often run it if they have smaller line-ups too such as here against the Orlando Magic.

This time, the exit action occupies the help defense the whole way, and Darius Garland essentially walks into an easy bucket when his man gets caught on Evan Mobley’s screen. It’s one of their most common concepts.

Here, they run a ‘small’ variant of Ram action with more inverted philosophy.

Donovan Mitchell this time receives a screen from Jarrett Allen and then Ghost Screens for Darius Garland. Allen chases it immediately and Garland once again walks into a wide-open bucket. They’ll use this ‘Ram Short 77 Ghost’ to try and force switches.

On the play below, they use it in a way that raises hypothetical questions about the action.

They have Jarrett Allen be the on-ball screener, and Evan Mobley executes ‘Short’ Action which is a cut to the strongside. Notice how it freezes the defender and Allen can get a free lane because of this as the Ram gave him some extra room at the beginning of the play.

The hypothetical question they will have to answer in the Knicks series is whether they’re better with Allen or Mobley as the on-ball screener. Allen is more likely to have Mitchell Robinson on him and he may feel comfortable playing free safety in that scenario. But Robinson is extremely disruptive at the level of the screen so having Allen as the screener might create more difficulties for the offense. They’ll likely mix things up, but this will be interesting to monitor.

My good friend Bowser also clipped another play similar to ram, known as ‘New Zealand’ Action.

This involves a ram screening action on the empty side. This may be something they go to in the playoffs if things stagnate with their more common actions.

Double Drags and Horns

Like any team trying to maximise a big frontcourt, the Cavaliers optimise Double Drags, and I think they’ll run these more in this series than usual. This is largely because a double screening action can put real strain on Tom Thibodeau’s defensive scheme as they prioritise defending the paint so may leave shooters open if the Cavs opt to use a guard in the action. They also quite commonly switch 4-5 so the Cavaliers may get some matchups they like. Here, they run ’77 Small’ with Donovan Mitchell ghost screening. Darius Garland then puts Dillon Brooks in the torture chamber.

The Cavaliers have done a great job mixing in these ghost screens. Here on this play against the Heat, Mitchell ghosting creates chaos.

Though the Knicks may be organised at the point of attack than Miami, they can still get beneficial switches and potentially get bigger defenders off Garland. It’s essentially they run these ‘small’ variants of double drag.

I love how high they set some of these double drag screens like they do here against Memphis.

The Cavs routinely have the second screener roll pretty quickly. Look how tough it is to defend. The Knicks will defend it in a similar way with trying to contain the drive. Expect to see the Cavs run a load of these.

As I’ve mentioned throughout this article, counters are important. On this play the Grizzlies try and get ahead of the action so Mobley rolls quickly and Darius Garland executes ‘get’ action which is receiving your own pass on a dribble handoff.

A key theoretical of the double drag comes with regards to Evan Mobley. The Knicks will almost certainly leave him open. They do with just about any popper in a double drag set. But Mobley needs to be aggressive. This is what will swing the series for Cleveland. Here against the Knicks he pops and takes Obi Toppin off the catch.

Though Toppin won’t see the floor often, it’s still an important play. He has to be willing to be decisive. Indecision kills offense more than inability at times. The Knicks will defend these double drags high and likely have Mobley’s man tag the roller. Hartenstein and Robinson will be containing the drive. He has to be decisive.

Cleveland also mixes in Horns Sets as a way of trying to keep the opposition center outside of the paint. Here they run a classic- Horns Ghost Flare.

Horns concepts are good because they can generate quick hitters for their elite guards while creating matchup problems. Using the gravity of their star guards early in actions just creates some incredible moments such as here where they mesh Horns and turn it into a Spain-Pick-And-Roll.

Spain Pick-And-Rolls are nightmarish anyway, and the Cavaliers mixing it with Horns is just excellent offense. It maximises the gravity of their guards and keeps bigs at the level. Spain PNRs can be particularly fruitful against the Knicks because it tests Tom Thibodeau’s philosophy of always having his low man tag the roller instead of defending the corner shot.

Cleveland also likes to use Ghost screens out of a Horns outline to generate favourable switches.

This will be particularly relevant in the Knicks series because Darius Garland can definitely get bothered by size, though it’s not a gigantic concern for me. Ghost screens in general are very good and they hold a big purpose for the Cavaliers.

The New York Knicks Defense

Now that I’ve looked at the Cavaliers diverse scheme, we should look at the New York Knicks defense. Per a source with Second Spectrum, the Knicks are 7th in the NBA in drop coverage frequency, and 2nd in at the level coverage. They rarely hedge or trap or play zone. They are aggressive at helping from the nail which is a staple of Tom Thibodeau’s defensive scheme. He prioritises defending the paint with a 5-man wall and expects his wings and guards to rotate to open shooters. The strong side defense looks something like this.

Note both corner defenders aggressively helping towards the paint. Hartenstein being up towards the level. Immanuel Quickley helping off his man to try and disrupt the roller. Some teams run teams off the three-point line with aggressive and close rotations. The Knicks escort you off of it at the top of the key then make your driving path as miserable as possible.

Here’s what the defense looks like in video form. Note how they’re in drop coverage on this occasion.

Note Julius Randle tag the roller, and then making RJ Barrett responsible for ‘splitting the difference’ between the two perimeter guys. Thibodeau’s wing defenders need to be instinctive, reactive and aggressive. Here the Knicks recover out to Darius Garland and force a shot they’re comfortable with from a structural perspective.

My general Hypothesis for this series is that empty side actions will decide the series. The Knicks love Empty Side Pick-And-Rolls for Jalen Brunson because the ‘counter punch’ out of it is baseline fadeaway jumpers, which might be Brunson’s strongest shot as his offensive ability off the planted pivot foot is elite.

Above I’ve mentioned how the Cavs love empty side actions and how the majority of their core actions can be to set up these empty side actions. It makes sense to explore how the Knicks defend these actions and ponder how fruitful they might be.

If the empty side action takes place on the right side and the screen is taking the guard towards the open side, they’ll generally be in ‘ICE Coverage’. This means they’re funnelling the play towards the sideline and essentially using the out of bounds line as an extra defender. It looks like this.

If the screen is set to the left side of the guard, the Knicks will mix up coverages. Here against the Wizards, they have Hartenstein drop so Kyle Kuzma just takes his man into the paint and hits the fadeaway.

Against the Cavaliers, empty side coverages can be complex and tricky because Garland and Mitchell are both incredibly shifty, and Allen and Mobley are such good screeners. Their ability to be unpredictable with the personnel can make a one size fits all scouting report difficult. I expect the Knicks to mix in some at the level coverages simply because Darius Garland is incredibly shifty off the dribble against drop coverage. Like what do you do with this?

Randle tries to drop and deal with Mobley, Barrett has to help away from Donovan Mitchell. Brunson isn’t active, and Jericho Sims is concerned about Jarrett Allen. Weirdly, Allen’s allergy to the perimeter can actually benefit the Cavs against Thibodeau’s strong side defense. He’s more concerned with Allen at the dunker spot than he would be with a corner shooter, philosophically.

This time, Hartenstein starts at the level of the screen. But once Garland gets a step on his man it’s close to over. Hartenstein is juggling being in the driving lane with mirroring the roll-man.

Note in this play how Quentin Grimes doesn’t really help off of Donovan Mitchell. Their approach to this will be intriguing because if you do help, even momentarily, you risk Mitchell being able to create off the catch and go like he does here. It’s generally clear though that a smaller guard on Garland without any nail help probably isn’t going to end well.

The Little Things- What the Cavaliers Can Do

Playoff series come down to micro adjustments more often than you might think. Here are a few things I think Cleveland can do to potentially make life easier for them.

The first, is setting higher screens. Given the Knicks like to be in ICE Coverage on these empty side actions, you can really cause havoc by setting the screens higher.

Note here that the entire empty side is genuinely empty. It’s because Randle has much more ground to cover in order to enforce the ‘No Middle’ ideology. Mobley also has more rolling room. I think high screens can genuinely really cause the Knicks problems in this series. I’d also attempt to get Randle and Brunson in actions as much as possible. Neither are awful defenders but they’re a step slower than their team-mates.

Here, the Cavaliers do the same with their ‘ram’ action.

Look at the gap between Grimes and his teammates before the action even happens. You could park a car in there. Mitchell makes Randle dance by faking the right drive, then makes Grimes dance before hitting the pull-up three. A good way to delegitimise nail help is to just set the action really far away from it.

Putting Donovan Mitchell or Garland in the actions as an off-ball threat should prove fruitful. I think their wedge set in particular could be a nice way to test if the Knicks want to trap. Here against Portland, the Blazers run wedge roll with Anfernee Simons setting the wedge screen for Nurkic.

Thibodeau wants to maintain structure above all else. No middle at all costs. Putting your best players in the action really tests this because your nearest help defender has to worry about a star moving off-ball. They could walk into good jump shots or just generally get the defense on the back foot with how they position guys.

Generally, I think pre-action is needed to really get at the Knicks. Make them work and force them to make quick decisions. Thibs wants teams to play slow against his defense. Something as simple as what Minnesota do here, would suffice.

The Wolves trigger the ICE Coverage with a quick pass to Mike Conley on the empty side. Gobert rolls, and when Randle tags, Conley hits Kyle Anderson who is able to manipulate the help defense to create a wide open three. Generally, forcing these nail help guys to be as reactive as possible is a good way of winning games. Generally, their target should be to get these with pre-action and higher screens.

In Summary

Overall, this might be the most interesting first round series of the NBA Playoffs. The Cavaliers offense is diverse and fluid, and the Knicks defense is really tough. Evan Mobley needs to be aggressive, and the Knicks help defense will need to be on point. The battle of the nail help defenders likely decides this series. I’m not meaning to underestimate the Knicks defense, it’s an immense unit. I just think there are ways Cleveland can attack it and that’s what I’ve tried to explore in this series. I hope you enjoyed.

The post The Most Interesting First Round Series: Cavs vs. Knicks appeared first on Swish Theory.

Heading into the season, few knew what to expect from the San Antonio Spurs. A Gregg Popovich-coached team is never going to be dismal, but with the Dejounte Murray trade, it was fair to infer that they might be looking for a high pick in the upcoming generational-appearing draft class.

However, the Spurs appear to have too many up-and-coming players to truly bottom out, as they have started the year with impressive wins on the road over Philadelphia, Minnesota, and Indiana. The Spurs have a plethora of intriguing guards and wings such as Devin Vassell, Keldon Johnson, and Tre Jones who appear to be taking leaps or consolidating on an already impressive developmental curve.

It is, however, another Spurs player who has caught my eye.

Jakob Poeltl originally arrived at the Spurs from the Toronto Raptors when they opted to trade away Kawhi Leonard. DeMar DeRozan was the centerpiece of the package they got back, but ironically it looks as if Poeltl is going to usher in a new era of the San Antonio Spurs. Poeltl’s passing, positioning, and all-around excellence have helped the Spurs to a surprising start, and he has built upon a 21-22 season where he took a major leap forward in his all-around game.

Since the moment Dejounte Murray was traded, there have been whispers and even expectations that the Spurs would eventually move Poeltl. Such a move right now would be silly, as the Spurs run their motion offense through him and he is making everyone around him better. Though of course, the individual Spurs players deserve credit for their own play, Poeltl’s unselfishness and fluidity make things easier for everyone.

San Antonio’s Egalitarian Offense

Though high-level basketball can often come down to complex schemes and dribble-drive moves, there is a huge argument that doing the little things right can really move the needle. Throughout the Gregg Popovich era, San Antonio has always excelled in the little things on offense. These include cutting, making the right move off-ball, screening, lifting from the corner, and so on and so forth. This iteration of the Spurs doesn’t run a ton of set plays, but rather they run a gorgeous motion offense with cutting, screening, and passing. Poeltl is often at the center of this.

As a team, the Spurs are 7th in passes per game, 1st in assists per game, 1st in potential assists per game and 4th in secondary assists per game. More notable is Poeltl’s role. The only center making more passes per game is Nikola Jokic. These don’t always turn into assists, but this is more proof that the Spurs aren’t just taking the first shot available. They are using Poeltl as a hub to bend defenses with cutters, and being patient and allowing their young players to work through progressions like NFL Quarterbacks.

Among the most used lineup combinations in the NBA, The San Antonio Spurs’ starting lineup ranks 1st in shot quality. This is a metric giving weighting to shots at the rim and three-point land, but also taking into account a variety of other factors as opposed to just merely labeling a shot good because of where it was taken. The Spurs are 15th in offensive efficiency, per ESPN. But given their shot quality, there is a decent argument that they can improve upon this as they are hitting the right players in the right areas of the court.

Let’s look at the first concept any team running things through a center will use: Delay.

Delay is where the center has the ball at the top of the key and has two players on either side of him. The most common read out of this is Chicago action, which involves a guard coming off a screen to take a dribble handoff. On this occasion, Vassell dives to the rim to take the help defender, knowing Gobert will be in drop, The Spurs end up with a wide-open look from three.

Delay action is hugely popular because it strains the defense by forcing centers out onto the three-point line. You can flow into a variety of actions from the delay outline. It’s also a good way of keeping multiple players involved and especially for teaching multiple young guards to read and react in different scenarios. This makes it make even more sense that the Spurs run it often. They also regularly run it down the stretch as you can see below.

Here, the Spurs mesh two of the most effective and modern phenomena in NBA offenses: Delay Action, and empty-side pick-and-rolls. Devin Vassell clears out, creating the Chicago action. PJ Tucker’s tight coverage is read well by Poeltl who instead flows into an empty side action with Tre Jones. Poeltl’s fluidity and quick processing speed make these actions hugely profitable for the Spurs.

The Spurs don’t just use delay in half-court, some of their out-of-bounds plays also just immediately flow into delay action which shows their desire to run such a free-flowing offense.

Here, the Spurs have Poeltl flash to the top of the key and run delay action with Richardson emerging from the paint on a sort of quasi-exit screen. They will sometimes go to this in the half-court but a lot of their out bounds plays just involve them flowing into motion offense as opposed to running some diverse screening action. This is becoming more common.

I mentioned their desire to create empty-side actions which are becoming extremely common throughout the NBA. Here, they run a pick-and-fade for Jakob Poeltl which isn’t immediately a threat. But they flow into an empty side hand-off action to get Doug McDermott a great look against Rudy Gobert’s drop coverage.

On the next play, the Spurs go to the extreme with their perimeter movement and cutting to get an empty-side action.

They pitch to Poeltl and two players make decoy cuts before they get their best player Keldon Johnson into a two-man game. He reads the coverage and takes the open three.

The Spurs empty side game is usually flowed into with real pace. Speed of action is probably a better indicator of pace than the raw ‘pace’ statistic which is just calculated by the number of possessions. But the Spurs’ young guns make this action quick and that draws respect. On the play below, the Spurs create the empty side action and Tobias Harris is just a step behind his man. This forces Embiid to show on the ball handler and from there the Spurs create an open corner three on the weak side. Their action created an advantage and their overall principles helped sustain it.

One might argue that any big on the Spurs roster can do this. While that is somewhat true in the case of Zach Collins, what sets Poeltl apart is his individual passing ability and his mix of fluidity and aggression on offense. He is by no means an elite individual scorer but his footwork and power means he can take the ball to the rack and finish irrespective of the support or quality of opportunity he is getting. Take the play below as an example.

It’s the same two-man game as before. This time, Minnesota covers the two-man game relatively well but Doug McDermott doesn’t see Tre Jones excellent exit cut to the corner. Poeltl gets it on the block against the multi-time defensive player of the year winner in Rudy Gobert but he backs him down and shows real craft to hit the reverse layup. Poeltl is shooting 76 percent at the rim this year which is the best mark of his career. Though Poeltl lacks the verticality and pure speed to really ever be a league leader in frequency of shots at the rim, he still makes the most of his 70th percentile volume of shots at the rim.

Poeltl also has shown consistent touch in hitting floaters. Given the fact he’s not a vertical athlete who will overwhelm NBA Centers with sheer power on a regular basis this is huge. He’s currently 53rd percentile as a finisher from short mid-range per Cleaning the Glass. But I’d expect this to rebound a bit given he’s never finished with a mark that low in his entire career. He’s an extremely high volume short-mid range attempts guy which comes down to the fact he’s usually lurking around the elbows and high post as opposed to aggressively diving towards the rim.

Something I love about the Spurs is they continue to move even when they see a player trying to go to work.

Here, the Spurs use Doug McDermott on a curl to open up the weak side for a two-man game. Knowing Lopez will drop deep, Poeltl flashes high and hits a high-level floater. He also had the option to feed Josh Richardson for an open three off the wide ball screen. Again, this further conveys how Poeltl is a hub that the Spurs other players flow around and quite literally give you death by a thousand cuts.

Poeltl is also the best passing big on the Spurs roster by a wide margin. He’s able to fit the ball into tough windows and his mesh of processing speed and overall aggressiveness means he can find windows throughout the shot clock. Generally, something San Antonio loves to do is run split-cutters off of him. These are incredibly hard to defend but it’s also a great way of keeping multiple players involved and feeding multiple mouths. This also meshes with something I believe to be Poeltl’s most overlooked skill- his ability to flash to the right areas and play effectively from these areas.

The staple play of the 2022-2023 San Antonio Spurs is simply split cuts off their center who positions himself at the elbow. Split cuts are merely cuts in different directions away from a ball handler, usually a big man. They are extremely hard to defend and given the Spurs have an array of fast-young players who need their reps, it makes sense to spam this play at a high rate.

On this play, everyone is moving. They attempt to have one player clear to the weak side to create that two-man empty side look they love. The Clippers defense stays extremely tight. When Poeltl opens the offense up to the weak side, Keita Bates-Diop punishes Reggie Jackson’s stunt to help on Norman Powell’s man, and Poeltl fires a perfect pass into KBD while the defense is rotating, also known as a proactive pass.

This wasn’t some one-off pass for Jakob Poeltl, he’s improved in this area drastically in San Antonio. The narrowness of his scoring profile means he will never be an elite playmaking big man but given most teams would want him as a screen and dive big, this well-above-average level of passing and playmaking is highly valuable.

Here, the Spurs flow into a two-man action that doesn’t involve the center. The ball generally will find its way somewhere else given the nature of the Spurs’ motion game, so they flow back into Poeltl and run split cuts. Three split cuts eventually end with Richardson getting a wide-open three out of the same principles the famed flex offense would utilize for many years in college basketball. Split cuts will often create traffic and screens don’t always need to be set simply because the player movement is having the same effect.

Something I like about the Spurs is the fact they flow into effective actions when the original actions break down. This is something that isn’t typical of young teams. Take the play below as an example.

They end up in a position of stagnation, but Poeltl goes into Chicago action to free up Keldon Johnson to go into that two-man game with Devin Vassell. Getting your two best players in an action is a good idea, but creating traffic and forcing the defense to constrict into the paint just makes these actions even more fruitful.

Poeltl also is beginning to show consistent flashes of reading off-ball defenders, which makes the Spurs cut heavy offense even more effective.

Aaron Gordon senses the two-man DHO game coming so tries to get ahead of it. Poeltl plays it perfectly though, he sets Gordon up for the hand-off then hits Keldon Johnson on the backdoor cut. As I previously mentioned, Poeltl isn’t ever going to be a top tier playmaker, but he’s still showing passing evolution and executing some really nice high level-reads.

Overall, Poeltl is extremely valuable offensively. He’s relatively fluid and this meshes well with his passing and overall reading of the court. The Spurs offense runs through him, even though he isn’t the number one scoring option. The numbers are fruitful for such a young team. The major limitation is his free-throw percentage which has been well below average his entire career. His lack of verticality isn’t really an issue assuming you have the right personnel.

Pick-and-roll heavy teams may not be the best use of his talents even with his short-roll passing because ultimately the lack of scoring could be costly. But teams who run diverse and creative off-ball offenses fit him like a glove. The Spurs’ offense would not work without his decisiveness, his fluidity, and his vision. The bail-out potential with his floaters is also extremely valuable to a young team that will no doubt have some broken possessions and makes some bad reads. His 88th percentile assist percentage summarises both his value and how emboldened his role is to this Spurs team.

The Defensive Anchor

Poeltl is perhaps more known on a national level for his defensive work. He’s been one of the better rim protectors and drop bigs in the NBA in recent years. Schematically, the Spurs generally run drop coverage. This simplifies things for their variety of young players who can theoretically use their athleticism to contest from behind and navigate through screens. They are third in drop coverage usage across the NBA.

Poeltl is one of a select group of players this season averaging one steal and one block per game. He impacts the game as a defender on multiple fronts and matches up well with a lot of the versatile big men in the NBA. Per Cleaning the Glass, Poeltl is in the 78th percentile for steal percentage and the 58th percentile for block percentage. I expect the block percentage to rise, given for the last three seasons he’s been at worst in the 88th percentile. He erases shots and seems to always be in the right position as you can see below.

Poeltl has legitimate bailout potential as a defender. Here, the Bucks flow into delay-chicago action on the sideline out of bounds play. Tre Jones ends up taking two bad angles so Jevon Carter has a free pass at Jakob Poeltl. Poeltl stays toe to toe with the driver the entire way and swats the shot away. Being able to erase mistakes is pivotal for a big man playing with such a young team as mistakes are bound to happen.

The best thing about Poeltl as a defender is his elite discipline, he just doesn’t seem to foul and that generally comes back to his positioning. If you set yourself up for success early and are in the right spot, you’re always less likely to foul. He’s in the 93rd percentile for foul percentage this season which is by far the highest mark of his career. The Spurs’ defensive rating overall is somewhat skewed by the fact they give up the fourth most transition opportunities in the NBA. In the half-court, they are a respectable 19th in defensive rating. This speaks well to Poeltl’s potential scalability to other teams should they choose to trade him.

Part of a re-tooling process is ensuring you sell on veterans at the right time to gain more assets and eventually open up opportunities for younger players. However, Poeltl is a really interesting test to this rule. He makes everyone else on the roster better with his passing and defensive positioning.

He also plays at quite a shallow position and matches up well with some of the more fluid fives which means the Spurs can justify playing small a lot of the time. Poeltl alters shots with his positioning and allows the Spurs’ young players to get steals and blocks. Generally, he opens up the playbook on both sides of the ball which is highly valuable to a team that has young players.

The solar system of the Spurs’ offense orbits around Poeltl at the elbow and the high post. His overall fluidity and willingness to make the right play is why the Spurs are surprising many people with how competitive they’ve been this year. The Spurs won’t fall apart if they trade him, but it’s hard to envision them finding anyone who is playing this well at a time that is right with everyone else on their roster.

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