Pascal being dealt was not a shock; the Raptors were flirting with NBA purgatory and in desperate need of a full reset. The package was also not a shock, as three middling first-round picks for a 2x All-NBA player with 22/6/5 averages is more than fair. The shock was the team involved in the deal and the lack of a following extension.

The Pacers, despite their burgeoning success with a young team, do not play in a market that historically attracts free-agent stars. A player like Siakam probably wouldn’t be joining Indiana of his own volition over the summer, thus the need to make a deal and spend the second half of the season convincing him that re-signing would be a boon. It’s fair to hand-wring over the thought of spending that draft capital on a star that can easily walk. Yet it was a swing Indiana rightfully felt compelled to take given their success.

The deal paid off in their first playoff series, finishing off a stumbling Bucks team in six games. Siakam led the team in scoring throughout the series including a crucial 37/11/6 performance (with no turnovers!) in a Game 2 victory on the road, stealing home-court advantage and setting the tone. I wanted to explore how Pascal’s performance fueled Indiana’s upset victory and propelled them to the conference semifinals against the New York Knicks.

Offensive Overview

Pascal led his team despite dropping plenty of points from distance (27% on 22 attempts) and at the free throw line (46% on 26 attempts). Inside the arc, he was a dominating force. Siakam converted 62% of his twos, an incredible figure for a guy who takes a lot of midrange and post-up shots. His best work came in the post and in transition, where he generated 1.4 PPP. Watching him use his athleticism, size, and touch to overwhelm an undersized and relatively unathletic Bucks team was extremely impressive.

In addition to the scoring prowess, Siakam managed 25 assists to a measly 3 turnovers. Incredibly, he managed to take care of the ball well despite the volume of double-teams thrown at him. We will explore the film to see how Siakam did his damage in addition to creating for his high-flying teammates.

Midrange Dominance

As previously mentioned, Pascal has produced elite results in the post. A lot of that is due to his lethal midrange fadeaway shot. His strength/handle combination helps to put him in the right spots and the length/size gives him a nearly unguardable release.

The threat of his drives opens up a lot of pull-up midrange looks. With Myles Turner serving in a spacing role, Spicy P was constantly matched against Milwaukee’s bigs. If they backed off, he would rise and hit the middy.

Indiana even sprinkled in pick-and-pops for his midrange attempts, some real 1980s basketball looks.

Despite the frequency and efficiency, Pascal’s midrange game is not the only way he contributes heavily to this half-court offense.

DHO/Post Usage

The usage of dribble handoffs, both as the pitcher and catcher, has been interesting to watch. The presence of those bigs guarding him serves to pull rim protection away from the paint, opening up space for drivers and for Pascal himself.

The post-ups have worked with similar efficacy. The midrange fadeaway we covered before is a go-to weapon, but Siakam won’t hesitate to seal off a mismatch and get to the rim if the opportunity presents itself.

What impressed me the most with his post usage was the playmaking. The Bucks without Giannis were forced to double him early and often, forcing him to make kickouts or layoff passes instead. Siakam was more than happy to oblige the Bucks by breaking them down with a flurry of post passes.

In this upcoming series against the Knicks, Pascal will see a healthy amount of doubles against a Tom Thibodeau defense. If his teammates can work hard to find the open space for cuts and perimeter shots, Siakam’s post playmaking will be a major point of interest. And it’s not the only area where his playmaking impact is felt.

Pinch Playmaking

Against a team willing to load up in the paint, Pascal did not get many chances for clean drives. Milwaukee would send lots of help at the nail or collapse from the weak side to prevent paint points. Siakam showed a willingness and ability to make the right kickouts from his drives to take advantage of the defense.

This upcoming matchup with the Knicks will present similar opportunities. New York will send help to force shooters to beat them, and Siakam has to be willing to kick out instead of forcing shots over Isaiah Hartenstein/Mitchell Robinson/OG Anunoby.

Another interesting element for this matchup is how often Thibodeau wants to tag rollers. He will send help from all over, including the strong corner, to force the ball out of the hands of rollers. Possessions like the following will be crucial to breaking this excellent New York defense.

Expecting him to post another 8:1 assist-to-turnover ratio is a little silly. Yet it will be important to sit around 4-5 assists per game while taking good care of the ball if Indiana has a chance. Tyrese Haliburton, Andrew Nembhard, and TJ McConnell typically share the playmaking burden. With the sheer volume of POA defense New York possesses, Siakam will need to step up as a shot generator for his teammates in order to balance the Indiana attack.

Offensive Glass Crashing

Not only was Pascal Siakam the Pacers’ leader in offensive rebounding during the Bucks series, but he also posted the 11th-highest offensive rebounding rate of 61 qualified players in the first round. It was an impressive display of effort, positioning, and coordination to generate second chances consistently. Despite being the third-tallest player in the 8-man playoff rotation (Myles Turner and Obi Toppin both clear him), Siakam spends the most time in the paint due to the spacing of those two. They place a heavy burden on Siakam to generate these looks.

And wow, did he ever dominate the glass.

Against a Knicks team that had problems on the defensive glass against the Sixers (74.4%, 11th among playoff teams in R1) Indiana will need a similar effort to tip the scales. New York was dominant at generating second chances (32.2%, 2nd among R1 teams) and Indiana needs to narrow that gap to get a possession advantage. It’s no surprise given that the Knicks were the top offensive rebounding team in the regular season, yet they were middle of the pack in defensive rebounding rate. The Pacers need Siakam (and the whole frontcourt, really) to capitalize on that weakness.

In a series that features a bad offense vs a bad defense and an elite offense vs an elite defense, the total possessions each team can generate will likely decide many of these games. Indiana cannot afford to lose the possession battle in a major way, or else their offense will have little chance of powering a series victory.

Transition Efficiency

Against a slow Bucks team, Siakam in the open floor was murder. He showed a fantastic blend of leakouts after shot contests, attacking an unsettled defense after grabbing boards and sealing mismatches early to generate transition looks. That 1.4 PPP mark ranked in the 84th percentile among all players in the first round, and it’s easy to see why.

It’s not going to be this easy against the Knicks defense. They’re more disciplined, possess better athletes, and have a size/mobility blend that can make life difficult in the open floor. Former teammate OG Anunoby, one of the better transition defenders around, will likely see his minutes matched with Siakam to boot.

The need to generate baskets in transition is of the utmost importance in this series. Indiana generated a 90th percentile rate of transition offense in the regular season, falling to the 63rd percentile in the opening round. Conversely, New York was a 60th percentile team at preventing transition looks in the regular season, but fell to the 25th percentile against a quick Sixers squad. Siakam must press hard to attack the unsettled defense before that elite half-court Knicks defensive unit can organize.

Pascal was the key that unlocked Indiana’s offense in this first-round series. Of all 5-man lineups across the 16 playoff squads, Indiana’s top lineup (Hali/Nembhard/Nesmith/Siakam/Turner) generated the highest offensive rating at 134.2 pts per 100. That kind of figure with only one player scoring 20+ PPG is a masterclass in ball sharing and versatility of attack. It’s the other side of the floor that has me concerned.

Defensive Overview

The other side of the lineup stats are rough. That top Indiana lineup surrendered 113.3 points per 100 possessions, a 17th-percentile mark in the playoffs. There is some good in the midst of all that bad, including solid marks in turnover creation and defensive rebounding percentage. Yet they leave a lot to be desired, which is a surprise in a playoff setting considering that Nembhard, Siakam, and Turner are all above-average defensive players in my eye.

Against this Knicks team, they’ll have to avoid the easy mistakes and make a struggling offense fight for every bucket.

POA Success

Indiana switched 1-4 (even 1-5 at times) against Milwaukee, with Pascal finding himself going from guarding Khris Middleton to Damian Lillard often. He did an admirable job containing those two in my opinion. He could stick long enough to let a better switch come, got around screens for rear-view contests, and contained them when called upon.

They don’t need him to be the point-of-attack guard ace when Andrew Nembhard is on the floor, who will be seeing heavy minutes on Jalen Brunson. Myles Turner patrolling the back line gives an extra measure of confidence. Yet there will come a time when the switches happen. The length and footwork of Siakam will make life tough on Brunson and creation nigh impossible for the other perimeter players.

What’s equally impressive about Siakam is the kind of impact he can make even if the switching doesn’t pull him out to the perimeter.

Hustling in Help

Siakam has never been a traditional defensive event creator. But historically, his event creation has risen in the playoffs. His steal and block rates from the regular season to the postseason remain the same across his career, yet the percentile ranks climb higher due to the nature of playoff defense. Slower and more methodical offenses will take away opportunities to create those events, yet Pascal finds a way.

Even if not getting a steal or block, Siakam makes an impact as a rotational rim protector to affect shots and make life hard on those getting to the rim when Myles Turner is pulled away from the rim.

I was pleasantly surprised at seeing Siakam’s impact as a transition defender. He could outright erase the play or show the hustle necessary to make opponents earn it at the line.

Whether he’s on or off the ball depending on how the switch plays out, in the halfcourt or the open floor, Pascal Siakam finds a way to make an impact.

Post Defense Questions

Milwaukee had to go post-heavy in the first-round series, and Siakam was often a point of attack. Bobby Portis especially went to work often, and the results were overall great for Siakam.

Milwaukee managed to generate 1.19 PPP on these post-ups overall, a strong mark. Yet many of these came on tough jumpers or contested hooks. The numbers don’t do justice to the kind of looks Siakam forced Portis and Brook Lopez to take.

New York was not a post-up team in the regular season, even with Julius Randle. They managed a 33rd percentile post frequency and had the 2nd lowest post-up efficiency league-wide. Those numbers have only dropped in the playoffs: New York posted up a total of 9 times in their series against the Sixers. Zero came from their bigs, as OG Anunoby, Jalen Brunson, and Bojan Bogdanovic (who is now out for the playoffs) accounted for those nine.

It would be a surprise to see New York try to post up Siakam to any degree, if they choose to at all. Even in desperate times when the buckets dry up, smaller Knick wings going up against Pascal wouldn’t help things. But it merits keeping an eye on.

Lastly, we come to possession finishing.

Strong Rebounding

After his trade to Indiana, Siakam’s rebounding efficacy jumped in a major way. His 17.3% defensive rebounding share put him in the 91st percentile amongst forwards. That number has jumped to 18.3% in the first round and made a major impact.

This is where you could argue Indiana will need Siakam the most as a defender. New York is a punishingly good offensive rebounding team as mentioned previously. Pascal will need to put in work to end possessions, or else Indy’s suspect defense will have to get stop after stop just to get back on defense.

Playoff Outlook

Indiana will once again be scrapping as underdogs, but they face a similar task. Their high-powered offense will face a strong half-court defense. And their lackluster defense will need to compete against a shorthanded and underperforming offense. It feels like whichever team can put together sustained offensive runs will be able to wrangle this series.

Siakam is the kind of guy who can tip this in favor of the Pacers. If he can get to work against the likes of OG Anunoby and Josh Hart on the offensive end, that takes away a lot of what makes New York great. Holding his own on defense and making an impact in help to contain Jalen Brunson (in addition to keeping the non-threatening scorers in check) will be massive.

I’m foaming at the mouth in anticipation of this series. Two teams punching above their weight with young cores. A high-paced and electric offense against a grinding defense. Stars a-plenty and excellent role players (or Alfreds, as JJ Redick would call them). Let’s see what kind of impact Pascal Siakam can make to propel his team towards their first conference finals in a decade.

The post Pascal Siakam Fears No Deer appeared first on Swish Theory.

Star Wars has the shameful second and third trilogies (Revenge of the Sith exempt here). Jurassic Park has created a lot of slop. Ghostbusters continues to churn out garbage. The Matrix creators decided a fourth movie was necessary for whatever reason. All devoid of the original magic that made them great.

The Terminator franchise is the most apt when I think about the current Warriors. The first movie was fantastic, something new the masses had yet to experience, much like the 2015 Warriors. They somehow came out stronger with T2, akin to the KD-era title teams. T3 was not as good as the first two, yet they managed to pull it off like the plucky 2022 Dubs.

Then the rebooting began, and the magic was lost. Terminator: Salvation still had their Steph Curry equivalent in Christian Bale, yet everything else failed to live up. Chris Paul did his best Sam Worthington impression, utterly without lift. Bryce Dallas Howard mailed it in like Andrew Wiggins, which I suppose makes The Village her 2022 Wiggins playoff run?

Like the IP holders of the Terminator franchise, the Warriors are faced with a choice: do we keep making the same movie and hope for a different result? Or try something new and reap the potential rewards?

The Crossroads

We’ve all seen the stories by now. Steph wants a winning situation. Klay Thompson is a free agent with suspected suitors. Draymond Green is under contract, but the patience may have run out.

It’s not as hopeless as many would make it out to be. The fans of the other 29 teams have been waiting to ring the death bell of the Warriors for some time. They tried to ring it once before, and that didn’t pan out. But even if the title hopes are gone, this team still has some meat on the bone.

Assuming the core trio stays together, the predictable outcome, GM Mike Dunleavy Jr. has things to work with. Chris Paul, Andrew Wiggins, Gary Payton II, and Kevon Looney have all made themselves expendable. That’s over $73 million that can be moved. Paul’s $30M is completely non-guaranteed, and Looney only has 3 of his $8M guaranteed, making them ideal expiring contracts to move. Wiggins is a tougher sell with one more year at $28.2M, but the right tanking team won’t mind.

I hope for Andrew’s sake that he can continue to cash the checks while spending the time with his family that he needs in these difficult past couple of years.

They’re also possessed with strong trade incentives to go with the salary. They can move at least two first-round picks with Jonathan Kuminga, Moses Moody, and even Brandin Podziemski or Trayce Jackson-Davis if they so desire. I’m not advocating for one deal or another. The point is that options are out there.

The Desired Path

I think I can speak for most Warriors fans in saying the last thing we want to see is the core being shattered this offseason. The chance of returning to a higher contending status is narrow, but it exists. The right trades and use of cap space could see them recover some of the old magic, and title #5 or no we’d all like to see them give it another try.

Equally disastrous as the nuclear option would be to continue chugging along with the current formula. Trotting out the old IP like a lazy studio executive. Make moves on the fringes, use all the draft picks to add more inexperienced talent, and continue to be content with mediocrity. That would be the path that takes a Steph trade decision out of their hands.

Retain the core. Be aggressive with trades and free agency. The rarest thing in basketball is to have a core this accomplished that starts and ends their careers together, and the fans would love to see it happen. It’s something we may never see again in the league. Riding off into the sunset with a whimper would be devastating. The front office must give them a chance to go out on their shield. Hopefully, this soul-crushing end to the season gives them the motivation needed to do so.

Let’s get something new and imaginative to put a bow on this. Don’t have next season be your Terminator: Genisys.

The post The Rebooting of the Warriors appeared first on Swish Theory.

Besides being a lefty who looks like the upper half of a centaur with a funky love of hook shots, his proficiency as a rebounder is nearly unparalleled among NBA guards. Podz rates as a 99th-percentile defensive rebounder amongst guards, and 97th-percentile on the offensive glass.

Even with the rise of huge guards (and Podz is no slouch at 6’5″), his rebounding stands out. Only two guards boast higher offensive and defensive rebounding shares than Brandin: Ben Simmons (6’10”) and Russell Westbrook (all-time rebounding guard). I’d say that’s pretty good company.

Rebounding at this kind of level doesn’t just happen. It takes effort, timing, and technique to reach the level Podziemski has already achieved as a rookie. How does he do it?

Using Boxouts

Like Westbrook, Podz excels at using boxouts by his teammates to secure boards. He checks his man well and has an innate understanding of angles, knowing how to best position himself behind the boxout:

Podz isn’t just reliant on boxouts from others to generate rebounding success. He’ll happily do the dirty work himself:

In fact, among all the guards who have played as many minutes as Podz, only two boast a higher rate of boxouts per 48 minutes: Jaylen Brown and Jalen Williams. Not bad at all!

Boxouts are decreasing in frequency and importance as the game spreads out further. The real question for most rebounders is how you handle your defensive rebounding zones.

In Zone vs Out of Zone

An important part of rebounding is making quick checks. Players have to move into the proper position when the shot goes up. Using that time to check for potential offensive rebounding threats helps make a great rebounder, and Podz excels at this.

Those quick checks give him a better idea of what kind of resistance is coming in addition to whether or not a boxout is needed. It makes him a fantastic in-zone rebounder (i.e. rebounds that come to his natural defensive position).

Controlling the rebounds that come your way is great, but it’s not as impressive as out-of-zone boards. Recognizing chances to crash into other zones and help collect rebounds impacts team rebounding hugely.

A huge part of recognizing out-of-zone chances is noticing when your teammates are at a potential disadvantage. Podz can check the scene, recognize opportunities to tip the scales and help to secure that defensive stop.

Podz doesn’t just excel at securing defensive boards: he sparks the transition game once secured.

Transition Triggering

Podz isn’t exactly a big transition threat. He has mediocre transition frequency (56th percentile) and even worse efficiency as a scorer (28th percentile). But he still finds ways to contribute, especially as an outlet passer, which all comes from his defensive rebounding.

He reads the floor quickly and has good loft/accuracy on his passes. You probably noticed the middle clip was a deflection, but given the time and score, it was a good risk to take.

If you can’t grab the board and burn down the floor like prime Westbrook, find other ways to help out the team transition game. This is a welcome addition for a Warriors team that has struggled to generate transition opportunities all year.

And it’s not all on the defensive end where Podz impacts the boards.

Offensive Rebounding

As previously mentioned, Brandin posts elite offensive rebounding numbers. His combination of technique and effort stands even taller when getting busy on the offensive end.

First, the technique. Inside positioning is the name of the game when it comes to the offensive glass. If you can get through boxouts and work harder for that position, you’ll find yourself creating a lot of second chances.

When you’re amongst the trees it can be difficult to outright secure the board yourself. Podz loves to high-point the ball for tipouts and give the perimeter players a better shot to secure the board, taking the bigs out of the play.

Tipouts by themselves can lead directly to second chances. When you play a lot of minutes with Steph Curry and Klay Thompson, they’re as good as assists.

In addition to being technically sound, the effort sticks out. Podz is constantly outworking his opponents to create these second chances. That kind of hustle endears you to teammates and makes them want to compete harder.

Does that kind of effort make you want to run through a brick wall? That makes two of us.

In a season where Golden State has suffered from inconsistency, lethargy, and a lack of size, this kind of rebounding from the guard spots can be a game-changer. There will be years to come when the Warriors try to build around a smaller team. Rebounding will have to be made up on the margins. Brandin Podziemski is a guy who thrives on the margins. You go, Mr. Tumnus. You go.

The post Brandin Podziemski: Guard Rebounder Extraordinaire appeared first on Swish Theory.

Sam Merrill was once a 24-year-old rookie taken with the last draft pick, one who struggled to find a consistent role in Milwaukee. Even though he was delivering on his primary college skill, shooting the cover off the ball, he couldn’t stick. Merrill bounced to Cleveland by way of Memphis entering last year, managing 59 total minutes this past season. It felt like he had run out of chances.

Sam stuck around for an end-of-the-bench role this year, and the opportunity arrived. Cleveland was hit with an injury to star guard Darius Garland in mid-December. That setback (and a 13-12 record) felt like a potential early-season knockout for a team pushing further toward contender status.

Then Sam Merrill entered the rotation and started blasting.

Garland missed 19 games, and Cleveland managed a 15-4 record in no small part due to Merrill’s contributions. Sam let almost eight threes per game fly over his 22 MPG across this stretch. The Cavs had a new lease on their season, and Merrill had a new lease on his career. He’ll be needed even more with news of Evan Mobley’s fresh injury.

I love a good specialist, and I wanted to explore how Merrill’s strap has bought him another shot in this league, plus how coach JB Bickerstaff’s playcalling has augmented his skill. So let’s get into it.

The Mechanics

There are a lot of physical components that go into a good shooter. Squaring your body necessitates good footwork, high-level coordination, and the strength to generate momentum for the shot. To get a good idea of a shooter’s skill, looking at release speed and range are strong indicators.

Sam Merrill has a lightning-quick release:

He’s also more than capable of extending beyond the line when needed:

Quick release and deep range are important tools in what comes next. So many of these plays we’ll see would not be possible without these skills. Let’s start with the simple stuff.

Relocation Maestro

Movement is a necessity for off-ball shooters. Filling space behind drives, moving off of nail help, relocating across the baseline, or just staying busy while actions flow around you. There are many ways for Merrill to make an impact as a relocator, and he delivers:

Another relocation trait I look for is knowing when to lift from the corners to press an advantage. Merrill is quite adept at evacuating his spot at the right time to create a better passing lane and shake his defender.

Merrill also has Curry-esque moments of frantic off-ball movement that leave his man grasping for air:

The quick release and heady sense of movement have produced incredible catch-and-shoot results. Merrill sits at 45.2% on catch-and-shoot jumpers, good for a 67.8% eFG. It’s one of the best marks in the league, with prodigious volume to boot (12.4 threes attempted per 75 possessions).

That skill alone at 6’5″ would make him a viable rotation option. The play calls he enables for Cleveland take him to a new level of utility.

Off-Ball Screening

With a player able to fly off screens in either direction, you can layer extra problems for the defense onto existing actions, or call them as the initial action. There’s nothing like a pindown for a shooter with Merrill’s catch-and-shoot talent:

You can run them wide (when Merrill starts from the corner) or narrow (wing to the top of the key) and the result is the same. It puts the help defenders in a tough situation. Pindowns move toward the initial ballhandler, usually not a player the defense is keen to help off from. With the speed of the action, it’s hard to organize the help from the backside, putting a heavy burden on the defending big. However, if they choose to blitz or rise to the level, it opens up a potential slip if the shooter hits the big over the top. Decisions, decisions.

Staggered pindowns are another way of putting the defense in a decision-making nightmare:

Do you force the man guarding Merrill to navigate two straight screens? Do you switch or try to blitz one of the screens? If so, who would do the switching/blitzing? This is nearly impossible to figure out in the brief time it takes for Merrill to get around the screens and get a shot off.

Exit screens are another simple yet brutally effective way to leverage Merrill’s off-ball shooting:

With a pass coming from the top, it’s nigh impossible for the big to switch the action and contest the shot without allowing a slip from the screening big. The passer from the wing would recognize this and find the big for a higher-value shot. Instead, the onus is on the chasing defender to get around the screen, one that allows time for the screening big to adjust the angle right up to the last second. Essentially, a good exit screen is entirely on the offense’s terms.

Cleveland has also grown to employ more complex off-ball actions to spring Merrill. This “twirl” variant is a fun way to throw a series of possible screening and shooting threats at the defense:

First it’s a stagger for Merrill, then he sets a “rip” screen for Niang and finally gets a downscreen from Tristan Thompson as Niang drives to put a bow on the action. The confusion leads to three Wizards converging on Niang’s drive and by the end, nobody is within spitting distance of Merrill as he takes the shot. Confusion and misdirection are often the best weapons in a coach’s arsenal.

The use of a “rip” screen as a misdirection has been very present in how JB Bickerstaff runs actions for Merrill. Shoutout to my friend and play-by-play master Joe Hulbert for identifying this one: “rip veer”:

Merrill setting a backscreen gives his defender pause, sagging back for a second as a big or wing moves through the screen. Then a second screener arrives to give Merrill a downscreen, popping him above the arc for a three, while the defender has to process this and recover around the screen. It’s a beautiful chain of events that puts the defense in a bind.

Not all of Merrill’s success has to come from off-ball movement and layers of deception. Simple actions on (or directly around) the ball have shown some efficacy as well.

Dribble Handoffs

What’s the first play that comes to mind with any shoot-first wing? A good ol’ dribble handoff. It’s becoming the bread-and-butter play for specialists like Merrill. Kyle Korver walked so that these shooters could run.

It’s effective for a few reasons. The screen after the handoff is usually closer to the handler, opening up the shooting window faster. Depending on the handoff big, the threat of the roll/slip combined with a fake handoff forces the defending big to pick a poison. This may necessitate drop coverage of a DHO, which a shooter like Sam Merrill will destroy consistently:

Drop also invites more layered DHO actions. I enjoy this pindown into DHO concept, which places undue burden on the chase defenders as Alex Len is not a blitz/level kind of big:

With the right defenders present, playing to the level of the screen or outright blitzing becomes an option against Merrill. Even a crisp show and recover can give him issues when he feels the shot is taken away. His production against these coverages is far more of a mixed bag.

Switching the action outright is another way to take away his shot from the jump. A bigger defender will have a larger radius to contest the shot.

This switching is largely enabled by Merrill’s lack of ability to counter with drives. Though this is an article on shooting prowess, it’s important to understand how the absence of viable counters affects this shooting ability. Teams have learned to sell out to deny the shot and risk his drives, knowing he is unlikely to make them pay going downhill.

Even with aggressive coverages, the purity of Merrill’s release and footwork skill can burn them even in the tightest windows:

Double-pitch DHOs act as a way for Merrill to feel out the coverage while still pressing the advantage against the defense. It serves to find a new angle for more separation while buying important time Merrill can use to his advantage:

The DHO looks are by far the most common usage for Merrill in direct actions, and he’ll have time to work on his counters against non-drop coverages. Though simple and with plenty of utility, it’s not my favorite direct action Cleveland has deployed for him.

Ball Screen Actions

Shoot-first wings or guards as ball screeners have been a fun league-wide development over the past several years. Though not as complex as Golden State’s actions for Stephen Curry and Klay Thompson or the Isaiah Joe screens in Oklahoma City, Cleveland is feeling out some Merrill screens as a tool for their primary offensive weapons.

A tidy pick-and-fade puts the defense at a quick disadvantage:

This guard-guard screening brings uncertainty to the defender on Merrill. Guards are less used to navigating screen actions from behind than bigs. When setting screens for Donovan Mitchell, a prolific driver and pull-up shooter, a switch or over must be navigated quickly so Cleveland’s All-Star guard doesn’t get open space. It’s difficult to do this while properly covering Merrill’s fade.

The guards assigned to Merrill are not going to be the cream of the defensive crop, especially when playing off of Mitchell and Garland. This is a simple and effective way to put subpar defenders directly in the action against their star creators.

Bickerstaff likes to add layers to this action, sometimes by adding a flare screen for Merrill after the initial screen:

Good luck switching and navigating that one properly.

Processing a screen from Merrill is already difficult enough for the players defending the action. If he ghosts the screen entirely into a fade, that processing window becomes even tighter.

Amazingly, Cleveland can get utility from an action where everyone knows what Merrill is going to do. Is he going to roll to the rim or slip? Absolutely not. That man is fading. And still, it creates enough matchup difficulty that the defense cannot properly contain him.

Wrapping Up

With news of Evan Mobley‘s injury, Cleveland will once again find themselves in heavy need of Merrill’s talent. Their bigger forwards will have to slide down positionally, only furthering the need for his shooting off the ball to create space.

Under contract for one more year, it feels all but guaranteed that he has earned a place on the team going forward. Even if Merrill fails to grow beyond a pure shooting specialist, it’s a strong enough talent to keep him a place in the league for years to come. Both Merrill and the Cavaliers have reaped the benefits of this second chance, and I’m stoked to see him fight for a playoff rotation spot down the stretch of Cleveland’s most exciting season since LeBrexit.

The post Shootin’ Sam Merrill’s Emergence appeared first on Swish Theory.

That’s how ex-NBA’er Tim Legler described his baseline requirements for a championship-level NBA defense on JJ Redick‘s podcast, The Old Man and the Three. And all Leglar has to point to for evidence is the NBA’s most recent champion, the Denver Nuggets.

Denver’s defense was the definition of ‘adequate’ in the 2022-’23 regular season, finishing 15th in defensive rating. But try telling that to the Los Angeles Lakers and Miami Heat; each of those teams scored just 38 points in the second half of their respective season-ending losses to Denver. Their defense didn’t just “ramp it up,” they shut it down.

The Nuggets did it again in their most recent win, a mere regular-season triumph over the Golden State Warriors on Sunday night. Their moment of truth didn’t come at half-time of an NBA Finals closeout-game, though, but when Head Coach Michael Malone chided his group for their poor defensive start, down 45-32 after 14-and-a-half minutes of play.

“I don’t know if you guys are watching. Klay’s got 21, five threes. Make him work for it. “

Over the final 33-and-a-half minutes, the Warriors scored just 58 points. Klay Thompson scored two more points, and zero after half-time. Switch: flipped.

The Warriors remain the pre-eminent test for NBA defenses. Not because they are still the league’s most fearsome offense, but because the Dubs exist to force mistakes. Splash Bro Ridiculousness aside, Golden State’s buckets are often the result of clear defensive breakdowns. Sure, it’s hardly a sin to overcommit to Steph Curry and let his screener slip to the rim, but mistakes are mistakes, and the Warriors give defenses ample opportunity to make them.

In Sunday’s contest, Denver either didn’t take the bait, or hastily covered their tracks. In doing so, their defense took the shape of their offense; Nikola Jokić led the way, and his teammates were everywhere they were supposed to be.

This started, naturally, on Steph Curry’s pick-and-rolls. With Jokić in the action, the Nuggets showed two to the ball as many teams do, but with a wrinkle. In an effort to prevent some of the 4-on-3 mastery that Draymond Green has long showcased, Denver had Curry’s defender go under the screen to jam Green before recovering to Curry. Watch Kentavious Caldwell-Pope body Green up before stealing the ball here:

In order to throw two bodies at Curry and slow down Green’s prolific short-roll ability, the Joker had to hold up on one of the toughest individual covers in the world. At least, for the split-second after Curry sees Green isn’t an immediate release valve and thinks he has space to attack, a scary proposition for a seven-footer.

Here, Jokić doesn’t fall for Curry’s hesitation move and forces a change-of-direction back toward an oncoming KCP, which results in a turnover:

Caldwell-Pope was characteristically terrific on D, whether it was nailing off-ball switches or going under these ball-screens while still providing pressure.

So too was Aaron Gordon, AKA chicken soup for Michael Malone’s soul. How easy it must be to trap ball-screens with Jokić when Gordon is on the back-line, capable of both recovering to the rim for a block…

…and recovering to the perimeter to make a textbook closeout, as the Nuggets ultimately stifle the 4-on-3 advantage Golden State spent a dynasty perfecting:

The Nuggets couldn’t prevent every 4-on-3 advantage for the Dubs — the accepted cost of trapping/hedging vs Curry — but Gordon consistently de-escalated those situations.

Yet, it was Nikola Jokić who played the role of Denver’s biggest neutralizer.

Players like Sabrina Ionescu and James Harden, both possessing outlier hand-eye coordination but regarded as poor defenders for the majority of their careers, don’t suddenly lose their athletic ability when defending their basket. For all their flaws on that end of the floor, each can rack up deflections, using that same skillset that allows them to be such prolific off-the-dribble shooters on offense.

Nikola Jokić is cut from the same cloth, but has turned it up a notch. The notion that he is a negative defender is long gone. Are we surprised that his singular feel for the game is now apparent on both ends of the court?

Draymond Green just had to learn the hard way. Here, Big Honey punks Green in a vaunted 2-on-1 opportunity, feigning at his drive before breaking up the lob, forcing a turnover:

The Warriors had won that possession. A high ball-screen for Curry in early offense created the roll opportunity Denver had been trying to eliminate all night: Green storming downhill unimpeded, with a lob threat in the dunker spot. We’ve seen this movie on an infinite loop, but Jokić changed the ending.

Denver forced Golden State’s hand. Not only is Jokić now nimble enough to run aggressive schemes on the perimeter, but he has defenders like Aaron Gordon and Kentavious Caldwell-Pope to fill the gaps. Let him roam around the basket, and the mistakes Golden State forces don’t amount to much. Slip your little off-ball screens, sure, and slip right into the hands of Nikola Jokić:

The defining sequence of the game — and perhaps this new era of Western Conference supremacy — came with eight minutes left in the fourth quarter. The Nuggets led by five points, and each coach had subbed their big guns back in for the stretch run. Curry and Green checked in, as did Jokić and Caldwell-Pope.

As Golden State got into the meat of their out-of-timeout play, Curry floated off a flare screen from Trayce Jackson-Davis. Green watched Caldwell-Pope get caught on said screen, and passed it to a soon-to-be wide-open Curry.

Only, Jokić broke the rules. Green knew Jokić was too smart to get beat on the slip from Jackson-Davis, but didn’t consider the obviousness of that line of thinking. So the two-time MVP picked off Green’s pass and headed the other way to run a 2-on-1 fast-break against the greatest defender of his generation. The roles had been reversed, and the two basketball savants locked into a three-second chess match.

It was over before it started:

The Denver Nuggets still have it. Their defense is much like their offense, led by Nikola Jokić and capable of exploding for game-breaking stretches.

And of course, they’ll still dunk on you.

The post How the Denver Nugget Defense Dominates appeared first on Swish Theory.

On pace to win 65 games, they are running laps around the Eastern Conference. They hold the best net rating in the league and have established themselves as clear title favorites yet again. Boston has not reached these heights in the Jayson Tatum era, which is especially impressive for a team that has played at a 53-win pace since he was drafted.

But the whole regular season is treated as one big “yeah, but” due to their recent playoff failings. Four conference finals appearances in six years have produced just one Finals trip, a gut-punch loss to a Warriors team that was objectively inferior. Not even this level of regular season success can erase that from the minds of observers.

Their search for answers led to the acquisitions of Kristaps Porzingis and Jrue Holiday in the offseason, moving on from reigning 6MOY Malcolm Brogdon and fan icon/former DPOY Marcus Smart. Jrue fills in a lot of what Smart did (and didn’t) do, but Porzingis is a new element entirely for this team. Easily the most well-rounded Celtics big since Kevin Garnett, Porzingis is a player destined to be the swing factor in this title chase.

A major element of change he brings is the post-up game. Porzingis is why Boston has jumped from 24th in post-up frequency last season to 2nd this year. The efficiency has also jumped from 13th to tops in the league. Boston has struggled in the playoffs in large part due to massive offensive droughts, ones in which the team banks on 3-point reliance and fails to generate looks inside the arc. KP’s skills in the post may be the kind of slump-breaker they need when these droughts hit.

Let’s explore how Porzingis’ post-up skills have thrived in Boston.

The Numbers

Porzingis posts up 3.1 times per game, placing him 8th in the entire league. It’s the efficiency that stands out: his 1.40 points per possession leads all players averaging at least one post-up. Elite efficiency and high frequency add up to 4.3 points per game in the post, a mark eclipsed only by Joel Embiid, Nikola Jokic, and Anthony Davis. Not a bad list to be on.

I was curious about what fueled this success before I dove into the film. I tracked every possession by shot type to see where his strengths lie and it blew me away.

Leading the league in post-up efficiency when 70% of the shots are jumpers? Unbelievable. He’s making a remarkable 64% of those looks in addition to a 72% mark on his shots around the rim. How did Porzingis become so dangerous?

Lethal Shooting

This is the real lethal shooting. No moving rims covered in knives, just cold-blooded buckets.

The face-up jumper is the best weapon in his arsenal at a frightening 77.3%. His blend of body control, timing, and touch makes it nearly unguardable. Of course, being taller than every NBA player not named Victor Wembanyama is a huge boon.

Though not as deadly as the face-up shot, the turnaround is his preferred weapon. Porzingis is especially adept at turning over his left shoulder, often needing only one hand for a sort of turnaround push shot. At 56.3% it’s a high-quality part of his bag as well.

Seldom used, the step-back represents only 4.8% of his post-up shots, but it’s still something he can go to when needed. A little variety never hurts.

He’s a lot more than just a pretty jumper when it comes to his efficiency.

Prolific Foul Drawing

Of the 56 players posting up at least once per game, Porzingis has the top free throw rate at 31.7%. His positioning skills, quick release, and Inspector Gadget arms make it extremely difficult for opposing players to avoid contact. It’s very common for defenders to wrap him up when he is posting a mismatch. In addition to the wrap-ups, Porzingis draws plenty of fouls on his jump shot attempts.

There’s a lot more to his post game than just shooting the cover off the ball and drawing fouls. KP is a master of putting himself in positions to succeed, and I want to highlight how he generates optimal post-up chances.

A Master of Opportunism

Kristaps is quick to recognize his opportunities to post up, especially against mismatches. It’s not that teams are comfortable putting smaller defenders on him and living with the result. Porzingis works hard to force the opposing defense into giving him the mismatches he wants to take full advantage of.

Transition leakouts and cross-matching with early seals are a favorite trick of his:

This is how he gets the majority of his rim looks from the post. Get into deep position in transition, seal, then turn and finish before the rest of the defense can organize itself. Simple as that.

In the halfcourt, Porzingis loves to punish switching with his post game. A switch out of the pick and roll is his bread and butter:

Dribble handoffs are another way for Porzingis to force these switches and an equally effective one at that:

If teams are foolish enough to soft switch preemptively, he will feast:

Boston’s proclivity for a 5-out alignment means switching is inevitable, or else they will blow teams out of the water. They can try to take other things away come playoff time but the KP post-ups will be a constant threat. And though most of these looks are generated organically by the flow of the offense, coach Joe Mazzulla loves to sprinkle in some clever backscreen plays to open up chances, utilizing Derrick White‘s superior guard screening:

Come playoff time, these looks will be extremely difficult to take away from Porzingis, and the elite efficiency means a dependable source of offense is present even when all else fails. Not only does it serve to get him repeatable high-value looks, but it can kickstart the offense for the rest of the team.

Quality Post Playmaking

I don’t have access to assist numbers from the post (Second Spectrum, I want you.), but he is a quality post passer while keeping the turnovers down. He’s in the better half of turnover percentage among the aforementioned high-frequency post-up group. There are instances of poor reads or pass placement from the post, to be sure:

Porzingis is pretty good at recognizing opportunities, and even the basic passing reads can lead to easy offense for his teammates:

What impressed me the most was how he manipulated help shifting from the weak side to find shooters or cutters:

He’s no Jokic, but it’s playmaking that will suffice. It’s also an extremely important layer to safeguard his scoring. If you choose to double, he’ll make the right reads to get his teammates involved. If not, he’ll fry you with his jump shot or force a foul. A true pick-your-poison situation.

How Does This Change Boston’s Playoff Outlook?

Even if he scales up slightly in the postseason, the post-up offense he generates represents roughly 5% of their offensive output. It’s not suddenly going to be one of their primary methods of scoring.

What is crucial is when these touches come. When Boston inevitably hits a cold streak from deep, they have a reliable scoring option inside that doesn’t require a drive. They can also play inside-out from their 5-out alignments through his post-ups, generating better looks to help break their slump. It also presents an interesting late-game option. As an alternative to Jayson Tatum’s crunch time “Hey look at me I’m Kobe!” moments, a Porzingis post-up is a viable high-quality look.

As previously mentioned, it’s extremely hard to take post-ups out of the equation entirely. Boston will have an attainable and efficient look at their disposal even in the most dire cold streaks. Margins are thin in the postseason as we know. A timely post jumper here, a kickout there, and a cold streak ended now and then could be the difference in a game, a series, or a title run. You never know.

The post Kristaps Porzingis’ Post-Up Excellence appeared first on Swish Theory.

No, it’s not “fire Kerr”, “trade Klay”, “European bigs” or “affordable housing”. It’s two timelines.

We know it didn’t work. The youth gave a minimal boost at best to the 2022 championship team, and the sheer volume of developmental roster spots arguably cratered the 2022-23 season. Trades were made, roster spots were consolidated, but still, the Warriors struggled to get production from the youth.

This season marks a turning point, all from the back of one man. Jonathan Kuminga‘s breakout as a legitimate second scoring option. That breakout stems from one word: drive.

I wanted to explore what has…driven this breakout, the only way I know how: watching every drive of Jonathan Kuminga’s career and tracking his development in four key areas: handling, finishing craft, midrange counters, and creating for teammates. I’ll work through each category in chronological order, starting from his rookie year up until the present day. So, let’s get going.

Handling

If you watched rookie year Kuminga, you can probably guess where this starts.

He was legitimately one of the worst handlers I’ve seen. Dribbling off his foot, failing to read help, losing the ball when the momentum got away from him. All that could go wrong did go wrong.

The turnover numbers certainly could have been worse: his 7.2% turnover rate on drives was in the range of James Harden, LeBron James, Luka Doncic, and many other stars. It’s the context of the turnovers that hurts: Kuminga was a low pass percentage player on the drive, and wasn’t creating a lot of offense for himself either. One turnover for every 4 baskets made is not ideal.

He had one handle play he could count on: the spin move. It was the one thing he had some semblance of control over, and he used it so often it would make Pascal Siakam blush.

You can see the flashes of advantage creation with his handle. Driving with the intent to draw help and spin away is huge, and he thrived while doing it at full speed. These were still simple reads and handle plays on the whole, and it wasn’t all sunshine and roses when he went into the spin cycle:

The slow spins were pretty rough. He failed to create advantages and was often trapped into bad shots or turnovers. Even with the majority of the spin results being positive, one good move does not a solid driver make.

Beyond the spins, most of his handle successes were 2-3 dribbles in a straight drive. There’s something to be said for a lack of wasted movement, but when that’s just about all you can do, it’s concerning.

But I did want to note one particular play, a foreshadowing of sorts for his handle development:

That body control and awareness combination – a running stop without traveling AND the well-timed fake – was a small sign of what was to come.

Moving to his sophomore season, his bag of tricks grew exponentially. To be sure, he still used the spin move to a high degree:

You can see the development in his methods with the spin. Incorporating fakes, changes of pace, a drop step on the finish. All of this requires a higher level of footwork and ball control in addition to the fast processing speed as he reads the defense.

Other tendencies remained. His propensity for travels contributed to an increased turnover rate on the drive, up 2.1% from his rookie season:

Despite this, the good in his handling started to outweigh the bad. Kuminga began to challenge himself, chaining multiple moves to create better advantages while cutting down on the careless lost ball turnovers. He created an impressive set of dribbling highlights in comparison to what he produced in that first season.

There were still the “oh no” moments, to be sure, but they were fewer and further between.

It’s also worth noting that the quality of his straight-line drives increased. He powered through digs and nail help, even bigs being placed on him, to get the looks he wanted.

With the handle tightening up, we got to see more of his power/speed combination on display. Put too slow or too weak of a wing/forward on him and he can dust them. Put a big on him daring him to shoot, he goes right around them. It’s the beginning of a serious defensive conundrum; all he needs is to add consistency.

Year three brought that longed-after handle consistency. Chaining moves, mixing up his looks and speeds, and keeping the handle-based turnovers way down.

The sheer volume of unguardable drives also increased. He began to exert his will over opposing defenders, some of whom are known for their defense:

There are still issues, to be sure. He has cut down on the travels this season but they remain, and he’ll lose his handle from time to time or have a rough gather affect his finish.

The development in this department cannot be ignored. He went from simple 2-3 dribble drives and constant, predictable spin moves to move combinations, maintaining balance with good footwork, and manipulating defenders with his dribble. By and large, Kuminga will be able to physically overwhelm defenders with his athletic tools. There will be situations where more advanced dribbling is called for to create advantages, and he is beginning to seize those opportunities.

Getting yourself to the rim is one thing. What happens when he gets there?

Finishing Craft

This is another area in which Kuminga has grown by leaps and bounds. Much like his rookie-year handling, the finishing was generally ugly and inconsistent.

Jumping off the wrong foot, using the wrong hand, not aligning himself into the shot leading to bad mechanics. A lot of major red flags. It only got uglier when he tried more complex footwork patterns in his finishing, like drop steps or drag steps.

Finishing with the left was a clear issue. Too often he tried to force it with his right hand in situations that called for the left or tried to adjust a drive to get to his right when the left presented the better option. But he did have some solid flashes with his right, showcasing a baseline level of coordination on the move.

Kuminga managed a solid 58.4% finishing rate on his drives, but if anything this was a reflection of how easy the majority of his drives were. 2-3 dribbles and a dunk were prevalent outcomes, especially when considering the bigs or slower wings that were tasked with guarding him. It’s not to take away from his skill – excelling at the easy stuff is important – but it left lots of wanting.

Going into his sophomore season, the finishing numbers dropped tremendously to 51.3%. This, however, is not an indication of a decline in finishing skill. It was a sign of pushing harder to get tough finishes.

The volume of his straight-line drives went down, replaced with tougher finishing angles after more complex dribble moves. As covered earlier, his turnover rate also rose during this season – another confirmation of the increased difficulty present in the film.

In a strange twist, the disparity between his righty and lefty finishing grew larger – in favor of the left. He displayed a lot of good touch with the left throughout the season:

A greater control over his body was leading to better results. His momentum was contained, he could pick better angles off the glass, and slow himself just enough to get soft finishes instead of clunkers.

It was the strong hand finishes dragging him down. Some of this was a product of the defense; at times they would dare him to finish left in single coverage, but sent major weak side help if he managed to penetrate the paint going right:

A major part of that increased difficulty on his drives was the increase in finishing moves he applied. Instead of spamming the spin button repeatedly, Kuminga mixed a healthy set of drop steps, drag steps, pump fakes and hesitation moves to unsettle his defenders.

Of course, some spins were still mixed in.

You’re probably wondering “Hey, this all looks great, but why the drastic drop in production?”. Well, there were a LOT of finishes that didn’t quite work out despite his best efforts.

What was important to me was that he was trying things. Development isn’t a process of doing the same things over and over until they’re perfect. Development is polishing those things that are good while working on those that are bad. So, you have to power through a LOT of bad to get to the good.

This process of trying things led to another important development: serious foul-drawing potential. With Kuminga putting together more consistent drives and drawing the attention of the defense, on-ball and help defenders alike chose to hack him down instead of allowing a finish. For the second straight season, Kuminga finished tops on the deal in percentage of fouls on the drive amongst rotation players with more than 2 drives per game.

Those final two clips are the most important to me. Pressing an advantage on a line drive and getting hacked is one thing. Using fakes and hesitations to get defenders off-balance or in the air and forcing the contact? That’s an important tool in the bag of an elite driver.

Now that we’ve seen the increase in difficult finishing tries and foul-drawing techniques, let’s see how he has put it together this season.

In the current season, Kuminga has risen to new heights of efficiency mixed with increased difficulty. His 57% finishing mark on the drive is not only a 6% increase from the previous season, but it also leads all Warriors players who get at least one drive per game. He’s also second on the team in personal fouls drawn per drive, with only Dario Saric beating him there.

Another important mark is the rise of his right-handed finishing. It jumped over 6% to sit at 50% for the year, nearly equaling his 51% mark with the left. It’s been great to see him power through increased defensive help on his stronger side and convert tough finishes.

Kuminga’s growing awareness has led to better finishing outcomes in many ways. His quick floor reads have led to an increase in “catch and go” possessions, where JK scans the floor to see an opportunity to drive off the catch and poises himself to take off as soon as the ball hits his hands. That gives extra fractions of a second before his defenders can turn to contain the drive.

It’s all coming together from a finishing and foul-drawing standpoint. You can see the complex moves to draw contact mixed with tough finishes:

His points percentage on the drive has reflected this. His rookie season, full of easy line drives, recorded a 77.4% mark. That dipped to 60.2% in his sophomore year, yet another reflection of the increased difficulty and defensive attention he garnered. Now, with all of those strenuous factors still at play, he has risen back to 77.2%.

To put that in context, 116 players in the league match or exceed his mark of 5.6 drives per game. Kuminga places ninth of all those players. Here’s a snapshot of who has him beat:

That’s your last 3 MVPs, another former MVP, and a whole bunch of All-NBA/All-Star players in front (Alpie, you were robbed!). I’d say that’s good company.

We covered the development in his handle, and the finishing has risen to match it. He went from struggling with complex dribbles and finishes to pulling them off with relative ease in only two years. Now he finds himself as one of the elite players at generating points off the drive.

But there is more to this than how you get to the rim, or what happens when you get there.

Midrange Counters

This has always been a very important aspect of driving to me, even if less so for wings/bigs.

Once a player gets past the three-point line on a drive, there are essentially three ways it can go: rim attempt, midrange attempt, or pass attempt. Knowing what the driving player is capable of dictates how the defense will play them. If only a rim attempt is likely, the whole defense will load up the paint. The midrange as a counter move can buy extra time for the driver to read the help. It also offers an alternative to the rim if the paint is loaded and no passing options are available.

(We will get to the importance of the passing aspect later; don’t fret.)

I don’t think it is reductive to say Jonathan Kuminga is a rim-first driver. He should be, in all honesty; what midrange attempt or kickout pass brings more value than a guy finishing 75% of his rim looks? But if that’s the *only* thing he threatens to do off the drive, it makes things quite difficult to generate those shots. Therefore the midrange is a necessity for the development of his rim pressure.

You could probably guess that the midrange was a bit ugly in his rookie season. Results were poor overall – 34% in the short midrange (26th percentile) and 5/11 on long twos. To be sure, there were some decent-looking possessions and he had confidence in his shot:

Ugliness was the dominant result, however, especially when it came to floaters. He simply did not have the touch for one-handed shots on the move, and the majority of his movement twos looked similar:

But the signs of life were there. He was willing to try and understood to some degree that a balance between the rim and the midrange had to be found. Even without good results, Kuminga rated in the 42nd percentile of midrange frequency in that rookie season. It was a threat, but not a convincing one. Compared to his rim looks, the midrange was a dull knife next to a katana.

The knife was sharpened a bit during his sophomore year. The confidence remained and the results looked a bit better; his short midrange jumped up 9 points to 43%, a 58th percentile mark. A rise in frequency was a welcome sign to boot – midrange shots went from a 24% to 29% share of his total shot profile, while three-point attempts dropped. Increased volume and efficiency is tough to pull off for *any* shot type, but especially the midrange since they are nearly all self-created.

He especially got comfortable with the turnaround over his right shoulder. It was an easily repeatable and often available shot. Kuminga seemed to be more settled physically when shooting the midrange; it felt less forced and more mechanically sound. This led to more soft-touch rolls on his shots, contributing to better results.

However, the floater still refused to come along for the ride. There were makes, but they looked awkward and with poor footwork/body alignment. The vast majority of the looks ended up looking like this:

Still, he tried much harder for those shots. Floater attempts became a bigger part of his game. He was on a similar track to his rookie season: take a lot of attempts and process the failures to deliver better results later on. He wasn’t just missing shots, he was collecting data in the process.

Now, the current season. Once again we see a huge jump in frequency, this time from 29% to 36%. That is an 86th percentile frequency amongst all wings. Paired with his 85th percentile rim frequency, you’re now looking at a player seeking to dominate at the first two levels.

Another important development in frequency is the number of long twos. 11 attempts in his rookie year were followed by 20 in his sophomore season. You could call it an increase, but at that level, it could have been a simple scaling up in shot attempts. He’s up to 38 attempts in this current season and still has 29 games left to add to it. Now we have a trend.

He took major steps in the variety of his midrange looks as well while seeing comparable success in terms of his makes (42% last year to 43% this year). There was a lot more variety beyond the right shoulder turnaround. He could comfortably pull up left and right, use the step-back, put defenders in jail, turnaround left, whatever you wanted.

It’s becoming a thing of beauty. He’s mixing increased volume, solid efficiency, and a deepening arsenal of moves to greatly advance his scoring profile.

Here’s a snapshot of forwards that can match Kuminga’s midrange frequency (35+%) and efficiency (43+%) with more than 200 midrange attempts: Kevin Durant, DeMar DeRozan, Tobias Harris, Paul George, Jimmy Butler, Julius Randle, and Mikal Bridges. That’s some damn good company for midrange success.

This success has enabled him to add further layers: drawing/baiting fouls in the midrange, using pump fakes and step-throughs to get himself to the line.

It never hurts to snatch some reliable points by getting your defender up in the air. His processing speed has grown by leaps and bounds in so many respects this season.

In addition to the massive gains in his midrange success, the floater showed real signs of life:

The additional confidence (and success) with his floater has done a lot for his midrange success, especially around the restricted area. Not only does it enable his short midrange frequency, but boosts the array of moves he can pull to keep defenders off-balance when anticipating his finishes.

As we saw with his handling and finishing development, Jonathan Kuminga was already a tough cover. Adding this level of prolific midrange shotmaking brings him to a new level of danger. The only forwards in the league that can match his driving and midrange efficiency? Kevin Durant and Kawhi Leonard. End list.

There is a last category, however; one that brings him down a rung.

Creating for Teammates

This part gets ugly. We’ll just rip the Band-Aid off.

Only one player posted a worse rate of passing out of drives (3+ per game) and assist percentage than rookie Jonathan Kuminga: Jaren Jackson Jr. The film asserts what the stats say. He couldn’t handle more than the most obvious reads, and even many of those were a struggle.

Here are his best plays made off the drive that season:

No, really. Highlights.

Then, you have the lowlights:

Bad footwork. Late reads, or entirely missed ones. Poor pass placement and body control. He checked all the telltale signs for a player struggling to catch up with the speed of the game. Picking up two turnovers for every assist on the drive was a tough scene.

It got somewhat better in his sophomore year. The passing rate on the drive increased (27.4% to 33.7%) and the assist rate jumped (3.4% to 11.0%) while the turnover rate increased modestly (7.2% to 9.3%). Much like his driving to the rim and midrange, he scaled in volume with increased success while not letting some bad results get in the way of him trying.

There were still plenty of bad turnovers on the drive and processing issues, to be sure:

This was balanced with better execution of simple reads: kicks to the near and far corner/wing, dunker spot finds, reading cutters or open shooters in space. It’s not impressive playmaking, but beats the hell out of no playmaking.

So it would seem his playmaking is on the up and up. But as I’ve stressed in previous articles, development is not linear, and his playmaking off the drive has crashed back out in the current season.

This season, he’s back at the bottom of pass rate (26%) and assist rate (2.8%) with – guess who! – Jaren Jackson Jr. To some credit, he’s cut down on the turnover rate (9.3% to 8.3%) but it’s nothing to write home about with that playmaking drop.

The bad pass placement could have been expected, but it seemed like he was less active in reading the help and has been prone to lazy turnovers. Despite the scoring heights he has reached the current season, the playmaking on the drive has clearly regressed.

Another problem with his drive playmaking has cropped up: running into an excessive amount of charges. Failing to read the help and carelessly running into turnovers feels like rookie-year behavior, not the player we have seen this year.

The most frustrating part is that he still put on the flashes of a solid passer, and even showed a better sense of how to manipulate the help on the drive to get higher-quality looks for teammates:

It was a question of consistent effort on Kuminga’s part, not a true regression of skill. If anything, the gap between his good and bad playmaking widened. The problem is that the bad once again outweighed the good.

This lack of consistent playmaking for others, especially considering the driving gravity he will draw, could become a major limitation of his star status. It’s something I’ll keep a close eye on as we track his trajectory.

Wrapping Up

It’s clear through the tape and stat mix that Kuminga’s development in handling, finishing, and midrange scoring has taken a major leap, all contributing to huge success on the drive. There are obvious playmaking concerns that loom large over this, but he has all the time in the world. He won’t turn 22 until next season. And don’t forget he went from utterly inept on the drive to borderline dominant in the span of 2.5 seasons.

Parts of this article may come off as overly critical and expectant for a player his age. That was partially my intent. He has put himself into a stratosphere of offensive performance that demands expectations for further development. When your game grows this quickly, why would it stop? We (the fans, the analysts, the team, Kuminga himself) all want the same thing. To see his game kick into an even higher gear, and the next one after that. And the next one. And the next one…

The post Jonathan Kuminga’s Drive to Stardom appeared first on Swish Theory.

Still, no handshake is complete without a wink. Your project could cut the line. Maybe the prognosticators were wrong. Maybe all he needs is a summer of professional weight-lifting and nutrition plans to flash potential and production at 19 years old. You never know.

Well, we found out pretty quickly with Scoot Henderson. He is nearly a lock to finish his rookie season dead-last in the NBA in eFG% and TS%, among qualified players. The Portland Trail Blazers go from bad to awful — getting outscored by just under 11 points per 100 — when Scoot takes the court. His early play was littered with missed shots and turnovers that just didn’t look right, quickly quieting the noise around the #3 overall pick:

The winking eye has faded, and what remains are the harsh realities of life as an NBA point guard who just turned 20. Disappointed? Perhaps. But should we be worried?

Jumper Watch

To answer that, we first have to talk about the jumper, his biggest pre-draft question mark. Scoot settled into his rookie year All-Star break shooting 31% from deep and somewhere between 33% and 34% on mid-range attempts. No matter where you get your statistics, the numbers tell a story of a broken shot.

Hold off, though, on declaring doomsday. It depends which of Scoot’s Jekyll-and-Hyde jumpers we’re talking about. If it’s the all-too common version where his energy transfer is corrupted by an exaggerated knee-bend, then yes. It’s broken:

After exerting so much energy to just get off the ground, — damn-near doing a squat — Scoot has little left for, you know, the actual shot attempt. It’s a symptom of poor lower-body organization, and it can manifest in other ways; he has one foot on red and one foot on green here:

The optimist’s case is quite easy to make: When Scoot gives himself a chance, he can shoot the rock. When his lower body complies, you expect the league’s least efficient scorer to knock it down. Even on a pound-dribble, side-step three:

Of course, slightly more power is required for deeper shots, but in general: The closer Scoot’s load-up looks to this, the better.

That’s the diagnosis on one of the worst jump-shooters in the NBA, but what’s the prognosis? Well, considering the raw numbers, it’s quite positive. The optimist has evidence of Scoot confidently step into sound pull-up threes when defenders duck under screens.

After a 2-of-21 start from deep in his first first five games, an ankle injury sidelined the young guard. Since his subsequent absence, Scoot is shooting a respectable 34% from deep. Overall, Scoot is making an eye-opening 35.2% of his threes off-the-dribble, but an also eye-opening 26.9% of his catch-and-shoot attempts. He is far more comfortable walking into pull-ups with the ball in hand, planning those steps to make sure nothing goes awry. This looks pretty good!

Anecdotally, his mechanics feel more consistent in recent weeks, though we still haven’t seen a percentage-boosting hot streak. I can’t, uh, spit on your head and tell you it’s raining by declaring that one of the NBA’s worst jump-shooters is actually a sniper, but there are signs of life.

Scoot will have ample opportunity — whether on or off the ball — to catch that heater. As you can see, defenders don’t show him a ton of respect beyond the arc.

The Magic is There

Or maybe it’s a form of respect. See, Scoot still displays the talent that Portland ultimately swung on. No matter how much space a defender puts between himself and Henderson, a minor slip-up still means Scoot is gone. Lu Dort learned this lesson the hard way, twice beat by a Scoot special: a ball-screen rejection:

The young man had us worried to start the year. Not about his athleticism or even ball-handling skills, but his advantage-perception. Scoot looked like a victim of overtraining. He had come from the shadowy G League Ignite and had every move in the bag. But in the fall, it looked like those moves were drilled into his muscle memory by high-level trainers and coaches, practiced on cones and chairs. Applying them against live bodies proved difficult.

The results were often ugly, like the offensive foul that led off this article, occasionally innocuous. Take this pseudo-Smitty that goes nowhere:

Did Scoot think Isaac Okoro was still on his hip, or that Evan Mobley was going to lunge at him? That would have been a nasty counter, if so, but Scoot reached in his bag for a solution that didn’t apply.

In the new year, that’s happened less frequently. Here, Dillon Brooks and Jock Landale think conservative ball-screen coverage is a piece of cake until they get hit with an evil, downhill tween/in-n-out combo:

Scoot’s shooting remains a concern, even for optimists. There’s talent to work with, and it does feel as if the lower-body organization has improved over the year. But until Scoot starts truly making more shots, those are words of affirmation rather than evidence points.

However, his driving has improved over his first half-season. He’s often more explosive than his matchup, but now he’s busting out appropriate, high-level dribble sequences to get by defenders. Throw in a consistent jump-shot (or, sigh, a real DeAndre Ayton screen) and this skill pops even more. But if there’s one worry that’s been quelled, it’s Scoot bringing the offensive goods at the point-of-attack. He’s gonna live in the paint; it’s not the first layer of defense that bothers him.

The Launch Pad

It’s the second and third. Ever the swing skill for young guards, Scoot picks the ball up too early on most his drives. His handle, impressive and aggressive in space, freezes up in the presence of even light help defense, and his shots at the rim are often unreasonably difficult.

When Scoot gets to the launch-pad, about ten or 12 feet from the basket, that’s it. He’s picking the dribble up and taking off, whether it’s off one foot or two. Even for a flammable, long-armed athlete like him, it’s too much:

Scoot is now taking 38% of his shots at the rim, per Cleaning the Glass. That’s a Ja Morant figure; he’s living around the cylinder. But he is only making 46% of these attempts, firmly in basement-territory. It doesn’t add up until you turn on the tape. Weak digs, stunts, defenders on hips, and big bodies in front of him abort his dribble. This one isn’t egregious, but the 6’2″ draft jewel should be able to dribble low through this nonchalant Jokić dig:

Aside from depressing his finishing numbers, Scoot’s launch-pad tendencies have blinded him from the weak-side. He views the second defender he inevitably attracts as a challenge, a big body to finish over, rather than a sign that someone is open on the other side of the floor:

Sure, these potential kick-outs aren’t glaringly obvious, and all are fairly late-developing plays. But through 43 games, Scoot hasn’t made many of these last-second decisions, or rather, adjustments on his drives. He’s set on taking a floater or layup once he picks the ball up, and thus, his decision-making window is real tight. There is currently little read-and-react to his game inside 15-feet.

Listen. Scoot is getting into that lane and drawing help defense, the ultimate point-guard building block. And yes, this seems like a correctable habit. But isn’t it mildly concerning that seeing multiple defenders doesn’t trigger passing instincts like, ‘Hey, I just left Jae Crowder in the dust, and I’m looking at Giannis Antetokounmpo preparing to meet me at the rim. Someone must be open!’

That’s why this play, from an early February game against the Denver Nuggets, put a big smile on my face. Scoot progresses to the fourth pick-and-roll read (shot -> roll -> corner skip -> slot), reading not just the low-man, but the second weak-side defender as well.

We can work on the passing accuracy later.

Scoot Henderson hasn’t proven he can’t do anything. Sure, he’s struggled to shoot the ball, but not because he doesn’t have the requisite touch. When he takes his jumper, it falls. What rookie doesn’t struggle with consistency and discipline?

And indeed, the show-stopping skill has arrived as promised. Albeit in bits and pieces, but still, pretty damn big bits and pieces. There were bumps in the road and there will be more, but even disrespectful defenders have a tough time keeping Scoot in front. He works around ball-screens — even those set by Ayton — like a veteran, mixing in patience with the signature explosion and handle that make the whole experience worth it.

Here’s a boring conclusion: Scoot Henderson is mostly just living the life of a young NBA point guard. His defense is nothing to write home about, fairly competitive on the ball but sleepy off of it. He’ll laze into an upright stance, preceding a late rotation or a non-threatening closeout. So, rookie stuff.

Still, this is a lot of rookie stuff for such a touted point-guard prospect, no matter how young he is. Do we have to recalibrate our expectations for Scoot after going #3 overall threw them out of wack, or should we be worried? There are not just undeniable positives from his first four months in the league, but growth too. Is it appropriate to pounce on them, or is it grasping for straws, being too lenient on a player who has struggled mightily in his rookie season?

For now, worry is a bridge too far. But a healthy mix of concern and intrigue? Nervous excitement? That sounds more like it.

The post The Scoot Report: Checking in on the NBA’s Premier Point Guard Prospect appeared first on Swish Theory.

Taken 17th overall in the 2019 draft, NAW has been the “also, this guy” in three separate trades, once on draft night and twice at the deadline. Struggling with injuries and offensive consistency, he has bounced between middling New Orleans and Utah teams before finding himself in Minnesota as part of the three-team D’Angelo Russell/Mike Conley/Russell Westbrook deal.

That Minnesota team was nothing special, still figuring out a Gobert/KAT/Ant identity while getting bounced in the first round by the eventual champion Denver Nuggets. Now they find themselves atop a bloodbath of a Western Conference to the surprise of many.

Boasting a defense that is tops in the league has kept this team thriving. There are the obvious defensive anchors (Rudy Gobert and Jaden McDaniels) but NAW has provided another elite defensive presence to their rotation. So, how did Nickeil Alexander-Walker go from being passed around like a blunt amongst middling teams to a crucial link in the armor of a contender? Let’s take a look.

Offensive Overview

Though not the finer part of his game, Alexander-Walker has made notable improvements in both results and mindset throughout his time in Minnesota. A lot of this comes from role realignment and shot distribution.

Before this season, 66% of NAW’s two-pointers and 12% of his threes were self-created. That has fallen to 48% and 3% respectively, a sign of a player having a self-creation burden taken away. This has led to a career-best efficiency from inside the arc (53.8%) and a three-point shooting mark well above his career norm (37% to 33.9%).

Looking at his shot chart gives a better idea of what this optimized off-ball role looks like for him:

Threes and layups baby. Daryl Morey would pitch a tent just looking at this.

Minnesota’s set of playmakers is not ideal, but more than enough for NAW to get the looks he needs. They have scorers that command the attention of the defense (Anthony Edwards, Karl-Anthony Towns) and strong connective playmakers (Mike Conley, Kyle Anderson) that help to keep the ball moving once advantages are created.

So how exactly does Nickeil capitalize on those advantages?

Confident Shooting

Despite being roughly league-average from distance, Alexander-Walker has a whole lot of faith in his shot. And that is a good thing when 2/3rds of your shots come there.

To be a good catch-and-shoot player, a lot more goes into it beyond “stand there and fire when ready.” It’s basketball, not trench warfare: you have to keep moving to stay productive. Alexander-Walker has taken a lot of steps (literally and figuratively) to become a more productive shooter by relocating often.

His 1.16 points per possession mark on catch-and-shoot jumpers is more than palatable for a defense-first guy. Being solid from deep also opens up a lot for NAW as a closeout attacker, which has especially benefited his midrange game.

He’s got some craft beyond a straightaway pull-up two. NAW likes getting into spinning turnaround jumpers, and they look quite good when he’s rolling.

Being able to pick and choose his PU2 spots in Minnesota as opposed to forcing them during his other stints has led to remarkable efficiency. Alexander-Walker is cashing in 55% (!!!) of his midrange looks this year, a 98th percentile mark amongst wings. Even if it only represents 1/6th of his shot diet that can be a huge swing factor come playoff time.

And it’s not the only part of his game being buoyed by his shooting.

Tough Drives, Middling Finishing

If a defender sells too hard to deny him the perimeter shot, Alexander-Walker is pretty good at putting the ball on the deck a couple of times and getting a shot at the rim.

Getting a clean angle because of the closeout and pressing that advantage is one thing. Beyond that, there are a lot of issues with his drives and finishing.

Don’t get me wrong: Alexander-Walker is capable of a solid drive and finish. I’ve seen it!

But there is a lot of rough stuff, namely concerning his handle.

Fast and loose is a fine line to walk with your dribble skill. Alexander-Walker tends to fall on the wrong side of that line. It’s a large reason why he has a 19th-percentile turnover rate amongst wings.

There’s a general trend of poor offensive coordination that shows up in his finishing skill as well. Some of it is a mindset thing – Alexander-Walker tries too hard for creative finishes. On the bright side, when he fails spectacularly, it’s rather entertaining.

Walker does make up for some of this rim-finishing concern with his cutting. He’s pretty heady about picking spots and finding space to exploit, and they usually result in much easier finishes.

Yet all of this does not add up to a good rim finisher. He’s sitting at 60% on the season – a 34th percentile mark. This more or less leaves Alexander-Walker as a 2-level scorer. More like 1.5 when you consider he’s just average from three and no longer doing self-creation from there.

Though NAW does have limitations as a scorer, he makes up for it somewhat with his playmaking skill.

Pinch Playmaking

Nickeil’s time spent as a combo guard at the beginning of his career has translated well as he moves to a wing role. As his usage has scaled down, he still finds ways to keep the rock moving constructively. NAW boasts a 77th percentile assist rate in addition to a 1.06 assist/usage ratio, a 95th percentile mark.

He’s not often the guy to begin the creation chain and force the defense into rotation, but can do it when called upon.

Alexander-Walker is especially adept at making the wrap pass to the corner when help comes to defend the pick-and-roll. It’s one of his most common reads in PNR and he executes often.

What he’s mostly good for as a playmaker is pressing the advantages created by others. With the defense in rotation, Alexander-Walker will keep that advantage pressed and make some pretty solid reads.

Similar to his driving and finishing attempts, Alexander-Walker likes to get spicy with his attempts. Sometimes it’s glorious.

But more often he gets himself in trouble by doing too much. The jump passes in particular are problematic.

So, he’s no Tyrese Haliburton. But I’d rather have the guy who tries too hard than not hard enough.

The potential growth areas offensively are pretty simple. Better finishing craft on the drive and reining in the turnovers would take him from a more or less average scoring guard to an above average one, if not a good one. As always with development, skill issues are far easier to fix than physical ones. NAW is only 25 years old and possessed with fantastic athleticism, so there is plenty of ceiling for him to reach.

And considering how good he is on the other end of the floor, being average offensively still makes him a damn good player.

Defensive Overview

A major theme in Alexander-Walker’s offensive game is chaos. When it comes to the defensive end that chaos becomes incredibly controlled and extremely impactful.

Some numbers before we dig into the film: NAW sits at a 91st percentile block percentage for wings (astounding considering he is undersized somewhat for a wing) and an 84th percentile steal rate. His D-EPM, perhaps the best catch-all star around, ranks eighth in the ENTIRE league. It’s the top mark amongst all wings (or third amongst guards, depending on how you view his position). That’s All-Defense level production, and he should be heavily considered for that honor come season’s end.

There’s one skill in particular that gets him to that level:

Elite Hands

The blocks stat probably indicates that NAW is a guy who can launch and meet a shot in the air. And, granted, he is capable of that:

A large majority of those blocks come from his strips as the shot is going up. It’s hard to differentiate which are steals and which are blocks at times, but regardless the ball is gone before the handler/shooter/roller has a chance to do anything with it.

Stripping perimeter shooters, guys posting him up, and even rotating over to get a strip on a roller or cutter. That’s unbelievable stuff. Hands like these would make Andre Iguodala proud.

It’s not just the skill of stripping shots and handles in clutch moments. Timing is everything. Alexander-Walker is particularly adept at blowing up PNR or DHO plays before they even have a chance to start.

Being a ballhandler or shooter going at NAW is akin to Anakin Skywalker on the platform on Mustafar. Obi-Walker is standing there, telling you “don’t try it”, yet they still do.

Even when he’s not cleanly erasing the play with his hands, Alexander-Walker does a great job at containment.

Perimeter Containment

With Rudy Gobert navigating the back line for Minnesota in a lot of NAW’s minutes, the job is simple: hold up as long as you can before the help arrives. Alexander-Walker excels at doing just that.

Point-of-attack defenders in today’s NBA rarely have the skill to completely shut down a drive by themselves. There is just too much talent to contain without the use of hand-checking. The job has changed: take away the easy shots and funnel your man into the help. Alexander-Walker understands the assignment and executes it to a T.

For his length and size, NAW is also quite good as a screen navigator. He knows how to get skinny and take the right angles to keep himself in the play, even if going around double drags:

Even when he takes the bigger wing assignments who want to post him up to create a size advantage, he’s damn good at containing those possessions by himself:

There are certainly weaknesses in his perimeter game. Some assignments are too quick for him to truly contain.

His physicality on drives can also get him in trouble from time to time. It’s no accident that NAW has a 34th percentile foul rate.

That’s the cost of doing business when you are a perimeter event creator and stopper. You have to toe the line of being overly physical at times. If a handler knows he’s going to take some contact when he creates an advantage against you, it makes them think twice about getting in your grill.

For an already dangerous Minnesota defense, the elite point-of-attack and stock threat coming from NAW puts them over the top as the best defense in the league.

Quality Rotations

Not only does Alexander-Walker do great work on the perimeter, he’s quite good in rotation.

We saw some of those earlier when he rotates to strip a roller or cutter. Even when he’s not creating a possession-ending play, he can do some great things.

I like his ability to dig or provide nail help from the wings. He knows his length and speed afford him time to take risks while not conceding open shots to the man he is helping off. Few players can help off Lauri Markkanen and not get burned by it:

Alexander-Walker also thrives as a low man. If his assignment is planted in the weak corner he has the timing and length to make a real difference when rotating over to the ball:

There are a lot of excellent point-of-attack defenders. Not all of them can be impact rotational defenders, which is a huge key. If the opponents know you are extremely hard to beat, they will choose to go after your teammates. If you can still impact the defense at a high level when off the ball, that’s how you solidify yourself as an elite perimeter guy.

I only have one gripe with his defense: the rebounding. NAW sits in the 1st percentile amongst wings for defensive boards. Only Gary Harris has posted a worse mark amongst wings. Gary is four years older, two inches shorter, and has three fewer inches on his wingspan. That’s not going to cut it for someone with his size and athleticism.

Granted, some of this is context. Playing alongside Rudy Gobert, Karl-Anthony Towns, and Naz Reid leaves few boards up for grabs. But he needs to step up as a rebounder to maximize these lineups. The top five lineups NAW plays with are 45th percentile or worse in defensive rebounding despite having two of those bigs on the floor. He needs to do more there.

Future Outlook

Only 25 years old and coming into his own, Nickeil Alexander-Walker has a very exciting future in this league.

He’s under contract for one more year in Minnesota at an extremely affordable rate. If they can keep this kind of defensive production up as a team, NAW will hit free agency in the theoretical prime of his career as an elite defensive piece and quality spacer/second-side creator. Contenders of all kinds will want him in their rotation as perimeter defense becomes a rare commodity.

If he takes further steps offensively to round out his rim pressure and playmaking, perhaps with a further shooting leap on the cards, he could be one of the better two-way guards around. It’s safe to say Alexander-Walker’s days of being “that other guy” in trades are over. He has arrived.

The post Finding a Role: Nickeil Alexander-Walker appeared first on Swish Theory.

As more and more talent clamors for spots among the 450, leashes grow shorter. Patience wears thin as the sheer number of options rises. Team context can give a bit more leash, or take it away entirely. It used to be that a first-round pick, especially those in or close to the lottery, would get second contracts even if struggles were present. Now the pressure mounts to decide if a second deal even comes.

Goga Bitadze was on track to become one of the forgotten men of the NBA. Taken with the 18th overall pick in 2019 by the Indiana Pacers, he immediately filled a position of need. Myles Turner was the only true center on the roster and was not exactly a roll man off screens or a prolific rebounder, two spots Goga was pegged to be positive in. Yet that did not develop, and two years later Indiana took a shot on Isaiah Jackson in the draft before buying low on Jalen Smith from the Phoenix Suns.

The writing was on the wall. Goga was not performing, Indiana now had options, and the leash had run out despite being a struggling team. That next year, Bitadze was waived around the deadline. He seemed destined to be remembered in NBA history by only an image:

Forgotten on draft night. Forgotten in the league. It’s a sad but all too familiar story in the modern NBA.

Then the Orlando Magic signed him, and Goga got a new lease on his NBA career.

Offensive Overview

A glance at Goga’s shot chart over the past 750 attempts may be misleading, but it speaks to his overall misuse in Indiana.

Over 170 games with the Pacers, he took roughly a third of his field goal attempts came from beyond the arc. He stayed in that offensive role despite shooting 25.6% from deep. That’s not going to fly, and neither does his shot; if anything, it thuds.

When the Magic got Goga in the building, the message was simple: “Hey man, stop that.”

43.7% of his Pacers attempts came beyond 10 feet. That number has plummeted to 9.1% in Orlando. Simplifying his offensive game has paid dividends for both the Magic and Goga himself. Focus on what you are good at, not what you could be good at.

This has led to some surprising results.

The Roll and Slam Man

Synergy has credited Goga with 1.3 points per possession as a roll man, a strong mark for a big. In an offense with two primary scoring threats (Franz Wagner and Paolo Banchero) the others are often ignored by the defense and forced to beat them. Bitadze is more than capable of good roll possessions when the defense is forced to key in on the ballhandler.

Even when running PNR with players who are less of a threat on the ball, Goga rolls with authority and can finish through contact with a full head of steam.

This ability to draw contact and finish lobs makes him a strong outlet for Orlando’s perimeter creators. He has, however, shown an ability to do more than just finish off the roll.

With Los Angeles mismatched on the above play, Goga seals the inside position off the roll, knowing this will draw help from Mason Plumlee. Chuma Okeke works in tandem by cutting into empty space where Bitadze finds him for an easy two.

Bitadze also knows when to take advantage of help being sent to cover his rolls, especially on empty side actions, and find perimeter options.

The playmaking ability Goga has shown is not elite by any means (56th percentile assist rate amongst bigs) but the ability to recognize gaps and opportunities has served him well in other areas.

Dribble Handoff Utility

I’ve always loved dribble handoffs more than pick-and-rolls. Part of that is the Warriors brain I grew up learning, but on a basic level, it is much easier for the screener and handler to make shoulder-to-shoulder contact. With a screener like Goga the more of an obstacle he can be the better.

With Orlando running a lot of creation through their 3 and 4 in Franz and Paolo, Goga’s physicality is needed to dislodge a player like Giannis Antetokounmpo from the ball. That creates a momentary 2v1 in the above possession where Brook Lopez has to guard the driving Franz while hedging against the lob or layoff pass behind him to Goga. Either way, it’s a great chance at two for Orlando, all created because of that contact at the point of the dribble handoff.

Another important aspect of a DHO is that just the thought of his contact will force the chasing defender to go over and create downhill opportunities. That threat alone is enough to create separation.

Goga is quite good at immediately taking the space that has been afforded to him. With Day’Ron Sharpe committing early to the Franz drive, Goga takes the space behind him to position himself for the layoff pass and dunk.

But there is far more craft to Goga’s DHO game than just being large and in the way.

He’s particularly adept at early slips, preempting the contact to get space through the defense. That is an important read-and-react tool for any DHO-running big to have.

That awareness also translates to faking the dribble handoff entirely, a skill that takes patience and the ability to recognize gaps in the defense if they oversell to take away the ballhandler.

Recognition of playmaking opportunities and processing speed, in addition to passing and a pinch of dribbling skill, makes Goga a fantastic operator of 5-out DHO actions. Bitadze has to evaluate options in rapid succession to take advantage of a spread-out defense. The results so far have been excellent.

Not only can Goga use the 5-out DHOs to open opportunities for himself, but for teammates as well.

It works in more layered actions to boot. Watch below how Paolo and Franz follow the same path, cutting through the middle before Jalen Suggs arrives as a third option.

This requires Goga to rapidly process the best options, and most importantly exercise patience. Instead of forcing it to Paolo or Franz he instead waits for further chances to develop and takes the safer route. That’s not to say he cannot make plays from 5-out though.

Goga is more than a simple roll-and-cut guy. This added utility as a dribble handoff man adds new layers. The ability to roll and score, set strong screens for others, and make the extra decisions and passes helps Orlando flow through their actions better. On a team lacking true depth of playmaking and scoring, this is a huge boon for the Magic.

And there are more ways he contributes to this offense.

Budding Glass Crasher

For the third straight season, Goga is posting an offensive rebounding rate at or above the 73rd percentile for big men. His bruising physicality and size make him a true force around the basket when a shot goes up.

Though very good at getting these offensive rebounds, the finishing tends to leave a bit to be desired. Goga tends to slap and bat at the ball to generally poor results.

There are still some instances where it works, to be sure. But this is a large reason why Goga’s rim numbers look so poor on the whole (31st percentile rim finishing). No question, however, that a few tip layup misses are better than a first-try defensive rebound.

Playmaking Flashes

Beyond the short roll and DHO passes we’ve seen, Goga surprised me as a playmaker from both the low and high post, and occasionally on the move. The bounce passes in particular have my attention.

Sometimes he chooses to get extra spicy with it. What is it with these European centers and their no-look passing?

The opportunities are rare, but Goga has shown an ability to make basic reads while on the move to keep the wheels greased.

Is Bitadze going to be the player you can consistently run the offense through to create advantages and make reads? Probably not. He doesn’t need to be. When the actions flow around him through the other handlers, he’s not a place where the possession goes to die. Surrounded by active cutters and possible shooters, Bitadze shows he can make enough plays to not be a drain without demanding usage, evidenced by his 77th percentile assist-to-usage ratio. That’s more than enough for Orlando’s purposes.

Growth Areas

As previously mentioned, the finishing is truly a mixed bag.

Sometimes Goga has quality tough finishes at the rim, as you can see below:

The touch is generally poor around the basket, however. He clangs a lot of layups off the iron especially when unable to use his right.

Another mixed bag area, which ties to the finishing, is the post game. He’s very inconsistent as a scorer unless he can get to the line.

The post-up thing isn’t a huge wart on his game. But an extra bit of touch and footwork would help him exploit mismatches or make good on the occasional late shot clock bailout possession.

I’d also like to see more consistency as a cutter. He’s excellent when he does it: picking spots, moving between dunker spots, and absorbing contact with his finishes.

It’s not so much a frequency issue, as cutting comprises the majority of his scoring opportunities. It’s the consistency of finding the spots, using physicality to maintain his position, and of course the finishing.

The progress Goga has made on the offensive end of the floor has benefitted Orlando in a major way with all the time Wendell Carter Jr. has missed. Their offense is 7.6 points per 100 possessions with him on the floor, a 90th percentile mark in the entire league. Bitadze has become an important cog in this system and proved that his game can translate. And it’s probably not the better half of his game.

Defensive Overview

Since arriving in Orlando, Goga Bitadze has been an absolute force on the defensive end of the floor.

In limited minutes last year, his on/off defensive splits were nothing short of sublime. Opponents scored 7.5 less points per 100 (95th percentile), their eFG% dropped 5.7 points (99th percentile), and the team controlled the glass (77th percentile OREB decline).

Those numbers have dropped off slightly, but still sit in a fantastic range. Those same three categories are in the 77th, 87th, and 58th percentile respectively. The individual numbers back it up as well. Goga currently sits at 10th in overall defensive estimated plus-minus (EPM), one of the most stable catch-all metrics. So, how exactly is a plodding big having such a massive impact on an already strong defense?

Elite Drop Coverage

Goga is not the guy to switch out on the perimeter or hard-hedge a screen. In the rare cases where he finds himself mismatched, it doesn’t go well.

Worrying about switching or playing up to the level of the screen is less of a concern when Jalen Suggs and Anthony Black are navigating the screens. The basic principle of drop is leaving the guard on an island and cleaning up whatever gets through. So when your guards can hold their own on an island, it delineates where Goga needs to be and what he needs to take care of.

Goga is especially good at taking up the space drivers can take, and can even affect shots in the midrange with his length and timing.

Notice the clean footwork, the wide hands, the way he coils himself to get ready for a jump. Goga is a master of conserving energy and waiting for the right time, which is especially necessary when dealing with possessions going behind or to the side of him.

The excellence in drop also applies to dribble handoffs. This is where the hands become even more important. With DHOs, the big is usually going to be closer to the level of the screen before dropping off, and quick hands are needed to make plays before things can get behind them.

The issues show when he plays up high. Unless he can head off the play at the start with a quick steal or block, bigs have no issue with getting in behind his drop for lobs or easy layoff finishes.

Empty-side actions are another way for other teams to take advantage of that space. Without a tag coming from the wing, he is the only thing left to impede the big. When that big is Anthony Davis it only becomes more difficult.

Though there are ways he can be beaten, the overall objective is accomplished. Nearly 70% of the offense initiated against Goga comes from pick-and-roll ballhandlers. If he’s staying in his drop with good screen navigators this is the way things need to be funneled. Deny the roll man and keep the easy attempts off the table, then force them to beat you in the midrange. Considering the results, an eFG% four points below league average, his mission has been accomplished.

And it’s not the only impressive portion of his defensive game.

Constant Physicality

Goga LOVES to throw his weight around. It’s not always to the benefit of the team, but he sure does it.

There are definitely instances where it doesn’t pan out:

This often comes in rotation, on post-ups, or trying to wall off a ballhandler in unsettled situations. The third situation is one where he commonly overdoes the body bump and gets in trouble.

When it comes to being posted up on, Goga has no hesitation to make his opponent extremely uncomfortable.

When he puts the physicality, the quick hands, and footwork together it can be a thing of beauty.

He certainly pays for this physicality in terms of his fouling – this year represents a career-high in discipline with a 37th percentile foul rate – but it has plenty of benefits. He has an excellent 0.86 PPP on post-ups. That physicality also benefits him greatly in rotation.

Rotational Power

When Goga sees an opportunity to make an impact in rotation, he can make some incredible things happen.

Coming from the weak side? He can do that.

Someone wants to take him on at the strong side? Good luck with that.

Anybody who tries to take him straight up is in for a rough time. I respect Gary Trent Jr. for trying here, I do. But it was not his best idea.

He’s also quite good at the non-traditional big rotations. Try to run action behind him or screen him out of the play, he’ll still find a way to make it into the play.

It’s not all perfect. Like many players, Goga tends to overhelp, especially as a player who thinks he can block everything. Though he is often right (95th percentile block rate), it gets him in trouble from time to time.

Overdoing the block hunting can lead to preventable putbacks, as it does in the first clip, or create openings for cutters as it does in the second. As a big, he has a responsibility to control the glass after a potential missed shot. Going all-out to block an already contested shot only adds so much value when it opens up an easy second-chance point.

Beyond overdoing rotations, there are certainly rebounding concerns to address.

Rebounding Struggles

For someone as big as Goga is, he does tend to get outmuscled on the glass with annoying frequency. Players know how to get leverage underneath him to take him off center. In short, he needs to remember an American football maxim: the low man always wins.

There are also instances where Goga doesn’t engage enough physically. Not only would that disappoint Dennis Reynolds, but it’s a letdown for his teammates as well.

This lack of consistency in technique and effort is a big reason why his defensive rebounding numbers are so middle of the road. A 43rd-percentile rebounding figure is not going to work for a man of his physical stature.

But when he DOES choose to impose himself, the results are quite good.

Applying the technical aspects in conjunction with his size is where it gets good. You can see in the above clips how he gets low to create leverage. Bitadze also shows the awareness to push his man under the basket when necessary, one of my favorite crafty rebounder plays.

The good thing about Goga’s rebounding is that the shortcomings are fixable. It’s not a question of physical ability or coordination; he needs more consistency and to apply himself. And if he gets there we have a potentially dominant rebounder on our hands.

Growth Areas

If Goga stays where he is at defensively, he’s already great. Perhaps a bit system-specific with his need to be in drop but that is a workable shortcoming with the right personnel. Who knows, maybe there is some agility growth in his future to accommodate a better blend of coverages.

But if he can show more restraint in help, control the physicality to avoid fouls, and clean up the technique/effort as a rebounder? That might just be one of the premiere defensive bigs in the league. It can only go up from here. And when “here” is already a top-10 player in D-EPM the possibilities are tantalizing.

Future Outlook

Orlando has already found a diamond in the rough, one that has played a major factor in their early arrival to the playoff conversation this year. If Wendell Carter Jr. continues to struggle with his health and his play, he will play a huge role in how far this goes in the current season.

For Goga himself, this season positions himself to do quite well in free agency this upcoming offseason. The offensive utility as a roll man and DHO runner with some passing chops fits him in well, and most teams still rely on drop in PNR, so the scheme fits are endless.

The fact that he is already THIS impactful on both ends, especially the defense, speaks to his value. Even marginal improvement as a finisher on the offensive end, or the aforementioned defensive growth areas, makes him an easy starter for any team looking to improve their center play. Goga may never make the jump from “star in his role” to a true star, but he will deliver a lot of value regardless. And hopefully he makes a nice chunk of change along the way for his efforts.

From a near league washout to one of the more impactful centers in the game. I’d call that a success story already.

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