I love it when a trade comes out of nowhere and rocks our socks off. Two days before the deadline, the Utah Jazz stunned the world by swinging a trade for Memphis Grizzlies forward Jaren Jackson Jr. Hey, NBA insiders, what is the point of you existing if we got no wind of this?

The Jazz are a fascinating case in small-market team building as it relates to my own team-building philosophies. Allow me to explain why I think this trade was very short-sighted and potentially disastrous for the Jazz.

Addressing the Talent Deficit

The NBA has always been a league of the haves and the have-nots. If you have the superstar talent, you are in the mix. If you don’t have it, you spend your time searching for that talent. The Jazz learned the hard way that having stars, but not superstars, does not win you titles. Donovan Mitchell and Rudy Gobert were a great tandem that led to a lot of regular-season success, but always came up wanting against teams with better top-end talent. That’s how we got here in the first place.

Utah has taken up a different tack since Danny Ainge came into town. Soon after his arrival in December 2021, Ainge shipped Mitchell and Gobert out of town for 11 combined picks and pick swaps. It was an admission of failure for that era of the team, and the acceptance of a stark reality: a huge volume of draft picks and a lengthy tank is the only way to get blue-chip talent in Salt Lake City.

Luxuries afforded to other teams are not afforded to the Jazz. Teams like the Lakers, Celtics, Knicks, and Warriors can fall back-asswards into star talent. Free agency is largely dead anyway, and no franchise-altering star is forcing their way to Utah via trade. So you can either pay a king’s ransom in a trade to get that talent, or you can hope the lottery balls bounce your way.

Last year was their best shot. Utah’s tank was successful, bottoming out with a 17-65 record that landed them the top odds for the No. 1 pick. Still, there was only a 14% chance of landing Cooper Flagg, a slam-dunk franchise-altering talent. Instead, they were bumped down to five, taking Ace Bailey. Womp womp. So it goes with the tank.

This year was another prime opportunity to tank into that blue-chip talent. Darryn Peterson, Cam Boozer, and AJ Dybantsa all have the look of franchise players. Odds are good that if you secure a spot in the top four, you’re coming away with a top-tier prospect, something the Jazz have not had in a decade. Until Tuesday, things were on track; Utah was sixth in lottery odds before the Jackson Jr. deal, with a 37.2% chance of a top four pick and 9% chance of the top selection. Not bad odds of changing your franchise forever.

Then the trade happened. And the evaluation changed completely.

The Sin of Gambling

Here’s why the Jazz are in such a precarious position after the trade. Utah is at the back end of the real tankers behind Sacramento, New Orleans, Indiana, Brooklyn, and Washington. All six of these teams will be racing to the bottom. But there are more contestants in this tank battle, and Utah just gave one of them an admission ticket. Here’s what the tank race looked like at the time of the trade:

At best, the five teams in front of the Jazz are standing pat, if not selling off more pieces. That makes it difficult to pass them in the standings, even if you lock JJJ in a closet for the rest of the season alongside Lauri Markkanen. You also have to look at the teams behind them.

The Bucks are actively shopping Giannis, and even if he doesn’t move, he’s going to be out injured and not motivated to return anytime soon. The Mavericks are in the same boat with AD and have other pieces to sell off. Then you have the Grizzlies, who just shed their most valuable player and seem likely to move more, possibly Ja Morant. All three of these teams got the memo: it’s over for us. Let’s hope the lottery gods bless us as we look to the future.

But the Jazz apparently missed the memo. Their chances of tanking into top-level talent worsened because of the players they acquired, and they also helped a team behind them tank. To me, that is a disastrous risk; making it 1% less likely that you get Darryn Peterson is catastrophic, even if your current chance of getting him is only 9%.

It’s also worth mentioning that the Jazz have protections on this year’s pick. If it falls outside the top eight, it goes to the Oklahoma City Thunder. Sam Presti, you dirty dog. Sitting at sixth in the odds means the Jazz only have a 3.8% chance of losing the pick. Seventh, that rises to 14.2%. Eighth, and you’re up to 39.2%. Tumble to ninth, and there’s a 79.7% chance it’s gone. The margins sure are thin.

There is an argument to be made that a boom-bust approach to this pick has merit. But look at this Jazz roster and the draft picks that have been worth keeping. Keyonte George and Walker Kessler, arguably their two best rookie-scale building blocks, were taken outside of the lottery. Kyle Filipowski was a high second-rounder. Isaiah Collier was late first. Jury is still out on Ace Bailey, but without question, the majority of the talent they’ve had worth keeping is outside of the top eight picks. Losing this pick to the Thunder would be a huge blow to the rebuild.

That is a smaller concern because the math still favors Utah, though less so than before the trade. The bigger draft concern for me is the 2027 first-round pick. The most favorable of Utah, Minnesota, and Cleveland’s first-round picks are going to Memphis. Now the Jazz have 1.5 seasons to turn it around, or else a primo draft pick is going out the door. And that’s assuming that they are worse than Minnesota and Cleveland. Jaren certainly improves their outlook (more on that soon), but it’s a big gamble that they can ascend after two straight abysmal seasons.

This is the gamble that Danny Ainge is making. He’s willing to harm his chances in this current lottery while punting on his best 2027 draft pick; those are two significant opportunities to get a blue-chip player that changes the franchise. And he did it all for a player I’m not convinced is all that transformative.

Where Is The Ceiling?

As discussed at the beginning, the Jazz got here by moving on from a core that was good, but not good enough. I’m willing to bet that this new core they’re working on is more of the same.

On paper, I like their emphasis on size. Walker Kessler, when healthy, is a tremendous interior defender and rebounder. JJJ and Lauri both provide floor spacing, secondary rim protection, and good rotational defense. Kessler and Markkanen, being plus positional rebounders, cover up for Jackson Jr.’s well-documented weakness on the glass. When on the floor together, I like that trio.

It also fits well with Keyonte George, who has been the breakout star for the Jazz at a time when they desperately need one. He’s shown himself to be an electric perimeter scorer who can shoulder a heavy usage burden. Keyonte can stir the drink enough for Jaren and Lauri, while that massive frontcourt trio covers for him defensively.

Theoretically, that big frontcourt trio, plus Keyonte and Ace Bailey, can work together on the floor. Hell, maybe it’s good enough to get them out from the bottom of the West. But where is the upside here?

If the Jazz luck into Darryn Peterson, all is forgiven. He’s got superstar perimeter creator written all over him, and would fit well at the two guard with that lineup. But that’s not something you can rely on. Assuming the Jazz don’t get one of the top picks (or lose the pick outright), the path to climbing out of the cellar is tough.

Utah has to fix a defense that has ranked in the bottom two in defensive rating for the last three seasons. JJJ and Kessler are a great step towards fixing that, but with so many perimeter players that cannot defend, it’s a tall task just to become average. You also need to take further offensive steps, which should be easier with Keyonte’s breakout and the great offensive mind of head coach Will Hardy.

There is an avenue for this team to become passable at both ends of the floor. JJJ does make a lot of their pieces click on both ends in theory. But passable doesn’t win playoff series, let alone get you to the mountaintop. That’s why the Jazz still need to be chasing superstars. And that gets awfully difficult when you look at the timeline here.

Utah will lock up Walker Kessler (RFA) and Keyonte George (rookie extension eligible) this offseason, locking in their core players for at least three seasons. That is a huge plus. After you take care of that, it’s time to win. Ask the New Orleans Pelicans about the dangers of shortening your rebuild. I’m not sure if you have looked at the Western Conference recently, but things are awfully tough out there.

A lot of the teams in the mix this year aren’t going anywhere. The Thunder, Spurs, and Nuggets will contend as long as they have their respective superstars. Both the Timberwolves and Lakers have flaws, but they have the superstars who deliver when it’s winning time. Houston has an aging superstar flanked by excellent young talent and a hoard of picks to trade. From there, things get murkier; the Clippers and Warriors are fading, but not dead yet. Phoenix and Portland have star talent and a rising cast of role players. Realistically, how far can the Jazz climb into this picture? My money is on a play-in ceiling for next year’s team, at best.

Chances are good that they’re forking over a lottery pick next year. That’s another chance at blue-chip talent gone through the draft. They will have other picks down the road, but that’s another tricky proposition.

If you’re good enough to make the playoffs in 2028, then the window for a high draft pick is gone. Then you’re reliant on later draft hits, which they have managed before, but it’s a low percentage gamble. Adding superstar talent through the draft is all but eliminated. That leaves only one other realistic avenue.

War Chest: Emptied

So many of the draft picks the Jazz had are gone now. They had four surplus first-round picks remaining before the JJJ trade; now they only have one. That pick falls in 2029 and is either a Minnesota or Cleveland pick. Ainge consolidated three lesser firsts to get a 2031 Phoenix unprotected first, then shipped it to Memphis in this deal. That was arguably their most prized asset remaining.

Let’s say a superstar that fits Utah’s timeline becomes available. As we’ve seen recently, nothing is off the table. The Jazz could have hoarded their picks and attempted to blow the doors off someone this offseason by being able to trade up to eight first-round picks, plus swaps. That’s a war chest few can match. After the JJJ trade, that dangling carrot is gone. They’re down to five picks, most of which are their own.

Don’t get me wrong, this Jazz team is vastly better now than it was yesterday. But to make serious noise, they need the guy. The draft avenues to getting that guy have decreased, and the trade avenues have decreased as well. It feels like the Jazz have painted themselves into a corner.

Time Is A Flat Circle

Jazz fans certainly have fond memories of the Mitchell-Gobert days. They cleaned up in the regular season, made the playoffs for six straight years, and brought a level of consistent excitement that was desperately needed in Utah. At the same time, they only won three playoff series in those six years and failed to get through to the Conference Finals. The West was as it always is: a murderer’s row of superstars and contending teams.

It seems that the Jazz yearn for that once again. The lottery balls haven’t fallen their way so far, and they’re tired of this intentional losing. So it’s time to assemble a handful of second-rate stars and become competitive with contention out of reach.

That’s not the worst thing ever. There’s no shame in staying competitive, but it does place a hard ceiling on your team. I’ve written before about why the Jazz are not going about their teardown in the right way; now I see them giving up on the rebuild early and settling for mediocrity. If that’s your thing, cool. But it’s not how I would go about turning a small-market team into a contender.

The post JJJ And The Knife’s Edge of Small Market Team Building appeared first on Swish Theory.

We are in the middle of the greatest era of parity in NBA history. With the Oklahoma City Thunder crowned champions, there have been seven different Finals winners in seven years, a new record; only once have we had five consecutive new winners. The days of the superteam and big market dominance are fading as chaos rules the contender circles. Projecting who is up next feels extremely difficult.

Even after a surprise Eastern Conference Finals run, the Pacers were not expected to come within one game of a championship. And they’re not the only surprise story in recent memory. The fifth-seeded Mavericks made it through the West last year. Everyone remembers the eighth-seeded Heat making it the year before, the third-seeded Warriors the year before that, the third-seeded Bucks the year before that, and the fifth-seeded Heat the year before that.

Granted, the line of delineation is strong. Four teams seeded fourth or lower have made the finals in the past six years, and all four lost. But we came so close to the exception this year. The point is that you can’t predict the future as you used to. Penciling in the Warriors and Cavaliers is no more. A surprise Conference Finals or Finals team is waiting out there, unknown to all.

I’m here to make the case that the Atlanta Hawks are the next surprise team.

The Aerial View

Okay, breathe. If you didn’t close the tab, you’re probably still laughing at me. I get it. The Atlanta Hawks? Contenders? In the National Basketball Association? It sounds ludicrous.

How soon we forget that these Hawks came within two wins of making the Finals just four years ago, when Trae Young scored 48 points on the road in Milwaukee to steal home court advantage in Game 1 of the ECF. I don’t blame you for writing that off as a blip: assuming Clint Capela walks in free agency, only two Hawks from that team remain: Trae Young and Onyeka Okongwu.

The slate has been cleaned for a new iteration of that squad. The premise back then was simple: Trae’s ability to shoulder a colossal offensive load makes life easier for all the role players, allowing them to focus on defending hard and hitting shots. That premise hasn’t changed. But it comes with a new twist.

Bayou Bailout

Before getting into the construction of this team, it’s essential to acknowledge how we’ve gotten here in the last year. At this time last year, Atlanta was coming off a 36-win season. It was the third straight year their winning percentage had declined since that ECF appearance. Dejounte Murray hadn’t made the desired impact next to Trae Young one year into a four-year, $114 million extension. Things looked dire.

Then the New Orleans Pelicans stepped in.

Dejounte Murray was shipped to the Bayou in a package that included Dyson Daniels, Larry Nance Jr., Cody Zeller, EJ Liddell, and two first-round picks. The first pick was a 2025 Lakers choice that ended up 22nd overall, the second least favorable of New Orleans and Milwaukee in 2027. The last three players are all off the roster, but Dyson Daniels is going nowhere.

He finished second in DPOY voting in his first year with the Hawks. His breakout changed Atlanta’s fortunes significantly (if only someone had seen it coming!) That alone would make the Murray trade worth it. The way Atlanta used the picks afterwards only makes it look worse for New Orleans.

At the past trade deadline, Atlanta traded Bogdan Bogdanović for Terance Mann, Bones Hyland, and three second-round picks. That left them with Mann starting his three-year, $47 million veteran extension, an overpay for a low-impact wing. Packaging Mann and Georges Niang with that 22nd pick from New Orleans landed them Kristaps Porzingis earlier this week. Now they’ve gotten two impact starters for Murray, and still have a pick in 2027 to play with.

And, it may not be the worst trade for New Orleans between the two. During the 2025 NBA Draft’s first round, the Pelicans sent a 2026 unprotected pick and the 23rd pick to the Hawks for the 13th pick. Atlanta ended up taking Georgia forward Asa Newell at 23, who they were rumored to be eyeing at 13. And now they have a pick almost sure to be a lottery choice in next year’s loaded class at the top. The Hawks still came away with a useful rotation player and now own one of the most valuable assets any playoff-hopeful team owns.

To sum it up: by trading with the Pelicans, Atlanta turned Murray and the 13th pick into Dyson Daniels, Kristaps Porzingis, Asa Newell, a 2026 unprotected New Orleans first, a 2027 first from New Orleans or Milwaukee, and a second-round pick from the Celtics. That’s the rock upon which this Hawks team is built. The fallout from these two trades will echo for these franchises throughout the next decade or more.

Offseason Additions

Kristaps Porzingis was Atlanta’s big domino. I’d be surprised if they got a bigger name or impact player. That’s no knock on Kristaps; his +3.6 EPM last season was a 96th-percentile mark. He’s been in the 96th or 97th percentile four years running. But their powder remains dry, with many avenues for addition. But more on why he is a great fit later.

Atlanta had three primary weapons at their disposal this offseason: a $25M trade exception (from the Dejounte deal – gift that keeps giving), a $13M trade exception (Bogdan deal), and the non-taxpayer mid-level exception for $14M. They used those financial weapons to make some significant additions.

First and foremost, Atlanta used the Murray exception to pick up Nickeil Alexander-Walker. I’m not saying the Hawks read my writing, but that’s two straight offseasons where they’ve picked up one of my Finding a Role breakout candidates. Hawks, I’m on to you. The terms of the sign-and-trade are window dressing to fit him into the exception. They sent a far-off second-round pick. Well worth it to add a high-level rotation player without counting against the cap.

NAW fits so perfectly into the vision Atlanta is outlining. He is a confident shooter who is lights out from the corners and is passable from above the break. While turnover-prone, he is an aggressive passer who can make reads above expectation for an off-ball wing. I love his floor sense and the way he moves around to find spots offensively. And that’s not where his value comes from.

2025 was something of a down year statistically, but he is an elite perimeter defender. NAW had 94th and 98th defensive EPM marks in 2023 and 2024. He’s one of the best screen navigators in the league and gives Atlanta another exceptional perimeter defense option alongside Dyson Daniels. Atlanta hit it out of the park getting Alexander-Walker, and they weren’t done there.

Since this deal folds into a trade exception, they retained the full mid-level exception. That gave them room to add another rotation player, and they did so in getting Luke Kennard. Part of my offseason wishlist was getting a genuine shooter; few are better than Kennard. Few players are better at high-volume above-the-break three-point shooting than Kennard. He’s not much of a defender, but Atlanta has the infrastructure to insulate him, even as a bench piece.

It’s wise to get him on a one-year deal. Trade exceptions are significant, but the bill comes due the following year. Trae Young has a player option after the upcoming season, and Dyson Daniels also needs to get paid. Between Porzingis and Kennard, that’s over $40 million in expiring money. If this team doesn’t meet expectations, they have avenues to retool with or without Trae Young. But I am entirely sold on this team, and let’s get into why.

Pulling Elements from Contenders

Atlanta is pulling pieces together, but what is the vision? When I see the NBA Finals teams, I see two formulas the Hawks are trying to emulate. Let’s get into how they’re trying to imitate the Thunder first.

We all know the Thunder won a championship with elite defense. But the elements building that defense are interesting. They have tons of depth, going from an incredible defensive starting lineup to bench pieces like Cason Wallace and Alex Caruso. These players have size, enormous wingspans, and are super athletic. Most importantly, they steal the ball like crazy. OKC led the league in steals per game, fueling their transition offense where those athletes could get out and run.

You know who was second in steals? The Atlanta Hawks. Almost a third of those came from Dyson Daniels alone, who had the best pilfering season of the 21st century. This isn’t some gimmick one-off. Look at their new projected starting lineup next to Trae Young: 6’8″ Dyson Daniels, 6’8″ Zaccharie Risacher, 6’9″ Jalen Johnson, and 7’2″ Kristaps Porzingis. That unit averaged a combined 7.2 steals per game last season. Together, and healthy, I’d expect that number to go up.

The big element is how this benefits Trae. He’s a better defender than people give him credit for, but still not great. If your weak link can get steals on the ball or work in passing lanes off the ball while the other four cover up for him, that’s an additive value. It’s the same thing Shai Gilgeous-Alexander does for the Thunder. Granted, he’s about half a foot taller, but that’s the tradeoff for what Trae brings offensively. And that’s where the Pacers’ formula comes into play.

If you want to find the next team to win with pace, look at the Hawks. They were third in pace this past season. Trae Young’s presence will always boost your speed and playmaking; Atlanta also finished second in total assists per game. But it’s not about having one high-level ball mover; it’s about others that keep that flow in motion. After their offseason moves, Atlanta can have as many as nine players who averaged multiple assists per game.

Jalen Johnson and Dyson Daniels are good secondary ball movers. Nickeil Alexander-Walker and Luke Kennard both find the right swing passes. Kristaps Porzingis and Onyeka Okongwu have above-average feel for the center spot. The new additions can multiply this team’s collective court feel to create a Pacers-esque environment where everyone can pass in a pinch. Coach Quin Snyder should push this team to keep the ball moving after Trae or Jalen create advantages.

The secret to the Pacers was ball movement without carelessness. Indiana as a team finished third in assists per game with the third-lowest turnover rate. The Thunder were the same; though they didn’t share the ball movement prowess of the Pacers, they had the ball stolen from them less than any NBA team.

This leads to the problems the Hawks have to solve to attempt to emulate these contenders. They coughed the ball up a LOT last year. Trae Young is a very risky passer, and while it often pays off, it leads to a lot of transition going the other way. Atlanta needs to build an environment of smarter ball handlers so they can tip the transition scales in their favor. As I wrote about a few weeks ago, steals are only increasing in their value. If Atlanta can keep a top-five steal rate while getting an average turnover rate, they’ll have a huge advantage.

Atlanta checked every box on the wishlist. Kristaps gives them elite center size, will stretch the floor in high PNR, and can swing the ball. Nickeil Alexander-Walker gives them multiple elite perimeter defenders, increasing their depth and lineup optionality. Kennard gives them a lights-out shooter. And they did all this while staying under the tax and adding future assets. It’s an absurd coup of an offseason to get significantly better in the short AND long term.

Draft Additions

Luckily for me, we have a Hawks and draft expert on hand at the Swish Theory. Why talk about things I’m not as qualified to discuss as our own Ahmed Jama? So, here are Ahmed’s thoughts on the Asa Newell addition.

My favorite aspect of the Asa Newell pick (besides the additional draft capital the team acquired in the process) is that the team already has proof of concept with the role Asa projects to play. Newell is a relentless rebounder who finishes extremely well at the rim, projects to be a credible lob threat, and should be able to guard every frontcourt position.

For Hawks fans, this sales pitch should sound familiar and reminiscent of a recently departed Hawk, John Collins. Although the tail end of Collins’ tenure may have left a bitter taste in the mouth of fans who’d expected a more linear development in Collins’ finishing and decision making, Collins undeniably outperformed his draft position. And if Asa Newell could contribute close to Collins’ level during his Hawks tenure, this would be an undeniable win for the team.

However, a few roadblocks are standing in the way of Newell achieving the level of success John Collins was able to reach during his time with the Hawks. First, we must begin with what defined Collins’ tenure with the Hawks: rim-running. Even though Newell finished 19th in the country in total dunks (3rd amongst freshmen), he was far from an effective rim-runner this past season. Newell finished the season scoring 0.931 PPP (points per possession) on rolls to the basket, and was in the 23rd percentile in efficiency in the ‘P&R Roll-Man’ playtype.

When considering these numbers, discussing the context of the team Newell played in the past season is essential. Georgia had some of the worst guard play of any high-major team. Their guards were both ineffective as scorers and inconsistent as facilitators. This personnel, paired with a highly congested and stagnant offense this past season, erased clean rolls to the basket for Newell and drastically affected the degree of difficulty on these plays. But despite Newell’s inefficiency as a roller, he still managed to finish over 70% at the rim, which is truly impressive for someone who wasn’t a full-time big. Newell was so effective as a finisher because of his persistence on the glass.

Newell’s offensive rebounding prowess could also be a boon to the Hawks’ defense. While the Hawks finished as the 18th-ranked defense by Defensive Rating, they were tied for 21st in fastbreak points allowed. Opponents, not fearing the Hawks’ mediocre offensive rebounding unit, predicated on an undersized frontcourt, could leak out and rack up easy baskets in transition. Newell’s presence on the offensive glass should limit these easy fastbreak opportunities for teams and establish a more physical identity in the frontcourt.

Overall, while Asa Newell may not be the flashiest player for the Hawks’ long-term future, I believe he can be an integral member of a frontcourt rotation, becoming increasingly capable of augmenting Trae Young’s strengths and compensating for his deficiencies. Although the Hawks are still lacking in size compared to most NBA frontcourts, Newell’s range defensively and ability to play in the open court add to the identity of a team that finished 3rd in pace this past season, even without Jalen Johnson and his grab-and-go talents for a large swath of the season. Asa Newell is the rare draft pick who fits into both the best player available AND best fit categories for the Hawks. And putting my draft analyst cap aside for a moment, it is truly refreshing to see the front office make such a shrewd move.

Internal Growth

One crucial element to remember here: the youth of this team. Kristaps Porzingis is now the oldest Hawk at 30 years old. Kennard is 29, NAW and Trae are 27, Okongwu is 25, Jalen is 24, Dyson is 22, and Risacher is 20. The vast majority of this rotation is on the upswing.

Sure, Porzingis is getting bogged down by injury. Trae has remained at a fringe All-NBA level for years. Kennard is what he is. But the rest of this team has more meat on the bone. I am bullish on more offensive growth for Dyson Daniels and NAW. Jalen Johnson should compete for an All-Star spot as his explosive development continues. Risacher now has a year under his belt and can get more bench minutes. Onyeka Okongwu continues to get better as he shifts to a backup role.

If these players stopped developing, this would still be a strong team. And I’d be willing to bet that more of them will progress than regress. Development isn’t linear, but they have a great core that’s young and flexible.

I love how the Hawks have positioned themselves to make a deep run in the upcoming season and, if they’re lucky, for years to come. Get on the hype train now before it leaves the station.

The post Atlanta Hawks: The NBA’s Next Sneaky Contender appeared first on Swish Theory.

Small edges drive on-court play as well. A defense will tag a roller because that corner three shooter can’t make them pay the way the pick-and-roll can. An offense will hunt a switch to find a slightly worse defender for their best player to attack. A coach goes bigger to create rebounds, while another goes smaller to shoot more and run in transition. On and on the dance goes all game long, until the edges one team creates outdo the other.

But these are all defined by small edges. When a significant edge is discovered, it blows the game wide open. The Moreyball-era Houston Rockets are the best example of this. They eschewed the midrange game to maximize threes and layups; at their peak, in 2017-18, Houston took 47% of their shots from deep and 35% at the rim. Their midrange frequency was dead last in the league. In fact, from 2012 to 2022, Houston was dead last in midrange frequency in every single season. With James Harden at the helm, they finished with a top-10 offense every season. That revolution broke the game open.

The average NBA team in 2024-25 took 39% of their shots from deep and 31% at the rim. If you go back to the first year of the Harden/Morey pairing in 2012-13, the average was 22% from three and 36% at the rim. The midrange has cratered from the most frequent shot (42%) to the least frequent (30%) in just over ten years. That was the product of the three-point gold rush.

Now, every team is on the hunt for shooting. Guards, wings, and even some bigs that can’t hit shots beyond the arc are losing value by the minute. Everyone saw the light, and the big edge generated by the “dunks and threes” philosophy has become a small edge. Thus, the search for the newest big edge begins. And I’m here to tell you now, steals are the next big edge that will create a gold rush in the NBA. Let me explain.

The Hypothesis

For these purposes, we’ll be focusing on the playoffs. The end goal of all teams is to lift that Larry come June. So, unless stated otherwise, I’ll be using playoff stats to explain the value of the steal.

Per Cleaning the Glass (like all my stats!), the average transition possession in the 2024/25 playoffs is worth 1.14 points. Conversely, the average halfcourt possession is worth 0.96 points. Going even deeper, the average transition possession coming from a steal is worth 1.36 points. These numbers will form the basis of my thinking.

Pushing a normal half-court possession into transition qualifies as a small edge. Take the Indiana Pacers, the best pushers of live rebounds in these playoffs. Indiana scores 1.05 points per half-court possession, which is the best mark of all playoff teams. They score 1.35 points per transition chance off a live rebound, also the best mark in these playoffs. So, roughly, any live rebound they push in a hurry is worth 0.3 extra points per possession. That’s a strong edge when you add up their average mark of 32.7 defensive rebounds per game.

But Indiana didn’t add the most points per 100 possessions through transition play of these playoffs. They finished behind two other teams: the Los Angeles Clippers and the Oklahoma City Thunder. LA lost a tight first-round series to the powers of Nikola Jokic, so I can’t fault their process. Oklahoma City’s transition prowess has defined them all year and continued into the postseason. In addition to the second-most points added via the average transition possession, they have the second highest transition frequency behind only the Detroit Pistons (who have a third of the sample size).

This is where the steals come into play. OKC led the league in steals per game in the regular season, and has generated the highest turnover rate in this postseason. The formula that fueled them all year has put them three games from a championship: we are going to take the ball from you, and we are going to score.

Let’s do some rough math here—the Thunder average 10.6 steals per game in these playoffs and score 1.43 points per transition possession off a steal. For argument’s sake, let’s say two of those 11 steals don’t turn into transition, because I don’t have the money for the fancy sites that could tell me this. So, nine transition possessions per game at 1.43 PPP equals 12.87 points. Their Finals opponents, the Indiana Pacers, generate 7.5 steals per game at 1.38 PPP. Being generous and saying six of those turn into transition, that’s 8.28 points. Oklahoma City is developing 4.59 extra points per game in transition with their steal rates compared to Indiana.

And that’s not where the math stops. Remember that the average halfcourt offensive possession has been worth 0.96 points. Unlike a blocked shot, a steal is a guaranteed zero. Possession ends. Finito. So, if you’re the Thunder, a steal that takes away 0.96 points and adds 1.21 on average (12.87 transition points added divided by 10.6 steals). That’s 2.17 net points per steal leading to transition.

Alright, that was a lot of math. Take a breather. We have a bit more to get through.

A 2.17-point swing on a given possession is a MASSIVE edge by NBA standards. Let’s consider the small edges that teams look for again. The average NBA player shot 35.8% from three this postseason. So, the average three was worth 1.074 points. If shooting was your problem, you looked for upgrades. Let’s say a GM moves a player taking four threes per game at league average rates for a player hitting 38% of four threes per game. That’s an extra 0.066 points per shot, and 0.264 per game. Stretched over 82 games, that’s 21.65 total points in a season. Those are the margins we’re operating on here.

Now, I am throwing context out. That extra shooting edge may open up more plays, change defensive coverages against your primary options, and improve your points per possession in ways that are harder to quantify. But don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater here. If a steal can be worth two points, finding a player that averages 1.5 steals to 1.0 can add an extra point each game. The additive nature of each steal is far above any edge you can reasonably create.

Put it like this. Steph Curry took ten threes per game in these playoffs, making 40%. That’s 12 points per game for the greatest shooter in NBA history. If a league average playoff shooter took that volume, it adds up to 10.74 points. Gravity aside, Steph was worth 1.26 more points per game than your typical shooter. That’s worth less than the average steal. And there’s only one Steph Curry, and only one team has that edge. Plenty of teams can find a way to generate an extra steal.

The Application

Maybe you’re thinking this is junk math. I’m not Daryl Morey. I don’t know how to build complex data models to flesh out the values of each individual play. I’m a guy with a laptop and a premium stats subscription who watches a concerning amount of basketball. You can nitpick the math, but the critical assumptions remain: on average, the steal is now the most valuable play in basketball. Now the question becomes, how does this manifest?

Teams may try to find the next Dyson Daniels (a player I have written about time after time). The third-year Aussie went from bench piece on a middling Pelicans team to First Team All-Defense by wrangling three steals per game with the Hawks. That’s an astronomical number of steals, one unlikely to be repeated.

But let’s look at something more attainable: Alex Caruso, acquired for pennies on the dollar, is keying this Thunder defense. His 1.7 steals per game are worth 3.7 points to Oklahoma City this postseason.

There are other ways to get in on the gold rush. Point guards like Tyrese Haliburton, typically admonished for being “conservative passers,” may increase in value. He who prevents transition chances is as good as the man who creates them, in a sense. Teams may hunt for stellar transition defenders like Draymond Green, Andrew Nembhard, Derrick White, and Derrick Jones Jr. It’s no coincidence that some of the best transition players in the league are/were part of teams that have made deep playoff runs in recent memory.

You don’t need me to find evidence of the rising value of the steal. I constantly come back to the Thunder—in addition to their lead in forced turnovers this postseason, their offense has the second-best turnover rate. If Indiana were to beat them in these Finals, I’d bet on that win being fueled by transition and a shift in the turnover deficit. Just look at Game 3 last night. Indiana won the steal battle 13-6, scoring 1.25 points per transition chance off a steal. That right there swung the 116-107 victory.

The last great NBA dynasty was put over the top by three-point shooting. The next champion will be fueled by the steal.

The post Steals: The NBA’s Next Gold Rush appeared first on Swish Theory.

For this article, I interviewed Day’Ron about his journey and skills. I will reference that interview often. You can find it here.

After winning a Class 4A title as a high school junior, Sharpe transferred to the famous Montverde Academy. That 2019-20 roster boasts an incredible six NBA alumni. Four of them went in the 2021 draft: Cade Cunningham 1st overall, Scottie Barnes 4th, Moses Moody 14th, and Day’Ron at 29th. Caleb Houstan was picked 32nd the year after, and Dariq Whitehead 22nd the year after that. Suffice it to say, that is talent few other teams can match. Day’Ron asserts that no other high school could compete with them from any year. With a 25-0 record and 24 of those victories by double digits, they have as good a case as any team.

Sharpe went to UNC for college under the tutelage of Roy Williams. That squad possessed an imposing collection of talent as well. Armando Bacot, Garrison Brooks, and Leaky Black formed an impressive defensive trio in the starting group with a freshman backcourt of Caleb Love and RJ Davis, two future All-Americans. That left Sharpe as one of the first off the bench. Another future NBA talent, Walker Kessler, could only get nine minutes per game. And it wouldn’t be the last time Day’Ron had to sit behind more experienced players.

The 2021-22 Brooklyn Nets team that Sharpe was drafted to felt like a who’s-who of 2010s greats. Headlined by the trio of Kevin Durant, James Harden, and Kyrie Irving, this team was built to contend. Their frontcourt included LaMarcus Aldridge, Blake Griffin, and Paul Millsap. Of all the greats on this team, Sharpe credits James Johnson as the most impactful veteran for his career.

By his own admission, Day’Ron didn’t have his mind right upon entering the league. He wasn’t the first to be there or the last to leave. He didn’t value winning the way he should have. Johnson took the rookie big man under his wing, taught him how to build good habits, and instilled a desire to compete. Four years later, Day’Ron is looking to pass that same spirit to a Nets team rebuilding from the exodus of Durant, Irving, and Harden.

It’s safe to say that Sharpe has dealt with as many changing circumstances and expectations as any fourth-year player can. Most importantly, he’s seen how to stick in this league in many ways. In this article, I’ll break down Sharpe’s strengths and limitations, potential growth areas, and look to the future for this restricted free agent to see where his game can fit best. Let’s dig into it. As usual, all stats I list are per Cleaning the Glass.

Offensive Overview

Sharpe set many career highs offensively this past season. He posted the most points and assists per game of his career. His free-throw percentage also jumped nearly 20 points to 79%. The underlying stats are more noteworthy to me. He took more midrange shots and upped his percentage from 37% to 44%. Sharpe tripled his three-point attempts and increased his percentage as well, from 25% to 28%. Most importantly, his assist percentage and assist-to-usage rate went up with his increase in usage rate.

Individual improvements are essential, but team context is everything. Brooklyn was 6.6 points per 100 possessions better on offense with Sharpe on the floor. That wasn’t due to some massive increase in efficiency, free-throw drawing, or taking extra care of the ball. It was due to Sharpe’s foremost skill.

Offensive Rebounding

When Day’Ron is on the floor, Brooklyn’s offensive rebounding rate increases by 10.8%. That’s the highest on/off OREB% mark of any player in the league. His offensive rebounding rate of 15.4% was a 98th percentile mark in the league. He brings it all: hustle, positioning skill, physicality, and jump timing.

These extra possessions Sharpe creates are immensely valuable. We’ve seen it as a theme throughout these playoffs. When efficiency bogs down and set plays go out the window, that guy who can create a second and third chance at the rim skyrockets in importance. Few players in the league create those chances the way Day’Ron can.

Rim Finishing

This is where things get spottier for Sharpe. In all four years, Sharpe has shot in the low 60s around the rim. He’s never been above the 28th percentile for bigs. Some of that is owed to the nature of his role; constantly tipping the ball around the rim leads to many misses. But there are also controllable aspects. Day’Ron has issues with loading his feet, finding proper positioning, and reading the rim protection.

I don’t expect Sharpe to suddenly become a 75%-ish rim finisher by cleaning up technical aspects of his game. He’s still going to have a lot of tip-ins go awry, and it’s in his nature to try relentlessly to get that final putback. Still, some work on positioning and loading his jumps would significantly improve these numbers.

Screen Actions

The 2024-25 season saw a ton of improvement for Sharpe in screen actions. He has a lot of utility on and off the ball, and sets great picks that free his teammates in a variety of situations.

I came away very impressed with his DHO game. Not only did he set strong screens, he made good passing reads and had a good sense of when to keep the ball and self-create.

His role as a DHO hub was crucial for a team lacking structure. So many new faces searching for offensive roles and identities. Sharpe’s ability to pass, screen, and make himself available for passes significantly raised this group’s floor. A play finisher learning to create those plays for others brings immense value to any team.

Odds and Ends

Most of Sharpe’s offensive value comes from screening, cutting, and offensive rebounding. He’s still finding ways to show skill in other areas, and I’m encouraged by his development as a shooter. He shoots an easy ball and the results have continued to perk up.

Day’Ron told me that the skill he is looking forward to developing the most is his shooting. Becoming an all-around contributor to the offense is paramount to his development. Another way he finds to contribute is in transition. Despite his hulking frame, Sharpe can move quickly in the open floor.

Watching his offensive talent grow with each passing game is a treat. At only 23 years old, it’s hard to put a definite ceiling on his growth, but I see him in the mold of Steven Adams with extra skill. Elite second-chance creation and screening talent can get you far. Adams grew a lot as a passer, but the shooting never materialized. Sharpe may find a way to be more of an outside shooter and DHO keeper threat. It’s the kind of offensive contributor many teams will be looking for.

Defensive Overview

Brooklyn posted a better-than-expected defense for a team that felt like an island of misfit toys. They finished 20th in total defensive rating, largely due to head coach Jordi Fernandez’s instilled competitive factor. The Nets deployed an aggressive style of defense designed to throw other teams off their game, and Sharpe was part of that equation.

With Day’Ron on the floor, the Nets had a 111.7 defensive rating. That’s a 77th percentile mark. Of course, a lot of this came from his best all-around skill.

Defensive Rebounding

Sharpe’s defensive rebounding rate isn’t as stellar as his offensive rebounding rate. A 63rd percentile mark is nothing to sneeze at, to be sure, but it begs questions. Those are largely answered by this Brooklyn rebound scheme, where Sharpe’s job was to find the best offensive rebounder and wipe them out of the play. His determination to box out was apparent on the tape.

I truly enjoyed his determination to box out the league’s most imposing players. Day’Ron said his favorite matchups are Ivica Zubac, Jonas Valanciunas, and the Pistons duo of Isaiah Stewart and Jalen Duren. It’s not just effort here, it’s technical prowess. He works hard to get inside positioning and push as far back as possible. In the worst-case scenario, he gets positioning and refuses to lose ground. Sharpe also uses a good leg bend to make any OREB attempts over his back futile. If he loses inside position, he’s excellent at pushing his man under the rim to reduce their rebounding radius.

There’s more meat on the bone with his defensive rebounding numbers, but the technique and effort are sound. The defensive scheme employed in Brooklyn on ball screen actions can explain some of this gap.

Pick-and-Roll Defense

As previously mentioned, Sharpe had three coaches in three years. That was before the hiring of Jordi Fernandez. Jordi brings a defensive style that maximizes Brooklyn’s athleticism. Bringing in an extra degree of unpredictability helped their defense punch above their weight and win some games they weren’t expected to. That included some aggressive ball screen coverages, with Day’Ron square in the middle of it. The blitzing and showing came with mixed results:

Often, the lineups came with Cam Johnson in the corner rotating to shut off the roller. He’s plenty capable of being a rim deterrent at his size, but that’s not the issue here. Problems arose from Day’Ron’s recovery speed and the angles he chose. This was not an athleticism concern – he’s got that in spades. It’s a question of decisiveness and efficiency in my mind. Before this season, Day’Ron spent far more time in drop, something he’s alright at doing. He does have a block-hunting problem that’s shown up in past tape. Plays like this one were all too common:

But there are the flashes of brilliance, where he chains it all together: play recognition, urgency of movement, precise angles and timing. And they look beautiful.

I don’t mean to imply that things will simply click someday and Day’Ron can become a consistently great ball screen defender. It requires a lot of reps and hard work to get there. But reps and hard work don’t get you superb athletic gifts. Pairing that hard work with Sharpe’s natural talent will take him a long way. It’s an area I’m confident he can build in.

Rim Protection

Sharpe encounters the same problems protecting the rim outside the action as he does in the action. He’s inconsistent with his footwork, load times, and chases blocks too often. I don’t want to harp on that further; instead, I will look at the possessions where things come together. Those are a sight to see.

When his feet are organized and his jump is well-timed, Sharpe has an innate ability to locate the ball at all angles. That kind of ball tracking and length covers up a lot of gaps as a rim protector. With more consistent footwork and positioning, in addition to cleaning up the windows in which he chooses to go for a block, he could be a serious asset at the rim.

Odds and Ends

I also enjoyed Sharpe’s transition defense. He loves getting out and running to commit the right fouls at a minimum. At best, he can contest multiple shots and get some impressive blocks.

I’d like to see more of that engagement off the ball in the halfcourt. He was too prone to losing cutters and being late to recognize off-ball screeners, which is a common issue for young players at all positions. The good thing is the engagement shows up in other areas; Sharpe needs to show the same commitment to stopping easy buckets that he shows when a rebound is up for grabs. That’s easy to translate with the right mindset.

Future Outlook

At 23 years old, Sharpe’s restricted free agency will be an interesting watch. The Nets have a lot of cap space, but things are in flux. They have Nic Claxton paid up as a true center, so the idea of paying two bigs that shared the floor for just 29 possessions (+31 net rating, just saying…) is worth inspection. However, trade speculation around Claxton has continued for years and could come to a head this offseason. There is a real chance Sharpe could leave elsewhere or end up back in Brooklyn as a starter.

These NBA playoffs did him a lot of favors. Physical rebounders and screeners like Steven Adams made a huge statement in the era of shooting and small ball. DHO runners and gap fillers like Isaiah Hartenstein have proven immensely valuable. Sharpe’s work ethic will jump off the page for any team interested in his services, and his desire to improve his skill set is noteworthy. As is, an elite rebounder who sets nasty screens and operates within the flow ot the offense has a lot of utility. An improvement as a paint protector, shooter, and rim finisher could take him to a new level. Watch out for Day’Ron.

The post Finding a Role: Day’Ron Sharpe appeared first on Swish Theory.

This may sound like I’m being critical, but I’m not. Long-term star injuries for contenders are rightfully watershed moments in NBA thinking, especially regarding team building. How can you not? The same moment happened when Kevin Durant grabbed his leg in Toronto during the 2019 Finals. And given the cascading effect of that injury, we were right to speculate wildly.

Although the Celtics are unlikely to experience the catastrophic post-injury season that Golden State went through, many of the same assumptions apply. The team won’t be contending this upcoming season. Their immediate window is over. Tough questions will have to be asked of the roster. The question for me becomes, can the Boston Celtics use this tragic injury to their benefit in the long run?

Key Assumptions

Those reading this most likely fall under the umbrella of NBA sicko-dom. You follow Keith Smith, you’ve opened Spotrac to check on contracts, and you can list CBA rules off the top of your head. You know, normal people stuff. The average NBA fan has some idea of how the salary cap works, but the motivations of NBA front offices/ownership groups and the avenues to accomplish their goals may be more of a mystery. My first assumption is that most people who wear Celtics hats don’t understand the ramifications of the salary cap.

The worst-kept secret in the NBA is that everybody fears the consequences of the luxury tax. Even Warriors owner Joe Lacob, with a franchise seemingly doubling in value yearly and a line of minority investors in Patagonia quarter-zips around the block, feared the tax. The Boston Celtics hit their tax window perfectly, setting up a two-year run of having Jayson Tatum, Jaylen Brown, Jrue Holiday, Kristaps Porzingis, and Derrick White all paid their worth. That first season resulted in a championship. The second, as we know, was a tragedy. My second assumption is that no matter how these playoffs went, the bill was coming due, and a slash-and-burn salary dumping was coming this offseason.

But the dollar figure is secondary here. What matters most are the restrictions associated with salary cap overages. New ownership will want a clean slate upon which to build a new team instead of being beholden to the transactions of the old regime. This leads us to the number that will define Boston’s offseason.

$19,959,873

The second apron is the word you’ll hear a lot this offseason. That amount you see above is the projected dollar amount Boston needs to cut to get below that figure. The second apron is extremely restrictive for a team that will need to be nimble over the next few seasons.

First and foremost, it stops you from aggregating multiple outgoing salaries together in trades or taking in more money than you send out. As long as they’re above the apron, Boston cannot send out multiple players in a single trade, and their cap number can only decrease in any trade. This, by itself, is very limiting. On top of that, if you spend three out of five years in the second apron, your first-round pick automatically becomes the 30th overall pick. It also limits the future draft picks you can trade.

The goal of this new CBA was to promote parity around the league, spread the talent out, make dynasties harder to form over years, and engage every fan base. When you’re the Boston Celtics, having five players making $28+ million is like walking into a bear den with your pockets full of beef jerky.

Boston’s championship team was $5 million above the second apron, and this year’s team was $4.4 million over. Don’t just take this prediction from me: Wyc Grousbeck, the newly former Celtics owner, said it himself. Since the draft pick penalty rolls over five years, the Celtics would have their first-round picks moved to #30 in several upcoming seasons. They would need to duck the second apron for three consecutive seasons to avoid further penalties.

In short, if the Celtics don’t find a way to shed this money, they’ll be strung up by their ankles trying to improve this roster in the coming years. Jayson Tatum is 27 years old, Jaylen Brown is 28 years old, and the two project to have many great years of basketball ahead of them. This limitation on their roster-building capabilities would be tough to overcome. Now, let’s figure out how Boston can get under this.

One last number to consider here: 13. Boston has to enter the season with at least 13 players to meet the league minimum requirement. As things stand, they have 12 under contract for next year. So all moves will need to keep that target number in mind.

The Jrue Holiday Issue

Jrue is the first and foremost player in these conversations. This season was the first year of a four-year, $134 million extension Holiday signed after the championship run. They wanted to take care of him for the chance at back-to-back titles, but it has been clear he would be one of the first to go, especially as he declines going into his age-35 season.

This article isn’t about speculating who Boston can acquire; you’re all adults capable of working a trade machine. This is about the math needed for a route to cap relief. So here’s the breakdown on what Boston can do to whittle down that $20 million tax overage, starting with Jrue’s $32.4M salary.

Boston must take back at least 80% of Jrue’s salary in a two-team deal. Assuming they can find a deal to take back the minimum, whether one player or multiple, that would be $6.48M in savings. That’s roughly a third of the number needed. It gets even more interesting when you take three-team deals into account. The 80% rule doesn’t have to go all the way around. Boston can send Jrue to one team, then that team can send the 80% of Jrue’s salary to a third team, who can in turn send 80% of THAT salary back to Boston.

If GM Brad Stevens can make a three-team deal work at the minimum amount, Boston could take back a minimum of $20.74M. That would be $11.66M in total savings, more than half of the number needed. Assuming this gets done by acquiring two or more players, that would also put Boston at or above the 13 minimum required players. Now, we’re left with some flexibility and several ways to get the remaining $8.3M off the books.

Remaining Options

I will take a leap here and assume that neither Jayson Tatum nor Jaylen Brown will be dealt. That leaves a few avenues for the remaining money.

First, and most obviously, they can move on from Kristaps Porzingis and his expiring $30.7M salary. If Boston again takes back the minimum salary in a two-team deal, that’s $6.14M in savings. Expanding to a three-team deal, the Celtics could save up to $11M; only taking back $19.7M in the exchange. That could cover the tax amount needed, but something else comes into play: the upcoming draft. Boston owns the 28th and 32nd overall picks, and assuming they draft and keep players at both those slots, that salary would put them back into the apron.

There are avenues to overcome this. Neemias Queta, Xavier Tillman, and Jordan Walsh all have minimum-level deals that could be salary dumped into the cap room of another team, or traded for non-guaranteed contracts that Boston can then waive. But it would be tight and would cut into their 13-player roster minimum.

Another option would be Sam Hauser and his $10M salary. His contract is small enough to be traded into an exception or cap room for teams with cleaner salary sheets. That and some trades involving the minimum deals above would accomplish the task. This would be even tougher to navigate with the player minimums, however. Turning Hauser and one or more others into zero returning players would put extra pressure on a Jrue Holiday trade to include three or more players coming back.

I lean towards Porzingis being the solution here. His expiring deal and dip in play this year make him an obvious candidate. Hauser did have a down year, but he fits the system well and is on the books for four more years. Trading Hauser for other players wouldn’t accomplish much due to the tax problems. So, of the more obvious solutions after Jrue, Kristaps makes the most sense.

However, Porzingis and Hauser aren’t the only solutions to this.

The Nuclear Option

One assumption I’ve made up until this point is that Boston is making these moves with the intention of returning to the fray with the same core after Tatum is healthy. Their star wing pairing, plus Derrick White and Payton Pritchard, can all stay on the roster while they duck the second apron. That would almost certainly make them a playoff team in a weak East next year with Brown, White, Pritchard, and whatever they get back for the above trades.

But there are alternatives. What if Boston looks at Derrick White, about to turn 31 and begin a four-year, $118 million extension, as a potential negative asset by the time Tatum returns? After all, defense-first guards tend to fall off cliffs sooner than expected. Perhaps Boston thinks it can get out of the casino before going bust by trading White to a more immediate contender, getting a big haul of picks, and truly re-tooling.

Pritchard is another question. His four-year, $30 million extension is an absolute steal for the Sixth Man of the Year. His upcoming $6.7M salary wouldn’t solve the tax problems by itself, but that low salary would certainly up his price in a potential deal.

Perhaps Boston thinks it can trim the fat on declining or less essential players and try to run it back in 2026-27. An alternative would be to trade White, Pritchard, and Hauser in addition to Holiday for short-term deals and let Porzingis stick around. That would clear a whopping $83.8 million, and open up nearly $60 million in cap room for the season when Tatum returns.

It would be a whole lot of uncertainty. That level of teardown could rip apart the fabric of Boston’s culture. Even if the internal promises to Tatum/Brown indicate this isn’t a true rebuild, it’s hard to trust someone on their word if the results are poor. There is the risk that if you break things apart you may be unable to build them again. But it could potentially raise the ceiling of the team once Tatum is back in the fold.

Which Way, Butler Man?

If you’ve taken anything away from this, know that Boston will be saying some tough goodbyes this offseason. And that general manager Brad Stevens will have many ways to accomplish this.

The fans’ goodwill after this injury effectively buys you a season to do what is needed. The title expectations are on hiatus. Stevens could trim salary, retain the core, and acquire some flexibility. Or he can take significant steps to reload Boston’s draft picks and try to fill as many rotation spots as possible with draft picks, enabling them to take a chance on acquiring more star talent.

There are so many variables at play here. Does the core want to stay? Will Al Horford wish to come back to a team that won’t be able to contend next season? Can stud head coach Joe Mazzulla coach a 45-win team the same way he can coach a 60-win team? Is Boston willing to risk getting Milwaukee’d by seeing one of their outgoing players end up on a team they’ll have to face in coming years, as Jrue Holiday did with their team? Most variable of all, does Boston believe that Tatum can come back strong after such a devastating injury?

I’d be surprised if any team is more active in trade calls this offseason. It’s an unusual position for a high-profile team to be quasi-sellers with two All-Stars on the roster, but thems the breaks. When that Shams Charania notification about Boston trading a piece away hits your phone this summer, you’ll know why these deals are being done.

The post The Boston Celtics Rebuild Window appeared first on Swish Theory.

It must also be said that these teams have just the right amount of neanderthal DNA to, sure, probably get curb-stomped by OKC in round 2, but to put on a show in the meantime. Through two games, WTF moments in the clutch and jagged edges — like Jokić’s defense and Dunn’s offense…Ben Simmons — have not subtracted intrigue, but added character. With a 1-1 split heading into Thursday’s game 3, each team has lost the game they played better in. These teams are weird! Anyway, let’s get to it.

Denver’s incomplete defense on Kawhi

Let’s start with the big stuff. Kawhi Leonard dropped 39 points in Game 2 after a poor Game 1, and the Denver Nuggets didn’t really adjust how they defended him when he got it going. Though he melted their face off with absurd shot-making, I’ve actually liked Denver’s overall philosophy vs. Kawhi. He got going early in Game 2 by feasting on cross-matches in semi-transition, but the Nuggets didn’t panic because they’ve been conceding switches and loading help toward him anyway.

That’s a fine plan, and they’ve been able to execute it without allowing Kawhi to create easy shots for his teammates, though Kawhi shoulders a chunk of the credit/blame there too. He has not made quick decisions with the ball in his hands.

But that didn’t save Denver in Game 2 because they didn’t finish possessions against Kawhi, hence the “incomplete” tag. The man is inhuman, and has proven that, with healthy legs, he can win series by performing how he did in Game 2, where he shot 15-of-19 from the floor. So Denver has to finish possessions, there is no point in showing help against him if it is indeed just for show (sound on):

Denver shouldn’t fear the possibility of Kawhi putting on a passing clinic by throwing cross-court lasers and manipulating defenders with his eyes. Over his 13 NBA seasons, that’s never been his M.O., and it still isn’t. That’s why LAC stays away from pick-and-roll led by Kawhi, given a near-turnover like this…

Just as important, the Clippers are always playing a poor 3-point shooter. Every single one of Kawhi’s minutes through two games have seen Kris Dunn, Derrick Jones Jr., or Ben Simmons on the floor with him, and occasionally two of those guys. Furthermore, any strategy geared toward forcing turnovers and speeding up the Clippers plays to Denver’s advantage.

They recorded the 7th-fastest pace in the NBA this year (PBP Stats) and had, by miles, the lowest 3PA rate. That’s a formula that limits randomness/shooting variance; playing at a slow pace and allowing Kawhi to get up 16 jumpers is not.

The idea of attacking Kawhi is frightening in any context, but in Game 3, Denver just might have to. They’ve thrown a lot his way thus far, but the kitchen sink remains in their back-pocket.

Limiting LAC’s two-man game

Let’s keep it on this end of the floor, where the Harden/Zubac pick-and-roll feasted in Game 1. Harden, looking quite spry, looked to get all the way to the basket, and in the first half, Nikola Jokić often did little more than escort him there…

Since then, Denver has played Jokić much higher up the floor, if not outright trapping or hedging ball-screens. (An awesome, very minor subplot of this series is Harden finding every angle possible to hit Zubac on the roll while Jokić tries to deflect those passes, just about the best hand-eye coordination battle you’ll find.)

The major subplot is what happens once Zu catches the ball, and it feels like both teams have left something on the table here. Zubac can make rudimentary reads quickly enough, and has gotten Kris Dunn a few layups off baseline cuts. However, they’re nobody’s idea of Draymond Green and Gary Payton II. Dunn has struggled to finish under any defensive pressure, and if they can take away his cut, Zubac has struggled to snap to the next read, a kick-out for three. In fact, his best offense has been simply going to work against whoever steps up to meet him.

Harden is key here, too. The more downhill pressure he applies, the deeper Zu’s catch inevitably is, and these two can play pitch-and-catch as well as any tandem…

After that play in Game 2, Jokić played even higher up the floor, and Denver produced the desired effect: Harden largely stopped trying to get downhill, whether by splitting a screen or by attacking Jokic’s outside hip. Can he dial up the pressure in Game 3 if Denver opens in the same coverage?

How much room do Harden, Zubac, and Dunn have to improve from game 2? To me, it’s a reasonable chunk. If Denver feels the same way, they should try to deny Zubac on the roll altogether. In this first play. Michael Porter Jr. helps off of Dunn to deny Zu, and Norm Powell promptly turns the ball over. In the second play, MPJ doesn’t leave DJJ, Zu catches it, and it leads to a wide-open three:

Yes, DJJ is on the strong-side in play #2, but perhaps gambling off him is worth preventing any sort of deep catch for Zubac.

The Harden/Zubac two-man game that so much of LAC’s offense is built around is in a fascinating spot entering Game 3. Each team has reason to adjust; for the Clips it could be setting the screen higher up the floor or making sure a 3-point threat is weak-side corner. Still, “play better” could simply be the adjustment.

If Denver believes the Clippers will indeed play better, they could get funky and put Aaron Gordon on Zubac, Jokić on Dunn, and switch screens. They’ve tried that on a single possessions so far, and it didn’t end well…

They could send more early help to take away Zu’s roll, but they might just feel confident where they’re at. We’ll soon see.

Will Jokić start launching?

As for that infamous two-man game on the other side, the Clippers have done fairly well defending Jamal Murray and Nikola Jokić so far. Kris Dunn deserves the lion’s share of the credit, as he’s been responsible for chasing Murray into tight, mid-range spaces, but then switching back out onto Jokić when he pops, otherwise known as a veer-switch. It looks something like this:

Jokić hands him three points, but this is the coverage the Clippers opened with in Game 1, and, 101 minutes of hoop later, they’re still leaning on it. Though Jokić shot 4-of-8 from deep in Game 2, it felt like he ignored five or six clean looks, many coming on pick-and-pops like this.

There are other ways for the Nuggets to counter this defense from the Clippers. Jokić simply rolling to the basket and posting Dunn or Derrick Jones Jr. has led to some favorable isolations for him. It also leads to confusion for Dunn and Zubac, when/if they actually commit to the late switch.

But the nuclear code Jokić could push at any time is something he’s always reluctant to do, and that’s to just let it fly. This coverage seems like a bet from the Clippers that, even if goaded into it, Jokić will not launch 12-15 threes in a game, even if he’s shooting just under 42% from deep, like he did in the regular season.

Late in Game 1, the Clippers went another route, pressuring Jamal Murray while meeting Jokić early on his catches. Nekias Duncan did a great job explaining how the Nuggets roasted that coverage; essentially, the Clips were spread too thin, unable to prevent open looks for capable if not elite shooters, and even less able to grab rebounds…

Have the Clippers already found their favorite answer to the Murray/Jokić love affair? Perhaps. The more juice you can squeeze out of Kris Dunn’s defense, the better. But this strategy also keeps them in their shell, keeps Zubac near the rim, and limits the opportunities for James Harden and Norm Powell to get caught ball-watching as cutters sneak behind them.

The real danger is that Jokić melts the Intuit Dome with a 3-point barrage on Thursday night. Does he want to?

Where’s the other two-man game?

Let’s end with a couple quick bites. In Game 1, the Nuggets targeted James Harden on defense by consistently involving Aaron Gordon with Nikola Jokić, either in off-ball screens or inverted pick-and-roll. Perhaps it’s Gordon’s limp calf, but rookie head coach David Adelman went to those actions far less in Game 2.

Why? Perhaps because Harden is the Clippers’ worst defender.

Let me explain: Per Cleaning the Glass, the Nuggets turned it over on a whopping 21.7% of their possessions on Monday, their second-worst mark of the season. Jokić had a rough game with seven of them, and frequently, it was Dunn, Nic Batum, or Kawhi jumping his passing lanes. In other words, the further L.A.’s best defenders were from the ball, the more havoc they wreaked.

The same could not be said of Harden and Powell, who did not provide much help in rotation:

So, with Harden on Gordon, is that why we didn’t see much of Denver’s front-court chemistry in Game 2, or was it an injury? Either way, the Nuggets have to get back to that two-man game, and find Gordon some easy rolls to the rim. The team that shot the highest percentage in the league on shots at the rim (Cleaning the Glass) is shooting just 57% at the rim through two games, which would have ranked as the worst mark in the NBA by light years.

I may know an all-time dunker that can help with that.

Please, Norm

The Clippers will not win this series if Norm Powell and Bogdan Bogdanović continue to struggle so mightily. However, Powell not only hit some huge shots late in the second half on Monday, but was the recipient of an (unscripted) play that stuck in my mind…

It was a rare instance of Norm directly benefiting from the attention his co-stars get, rather than simply trying to emulate them by creating from a stand-still. Even if Jokić isn’t in much drop coverage, the concept still works, getting Norm the ball on the second side with the defense ever-so-slightly out of whack.

There are many more wrinkles to this matchup we could discuss. (Please go look up Kris Dunn’s defensive highlights from this series.) Tyronn Lue has not remotely settled on a substitution pattern, and in Game 2 Ben Simmons was the game’s first sub. Harden also played a chunk of minutes without Kawhi or Zubac, which felt off at the time. The Nuggets are battling injury and fatigue across the board, and seem unsure whether to devote much energy to getting Michael Porter Jr. going.

No matter which of these storylines takes center stage in Game 3 and beyond, we do know that this series has been, and will continue to be awesome.

Prediction: Clippers in 6

The post Round One: Nuggets vs. Clippers appeared first on Swish Theory.

Those Rocket squads were potent, and they got close. Closer than anyone else got to beating a healthy KD-Steph Warriors team. But the results are the results, and Steph and Co. effectively broke the team up. Much has changed for both squads since then. But as the adage goes, the more things change, the more they stay the same. Six years later, we are back.

Now, Steph, Draymond Green, and Kevon Looney are the only holdouts from those 2010s slugfests. It’s a brand new matchup with brand new intrigue. I dug into the film of the past two matchups (post-Jimmy Butler acquisition) to explore the game plans from a Warriors and Rockets perspective. I’ll take my best stab at guessing what can tilt this matchup and what tactics we might see.

Sengun Matchups

There are a lot of interesting matchup questions concerning Alperen Sengun. Houston’s 22-year-old offensive focal point poses interesting questions for these small-ball Warriors on both ends. How Golden State covers and contains him on offense is one of the foremost questions here. One of their main tactics so far has been doubling him off the ball early or sending immediate help on his lethal post spin move.

Forcing Houston’s less capable offensive players to beat them off the double teams is key. The Warriors are comfortable in rotation, and timely, effective doubles will go a long way towards kneecapping their halfcourt offense.

What interests me more is how Rockets coach Ime Udoka deploys Sengun on defense. In their small-ball alignments, Draymond Green is the de facto center. But given how often he runs action with Steph Curry, Houston tries to hide him on less frequent screen partners. That has produced varying results, most often bad for Houston’s defense.

The Gary Payton II matchup was a pressure point for Golden State in the last matchup. He’s an effective screener and roller in addition to the corner shooting. If Sengun is stationed on GP2, expect a ton of ball screens called for by Steph or Jimmy Butler. When running the double big lineup with Steven Adams, Sengun was more often positioned on shooters, and his poor closeout speed creates open shots off the drive. Who Sengun covers and whether or not Golden State can take advantage is a major swing point in the series.

Small-Ball Rebounding

This is another huuuuge swing point. The Rockets had a 96th percentile offensive rebounding rate, and it gets even wilder when they run Steven Adams-Alperen Sengun lineups. Per Cleaning the Glass, lineups with those two rebounded 50.3% of their misses while allowing a paltry 17% offensive rebounding rate. Both marks are #1 for any two-man lineup combination. Go back to any of these games, and you can see instances of Rockets big men bullying the small-ball Dubs on the glass.

Lineup-wise, it’s going to be a big Kevon Looney series. One of the best defensive rebounders in the league, he will have to go crazy on the glass when in the game. The Loondog played 37 total minutes in the last two matchups and gobbled up 20 total rebounds. They’ll need that kind of performance to survive. On top of that, they’ll need rebounding effort from the small-ball units. Draymond needs to box out hard, Jimmy needs to pitch in all over the glass, and the perimeter guys need to crash hard. It limits their transition chances, but Golden State cannot afford to give Houston second and third chances regularly. It’s a sacrifice they have to make.

Golden State managed to win the offensive rebounding battle in the last contest, but lost it considerably in the first. In both instances, they lost the putback points per possession by a wide margin. Considering Houston’s putrid halfcourt offensive ratings of 68 and 82.1 points per 100 in the two matchups, more chances are their best shot to keep in the race.

Steph-Jimmy Off Ball Screens

This was perhaps the most dangerous action Golden State ran against Houston. It worked like a charm for Jimmy as Houston sold out to contain Steph’s off-ball production. Split action, wide pindown, it all works to get Jimmy downhill for rim looks and free throws.

The fouls Jimmy draws, and who he draws them on, will be a major swing factor in the series. These off-ball actions will create a lot of free throw attempts and put Houston players in foul trouble if run correctly. Keep an eye on Golden State running these actions when the halfcourt offense dries up and they require momentum.

Attacking Jalen Green

Perhaps no tactic stood out to me more in the last matchup. Whenever Jalen Green was on the floor, Golden State ran off-ball actions on his man, forcing him to move and communicate. Or they just attacked him outright on the ball. It was their most consistent source of offense in the April 6th game and kept them in it on a night where Steph Curry didn’t have it.

Houston can’t afford to limit Jalen’s minutes. He’s crucial to their offense as one of two players who can consistently self-create in the halfcourt. That means tons of opportunities to test his mettle on the other end. In just about any lineup Houston deploys, he will be the worst defender on the court, and coach Steve Kerr will surely beat off-ball actions on Jalen to death.

Fred VanVleet PNR

Take a breath, Warriors fans. I know seeing that name is traumatizing.

Luckily, this isn’t the FVV of old. The dad strength is gone, and this season was the worst offensive performance for the 31-year-old since his rookie year. He posted a career-low in usage rate while his points per 100 shot attempts and assist rates were the lowest since that rookie year. But he still plays an important role in this offense due to his pick-and-roll usage.

Per Synergy sports, FVV was a 97th percentile pick-and-roll usage player with 50th percentile efficiency. Middling efficiency isn’t a concern on most teams, but on a Houston team that is feeble in the halfcourt, anyone with high usage and average results is a point of concern. A lot of icing is the answer, forcing the ball out of his hands to trap the roller or force kickouts to less capable players.

Golden State has the athletes and the discipline to properly ice him out. The question becomes, can the Rockets’ role players make the Warriors pay for the aggressive coverage? Or will they stonewall the pick-and-roll enough to keep this halfcourt offense in the dumps?

Rockets Transition

Nothing better exemplifies the gap in athleticism between these teams than the transition game. When these Rockets get out and running, this aged and slow Warriors team has little chance to stop them.

I think Golden State did an okay job containing the Rockets in transition off of rebounds, especially when Draymond was out there. Off of turnovers, they had no chance, and it swung the result in the two matchups. The Warriors only turned it over 11 times in the first matchup and won. They coughed it up 20 times in the second matchup and lost. All of those above baskets came in transition. If they’re giving the ball away more than 15 times per game, Houston’s athletes will get out and run, and Golden State will be in huge trouble.

Dillon Brooks Offense

Rightfully so, Golden State fans point to Dillon Brooks’ 24-point performance in the last game as an outlier. His 10-of-13 shooting night is not likely to be repeated. What interests me is that Houston made it a point of emphasis to get him involved in that game and was rewarded for it.

When he was guarded by Steph and Buddy Hield, they had Dillon go after him early and often. Golden State is content to put their defensive weak links on him for two reasons. One, he is rarely involved in screening actions. Two, the guy just can’t dribble. And when he does make shots, he immediately heat checks like he’s prime Steph. For better or worse, the Warriors will live and die by letting Dillon take his shots. It bears watching if Houston will try to get him going early in these games.

Jimmy Butler Drives

Other than Steph running in circles, this is Golden State’s best source of offense. They’ll need a tough-nosed driver to get the defense in motion or create points in isolation. Playoff Jimmy is extremely capable of creating off the drive regardless of who is defending him.

On top of the shots it generates for himself and others, it’s going to draw a ton of fouls. Getting switches on their best offensive players like Jalen or FVV creates issues, or getting into the body of Sengun. He’s also unafraid of Dillon, Tari Eason, and Amen Thompson. Any fouls he can draw on their stalwart defensive options can go a long way in this series. Expect the Warriors to live and die by Playoff Jimmy’s offense.

The Amen Problem

I think of all the Rockets players, nobody creates more all-around issues than Amen Thompson. His exceptional defense, transition offense, and half-court versatility all pose issues. Those were on display in the last matchup as he was arguably their best player.

They’ll need to limit his transition chances, work hard to get him off Steph, and send bodies in the halfcourt when he gets downhill. Force him to pass, or he will dunk it on your head. Thompson’s level of impact on this series has the most swing potential of any player to me, and he will be a point of focus for both coaching staffs.

Jonathan Kuminga?

Stop me if you’ve heard this before: Warriors fans online are being irrational about a young player. Kuminga was benched outright for the last two games. With playoff stakes, coach Steve Kerr opted to make the fourth-year forward ride the pine. Luckily for Kuminga, this Rockets matchup may be how he gets back on the court. His athleticism is sorely needed, and he presents an interesting screening/ballhandling option against an offense that usually sits in deep drop or blitzes hard.

I’d expect Kerr to give Kuminga some run and see if he can impact the offense. Given Houston’s offensive issues, his lack of awareness off the ball becomes less of a problem. If he can contain ballhandlers and rebound well in addition to offensive utility, perhaps he can swing things in Golden State’s favor.

Odds and Ends

I could go on and on about the swing factors and tactics in this series. Will Quinten Post play minutes to space the floor and affect the glass? Will the Rockets’ defenders, namely Dillon Brooks, be allowed to grab and hit Steph with impunity like the last matchup? Can Tari Eason make an offensive impact while being wide open? What kind of impact can Moses Moody make on both ends? Will Ime Udoka once again be extremely annoying?

This is going to be a real race to 100 kind of series. Both teams have elite half-court defenses and major offensive questions. For me, the difference is the high-end star power and playoff scoring experience on Golden State’s side. Steph Curry and Jimmy Butler know how to get things done in this kind of environment. Memphis just found that out the hard way.

Houston will have to limit those two in addition to crushing the Dubs on the glass and in transition to pull this one out. The Warriors can afford to slightly lose those battles if the halfcourt defense holds up and one or both of Jimmy and Steph can get going on a given night. I think this ends with yet another Golden State victory over Houston and a severe dose of psychic trauma inflicted on Rockets fans yet again. Get ready for the slug fest.

The post Warriors vs. Rockets: Key Matchups and Tactics appeared first on Swish Theory.

You never know which version of this Orlando Magic team you’re going to get. Sporadic 3pt shooting. Roster-depleting injuries. Rotations lacking rhythm. But there’s two things you can always count on for this group:

1. Opponents scratching and clawing for every point against this pestering defense
2. When Paolo and Franz get going, this team can hang around with anyone.

Orlando’s defense is as impressive as any team in the league; this year the Magic are on track for their second straight season as the league’s 2nd-best rated defense. The one thing you never question is The Competitive fire. The Energy. The Hustle. (get well soon, Suggs.)

The offense, though, lives and dies with the consistency of its stars, not to mention the shooting luck of its role players. The difference between stars and superstars in this league is a little bit of super and a lot of consistency. Orlando’s two shooting star rising suns still have to find that consistency to make the last jump into the superstar galaxy.

This season, both players made leaps closer to that goal, becoming franchise cornerstones any time would build around. When you play the Magic, sometimes you get Boogie; sometimes you get The Beast.

How many NBA teams run their offense through a pair of 6’10” point-forwards? Two big wing scoring creators here to bend driving angles, hit tough shots, and create good looks for the team.

Often penetrating the paint with postups and pick-and-rolls, what are the odds these two big wings average the same 4.7 Assists Per Game with exactly 223 Drives a piece over the course of the season for the same team?

On most nights, The Magic’s offense relies on its star scorers accomplishing 3 main goals: Getting to the line, Scoring at the rack, and Creating open looks for others. Franz looks to methodically run P&R and DHOs, using the screener to create that half-step advantage into the paint with hostage dribbles and shifty direction-changing drives until he gets to the rim for his patented running flip shot, his dirk fade counter, or the lob to the roll man.

Paolo makes scoring look effortless, bringing the ball up the floor and deciding between a quick pull-up jumper, backing down his defender from the perimeter with brute strength, or simply driving through every defender in front of him for a Power Slam.

I asked Orlando Magic Head Coach Jamahl Mosley about the challenges that go into playcalling with players as talented and versatile as Paolo and Franz, where it feels like any play could work on any possession depending on matchups and lineups:

“I think a lot of it always boils down to their feel, their read, their recognition to who’s on the floor with them, and the spacing placed around them.” – Jamahl Mosley

Sometimes the role players’ 3pt shooting shows up, like in Cleveland in a National TV spot, and on those rare nights where this team has the “we can make 15 threes” factor in play, they look like they can compete with any team in the league. Other nights, they have trouble hanging with the bottom of the barrel, because when the shots don’t fall, the paint is packed, and every possession becomes a grind to force a stop and follow it up with a tough shot.

Sometimes you get Jekyll, sometimes you get Hyde; no matter which version of The Magic show up, it’s scary.

The Numbers

How do each of these rising stars’ stats compare to the rest of the league?

Franz’ +3.5 EPM rating ranks 19th in Estimated Plus Minus in the 96th percentile overall. Wagner has an elilte rating on both ends of the floor, rating in. the 90th percentile defensively (+1.3 D-EPM), and 91st percentile offensively (+2.2 O-EPM). Only 6 players with a higher EPM than Franz’ 3.5 EPM are also in the 90th percentile or higher on both ends, via Dunks and Threes. That puts Wagner in the company of NBA Stars who impact both sides of the floor, revealing that Franz is one of the best young rising two-way wings in the league.

This impact rating isn’t as high for Banchero despite his impressive box score stats, yet still rates in the 80th percentile overall (+1.0 EPM) and in the 81st percentile offensively (+0.9 O-EPM). In another impact metric called LEBRON, Paolo actually has a slight edge now at 1.43 to Franz 1.38 rating, while Franz still has the lead in LEBRON WAR (Wins Above Replacement) with 4.32 to Paolo’s 3.28.

Many Magic fans and skeptics around the league often debate who is the better player of the two, based on these impact numbers being higher for Franz than Paolo for one reason or another. Two prominent analytics folks have weighed in on the matter to help provide insight; in fact, its the people who created these very two impact metrics.


Taylor Snarr, the creator of EPM, was asked about this very topic in a recent F5 newsletter by Owen Phillips; here’s his thoughts:

I asked Krishna Narsu, the inventor of LEBRON, about this topic directly on my podcast, Learning Basketball. At the time, and up to that point in their careers, Franz had steadily rated higher than Paolo, despite Paolo scoring more points per game.

One might expect Franz’ impact to go down as his usage has gone up, but it hasn’t. Franz has stayed efficient when given Paolo’s #1 option touches due to injury, becoming the primary option defenses have to stop, yet his impact is as high as ever.

Krishna’s conclusion here at the time is that Franz impact stats are generally higher due to his playmaking creation for others, his shooting gravity on and off the ball, and his matchup difficulty as a more active defender. Doing more little things that impact winning than just smooth scoring and tough shot making.

That said, Paolo has finally reached the same level of impact via this metric, showing Paolo’s impact has risen as of late for making winning plays, improving as a shooter, producing as a scorer, and being a reliable scoring hub for the team.

Franz “Boogie” has been putting up legit All-Star numbers all season, averaging 24 PPG – 6 REB – 5 AST / 2 TO – 1 STL,
while shooting 54% 2P% on 13 2PA – 32% 3P% on 6 3PA – 88% FT% on 5 FTA. Franz has had marquee moments throughout the season, like going supersonic anytime he sees the Lakers, featuring a stepback game-winning kill shot on a 37 PTS – 11 AST – 6 REB – 4 STL evening in L.A.

Since the All-Star break, “The Beast” Banchero is scoring 29 PPG, which is 2nd only to The NBA’s Leading Scorer tough shot-making MVP-favorite superstar in Oklahoma City, Shai Gilgeous-Alexander. Paolo’s averaging 29 PTS – 7 REB – 4 AST / 2 TO – 1 STL in that 17gm stretch, while shooting 51% 2P% on 14 2PA – 37% 3P% on 7 3PA – 80% FT% on 10 FTA.

This success didn’t happen overnight; Paolo’s battled a tough injury all season, one that has taken time to fully recover from even while playing games. The standard is so high for the former Duke star that when he was averaging 22 PTS 7 REB 5 AST for 21 games after coming back from injury, outsiders still expected more.

One smart evaluator who looks at the game with a unique eye for physical movement pointed out he didn’t quite have the same leg strength back yet that makes his game so deadly. (h/t @Polarfall on Twitter)

I asked Paolo about his injuries, the physical and mental aspect of recovering and finding a rhythm after the comeback, and how the team’s mindset has been dealing with so many different injuries this season to key players.

Averaging 31 PPG – 8 REB – 4 AST – 1 STL in 14 games since this question, it’s safe to say Banchero is back to his star self.

Against Charlotte on March 25th, Paolo became the first Magic player since Dwight to drop 30+ PTS in four straight games, joining Dwight, Shaquille O’Neal, and Tracy McGrady as the only players in team history to drop 30+ PTS in 4+ straight games, via Magic PR. Against Dallas on March 27th, Paolo did it again, becoming has become the first Orlando Magic player since T-Mac and Shaq as the only players in team history to score 30+ PTS in FIVE straight games

That only scratches the surface of the scoring run The Beast is on. Paolo’s dropped 30+ PTS sixteen times this season Banchero’s posted fifteen straight games with 20+ PTS, a Career-High. Throw in four games scoring 40+ PTS for good measure, including his career-high 50-Burger against Indiana in the 5th game of the season, just before going down to injury. For all we know, Paolo could have been headed for an All-NBA team between his production and where the Magic could have been in the standings had he (Franz, Suggs, Moritz, Goga) not lost so many games to injury.

Seemingly every night, Paolo Banchero ties or sets a record not seen in Orlando since the Magic Mount Rushmore stars who have graced the blue and white pinstripes before him.

• First player to score 40+ PTS in multiple games in multiple seasons since T-Mac & Shaq after his shootout with Steph (56 PTS) in Orlando.
• Against Toronto, he drilled the most FGs made in a quarter without a miss (8/8 FG) since Shaq.
• After a game in Atlanta, Banchero became the 3rd player in Magic history to have multiple games of 35+ PTS, 10+ REB, and 5+ AST, joining, you guessed it, T-Mac (16x) and Shaq (3x).

I asked Orlando Magic Head Coach Jamahl Mosley how Sequencing factors into his playcalling to keep defenses on their toes with counters of similar plays: “it’s part of the game. it’s the game read. it’s the game feel.”

By The Numbers…

Banchero & Wagner have shared three games this season where they both post a statline of 25+ PTS – 5+ AST – 5+ REB in the same game, the most for a set of teammates in Orlando Magic history.


Paolo is scoring 25.7 PPG, tied for 10th with Cade Cunningham, meaning he scores slightly more points per game than Devin Booker, Anthony Davis, LaMelo Ball, Damian Lillard, Kyrie Irving, LeBron James, Karl-Anthony Towns, and Zion Williamson.

Franz is scoring 24.4 PPG, ranking 20th among all players, sitting just ahead of Steph Curry, Trae Young, and Victor Wembanyama

Paolo’s 7.2 RPG is T-47th with Zion Williamson.
Franz’s 5.7 RPG is T-92nd with Jaylin Williams, Anthony Edwards, Dyson Daniels, and Guerschon Yabusele.

Franz and Paolo are both tied at exactly 4.7 APG a piece, T-51st among all players.

Franz 1.3 SPG is T-37th with many including Lonzo Ball, Bilal Coulibaly, Amen Thompson, Jaren Jackson Jr., Bam Adebayo, Anthony Davis, Jaylen Brown, Donovan Mitchell, and Chris Paul.
Paolo’s 0.8 SPG is T-169th with many players including Giannis Antetokoumnpo, Ben Simmons, Evan Mobley.

Paolo draws the 3rd most Free Throws at 8.3 FTA/gm, converting 73% FT%.
Franz draws the T-25th most Free Throws at 5.4 FTA/gm, hitting 86% FT%.

Paolo shoots the T-56rd most three pointers per game at 6 3PA, the same volume as Gradey Dick, Cade Cunningham, Jamal Murray, Jalen Brunson, and Naz Reid(!)
Franz shoots 30% 3P% from deep on the T-65th most three pointers per game at 5.8 3PA, the same volume as LeBron James, Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, Jared McCain, Desmond Bane, Andrew Wiggins, Jaylen Brown, Max Strus, and Kristaps Porzingis.

Franz is shooting 36% in the clutch on 15/42 FG.
Paolo is shooting 47% in the clutch on 21/45 FG.

Franz Wagner isn’t just Top-15 in PPG and Fast Break PTS, he’s rated even higher in four areas; Franz is exactly the 6th best player in the league this season at scoring Points in the Paint (13 PTS), Points on Drives (10 PTS), and Points off Turnovers (4 PTS) via the Orlando Magic broadcast team.

Paolo Banchero is similarly great in some of these areas, as these are two of the premier paint penetrators in the sport. Paolo averages as many PTS off Drives as Giannis (8.2), T-16th, and scores exactly 10 PTS in the Paint per game, ranking 29th.

In 809 MIN with Franz & Paolo both ON the court together, Orlando has a +2.2 Net Rating.
In 979 MIN with just Franz ON the court and Paolo OFF, Orlando has a +7.74 Net Rating.
In 484 MIN with just Paolo ON the court and Franz OFF, Orlando has a -8.85 Net Rating.

One thought with having multiple point guard creators on the same team is that one can be on the floor at all times; the same can be applied to having two stars, especially when both can serve as an offensive hub every second on the floor.

As the season has gone on, it appears these two are staggered more and more, where goal is to play as few seconds of basketball as possible without one or both of them on the floor – against Charlotte before the All-Star break it was 6 minutes; against Atlanta after the ASB it was 30 seconds; against Memphis the next night it was 4 minutes.

I asked Jamahl Mosley after the Grizzlies matchup what factors come into play when deciding between staggering Franz’ and Paolo’s minutes compared to the benefits of playing them together and keeping a balanced second unit in place behind them:

Volume & Efficiency

Below’s a chart that compares the two stars shooting touch in three efficient shot locations:

Shooting Touch – At The Rim, Free Throw Line, Beyond The Arc

Paolo shoots better from deep on and off the ball.

Franz shows better touch on a much higher volume of shots at the rim on layups and FLOATAs.

Franz shoots much better at the pinstripe, while Paolo gets to the line more often.

Synergy help us see the volume and efficiency for each Player based on the playtypes they categorize every possession into.

Keep in mind, that these tracking stats are still a work in progress; these stats measure the *final* action of a possession – for example, if a team runs 2 pick-and-rolls in a row bending the defense, and then follows that up with 1 handoff that results in shot attempt, that play is tracked as 1 Handoff Possession.

The two charts below shows how Franz and Paolo stack up in every Synergy Playtype as scorers, while 3 playtypes including both scoring and passing to teammates to compare them as Scoring Creator Offensive Engines: ISO, Post Ups, P&R Ball-Handler

To no surprise, Paolo Banchero has the efficiency edge in ISOs, Drives, and Spot Ups; what is interesting is Paolo is also more efficient on Cuts and in Transition this year.

As expected, Franz Wagner is more efficient running Handoffs and P&R as the ball-handler; what may come as a surprise is that Franz is also more efficient as the P&R Roll-Man and as a Post-Up creator hub this season.

One important note is that volume for some of these plays is drastically different. Paolo has 16 handoffs, 35 cuts, 75 P&R roll-man plays on the year; Franz is up to 68 handoffs, 90 cuts, and 30 P&R roll man possessions.

Both big wings like to leak out in Transition, scoring 1.14 and 1.22 PPP respectively on a total of 391 fast break possession between them.

What really stands out for Paolo is his scoring versatility – Paolo averages between 0.93 PPP and 0.99 PPP on his five most common halfcourt playtypes, which might be roughly average efficiency overall, but on high volume these can be reliable actions.

As for Franz, the combined P&R Ball-Handler efficiency and volume jumps off the page, creating over 1.0 per possession on extremely high volume. His efficiency is very good and doesn’t drop off the more the team runs him through the action. This is by far Orlando’s most reliable set to create a good shot through Franz as the offensive engine.

The numbers supporting Post Ups for Franz makes one do a double take. Paolo is the star swishing beautiful baseline fadeaways, yet the numbers say Franz creates more efficient offense for the team when running through him through the post. Franz creates 1.13 PPP on 104 possessions; Paolo creates 0.98 PPP on 131 possessions.

I asked Jamahl Mosley about the advantages created by moving Franz off ball around screens before initiating the downhill action, like in sets like Chicago and Peja where Franz will run around the perimeter through screen(s) into a handoff that helps give him separation from his defender.

Jamahl notes that this idea of creating advantages by moving off ball, gain ahead of steam, running defenders through screens, to create a situation where the scorer can shoot drive or kick with an advantage already created, is the goal for not just Franz, but all of the team’s scoring options:

Tracking The Assist Combo

Sometimes Boogie looks for The Beast; sometimes The Beast needs a little Boogie.

Paolo assisted Franz 40 times this year, the most of any duo on the team; Franz found Paolo for 27 dimes this season, the T-5th most of any combo on the team.

They have both assisted each other directly at the rim exactly 18 times a piece, T-3rd most of any duo on the team.

Considering how few games these two have actually played together, these marks show how they both prioritize looking for each other on the court for the most efficient shot in halfcourt – at the rim.

As for the costars finding the rest of the team for good looks at the rim and beyond the arc, Franz has created more total shots for his teammates (89 3PT AST, 110 ATR AST) compared to Paolo’s totals (72 3PT AST, 52 ATR AST), partially due to playing more games this season.

However, when the number is based on racking up dimes on a more comparable one-to-one scale of per one hundred possessions, the shot creation rates look much closer.

Paolo creates more looks for the team from deep (3.02 3PT AST per 100 poss),
but fewer dimes at the rim. (2.13 ATR AST per 100 poss)

Franz creates fewer looks for the team from deep (2.8 3PT AST per 100 poss),
and a much higher rate of dimes at the rim. (3.4 ATR AST per 100 poss)

(assist combo numbers via 3.18.25)

Boogie Nights

Some of Orlando’s many 4pt swings each game comes when the defense forces a turnover, the ball finds Franz, he immediately looks up the floor, and finds Banchero streaking down the sideline outlet for a breakaway slam, or he pushes the pace to create a 2-on-1 alley oop lob to Banchero on the break.

The majority of Franz assists to Paolo came in transition for 10 fast break buckets.

The 2nd-most assists from Franz to Paolo came on the move in the half court, with 8 assists coming on off ball cuts and 3pt kickouts.

The Franz-Paolo Pick-and-Roll hasn’t been used often, but it stands as a powerful weapon up Orlando’s sleeve going forward that unlocks Paolo as a short-roll playmaker and Franz as an on-ball creator with a screen, both pulling attention from defenses.

I asked Jamahl Mosley how high the volume of the Franz-Paolo P&R could reach for Orlando as one of the team’s staples sets:

“I really do believe that those two create a problem. And so, when you have two of your best players in P&R — they’ve got to make a decision — and they’re both great playmakers. And so, I think them being able to make plays and read off each other is something that can cause problems for a defense down the stretch.” – Jamahl Mosley

This action sets up the playfinishers around those two to finish at the rim or from beyond the arc. Send two at Franz or Paolo if you like living in your own nightmare.

Franz found Paolo 3 times for assists when running P&R. On two other possessions, Paolo drew a shooting foul after Franz found him in the 2-man P&R set.

Unleash The Beast

Oddly, Paolo did not assist Franz one time in any inverted P&R, and that action doesn’t seem to be used often where Paolo is initiating and Franz is the roll man, probably since this duo’s strengths may be most effective as a combination in the order described before with Franz on ball and Paolo setting the first screen.

Paolo most often found Franz on off ball cuts or relocation threes 21 times.

Winning early post positioning has been key to unlocking quick easy baskets for these two, looking for each other up the court once one has secured the advantage under the rim deep into the paint before the defense is set. One of the most reliable buckets every game is Franz taking off in transition, planting his feet deep in the paint, posting up the first mismatch he sees. Paolo hit ahead to Franz in transition 13 times.

Paolo also found Franz 2 times in the post after securing positioning advantage in halfcourt situations. Sometimes you’ll see one set a back screen for the other in the middle of a set like Horns to help force switches and create mismatches, shown here:

Finding a guard concept that works around Paolo and Franz is the next step

Orlando’s up and down season can be directly attributed to injuries first, and shooting luck second. Even this late in the season has seen volatile stretches, with the team now 6-4 in their last 10 after bouncing back from an 5-game losing streak. What’s been the difference as of late outside of the chemistry of these two stars?

Anthony Black‘s play has been the wildcard factor for this team. His defense is reliable enough to start every night, and his decision-making feel is special, two traits that define the strengths of his game. Even though he’s just in Year 2, he’s become the team’s third scorer, first option off the bench, and third big playmaker who can initiate offense and even space the floor.

When AB’s shot is falling and he finds a way to score, this team is often more competitive:

in Orlando’s 33 wins with AB playing, he scores 11 PPG on 60% TS% and 43% 3P%
in Orlando’s 37 losses with AB playing, he scores 8 PPG on 45% TS% and 20% 3P%

Black continues to develop the 3pt shot despite receiving constant criticism of his shot. In his last 31 games, Black is shooting 40% 3P% from deep on 2.6 3PAs per game; in his 39 games prior, Anthony shot 24% 3P% on 2.4 3PA per game.

I asked Anthony Black about his about his changing role due to injuries and his 3pt development after a 4/5 3P outing “I’m pretty comfortable playing where I’m at right now. It gives me a chance to operate a little bit, while also playing some minutes with our two guys.”

Another underrated factor has been the addition of 33yo Cory Joseph into the starting lineup.

You know a team is shuffling the rotation with injuries when arguably the 7th guard on the roster to start the year is now their most trustworthy starter.

Credit to Cory for doing the little things that have earned that spot: team-first ball movement, hit the open shot, run some O when called upon, take what the D gives you, hold your own defensively. Joseph serves as a fine example of the type of connector floor-stretching plus-defender guard who can slide right into an offense featuring two big wing playmaking initiators.

Orlando has a +8.9 rating in 173 MIN when they play Cory Joseph alongside Boogie and The Beast.

Cory earned the starting job after an impressive stretch against Toronto. Despite losing the game, Orlando mounted a 14pt comeback after inserting Joseph into the game to close with 10 MIN to play for the first time all night, making Cory a +14 on the night. He’s started ever since, leading Orlando to a .500 record after a rough stretch after the All-Star break.

I asked Jamahl Mosley how much he trusts the veteran experience of Cory Joseph after the game:

There’s no more debate to be had; Franz Wagner & Paolo Banchero are NBA Stars, rising suns for a team with the 2nd best defense in the league for the second straight season.

What separates the Orlando Magic from pretenders to contenders is that volatile 3pt factor. Whether they find a guard who can draw two on the ball with pull-up 3pt gravity or flank these two supernovas with more consistent shooters, that’s the last step to go from making the playoffs to competing in them.

The cool thing about this article is it starts and ends with the same picture – the Magic’s defense runs on Chaos Energy, and once Boogie and The Beast carve out the super to their star, this team might just mess around and find the rings they covet.

Stats via Synergy, NBA Stats, Basketball Reference, Dunks and Threes, and Magic PR as of 03.27.25 unless otherwise noted

The post Boogie and The Beast appeared first on Swish Theory.

For the third straight season to begin his career, the Houston Rockets are much better when Eason is on the court. And he’s covered his bases, improving a bad team in 2023, a mediocre team (albeit in just 480 minutes) in 2024, and a good team here in 2025. Better yet, the Rockets improve exactly where you’d expect them to, given Eason’s play-style.

In each of the soon-to-be-24-year-old’s first three seasons, the Rockets…

• take more shots directly at the rim
• shoot more free-throws
• grab (far) more offensive rebounds
• force more turnovers
• and thus, initiate transition offense more often

…when Eason is on the court, vs. when he sits (per Cleaning the Glass).

It’s turned out be quite the marriage between team and player. On a team full of quick, long-armed athletes who struggle to shoot the 3-pointer, Eason helps the Rockets play the way they need to play. Throughout Swish Theory’s installments of Finding a Role, including my earlier introduction of this season’s crop of players, Eason may be the closest to having found a role.

Alas, some brake-pumping is required. It’ll be tough to gauge his individual offense in such a unique(-ly congested) offensive environment in these upcoming playoffs, but we should still learn much about Eason’s viability in the half-court. Despite an uninspiring 3-point shooting profile for an off-ball wing (34.6% on 5.3 largely stationary catch-and-shoot attempts per 100 possessions), there are long stretches of off-ball production.

He applies earnest pressure on the rim in his off-ball role, often turning his many cuts into offensive rebounds. Pairing quite well with Alperen Şengün’s work around the blocks and elbows, Eason is timing his movement and recognizes gaps in the defense better than ever before. The first put-back here is an absolute beauty:

His offensive rebounding game blends with his cutting in Houston’s offense. If, say, Şengün or Dillon Brooks miss him roaming the baseline, then Eason ends up on the block, in prime position to put back one of the many mid-range shots the Rockets take.

Thus, Eason is a more willing outside shooter than the raw volume suggests. He doesn’t pass up a ton of open catch-and-shoot threes, even above-the-break; in fact, he’d probably be taking eight or nine 3PA’s per 100 if he wasn’t one of the league’s more active cutters/rebounders from the wing, despite a slow release.

The bigger road-block to half-court versatility (Synergy Sports has Eason has a 22nd percentile scorer in spot-up situations) is what happens when he gets downhill. This strong, rangy Rocket has some athletic deficiencies, believe it or not. A lack of vertical athleticism and flexibility/balance often pop up on his drives. In other words, if Eason has to avoid a defender in mid-air — say on an up-and-under move — he’s likely missing that look:

Eason’s drives finish more smoothly when he gets to two feet, true of most players.

And in fairness, it seems as if he’s made a concerted effort to slow down in the lane, getting to two feet more often. After shooting 56.1% at the rim over his first two seasons, he’s at 63.9% in 2025, much more appropriate for his 6’8″, plus-wingspan frame (Cleaning the Glass).

But as I noted in Eason’s introduction, his passing is likely the key to upping his value, especially in a different team context than Houston’s. His passing numbers still resemble the head-down play-finisher he is, but the flashes don’t. This is particularly true in transition, where Eason is a threat to grab, go, and make a high-value read. In the half-court, there are more tunnel-vision moments, but still plays that resemble his transition game.

It’s not that Eason can’t make the reads. Partially evidenced by his off-ball activity, he understands pressure points and rotations, particularly in advantage situations. It’s when he’s pressed for time — attacking a crowded paint instead of dribbling the ball end-to-end — that his decision-making wavers.

Per Synergy, Eason has only attempted a dozen shots as the screener in pick-and-roll situations this season. The Rockets don’t have a ton of guards defenses need to double, but at some point, hopefully soon, he gets some opportunities in the short-roll. Blessing him with some 4-on-3 situations and more familiar floor balance than dribble-drives should provide some insight as to his play-making ceiling.

Thanks to the NBA’s publicly available tracking data, we know Eason averages 8.4 potential assists + hockey assists per 100 touches, in line with fellow off-ball wings Kelly Oubre and Dorian Finney-Smith, but higher than teammates Jabari Smith Jr. and Cam Whitmore. (For reference, Royce O’Neale, one of the NBA’s great off-ball passers, is averaging north of 20 potential assists + hockey assists per 100 touches.)

If you were completely unfamiliar with Tari Eason prior to this article, and, after reading about his offense, you now had to speculate how he plays defense … I think you could do it.

He creates chaos, with a insane combined steal + block rate a hair under 6% — to be clear, that means nearly 6% of all possessions end with him stealing the ball or blocking a shot:

Of course, Eason is prone to a high foul-rate and some overly risky moments, as with any gambler of his caliber. This is mostly fine with Houston, perpetually eager to get out in transition and avoid running their often stagnant half-court offense.

Still, experience is getting to Eason. There are plays driven by recognition and understanding that he would not have made over his first two seasons. Here, Jayson Tatum uses double-drags, with Eason’s man setting the first screen:

Eason initially switches his assignment, readying for Tatum to turn the corner, only to step back up and offer a strong contest, though Tatum makes the pull-up three anyway.

Though the Rockets are experimenting with Eason’s matchups, he seems more comfortable guarding up than down. His screen-navigation, though occasionally solid, leaves something to be desired…

…and his penchant for poking at the ball can leave him vulnerable to smaller, quicker players blowing right by him.

Conversely, Eason is comfortably boxing out bigger players down low, and even attacking ball-handlers in 2-on-1 situations. Not only can he switch onto opponents, but thanks to his improved awareness and anticipation skills, we could see some drop coverage in his future, similar to Dorian Finney-Smith moonlighting as a micro-ball 5 throughout his career.

Like the Houston Rockets as a whole, Eason’s playoff fortunes could depend largely on matchup. Teams with such limited outside shooting can’t survive any random opponent, just like modern wings. But Eason is truly finding a role, and he helps make the Rockets who they are.

Thanks to his constant pressure on both sides the ball, Tari Eason is going to force his way onto the court come late-April. How that goes, though, is anybody’s guess.

The post Finding a Role: Tari Eason Update appeared first on Swish Theory.

The 7-1 start in the Jimmy era has certainly provided some answers. The team’s energy has returned, and vibes are undoubtedly restored. The initial numbers are positive, as the vibe shift translates to on-court results. Most notable to me is the discovery of a new lineup that has resuscitated their efficacy on both ends of the floor and could be a major tool come playoff time. That lineup consists of Stephen Curry, Brandin Podziemski, Moses Moody, Jimmy Butler, and Draymond Green.

First, some stats for this lineup. It’s far and away the preferred Jimmy Butler unit since the deadline with more than twice as many possessions as the next lineup, and it is efficient. So far, the unit boasts a 114.7 offensive rating (57th percentile) and a 100.8 defensive rating (99th percentile), good for a +14 net rating that is 96th percentile amongst all five-man units per Cleaning the Glass (go subscribe to their service, by the way!). This is accomplished through their elite turnover and free-throw gaps, uncommon for this iteration of the Warriors.

This five-man unit boasts a 10.1% turnover rate (99th percentile) while turning over their opponents 19.4% of the time, a 94th percentile mark. The free throw gap is just as preposterous with a 22.3% free throw rate (90th percentile) and only allowing a 9.8% mark on defense, tops in the league. They also manage comparable eFG% numbers (50.8% to 53%) and offensive rebound rates (29% to 27%). Winning three of the four factors, and dominating two of them, is an excellent formula for success.

Now, more important stats: the halfcourt. Their 107.1 offensive rating in the halfcourt is a 95th percentile mark while generating a 94th percentile mark of transition looks. These Dubs are also holding their opponents to an 87.5 rating in the halfcourt as well. Those are numbers you can build on in the playoffs.

Alright, those were a lot of numbers. Unless you are completely new to my work you’ve probably guessed what comes next: copious amounts of film. I watched all 319 plays with these five players on the floor so we could learn what led to this early success and discern what is sustainable versus what can be exploited.

Stop me if you’ve heard this before: Steph makes a Warriors lineup entirely possible. Unsurprisingly, even at 36 years old, he is the bellwether of the Dubs. So for the sake of this article, I’ll work in a rough descending order of who dictates the success of this lineup. We’ll start with none other than Wardell himself.

Steph

The first 50 games of the season felt like watching a prolonged crucifixion on offense. Steph was sent out there every night to die for the sins of the organization, doomed to give his life just to eke out a passable team offense. With Jimmy Butler on the floor, that burden has been eased considerably, and the results show. He’s gotten his energy back and is attacking switches and isolations with renewed vigor.

Reducing the amount of players you can help off has given Steph and Draymond newfound space to work their two-man game. When the other three are a clear threat to score, they might be frozen on the right alignments and allow a 2v2 to unfold.

Still, Curry is going to see his fair share of double teams. The four-man unit around him has handled these chances well. A mix of good decision-making and various scoring tools has led to some great looks.

He’s the worst defender on the floor in this lineup. However, he can still funnel well, a tactic this lineup will utilize even more than normal Warriors lineups. The problem is that the 5-man unit is lacking in size before you even get to Curry, who is a couple of inches shorter than his compatriots. That problem shows up more in help defense and rebounding than at the point of attack.

All things have balance. Steph does more for the other four to get them good looks; it’s only appropriate that they have his back on the uglier end of the floor.

Jimmy

The Jimmy Butler acquisition opened up one of the deadliest actions this team can run. Split actions are common with many combinations of perimeter players and bigs, and Steph/Jimmy split cuts were expected to be a source of excitement. So far, the results have been exceptional for Jimmy, allowing him to get into the paint freely by using Steph’s gravity.

The reverse side of that is Jimmy’s driving opening up looks for everyone else. Driving and kicking or finding cutters is a great way to jumpstart the motion offense, and he seems to get it immediately.

This lineup has also buoyed the best parts of Jimmy’s game: driving and posting up. If you take away the ability to help early on his drives or properly double-team his post-ups, he will have clean looks in the paint all night and plenty of trips to the free throw line.

It strikes a good balance so far that takes advantage of Jimmy’s offensive instincts, size, and floor mapping. Accentuating his best scoring methods without over-exerting him bodes well for this team. It also enables him to make a major impact on the defensive end of the floor.

Jimmy’s skill as a rotator and rebounder with his size and instincts is impressive. He can make plays all over the floor while trusting the rotations behind him and the funneling skills in front of him. There have been moments where he feels hesitant at times, but he’s learning to get in the flow with 4 guys who have been playing together for a season and a half. It’ll come in time. For now, I’ll settle for some strong double teams and boards while he learns to play off the following defensive force.

Draymond

Whew. Nobody has been more invigorated by the Butler acquisition than Draymond Green.

We saw it early on how he’s been thriving again on offense working a two-man game with Steph and making plays when he’s double-teamed. It feels like the Dray of old. Sprinkle in some open threes and transition looks and suddenly he’s becoming a productive offensive player again.

The real standout here is how his defense has been transformed in this lineup. The trust he has in his rotations behind him and the technically sound containment in front of him looses him like the Tasmanian Devil on opponents. Here’s just a snatch of his elite rotation and help defense with this group:

No real change in his game to be noted in this lineup. It just feels like the Dubs are turning a giant dial that says “Draymond Green” to the max and looking at the audience for approval.

Podz

Now is when things get interesting. The star trio coalescing and playing well is a pleasant development but not necessarily a surprising one. A guy who’s been struggling all year turning into a high-level starter seemingly overnight is eye-opening. What has impressed me the most is how Podz has begun to capitalize on his defensive potential with this unit, making a huge impact with his funneling skills first and foremost.

Funneling your man out of the middle and into the help of Draymond Green, Jimmy Butler, and Moses Moody is a great formula to stay in the lineup defensively. Some outright stops or trail blocks will be welcome. He’s made an impact with his double teams too, blowing up actions left and right while maintaining good hands off the ball to generate steals. But the most important thing he brings to this lineup is the rebounding prowess from the guard spot.

Draymond, Moses, and Jimmy will throw around some hard boxouts, enabling Podz and Steph to come in and clean up the glass. They’re rebounding very well as a unit (more on this later) and Podz is a key cog in that equation. His size and nose for the ball have always produced strong rebounding numbers across several levels of basketball, and it’s much needed to make this unit work. If you want to read more about Podz’s talents as a rebounder, I wrote about it last year.

Offensively, he’s doing an excellent job at filling gaps. He’s the third most versatile scorer in this lineup behind Steph and Jimmy but has a lessened burden to contribute. That gives him the range to focus on his defense while finding ways to contribute as a shooter, closeout attacker, cutter, screener, and transition weapon.

That last part is the most important to me: transition. This lineup has managed to create a 98th percentile transition offense frequency, yet their 1.00 PPP mark in the open floor is abhorrent, to say the least. They desperately need someone to trigger good looks for others and find spots to pick for their shot. Podz’s passing and finishing talents mixed with youthful energy and his halfcourt defensive positions bode well for transition success.

I’ll be keeping a very close eye on Podz in these lineups going forward. The quality of his play might be the most important tipping point given his past inconsistencies and specific skillset. Here’s hoping he continues to thrive with these four.

Moses

It speaks a lot to the talent and cohesion of this lineup that Moses is arguably the fifth starter here, yet remains very impactful. The Dubs are now up to 11-0 this year when Moses starts a game and 21-27 otherwise. That’s not just happenstance.

Within this lineup, Moses is the most accomplished perimeter defender. His length and footwork combo, with some solid funneling instincts, makes him outstanding against most matchups. Podz and Steph can funnel well but are unlikely to stop a drive outright. Moody can do that or make a drive so dire that the driver is extremely vulnerable to help.

His size also leads to different usages when off the ball. He’s more than capable as a low man rotating or boxing out for rebounds and crashes well after shots go up. The athleticism makes him a defensive threat in transition as well, a large reason why this lineup has successfully closed down transition chances at a high rate.

I’ve especially liked seeing his synergy with the help in these lineups; defending in tandem with Draymond or Jimmy has produced wonderful results.

When you are taking on tough assignments, 75% of your floormates being experienced veterans helps a lot with your trust and confidence. This lineup unlocks a level of defensive intensity he has not discovered before.

On the offensive end of the floor, he holds similar responsibilities to Podziemski with slightly less handling. Shoot when open, crash the glass, screen, cut, and get to work in transition. Per usual he’s done a great job at all aspects of his role.

Moody has always been great at playing within himself offensively. As the 4th/5th scoring option in this lineup, he won’t take chances away from others by forcing things and capitalizes well on the chances given to him. If he can mix in some quality drives and glass crashes, he can be more than a 3-and-D player, which is all they need him to be in the first place.

Team Play and Strategy

As previously mentioned, funneling is a fundamental Warriors tactic. Double teams and icing the pick-and-roll play into that equation as well. They’re comfortable in rotation as a defense so forcing the issue is a benefit. It’s led to some wonderful moments of team defensive play in the halfcourt.

The team transition scoring has been tough, but transition chances are a goal with their 94th percentile transition frequency. The poor results have largely come from hesitancy as this less-than-speedy lineup is not pushing things hard. Yet there have been some moments of great team play in transition that I’ve enjoyed greatly.

What’s more absurd is that despite the lowly offensive rating in transition, this lineup manages to boast a +15.8 net rating in transition so far due to a wild 84.2 DRTG in the open court. There have been moments of brilliance, largely by Draymond Green. However, this looks like a bubble ready to pop. They’re allowing a high frequency of transition looks off live rebounds and have been burned by simply being too tired, not athletic enough, or not attentive enough.

This is certainly a playoff-intensity sort of lineup, and the concern is lessened come April but not gone entirely. They’ll need to continue limiting turnovers and picking offensive rebound opportunities well to limit the transition chances. Draymond can paper over a lot defensively in the open floor but he cannot do everything. Finding a way to keep chances low and relatively covered will be paramount for their success.

A last strategy point that may prove a weakness is the size. As previously mentioned, they have nobody taller than 6’7″ in this lineup, and it brings a host of weaknesses. They’ve been susceptible to offensive rebounds and post-up chances by the league’s taller players.

They need to be crisp with their double teams and help to deter these bigs on the block and rebound well as a team to maintain some control. They can control the floor horizontally with their ability to fly around and pack the paint, but you can only control so much vertically. The tallest trees soak up the most sun at the end of the day. Luckily, there have been lots of great team rebounding moments with this lineup:

On the whole, this lineup is extremely good despite these flaws and has ways to control these flaws. There’s a lot of season left to play but I’m keeping my eye on this grouping. Last night’s game against Orlando was a wake-up call of sorts, and the first time this lineup hasn’t closed a close game since the trade deadline. When teams throw two bigs at them and begin controlling the paint, countermeasures have to be deployed. Will it be the same when they come up against Oklahoma City’s twin towers, or Nikola Jokic and Aaron Gordon?

Flaws will be managed in the long run. They may have unlocked a lineup that could carry them up the Western Conference standings and put the fear of God into a team in round one. From there, who knows how high it could take them?

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