They’re not entirely wrong. It’s impossible to be a complete developmental determinist given the confluence of factors related to both the drafting team and the mental makeup of the player. These are intuitively important but difficult to decipher without being involved in the draft process with a team.

But what’s frustrating is that “crapshoot” canonically implies utter randomness, as if the entire evaluative and developmental process is entirely unpredictable. It ignores that certain loci of traits are associated with differing rates of development, a principle that forms the basis of my current draft research.

Moreover, even if we know that college production does not exactly scale to pro production, there’s a mountain-load of evidence that suggests stronger age-adjusted production yields better professional results.

This makes the Egor case seemingly open and shut.

At first glance, this is an unmitigated disaster. Egor had a sorta defensible 4.7 BPM… but he was infamously stat-padding against inferior competition. 26 of his 33 games came against top-100 opponents, and in these games, he had a disastrous 1.8 BPM. Against these opponents, he could not score (46.6% TS), he could not rebound (0.7% OREB), and he could not secure the ball (25.2% TO). Re-read those stats. 46% TS and 25% TO is just preposterous. His role is listed here as “scoring PG”, yet it seems that he cannot efficiently score or prevent turnovers?

It’s fair to ask what Egor can reliably do on offense when he isn’t playing shitty teams. Nothing indicates that he can be productive in the NBA.

My initial view on Egor

Full transparency: I ranked Egor 31st on my board. Many analytically-inclined individuals had him far lower. 1.8 BPM vs t100 without scoring upside or outlier athleticism should be a death knell.

Many have lambasted the Nets’ draft, calling it the worst of all time. To me, the bigger issue is accumulating five first-round picks in a single draft: it implicitly punts the value of these picks as they are all competing for the same scant playing time/resources. Even more concerning is that all five of the selected players are fairly low-floor. A few of them will likely bust pretty hard.

Still, it’s nice that there was a coherent vision of accumulating smart, tall guys with reasonable feel. Even if it seemed like they just multiplied height and assist rate, and then took the first 4 guys they saw. While the players they selected were not particularly inspiring, Sam Presti has consistently demonstrated that this size x passing formula has high reward (and also high risk).

Based on some recent conversations and philosophical changes spurred by my year-round historical research, I believe that the incongruence between Egor’s draft capital and my estimated draft capital projection was too large. To be clear, this belief has little to do with his tepid Summer League production, though there were some reasons for cautious optimism. While I still believe the Nets reached to some degree on Egor, and that he has many red flags, I now view him as a strong mid-first option, pumping him up a dozen or so spots on my board.

Here’s why.

The Problem with BPM

Beyond his TO issues, Egor has a terrible BPM, terrible TS%, and terrible 3P%. Altogether, it led to atrocities like the following:

Are these three separate issues? Not quite.

The most underrated part of his profile: Egor’s 3P misery collapsed the rest of his statistical profile.

Egor took tons of 3s. Half his shots came from 3. And yes, he shot an absurdly bad 27.3% from 3. But he was completely fine inside the arc.

This is a legitimately great scoring profile inside the arc. Not only was Egor doing it with over 80% of his two point scoring being un-assisted (anything over 60% un-assisted is notable to me), but he shot 55% on twos. While Egor has picked up a label as a “comp dropper”, his inside-the-arc percentages vs top 100 teams (52.5%) and top 50 teams (55.0%) were perfectly reasonable. Egor was self-creating a huge proportion of his two point makes and converted them at a fairly good rate.

Sure, the vast majority of this scoring came in the PnR with the help of a screen, 150 total 2P attempts is on the lower side, and he has less than optimal burst off the dribble. These are all important considerations, and it would be unwise to treat Egor as a future inside-the-arc scoring maestro. But the fact of the matter is that he was highly efficient without a strong assisted shooting profile, and considering his transition woes, this production almost entirely came in the half-court. There comes a point where efficient HC shotmaking on a strongly unassisted shooting profile must be respected.

And yet, despite his strong inside-the-arc efficiency… Egor shot 46.6% true shooting versus top 100 teams. This is what happens when you shoot 27% from three and those shots make up half your shooting profile. 3P bricklaying should not be excused completely, but we cannot simultaneously champion a high 3PR shot profile and demonize high 3PR shooting profiles with less success.

Egor is a great inside-the-arc scorer, and while he takes many 3s, he fails to convert them at a high rate. This should be the Egor scoring evaluation, rather than taking on overlapping metrics at face value.

Egor shot 22% from 3 and took over half his shots from three vs top 100 comp; it’s immensely obvious that his TS% and BPM were going to tank. BPM is famously prone to react strongly to small sample three point shotmaking. The high volume three point misses strongly diluted his 3P%, TS%, and BPM.

This dilution even applies to offensive rebounding, though to a lesser degree. There is a known and strongly intuitive negative relationship between offensive rebounding and 3PR. When you are hanging out on the perimeter, you will be less likely to be in the proper position to secure offensive rebounds. See: known super-athlete Anthony Edwards and his preposterously low 2% OREB.

So while it’s fair to point out Egor’s relative “softness” via OREB and FTR, it must be done with the contextualization of highly perimeter-oriented scoring style. When 63% of your halfcourt twos come from the PnR and half of your shots are threes, you are not in a position to offensively rebound, nor are you in optimal position to draw fouls. It should also be noted that 15% DREB is far more compelling.

Still, as I will note a multitude of times in this piece, Egor’s softness is concerning. His putrid offensive rebounding may be the single biggest road block to his reaching higher outcomes. 0.7% OREB vs top 100 teams is awful, and even 3PR-maxxed PGs like LaMelo and Kasparas were o-rebounding far better. Decent rebounding priors, elite size, and reasonable blocks/defensive rebounding give Egor some outs to neutralizing his functional timidness.

So will Egor’s shooting improve?

This is the million-dollar question. Sure, Egor’s high volume three point inaccuracy tanked his 3P%, BPM, and TS% to a significant extent, but my point is asymmetry: that strong three point accuracy is going to skyrocket these metrics. How likely is this?

Well, three point volume is a helluva indicator, and Egor had a massive 50 3PR. I don’t find it instructive to call Egor a non-shooter when he is legit taking half his shots from beyond the arc.

Unfortunately, the rest of his shooting indicators aren’t particularly encouraging.

Egor shot 69.5% from the line this year, which is okay. Coupling all his shooting samples together, he’s at 74% FT (260 attempts). Egor shot 27% 3P on 154 3PA at BYU. This is quite bad, but it’s notable that Egor took nearly as many C&S 3s as dribble jumper 3s, and he shot 24% on dribble jumper 3s, which are more prone to variance. This would typically be more encouraging had Egor not shot 30% on C&S 3s.

What’s more concerning is that Egor shot 31.5% 3P on 615 3PA across all samples.

This is a meaningful, multi-year sample of 3P badness. In theory, it’s more than enough attempts for Egor’s 3P% to have stabillized, which makes that 31% 3P look even more damning. If Egor shoots 31% from 3 across his NBA career, I cannot stress enough that his career will be replacement level at best.

The most intuitive refutation, however, is that 3P% cannot reasonably stabilize with a teenage sample. The sole utility of this giant sample is proving that Egor is a bad shooter right now. Shooting development is fickle and hard to understand, and some even view 3PR as the pre-emptive indicator of shooting upside. Contrary to my pre-draft estimation, Egor’s youth, size, and huge 3P tendency gives him a coinflip chance at worst to become a reasonably good shooter. This may seem low, but as I will outline later, this outcome would drastically change his NBA outlook.

The other two indicators of touch are FTs and runners. Egor’s 74% FT is uninteresting at first glance, but 74% FT in conjunction with his age/size/3PR strengthens his shooting outlook even more.

Runners were harder to come by. Egor rarely took runners (3.9% frequency), though he made them at a reasonable clip (0.83 points per shot is ~60th percentile). Prior to BYU, in 17 games with Real Madrid’s U18 team across two seasons, he made just one total runner. Egor’s runner infrequency is especially interesting for two reasons:

1. A gargantuan 44% of Egor’s scoring possessions came as PnR BH (98th percentile frequency). This playtype is especially conducive to runners (fairly intuitive).
2. BYU was one of the best teams in the country at taking (86th percentile) and making (92nd percentile) runners.

A low runner frequency is usually of slight concern for any ball-handler, but this was an offensive context plump for runner liberality. It is a serious red flag that he was unable to get to that runner, and even watching his few runners, it’s clear he’s not comfortable transitioning mid-dribble into the shot.

This lack of dynamic comfort is also seen in his lack of functional pullup two fluidity. Sure, he has a fairly fluid shot when OTD from 3. But he shot 6/22 on pullup 2s, and it’s clear that he favors pausing his dribble near the highpost and doing a turnaround into the pullup rather than fluidly pulling up.

Egor’s ineptitude in fluidly taking pullup twos with his lack of runner volume in a runner-conducive context is reasonable evidence for his touch discomfort in dynamic environments.

The last piece of data is secondary, but I’ve heard from quite a few sources that Egor shot pretty well during workouts. Again, this is anything but a dynamic ecosystem, but it’s a positive datapoint.

Overall, there’s reason to be cautiously optimistic, but there are many warts that diminish Egor’s shooting projection. It’s hard to tell how his shooting development will progress, but I am cautiously optimistic that legitimate strides will be made given his age and volume.

A Brief Note on Turnovers

This is more of a stylistic concern, but not all turnover-prone players should be billed as the same. Consider the following:

There is a clear discrepancy between the badness of Egor’s TO rate and the goodness of his A:TO. Egor was converting passes far more than he was committing TOs, while Kasparas Jakucionis had a slightly lower TO rate but far lower A:TO.

So while Kasparas, Fears, and Demin were all very turnover-prone, Demin was by far the most functionally turnover-avoidant.

We should also understand the issues with TO rate, which is estimated with the following formula:

TO%: 100 * TO / (FGA + 0.44 * FTA + TOV)

It’s basically estimating the share of a player’s scoring possessions that end in a TO.

By virtue of his three-point heavy shooting profile, Egor wasn’t getting to the line particularly much, nor was he scoring with volume inside the arc. This underestimates the value of the denominator here, as there are fewer than expected total possessions. At the same time, Egor’s relative timidness inside the arc is both a product of his pass-heavy nature and his lack of physicality and comfort getting downhill, especially without a screen. Ultimately, his shot diet likely inflated his TO rate to some degree.

While I understand the logic of the formula, Egor’s softness leaking into adjacent parts of his profile demonstrates the issue with taking metrics at face-value. We know that he rarely gets to the line, but his softness has artifically inflated his TO rate. This fits into my larger point that the downstream effects of Egor’s 3P heavy shooting profile are far-ranging and need to be more thoroughly considered.

So is it fair to call Egor “turnover-prone”? Perhaps, but the turnovers are largely a product of his super-high passing volume. His decision-making is fine, and there aren’t nearly as many head-scratching turnovers (or more generally, bad pass turnovers) in comparison to someone like his new teammate, Danny Wolf.

The number I care most about is 1.9 A:TO. As a raw ratio, A:TO is the strongest indication of scalability, and converting nearly two assists for every turnover bodes very well historically, particularly for size. The TO rate is not nearly as important. I am far more worried about Kasp or Wolf’s turnover issues, considering they convert far fewer assists per turnover.

Egor is an insane passer

This is probably the single most underrated and most publicized aspect of Egor’s game. He can really pass. The list of guys who can run PnRs and pass as proficiently as Egor historically is very, very low. The only 6’8+ player in Bart with even career 30% AST% and reasonable PnR BH scoring frequency is Scottie Barnes.

In my database of draft measurements, there has never been a prospect listed as a point guard that comes even close to Egor’s dimensions. Forget point guards, there has never been even a shooting guard that has matched Egor’s height in the history of the NBA Combine. This is the type of historical context that makes me uneasy fading Egor.

Another comparison I’ve seen is Josh Giddey. This one isn’t that bad. Let’s take some time to flesh it out.

Per RealGM, Giddey was at 36.3% AST, and Egor was at 35.3% AST. Giddey was 23.7% TO rate, and Egor was 21.9% TO rate. I’m not sure why RealGM has a lower TO rate than Barttorvik for Egor, but probably dissimilar formulas.

Giddey had a strong edge in rebounding, but Egor clears him in steals. Coincidentally, Egor (84/152, 55% 2P) and Giddey (84/165, 51% 2P) made the same number of twos in the same number of games, but Egor was more efficient.

The parallels don’t stop there. Giddey shot 29% from 3P, 69% FT, and 25.6 FTR. Egor was 27% 3P, 70% FT, and 26.8 FTR. It’s notable that Giddey had such a poor FTR considering his two-point scoring rate was far higher.

I’m not sure if the NBL is even better than the Big 12, and if so, it’s probably not worth sweating. Egor and Giddey both played ~900 minutes, so this is a fairly ethical comparison altogether (see: dunk volume).

Giddey’s rebounding is a large edge, and he was a more efficient passer. But Demin’s combination of wingspan and steal rate is a massive ceiling-raising edge, and he scores far more efficiently inside the arc with better 3PR. Demin offers a much higher ceiling, but Giddey’s floor is probably safer with his elite positional rebounding. These are at least similar caliber of prospects to me. I would prefer Demin, as Giddey’s 3PR+FTR strongly dampens his ceiling.

Giddey ranks 6th in the 2021 class in BPM at 1.3, but much of this is spurred by his career 7.5 rebounds/game. Demin doesn’t have this strength to fall back on, so he really needs to shoot to tap into his upside.

So many good names here. My absolute favorite integration is size x feel, and we approximate this with height/block/2P% to filter out the unphysical players, while A:TO / steal takes care of feel. If we raise the height filter to 6’8, we get:

Some may immediately point out BPM, but I urge them to use their brains: the box-score stats that are fed into BPM can be evaluated by our own eyes, and Demin is generally in the same ballpark as these guys. Still, Demin is the worst prospect here, given that he has by far the worst block and rebounding rates, but he grades fairly well outside of his softness.

The bottom-line is that Egor has legitimate ceiling-raising traits, which is important considering his age-adjusted production according to general impact metrics are poor on the surface.

Underrated Trait #1: Foul Avoidance

Egor’s reaction speed is pretty fire. I assume all readers are familiar with his spectacular passing, but even on defense, Egor has some impressive blocks.

This is a cool clip. Egor’s huge size forced the long initial inbounds pass, and his quick reaction speed helped him get the perimeter block. Despite not being in position to farm blocks, Egor racked up a solid 1.7% block rate.

What’s especially notable is his micro-foul rate.

As always, Egor comfortably cleared these thresholds. 1.7% block, 2.5% steal, 1.8 FC/40, and 6’9. No one has come close to Egor’s combination of stocks+foul avoidance at wing size.

This guy is 6’9 with a 6’10 WS and he can match up against guards. His stocks are solid. He’s at a very reasonable 0.3 blocks/foul. He has the height and instincts to guard up, and he did average ~ 3% BLK/20% DREB in ANGT. There’s enough evidence that if he ever gains enough mass to consistently guard NBA-caliber forwards, he could be a real demon defender. This defensive upside needs to be noted!

Even if we drop the height filter on this query, and throw on an A:TO filter to grab “guards”, it’s a fairly limited group of guys:

By integrating A:TO, steals, and foul rate, this is pretty much the ultimate “high feel” list. It’s just unfathomable that Egor is a whole 3 inches taller than the next closest player. Shai/Haliburton are two of the next three tallest players here. Funny how they find their way into a query yet again.

Remember at the beginning when I noted that “certain loci of traits are associated with differing rates of development”? I think I’ve formed an admissible case that Egor encompasses a particular loci of traits associated with strong feel, reaction time, and potentially, continued strong development.

A better way to explain this is by introducing my new evaluatory framework: outlier cognition per mass. I’ve really grown to value dudes with huge height, length, or weight that can react quickly and process the floor. I will likely write something about this in the future, but something like “cognition-mass index”. BMI, but for cognition. Unsurprisingly, Egor’s immensely feel and huge frame scores quite well within this paradigm.

Overall, beyond this philosophical commentary, my point is that Egor avoids fouls like a guard despite being wing-sized. While this indicates underrated switchable upside, I consider this more importantly a proxy for strong cognition. All signs point to Egor’s cognition-mass index being especially high. We should take note.

Underrated Trait #2: Luck-Adjusted Impact

This is short, but Egor’s offensive impact was strong despite being turnover prone with low true shooting. Here, we luck-adjust for 3P%, but 1.6% TO swing against baseline is notable. For reference, this is versus t200 opponents:

4.0 net rating against baseline is huge. Again, A-B is useful for comparing Egor versus his backups, but A – Baseline shows how much better the team was with Egor. He had a legit positive effect on offense, and if he trims the turnovers/makes 3s at a higher rate, his offensive impact will only increase.

Real On/Off and RAPM tell a similar story. It’s clear that Egor’s TO tendencies are mitigated on a team-wide level, given his strong assist volume, and he had a strong effect on an already good BYU offense.

It’s also interesting how Egor coincided with a drop in 2P rim%, even with real on-off (which adjusts for teammates), but I didn’t pick up on anything when watching. This is something to sorta keep an eye on in the league.

Overall, this is to say that Egor had an inflationary effect on BYU’s offense even with his current warts. This is a good sign indeed, as he has much room to grow as a ball-handler.

A Cause for Concern

To me, the biggest cause for concern is Egor’s athletic profile. He’s not particularly quick (11.31 lane agility + 3.33 sprint), and he is a straight up bad vertical athlete (awful 26.5 inch standing vert + 32.5 max vert). Coupled with his skinny frame, he has the quintessential bust athletic profile: the low BMI bad athlete.

The low BMI, bad athlete is a devastating, ceiling dropping archetype. See for yourself:

Egor falls comfortably within these thresholds. We can see this softness reflected in his oreb, FTR, and perhaps even in his lack of runner volume. This is concerning, and he will need significant mass gains.

Two reasons why this isn’t as much cause for concern:

1. This anthropometric sample is pretty incomplete and is skewed towards less heralded prospects. For many years prior to 2024, prospects who accrued significant draft capital did not participate in combine testing.
   • For instance, we don’t have Giddey’s testing but he’d probably be somewhere here (BMI probably hits a tad above 23 but still).
2. If Egor can accumulate minutes at the 1 or 2, his large size advantage will be more than enough to overcome BMI issues. In other words, positional size will deter disadvantages conferred by his BMI.

He’s also clearly cognizant of all this:

The Elephant in the Room: Positionality

What position does Egor play in the league?

Obviously, Egor could play as a guard. It’s probably not worth discussing too much since he primarily played the 1 at BYU. Egor would need to cut down on TOs and shoot, but it’s a fairly straightforward outcome.

I have seen concern about Egor’s guard viability, on the premise that Egor cannot get downhill without a screen. He’s definitely not the most imposing athlete, but:

1. I question the independent value of getting downhill without a screen in such a PnR centric league.
2. Damn near most of his offense either came out of the PnR or spotting up from 3. Are we sure that scoring out of PnR on a PnR-heavy team means that he is reliant on a screen? Causation seems strong.

However, Egor does not need to play the 1/2 to provide meaningful value. He could be a really good wing.

It goes without saying that Egor needs to make 3s at a far higher clip than he did this season. If Egor cannot make open C&S threes at a reasonable frequency, it is likely over. He needs legit shooting development, and we’re betting a lot on 50 3PR to clutch up as a shooting indicator.

If Egor can make 3s at a reasonable frequency, then he offers real positional versatility. The second coin toss is physicality: Egor needs to bulk up a bit and guard wings with consistency.

And, if Egor can make 3s AND guard wings, he offers basically no lineup friction. You can fit him into so many lineups.

My working theory is that cognitive load per position is rising league-wide, so having someone like Egor may end up more of a necessity in a decade. Even with the current league in mind, Egor would have a huge cognitive advantage at the 3 (the 3 probably has the lowest cognitive load by position), a large size and cognitive advantage at the 2, and an overwhelming size advantage at the 1; this would give him pretty strong staying power.

To be clear, this sort of frictionless upside would only come if he’s able to make 3s AND guard wings.

Conclusion

So, how likely is Frictionless Egor?

Based off the evidence I’ve provided, I would equate the probabilities of making 3s and guarding wings (at reasonable frequency) to ~ 60% each. So, by my shoddy odds, there’s a ~ 36% chance at this frictionless utopia, which is easy for me to swallow and rank top 20 at the absolute worst.

The odds of either 3s or guarding wings coming around is 84%, which is nice. That being said, there’s 40% chance that shooting does not come around, which would be pretty disastrous.

There’s also the point that the shooting thresholds for guards are much higher than for wings, as there is legit off-the-dribble necessity. So the odds of him playing as a guard are probably somewhere near 50%, if not closer to 36%.

Here’s the takeaway: Egor is a pretty high variance player. I’ve called other players in this class high variance but I honestly think that title should go to Egor. He could reasonably be out of the league by the end of his rookie contract. Egor needs to shoot, and he needs to shoot at high volume. And he needs to rely on skill and weight gain to overcome the poor BMI x athlete tag.

Previously, I was over-indexing on Egor’s strong downside. There are quite a few ways this could go badly. But I didn’t fully consider the uniqueness of Egor’s game. He has some (dare I say) generational strengths that I’ve demonstrated with some pretty generous Bart query thresholds. The league is built on outliers, and I do not feel comfortable ranking a fairly well-rounded freshman with huge strengths outside the top 20.

That being said, I sympathize with Nets fans and their front office, as they have invested significant draft capital into a guy who could be pretty bad. I would personally have been more risk-averse with this selection, but the upside is high enough for it to be reasonable. This is not a particularly popular take on Draft Twitter, but Egor’s positional versatility is that compelling.

Also, this is a half-serious point but if a conglomerate like Draft Twitter is so opposed to a single player/concept, then it is probably a good idea to zag a bit to account for the effects of overconfidence bias and consensus bias.

Moreover, one should be wary of a massive delta between perception and draft capital barring a catastrophic pick by “unwell”-intentioned front offices (i.e., anything the Raiders did in the last quarter century, or Nico selecting OMP). I do not believe the Nets to be in this tier of franchise ineptitude. That’s not to say that we should become mock draft warriors, but it’s a sensible sanity check for select prospects. The draft is a tad bit more of a crapshoot than we’d like to believe.

Ultimately, so many of the warts Draft Twitter has ascribed to Egor are by virtue of his 3P bricklaying. He has real red flags, and his floor is far lower than I’d usually be comfortable selecting in the top 10. But Egor is tall and smart, he can accumulate 3s and stocks without fouling, and he can efficiently self-create inside the arc. He passes like very few we’ve seen with his size. He managed to raise the offensive ceiling for a dominant BYU offense. The upside is hard to ignore with Egor, and his unorthodoxy is riveting.

He just needs to make those damn threes.

The post The Case for Egor Demin appeared first on Swish Theory.

In the previous article I wrote analyzing Tre Johnson, I alluded to the changing perspective of front offices and fans alike regarding the draft. The 2024 cycle was an emphatic indication of the sea change in teams’ approach to the event. With players from Reed Sheppard to Zach Edey being selected with high picks, it became apparent that teams were prioritizing cerebral players with analytically sound profiles over those with traits more traditionally associated with high upside.

What drove me to write about Kon was how representative his journey was of this shifting dynamic. Widely recognized as a subpar athlete by NBA standards, due to the optics of Knueppel’s game, I doubt he would have ever been considered worthy of a top-5 pick even as recently as a decade ago. However, because of his stellar efficiency and deserved reputation as an intelligent player, the Hornets’ selection of Knueppel was seen as a no-brainer.

My intent with writing this piece was to figure out one thing: has the pendulum swung too far? At what point is it acceptable to go against conventional draft logic and select a player whose deficiencies would have been considered disqualifying in previous eras? By investigating both contextual and individual statistics, in tandem with tape dating back 2 years, I found myself in firm disagreement with the direction the Hornets ultimately went in.

The Beginning

Standing slightly over 6’6 in shoes with a 6’6.25″ wingspan, Kon Knueppel may have left this draft with the highest approval rating of any non-Cooper Flagg prospect. Knueppel’s playstyle eschewed norms typically associated with star level production, he relied on technique and guile in lieu of dynamic physical traits. His fundamentally sound game, paired with an inscrutable demeanor, and an overwhelming amount of team success quickly earned Knueppel fans. And Kon would finish with one of the most impressive underclassman seasons from a perimeter player in recent memory, inserting himself into the group below along with fellow one-and-done Jase Richardson.

What makes Kon such a compelling case study isn’t just his ascension from fringe top-40 recruit at the beginning of his final AAU campaign, to top-5 draft pick 2 years later, but the rapid and tangible development he made in that span.

To gain a complete understanding of Kon’s game we must begin with his time spent on the grassroots circuit. Knueppel’s scoring and scoring efficiency have remained constants over the course of his career, having led his EYBL age group in scoring for 3 consecutive years and never once dipped under 60% True Shooting. However, outside of the high-volume flamethrowing from deep, Knueppel’s utilization at Duke held a faint resemblance to his time playing AAU.

During Kon’s time playing his AAU team, Phenom University, he served as the focal point of a motion offense. PhenomU would run concepts broadly similar to Duke, but with drastically different objectives. PhenomU frequently schemed looks for Knueppel to post-up in the middle of the floor, where his combination of size, strength, and touch were enough to overwhelm opponents at the high-school level. Actions like ‘Cross Punch’..

Outside of these schemed looks Knueppel was the frequent recipient of opportunistic buckets made possible by the Motion Offense and the miscommunication it brought about in opposing defenses.

And although these principles aren’t incompatible with quality offense at the collegiate or professional level, they did leave Knueppel unrefined in certain areas which became significantly more relevant during his time at Duke. One example would be Kon’s relative inefficiency attacking closeouts, where he was comfortable settling for short range jumpers and would seldom applied pressure on the rim.

Starting at Duke

Kon’s shift in usage once arriving at Duke was abrupt and apparent, the aforementioned post-ups and cuts were largely replaced with PNR ballhandling reps, as evinced below.

And for someone who came into the season a vocal proponent of Kon, frankly, the beginning of his Duke career was largely underwhelming. Duke almost exclusively schemed two plays for Knueppel, the first of which being ‘Zipper Stagger PNR‘, which exposed his inexperience operating out of ballscreens,

and the second play which comprised the majority of Knueppel’s organized offense was ‘Pin Ricky Flare‘, where again Knueppel struggled to generate quality looks if he wasn’t provided the requisite space to attempt a 3.

There definitely wasn’t a singular culprit behind Knueppel’s ineffectiveness as a driver, but the most obvious contributing factor was the misalignment between Duke’s offensive approach and Knueppel’s habits inside the arc. As previously mentioned, when Kon was ran off the 3-point line in highschool he expressed no urgency in getting to the rim, and was perfectly content with taking longer 2PA. Duke was the first setting where this characteristic of Knueppel’s game was met with resistance. In Jon Scheyer’s short time at the helm, an early emphasis he has made known is his desire for his teams to maintain a modern shot profile. In every subsequent year of Scheyer’s tenure, Duke has reduced their volume of midrange attempts.

The clash between the playstyle Scheyer had implemented within his team, and Knueppel’s personal style of play lead to ugly moments early on. With Knueppel’s ballhandling skills being fairly underdeveloped for his new, more perimeter oriented role, Kon attempted to rely on his physicality on create space and find finishing windows on drives. Knueppel’s forays towards the rim often lacked pace, and oftentimes Kon would over-penetrate and place himself in compromising positions inside the paint.

At roughly the halfway mark of the season, Knueppel’s statistical profile was far from the stellar marks he would finish the season with.

The Transformation

The defining change in Kon’s game this past season was undoubtedly his ability and effectiveness getting to the rim. Not only did his rim-rate increase by 8% from his final season of AAU to this past season, the complexion of these rim attempts also radically changed. Hand-tracking Knueppel’s rim-finishes reveals a player progressing from a forward to an out and out guard.

Knueppel having his playtype distribution significantly altered, while being forced to largely abandon his most reliable interior counters, AND STILL maintaining the efficiency he’d displayed at previous levels is borderline miraculous. And the catalyst for this improvement were the gains Knueppel made as a ballhandler.

While I still wouldn’t view Knueppel as an elite ballhandler by any means, the strides he made in this area, in conjunction with his physicality, made him a potent driver by season’s end.

For large swaths of the season, Knueppel’s inability to handle ball pressure or digs on his drives consistently prevented him from creating quality paint touches.

And I have a theory as to what was behind Knueppel’s leap as a ballhandler and driver. Kon seems to have married the technical gains he made, specifically developing better ball-control and an improvement altering ball-speeds, with the strong footwork foundation he already possessed from all the years spent playing out of the post. Post footwork translating to other facets of the game is an axiom espoused by coaches everywhere, and Knueppel seems to be the most recent testament to this. As the season progressed Knueppel was more capable of keeping his dribble alive inside the arc, making him a more potent scorer and playmaker.

Towards the end of the season, Knueppel started to thrive in the same actions that he’d previously been out of his depth in. Below is a succession of ‘Zipper Stagger PNR‘ plays conducted sublimely by Kon. Even when he isn’t able to finish the play with a basket it is abundantly clear the process is better.

When faced with slightly more exotic coverages Knueppel showed to be up to the task. Compare the clips compiled below, in the initial play versus Kansas. Knueppel is hedged as he runs the ballscreen and immeditely swings the ball at the first sign of ball pressure. The subsequent plays Knueppel keeps his dribble alive, turns the corner, and either draws a foul at the rim or finds an open teammate.

Knueppel’s enhanced foul-drawing compared to previous seasons was evident,

but what I found most impressive about this was how the in-season free-throw rate progression was equally significant.

What this shows is Knueppel recognized the respect he had as a shooter and parlayed the hard closeouts he was receiving into rim-attacks.

As delved further and further into Kon’s career, his self-awareness and work ethic became increasingly apparent. To acclimate this quickly when confronted with change is impressive from any player, never mind a freshman being thrust into the greatest pressure cooker program in college basketball.

A point raised by the always insightful Mike Gribanov (@mikegrib8 on X) was how notable it was for a team to achieve the level of success 2024-25 Duke did while primarily featuring underclassmen. Especially considering how veteran-laden the current college basketball landscape is, I wanted to establish a frame of reference for exactly how rare it was for a player to produce at the level Kon did this past season without the benefit of having experienced teammates. Using KenPom’s ‘Experience Rankings’, which weighs the age of their roster by minutes played, along with some other offensive efficiency and self creation metrics yielded the list below.

Unsurprisingly these thresholds produced a list of offensively slanted perimeter players, but at first glance what caught my eye was how size seemed to have a polarizing effect on this group’s NBA translation. The majority of players who returned overly positive EV from the query seemed to be clustered on the shorter end of the height distribution. However, height having a negative correlation with an all-in-one metric like Estimated Wins goes against all I know about these catch all stats, so I looked elsewhere. And what emerged as the obvious contributing factor to this relationship was the share of a player’s shots which were assisted.

Here lie my Koncerns

To see the strength of the relationship between this group of players’ NBA impact and their pre-NBA self-creation burdens I ran a simple linear regression.

While the  r² here is moderately strong, again there are only so many conclusions to be drawn from what was already a small and fairly curated sample. Where the value lies in this cursory analysis is in illuminating how misleading scoring efficiency can be. The list above is littered with players who couldn’t shoulder a higher creation burden and were too deficient in other areas to warrant serious consideration for playing time. Herein lies the challenge in projecting Kon Knueppel, will he be able to become a load-bearing player for an elite offense and/or round out his game enough defensively to avoid being placed in basketball purgatory?

The Case for Helio-Kon

A case frequently made in support of Kon’s primary upside was his potential to develop into a high volume foul-drawer. We’ve already addressed the strides he’s made in this department, so could this trend continue in the league? In short, I am skeptical Knueppel is next in line of the Morey-ball disciples. Of course the absence of dunks in Kon’s resume has been discussed ad-nauseam (this past season Knueppel actually doubled the number of dunks he’d made over the course of his entire AAU career, with 2), its how often Kon has his shot-blocked at the rim that is my greatest cause for concern. Knueppel had 7% of his FGA blocked at Duke, per Synergy, which isn’t a particularly disqualifying number on its own, but puts him in a precarious position when compared to his now peers in the NBA.

Again, this is not an exhaustive sample we’re drawing from, but there’s no recent precedent for a player with Knueppel’s lack of vertical explosion becoming a formidable rim-pressure guard. In fact I think Knueppel, and the majority of the Duke players this past season, saw their driving efficacy greatly augmented by the presence of Khaman Maluach. Individually, Duke did not roster any players known for their prowess getting downhill, and Maluach was chiefly responsible for providing rim-pressure for the team. Clips like the ones below are examples of the attention Maluach demanded on the interior. In each clipped possession there’s a freeze frame on Maluach’s defender showing the defense’s approach, they were almost never willing to send help on Knueppel’s drives should they risk giving up an easy putback or dumpoff to Maluach.

Duke lead the nation this past season in Wide Open threes, and while their connective passing and willingness to forgo good shots for great ones definitely deserves credit, the attention Maluach demanded as a roller greatly simplified reads for Duke ballhandlers.

Again my friend and tan incredible draft mind in his own right @NileHoops beat me to the presses in writing about the inflation in perception many Duke prospects were granted due to Maluach’s gravity, and I would strongly recommend reading his draft notes here on the matter: https://medium.com/@Nile/nile-presents-2025-nba-draft-master-notes-part-2-of-3-626ef75aefbb.

Knueppel’s statistical fluctuations corroborate this relationship. Per Hoop -Explorer Knueppel’s AST% and rim-rate declined substantially in minutes without Maluach versus the minutes he shared with the superstar big.

This effect reverberated throughout the Duke squad, with the team’s mid-range frequency skyrocketing while their PNR frequency plummeted. Recall earlier when Jon Scheyer’s mid-range aversion was mentioned, without Maluach on the court Duke was forced into taking shots they were explicitly advised against.

Debunking the notion that Knueppel will develop into a prolific driver and free-throw grifter at the next level doesn’t necessarily preclude offensive primacy. After all, many of the players presented early as potential analogues found their way by becoming elite pull-up shooters. Knueppel’s shooting profile definitely makes this the likeliest outcome, but there’s still evidence his stellar touch indicators may belie how long a process it will be for Knueppel to reach these heights.

While Knueppel shot 12/30 on pull-up 3s in his final year of AAU, 10 of these makes came in transition or semi-transition, where he had a cleaner platform to self-organize for these attempts.

In the half-court Knueppel’s issues regaining balance on the move and creating space in close quarters were more evident. Even at lower levels Knueppel struggled getting his shot off cleanly under duress, the aforementioned 7% blocked FGA rate at Duke was identical in AAU.

And of course this isn’t to say Knueppel will be easily neutralized as a shooter at the next level, these are somewhat granular issues I fully believe will be addressed and ameliorated in the long run. But my thinking is the tandem of weaker change-of-direction ability and a drastically slower pace (Duke was 266th in Adjusted Tempo) was behind Knueppel’s precipitous fall from a 42% (30/72) off-the-dribble 3P shooter during AAU, to only making 1/18 3PA off the bounce in college. And the acclimatization period Knueppel would need to round his shooting into form could muddle his long-term offensive projection.

The Defense

As limiting as Knueppel’s change-of-direction is offensively, I think it could be truly debilitating on defense. For as much as Duke’s offensive scheme placed Knueppel in an uncomfortable situation early, the defensive scheme greatly compensated for his flaws. Duke’s conservative switching scheme paired with their ++ positional size (1st in the country in average height and 10th in effective height) masked Knueppel’s deficiencies. The team’s penchant for dragging out possessions with their constant switching, along with the deterrence afforded by their backline size, left a minimal amount of ground for Knueppel to cover in any given possession. I think plays like the clips below are responsible for some overstating Knueppel’s defensive ability, in these possessions Kon is guarding under circumstances where Duke’s already effectively ‘won’ the possession by merit of these players either attacking Knueppel in isolation or driving into a congested paint.

The areas where Knueppel’s difficulties changing speed and direction manifested most consistently were guarding capable pull-up shooters. Knueppel’s inability to mirror these smaller players forced him to give them a cushion, without the length to compensate for the distance he provided Knueppel was prone to ceding acres of space on these attempts.

Maybe even more glaring than Knueppel’s issues guarding pull-up shooters was his total inability to navigate screens. Kon almost never remained attached when tasked with working over screens, and when a teammate wasn’t in position to immediately switch onto Knueppel’s assignment an immense pressure was placed on help defenders to correct for the breakdown. Screen navigation for Kon is another struggle which has persisted since high school.

Predictably Knueppel’s issues changing direction were reflected in his agility testing. Although Kon’s jumps impressed relative to expectations, his 3/4 court sprint and lane agility only added to what was already a bleak defensive projection.

Final Takeaways

My intention with writing this piece is not to pan the Hornets for selecting Kon, but in the wake of Summer League I think now is an appropriate time to adjust expectations before a few inconsequential games dilute any evaluation. As it stands currently, there’s an overwhelming amount of data suggesting that even projecting Kon as a neutral defender may be unrealistic. The most likely outcome seems to be that Kon will be left in limbo defensively, he’ll unable to guard backcourt players because of his poor footspeed, and with no supplementary rim-protection or rebounding skills to speak of Kon will bleed possessions as a frontcourt defender. In search of players at Kon’s size who were also lacking in athletic traits yielded a mixed bag. There’s a handful of positive defenders here, even amongst the highlighted players who hit these thresholds in their pre-draft season. But outside of Cameron Johnson and Khris Middleton, who only hit this threshold in their freshman year (and Middleton was 0.3 DRBD% away from falling out entirely), there’s no other players who would be considered top 5 in their respective draft.

The list of players with Kon’s offensive resume to justify such high draft capital is even slimmer.

While it may seem encouraging that Desmond Bane is included in this group because Kon was frequently compared to him throughout the cycle, Bane’s dunks only bottomed out when he was thrust into a primary role. Bane saw his PNR volume almost quadruple from his Junior to Senior year, and this shit in usage coincided with the lowest number of dunks in his college career.

As heavily as I rely on these statistical queries to inform my opinion, I think its necessary to include all players’ seasons as a reminder of the developmental dichotomy. It seems as often as players undergo these outlier developmental arcs there are as many, if not more, players whose weaknesses crystallize much quicker than we’re willing to acknowledge. In Kon’s case, there’s little reason to believe an athletic transformation is on the horizon. And if he’s going to be a defender who needs specific lineup configurations to stay on the floor will his offense warrant those accommodations? The in-season improvement previously outlined gives me more confidence in Kon eventually ‘guard-ifying’ his shot profile and becoming a more capable creator off the bounce. But the idea that the self-sustainability of Kon’s offense can be reasonably doubted is enough to preclude from being a top 5 pick.

The post Summer League Primer: A Comprehensive Kon Knueppel Scouting Report appeared first on Swish Theory.

That’s what this annual column is for (see 2022, 2023 and 2024 versions): How did I evaluate this NBA draft cycle, how does it compare to years’ past and how will I adjust for 2025-26? Where does my process fit into the greater universe of basketball understanding, and how can it get better? These are questions I believe more should ask.

I published the below graphic at the end of my last piece with The Stepien before it shut down. It is easy to get bogged down with the evaluatory framework I outline on the far right. You read consensus views from major outlets, then either take them at face value or come up with a shortcut reason why this is not the case. Many use the middle approach, relative scouting, ordering by category / archetype (i.e. primaries first) and then comparing within that group. I have aimed for something I like to call absolute scouting, that is, looking at a player’s current ability while assessing with an eye to what they may become. This process can be amplified by the other two, but is ultimately the “truest” evaluatory framework, giving the player himself center stage.

But even within absolute scouting there are endless approaches. This column tracks the evolution of my evaluatory framework to better project NBA careers at the time of the draft.

Forbidden Knowledge

My thesis last year went something like this: if a player is productive on the court, making things happen almost by accident, exhibits high feel, and also demonstrates a high level of athleticism, that is the type of prospect I would want to invest in. The draft is about chasing outliers, and outliers tend to show themselves in those three arenas.

This strategy led to some major out-of-consensus calls. The highest profile call was placing Zach Edey #1 atop my 2025 NBA draft board. Edey was productive in a way I expected to translate at the next level, particularly his rim volume, offensive rebounding and screen-setting. He has made significant improvements to both his feel and athleticism over his college career, items you could notice even evolving over the course of his rookie season, and despite a nagging foot injury. Finding a way to be useful for an above-average Grizzlies team while drastically shifting from his college role, I still have high hopes for the big.

I also had Jonathan Mogbo as a clear-cut lottery talent, finishing as my #5 prospect, then drafted by the Toronto Raptors to kick off the second round. Mogbo finished #18 in the class in minutes played, able to get rotation and occasional starter playing time. While only 22nd in the class in points scored, Mogbo is #8 in the class in rebounds, #7 in assists, #5 in steals and #12 in blocks after his rookie season. While still a bad player overall – he was one of the worst finishers in the league, exchanging his lob finishes in college for off-the-dribble lays too far from the hoop – Mogbo has quickly proven he can do as many non-scoring things on the court as anyone in the class. In some ways, he’s adapted from mid major to NBA competition better than I expected. I’d still bet on him, particularly given his immediately above-average defense and the weakness of the 2025 class otherwise. Should the passing continue to click and his teammates become more comfortable finding him on lobs, the path to offensive value is there. He came out of the gate as one of the NBA’s most bothersome defenders.

My other two big swings near the top were Oso Ighodaro and Terrence Shannon Jr. as late lottery bets, consistent rotation players. While minutes for both were up and down, both showed enough for me to remain encouraged.

The Ten Dimensions

This year, however, I wanted to become more literal in assessing player value. This led me to inspecting the game by “dimensions of impact,” where I categorize each type of contribution into ten groupings. I based these on how one interacts with the ball and court in literal manners, inspecting each realm in close detail, creating clear as possible delineations among categories.

The ten categories within three skill groupings:

• On-Ball Interactions: Three point shooting, midrange shooting, rim finishing, handle, passing
• Off-Ball Interactions: Grabbing/deflecting the ball, ground coverage, positioning
• Physical Force: Pace-force, strength-force

However, no two traits have the same impact of the game; I would have to weight each area of impact. I constructed these weights and inputted values for each player on my board with endless tinkering, informed by tape watch, statistical assessment, philosophical inquiries into how the game is won. The heaviest weights went to three point shooting and positioning, two areas of impact I only added more and more weight to as I back-tested to current and historical NBA players.

But this has limits, too. Namely, skills on the court interact with each other in varied and unusual ways. Even though both combinations provide additional value, a player’s ability to finish at the rim is more advantageous when mixed with a strong handle than if it were mixed with great rebounding. While rim touch + rebounding equals putback potential, handle + rim touch means an extremely deadly drive threat. A team is able to scale that up and gain secondary benefits off of that more than the other combo. There are synergies and frictions across skillsets that make performance better or worse. You can’t just add up skills.

How Good Are You?

My solution? To throw away the ladder, yet again, to construct a new one. Having advanced my ability to inspect skillsets by interaction type, how each player impacts the game became much clearer. But basketball evaluation is even more mystical than that, especially in the absence of a well-constructed statistical model.

So, my answer was simple: ask myself, “how good is this player, on offense and defense?”

I decided to use Estimated Plus-Minus projection as my peg, not taken too literally but a useful impact curve where one can ascertain, as long as with context on role, a rough approximation of how good a player is. Not perfect, but more dynamic than skillset grading.

I’ve said it before, but draft projection is primarily an exercise in imagination. Even if I graded each player’s current skillset perfectly, there are more complex interactions between qualities shown today as it relates to future skill development. For example, a high feel, coordinated player may be more likely to develop a shot than one who doesn’t have those underlying foundations.

It is also extremely difficult to anticipate where development may arise, to the point of it being easier to rather say, here are the way this player might improve, and here are the odds of each happening. I back into this assessment by projecting into multiple scenarios: the future has not been set.

A New Dynamic

My philosophy has generally been extremely pro-risk, for two simple salary arbitrages, in addition to the fact that I can’t get fired: 1.) a team gets its most value out of paying only a max contract amount to a player worth far more, and 2.) if a player doesn’t work out, his minutes go to zero, limiting the downside impact. These are two HUGE incentives, as it is very difficult to compete if you aren’t getting plus-max value out of one player, making even multiple busts less damaging.

However, my strategy did evolve somewhat towards the end of this cycle. I changed my board to become dynamic, first ranking the top of my board by 80th percentile outcomes only – still keeping it high risk for the players whose talent makes it worthwhile. Then, towards the end of the lotto, the assessment becomes 50/50 between a player’s 80th percentile outcome and 50th percentile outcome. By pick 30, my calculation will only be considering median outcome, omitting the ceiling factor at all.

I made this change for an obvious reason I had been ignoring: it is simply impossible to develop an entire roster of projects at the same time. If a player isn’t deemed as high ceiling, he simply will not get the developmental reps to push through to those higher percentile outcomes. In this way, it is more worthwhile to take the bird-in-hand once you get past the obvious star bets. My changed formula accounts for this.

In addition, I should not be ranking my board, as an outsider not working for a team, based on salary arbitrage opportunities, rather than by how I expect the long-term results to shake out.

The Winners and Losers

My outlier calls this year included four bigs or big wings with shooting questions: South Carolina’s Collin Murray-Boyles, Georgetown’s Thomas Sorber, Creighton’s Ryan Kalkbrenner and Arkansas’ Adou Thiero. They went #9 to Toronto, #15 to Oklahoma City, #34 to Charlotte and #36 to Los Angeles Lakers, respectively, but I would have taken all four much higher.

Collin Murray-Boyles is perhaps my boldest take, finishing #2 on my Big Board. “CMB” is a tank at Draymond Green dimensions, and has shown a non-shooting skillset, defensive acumen and physicality that indeed do remind one of the Hall of Famer. Draymond is one-of-one as a processor, but Murray-Boyles has lightning quick reaction time and excellent understanding of the floor, too. He does not have the vertical pop of Charles Barkley, but CMB does mimic him in carving out space around the basket, constantly. The most important commonality is the physicality and processing speed, and CMB is far ahead of his age for both.

For a glimpse into the degree of impact CMB had on South Carolina’s woeful squad, I calculated the number of points at the rim SC would score or allow when Murray-Boyles was on or off. South Carolina scored THIRTEEN more points at the rim when he was on than off, and allowed SEVEN fewer points at the rim in the same scenarios. That offensive figure is more than double the second most among his 2025 comps, and defensive figure third to stalwarts Thomas Sorber and Amari Williams.

CMB has perhaps the best hands in the class, and they synergize nicely with not just his defensive but also his offensive game. Murray-Boyles learned how to better manipulate the ball when driving to the basket over the season, using his intelligence for when to attack to find seams just large enough to let his stellar touch take over. CMB was in the 85th percentile for layup efficiency, and top ten in the country in rim finishing among anyone with 150+ makes. Only Derik Queen was close among underclassmen, and CMB is six months younger despite being the higher grade.

Murray-Boyles is able to conduct traffic, palming the ball in the high post, one spin away from the hoop. He will operate more out of the short roll in the NBA, and thankfully with better shooters (even with the Raptors’ subpar personnel, they exceed his 31.6% three-point shooting college team). He is better than a connective passer, able to hit small windows and create advantages with his sense of timing, leading his teammate into space.

CMB provides rim protection, elite rebounding, on-ball disruption (he is particularly strong blitzing and recovering) and leads the defense when guarding away from the ball. He is the best defensive prospect in a class full of very strong bets in Cooper Flagg, Thomas Sorber, Noah Penda, or perhaps second to Joan Beringer. He does that while being one of the best driving big men in the country, putting up a very strong 0.92ppp on over 100 drives. He thrived out of isos as the season went on, scoring nearly five points per game out of the play type over South Carolina’s final six games. Check out the versatility in the clips below.

It is rare to find obvious defensive disruptors of this level who also have this kind of offensive potential. He almost certainly won’t be a very useful three point shooter, but he has nearly everything else (I’m even hopeful about the midrange).

On the downside, I thought players like Ace Bailey, Egor Demin, Nolan Traore, Hansen Yang and Will Riley went over-drafted. A common theme for these players is being young and high-risk while needing a good amount of touches to approach their ceiling. With my new system, their upside outcomes do not quite drag them up the list high enough to use the 80th percentile calculation, rather being graded on their less thrilling median outcomes.

Four of the five are skinny for NBA players at their heights, with the exception of the slow-footed Hansen Yang. Returning again to our synergies, a weaker frame mixes extremely poorly with on-ball potential, unless you’re a Haliburton-esque conductor, or Shai-esque scorer, both nearly perfect at capitalizing on space creation specificity. This does not mean the path is closed – I’m especially still high on Ace Bailey as a late lottery option – but not the bets I would make with the group compared to where they were drafted unless you can spot the magic. All five have magical moments, no doubt, but lack consistency and are likely to face struggles as they adjust to NBA physicality.

CMB is, on the other hand, extremely difficult to tilt off his spot, making those on-ball reps more consistent and allowing him to explore the studio space in a safer manner. I was also high on Javon Small, Max Shulga and Joan Beringer, all with BMIs higher than all but Yang from the group of players I was lower on. Small’s physicality allows him to drive and dunk through traffic, set up offense without being knocked off his spot. Shulga is broad-shouldered, allowing him to wall off drives and switch up. Joan Beringer, despite being one of the youngest in the class, has been able to bulk up some, on his way to becoming one of the NBA’s best rim protectors. If I have one regret so early, it would be not ranking Beringer in my top ten. The defensive instincts and physical tools give him an extremely lofty ceiling, even with mediocre offense, and he already seems good enough to say his defensive floor is safe, too.

An Eye to 2026

2025 was a fantastic class to evaluate, extremely deep in starter bets. I ended up ranking Jase Richardson around 20, and even so would not be surprised at all if he carved out a starter spot, overcoming his 178-pound frame by being so effective and technical playing off the ball. He was a painful player to rank even that low, given how high his feel for the game is and proven technique, though I remain concerned about his lack of a right and limited defensive ceiling.

2026 promises to be thrilling at the top, as Cameron Boozer, Darryn Peterson and AJ Dybantsa all vie for the top spot. My early leanings rank them in that order, with Boozer vs. Darryn vs. Flagg being very tough to discern.

My biggest adjustment will be getting more accustomed to projecting peak impact, but I want to tweak my ratings system to become even more risk-averse as you go down. I will do so by implementing a 20th percentile outcome which becomes the ranking priority starting at pick 30. With each round of new tape or statistical analysis, making those projections gets a little easier.

As usual, I expect that evaluation criteria to evolve over time.

The post Lessons from the 2025 NBA Draft Cycle appeared first on Swish Theory.

To put it simply, a flaw in the subcategories for one player can be irrelevant for another: each prospect is unique and individual, and their path to NBA success can pull from vastly different traits. If you were grading skills broadly, you could theoretically have two players listed as ‘B’ in driving, but they could both be very different types of drivers.

One skill I always find particularly intriguing is ‘Feel’. The term can sometimes be hard to define, and each person likely has different types of ‘feel plays’ they value more than others. Generally, rotations and defensive positioning are seen as the primary barometers for feel, and I don’t disagree with this. Modern basketball offenses are so diverse, full of inversion and misdirection at a pace we’ve never seen before. Merely being able to master one position or one defensive role likely isn’t enough to stick for non-centers.

I am going to be exploring feel and what I deem to be ‘valuable’ types of offensive feel through Javon Small, who I believe to be the smartest player in the draft class. Small is currently 14^th on my big board at the time of writing and someone I’d happily use a mid to late first-round pick on. He is the best off-ball player in the class and a superb passer, something I’ll analyse and chart at length later in this article.

At times, I am of the opinion that Feel can be oversimplified. Similarly to driving, feel is complex and can be quite role-dependent. I would also like to share how I scout passing and all the different facets of passing that matter to me, noting why all passing is not the same, and why versatility matters. We can sometimes see a flashy pass and get enamoured, but you want to study the body of work and post the flashy stuff if you think it matters or is part of something bigger.

AST:TO is often used as a broad indicator of offensive feel. I am of the opinion that turnovers are bad and having a wildly negative AST-TO ratio is probably a bad sign unless you are a nuclear shooter or hyper athletic lob-threat. But does having a high AST-TO automatically mean you have feel on a basketball court? Quite often, players who are incredibly high in this stat can simply be table-setters on teams running high-powered offenses full of off-screen plays. I am not suggesting these skills aren’t valuable, but more that it can be worth contextualizing the types of assists players are getting. More filtering is needed to truly grasp a players “feel”, whether that be more granular stats or film analysis.

To me, defensive feel is much easier to define than offensive feel. I think there are two main reasons for this, the first being that bad defensive positioning is just so glaringly obvious on tape to the naked eye. If the tag man falls asleep on a Spain PNR, a layup is given up. If someone crashes on a drive and doesn’t rotate back out quickly enough to defend ball reversals, a wide-open jump shot will be given up. If a player panics as his defense is rotating, he may over-commit and end up fouling a mediocre three-point shooter.

The other reason is that scheme and surrounding personnel can play a large role. Teams that run the Princeton Offense naturally create opportunities for back cuts. Iverson Loop is a favourite set play of mine that will almost always create a wide-open backdoor layup. These are ‘cuts’, but created via schematic or tactical brilliance. Also, playing with an elite passer such as Nikola Jokic or Trae Young will give you more opportunities to showcase off-ball feel than if you are on a poor roster.

The balance comes with the fact that you cannot completely ignore good cutting because it comes within the context of a good scheme. Peja Stojakovic was a terrific off-ball mover when playing in Rick Adelman’s high-powered offense alongside two elite passers in Chris Webber and Vlade Divac. The fact that the corner offense was so meta for its time doesn’t change the fact; it’s just worth keeping in mind when studying this stuff. A good cut also doesn’t get you an assist or at times even the ball thrown your way, sometimes it will create space for someone else such as with a 45 cut.

This piece serves as more of a philosophical dive than a true draft profile, but for the sake of being complete I will say that Small is a plus playmaker, a very good off-ball mover who should shoot well at the next level. His three-point percentage is slightly lower than I’d expect it to be in the NBA, largely because, as a first-option, over half of his attempts were off-the-dribble three-pointers. The likely biggest weakness on offense is that he doesn’t like to challenge rim protectors. He has a decent floater in his arsenal but will often prefer to pass out of those situations.

Literature on Feel

Feel, being as complex as it is, requires study beyond the tape. Part of growing as an analyst in Basketball is reading pieces that challenge you, but also help you learn. As a guy who never played the sport, my background is unique and self-created. Other guys have different paths and skillsets. One of the best pieces ever written on feel is by my good friend Evan Zaucha, who now works at a high level in the sport.

Evan is a neuroscientist who pondered whether feel can be improved upon, and turned this late-night pondering into one of the greatest articles ever written on basketball.

This article is well worth your time and changed the way I look at the game of basketball. Evan makes several conclusions in the article, but there are two tha I’m really going to focus on:

• Ev concludes Feel is one of the 2 hardest skills to develop, alongside dribbling, with a general conclusion that mental skills are harder to develop than technical skills.
• Ev breaks down ‘feel’ into three parts: Processing Speed, Pattern Recognition and Visual Processing.

I’m not going to regurgitate a watered-down version of Zaucha’s masterpiece, but for the sake of moving things along in my own piece let’s just quickly explore these three through a play from my timeline where Louisville runs ‘Horns Out Knicks Spain’.

The pattern recognition aspect is Chucky Hepburn identifying the play, snaking to the right after the screen flip and seeing the defense angle their bodies to his left. He’s been running PNRs all his life and Kelsey would have installed this particular play in practice. In addition to this, he also sees his back screener angle his screen to the right-hand side.

Things are not always so simple, though, and players often have to react to what the defense does, not what they think they’re going to do.

The visual processing in this instance is seeing that #11 from Notre Dame has jumped into the paint to defend him as opposed to sticking with the back screener (a possible surprise). He continues processing by throwing it to the back screener, who leaked out of the paint for three. The processing speed is a constant throughout the play because if Hepburn picks up his dribble or stops after seeing the guard in the paint, Notre Dame would be able to recover out to the ‘leaker’ in the Spain PNR. Windows can shut it in an instant in basketball, so being able to do these things consistently is a true barometer of high-end ‘feel’.

These descriptions are similar to how the great NFL analysts will discuss quarterback play. You have a route combination to beat a specific coverage; if they’re vanilla, you know what you’ve got and don’t have to hesitate. If the coverage is disguised, you have to adjust on the fly, whether that’s taking a checkdown or something else. The speed you do that and how quickly you can move your feet (in the case of Hepburn above, it was his handle) will impact how likely you can adjust on the fly.

Another article that changed the way I scouted was Jake Rosen’s piece on how to look for processing speed on a court, in which the majority of ways Jake identified processing speed were off the ball. This largely tracks, as cutting is the most commonly identified type of intelligent ‘feel’ play. The one on-ball skill that Jake noted can be used to spot processing speed is when a playmaker is going through their progressions. You might run a double drag and your defender gets caught under the screen, so you know you have a clear run to the rim. But there will be other occasions where things are not that simple and you have to go further into your script, if not play in a way that wasn’t on your original script.

To Quote Rosen:

“The easiest way to detect fraudulent processors is when the first read is forced. Whether it’s a drop off to the roll man, or a lob for a scripted ATO play, blindly following the first read is a huge red flag. Not only does it show they didn’t read the defense on that particular play, it also means they were too overwhelmed with the idea of going through progressions”

There is nothing wrong with hitting a first read if it’s there. The issue is, defenses are getting longer and longer, and defensive tactics are becoming more aggressive. The picture you have in your head when you start the pick-and-roll will sometimes be completely different to what you see a couple of seconds later. NBA analyst Polarfall always likes to differentiate the very best playmakers from people who make ‘pre-planned’ decisions. You may go into a Double Drag wanting to get an easy layup, but you need to be able to read if you aren’t going to get that and have already made the decision to hit the popping big man before the defense has time to adjust.

That is the main change I have noticed as I’ve covered this game tactically for the last decade. Things can get complex quickly, and, more and more often, players are more comfortable temporarily leaving players open to overload certain areas of the court. Teams will try and counter this with stuff like 45 cuts, Stampede Action and Dead Corner concepts, but great passing is a way to cut through all of this, as if you’re against a truly elite processor, there isn’t always a ton you can do.

Passing Versatility

I’ve outlined some of the pieces that impacted the way I watch film and process playmaking on the court – now lets look through this lens with Javon Small. Small is a player projected in the mid-second round, but I’d feel comfortable taking him quite a bit earlier. I believe he can be a rotation player on a very good team due to his mix of playmaking, off-ball interest, feel, shooting, and capable paint scoring.

Something I always take note of is the variety of assists a player gets. I think even the top-end playmakers, such as Nikola Jokic, Steve Nash, and Luka Doncic, have passes or deliveries they lean on disproportionately. Even still, these 3 guys stand out as being capable of making a variety of passes, adapting to the playfinishing personnel they have on the court with them. To further explain this theory, I hand-tracked all of Javon Small’s assists from the past season. If an assist contributed to two categories in a relevant way (IE, if Small came off a screen, then drove and kicked it), I added a number to both categories.

As you can see, there is a lot of variety here. I believe this is important because at the NBA levels, some passers have very specific tendencies, and these can be game planned for. For example, the old Brooklyn Nets teams had D’Angelo Russell and Spencer Dinwiddie as their lead guards. Russell had a very strong preference towards interior passing, whereas Spencer Dinwiddie had a heavy bias towards drive-and-kick passing. Being able to hit the whole floor in the half-court is extremely important, even though Russell was still a plus playmaker in the grand scheme of things.

It is also worth noting that passing variety on its own isn’t a reliable indicator of feel. You could theoretically be able to make every pass in the book and make it accurately, but still be a low feel or poor processing player. Instead, I feel the ability to make different types of passes elevates the value of feel, which is why I talked about contextualizing AST:TO Ratio earlier. Small’s AST:TO Ratio moves me because of the difficulty and variety of the passes he executes in a high-level on-ball role.

Something I feel is essential when scouting a prospect is to consider the surrounding context. This does not mean I would completely overlook a prospects’ flaws because they’re in a bad context, but, rather, you weigh it in as part of the evaluation. With regard to passing variety what you should contextualise is that sometimes your front-court options will dictate the types of passes you throw.

For example, when scouting Kasparas Jakucionis it is painfully obvious that Illinois did not have a consistent lob-threat due to the fact that their center, Ivisic, was more of a stretch-five. This does not necessarily mean Kasparas cannot throw lob passes or prefers not to, but it’s a variable to consider. In the case of Small, West Virginia’s bigs largely preferred passes to be thrown as they were rolling; they didn’t have much of a true vertical threat. Still, having watched Small, I don’t believe he had an aversion to throwing lob passes, but instead was adapting to his personnel – those he did throw were accurate and the right read.

Effectively, passing variety shows you can solve problems in a variety of ways, which can increase a playmaking ceiling down the line. You can still be a positive playmaker without it, but the more passes you’re capable of, the more ways you can solve problems in the half-court.

Javon Small

As I’ve mentioned, I believe Small to be an incredibly smart player who can do anything on the floor. West Virginia were a good team last year, and Small played a large part in that stepping up to the plate after Tucker DeVries’ season-ending injury early in the season. Darian DeVries is one of the best offensive minds in college basketball, and Small’s passing was a great mesh with this, opening a whole realm of possibilities.

Something I’d like to note is I always try and make sure I’m being realistic and balanced. At times it can be tempting to find a clip of a prospect doing something once or twice and labelling it as a ‘flash’. It’s something I try and fight doing because you could find a clip of Dwight Howard hitting a three or Andre Roberson hitting a movement three if you looked hard enough. I have chosen to highlight Javon Small’s passing because after a full scout I believe it to be a difference making skill that can help a team, not because I’m trying to force anything.

What you will notice with a lot of these plays, is just how active Javon Small is off-the-ball. He takes great pride in moving to create advantages for his team-mate and it means there is passing potential off the catch due to his movement to take movement threes.

Below is the quintessential Javon Small play.

West Virginia runs ‘Point Over’. He cuts backdoor, loops back around, gets top locked. Many players just stop here or continue to try and get open in the same way, but Small keeps it moving and clears out eventually receiving the ball on a handoff, then making a quick dumpoff pass to Amani Hansberry who largely prefers to receive the ball in face-up situations. This is a great example of how he never stop moving and makes passes quickly.

Making passes in one motion after receiving the ball is a very common play-type for Small. Below he comes off the screen in a ‘Garfunkel’ set and makes the dumpoff pass to Hansberry at the baseline quickly enough so Hansberry can score without resistance.

After Tucker DeVries went down. Small became the fulcrum of the half-court offense – other guys stepped up where needed, but he was the advantage creator. They also sought to weaponize him off-ball largely due to his willingness to do it, but also to avoid predictability and stagnation.

Part of how they’d do this was by using Floppy Action and other double staggers.

On the play above, Javon Small makes the bounce pass to Amani Hansberry after coming off the double stagger. Hansberry likes these bounce passes as they’re a good way for him to quickly get into floaters and quick jumpers.

The play below is a good example of his good visual processing.

Small comes off the screen and is getting blitzed. More often than not Small expects to dump the ball off inside the paint, but on this occasion, his screener is a 6-foot guard. Small sees him moving to the corner so he stops and throws a pass over his head with the left hand, choosing a whipped pass to give a closeout the least chance of happening.

A concept that Polar introduced to NBA Twitter was the concept of ‘proactive passing’. The idea behind this is that you at first react to what is happening, but then throw a pass in anticipation of the defenses next move. I refer to any pass where it’s thrown as the defense is rotating (as opposed to afterwards) as a proactive pass. Small makes a lot of these:

Here they run their ‘turn’ series for him. The main option is for him to drive to the rim himself as the roll didn’t really get open. But watch how he reads #23 – the defender is in a position to clog the lane, but Small sees his back turned to Toby Okani so he throws the pass in anticipation. Effectively, he throws him open on this play )to use American Football terminology). He also correctly chooses the bounce pass as it’s Okani’s preference and allows him to pick up and finish off the glass in one motion.

Holding Defenders

Small does a great job holding defenders in a variety of ways. Sometimes it’s with his eyes, sometimes he extends windows for his roll men to give them more space and further stretch the defense.

I’m normally quite a harsh analyst on passing because I think at times basic passes can become highlight plays because of some finesse or trickery on them. But Small made so many proactive passes this season into tight windows and did a great job at both understanding and predicting defenders, like this play against Kansas:

WVU open the game by running a Shallow Double Drag which is designed to clear nail help and create a 2v2 in the PNR game. Kansas decide to hedge on the screen. Small’s roll-man is briefly covered by #3 but he waits for the mesh point and throws a beautiful wraparound pass to Eduardo Andre as Hunter Dickinson is rotating back. He stayed patient and made the pass right as he predicted that #3 would want to recover out to the shooter.

Dickinson is technically still right in front of him when he decides to make the pass. Proactive Passing doesn’t mean the pass has to be instant – windows are always opening and closing on a basketball court – it’s just all about having a feel for timing.

Small’s bounce passing was consistently accurate, managing to maintain the leverage of his roll-men quite often.

Again, you see his ability to make proactive quick passes as defenders are getting into position. He has a great feel for finding the timing on his passes, as the ball is quite often past defenders before they’ve even reacted. His processing speed and pass selection are both top notch. From a fit perspective, it’s easy to envision him thriving alongside someone with short roll ability or a powerful driver from the mid-range area.

Here’s a play where all of this comes together and we see his ability to hold defenders still.

WVA runs a Drag PNR into a give and go designed to punish the drop defense. The shallow lift in the roll and replace action isn’t open, but Small stays patient by pulling a favorable switch further away from the action. Watch him fake the swing pass to the right to pull the recovery defender out of the paint, then hit Eduardo Andre inside. You can even see him get #14 to jump – it’s these subtle manipulations that can win in the half-court. He kept the swing pass open for the whole possession and kept leveraging the threat of it to eventually generate an interior read.

As Rosen discussed, staring down the first read all the time isn’t a good sign, as it showcases rigidity in decision making. Current NBA Basketball isn’t akin to following an instruction manual. Superhuman athletes roam the court and coaches are trying wackier defensive tactics than ever before. Gone are the days of teams running flat 1-4 PNRs with both corners and the slot occupied with spacers. The court is more positionally fluid than ever, so being able to read on the fly is as important as it’s ever been.

Effectively, you’re going to see weird stuff so you can’t rely on making pre-planned reads. These plays often stand out as containing unique angles, misdirects, or anything that elicits surprise in the viewer. In essence, a prospect being able to break your camera is a good sign.

Below is one of my favourite passes of the cycle.

This looks a simple read in the PNR, but Small actually makes two moves here: before the bounce pass, he gets the defender to jump at the idea of the high pass. He chains it together so quickly that it’s quite hard to see on the video without really slowing it down. He extends the window for his roller because if he’d thrown it earlier, #10 has a better chance at making a play.

Small also loves throwing wraparound passes. You’ve seen one or two so far, and it’s something he’s good at and feels comfortable doing. He’s ambidextrous on these passes, though ultimately he is probably slightly more comfortable using his left hand.

Modern Concepts and Athleticism

Something I love about Javon Small is how he’s already executing some of the modern concepts and tactics that we are seeing rise in the NBA, particularly in regards to throw-and-gos. These are not new to basketball, but teams such as the Cleveland Cavaliers have made them a feature of their half-court offense in recent years. Kenny Atkinson in particular preaches fast-paced principles and pass-and-move concepts, as opposed to set plays. Below is an example.

The play basically dies, which happens often against Kelvin Sampson’s defense. But Javon Small simply flows into a give and go with Amani Hansberry to get things moving again. It’s effective because Hansberry’s man is sagging off, as he’s not a great shooter. Small gets into the teeth of the defense before jumping and hangs in the air so he can allow things to develop more and make the right read.

There are a few things I note here. Caitlin Cooper has long been a proponent of jump passing and nearly every fellow Film writer I know including myself owns a T-Shirt to celebrate this. Caitlin noted that jump passing is important for Haliburton because he “jumps because he has an idea, not because he has run out of ideas”. I noticed on film while watching Javon Small that he likes a Jump Pass. In the case above the Jump Pass gave him a little time to read the low-man and pick between the 45 cutter or the corner shooter. He does similar on the play below, where he uses a jump to create time to read the low-man, then decides a kick-out is a better option than dishing into the paint.

Some may have preferred him to make the interior pass, but he underestimated the length Colorado threw at him early in the play and adjusted on the fly. Small uses the jump pass to open up two-options for himself, before ultimately deciding to read #6 inside the paint. As noted before, he chains this together rapidly and is capable of making quick adjustments with his handle. He turned what was a misread into something valuable, like he does again here:

WVU runs a Gut Chicago set on the BLOB play. There isn’t much open at first, so Small lofts a pass to his center and runs a give-and-go, creating a lob opportunity and an easy bucket. As noted in the pass tracking, Small didn’t throw a ton of lob passes – largely because the opportunities were not always there – but he is someone I project to be capable of throwing them.

I mentioned the Cavs above. Their backup guards (Ty Jerome in particular) were excellent at always keeping things moving and making quick decisions. Some call this ‘0.5 decision making’. It’s very easy to project Small doing this stuff at the NBA level, largely because he has already done it at the collegiate level. I’ve pondered whether I’ve been too optimistic on how easy these instant decision concepts are to install. Sure, you can tell any of your players to do these throw-and-gos, but the ability to do it at game speed and move quickly is the differentiator. Because of this, feel is crucial to how much value you generate from these concepts, especially on the cutting side.

Javon Small also shows great core strength on many of his passes. It should be noted that Javon Small is very athletic, full stop. Among point guards all time his combine score ranks in the 96th percentile per Nick Kalinowski (KaliDrafts).

Small shows this hand width and core strength on tape by making some crazy one-handed passes:

Javon snakes the PNR, stops and throws a great one-handed pass to Toby Okani before the defense can even react. This showcased nearly everything we’ve touched upon so far – pattern recognition by reading his defender and snaking, adapting to the changes in coverage and seeing the soft spot in the defense while doing it quickly (Zaucha). He doesn’t stare down the obvious read which is the roll, instead realizing a later progression is going to be open (Rosen). Finally, he makes a jump pass because he had an idea he wanted to execute. The one-handed pass shows core strength. This is everything I’ve discussed all coming together at once, and these weren’t one-off passes either. His handle and processing speed are on full display again in the clip below:

Cutting

Small is an exceptional cutter, able to make them quickly but also uses a lot of veteran tricks to maximize himself. Here’s a play that exemplifies this while also touching upon the jump passing we detailed above.

WVU go with a basic 5-out look and show as if they’re gonna run ‘Doom’ action (Double Zoom). Javon Small is on the weak side and briefly pushes off on his man to get a little separation, then cuts backdoor. He hangs in the air and throws a great dump-off pass. Again, he uses the Jump Pass as he had an idea as opposed to running out of them. These veteran tricks are all over the film and mesh with his passing and court mapping.

He did the same in an early-season matchup against Gonzaga:

Darian DeVries spammed this ‘Peja’ action (Back Screen into a Handoff) for his son Tucker while at Drake. WVU look to set this up on the SLOB play. Watch Small push his man (who is expecting Peja action) downhill to create a blockade then cut backdoor to generate the free-throw attempts. Small’s defender is basically only thinking about top-locking Tucker DeVries and Javon makes him pay with some smart and effective movement.

Yes it’s a defensive lapse, but good cutting will create these. You won’t create a defensive lapse out of thin air.

Small also had a couple of plays where he saw things instantly on SLOB plays as the inbounder and created points.

WVU are trying to set up some form of an away screen for Sencire Harris. He gets top locked and Small responds almost instanteously by throwing to Eduardo Andre and going for a backdoor cut which works as #3 is playing conservative defense on Andre. Again, these things look simple, but Small thinks so quickly and was doing this sort of stuff on a nightly basis.

Conclusion: Revisiting Feel, Passing and Processing Speed

I’ve explored the thoughts of others throughout this piece and deep-dived the passing variety and effectiveness of Javon Small.

Small’s offensive feel was just seriously impressive. Not many small guards engage off-ball, but Small not only engages but simply sees things so quickly. A lot of how much this might matter will depend on the shot. I believe Small’s percentages are largely tanked by the fact over 65 percent of his attempts were off-the-dribble 3s. It’s unlikely he’s going to be playing as big a role as he played at WVU so I expect the shooting numbers to stabilise a little.

The major question I have for Small is how much he can challenge bigs as a scorer. There were times he could drive and somewhat get swallowed up and almost be reliant on a cut to make stuff happen. This isn’t necessarily a gigantic deal because players should be moving anyway but working out how he wants to challenge bigs will be the major question I’d ask. But the processing, passing variety and general feel should translate immediately.

He seems pretty scalable because of his passing variety. The only real instance I can think of where he might not fit would be on a team that runs very little pick-and-roll, but even then I think his cutting, off-ball movement and smarts mean he will find opportunities to score and create from the second-side quite often.

Javon Small, with all his passing talent, indeed had a strong A:TO. However, I noted earlier that I like to contextualise Feel and analyze AST:TO in a more comprehensive way. A:TO has its value and is probably a good filter generally. But ultimately it’s worth your time to dive deeper and find other ways to filter guys out, whether that is with more statistics or with film watching. I hope sharing how I scout passing , feel and playmaking can help with that.

The reason I like to do that is to put it simply, it’s very hard to make it in the NBA. Having feel alone will not keep you on a court. The types of ways you can ‘feel’ the game matter as does the rest of your game. Zaucha’s three cornerstones of feel showcase that it can be complex to understand how feel works and how impactful it will be. Small understands the game, can adapt to defensive wrinkles and can adapt to them quickly. This is all fuelled by an impressive handle; feel cannot stand alone without technique.

Diving into the film allows you to gauge how much the feel might matter at the next level. Many high AST-TO guards get drafted, it just isn’t always enough. That is what I mean by ‘contextualising feel’. I sought to add to this by showcasing how I scout passing and the types of ‘high processing speed’ passes I look for and how to spot them.

In the modern NBA, spacing is said to be at an all-time high. This is largely because we shoot more threes than ever and have true five-out stuff. The 2002 Sacramento Kings broke the NBA with their spacing which was Chris Webber and Vlade Divac both being able to shoot mid-rangers. But the more i watch the less I become sure that space is actually always there. Part of this is because NBA defenses want you to shoot mid-range shots, but defenses are also just long and smart. What has stood out to me in these Finals is how compacted things are; things are played in a phone booth when it comes down to it. Even though we utilise the three-point line more than ever, traffic is there. Things are clogged, and you need to find solutions within the space you are given. It’s why I often fade hyper-athletic, speedy prospects because I think agility and finesse can be extremely important in these phone booths.

It’s not as simplistic as saying processing is the only way to beat it. There are sub-optimal processors who can attack these compact defenses we see and do a good job of it. In the case of Javon Small, and just Javon Small, I think his answer to this problem is that his handle, his instant processing and his ability to throw a variety of passes can unlock doors. That’s the problem he might solve for you. I try and treat every prospect as unique, and the solutions they provide for one team will not necessarily be the same they can provide for another. As I have displayed by contextualizing the stats with tape and scheme analysis, Javon Small can provide a lot of solutions for a lot of teams.

Favourite Fits: Clippers, Pacers, Timberwolves, Hawks

The post Javon Small: Scouting and Contextualising Feel, Passing and Processing Speed appeared first on Swish Theory.

VJ Edgecombe

Valdez (VJ) Edgecombe has been a projected top 5 pick wire to wire in this class. Despite a rocky start to the season, Edgecombe’s status as a blue chip recruit seemed well deserved after a freshman season that placed him in exclusive company.

As much as Bart Torvik queries have become a fraught subject amongst the draft community, when taking an Occam’s Razor approach it is apparent there’s not really a precedent for a player with Edgecombe’s intersection of feel, athleticism, and production becoming an abject failure in the league (barring unforeseen circumstances taking place in the case of Zhaire Smith).

So if Edgecombe has the pedigree and production, what consternation is there with his current standing near the top of the draft? To start, one may point to VJ’s suboptimal finishing at the rim. While Edgecombe ended the season at a solid 60% at the rim, his rim efficiency was largely inflated by his dynamic vertical athleticism and transition frequency. Just under 48% of Edgecombe’s rim-attempts came in transition, while in the halfcourt Edgecombe finished only 49% at the rim and a disconcerting 44% on half-court layups. However, this is not a novel insight; most publications and scouts have noted VJ’s half-court limitations for some time, with his unrefined ballhandling typically being pointed to as the culprit of his unimpressive rim-finishing. Per @henrynbadraft, Edgecombe’s relative weakness at the rim has been present since his time on the grassroots circuit. In the query below of top-50 RSCI players’ AAU statistics over the past 3 years, along with Edgecombe, these were the only players to have <53% on two-point attempts (2PA), <0.6 2PA/TSA (true shot attempt), and <0.1 FTA/TSA.

Of the 5 players here (excluding Edgecombe) to play over a 50% minutes share, their average rim-rate was 20.9% as a freshman. With the exception of VJ, these players were either three-point specialists or jumpshot-oriented creators. With VJ not falling into either bucket he was placed in a precarious position, how does one deploy a blue-chip recruit without a clearly defined offensive skillset? Early in the season, the fit could best be described as ‘trying to fit a square peg into a round hole’. Baylor runs a notoriously ballscreen-heavy offense, finishing this season in the 81st percentile in ‘Pick-and-Roll’ frequency, and over the last 5 years Baylor has never finished lower than the 77th percentile in this playtype.

Operating core ballscreen actions in the middle third of the floor, Edgecombe greatly struggled generating deep, quality paint touches. When asked to create from a standstill against a set defense as frequently as Edgecombe was, his high center of gravity caused issues changing direction off a live dribble, withstanding contact on drives, and altering stride length, all of which are critical components of any downhill driving game. The convergence of Edgecombe’s physical and skill limitations as a primary ballhandler is evident from the clips below.

When you pair this schematic emphasis on running ballscreens with one of the slowest paces in the country (Baylor finished 320/364 teams in Adjusted Tempo) you are left with a team uniquely suited to exacerbating Edgecombe’s weaknesses and suppressing his strengths. I believe this combination is the primary cause of Baylor’s offense being BETTER with Edgecombe on the bench. Per Hoop-Explorer, Baylor’s offense was 7.6 points better per 100 possessions. While the 479 possessions Edgecombe wasn’t on the floor isn’t the most robust sample, the underlying numbers fall in line with what the film suggests. Baylor’s shot quality suffered with Edgecombe running 24% of the team’s PNR actions per Synergy. Not only was Baylor less capable of generating threes and free-throw attempts, the QUALITY of three-point attempts was lower with Edgecombe on the floor, with the team shooting almost 2 less corner threes per 100 possessions.

Even if Edgecombe’s outlook as a downhill creator is replete with red flags, there are still other avenues Edgecombe could take to develop into a star-level offensive player. After all, despite getting off to a rough start shooting this season, Edgecombe’s shooting priors are near stellar. Coming into the year, Edgecombe had shot 39.1% on 274 threes and 79.9% on 134 free-throw attempts. These numbers indicate that Edgecombe developing into a potent off-the-dribble is well within the realm of possibility. And when looking at historical precedent, significant pull-up shooting development may be the most integral component to Edgecombe returning top-5 value. Below are all the players drafted in the lottery since 2010 who were: 6’5 or shorter, with 5 or fewer unassisted two-point makes per 100 possessions, and 30% or more of their two’s assisted (per Bart Torvik)

Virtually all of these players who returned positive expected value based on their draft slot developed into highly effective shooters off the dribble. And where it currently stands, Edgecombe is behind the curve in this respect. Compared to the players in the previous query, Edgecombe finished his pre-NBA season with the lowest volume AND tied for the 2nd worst efficiency on these pull-up twos.

Edgecombe’s lack of comfort shooting off the dribble is apparent on film, and another facet of his game limited by his handle. VJ cannot self-organize off multiple dribbles and take pull-up jumpers on balance currently, and the line between midrange attempts and floaters is frequently blurred when Edgecombe takes these shots.

Again, VJ’s issues shooting off the dribble date back to his pre-NCAA career and are rooted in his biomechanical issues. Edgecombe being a ‘high-hipped’ athlete who struggles decelerating is preventing him from leveraging his impressive straight-line speed to create space off the dribble. VJ’s proclivity for over-striding on drives limits how effectively he can generate power when he transitions into a pull-up jumper.

My current hypothesis is Edgecombe’s difficulty controlling his stride length while driving is what’s responsible for the discrepancy between VJ’s dynamism leaping off 2 feet, where he’s arguably the most explosive player in this draft class, versus 1 foot, where he’s struggled greatly relative to expectations. Baylor’s coaching staff made schematic changes for Edgecombe to improve his on-ball efficacy, from using guard-to-guard Ghost Screens to clear driving lanes…

…to using actions such as ’77 Shallow’ in order to simultaneously beat hedging ballscreen coverages and remove nail-help to aid Edgecombe’s drives.

However, neither adjustment bolstered Edgecombe’s efficiency to the desired extent. So this begs the question, if there’s reason for concern with regards to Edgecombe’s effectiveness as a pull-up shooter AND attacking the basket, is there any reason to believe Edgecombe’s profile warrants his lofty draft projection? As previously mentioned, Edgecombe’s deployment in an extremely ballscreen heavy offense was far from ideal, however his playtype distribution does not paint the full picture of how inconducive Baylor’s offense was for Edgecombe specifically.

The 3-man lineup of VJ Edgecombe, Norchad Omier, and Josh Ojianwuna makes up 22.5% of VJ Edgecombe’s total possessions played this season, however this lineup was on the floor for 26.9% of PNR possessions ran by Edgecombe this season. In Offensive Rating, this 3-man lineup was 22nd out of 25 Baylor lineups that played over 350 possessions, with this 3-man unit’s only saving grace being their relative strength on the offensive glass.

This lineup’s spacing issues only amplified Edgecombe’s aforementioned struggles as a primary ballhandler. Take the clips below, for example. This group of clips displays Baylor running ‘RAM PNP’, a staple of their ballscreen offense, where a player receives an off-ball screen before setting the middle ballscreen and ‘popping’ to the 3-point line. In the first clip, Baylor has the 2 bigs involved in the action, with Norchad Omier first receiving the off-ball screen before setting a ballscreen for Edgecombe. Notice how compacted the spacing is inside the arc, with Omier’s defender completely disregarding the popping Omier.

However, in the following clips, a ‘small’ sets the middle ballscreen for Edgecombe. Even in the first possessions with the action taking place against the same opponent in Tennessee, the improvement in shot quality is apparent.

The double-big lineups’ impact on tape was corroborated by VJ’s PNR data, as well.

Ultimately, this is a minuscule sample of possessions Edgecombe played with the double big lineup, and I do not want to make it seem as though these suboptimal lineups are totally responsible for VJ’s issues as a PNR ballhandler. However, I do think this data is key to realizing that Edgecombe’s outlook as a creator isn’t entirely doomed. Of players with ≥ 150 PNR + Passes possessions, Edgecombe was ranked in the 40th percentile in PPP, but in lineups with only one big Edgecombe’s 0.944 PPP was in the 66th percentile. Over the course of the season Baylor substituted these 3-man ballscreen actions with ‘Empty’ PNRs to ‘clear up’ the picture for Edgecombe on drives and place less strain on his handle. In these less complex ballscreen actions, Edgecombe’s processing (which well outpaces the functionality of his handle at this point) was able to truly shine.

My case for optimism in Edgecombe’s creation ability is relative to the position taken by his greatest detractors. The likelihood of VJ becoming a high-level PNR operator is slim-to-none in my opinion, but this doesn’t preclude the possibility of him becoming a highly valuable offensive player. The use case for VJ Edgecombe offensively just requires a degree of creativity.

For as many questions as I’ve raised regarding the functionality of VJ’s athleticism, there have only been a few players his size to reach certain athletic benchmarks. Below is a query I’ve run on players since 2010, where ‘Team Stock%’ is the share of a team’s steals+blocks a player logged. I decided to use this instead of steal and block rate to account for some noise introduced by team stylistic tendencies.

The only other players to appear alongside Edgecombe are players whose role I’ve termed ‘Utility Guards’, those with the size of perimeter players who can fulfill responsibilities typically associated with frontcourt players. This sort of role is where I see Edgecombe being best utilized. As VJ transitions to the NBA and his on-ball burden lessens, I would hope that Edgecombe is integrated as a stylistic wrinkle versus a featured piece. There may not be a team better at deploying their guards in such a manner than the Boston Celtics. With the acquisition of Jrue Holiday, the Celtics could place teams in conflict without deliberately involving Holiday in actions. By simply stationing Holiday in the Dunker Spot, the Celtics were afforded the luxury of having a player who could function as an outlet for their jumbo creators on drives and consistently win the rebounding battle versus like-sized perimeter players.

In the original ‘Utility Guard’ query I provided, pre-NBA 3-point volume and efficiency were listed. The relevancy of these stats outside of the obvious is the prevalence of the most consistent counter used to neutralize this archetype. I am currently writing this article as the Eastern Conference Finals takes place, and much has been made of Josh Hart’s ineffectiveness in the series, with the Knicks coaching staff going as far as removing Hart from the starting lineup. What has plagued Hart and many of these Swiss army knife players (at least offensively) is the lack of consistent spacing they provide. Opponents have experienced success defending these players with Centers and ignoring them on the perimeter. What makes the prospect of Edgecombe in this role especially tantalizing is the confidence I have in his ability as a spot-up shooter.

Granted, a significant portion of these attempts are from the high-school line, and Edgecombe has shot a paltry 24.4% (19/79) on off-the-dribble 3PA in the same timeframe. But at the same stage of their careers, Edgecombe is significantly further along as a spacer than players of a similar archetype, while also possessing the explosiveness to take advantage of opportunities as a screener like Gary Payton II in the clip below…

Or exploit cross-matches versus bigs in space, as he does to Henri Veesaar in the play below.

And as previously mentioned, Baylor’s PNR-heavy style being centered around smaller guards who couldn’t create advantages eradicated opportunistic scoring from Edgecombe’s shot diet. The few chances Edgecombe has had to attack from the weakside or get downhill versus a tilted floor, he delivered.

Obviously, there’s only so much accommodating a team would want to subject themselves to when it comes to a player drafted as high as VJ will be. However, a player capable of providing lineup and stylistic flexibility without compromising spacing or rebounding is scarcely made available at a rookie deal price point. This archetype’s dependence on high-leverage creators is undeniable, but this era of the NBA reflects the appeal of a prospect like VJ Edgecombe. Sacrificing the size traditionally associated with certain roles in favor of skill can pay massive dividends.

Miles Byrd

Any reservations to be had with Miles Byrd are fairly straightforward; a glance at a query of players with Byrd’s combination of size and scoring inefficiency yields a list almost bereft of long-tenured NBA contributors.

It wouldn’t be entirely off-base to say the only reason the majority of this list was even able to enter the draft pool was due to exceptional high school pedigrees. The obvious throughline between success cases of this query is their high-level defensive aptitude. There is definitely reason to believe Byrd’s defensive capabilities are enough to buoy his NBA prospects, as of the players in the above query, Byrd has the highest Block and Steal rate. To my surprise, however, Byrd’s impact on San Diego State’s defensive efficiency was muted relative to his statistical production on this end of the floor. Per Hoop-Explorer, San Diego State’s defense was only 2.5 points per 100 possessions better with Byrd On Court vs Off. Perhaps most unexpectedly though, SDSU’s Defensive Turnover Rate remained unchanged regardless of whether Byrd was playing or not!

Watching the tape, it is fairly easy to draw conclusions as to what could be behind the discrepancy between Byrd’s stellar event creation numbers, and the On-Off Splits. San Diego State runs an aggressive switching scheme, which incentivizes players to sacrifice ‘sound’ positioning in favor of forcing opponents into congested areas of the floor where they are more prone to committing turnovers. Byrd’s tape is littered with possessions where he is overhelping, or even throwing himself out of position by jumping passing lanes and attempting to create havoc.

Referencing SDSU’s defensive resume, there are two statistics that are key to elucidating Byrd’s directive schematically.

San Diego State was in the Bottom 10 in Opponent 3-point Rate, while leading the nation in Block Rate. It seems Head Coach Brian Dutcher was comfortable with trading off 3-point attempts as long as they were able to pack the paint and prevent their deep-lying shell from being compromised. This philosophy has been a defining trait of the Dutcher era, with SDSU ranking in the top 200 in opponent 3-point rate once in his 7 years at the helm, and outside the top 300 three times, including this year. SDSU’s Block% is relevant to their scheme and Byrd’s defensive evaluation because it empowered Byrd to take risks on the perimeter. If Byrd made an ill-advised gamble and provided the opponent a numerical advantage to attack, they still had to contend with a formidable frontcourt led by Magoon Gwath who finished 4th in the country in Block%.

Synthesizing this information initially led me to take a skeptical approach to Byrd’s defensive translatability. And prompted a less charitable interpretation of instances where Byrd’s point-of-attack defense faltered…

…or Byrd’s lack of strength seemed to be insulated by SDSU’s constant switching.

And while these were valid concerns at the time, taking a more holistic approach to Miles Byrd’s defensive profile incited me to revise my approach. But before delving deeper into the defensive side of things, I believe Byrd’s offense deserves further attention.

The Case for Miles Byrd’s Offense

Of the 68 teams in the NCAA Tournament field, San Diego State was 61st in Adjusted Offensive Rating, surpassing only the four 16 seeds in the field, Bryant, Troy, and Robert Morris in offensive efficiency. Historically speaking, San Diego State under Bryan Dutcher has never been a system conducive to high-octane offenses. A look at SDSU’s offensive statistical profile over the years portrays a team that plays a deliberate style without generating high-quality, schemed looks.

Too often, there’s a false equivalency drawn between slow offense and bad offense. That’s far from the case in my opinion, one only need to look as far as the NCAA and NBA champions in the 2023-24 season, the UConn Huskies and Boston Celtics. Both teams played a laborious style, but with intent. UConn’s meticulously schemed motion offense was incredibly efficient, creating clean looks for their bevy of shooters. Boston’s dominant run through this past season was defined by their relentless matchup hunting and isolation game. San Diego State, though, according to their own coach, is willing to play a much more laissez-faire approach to offense. On the Basketball Immersion Podcast, Dutcher discussed his philosophy on his offense in relation to his defense as “We spend a lot of time on defense. You’re good at what you work at…we might spend 50-60% of practice on defense…Offensively, we play with great freedom. We play with freedom within framework, we have things we try to accomplish but we like high IQ guys that can break out of that at any moment and just make plays.”

Although in many areas of the game flexibility is an admirable trait, in this instance, SDSU’s willingness to grant players freedom offensive autonomy has resulted in a consistently undesirable shot profile. Below is SDSU’s shot profile data under Brian Dutcher, with Near Proximity field goal attempts being defined as layups, dunks, and tip-ins.

Even with the offensive context being subpar, anyone who has read this far is probably looking for a better explanation for Miles Byrd’s offensive shortcomings than ‘the spacing and system were terrible.’ After all, this could be applied to a litany of former prospects. Despite a team’s structural issues, a player shouldn’t be entirely absolved of the product right? In Byrd’s case, though, despite the uninspiring raw efficiency, he finished in the 87th percentile in Offensive On-Off, per cbbanalytics. San Diego State was 8.9 points per 100 possessions better with Byrd on the court, due to his contribution in a few areas.

First, Miles Byrd is a stellar example of the importance of interior passing. Ranking in the 92nd percentile in Rim-Assists/40 minutes and the 96th percentile in the percent of total assists at the rim, on a per-touch basis Byrd was extremely efficient as a playmaker. Without running a high volume of PNR, Byrd routinely displayed a diverse passing vocabulary in the few opportunities he had attacking a tilted defense.

Even though I would consider Byrd’s handle a weakness at the moment, his penchant for playmaking manifested in his schemed possessions as well. The glut of actions drawn up for Byrd were ‘Spanoulis’ or ‘Zoom Chicago’, but he did operate and was effective in a limited sample as a PNR ballhandler, finishing in the 84th percentile in PNR PPP.

What Byrd’s projection on this end will be reduced to, though, will be how consistent a spacer he will become. Ending the season shooting only 30.3% from 3 on a robust 11.7 3PA/100, I am more optimistic Byrd will develop into an effective spacer than the raw numbers indicate. A significant portion of the optimism lies in Byrd’s stellar three-point volume and career 82.8% FT%, while also being rooted in the circumstances brought on by SDSU’s offense. On Guarded 3PA Byrd shot 37.2% (32/86), which was significantly better than the 23.1% (12/52) Byrd shot on Unguarded 3PA. My hypothesis as to how this could have been possible is that half of Byrd’s 3PA were classified as ‘Long Threes’ which per cbbdata are 3PA from 25+ feet. Already lacking in physical strength, oftentimes Byrd was placed in the position of HAVING to take long 3PA when his teammates were incapable of penetrating and breaking the defensive shell on the initial action.

What may be the strongest evidence for optimism in Byrd’s offensive profile is how extensive a creation burden he was tasked with. Over the course of researching relevant data for this piece, I’d realized Byrd’s self-created shot volume stood out amongst similarly sized players from previous drafts. This past season, only 22.9% of Miles Byrd’s two-point attempts were assisted and he produced 7.42 Unassisted 2PA per 100, a shot distribution more in line with guards trusted with generating half-court offense. To gauge how Byrd’s creation compared to similarly sized players, I conducted a (slightly overfitted) query…

….which yielded this list of 72 players since 2010

50th percentile EPM in the NBA this year (regular season) is -1.71 and slightly over half of this list’s 3 Year Peak EPM surpasses this number. Considering the draft capital (or lack thereof) spent on these players, a majority of them outperformed the expected value attributed to their draft slotting. Notably in the mix here are some of the most impressive recent ‘margin wins’ in Naji Marshall, Herb Jones, and Aaron Wiggins. And while there are some significant disappointments (like a Jarrett Culver or Johnny Davis), even some widely considered ‘busts’ such as Evan Turner managed to contribute in the league for a significant period of time. Two shared traits with players unable to stick in the league were:

1. Lacking a complementary offensive skillset (perimeter shooting, connective passing, and other play-finishing traits)
2. An inability to contribute defensively.

As previously outlined, I’m of the mind that San Diego State’s offensive ecosystem deprived Byrd of opportunities to display the former, and in the next section I plan on quelling concerns of the latter issue.

Tying it all together

For all the aforementioned reasons, Miles Byrd and VJ Edgecombe’s profiles are not without their flaws. There are probably plenty of issues with their skill sets that I haven’t mentioned that would make teams wary of drafting them. What these two have in common, and what has been particularly enamoring, is the seamlessness with which they fit into the modern game. Particularly defensively, Edgecombe and Byrd embody traits that I believe are necessary to play in today’s style.

After this season, Miles Byrd found himself in rare company with his defensive production. The list of non-bigs who managed to contribute to elite defense to the degree Byrd did, while maintaining a baseline level of feel, is exceedingly small.

Taking account of the right-most column, zone-heavy teams seem disproportionately represented amongst this group of players, making Byrd’s inclusion even more compelling. Per Synergy, San Diego State only logged 2 (!!) possessions of zone defense this entire season. Circling back to the initial concerns raised about SDSU’s defense and how relevant Byrd’s responsibilities within the scheme would be to what he’ll be asked to do at the next level, I believe SDSU’s scheme is one of the college defenses most analogous to the NBA systems currently in vogue.

Earlier, I had mentioned SDSU’s willingness to switch in conjunction with their tendency to show help early and often as a potential crutch for Miles Byrd, an obstacle in properly evaluating his defense. Originally, I’d thought if I were unable to assess Byrd’s ability to perform in ONE isolated defensive role, whether it be screen navigation, POA defense, or weakside rim-protection, then I’d be unable to determine which defensive role best suited him. The direction defenses in the NBA are heading, though, proves this is an antiquated way of evaluating defensive talent. In the same way competency in dribbling, passing, and shooting has become requisite for incoming NBA players, we have now arrived in an era where personnel need to demonstrate a degree of proficiency in each facet of defense to contribute to elite ’16 game’ basketball.

Of course, no team has exemplified this philosophy more than the prohibitive favorites for this year’s championship, the Oklahoma City Thunder. By compiling a roster full of players who are not only physically capable of executing a variety of defensive roles, but can simultaneously diagnose complex rotations, the Thunder have architected a defense with a singular identity amongst the NBA elite. Similar to San Diego State, the Thunder have no issues helping off of shooters, switching early and often, varying ballscreen coverages, and breaking with conventional defensive principles like helping off the ball-side corner.

While the other participant in this year’s NBA Finals doesn’t play as frenetic a defensive scheme, the Indiana Pacers mirror Oklahoma City in their utilization of early pick-up points in order to extend their pressure and convert a perceived weakness, their size, into a strength.

This kind of defense, which is becoming more and more commonplace, is where both Edgecombe and Byrd should thrive. Both have routinely shown their chops in each ‘phase’ of defense. Role notwithstanding, both were exemplary as point-of-attack defenders.

As previously discussed, SDSU’s scheme gave Byrd carte blanche to trust his instincts and range as a help defender, to consistently great results. Byrd’s activity was pervasive in every area, changing the geometry of the court by altering drive angles as a nail-defender…

…and keeping his team’s defense out of rotation with his sticky screen navigation.

Edgecombe’s deployment wasn’t nearly as fluid as Byrd’s, as Baylor played significantly more zone defense than SDSU (Baylor finished in the 91st percentile in zone frequency), making their defensive identity this season much more conservative. Coming into this season as the 234th-ranked team in average height per KenPom, Baylor didn’t have the luxury of rangy defenders to execute longer, more exotic rotations, so their prerogative was to stay out of rotation entirely and maintain shell integrity. This confined Edgecombe to playing a much more static role than Byrd. Even with a more parochial role, Edgecombe’s hand speed and lateral quickness mirroring players on the perimeter shone.

The instances of cognitive athleticism Byrd and Edgecombe show in the clips above are what make them especially suited for modern defenses. Oklahoma City has become the blueprint by acquiring players with traditionally valued athletic traits, decision making, and reaction times to dial their defensive aggression to the point where they are dictating terms of play to the offense. Recently, a major shift in NFL defenses was made when teams realized offenses struggled playing against 2-high safety alignments, where big-play opportunities were limited and offenses would have to slowly matriculate the ball down the field. I do not find the recent schematic changes made by the OKC Thunder all that different. The Thunder defense, by swarming to the ball and congesting driving lanes, have turned the long-held ‘drive and kick’ logic on its head. Similar to San Diego State, OKC concedes a high volume of 3PA defensively, especially relative to contemporary elite defenses. However, this is by design, by selling out on drives and forcing the ball to travel east-west versus north-south, both teams force longer possessions. In Oklahoma City’s case, the number of defensive playmakers they roster makes each drive by the opponent a tenuous proposition. When a team rosters so many chaos agents on defense, there’s the opportunity cost assumed with each successive drive, that the chance of the driver committing a turnover increases.

The emphasis on turnover generation in convergence with the break from traditional defensive philosophies resulted in NBA defense being ‘up’ this year, with drive volume, secondary assists (an assist made without the passer dribbling before the assist), and offensive rating all declining. While I understand this is a somewhat strained assumption, especially on such a small sample, I truly believe the sustained intensity and creativity we’re seeing in defenses is responsible for this phenomenon.

In SDSU’s case, Miles Byrd was disruptive enough on his own to mimic this effect on opposing offenses. By covering large swaths of ground and making multiple efforts after the initial rotation, Byrd was largely responsible for preventing flow to build within an offense.

By now I am probably starting to sound like a broken record with the continued use of terms like ‘ground-coverage’ and ‘event creation’, but it truly can’t be overstated how essential this is becoming as we transition into what has been aptly termed ‘The Weakest Link Era’ (a phrase coined by the inimitable Owen Phillips). So far, I’ve outlined the kind of player required to play this work-intensive style of defense, but the fact of the matter is that to play this way throughout the regular season and playoffs, you need MORE of this kind of player.

NBA basketball has never been more physically demanding, so it follows that to play a style hinged on range and effort, you’ll need a rotating cast of players to complement your core group. In Oklahoma City’s case, their depth is not only complementary, but ameliorates the weaknesses of many players in their rotation. So many members of the Thunder either currently possess or were at an earlier point designated as half-court deficient players; however, their greatest strength defensively allows them to play in the game states most conducive to efficient offense.

This applies to Miles Byrd and VJ Edgecombe because, irrespective of their offensive limitations, their penchant for creating turnovers will greatly augment the offense of a team, especially one already rostering players with similar defensive talents. The effect both Byrd and Edgecombe had on their respective teams’ transition numbers is instructive as to their value-add offensively.

In Byrd’s case, these transition numbers are especially notable: this is how a player shooting 38% from the field becomes the most impactful player to his team’s offense. San Diego State’s rim rate went from 122nd in the country with Byrd on the court to 293rd with him off. Without Byrd providing a spark in transition, the Aztecs were incapable of generating quality rim attempts in the half-court.

Conclusion

As it currently stands, the NBA is in a transitionary period. Slowly but surely, fans, analysts, and teams alike are acknowledging this era is a far departure from the star-centric league most of us grew to know and love. Now, as depth and flexibility become the focus, and while salary cap restrictions are more punitive than ever, it is paramount that teams get the most out of whatever draft capital they possess to maintain a standard of competitiveness. Otherwise, teams will routinely subject themselves to the whims of the ever-temperamental lottery gods (my condolences go out to fans of the Wizards, Jazz, and Pelicans alike). As I’ve mentioned repeatedly, Miles Byrd and VJ Edgecombe are far from perfect prospects, for as much as I’ve lauded their defensive acumen, even in this area their physical strength could become a significant obstacle which prevents them from being All-Defense caliber performers.

In Edgecombe’s case in particular, I would be surprised if he ended up returning top-4 value, and personally have him ranked 7th at the time of writing. I see VJ developing in a way where he could disappoint relative to expectations on his rookie contract. However, the style both players allow you to play, and the confidence I have in the depth they will provide, anchors my belief that both players have productive NBA careers ahead of them.

The post Contextualizing Production: VJ Edgecombe and Miles Byrd appeared first on Swish Theory.

Listed at 6’10”, Rutgers Scarlet Knights, Freshman, 18.9 on draft day

Ace Bailey is a dynamo, a blistering midrange scorer where he shot 46% with only 27% of his makes assisted.

Much of the damage was done on midrange pull-ups: he was 40 for 110 there (36%). His very high volume of 3.7 midrange pullup attempts per game places him 32nd in the country as an 18-year-old, exceeding the figures of teammate and presumptive #2 pick Dylan Harper who ranked 235th and shot only 28%. Cooper Flagg also took about half the midrange pullup attempts per game of Ace, and similarly shot a decent bit worse than him there at 33%.

In the first clip above, one of my favorites of the cycle, seen from a better angle, Ace goes from this positioning:

To this tiptoeing the sideline:

Then gathering from his low stance to rise and fire over the help:

I harp on small space coordination for a reason: it is one of the traits I identified as characteristic of all the NBA’s recent greatest improvers (players like Pascal Siakam and Devin Booker). I wrote the following: “On offense, small space coordination not only means being nimble enough to create an initial advantage, but, arguably more important, the ability to dance through traffic. We return to a similar concept as the previous sections – the ability to finish a play.”

Small space coordination leads to improvement because it gets you reps others cannot receive. It opens up creative pathways to score and allows you to pick your spots more accurately. Ace Bailey, with his nimble footwork, will be able to experiment with scoring techniques others could only imagine.

In the midrange one has to not only deal with their immediate defender but some level of help as well. This dual focus makes small space coordination all the more important, squeezing through gaps closing in on two sides. This is not like three point shooting where shooting over a closeout rules supreme.

What else does Ace exhibit in his midrange game? Most notable, fluidity and creativity. Take as another example from the above highlight reel his midrange make against Kennesaw State.

Ace gathers with a pro hop, attacking at an oblique angle to the basket from the wing to the paint:

But instead of rising up out of this gather, he expertly ducks and turns back the direction he came:

This leaves the defender completely in the dust where he now has a fairly uncontested turnaround.

If you put all of the shotmakers of Ace’s ilk in this situation, it is highly unlikely anyone else would have come up with the same solution. For someone broadly considered with worse feel for the game than his peers (as shown by his 0.6 assist to turnover ratio), Ace has plenty of moments of genius in a pinch.

This is to speak nothing of his actual shooting form. That analysis is more subjective, but still worthwhile. Bailey’s strength comes from his ability to keep his form regardless of the angle he’s firing from, working well with his proclivity for quick fadeaways.

Just look at that follow through and holding of pose in spite of his lower body being angled off to his left.

Finally, Ace is great at simply throwing it up there. He was elite with both floaters (14 for 23, 61%) and barely missed any of the few hooks he attempted (7 for 9, 78%). The fact that he is able to guide the ball to the rim from unstructured shooting forms is a great sign for his touch. Check out the final minute of the highlight reel above for some examples, in addition to this impressive make.

Bailey has all the tools as a midrange shotmaker: the height and speedy and high release to get his shot off with ease. The creativity to find unusual finishing patterns. The touch from any kind of angle. Expect him to be shooting through narrow midrange windows his whole career, handle pending.

#2: Tre Johnson

Listed at 6’6”, Texas Longhorns, Freshman, 19.3 on draft day

Tre Johnson is the first 2x superlative winner in this series after being our #1 three point prospect.

His shooting form once again stands out, as does his versatility of set up.

The makes in the above video display finishes in the following manners:

• Drift forward left
• Fade back right
• Quick stop moving right
• Spin fade right
• Drift forward right
• Up and under floater
• Up and under floater
• Quick stop floater

Johnson is particularly adept at drifting just as much as necessary to counterbalance his forward momentum, often slowing just in time as he rises up.

This mixes well with his stutter rip tendency / ability, creating the seam needed to hit with a quick burst, then counterbalanced after a single hard dribble.

Statistically, Tre was a better pull-up three point shooter (at 38%) than pull-up two point shooter (36%) on equally heavy volume at just under 100 attempts each. I attribute much of the worse two point shooting to variance, as the technique is there, but he does force some difficult shots to suppress the efficiency.

With Johnson’s ability to push for difficult attempts, it can be easy to write him off as low feel. Indeed, I do have a concern there (it was especially difficult to see him repeatedly wave for the ball at 0:25 above), especially given his upright driving nature. But, moreso than Bailey, Johnson has so many tools in his repertoire it would be impossible to get here without study and dedication.

I am particularly impressed by Johnson’s ability to pair a midrange fadeaway with an up-and-under floater. You have to leap to contest the 6’6” Johnson’s attempt (he shot 50% in the post), leaving you vulnerable to a fake and pivot forward. His touch does the rest of the work – Johnson shot 23 for 55 on floaters.

While I remain very pessimistic on Johnson’s defensive ability, particularly his poor rebounding, his nuclear scoring ability seems likely to translate in some form. He has too many weapons at his disposal, with balance and technique providing the base. His ability to both quickly organize off of movement and finish with just the right drift can make up for his lack of separation when he hangs onto the ball for longer. The habits may need some refining, and the on-court product might be rough at first, but Johnson remains a compelling lottery bet regardless.

#3: Tahaad Pettiford

Listed at 6’1”, Auburn Tigers, Freshman, 19.9 on draft day

Shooting 43% with Auburn on 40 pull-up twos and, more importantly, 52% on 35 floaters, Pettiford was an easy third option here. Evident in the tape is his consistent ability to not only separate off the dribble, but flow perfectly into his pull-up following these dramatic moves.

The first clip above displays this as well as any. Tahaad pulls off a two-step step-back and knocks it down clean. This reveals not only great balance but precision of footwork.

Just as important, Pettiford has an extra quick release, rising off the ground in an instant. You could call Pettiford’s ability to adapt to his smaller stature a cauterized wound – a consistent physical deficit that you have learned to overcome in a way where it’s no longer harmful. Think of Alperen Sengun becoming a plus defender despite his lack of foot speed, or Pettiford’s high-arching floaters. Cauterizing one’s wound most often requires a high degree of both adaptability and creativity.

Pettiford is comfortable pulling up from both directions, and looks about as adept with right hand floaters as his dominant left. The road is uphill for guards of Pettiford’s size – we are likely to find his 6’1” listing as generous – but his cauterized wound of size is compensated by an elite adaptability of shooting. Pettiford is worse at the rim than he is on floaters, but is likely to be operating much more outside of the paint anyways. There is more space out there for him to grab in a flurry of footwork.

While I generally shy away from small guards who are highly likely to be -1 or worse per 100 possessions on defense, Pettiford is still worth a first round flyer due to his ability to work between the paint and three point line and pass outside in. His assist rate of 23% is unusually high for players at his level of shotmaking, where only 11% of his midrange makes were assisted. Compare that to Ace Bailey at 27%, Tre Johnson at 18% or Tyler Herro at 21%. There’s a chance Pettiford can make the poor defense worth it, especially as a bench sparkplug.

Value Analysis

Midrange scoring is fairly obviously less important than three point shooting, but it is a mistake to either shrug it off as a viable weapon to keep defenses honest or assume a player’s skillset or ability is basically the same as the three. It is very difficult to create plus efficiency offense from midrange, with the highest volume midrange shooters averaging around 0.8 to 1.05 points per shot. But not all shots are created the same, and the midrange can be a fantastic counter for the elite of the elite who can hit the majority of open midrange looks. If you have to be covered in midrange as aggressively as at the rim or from three, it can pinch in or disorganize the defense in a similar manner.

The post 2025 NBA Draft Superlatives: Midrange Scorers appeared first on Swish Theory.

This series will inspect all ten categories by highlighting three standout performers for each trait. My hope is that my process for evaluating this trait will improve with the exercise, inspecting my own criteria, while also recognizing just how rare each trait is.

First up, perhaps the most important category of all: three point shooting.

Note the rankings relate to who will have the most three point success in the NBA more than the most three point talent (eliminating specialists like the incredible shooter Koby Brea).

#1: Tre Johnson

Listed at 6’6”, Texas Longhorns, Freshman, 19.3 on draft day

Tre Johnson’s greatness as a three-point shooter is perhaps the most self-evident of the draft, as it takes only one shot of his to react, “Oh, he can shoot.” The aesthetics are stellar: Johnson has an appropriately wide base, hopping light into the shot before rising up with intention.

Look at how he perfectly squares from a 90-degree gather in one of the clips above:

He perfectly angles his shooting pocket:

And snaps his wrist hard while releasing high:

It is hard to ask for more in a shooting form, with his fluidity especially notable given his 6’6” height.

He meets very high thresholds for outside shooting, statistically. High major freshmen with his level of three point volume and efficiency are rare, as all 6’3” or above NCAA players with his profile have stuck in the NBA.

His flexibility of gather, skilled in footwork, allows him to be successful in all kinds of actions:

• 17 for 31 (55%) on threes running off of screens
• 23 for 52 (44%) on threes in transition
• 12 for 28 (43%) on threes out of pick and roll
• 5 for 12 (42%) off of handoffs

The two lagging in efficiency are spot ups (24 for 71, 34% from three) and isos (7 for 25, 28% from three). He was surprisingly just as efficient on guarded catch and shoot (42%) than unguarded (39%), with the open ones actually dragging down his spot up efficiency. Given his fundamentals and success hitting the difficult ones, I’m not too worried about him figuring out the simple. In fact, he was 44% on unguarded threes in his final high school season.

I have gotten higher on Tre Johnson over this process, as his elite three-point versatility matches his elite three-point efficiency. The isolations are the one concern, as he struggles to create space, but hopefully will represent only a small volume of his NBA looks. His ability to counter when the defense commits in pick-and-roll (39th %ile efficiency, including passes) is also a concern for his overall shotmaking difficulty, but he has the talent and range to overcome it. While that lack of quick burst and the defense hold back his ceiling, his combination of nuclear shooting off of movement and strong passing instincts makes him impossible to pass up in the lottery.

#2: Walter Clayton Jr.

Listed at 6’3”, Florida Gators, Senior, 22.3 on draft day

Walter Clayton Jr.’s appeal is also immediately clear in the tape, but for a different reason: the degree of difficulty. In particular, Clayton Jr. is elite from NBA distance, having to be covered far beyond the NCAA three-point line.

This is a major defensive breakdown:

As is this:

Also obvious from the tape is how comfortably Clayton Jr. gathers both left to right and right to left off of movement or the dribble. His core strength allows him to stay square with torque when rising up in an instant. He is an extremely confident shooter, ensuring he commits to every shot with intent.

Perhaps even at a better level than Johnson, Clayton Jr. can re-square his shoulders rapidly. Because he is smaller but a good leaper, he can spring in any direction to counter-balance his motion. It’s a delight to watch.

Despite what had to be among the most difficult three-point diets in the NCAA, Clayton Jr.’s three-point percentage was very good at 38.6% on 303 attempts, seventh most in the country. He also shot a stellar 87.9% from the line on 481 career free throw attempts. After this past season, there is plenty of evidence that Clayton Jr. is an elite shooter.

Clayton’s core strength and comfortability moving laterally, confidence in his shot all allow him to be successful in a variety of play types. In fact, Clayton was 71st percentile efficiency or better in seven different play types:

• 42% on 45 threes in transition
• 40% on 75 threes spotting up
• 39% on 23 threes off of screens
• 36% on 14 threes in isolation
• 36% on 42 threes off of handoffs
• 35% on 102 threes as pick and roll ball handler

Walter Clayton Jr. is an obvious bet to be a nuclear NBA shooter, due to his ability to pull up quickly from distance as well as off of movement. His resume is excellent, leading a great Florida team through the NCAA tournament. Difficulty means streakiness, but Clayton is on far more often than he is off, and when he is on, he can drive a scoring run single-handedly.

The downsides come elsewhere, namely in his somewhat below-average handle and passing for a 6’3″player, which keeps him from having creation equity. He can sometimes fall asleep on defense (such as in the final moments of the NCAA championship game) but makes up for it with elite recovery tools (displayed in the few moments after, in addition to strong 2.5% steal and 1.8% block rates over his college career).

Because Clayton Jr. is 6’3”, a good leaper and capable of getting threes up with volume like no other in this class, he resembles a first-round pick. Even if the non-shooting traits lag, they are good enough to stay on the floor to allow his shooting to shine.

#3: Kon Knueppel

Listed at 6’7”, Duke Blue Devils, Freshman, 19.9 on draft day

Kon Knueppel’s excellence might not be as obvious as that of Clayton Jr. or Johnson. He shines through technique, consistency, and, well, track record.

We have enough data on Knueppel to suggest he is an elite shotmaker. Let’s start with catch and shoot. Knueppel has now had three consecutive seasons of shooting over 40% on catch-and-shoot threes, giving him a career 42% mark on 419 catch-and-shoot looks.

Despite the dip in his form, Knueppel has an otherwise compact motion, easily repeatable. My favorite thing about the form is he “finishes heavy,” that is, exaggerates the end of his form to get extra lift but also gain consistency of motion.

He typically fully lands back on the ground while still holding his follow-through:

This consistency of technique, in addition to a low center of gravity, permits Kon to rise up off the catch even off of movement.

The pull-up figures are iffier, with little success at Duke. But looking at the EYBL statistics and tape gives one much more comfort.

When given more of a green light to let it fly – two pull-ups threes per game in Phenom 16-17U compared to 0.5 at Duke – he looks much more comfortable and flowy off the dribble. In fact, he was capable of shooting out of complex set ups like at the 0:50 mark of his highlight video above.

If Knueppel had been enabled to be an off-the-dribble gunner, I have no doubt his efficiency would have risen at Duke. Knueppel reminds me of Desmond Bane here: Bane has the instinct to put the ball on the floor even just once to induce a defender fly-by. With a similar high feel for picking his spots, I expect Knueppel to do the same with success.

Not too much commentary needed here; Knueppel is among the elite free-throw shooters. Of NCAA players with at least 100 free throw attempts, Knueppel ranked fifth in free throw percentage, the only one in the top ten 6’7″ or above.

Even with the poor pull-up shooting, Knueppel hit some gaudy marks for a high-major freshman. Since 2008, there have been only four other high-major freshmen in his vicinity: Tre Johnson, Ben McLemore, Jared McCain, and Tyler Herro. Kon meets the below thresholds with ease.

I’ve only gotten higher on Kon Knueppel with each subsequent watch. While my initial instinct was to fade him given the athletic limitations (the track record for players who miss most of their dunk attempts is not good), likely not 6’7”. However, his instincts for rotations and how to wall off drives keep him relevant on that end.

A minimum level of defensive contribution is all that is needed for Knueppel’s three point shooting to potentially take over games (not to mention his passing acumen). While not as much of an aesthetic/degree of difficulty play as Tre or Clayton, Knueppel has the track record and eye for technique / when to shoot that gives a high level of faith in his three ball being excellent. With his integration of other skills, draft Kon in the top 10.

Value Analysis

Three point shooting is the most prized ability in the titular “three point era,” and for a reason. Shooting from outside the furthest ring of the defense can be the most reliable way to generate looks. Our three three point shooters are able to do just that, bombing away even with small creases — all three are reliable to get a high volume of attempts in a variety of ways.

Simply, beating three levels of defense (perimeter defenders, help defenders, rim protectors) is the most valuable thing you can do on the court. Especially as three point volume is almost always scalable. If you want more threes, you can have them: the quality of the looks will decline, but it is unlike midrange or rim attempts which require a higher level of passing and/or dribbling to get there. For our three shooters, the area over which you have to cover them with their deep range and quick triggers is massive.

As this series goes on, I will try to note the relative value of each trait, and why. Threes are our first trait, but, from my analysis, also the single most valuable. Next up, we move slightly closer to the basket – the oft-theorized midrange.

The post 2025 NBA Draft Superlatives: Three Point Shooters appeared first on Swish Theory.

For our most recent mock draft, featuring written explanations for each pick, go here.

1. Cooper Flagg, Duke

Do-it-all wing with premium skill and athleticism

2. Dylan Harper, Rutgers

Bruising driving guard and potent scorer

3. Collin Murray-Boyles, South Carolina

Elite playmaking forward on both sides of the ball

4. VJ Edgecombe, Baylor

Explosive scoring guard and lockdown defender

5. Khaman Maluach, Duke

Towering young big with upside as a play finisher and rim protector

6. Derik Queen, Maryland

Creative big-bodied drive threat who can pass

7. Jeremiah Fears, Oklahoma

Young lead guard with dribble, pass, shoot upside

8. Ace Bailey, Rutgers

Versatile shooting wing with dynamic athleticism

9. Tre Johnson, Texas

Tough shotmaker all over the court

10. Jase Richardson, Michigan State

Three-level scoring guard with quick processing

11. Kasparas Jakucionis, Illinois

Pull-up maestro with passing creativity

12. Kon Knueppel, Duke

Three-point sniper with shooting versatility and P&R playmaking chops

13. Asa Newell, Georgia

Versatile defender, glass-crashing post-up threat developing three point shot

14. Noa Essengue, ULM

Sinewy rim attacker with budding ball skills and defensive versatility

15. Thomas Sorber, Georgetown

Tough freshman PF with strong feel for the game

16. Noah Penda, Le Mans

Menacing wing defender and offensive connector

17. Labaron Philon, Alabama

Gadgety, versatile, productive guard every team could use

18. Miles Byrd, San Diego State

Stocks machine with shooting potential

19. Ben Saraf, ULM

Best passer in class as a game managing point guard and scorer

20. Bennett Stirtz, Drake

Potentially underrated lead guard up-transfer from Division II

21. Nolan Traore, Saint-Quentin

Quick first-step point guard who is a willing shooter and active defender

22. Nique Clifford, Colorado State

Fluid-moving upperclassman who does a little of everything

23. Kam Jones, Marquette

Paint touch machine, three-level scorer who can pass

24. Rasheer Fleming, Saint Joseph’s

Big wing who can shoot with a 7’5” wingspan

25. Johni Broome, Auburn

Versatile playmaking forward as one of best NCAA players in the country

26. Danny Wolf, Michigan

Unique ball-handling point center with quick processing skills

27. Liam McNeeley, Connecticut

Three-point threat who attacks closeouts looking to finish strong

28. Carter Bryant, Arizona

Talented freshman wing providing a punch off the bench

29. Ryan Kalkbrenner, Creighton

Big man upperclassman who dominates the paint on both ends

30. JT Toppin, Texas Tech

High motor, high producing rim attacker

31. Yaxel Lendeborg, UAB

Elbow/post hub with a well-rounded driving game and plus passing

32. Anthony Robinson II, Missouri

Point-of-attack demon with some ball skills

33. Tahaad Pettiford, Auburn

Dribble-pass-shoot quick small guard

34. Will Riley, Illinois

Under-developed young wing shooter and passer

35. Adou Thiero, Arkansas

Physical slasher who creates events on defense

36. Joshua Jefferson, Iowa State

Physical defender with some connector chops as a big wing

37. Egor Demin, BYU

Elite passer with inconsistent play against top competition

38. Darrion Williams, Texas Tech

Skilled upperclassman who can shoot and pass from the wing

39. Alex Condon, Florida

Sharp-passing sophomore big who can grease an offense and get stocks

40. Walter Clayton Jr.

High volume three point shooter who can do some guard things

41. JoJo Tugler, Houston

+12 wingspan for this mobile rim protector

42. Boogie Fland, Arkansas

Game managing shooter and passer

43. Hugo Gonzalez, Real Madrid

Toolsy high motor player with versatility

44. Flory Bidunga, Kansas

Undersized but hyper-athletic rangy big

45. Alex Karaban, Connecticut

Elite shooter and wing defender, national champion

46. Dailyn Swain, Xavier

Sparks of dribble-pass-shoot ability for this athletic wing

47. Javon Small, West Virginia

Highly productive lead guard essential to WVU

48. Rocco Zikarsky, Brisbane

18-year-old with a chance to be best rim protector in class

49. Ian Jackson, North Carolina

Pure scoring freshman who can catch fire like few others

50. Bogoljub Markovic, KK Mega

Astounding rebounder with some intriguing movement skills at 6’11”

51. Drake Powell, North Carolina

Hyperactive freshman defender with shooting potential

52. Tomislav Ivisic, Illinois

Floor-spacing center and ball-mover

53. Chad Baker-Mazara, Auburn

Upperclassman utility wing with a smooth shot

54. Zvonimir Ivisic, Arkansas

PNR roll & pop 7’2” big

55. Max Shulga, VCU

Strong combo guard who can run some PNR

56. Xaivian Lee, Princeton

Shifty guard who can table set and let it fly from deep

57. Alvaro Folgueiras, Robert Morris

Ultra-versatile big wing hiding in mid majors

58. Eric Dixon, Villanova

Pure shooting 6’8” upperclassman, one of best players in NCAA

59. Otega Oweh, Kentucky

Tough-nosed defender and transition threat

The post 2025 NBA Draft Big Board 2.0 appeared first on Swish Theory.

This one is a no-brainer. Flagg is a special prospect, capable of instantly changing the fortunes of any team that selects him. Washington is the fortunate one here, landing their future primary initiator and defensive leader. Flagg helps round out their already promising young core, adding a true superstar prospect to the mix.

– Ben Pfeifer

2. Charlotte Hornets: Collin Murray-Boyles, South Carolina

As a sophomore, Collin Murray-Boyles has boosted both efficiency (82nd percentile to 83rd percentile) and frequency (65th percentile to 70th percentile) as a post-up hub, possesses a burgeoning perimeter isolation game (88th percentile efficiency on 88th percentile frequency), and is a dominant passer in a variety of situations (career 19.8% AST and 1.2 A:TO). With elite offensive production regardless of usage, team context, and opponent difficulty as a young sophomore, Murray-Boyles has all the ingredients of an offensive star. Pair that potential with incredible defensive production, baseline touch, and outlier development indicators galore, and he has endless avenues to impact even if the offensive stardom doesn’t manifest. For a Charlotte team that ranks 29th in offense and 19th in defense, Murray-Boyles brings an integration of both offense and defense that lags behind only Cooper Flagg.

– Maurya Kumpatla

3. Utah Jazz: Dylan Harper, Rutgers

Dylan Harper has established himself as one of the clear-cut top prospects in the 2025 class, combining ideal size for a ball-handler with the ability to generate consistent paint touches via advanced footwork and elite body control. He’s had to handle huge creation responsibility on a Rutgers team devoid of much shooting or ball handling to surround him, and has still managed to be efficient (59% TS%) in spite of that. The biggest question/swing skill with Harper is how well he’ll shoot it at the NBA level, but his percentages (35% 3pt, 74% FT) are respectable enough that you have to imagine that he’ll at least be a decent shooter. Even with Isaiah Collier showing promise as a lead ball-handler in his rookie year, Harper is too good of a prospect to pass up at #3.

– AJ Carter

4. New Orleans Pelicans: Kasparas Jakucionis, Illinois

The Pelicans underwent a pseudo youth movement and Jakucionis will only add to it. They’ve needed more high-end playmaking for Zion Williamson’s entire career, making Jakucionis a perfect fit here. His shooting provides a tantalizing ceiling on the ball and will help him space and cut next to Williamson.

– Ben Pfeifer

5. Toronto Raptors: Khaman Maluach, Duke

Khaman Maluach is a monster. With a true shooting percentage over 70, Maluach is one of the most efficient players in his role in the entire country, despite being introduced to the game of basketball later in life. With fewer years of experience, it is fair to expect some growing pains and there certainly have been some this season at Duke. What has impressed me most throughout the year is not Maluach’s freaky athleticism, true center size, overwhelming offensive rebounding or hyper-efficient scoring, it has been the rate at which he has improved throughout the college season. Playing the five in the NBA will take some refining, it is the most difficult (and important) defensive role on the court, and few players walk into the league ready to do so. With Maluach’s physical tools, potential touch and competitiveness he has all the tools to be a true building block for Toronto. It is hard to imagine a more perfect mentor than Jakob Poeltl as he learns the ropes of NBA defense.

– Tyler Wilson

6. Philadelphia 76ers: Asa Newell, Georgia

Asa checks many boxes for this Sixers team, fitting cleanly at the 4 in the starting lineup and providing a reliable backup 5 option behind Embiid. The strengths of Newell’s game complement this team between his pinpoint offensive rebounding, frontcourt defensive versatility, helpside shot blocking, catch-and-shoot 3pt shooting potential, and the ability to attack closeouts with the shot or pumpfake, drive, and post-up hook. Newell slides right into the starting unit without taking touches from the star scorers and will produce as a positionless defender and off-ball play finisher.

– Ryan Kaminski

7. Brooklyn Nets: VJ Edgecombe, Baylor

VJ Edgecombe has managed to alleviate many concerns brought about by his early season play by consistently shooting the ball from distance (39.5% from 3 in conference play), while increasing both his volume and efficiency as a driver. Despite Edgecombe’s becoming more heavily featured within the Baylor offense, his defensive effort and production has seldom waned. This effort and production has come even though Edgecombe has been cast in a variety of roles and schemes as Baylor constantly tinkered to compensate for the lack of size in their rotation. The schematic inconsistencies have managed to provide a glimpse of how Edgecombe could be deployed as a ‘utility guard’, an archetype which has recently come into vogue and has in many ways defined the best defenses in the NBA over the past few years. Combining the versatile defensive ability with an increasingly potent offense has made Edgecombe a no-brainer pick at this juncture of the draft.

– Ahmed Jama

8. Chicago Bulls: Jase Richardson, Michigan State

The 6’3 quick guard can score at all levels, threatening teams with his feathery touch, feel, and footwork. At pick #8, Richardson was the perfect player for the Chicago Bulls to add to their young core and build on their halfcourt creation. Jase Richardson can hold up defensively for a small guard while being an extremely role-malleable offensive player. The bet for the Bulls is that Richardson’s shot-making inside the arc continues to evolve and translate further beyond the arc, enabling him to keep up with a higher usage role in the long term. In the short term, the Chicago Bulls play with a high transition frequency under Coach Billy Donovan which is a perfect fit with how effective Richardson is in the open-court.

– Roshan Potluri

9. San Antonio Spurs: Ace Bailey, Rutgers

Ace Bailey would be a strong pick for the San Antonio Spurs due to his exceptional shot-making ability and positional size at 6-foot-10, offering a high-ceiling wing who can create his own offense alongside Victor Wembanyama and De’Aaron Fox. His scoring versatility and length could complement the Spurs’ growing core, adding a dynamic perimeter threat to elevate their attack.

– Larry Golden

10. San Antonio Spurs: Derik Queen, Maryland

Derik Queen brings a positionally unique form of advantage creation as a post-hub passer with off-the-dribble shooting upside. Still, his offensive versatility is paired with limited defensive versatility: he’s at the horrid intersection of poor lateral quickness, poor vertical explosion, and underwhelming center size. There isn’t a better fit for this type of offensively tilted, defensively limited PF/C than alongside Victor Wembanyama, potentially the most transcendent two-way center in NBA history.

– Avinash Chauhan

11. Portland Trailblazers: Noa Essengue, ULM

The Portland Trailblazers get one of the youngest players and higher upside propositions in the 2025 NBA Draft at pick #11. Noa Essengue fits what Portland is building with its group of rangy defenders and strong interior presence. At 6’10, Essengue is a versatile defensive player who can operate out of the point-of-attack, back-line, or general help situations. Offensively, Essengue has been dominant in transition and applying physicality in the half-court for Ulm in the German BBL this season, and that can immediately translate to the NBA. While the shooting and strength are still a work in progress, Essengue has been improving these traits at a drastic rate enabling him to be someone who can attack off the catch consistently during his rookie-scale deal.

– Roshan Potluri

12. Houston Rockets: Thomas Sorber, Georgetown

While it was tough to pass up Tre Johnson, I liked the idea of Sorber within this group of exciting young players even more. The idea is somewhat like why they brought Steven Adams in, to provide a physical interior presence, good screening and strong passing. Sorber might eventually shoot it, too, with a smooth form and solid free throw and midrange percentages for a big.

– Matt Powers

13. Atlanta Hawks: Tre Johnson, Texas

Tre Johnson has had one of the most impressive scoring seasons from a high-major freshman in recent memory. Posting a 6.5 Offensive Box Plus-Minus in conference play, second amongst freshmen and only trailing Cooper Flagg, Johnson has ameliorated many concerns of how quickly his game would translate to the most difficult conference in the country. Despite shouldering a massive 27% usage rate, Johnson has managed to adapt and make significant progress both as a facilitator and driver, consistently elevating his rim-rate over the course of the season without detracting from his efficiency. Johnson’s malleability as an offensive player bodes well to his professional career, as his ability to synergize with more interior based scorers will be crucial considering Johnson’s defensive limitations.

– Ahmed Jama

14. Utah Jazz: Kon Knueppel, Duke

For teams looking for shooting on the wing, Kon is one of the premier shotmakers in this year’s draft. He lacks much explosiveness or burst as an athlete, but has strong positional size and is a skilled scorer from every part of the court. Kon is a knockdown shooter off the catch but has more variety to his shotmaking than just that, showing the ability to make pull-ups off the dribble or use his size to carve out space for short jumpers. It remains to be seen how well he’ll be able to survive on defense at the NBA level, but offensively Kon has one of the most translatable skillsets in the draft.

– AJ Carter

15. Orlando Magic: Danny Wolf, Michigan

Have you seen this guy play basketball? Danny Wolf is a grab-and-go seven-foot offensive hub diming up defenses on fast breaks and pick and rolls. Wolf flashes exciting handles, natural point center vision, and incredible feel for the game, hitting highlight pull-up threes and tough finishing touch shots at the rim. Danny makes good reads as a primary decision maker reacting to defenses, averaging 1.01 PPP on “P&R including passes” that ranks in the 84th percentile of all college players.

– Ryan Kaminski

16. Oklahoma City Thunder: Noah Penda, Le Mans

Noah Penda’s integration of length (6-foot-11 wingspan), strength (225 lbs), instincts, and hand-eye coordination have led him to a league-leading blocks total and 2nd-best steals totals as just a 20-year-old in the French Jeep Elite, giving him an argument for best non-big defender in the class. For an Oklahoma City Thunder scheme that’s already historic at forcing turnovers and boasts rim protection from each position, Penda adds even more value. Though he brings shooting and finishing question marks, he’s on a special developmental trajectory as a shooter, and his monster offensive rebounding-assists-stocks integration promises further room for growth.

– Maurya Kumpatla

17. Dallas Mavericks: Jeremiah Fears, Oklahoma

The idea of Kyrie Irving mentoring Fears is too appealing to pass up, but Fears is easily my best on the board at this point. Much like why I drafted him to the Nets in our prior mock draft, Fears has some of the best dribble-pass-shoot upside in the class, carrying a heavy burden for Oklahoma at age 18. It’s tough to find primary upside this late, but the Mavs do here.

– Matt Powers

18. Oklahoma City Thunder: Bennett Stirtz, Drake

Bennett Stirtz is one of the best volume pick-and-roll scorers in all of college basketball, fusing pace, a tight handle, and shotmaking from every area on the court to power 87th percentile pick-and-roll ballhandler efficiency on 99th percentile frequency. He pairs this scoring with best-in-the-class feel, blending visual manipulation with a wide range of deliveries to produce a 35% assist rate and engine a top-40 Drake halfcourt offense. All this makes him an underrated creation bet, but a 47% catch-and-shoot jumpshot and tons of driving production give him a strong dribble/pass/shoot wing base. His footspeed on defense in such a role would be worrisome, but his strong feel and hand-eye coordination that leads to defensive playmaking (3.6% steal rate) would fit like a glove in Oklahoma City.

– Maurya Kumpatla

19. Miami Heat: Dailyn Swain, Xavier

At pick #19, the Miami Heat select Dailyn Swain: the young sophomore forward with creative ball-handling and lock-down defense out of Xavier. Standing at 6’8, Swain fits the Heat’s culture of players who play with a motor and a sense of toughness, which exudes itself in how Swain consistently impacts games in the most opportunistic ways. The impact is seen without needing to play on the ball at Xavier – Swain runs the break hard in transition, keeps the ball moving in the halfcourt, and is always hustling on the boards. That energy, with his size and length, translates to the defensive end where he can cover ground well and excel in lock and trail situations. While the defense and feel on the offensive end will keep him on the court early on, the Heat will need to improve Swain’s two-motion jumper for Swain to hit any form of creation upside. However, in the middle of the first round, Swain’s combination of age, size, burst, feel, flexibility, and handling comfort makes him a worthy proposition for a retooling Heat team.

– Roshan Potluri

20. Minnesota Timberwolves: Nolan Traore, Saint-Quentin

With Mike Conley’s decline Minnesota has a clear need for long-term ball-handling/shot creation outside of Anthony Edwards. While 2024 draft pick Rob Dillingham is an obvious candidate to fill a lot of that responsibility in coming years, it wouldn’t hurt to take another swing on a potential creator. Traore has slid down draft boards after being a preseason potential top 5 pick candidate due to a lack of efficiency and consistency, but outside of the lottery it’s hard to find players with more upside than Traore. Despite struggles this season he still has the talent to be a dynamic creator off the dribble if he can improve as a shotmaker and make smarter decisions with the ball.

– AJ Carter

21. Indiana Pacers: Ben Saraf, ULM

Rick Carlisle loves guards, and Saraf gives the Pacers another dribble-drive-pass threat. The three-point shot is poor off the dribble but acceptable off the catch. At a strong 6’5” and still just 18, Saraf has the build and productivity of someone capable of handling bench primary duties. Perhaps the single best passer in the class.

– Matt Powers

22. Brooklyn Nets: Ryan Kalkbrenner, Creighton

Kalkbrenner’s brand of mistake-free basketball, characterized by foul and TO avoidance, is inherently low friction, and his sheer size (7’5 WS + 250 lbs) with relative mobility gives him a fairly high floor as a defender.  He’s exhibited NBA-caliber dominance since his sophomore year, and he’s slowly increased his 3P rate while consistently shooting over 70% FT for his college career. With much more room to err and experiment on the rebuilding Nets, Kalk’s collegiate extent of dominance may persist more than one would expect with a typical four-year center.

– Avinash Chauhan

23. Brooklyn Nets: Carter Bryant, Arizona

You don’t see too many bulky, athletic forwards take over half their shots from beyond 3P, but at 6’8, 225 pounds, Carter has a whopping 0.60 3P rate while remaining hyper-efficient inside the arc (14 of his 37 2P makes are dunks). The upside with Carter lies within his pull up game: in interviews, he consistently cites players like Tatum and Paul George as personal exemplars, and his AAU playtype distribution was littered with far too many pullups and PnR BH possessions. While his production and processing (7.6 BPM, 6% block, 3% steal, 1 A:TO) give him a reasonably high floor, it’s Carter’s tantalizing combination of youth, size, and shooting proclivity that could unlock true star upside.

– Avinash Chauhan

24. Atlanta Hawks: Liam McNeeley, Connecticut

This was an easy selection, and I would imagine Atlanta would be pretty stoked to draft someone at 24 who is all but a guaranteed NBA rotation player. McNeeley gets it in more ways than one. He is a surprisingly effective defensive rebounder despite his physical limitations, he makes quick decisions on and off the ball, and (somewhat surprisingly) has shown the ability to handle a larger offensive load than he did in high school playing on one of the most stacked teams in recent memory. McNeeley will present some questions defensively, but he should be able to slide into lineups featuring both Dyson Daniels and Jalen Johnson easily. He’s only hit ~35% of his threes this season, but don’t let that deceive you, McNeeley is one of the premier off-ball weapons in this class.

– Tyler Wilson

25. Washington Wizards: Labaron Philon, Alabama

Philon was by far the best player available, but he’s a logical fit for a Washington team still looking for high-end talent. The Alabama freshman is a quick, shifty guard who pressures the rim and passes at a high level. He could develop into a valuable connector piece for a Wizards team that just added Cooper Flagg.

– Ben Pfeifer

26. Orlando Magic: Tahaad Pettiford, Auburn

Tahaad Pettiford brings downhill explosiveness, quick first step burst, soft finishing touch, pull-up 3pt shooting range, and two-way feel to a team that needs it. A guard that can penetrate the paint, attack the rim, kick out to shooters, score and shoot the rock who can hold his own defensively would see a warm welcome in Orlando. He’ll have opportunity to develop as Orlando continues building a perennial playoff contender, where maybe the Magic won’t need to make a splashy trade if they can nail the right complementary guard to their core in the draft.

– Ryan Kaminski

27. Brooklyn Nets: Kam Jones, Marquette

Kam Jones would be a strong pick for the Brooklyn Nets due to his proven scoring ability and playmaking skills, averaging over 20 points and 6 assists per game at Marquette, which could bolster their backcourt during a rebuild. His experience as a senior guard, combined with his improved shooting and passing, makes him a ready-made contributor who could thrive in Brooklyn’s system under Jordi Fernández.

– Larry Golden

28. Boston Celtics: Rasheer Fleming, St. Joseph’s

Fleming is a bit of a divisive selection as a lower-usage upperclassman playing in the A10, but at pick #28 the positives are too hard to ignore. He has been massive for St. Joe’s this year, shooting over 70% at the rim and 41% from three. In an era of NBA basketball where efficient shots are valued more than ever, Fleming is an easy bet to score in the most valuable areas of the court. His block, steal and rebounding numbers are all positive and point towards a genuine contributor on the defensive side of the ball as a powerful forward with the ability to play some small-ball five. If Boston truly “needs” anything in the draft, it is cost-controlled production. Fleming should provide real value on his rookie deal as an older prospect with the frame and complementary skillet to produce immediately. 

– Tyler Wilson

29. Los Angeles Clippers: Nique Clifford, Colorado State

Nique Clifford to the Los Angeles Clippers would be great because of his versatility as a 6-foot-6 guard bringing defensive flexibility and rebounding tenacity, addressing the team’s need for depth on the wing alongside stars like Kawhi Leonard and James Harden. His senior-year performance at Colorado State—averaging 15.6 points, 9.7 rebounds, and 2.8 assists on efficient shooting—shows he could provide immediate contributions as a role player for the Clips.

– Larry Golden

30. Phoenix Suns: Anthony Robinson II, Missouri

It is unclear in which direction the Suns want to go, and Ant gives them options. His POA defense is NBA-ready, a thief ready to pounce at any moment. The best player on a top-20 team in the nation as a sophomore, Robinson is able to do important things on the court. He is the team leader in assists who has also shown outside shooting potential with 42% from three, 49% from midrange and 77% from the line splits. Despite being only 6’3”, Ant’s reported 6’7” wingspan makes him more dangerous in passing lanes or snagging the errant offensive board. His 0.78 free throw rate reiterates his level of physicality, NBA ready despite the skinny frame.

– Matt Powers

31. Boston Celtics: Johni Broome, Auburn

32. Charlotte Hornets: Miles Byrd, San Diego State

33. Minnesota Timberwolves: Flory Bidunga, Kansas

34. Charlotte Hornets: Yaxel Lendeborg, UAB

35. Detroit Pistons: Paul McNeil, NC State

36. Philadelphia 76ers: Adou Thiero, Arkansas

37. Brooklyn Nets: Javon Small, West Virginia

38. Sacramento Kings: Darrion Williams, Texas Tech

39. San Antonio Spurs: Chad Baker-Mazara, Auburn

40. Toronto Raptors: Eric Dixon, Villanova

41. Oklahoma City Thunder: Joshua Jefferson, Iowa State

42. Washington Wizards: Egor Demin, BYU

43. Orlando Magic: Boogie Fland, Arkansas

44. Golden State Warriors: JoJo Tugler, Houston

45. Chicago Bulls: Max Shulga, VCU

46. Los Angeles Clippers: Walter Clayton Jr., Florida

47. Utah Jazz: Alex Toohey, Sydney

48. Washington Wizards: Nate Bittle, Oregon

49. Utah Jazz: Tyrese Proctor, Duke

50. Washington Wizards: JT Toppin, Texas Tech

51. Cleveland Cavaliers: Nolan Winter, Wisconsin

52. Indiana Pacers: Alex Condon, Florida

53. Memphis Grizzlies: Isaiah Evans, Duke

54. Los Angeles Lakers: Curtis Jones, Iowa State

55. New York Knicks: Terrance Arceneaux, Houston

56. Phoenix Suns: Hugo Gonzalez, Real Madrid

57. Orlando Magic: Otega Oweh, Kentucky

58. Houston Rockets: Rocco Zikarsky

59. Cleveland Cavaliers: Braden Smith, Purdue

The post 2025 NBA Mock Draft 2.0 appeared first on Swish Theory.

Impressive start for Kam Jones

Kam Jones is someone I’ve gone back and forth on in the past, but he’s been one of my biggest risers among returning players so far. He’s taken on a bigger load this season and in turn has been as good as any player in the country. What’s been really impressive about Kam this year is that he’s clearly not in a role best fit for who he is as a player, but he’s still been incredible in spite of that. 

Kam’s ideal usage is similar to how he played next to Tyler Kolek in previous years, as someone who can create some on the ball but also thrives as an off-ball weapon who is constantly moving and putting pressure on defenses with the threat of his shooting. This year Marquette has surrounded Kam with significantly less playmaking than in years past, and in turn he’s been really good in a lead creator role where he’s responsible for creating a ton of offense with the ball in his hands. This has caused his 3pt rate to plummet, going from taking 13.9 3 point attempers per 100 possessions the past 2 seasons down to just 8.4 3PA/100 this season.

Despite not getting to showcase one of his best skills as much this year, Kam has been better than ever. He’s averaging more than double the assists per game without increasing his turnover rate at all, giving him an outstanding AST/TO ratio of 4.4/1 so far this season. I still wouldn’t label him as a super advanced passer, but he’s quick with a good handle and doesn’t make many mistakes or bad decisions. Since prospects generally can’t control what team they go to or how they are used early on at the NBA level, this type of role malleability that Kam has shown is a really positive sign for his translation to the NBA level.

If you look over the course of his career Kam has proven that he can easily scale his usage on offense up or down depending on what his team needs. He’s extremely effective playing with limited dribbles while keeping the ball moving, but he’s also very comfortable stringing together dribble moves to create against a set defense. That combination of skills is really rare and valuable to find. Add in the fact that he has the strength and frame to compete on defense a little more than most combo guard prospects, and the package that Kam Jones brings to the table is really enticing – even for someone who will be 23 years old on draft night. He’s comfortably a first-round caliber prospect to me right now and I think you can make a strong argument for Kam to be a lottery pick in the 2025 class.  

Understanding Ace Bailey

So far this season there have been a lot of mixed opinions and commentary on Ace Bailey. He’s shown tremendous flashes as a tough shotmaker, but there have been a lot of people pointing out that he’s so reliant on these tough shots because he isn’t able to generate himself anything easier off the dribble due to a basic handle and lack of physicality. And sure, it’s definitely true that he’s struggled to create separation, rarely gets 2 feet in the paint off the dribble right now, and doesn’t do much as a playmaker. But I think it’s important to value all of the stuff that Ace does well rather than just focus purely on the areas that he isn’t currently good at, and consider how he would look in a different role.

He still has a ways to go in his development but Ace looks to me like someone we can project as a 6’9 athletic wing that is versatile defensively, contributes on the glass, can get out and run the floor, and has rare shot making ability for his size. Even if he’s never effective taking more than 2-3 dribbles at once, that’s still an incredibly valuable and useful player for any NBA team. So while I agree with most of the concerns most people have about Ace’s handle and viability as a creator, I think you can still justify ranking him near the top of the draft regardless of the on-ball limitations. One thing I’m looking to see from him the rest of the way is if he can up his 3pt volume, as his current rate of roughly 7 3PA/100 is solid but below what I’d like to see from a shooting prospect of Ace Bailey’s caliber. 

The Two Sides of Egor Demin

Egor Demin has been one of the more interesting players to monitor so far this season, as he’s looked extremely different depending on the competition he’s facing. Against low/mid-major teams such as UC Riverside and Central Arkansas, Demin has looked every bit like a top 5 pick. He’s gotten downhill off the dribble, shot it at a high level, showed some athletic juice, and looks like an incredible passer for a 6’8-6’9 guard. 

However, against high-major teams, it’s almost like watching a different player. Demin has struggled immensely to score against length and hasn’t been comfortable or confident enough to get to his spots in the same manner. There’s been a lot of instances in games against teams like Ole Miss and Providence where Demin is picking up his dribble and passing before ever creating an advantage, which has stalled the offense a bit. When he has tried to get into his bag off the dribble his handle has looked slow and sloppy. Even his passing ability has looked worse in these games, as he’s had a lot of turnovers trying to thread passing windows that just aren’t there against teams with higher levels of length and athleticism. Missing more shots against better defenses is natural and isn’t super concerning by itself over a small sample, but the way in which his creation impact has fallen off a cliff in these matchups is pretty worrisome. 

Ultimately Demin is still someone that I’m relatively high on due to the combination of size and passing as an 18-year-old and I do believe in his jumper, but it’s clear that we need to temper expectations of him as a creator until he starts to show he can produce against higher level competition. 

Other BYU Prospects

Outside of Demin, BYU has another pair of interesting potential prospects that I think are worth mentioning in Kanon Catchings and Richie Saunders. They are near polar opposites as players as Catchings is still very raw, but shows a lot of skills valuable to being an NBA forward. He’s about 6’9 with good length and covers ground at a high level on the defensive end, giving him a lot of potential versatility on that side as he fills out his frame and gets more disciplined. Catchings has also come out of the gates as a very high volume 3pt shooter (13.9 3PA/100), and while there has been mixed results the comfortability that he already has getting up jumpers as a 19-year-old forward is a very good sign. I talk about 3pt volume a lot, but it’s something I really value and in a lot of cases is better for projecting long-term shooting talent than just looking at 3pt%. Right now I think there are too many holes in Catchings’ game to be a 2025 prospect that I’m really interested in drafting, but he fits a valuable archetype as a projectable 3 + D forward and is someone to keep an eye on long term. 

Richie Saunders doesn’t share the high-end physical tools that Catchings has, but he’s just a very good basketball player who knows how to impact winning. Saunders’ game is built around really high level feel, motor, and processing speeds on both ends of the court which allows him to be a relatively mistake-free player who is constantly moving and making things happen. He’s really effective playing off the catch on offense and his combination of feel and quick hands leads to a lot of deflections on the defensive end.

Saunders is someone who both impresses a lot when I watch him and also has a really solid statistical profile. He’s averaging less than 1 turnover per game, is shooting around 40% from 3, finishes at the rim at a high clip, and has nice STL + BLK rates. The biggest swing skill for Saunders that I’ll be looking at the rest of the year is the shooting. He’s had a nice start from 3pt but prior to this year he’s been closer to an average shooter. With some of his athletic limitations he is likely going to need to be a definitively above-average shooter to be an NBA player, but if the shooting improvements are real I can see Saunders being a quality 2nd round target.

The Versatility of Labaron Philon

Coming into the year my main impression of Labaron Philon was that he was a really crafty offensive minded guard that can create offense with the ball in his hands. And while that’s certainly remained true, I’ve been impressed with how well-rounded his game is for a teenage guard prospect and his ability to contribute on both ends. He’s not an elite level defender but he’s shown the ability to stay in front of the ball and he has the length to defend both guard spots. He’s had some struggles fighting through physical screens, but otherwise he’s done a really good job of staying attached on the ball when defending in space and has already been tasked with guarding some really high-level college guards.

Offensively, Alabama has let Philon have chances with the ball in his hands but he’s also had to fit in as a role player playing next to one of the most established guards in the country in Mark Sears. Philon’s ability to fit in well with or without the ball in his hands has stood out, as he already has a lot of quality complementary skills while still being someone who can create when you put the ball in his hands. He makes quick decisions off the catch and is good at extending advantages against a compromised defense. Alabama has even used Philon as a guard-to-guard screener in actions with Sears at times, which might not apply to his NBA role but speaks to the versatility and willingness to play a role that he’s shown this year.

Labaron needs to add some strength and he hasn’t looked comfortable or been effective from beyond the arc this season, but he has good enough shooting priors and natural touch to where it’s easy to believe in the shot improving. Outside of that he already has a good foundation of skills in place. His ability to play on or off the ball while competing defensively gives him the makings of a really solid all-around guard who can fit into different roles effectively, while his ball handling and ability to break down defenses off the dribble still give him the creation upside you’re looking for in a lottery caliber guard prospect. I view Philon as a solid 1st round prospect with a chance to climb into the lottery if he shoots it better from 3 the rest of the year. 

The Adou Thiero Breakout

One of four Kentucky transfers to follow John Calipari over to Arkansas, Adou Thiero has taken a huge leap offensively this season and has been his team’s leading scorer so far. He can still be rigid with the ball in his hands and isn’t a natural handler, but he’s clearly figuring out how to leverage his athletic gifts to get to the rim and has developed the ability to make tough off-balance jumpers from 10-15 feet out. Thiero is also a pretty solid passer for an energy guy and knows how to keep the ball moving and make basic passing reads.

The glaring issue right now is the 3pt shooting, which has always been something Thiero has struggled with. He doesn’t have the smoothest release and will put up some bad misses, and is sub 30% from 3pt for his college career. He is pretty good at using his size and athleticism to cut towards the rim when teams sag off of him, but the lack of 3pt shooting is still an issue. The hope for him is that the touch he’s shown on some of the shorter mid-range shots he’s been good at this year can be expanded out farther to the perimeter. 

The main selling point for Thiero is that he’s an elite defensive prospect, equipped with a special combination of physical tools and motor. It’s not hyperbole to say that you would be hard-pressed to find a player who consistently brings as much energy on the court as Thiero. The athletic tools let him put the motor to effective use as well, as he has the verticality to make plays on the interior as a rim protector, the foot speed to guard down on the perimeter, and the strength to match up against bigger wings and forwards. 

Ultimately it would be hard to justify taking Thiero with a high draft pick right now with how bleak his 3pt shooting profile looks, but he still has more long-term upside to tap into and is someone I’d be happy to take later in the draft as is because of all the other stuff he does well. He has all the intangibles and tools you want in an athletic end-of-the-bench energy guy early on in his career, while still having a clear path to being a valuable piece if he continues in his offensive development and is ever able to even be passable as a jump shooter.

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