The larger lesson I’ve come away with from this Finals isn’t a novel insight by any means; it was an emphatic reinforcement of what makes exercises like rankings (which I admittedly find great joy in) a futile exercise. In the modern NBA, fit is everything, a fairly banal observation, I know, but in an era where punitive salary cap clauses place a premium on continuity, differentiating between players who can or cannot augment in-house personnel is paramount. Currently, the NBA is approaching a saturation point of talent, where there truly aren’t many players incapable of contributing in any setting. And as the skill level reaches a crescendo, drowning out the noise and identifying the players tailor-made for your current setting is key. And in this class, I’m not sure if there is a player more representative of this idea than Tre Johnson.

In the 2025 draft class, there may not be a more known commodity than Tre Johnson. In 2022 Johnson debuted at 3rd overall in 247’s initial rankings for the 2024 High School class and never dropped below 6th for 247. In RSCI (Recruiting Services Consensus Index), Johnson finished 5th overall. As stat tracking in the amateur hoops space has become more prevalent over the past few years, players are entering college with increasingly robust statistical profiles. This, paired with more accessible game film, makes this current crop of one-and-done prospects maybe the most thoroughly scouted group of players to enter the NBA. Take the evaluation of Tre Johnson below, from 247’s Adam Finklestein.

Written over eighteen months ago, if you were to remove the date, this scouting report could easily be mistaken for a write-up on Tre’s game from his lone season at Texas. If you were to analyze Tre’s game on a more micro-level, Finkelstein’s analysis could be used as support for the validity of ‘prospect determinism’, an idea dictating that players, even as early as high school, are more fully formed than we are willing to acknowledge. Coming into the season, I had made two fairly innocuous posts observing a perceived weakness (Half-Court finishing), and strength (Isolation scoring) in Johnson’s game.

Lo and behold, Johnson remained a subpar finisher in the half-court (46.5% with a 17% rim-frequency) and saw no issues translating as an Isolation scorer. Per Synergy, Johnson was 11th in the country in ISO PPP (.827) of anyone with 100 or more possessions, and the second most efficient freshman of anyone with this high of volume in the past decade (trailing only Dennis Smith Jr). Even with his ineffectiveness at the rim, Johnson’s individual scoring prowess put him in rare air amongst freshmen to have entered the league.

Keep in mind the query above was not conducted on a pool of only drafted players, but on every season of every player to enter the league since 2010. 12 of the 14 players in the query were, or are projected to be, top 10 picks, all were high pedigree prospects. However, even with Johnson’s impeccable resume as a scorer, plenty of evidence calls his lofty draft status into question. The issue of Tre Johnson’s defense is well known by now, and it has been widely recognized as an acceptable risk to take considering the caliber of offensive player Johnson profiles to be. Defenses lapses shown below have been met with a degree of hand-waving.

Texas made it a point to keep Johnson from the action defensively, typically assigning him to smaller, lower usage, perimeter players to suppress his fouling and keep him on the floor. And for as frequently as Johnson’s impressive anthropometric profile is cited as a reason for optimism in his defensive projection long-term, I was only slightly less underwhelmed by his individual defense when he was involved in possessions.

A fundamental belief of mine is that players’ offensive and defensive profiles shouldn’t be assessed independently; often, issues that manifest on one end are related to a player’s behavior on the other. In Tre Johnson’s case, the absence of rim pressure and defensive activity amount to one of the worst cases of applied physicality we’ve seen from any well-regarded prospect in recent memory. In the query below I included all players which met these thresholds in any of their college seasons, no matter the minutes share they played, and included the 14 with the most accumulated ‘Estimated Wins’ to this point of their career (disclaimer these numbers are from roughly the midpoint on the 2024-25 season so may not be exact for active players). The average Estimated Win Total for Top 10 picks since 2008 is 32.4; this group comes in well short of this mark at an average of 18.6 Total Win Shares.

Adjusting parameters in the query in order to cast a wider net and to explicitly search for players whose defensive struggles can’t be attributed to size alone, yielded an even more concerning list. On the left are players within the query with the highest Estimated Win Total. Understanding that a cumulative metric like Estimated Wins could potentially omit recent success cases, on the right are all the players within the query who have been drafted within the past 5 years. The players highlighted below are those who met the query in their pre-NBA season. Virtually all of the players who were selected with high picks, like Tre, were underclassmen whose physical limitations were dismissed as a byproduct of age. And while it’s early enough for these players to shift the perception of their careers, I believe it’s fair to say they have not yet returned value to their drafting team commensurate with the draft capital spent on them.

So, with evidence mounting indicating that, in all likelihood, Tre will be facing an uphill battle on the road to justifying a top 10 pick, what reason is there for optimism? What context would be most amenable to Tre’s skillset, and under what circumstances could a team transform Tre Johnson into an indispensable building block of their roster despite all the evidence to the contrary?

The Two Houstons

The seeds of this piece were planted the weekend of April 4th, after possibly the best stretch of basketball (or at least my personal favorite) so far this year. On that Friday, the recently crowned champion Oklahoma City Thunder were defeated by the Houston Rockets 125-111, and on the next day, a star-studded Duke squad was toppled in a shocking upset by the Houston Cougars 70-67. Both Houston squads came into their respective contests heavily doubted; the Cougars were 5-point underdogs while the Rockets’ spread was set at +6.5 points.

In the Rockets’ case, their victory has probably already been lost to time as an April regular-season win, even over the eventual champions, hardly qualifies as more than a footnote of the NBA season. But the narrative surrounding the Houston Cougars I found much more interesting and in a way was the true catalyst for this piece. For as much respect as I have for the Houston Cougars basketball program I, like many others, was confused as to how a team with no highly regarded NBA talent could have bested a team with three players who could very well be drafted inside of the top 10. Most (well-adjusted) people probably attributed Duke’s late-game collapse to their lack of experience. Per KenPom, Duke was 268th in minutes continuity this season. After a few early-season struggles versus staunch competition, Duke had laid waste to practically every opponent before Houston and as a result they just didn’t have the calluses which can only be formed in tightly contested matchups. This rationale, although flawed, probably does apply, but it still left me searching for a more definitive answer. How were two ostensibly overmatched teams able to overcome a perceived gap in talent and beat two championship-caliber squads? My attempt to find a satisfactory answer to this question has probably transformed the way I think about the game more than any previous exercise.

Anyone lucky enough to watch both games probably recognized the parallels between the two winning teams. Both squads weaponized their physicality via their relentless defense and commitment to the offensive glass to carve out extra possessions.

However, the similarities between these two squads are not confined to their defense and presence on the offensive glass. Further examination shows two almost mirrored stylistic profiles.

The players of both teams also had their individual stat profile curated similarly, with their teams opting for a more egalitarian approach offensively as shown by the tight usage spread between their players.

Even though the significance of these parallels may not be clear at the moment, I believe that because of the Houston Rockets current roster construction, they have positioned themselves to benefit from a market inefficiency which has been exploited by the Houston Cougars for years. And the environment they are cultivating is the exact context where a player like Tre Johnson could be optimized.

The Blueprint

Before delving into the specifics of the relationship between Tre Johnson’s skillset and each of the Houston based teams, I think it is necessary to discuss how the Houston Cougars became such a resounding success, what elements of the Cougars program they should look to replicate, and why the Rockets should consider the Cougar model a roadmap for their own success.

The success Houston has experienced under Kelvin Sampson has been nothing short of unprecedented. Prior to Sampson taking the reins at the onset of the 2014-15 season, the Cougars had been to the NCAA tournament three times in 25 years and were unable to win a tournament game in any of their appearances. When Sampson arrived in Houston, the program was entering its first season in the American Athletic Conference, a league composed of an eclectic group of Conference USA castoffs and Big East schools taking temporary shelter within the conference. Amid the chaos of the ad-hoc league, the Cougars quickly established themselves at the top of the food chain and never looked back.

What is most interesting about Houston’s meteoric rise into the upper echelon of college basketball, is how they managed to attain and sustain their success. Simply put, Houston may be the greatest endorsement for the importance of establishing an identity in basketball, and a cursory glance at their statistical profile would confirm as much.

As we’d mentioned at the onset of the section, Houston’s elite offensive rebounding is no surprise and a consistently low TO% is a staple of any high-performing offense. The success in these two categories making for quality offense shouldn’t come as any surprise. After all, these are pillars of Dean Oliver’s 4 Factors of Basketball Success. BUT what is especially interesting to me is how poorly the Cougars fare in Oliver’s other 2 Factors, Free Throw Rate and Shooting. For being a consistently elite offense for nearly a decade, the Cougars have been comparatively underwhelming with regards to their scoring efficiency. To establish a frame of reference for exactly how rare this confluence of factors was, I conducted a quick query of exactly how often good offenses played this slow with a shot profile as inconducive to success as the Cougars seemingly were.

Since 2008, 53 teams met the query above, with only the 9 pictured meeting these thresholds more than once. The Houston Cougars attained these marks 6 (!!) times. So, how does a team whose offense frequently unfold like the clip below, where the paint isn’t touched ONCE throughout the entire possession, consistently perform to the level Houston does?

What Houston has done to find success at the highest level is implicitly acknowledge the limitations their overwhelming strengths (offensive rebounding) impose on their offense, and they’ve addressed these limitations by strictly and increasingly adhering to the ‘Hands and Gloves’ philosophy.

Houston’s Hands and Gloves

Hands and Gloves is a term coined by the always insightful @nilehoops to describe the symbiotic relationship between players whose skillsets are more based in their physical advantages and players whose strengths are typically utilized in more offensively demanding roles. At the risk of further butchering the definition, here is the quote from Nile’s article articulating the concept.

In the case of the Houston Cougars, they take this concept to the extreme. Despite often ranking in the bottom half of the country in 3PA rate, the Cougars have rostered a bevy of high-volume long-range gunners. Many of which were analytical darlings despite their paltry efficiency scoring inside the arc.

Now the picture is starting to become clearer: in the Cougars’ case, their commitment to maintaining a standard of physicality and rebounding efficacy on the court at all times reduced the potency of their downhill scoring. I agree wholeheartedly with their (assumed) assertion and think the opportunity cost of drives is significantly underdiscussed in the sport. For a team like Houston, where possessions are in short supply, they can ill-afford to risk accumulating turnovers on meandering drives into a congested paint. In addition to the rim aversion present in the majority of guards’ profiles, the lack of playmaking also stands out. Despite almost all the players above being smaller guards (Quentin Grimes and Jherrod Stiggers being the tallest at 6’5), there isn’t a single player with a positive AST%:USG% ratio, again emphasizing how narrowly defined their roles are. The responsibility of ameliorating spacing issues and maintaining the turnover margin falls squarely on these players’ shoulders, with little else outside of this being asked for them offensively. What makes the players pictured above especially unique in the ‘Hands and Gloves’ framework is not just the duty they are tasked with, but the degree of difficulty under which they are asked to execute.

After taking note of these trends within Houston’s teambuilding, I wanted to see if the relationship between a team’s environmental factors was more universal. Specifically, I wanted to see if teams lacking in schemed advantages (as represented by AST%) and multiple spacing options (3Pr) were more prone to placing a heavy burden on the shotmaking talent they did have on their roster. The query below is what I’ve termed a ‘Scoring Stress Test’.

As Mr. Oliver’s 4 Factors would dictate, what these teams sacrificed in their shot quality, they were forced to compensate for in other areas, specifically the TO Margin and Offensive Rebounding. The theory I had posited earlier also seems to be confirmed to an extent, as this query houses some of the best off-the-dribble shotmaking talent of the Bart Torvik era. Below are each team’s leaders in shot attempts for the season in the previous query. Each player is one of the more prolific shotmakers in the country in their respective season, and I do not think it’s coincidental that the two largest players have seen their shotmaking ability translate seamlessly to the NBA.

Now that we’ve established the necessity of high-volume pull-up shooters to teams who find success without traditional markers of an efficient offense, it’s time to discuss this idea’s implications for the Houston Rockets.

Houston Rockets: Closing the Gap

At the time of writing this, the Houston Rockets have just completed a trade for Kevin Durant, sending the Phoenix Suns Jalen Green and the 10th pick in this year’s draft. This trade has been universally praised and for good reason. Kevin Durant is still one of the most efficient scorers in the world, and while Jalen Green is still a promising young player, the value and fit were too good to turn down. With the transaction, the Rockets stand to make a leap not only because of who was traded, but the kind of players that were involved in the deal.

Circling back to the similarities present in each of the Houston teams’ statistical profiles, I want to focus specifically on the sections outlined below.

It is my belief that by trading Jalen Green and acquiring Kevin Durant, the Rockets will make a major competitive leap due to their improvement in these 4 statistical categories. More specifically, the improvement in these statistics will result in the Rockets’ profile bearing an even closer resemblance to the 2024-25 Houston Cougars.

Along with their suffocating defense, the defining trait of the Houston Cougars may be their pace. Consistently ranking near the bottom of the nation, the Cougars would not be able to control the pace to the degree they do without the interplay between their offensive and defensive philosophies. In studies on whether offense or defense has more influence on a team’s style of play, the overwhelming conclusion reached has been that offense has a greater impact on the pace of play. The most evident way Houston goes about suppressing pace is through their offensive rebounding. The two frames below are a perfect contrast in the effect offensive rebounding has on pace and may shed some light on the resurgence of double big lineups.

In both frames, we have the Alabama Crimson Tide, #1 in the country in Adjusted Tempo and the antithesis of Houston’s playstyle. In the first frame, the Crimson Tide are playing Illinois, a similarly modern team that deploys multiple floor spacers along with a stretch big. Illinois runs a ‘Middle PNR’ in 5-out spacing with the ballhandler being Kylan Boswell, who historically speaking, is an extremely ineffective downhill driver. As soon as Boswell steps inside the free-throw line…

…the possession is over. Zero pressure has been placed on the fairly diminutive Bama backcourt to contribute on the glass and they are granted a free release into transition, which culminates in Labaron Philon Free Throws.

Compare this to Houston’s matchup with Alabama earlier in the season, where they are running a similar ballscreen action for an equally limited driver in Emanuel Sharp. Because of their physical frontcourt personnel, Alabama is forced to commit their entire lineup to crashing the glass.

The threat Houston presents on the offensive glass flips the dynamic Alabama saw in the Illinois game. Now, HOUSTON is able to set up their halfcourt defense unencumbered. This forces Alabama to play off kilter and Mark Sears logs a turnover.

Offensive rebounding’s effect on transition play is a fairly well-known concept, and this is an element the Houston Rockets have in spades. The difference in these teams’ ability to establish a pace of play actually lies in their shot profile.

Previously, I’d mentioned the tradeoff the Cougars willingly made between their rim pressure, as represented by their free throw rate and 2P%, and their offensive rebounding and turnover economy. However, there is another, subtler, edge the Cougars gain from removing ‘no-hope’ drives, as you saw from Kylan Boswell in the first clip. By playing a more static style and concentrating on off-the-dribble jumpers and post-ups, the Cougars seldom have their shot blocked. This style of play also rarely puts the defense into rotation, resulting in few drive and kick opportunities and leading to their low C&S (Catch-and-Shoot) frequency over the years. The lack of ‘easy’ jump shots places an acute pressure on their perimeter players to be multifaceted shooters, hence the disproportionate number of off-the-bounce shotmakers on the Kelvin Sampson Cougars.

The relevance of the ‘Average Defensive Poss. Length Percentile’ column in the graphic above is intertwined with the Cougars’ seemingly suboptimal shot diet. In the Cougars’ preferred game state, the margin for error is very thin; along with the turnover variance that comes with drives, blocked shots are a massive variable that cannot be accepted given the constraints of their deliberate style. The devastating effect blocked shots can have on your defense isn’t a phenomenon only present in the NCAA, as Owen Phillips of the F5 pointed out earlier this year. In the past NBA regular season, only Live Ball Turnovers were more detrimental to defenses.

Ultimately, the foundation for the Rockets should be their offensive rebounding and their defense. But because of their proclivity for low-quality rim attempts, there was no top defense more consistently put in disadvantageous situations than Houston.

For context, the r² between Defensive Possession Length and Defensive Rating is -0.47, which by basketball standards is a fairly strong correlation, and the relationship between the two variables is equally intuitive. The more often a defense can prevent early advantages, the lower the offense’s shot quality should be. This is a large part of why we saw higher and higher pick-up points in the NBA this past season and an increased emphasis on turnover generation. The days of thinking of offense and defense discretely are long gone, and the fact that the Rockets mustered a top-5 defense IN SPITE OF their offense actively sabotaging them is highly impressive. And although this was probably not the impetus of the trade, the Rockets may have removed the greatest inhibiting factor to their defense, challenging the Thunder for top unit in the league.

For all the potential Jalen Green has shown as a dynamic and versatile scorer, his personal scoring hierarchy was incompatible with the shape this Rockets roster was taking. Although a score-first guard certainly CAN thrive in the Rockets’ system, it would have to be similar to how the Houston Cougars’ backcourt options have found success: erasing turnovers and relying on prolific pull-up shooting. So far in his career, though, Green has not shown any significant growth in his ability to take care of the ball, as evidenced by his playmaking profile from Databallr.

In Lehman’s terms, Green’s ineffectiveness as a volume scorer has not been offset by sound decision-making as a passer. On top of this, since entering the league Green has finished 1st, 1st, and 4th in Blocked FGAs at the rim. Again, this is in no way an indictment on Jalen Green’s future, but in the interest of maximizing fit for both team AND player, this separation is certainly best for both parties.

Finding the Fit for Tre Johnson

First, for any readers wondering where the previously advertised scouting report is, I’d like to formally apologize for the digression. What first drew me to the idea of writing about Tre through this lens was how specific and pronounced his gifts are. Of course, the shooting is the main draw. I have repeatedly and emphatically stated Tre’s lone season at Texas very well could be the best shooting season from a freshman in the past 15 years. But history would dictate that no prospect with Tre’s negative intersection of applied physicality and defensive instincts could possibly return top-5 pick value. So what is the sell? In short, I believe Tre Johnson could be the ultimate ‘Glove’, and by selecting Johnson a team could take their first step in recreating the revolutionary blueprint laid out by Kelvin Sampson and the Houston Cougars.

The case for Tre Johnson being drafted inside the top 10 is two-pronged. Naturally, it all begins with the shooting, as anyone reading this probably noticed, the archetype most frequently grouped with Johnson in the piece’s initial queries was movement shooter. In an attempt to gauge exactly how much margin for error Johnson’s pairing of feel and touch would give him I conducted the query below, with Ben Taylor’s ‘Offensive Load’ stat used to paint a more complete picture of players’ offensive burden.

Again, Johnson’s profile compares favorably to elite shooters of past drafts, but in Johnson’s case, there’s reason to believe there’s a reservoir of untapped potential compared to past players in a similar mold. Comparing Johnson’s three-point rate and volume to the other players above with the lowest 3Pr in their pre-draft year, Luke Kennard and Tyler Herro, shows the potential trajectory Johnson’s shot distribution could take in the league.

Like Johnson, Kennard and Herro’s college teams struggled to scheme easy opportunities for players. Kennard’s Duke squad was 280th in Assist%, and Herro’s Kentucky team were 194th. When Johnson is dropped into a roster with more connective playmaking talent, he should easily be able to convert some of his contested mid-range attempts into threes.

The Nembhard Corollary

In my opinion there hasn’t been a more fascinating player in the past 5 draft classes than Andrew Nembhard. Nembhard was undoubtedly an elite college point guard, but as a prospect, his statistical profile was fairly non-descript. And compared to other players who are inevitably mentioned as testaments to 2nd round value, its difficult to find the evidence Nembhard was capable of producing to the level he has in the league. What I eventually decided was that the basis of Nembhard’s unexpected success is his exceptional positional size, and in Tre’s case, I believe the same principle applies. When compared to the players in the previous query, Tre ranks first in every measurement and athletic test despite being the youngest of the group.

This should be the foundation of any optimist’s case for Tre Johnson. A suboptimal Texas context, with no significant passing talent to speak of, masked Johnson’s true shooting potential. And when Tre is surrounded by more cerebral, defensively minded, glass-cleaning frontcourt players who can assume some facilitating responsibilities, his potential will be fully actualized.

Currently there’s plenty of evidence that Tre could quickly become a context-changing shooter. Dating back to 2022, Tre has shot 51.8% (29/56) on 3PA coming off screens. Even though Tre is not the most well-rounded athlete, movement shooting is where his athleticism is most functional, and because of the degree of difficulty in his attempts it’s easy to see him placing immense pressure on the defense in this way.

As the season progressed and Johnson became the focal point of opposing defenses (to an absurd degree at times), a common counter was to utilize Johnson as a screener. This is one of my favorite schematic wrinkles, especially in a context where Tre is sharing the court with other non-spacers, utilizing his scoring gravity to trigger mismatches for interior-based scorers should prove effective.

Reorienting Tre’s usage to more of a movement shooter will require more ‘0.5’ decision making, which Tre doesn’t have much experience with at the time. Johnson is much more of a reactive decision maker. Although these aren’t especially challenging reads, I expect this to be a focus early on.

As his processing becomes better aligned with this usage, it will be key for Tre to trim fat from his shot diet as well. Even giving him the benefit of the doubt when accounting for Texas’ personnel, to maximize his potency as a shooter, Tre will need to take these spot-ups instinctively.

In the end, these are quirks in Tre’s game which I anticipate will be ironed out in short order. There’s no real precedent for this precocious a shooting talent failing to translate as a scorer, and frankly, I do not think the shooting on its own is Tre’s ‘superpower’ as a prospect. In my opinion Tre’s penchant for taking care of the ball at such a high usage is truly special amongst scoring prospects.

Above is another ‘Stress Test’ query, but on a player level. On the surface these players do not seem to have much in common, and I’d understand someone’s skepticism in seeing a group featuring one player who is currently playing in China (Tremont Waters) and another who has been above league average TS% 3 times over the course of a 14 year career (Alec Burks) and any desirable company for a prospect. I would argue that this group has the distinction of some of the most resilient scorers in the Bart Torvik era. All of these players demonstrated an ability to manufacture offense independent of their context, and for the players who failed to find NBA success there were typically extenuating circumstances at play. In Tremont Waters’ case his height and inability to shoot early on prevented him from sticking in the league, but even this past season he spearheaded the #1 offense in China. Alec Burks is a more nuanced case, in my opinion Burks came into the league just a few years too late for his game to translate. As downhill guard without exceptional vertical athleticism or the perimeter shooting to keep him afloat, Burks struggled mightily acclimating to the popularization of 3-point shooting that swept the league.

While I don’t foresee Tre experiencing an outlier developmental arc like Donovan Mitchell or SGA due to the previously alluded to physical deficiencies, I am bullish he will become one of the more successful alums on this list for two reasons. First of all, Tre did not have the benefit of being part of a high-level offensive rebounding team, placing an outsized pressure on him to create without logging turnovers. And secondly, I believe Tre’s scoring portability and unique playmaking strengths are tailor-made for the direction the league is headed.

There are 5 games of Tre’s season I found particularly instructive of how his creation situates him to find success at the next level, Texas’ contests with the Tennessee Volunteers and Texas A&M. These teams were two of the best defenses in the country, but interestingly made up 4 of Texas’ 7 best relative performances this season.

Both these teams had stylistic parallels in their aggressive, swarming defense. Tennessee with their frenetic switching, hedging ballscreen coverages, and aggressive gap help. Texas A&M also switched but frequently opted to extend their pressure past half-court to slow down opposing offenses. Both rank near the bottom in the country in opponent 3Pr, willing to cede late clock 3s in order to cut off the paint entirely. This philosophy should sound fairly familiar: aggressive help, comfort giving up 3s, and relentless ball pressure were the defining traits of both NBA finalists! And it was versus these coverages that Tre’s calm under pressure, shrewd interior passing, and dynamic shooting truly shined.

The relevance of Tre’s size amongst shooting-oriented prospects was on full display versus these teams. Johnson was able to make teams play for late and/or lazy switches with his high and dynamic release.

Despite the congested paint, Johnson consistently made high-value passes without turning the ball over.

Johnson’s ability to pass over and around the defense while avoiding turnovers forced Tennessee to tone down their aggression in ballscreen coverages as well. In the first clip for instance, from Texas’ first matchup versus Tennessee, where the Volunteers maintained their hard-hedging ballscreen coverage. Johnson’s ability to keep his dribble alive and see over the lifted bigs allowed him to manipulate and beat the backline defenders in rotation

This occurred to the point where, when the teams rematched in the SEC tournament, Tennessee softened their ballscreen coverage greatly and reduced the nail-help to prevent the defense from becoming overextended. Johnson still managed to find a way.

This is an extremely small sample, of course, and even though the scheme has similar tenets to NBA defenses, these certainly aren’t NBA defenders. But these kind of plays and performances, while always captured in the box score, are what make Johnson the ideal ‘glove’ player in the NBA. With offensive rebounding becoming increasingly prevalent in the league’s meta…

Precise interior playmaking will become a necessity for perimeter players. And Johnson proved himself to be extremely adept with these naturally high-risk passes all season.

Conclusion

It doesn’t take a veteran scout to recognize the flaws in Tre’s game, and typically, any player who requires so many caveats and accommodations should probably not receive the level of investment Tre Johnson inevitably will. But what Tre is representative of, in my mind, is a departure from teambuilding dogma. A player who possesses outlier talent in the areas Tre does can be essential to forming an identity like the Houston Cougars and Rockets have sculpted over the years. What this exercise has taught me is there is a universality to basketball, and any team whose success is rooted in generating turnovers, rebounding, and maximizing the possession battle will require maximal turnover economy and close-quarters scoring from their backcourt. And a guard like Tre Johnson, who has met this criteria at such an early age, would be a defensible choice for any team keeping this roster building strategy in mind. In all likelihood I do not ever see Tre being the best, or even second-best player on a title-winning team, but he does make the acquisition and integration of perennially undervalued interior players a much simpler endeavor. And that may be where the edge lies in drafting Tre Johnson.

The post Finding the Fit: Tre Johnson, a Tale of Two Houstons, and Winning Ugly appeared first on Swish Theory.

While Indiana’s current successes are not wholly tied to Bruce Brown, he exemplifies ‘why’ they have been successful. Anchored by a multitude of intelligent mistake-free ball handlers, Rick Carlisle has found the formula that has led Indiana to the first-ranked offense in both offensive efficiency and half-court offensive efficiency. This offense resembles a metaphorical ‘greatest hits’ of NBA modern offense, all of which will be explored here. Carlisle has long been an offensive mastermind, and this scheme shows he has kept evolving as the game does.

There is no correct way to run an offense. It depends on your personnel: good and bad plays come down to execution and personal preference. Indiana, however are running the majority of the core concepts you see in modern offense (Zoom, Pistol, Delay, Double Stagger screens, Empty Side Actions). While running such a diverse offense, they are still incredible at ball security, with only two teams turning it over fewer times per game. This points to the fact Indiana has managed to have four high-feel ball handlers on the same roster anchoring their scheme (Haliburton, Brown, Nembhard, McConnell).

Indiana’s offense somewhat reminds me of a quote from the late Johan Cruyff:

“Playing football is very simple, but playing simple football is the hardest thing there is.

A lot of what Indiana does schematically is replicable to an extent. But a big reason they are able to play as they do is because they have stacked together some of the better passers and processors in the NBA. Many believe offense is simple and just about quick decisions and letting hoopers get to their spots. What is often undersold is how difficult this can actually be to achieve. Replicating any perceived ‘simplicity’ of the Indiana Pacers motion offense undersells the execution of their modern concepts, and how rare it is to have stockpiled such a variety of smart ball handlers on one roster. Indiana runs their scheme so well that you are often lulled into thinking it is simple. The variety of cuts and freelance screens are created by their ball handlers and their offensive concepts. It’s a sort of Chicken or the Egg Phenomena in which I lean towards one side.

Early Offense and Spain PNRs

Indiana pushes the pace. Per NBA.com, they take the most shots in the ‘very early’ and ‘early’ ranges of the shot clock. This varies between 22 seconds and 15 seconds. They push for quick hitters out of ‘wide’ ball screens such as below.

This isn’t a novel concept, every team runs it. But pushing these early and often sets up quick advantages that have the defense in rotation early. Indiana are a nightmare to play against because of their early decisiveness.

This is where things get interesting. More often than not, NBA teams will take away this wide ball screen. Giving up early threes and allowing early passes is not something NBA teams want to do. Indiana will often counter this with ‘Wide Reject Spain’. This is one of the more common counters in the NBA but no one runs it better than Indiana.

The Pacers push the ball up and Jalen Smith makes a quick glance behind him to set up the wide ball screen. With Danuel House already top-locking Buddy Hield, the Pacers quickly flow into Wide Reject Spain with Buddy Hield setting a back screen on Jalen Smith’s man. Hield is particularly good on this set, and I’d bet very few guards in the NBA set more screens than him. The result is an easy look for TJ McConnell.

These sets become even more effective when Tyrese Haliburton is the ball handler. Haliburton’s blend of shotmaking and passing isn’t new information to anyone reading this. He’s shooting 54 percent on pull-up threes this season. Even if that regresses to last years measly 41 percent (sarcasm), he’s still one of the very best shotmakers in the game. Here he rejects the ‘reject Spain’ action, taking a filthy step back jumper to the defenders left. I’m unsure what you do with this.

A cruel wrinkle Indiana has started to show is using Haliburton as the back screener. You may be confused by the concept of taking Haliburton off the ball, but it genuinely tortures defenses. This is where Indiana’s pursuit of multiple ball handlers has really shown up, I don’t believe they’d have run this wrinkle last year. Below is how it looks.

Andrew Nembhard initiates the pick-and-roll. With Haliburton being the back screener, De’Anthony Melton has no intent of leaving him. Embiid has to go with the hyper-athletic Isaiah Jackson and the result is Nembhard being able to walk into a good look as there is absolutely no at the level help. Though Nembhard misses, this is still superb process as he’s an elite finisher at the rim and from short-mid-range areas (94th and 79th percentiles respectively).

In their recent demolition job of Philadelphia’s elite defense, they went to this set at the end of the game. This time without the Wide Reject window dressing.

Bruce Brown is the initiator this time. Haliburton sets the back screen and it causes the exact same problem as the previous play. The guard has to stay attached to Haliburton. On this occasion, Embiid ignores the roller and tries to close the gap. It doesn’t matter because Bruce Brown scores off the glass with a superb finish. Brown’s finishing numbers are down overall but he’s still an effective finisher. His addition has opened up more wrinkles such as this one.

They also have mixed ‘Wide Reject’ and ‘Spain’ into out of bounds plays such as below.

This play ends up becoming ‘Wide Reject Get Spain Leak’. They try and bring Buddy Hield off a wide ball screen. They’ll sometimes run ‘wide dribble’ where Hield flips it back to Haliburton. Charlotte knows this and denies it, so Haliburton chases his own handoff (Get Action) and they flow into a Spain PNR where Buddy Hield leaks out. This is a common read Rick Carlisle has used before. He’s had two lead guards with such gravity that the back screen often doesn’t need to be set for the play to work.

Indiana will also get into Spain Pick-And-Rolls out of double stagger screens. Like Wide ball screens, we should class Double Staggers as ‘the easy stuff’. Here’s just a very brief example of what allowing these easy quick hitters might look like. Indiana runs ‘Strong Dribble’.

As you can see, this isn’t exactly hard labour for the Pacers. The Wizards allow the free catch and the play gives Tyrese Haliburton easy momentum for a pick-and-roll. This isn’t exactly something you want to make Indiana not have to work hard for.

These are also commonly top-locked by teams because of Indiana’s shooting talent. They have many reads out of their staggers and though they don’t always lead to instantaneous shots, they are still effective. Here we see ‘Strong Reject Spain’.

DeAnthony Melton is glued to Haliburton, so he drifts inside and becomes the back screener in a Spain Pick-And-Roll set. Melton sees Embiid not showing any kind of help so he has to cover the driving lane which leaves Haliburton open. Notice the sheer panic when this happens. Haliburton’s a special shooter. He didn’t receive the ball on the Wide Reject Spains above but above is an example of what the defense thinks when he does receive the ball after leaking out.

In a recent game against the Sixers, they meshed this concept into something different. I label it ‘Strong Reject Wide Dribble Lob’. Naming doesn’t matter, but watch how mean this play is.

Haliburton is top-locked so he flows to the other side of the court. Obi Toppin who was an original screener, receives a wide ball screen. He flips it back to Bruce Brown (Dribble), but watch Haliburton. He this time sets a back screen for Obi Toppin who had ghosted after flipping the ball to Brown. It ends with a lob for Obi Toppin which only ever ends with one result. Though this isn’t a core or common play, it just shows the versatility and creativity Indiana has with their off-ball screening actions. It also showcases Haliburton’s work ethic, the ability to buy into off-ball screening. Not every star does this and it’s great to see Haliburton doing it. Using him as a screener as opposed to trying to force him onto the ball maintains the egalitarian motion offense Rick Carlisle is trying to run.

They also have another counter from their strong reject series. ‘Strong Reject Ram 77’

Buddy Hield is being top locked, so he goes under the screens and sets the first of two on ball screens (77). Though the play doesn’t instantly get a bucket, the constant activity occupies all defenders and allows Andrew Nembhard to create a bucket off the dribble. Also note Hield and Turner setting a freelance double stagger, and Obi Toppin making a great backcut. This Pacers team makes a lot of smart off-ball reads that make their offense even scarier and harder to defend. Others create advantages, but guys who can elongate and eventually hammer home these advantages matter. It’s another great counter when the easy stuff is taken away.

They have another counter from their strong series. It comes in the form of ‘Oklahoma’ Action. This is part of the double drag series that involves a double drag where after setting an on ball pick, the second screener turns round and sets a screen for the first screener.

Though this doesn’t necessarily fit the criteria for reject, it’s clear Hield is going to get any kind of a shot off the initial stagger screens. So he becomes the first screener in a double drag. Jalen Smith then turns and gives Hield an off-ball screen in Oklahoma Action. This is such a diverse offense with multiple counters. Taking away the ‘easy stuff’ is becoming more common, but Indiana’s mix of diverse counters and smart ball handlers means the second and third reads become easy stuff.

Indiana needs very little excuse to get into any actions they love. They will get into their Spain PNR straight from an out of bounds play like below.

The Pacers are capable of scoring on the easy stuff, but to them, the more complex plays become the easy stuff. They get into their core plays early and often and it’s why this offense is historically great.

Pistol, Doom and Zoom

If you’re trying to collect the greatest hits of any NBA Coach, Pistol and Zoom are always going to be on the agenda. Indiana loves guard screening more than any other team. Per a source with Second Spectrum, no team utilises more guard screens then Indiana. Every team in the NBA uses Pistol entries. And Indiana’s guard screens are not limited to pistol. But think as Pistol guard screening actions as just the tip of the Iceberg for Indiana.

Here’s the most basic look of it.

Pistol entry for Nembhard on an empty side. A simple ball reversal ends in Zoom (Chicago) action that eventually flows into an empty-side action. Per a Second Spectrum source, the Pacers rank inside the top 10 for the frequency of empty-side screening actions. They push them early and had the option twice on this one play.

They also utilise the base ‘Pistol Flare’ action.

This play works because it uses a very effective screen (more on that later) to clear out help defense and stop teams loading up on aggressive strong-side overloads. With the sheer pace that Haliburton operates at, instant advantages are created. Here the play ends with a Myles Turner three. He’s shooting 40 percent on these shots this year. The swinging hypothetical for this team feels as if it will be centered around Turner’s three-point efficiency.

The pistol touches aren’t anything groundbreaking, but like their wide and strong series I like some of their reads and counters. They like to run what I call ‘Doom’ Action, which is simply a cool name for Double Zoom Action. Meaning instead of one screen, you receive two before coming off the handoff. It can also be called Chicago Extra.

Tyrese Haliburton pitches the ball and then sets a screen for Buddy Hield to come off and collect a handoff. The concept doesn’t lead to an immediate shot but it more showcases their offensive philosophy. Constant motion in 5-out looks. No wasted seconds or waiting for stuff to develop. Just constant pass and move basketball. They’ll also get into the action out of ‘Flip’ as they do below.

Flip is a simple concept to get pretty much any player involved, and meshing it with a concept that gets Haliburton starting the play off-ball is excellent scheming. With many teams choosing to invert personnel and just trying to dictate where defenders have to be, you will see a rise in this doom look.

Zoom is a good platform to get the defense moving, but also to get your own players moving. Here’s a play showcasing how Indiana’s fundamentals fit into the actions overall effectiveness.

Constant ball reversals but action with a purpose. The purpose is quite simple. The Pacers are trying to stop gap help as often as possible. Zoom action quite often achieves this purpose, but mixing a flare screen in on the weakside makes the action even harder to defend because the first gap helper (Robert Covington) gets flared by Buddy Hield. It gives Bennedict Mathurin some extra space to work with.

Another way to dissuade gap help is by using the ‘weakside flip’

You can see the Jazz defense zeroed in on the Zoom Action. Teams like to try and congest the slot to deter Chicago Action. But you can see the low man (Keyonte George) is also expecting a flare. The weakside Flip of the screen from Bennedict Mathurin gives Haliburton an extra step which is a gigantic advantage for a player of Haliburton’s level.

Every NBA team runs pistol, it’s not a newsflash. But I hope explaining why it works somewhat adds to the discourse.

Flare Screens, Ghost Screens and other Tidbits

Rick Carlisle’s teams also use guard screens heavily. Sometimes this is to hunt specific matchups. But if you are playing for him, you are going to work offensively. There is no such thing as low usage in the way Rick Carlisle coaches. He expects you to do stuff. His teams utilise both actual guard screens and ‘ghost’ screens.

The Pacers run ‘Iverson Out’. Normally this is run with a big as the screener. But Rick Carlisle wants to get Zach LaVine in the action so Nesmith is the screener. Simple stuff, but has to be noted that Rick Carlisle teams do this at a well above average rate. He once countered a Ty Lue playoff adjustment where Lue put Ivica Zubac on Dorian Finney-Smith to have him as a constant weakside helper, by just running every pick and roll set with Finney-Smith as a screener. This is a philosophy of his, you work and you screen.

They love ghost screens as a team. Here they have two on one possession which ends with Bennedict Mathurin getting an empty side all to himself.

Note how Mathurin sets a ghost screen himself before getting one to give him a look from his area of the floor. It’s a further reminder of how these players put in work off the ball.

I also like how Indiana involves their guards in ‘double drag’ actions, known as 77 Action.

Here they use Tyrese Haliburton as the second screener. Like the Spain plays earlier, this does scare the defense. It’s opened up heavily by Indiana’s variety of smart ball handlers, but part of it is also Rick Carlisle’s philosophy. You will be involved.

They’ll mix ghost screens into their late-game offense.

The Pacers use Haliburton as a fake flex screener then have him dart to the top of the key. Buddy Hield ‘ghost screens’ for him and the initial separation eventually leads to an open bucket.

Here’s why ghost screens work. It attacks good defensive practices. Players will position themselves high to try and delay the ball handler.

Gordon Hayward is showing at the level, but when Hield ghosts the screen he has to go with him because of his shooting gravity. This creates a corner for Tyrese Haliburton. An easy answer is to switch this action but this is also a big reason Carlisle loves incorporating guard screens into his base motion offense. It’s not got the normal sluggishness of switch hunting if you mesh it into your plays.

This takes me to the final, and perhaps most important part of the article. The Indiana Pacers love flare screens. We have many screens in Basketball, dozens of them. But with the way modern NBA defenses are operating, the Flare Screen might be the most important one in the League. Let’s explain why.

Though there are 30 NBA teams who all have slightly different defensive philosophies, there are a few constants across most of the NBA. These are ‘No Middle’, and nail help. These go slightly hand in hand as it’s tough to deny the middle without nail help. But these are the cornerstones for most NBA teams. Flare screens are the most effective screen to attack these.

Indiana runs ‘iverson out’ for Tyrese Haliburton. He is important to explaining this play. More often than not, teams like to load up on empty-side actions because they are so difficult to defend. When you add someone such as Tyrese Haliburton to the equation it’s downright terrifying. Teams will load up on early help early in the shot clock as they do here.

There are four players watching a two-man action. This isn’t bad defense, it’s by design. It’s where no middle comes in. If Jordan Clarkson is on Bruce Brown like he would be in a traditional defense, Tyrese Haliburton is almost certainly going to get to the middle. No Middle has always been a preference for coaches such as Tom Thibodeau, but it feels as if it’s become the rule in modern NBA defense. It’s non negotiable. Below is why the flare can beat this.

If a defense is defending with a sort of zonal concept (overloading the strong side), then a flare screen can attack it. Myles Turner lingering inside the arc as opposed to being on the three-point line obviously helps, but it’s not required. It is almost a way to protect your core offense and empty-side actions. Remind the nearest nail helper that if he glances too far, he’s going to get flare screened.

In an era where teams genuinely are just loading up on primary guys and trying to rob you of vertical drives into the paint, the flare screen is more important than it’s ever been. The achilles heel of a flare screen comes with regards to how much skill the person catching the ball has as both a shooter and a driver. With Indiana having so many ball handlers, they’re extra effective.

Will Hardy’s Utah Jazz also use the concept, notably to support empty-side actions.

These are embedded into Indiana’s offense. They don’t just come during set plays. Below is an example.

Tyrese Haliburton goes into a pick-and-roll. Myles Turner sets a flare screen that would give Aaron Nesmith a wide-open three if Hali decided to use it. If you think I’m over exaggarating these flare screens, just know I’m not. Not every team does these, and there certainly aren’t many teams with them embedded into their basic off-ball reads. They’re automatic.

Aaron Nesmith in particular is a really active screener in freelance or broken situations. The play below illustrates this.

TJ McConnell pushes in early offense to no avail. Nesmith receives the ball, plays the skip pass then ghost screens for Tyrese Haliburton and pops off a flare screen to the empty corner. This leads to easy ball movement for a bucket on the inside. Ghost screens and flare screens are a major part of this offense and mixing them into the same play is never a bad idea.

On this play, Bennedict Mathurin uses the gravity of Tyrese Haliburton to his own advantage. He briefly sells a flare screen which forces Jordan Clarkson to stay inside (no middle), then he actually ghosts the screen and gets a wide open three. Again, watch the flare screen on the weak side of the play. It’s just automatic with this team.

As I’ve noted previously, Indiana have counters upon counters. They even have these for flare screens. It involves actually setting fake flare screens and incorporating them into their offense. Here’s an example.

The Pacers go into a pick-and-roll, and again you see the weakside flare screen designed to occupy any potential help defenders. The Wizards play it which gives the environment required for ‘veer’ action to work. On this occasion the flare was really a decoy designed to create space for the veer action. They’ll run this for both Buddy Hield and Bennedict Mathurin and it was part of their playbook last season.

Wrapping Up

Overall, the Pacers offense is pretty special. This is a team that has acquired an insane amount of high-feel players and built the correct system around them. It’s an offense that is basically running all the greatest hits of modern basketball offenses, but running them better than everyone else.

There is a common theorem amongst coaches regarding the attitude of ‘plays can be stopped, but concepts can’t’. I don’t fully agree with this sentiment, because sometimes you need to run the right plays for your concepts to shine through. Indiana are a team who support my theory on this. What they do might look easy to replicate, but the Cruyff-like simplicity with which they play does not correlate with it taking little effort. It is a result of having acquired an amount of feel across the roster that many teams have never had. This hasn’t happened by accident, it’s what they’ve built towards. Replicating this or trying to be a copycat, may end up being a fools’ errand.

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