So much of NBA team building is predicated on teams’ ability to forecast changes in the league and adapt accordingly. Whether it be an evolving meta game, alterations in the CBA which change team’s cap structure, or an ever-expanding pool of talent, the league is in a perpetual state of flux. And with the new CBA being enacted this summer, NBA teams incapable of determining the requirements necessary to succeed in this new era could be doomed to residing in the basement of league standings.

We’ve seen this equivalent to basketball Darwinism play out time and time again, most recently in 2016 when teams naively commit a disproportionate amount of their salary cap to players due to a temporary spike in the cap brought on by additional TV revenue. A quick examination of teams salary caps over the past few years will find their books littered with contracts from 2016 still being paid due to these rash spending decisions.

In my mind the most consequential addition to the new CBA are the new luxury cap rules, specifically article 7 sections D and E, which detail the restrictions both financially and transaction-wise placed on teams who exceed the cap. Without getting into specifics, these rules drastically increase the financial burden of teams who exceed the cap, with the tax burden compounding with every increment a team passes the tax level. In addition to this, other roster building mechanisms such as trade and mid-level salary exceptions will be removed from teams surpassing these cap thresholds. Ultimately, this will place teams in the difficult position in the short run, having already signed players to sizeable contracts under the old CBA; and in the long run because in my opinion, the assumption that relatively competent younger players on rookie contracts will be extended is going to become less prevalent.

The value of vacant cap space around the league will only increase as more punitive salary cap rules make teams reluctant to commit to players who may not fit their roster’s needs. In my opinion teams will become more tentative in trading for or signing veteran players as the financial risk which comes with these more lucrative contracts, paired with the potential these players don’t properly congeal with the roster, outweighs the perceived benefit. However, a tool to combat this roster building quagmire, in my eyes, is readily available in the draft. The tool in question being Pre-Drafting.

Pre-drafting, simply put, is the idea of teams drafting players a year (or two) before they are seen as capable of regularly contributing to an NBA team. Conventional wisdom of the draft has often been reduced to, “there are only around 15-20 players worth taking every year.” And while there are definitely years more scant in talent than others, I believe this circular reasoning persisted because teams have improperly framed the question of what constitutes a NBA caliber prospect.

Typically teams will opt for players who have met certain markers of statistical production which have historically been considered acceptable. These production markers, relative to a player’s age, are used to whittle down the player pool into a group of what teams consider ‘draft-able prospects’. Generally this a respectable framework to apply to the draft and has yielded good results over the year. However, as earlier mentioned, its necessary to adapt to the changing NBA landscape, and the current drafting approach for teams with substantial contractual obligations leaves much to be desired.

These high achieving teams with large contracts usually do not have the luxury of choice when it comes to drafting, the players with the highest production relative to age are long gone. In turn, these teams opt for the players who hit the most of their preferred statistical markers over the past season. This predictable line of reasoning leads to the idea of draft results, on the whole, being predictable. This parochial view of players only being deemed draft-able if they meet a certain statistical threshold (statistics which were more than likely accumulated in a basketball environment that is impossible to replicate in the professional ranks) has led many teams to squander what are becoming increasingly crucial, cost-controlled assets, in draft picks. Instead, if teams view prospects through a continuum, and consider each age-eligible prospect as part of the draft pool when they matriculate into college or one of the various professional leagues, they could drastically increase the probability of attaining positive return-on-investment from their draft picks.  

With the concept of pre-drafting having been explained, the question arises of which prospects should be sought after under this philosophy? In the past, pre-draft prospects have been conflated with whoever the youngest, highest-ranked high school prospects may have been. I can not stress enough how far this is from the truth. The heuristic I have applied when seeking pre-draft candidates are prospects who possess an intersection of outlier physical traits, at least one foundational skill I am confident will translate to the next level, and an unobtrusive game. Unobtrusive game being one which doesn’t require a high volume of on-ball reps for the player’s early development, as this reduces the number of variables which need to be accounted for when projecting pre-draft candidates.

Condensing this logic into a word, the ideal pre-draft candidate is one which allows for strategic multiplicity. As earlier stated, league rosters are constantly in a state of flux, incorporating a young player whose skillset can be integrated into numerous contexts, without stunting their individual development, is a player worth investing in as soon as they are made available. With the new CBA adding more financial guarantees to 2^nd round players, the league has never had more ammunition to entice young players to entering the draft pool. Professional teams in any sport sustain high level rosters by consistently winning at the margins, using draft capital to cultivate talent internally at a low cost with the pre-drafting methodology in mind, presents an option to do just this.

What makes the 2024 draft class especially interesting, in my mind, is many of the most compelling long-term prospects fall under the pre-draft candidate umbrella. These players more than likely will not experience immediate success at the college level, and in fact what would be the most conducive to their long term development is receiving reps at the professional level as soon as possible.

There is not a player in the 2024 draft class who better illustrates this point than 6’7” incoming freshman big man Joseph ‘JoJo’ Tugler.

The Intro

Joseph Tugler is a 6’7” 4/5 man from Houston, Texas, who exploded onto the national scene after an AAU season spent with the Elite Youth Basketball League (EYBL) team Houston Hoops. Tugler went into his final AAU season with only one college offer, from local low-major school Lamar University, and did not receive his first Power-5 offer (from Kansas State) until April of his junior year. Shortly after the Kansas State offer, Tugler received an offer from local school and national power Houston University, committing soon after. The reason for mentioning the timeline of Tugler’s recruitment is to clarify how a potential NBA prospect could exist in such anonymity. Such a condensed recruiting timeline is almost unheard of, much of the outside perception of an incoming freshman is decided by the intrigue which builds up over the course of their recruiting cycle. Tugler concluding his recruitment so decisively is an anomaly amongst high-major recruits.

As is the case with many recruits who rise from relative obscurity, Tugler experienced a substantial growth spurt over the course of his high school career, growing over 3 inches from his freshman season to the beginning of his senior season. However, what is abnormal about Tugler’s physical development however, is the WAY he grew. While Tugler sprouted to 6’7” (in shoes), modest size for a frontcourt player, he boasts a 7’6” wingspan with enormous hands. Both can be seen in the picture below, posted by Houston basketball’s Director of Sports Performance Alan Bishop. (Listed height is without shoes)

However, tools are only as effective as their application, and Tugler has a keen understanding of how to apply his outlier physical dimensions to create havoc whenever the opportunity presents itself.

The diversity in Tugler’s event creation is perhaps the most notable aspect of his defense. It is rare to find a big equally as capable of creating turnovers on the perimeter as he is altering and blocking shots at the rim. What separates Tugler from a more conventional under-sized big, besides his unique anthropometric stats, is his movement skills. Tugler’s flexibility in his lower body is truly remarkable, allowing him to mirror smaller players on the perimeter comfortably. What struck me about Tugler’s fluidity, specifically his lateral movement, and has me confident the flashes of perimeter defense weren’t largely due to weaker competition is his biomechanics.

To fully understand Tugler’s lateral movement I’ll need to explain ‘foot-ground interaction. First of all, the most important characteristic of the foot-ground interaction in a basketball context is lateral banking. Lateral banking is the idea that if the contact surface between the athlete and the ground is flat, then all lateral forces will produced by friction between the foot and the ground, thus creating the most power. Simply put, the more contact you are able to make with the surface, the more force you will be able to generate. And if you are able to ‘bank’ the surface, i.e alter the angle of your foot ground interaction with the surface, you are able to create more contact with the surface, and as a result, apply more force to change directions quicker. The concept of lateral banking is why we see Nascar tracks banked, so that vehicles can maintain highs speeds while turning! Below is a diagram depicting how lateral force is produced.

If an athlete has the requisite flexibility through their ankles to ‘bank’ their surface and create more of a substantial foot-ground interaction, they will be better lateral movers. And there are examples littered throughout Joseph Tugler’s tape where he exhibits this exact kind of flexibility.

While not the most clear, keep an eye on Tugler’s left foot, it maintaining almost 100% contact with the ground while changing direction and he’s simultaneously able to achieve full extension through his left lateral sling (lateral sling being the muscle grouping responsible for lateral movement).

This kind of biomechanical analysis can seem unnecessarily granular, however I find this information illuminating when it comes to assessing how certain movement skills may translate. And in Joseph Tugler’s case, understanding his unique movement patterns informs how he’s able to make plays like the one below, where he closes out on 5-star 2024 guard Tre Johnson on an attempted drive, is able to seamlessly funnel Johnson towards the help defenders, and force Johnson to travel when he tries to spin back.

Even when Tugler isn’t able to completely stonewall quicker perimeter players, he is able to resort to his gargantuan wingspan to stay attached and place offensive players in a position of discomfort. The clip below is an instance of this playing out, Tugler is switched onto Bronny James on the perimeter, and while Bronny manages to get a step, the presence Tugler presents as a shotblocker causes Bronny to drive directly into a dig.

The Defense

It is impossible to discuss Joseph Tugler’s defensive projection without first mentioning the responsibilities of the modern big on that side of the ball. Scheme versatile big men are at a premium in the NBA, as ideally teams want big men who are able to produce without precluding their team from using any one lineup. Multiplicity is the name of the game for power forwards on both ends of the court, and defensively Tugler not only has the potential to be deployed in multiple roles without needing to be catered to with other lineup adjustments, Tugler can actually provide you flexibility at other positions by masking other deficiencies in the lineup.

The majority of Tugler’s time in EYBL was spent playing center, where Houston Hoops tasked him with playing a variety of coverages to account for inconsistent player availability. Tugler was not only able to play these coverages competently, but often excelled, and was frequently able to end possessions as evidenced by his 1.6 steals and 4.1 blocks per-40 minutes (over the course of 27 games) as tracked by Cerebro.

Even in plays where Tugler isn’t able to create an event (block or steal) he is constantly disrupting offensive players’ rhythm, forcing them into points of conflicts where they have to make decisions earlier than they’d prefer. The possession below of Tugler playing drop coverage exemplifies this form of deterrence.

Whether it be in drop coverage, or hard hedging ball screens…

Or switching onto smaller players on the perimeter…

…Tugler is a defensive force who needs to be accounted for at all times by the offense. However, in the professional ranks, I see Tugler’s best usage being as a roamer. This would see Tugler being deployed in a role where he can either utilize his length to create havoc in the gaps via deflections like in the clips below…

…or rotating over from the weakside to block shots…

….Tugler effectively serves as the bedrock of a defensive infrastructure, capable of impacting virtually any play type with his unique skillset. Notice how in all of the previous three clips Tugler blocks these shots with his left hand, despite being right hand dominant. This level of ambidexterity as a shotblocker is exceedingly rare and adds to Tugler’s potency as a defensive difference maker. Being able to block shots with his left hand also shows Tugler’s keen understanding of angles and how taking these angles closes distance between himself and the ball quicker, while also limiting the contact he makes with the offensive player.

What gives me a level of confidence in Tugler’s defensive skillset translating to higher levels is how frequently he was able to stifle some of the most highly touted members of his class. The question of whether these players warrant their current high school ranking could be debated, however they all serve as potential proxies for NBA bodies.

Whether it be Garwey Dual…

…Omaha Biliew…

…Matas Buzelis…

…Xavier Booker…

…or 7’1 2024 big man John Bol.

The list of elite high school players Tugler was able to either prevent from scoring, or deter from shooting in the first place, is considerable.

Key to Tugler’s projection as a scheme diverse big, one who is capable of detonating possessions as a help-side defender, is his ability to cover ground in a way that warps the geometry of the court. Tugler does a great job of balancing his responsibilities of covering his man while remaining cognizant of the conflicts the offense is placing his teammates in. Tugler is a player who is not only able to cover the ground necessary to compensate for breakdowns in the defense, but one who also possesses high-level pattern recognition, and can address these breakdowns before they cause a complete collapse in the defensive structure. These skills, in tandem, constitute the profile of a player who can potentially be a load-bearing structure of a defense.

Take the clip below for example, where as the opposing team runs a variation of UCLA, Tugler attempts to call out the screen and when he realizes his teammate is unable to get over it, he then switches onto and bumps the point guard (Jeremy Fears) off his path, giving his teammate enough time to recover back to his initial assignment. After this, Tugler immediately recognizes the need to switch onto the secondary side pick-and-roll action, where he’s able to flatten out the drive angle of the ballhandler, force the swing pass to Fears, stunt onto Fears’ drive, and recover back to his man in time to contest a 3-point attempt! This is an amazing example of Tugler’s defensive bandwidth and how it, in concert with his physical tools, can be weaponized to alter entire possessions.

Another instance of Tugler’s ground coverage ability, and specifically how it can allow for a team to play more aggressive defensive coverages (much like his current college team, Houston, prefers to play) can be found in the play below. His teammates are trapping the ball on the sideline and Tugler, anticipating the pass to the top of the key, sprints out towards the 3-point line while remaining focused on the ballhandler’s eyes. Tugler reads the ballhandler, manages to recover back to the dunker spot, steal the pass, and instantly parlay the turnover into an easy transition bucket with the outlet pass.

Tugler’s relentless motor makes his ground coverage even more apparent on tape, I have seldom seen players who can play as a primary rim protector creating plays in transition like in the clip below.

This level of ground coverage, combined with Tugler’s outlier length and accurate hands, make it so he has outstanding range as a defender. Plays like the clip below display this, where Tugler initially loses contain on the ballhandler and cedes a driving lane, but uses his length to stay attached to the ballhandler and block his shot at the rim.

These kind of plays are common in Tugler’s tape, as he is great at playing this kind of cat and mouse game, providing the offensive player with a false sense of security to where they feel comfortable attempting a shot at the rim which Tugler is able to alter or block. Below are a few instances of this situation playing out.

So often in the NBA context defensive ‘range’ is tantamount to how capable a defender is of altering and affecting the number of threes attempted by the opposing team. Tugler is in no way bound to solely impacting shots inside the arc and proved himself capable of making long, prudent rotations to cover for missed assignments outside the arc.

Take the play below, where the opposing team begins the action with an Iverson cut where the player opts to go under the screens to counter the defender top-locking. To account for this the cutter’s defender calls to switch. Tugler, seeing this transpire, anticipates his teammate getting beat off the dribble (which isn’t a bad assessment considering the angle #1 takes on the closeout). Tugler overhelps as a result, but is able to recover to the 3-point line when the ball is kicked out, and block the 3-point attempt.

So far we have explored Tugler’s intersection of athletic ability and defensive awareness, however he is not without his flaws on this end of the court, the most glaring of which being how foul prone Tugler is. Per Cerebro, Tugler averaged 5 fouls/40 minutes over the course of 26 tracked games.

While watching Tugler’s tape and trying to make sense of the underlying cause of his extremely high foul rate, I was brought back to times I have watched combat sports, and specifically mixed martial arts (MMA) in the past. In MMA the specific language regarding fouls, such as illegal eye pokes or strikes below the belt, is that the fighter “should always be aware and in control of their weapons”, weapons of course being the limbs they use to deliver strikes. I reference this because the majority of Tugler’s fouls aren’t a result of a lacking understanding of where he should be positioned, but a result of over-aggressiveness. Tugler’s penchant for causing turnovers comes at a cost of believing he can force turnovers from any angle no matter how much he may be positionally compromised. These gambles which result in steals like the play below:

Also frequently result in fouls like this ill-advised steal attempt:

Tugler’s over-aggression is often amplified by his greatest athletic deficiency at the moment, his deceleration, and these two paired together materialize in head-scratching fouls such as this out of control 3-point contest:

One of my favorite aspects of Tugler’s game is the physicality he plays with despite not having an overwhelming amount of mass. However, this element needs to be better trained as he’ll have inexplicable lapses in judgment which make up a non-insignificant portion of his fouls. The play below where he hip checks a baseline cutter is a perfect example of this:

Ultimately, I believe in Tugler’s defensive processing and how, in combination with his motor and physical tools, he fits the profile of a player who can be a bulwark for defenses at higher levels. Tugler certainly has to make significant improvements in technical areas of defense, such as his hand placement in drop coverage and footwork on closeouts, but I consider this low-hanging fruit in comparison to the skillset he already has. As certain defensive archetypes come in and out of favor, in my estimation a player like Tugler who can be deployed in numerous roles has the potential to retain value no matter the current defensive meta. Tugler’s not only able to make the long rotations created by subpar team defense, but by the same token, shortens rotations his teammates need to make by virtue of his physical tools and defensive workrate.

Tugler’s ability to end possessions places a strain on offensive players’ decision making process and this, even momentary, indecisiveness can throw off the timing of an entire play. So often we call offensive player’s ability to force hasty decisions ‘gravity’, and while there isn’t a universally repellant force to counteract gravity, Tugler’s defensive acumen can greatly help a defense retain its shape by limiting the scrambling situations that elite offensive players’ gravity causes.

The Offense

Joseph Tugler’s offensive projection is a much murkier conversation, and first requires a more abstract discussion of what is demanded from a modern power forward. What is so interesting to me about the modern 4-man is how there is no concrete expectations or necessary conditions for the position versus other positions on the team. Even though the game has moved further and further away from traditional positions, there is still an implicit understanding that a shooting-guard for example will bring some amount of shooting versatility to the table.

In contrast, the power forward responsibilities seem largely dictated by the center they are paired with. For instance, in certain contexts a 4 may have to stretch the floor for a paint-bound big man, while in other situations a team may need a more athletically dynamic 4 whose gravity rolling to the rim or cutting pairs well with a playmaking big. These lineup considerations are ubiquitous in high level basketball now. As front-court synergy becomes not only desired, but required, for any high performing team, the PF will be viewed as a binding agent for the rest of the lineup.

Tugler is a perfect distillation of how incongruous the demands are and, as a result, the development of big-men in youth basketball are compared to modern professional big men. In all the tape I have watched of Tugler his usage was almost exclusively that of a traditional, back to the basket, big man. This aligns with the background knowledge of Tugler’s developmental context, where he did not play on any major shoe circuit, and the public school league which he played with he was far and away the most physically dominant force. Tugler is 6’7” in shoes, a modest height for a PF, and he towers over the rest of the players in this interscholastic game for Cypress Falls High School.

When Tugler began to play high-level competition on the EYBL circuit, he saw the same kind of usage he’d been used to receiving in high school. Now, with size more representative of what Tugler would face at the next level, the results were ugly more often than not.

Tugler’s ineffectiveness in the low-post is a byproduct of his over-reliance on previously held physical advantages. Playing at lower levels Tugler was able to physically outmatch virtually any player he was matched against. However, I do not believe the low level competition is the only cause of Tugler’s lack of refinement in the low-post. Taking a more macro view of Tugler’s developmental trajectory, taking into account that he is a player who grew a substantial amount over a relatively short period of time, is key to understanding the main deficiency in Tugler’s low post footwork which is his balance. Tugler routinely loses his balance even in situations where his path is not being obstructed by other players.

I think this is an important aspect of Tugler’s athletic profile to mention because his novice footwork in the post and hapless shot attempts can be easily misconstrued for a lack of coordination, when in reality I believe Tugler has a good baseline of dexterity/fine motor skills. However, he rarely has had the chance to display them due to his usage and developmental context.

In lineups where Tugler was paired with another big man and he was provided the opportunity to faceup more frequently to the basket, or he was able to catch further away from the basket (like in transition for example), the results where fascinating.

Take the play below: Tugler makes the catch slightly above the 3-point line, is able to maintain his dribble when an opposing guard applies pressure and delivers an accurate no-look pass to the corner shooter (with his off-hand) as soon as Kwame Evans Jr. commits to help. For a player with extremely limited reps handling the ball in this capacity, Tugler routinely uses his massive hands to make unique, precise, passing deliveries. The variety of deliveries, along with how infrequently Tugler telegraphs his reads, is a rare combination for a young big.

The fact Tugler seems almost as comfortable making passes on the move, as he’s driving from the perimeter…

…as he is making reads from the middle of the floor…

…despite Tugler having drastically more experience making reads out of the latter position, is an encouraging indicator that his passing isn’t limited to a narrow application, and that his playmaking can adapt to the context.

For example in the play below, Tugler immediately gets downhill after the catch and is walled off by the defense. However, he has the court-mapping skills to recognize how imbalanced the court is, and makes the skip pass to the wing to create the longest rotation possible for the the weakside defender at the nail. While some coaches/evaluators may disapprove of Tugler making a riskier jump pass, his long levers allow him to put more velocity on the pass while maintaining accuracy.

The key to fully optimizing Tugler’s passing will be improving his ball security and expanding his repertoire as a ballhandler. While his passing is far ahead of what would typically be expected of a young big, Tugler’s comfort as a ballhandler is in its nascent stages. Any attempt to string together multiple moves usually ends in disaster for Tugler as shown in the clip below.

While I do not think it is necessary to Tugler’s viability as a PF to develop an expansive handling repertoire, it does need to get to a level where it is at least functional. And at the moment, Tugler’s lack of confidence in is handle reduces his effectiveness as a finisher because he so often has to resort to early pickup points, and doesn’t have the extreme level of vertical explosiveness to compensate. Below are instances where this limitation forces Tugler to turn ideal layup opportunities into awkward, low percentage, attempts.

While this may sound overly optimistic judging off how dismal the previous examples are, I believe players with unique physical tools such as Tugler are presented with unique solutions in skills such as ballhandling. Tugler’s hand size give him a larger margin for error when it comes to developing a functional handle where he can manipulate ball speeds. The threshold Tugler has to clear to be deemed a functional ballhandler is much lower than a smaller player; the fact he is able to win the leverage battle versus his defenders so consistently leads me to believe his handle does not need to be deceptive as much as it needs give him the time to react to different inputs from the defense on drives. Any improvements in this area will lead to his drive paths being less predetermined and Tugler’s efficiency driving to the basket, both as a playmaker and scorer, will greatly improve as a result.

Scattered throughout Tugler’s tape are plays where his impressive dexterity are on display. Tugler habitually uses his left hand to make passes and finish plays around the basket, and in my opinion, it is reasonable to expect a player whose exhibited this degree of coordination to progress to an acceptable level of ballhandling. Take the play below, Tugler catches the ball in the low post out of the pick-and-roll and quickly makes an accurate, underhand, left-handed pass to the wing. While a relatively mundane play which doesn’t result in an assist, this is far from a standard passing delivery.

The blend of tools and movement skills allow Tugler to generate deep paint touches when faced up, despite his unrefined footwork and suboptimal balance. Tugler consistently wins the leverage battle against his defender, consistently keeping his shoulder level below that of the defender, as evidenced in the clips below.

However, though I believe there to be optimism in Tugler’s growth as a driver, he is very much in the embryonic stages of development in this skill, and the record scratch moments when he does faceup and drive to the basket are prevalent.

The Shooting

Power forwards’ versatility is typically viewed through their ability to space the floor. The ‘stretch 4’ has become a relatively oversaturated archetype, in my opinion, to accommodate players who aren’t capable of scoring effectively in the paint but have at some point shown at least a cursory ability to shoot and possess shooting indicators which can be construed as revealing latent shooting potential. I say this to say I truly believe shooting ability in draft prospects, when it comes to big-men (being 4s and 5s), is too often graded on a different rubric than wing and backcourt players. And I believe the players who have seen the sharpest development trajectories in their shooting were able to grow this skill because of the value they added in other phases of the game. Granted this isn’t a quantifiable observation, however relating back to my belief in the increased churn in the league, if a frontcourt player isn’t able to quickly return value as a floor-spacer, and are deficient in other areas on top of this, the likelihood of the player being provided with developmental resources such as playing time are unlikely. This philosophy is pertinent to Joseph Tugler because his shooting outlook and potential at the moment are bleak, to say the least.

Per Cerebro Sports, Tugler shot 7.2 free-throws per/40 mins, and was an alarming 46.8% from the line. For as consistently as I’ve praised Tugler’s tools and how conducive they are to basketball performance, a +12 inch wingspan with what I’d estimate to be at least 11.5 inch width hands are major detractors from his shooting efficiency. When shooting, the shooter wants to ensure that their elbow, wrist, and fingers are on the same plane to ensure the ball rests on as stable a platform as possible to the most linear force can be put through the ball, limiting the superfluous lateral forces which can cause the shot to be misdirected. With Tugler his hands, and especially his fingers, are so long that when paired with his condor-esque wingspan they introduce many more points of failure. Point of failure being an engineering term referencing any non-redundant part of a system that, if dysfunctional, would cause the entire system to fail.

An example of this can be seen below, Tugler has what can best be described as a delayed follow-through. It is apparent he is aware of the traditional teaching point of shooting to flick your wrist completely through the shot to get adequate rotation on the ball, but is unable to execute this principle because he’s subconsciously afraid of putting too much force into the shot. This phenomenon is especially evident in the second shot in the clip.

This hitch causes Tugler’s shots to have a flat arc towards the basket. Ironing out these mechanical issues and improving Tugler’s free throw percentage to an even passable level could catalyze a significant improvement in his efficiency. Over the course of the 26 games tracked by Cerebro Sports, Tugler posted a stellar 0.58 free-throw rate (free throws per shot attempts), and his inability to capitalize on opportunities at the line resulted in a relatively underwhelming 57.5 true shooting percentage.

As oxymoronic as it sounds to be relatively optimistic about a 47% free-throw shooter’s ability to stretch the floor, Tugler’s confidence in taking threes, despite the free-throw line struggles, is encouraging to me. Tugler only shot 30.7% on 1.8 attempts/40 minutes; however the confidence I have in the rest of Tugler’s skillset translating to a higher level, paired with his willingness to take 3s when the defense gives them to him, leads me to believe shooting is an element which can eventually be incorporated into his game even if it is in a limited capacity.

Considering Tugler’s shooting profile, an obvious concern would be how could a negative spacer who doesn’t project to exclusively play center contribute to an offense? In a league where the majority of teams’ ideal lineup consists of personnel who can play 4-out 1-in, and 5-out for stretches, where does a player with limited shooting potential factor in? This is where I believe Tugler’s passing acumen and latent slashing ability come into play.

In addition to these skills, Tugler is a player who already has a good sense of timing and positioning as a play-finisher. The spatial awareness and Tugler’s minimal load-time as a leaper make him compatible with frontcourt players who are more perimeter based and/or possess more ball-skills. While this kind of frontcourt partner hasn’t been present at any level Tugler has played so far, the clips below display his potency as a play-finisher from the dunker-spot.

The Role

Harkening back to this past season’s NBA playoffs, while many were finally made aware of Nikola Jokic’s transcendent skill, and rightfully so, I believe the larger takeaway should have been how devastating the pairing of two big-men with high-level processing and finishing ability can be. The interplay between Aaron Gordon and Jokic, and the strain they placed on defenses’ decision making, was consistently made apparent. In no way am I attempting to make out Tugler to be a 1-to-1 comparison to Gordon, and of course the expectation of any player to be paired with as special a talent as Jokic is unrealistic. However, I believe Tugler’s skillset at the 4 can replicate the conflict Gordon has placed teams in during his Nuggets tenure.

Take the play below for example, Jamal Murray runs a side pick-and-roll with Jokic, and the gravity he has as a roller presents Kevin Durant with an impossible choice, either help off Gordon in the dunker spot or allow a clean look to one of the best finishers in the league. This split second of indecisiveness allows Jokic to throw an easy short roll lob.

This next play from the 2023 Finals exemplifies how a non-shooting threat (by NBA standards), can counter defenses sagging off them by sharpening their instincts as a cutter.

Tugler’s current offensive limitations will most likely see him being deployed as a small-ball center as he adapts his ball-skills to handle more power forward duties. Tugler’s already a remarkably consistent short-roll passer. Take the clip below, Tugler sees the low-man overcommit on the tag and zips in an accurate left handed pass to the corner.

While not very layered reads, Tugler executes these passes well consistently.

An often overlooked skill in frontcourt players is their ability to rebound. And while Tugler would give up size to his opponent either playing the 4 or 5, his superb second jump, length, and workrate prior to the shot being hoisted, make him a force on the boards. Tugler averaged 13.6 rebounds per 40 minutes (5.9 offensive, 7.6 defensive), and routinely beat bigger, stronger players for rebounds on the offensive glass.

The Conclusion

As we’ve dissected virtually every aspect of Joseph Tugler’s game one may be wondering how prudent it may be to project a player who is obviously far away from being the final article. Even compared to most frontcourt prospects Tugler will take a significant amount of time and require heavy developmental resources to be fully actualized as a productive NBA level player. However, I believe too often NBA teams assign prospects the ‘raw’ label as a pejorative, when in reality they should see a player from the kind of developmental context Tugler is coming from, and equate the lack of NBA relevant reps as an opportunity to paint on a blank canvas.

The draft is about making calculated risks, and a player like Tugler who has a portable skillset, with his defensive aptitude, passing feel, and relentless rebounding, should be malleable to virtually any roster. Teams would be best served realizing how conducive to long-term roster construction investing in a player before they are considered ‘ready’ is. The flexibility this allows a team moving forward, to have a player in their program who is a cost controlled, consistently appreciating asset, which can be molded with your specific team needs in mind, is invaluable. At the risk of sounding pollyannish, I am confident Tugler will only appreciate in value in the immediate future and will have a shorter learning curve not only because of his physical ability, but also the high basketball character he seemingly always displayed.

Plays like the one below, where Tugler’s team is down 16 points in the waning moments of the 4th quarter, and despite the game being out of reach, Tugler is hounding the ballhandler fullcourt. When Tugler loses attachment to the point guard, he peels off and blocks the big man’s layup attempt. These kind of effort-based plays are routine in Tugler’s film.

To briefly revisit the earlier exemplification of the Denver Nuggets, my failing to mention the space Aaron Gordon and Nikola Jokic were afforded by the lethal shooting from perimeter players like Jamal Murray, Kentavious Caldwell-Pope, and Michael Porter Jr probably was considered a gross omission by many readers. However, this ties back to a central tenant of my draft philosophy: I believe NBA evaluators are relatively consistent in assessing scoring talent, however as 3-point shooting has become a ubiquitous feature of the NBA-meta, these players have become more widely available and as with any skill/product that becomes less scarce, shooting/scoring is more fungible (outliers aside of course).

Paradoxically though, perimeter scoring has seemingly become the predominant skill considered in talent acquisition, with teams willing to overlook other glaring deficiencies in a player’s game. This line of reasoning, in my opinion, has lead to a drastic underestimation in the value of players who are lower usage, but are proficient in what are usually categorized as ancillary skills. Addressing this market inefficiency, and determining which players possess unobtrusive skillsets, skillsets which are capable of impacting the game no matter where they fall in the offensive pecking order, is commendable teambuilding process.

Joseph Tugler, in my mind, is a prime example of a player who could serve as this kind of connective tissue for an NBA team. NBA personnel acknowledging the disparity in responsibilities, especially offensively, between college and professional frontcourt players should realize how beneficial professional reps would be in Tugler’s case. Utilizing professional game and practice minutes to train Tugler’s decision-making framework, on both ends of the court, could yield the best version of Joseph Tugler over time. And while the best version will almost certainly never be a conventional NBA star, it may very well be the quintessential modern frontcourt player.

The post Jojo Tugler & the Case for Pre-Drafting the Modern PF appeared first on Swish Theory.

What role will Leonard Miller play in the league? I have no idea. What I do know is that role projection analysis is capped, the issue with historical analysis is overgeneralization, and Leonard Miller should most definitely not be mocked in the 20s for the 2023 NBA Draft.

I can say with strong confidence that there really has never been a prospect like Leonard Miller. And quite frankly, there’s no reason why his integration of skills should be demonized (see: Refutation). His combination of physical tools, tangible skill, and sheer productivity is ridiculous, and it’s best epitomized through the following Skill-Paradigm framework.

Skill: Youth + Productivity

Paradigm: Exceptional productivity at a young age is indicative of untapped upside.

Leonard is freshman aged (Nov 2003, born in same month as Taylor Hendricks and Keyonte George). He is averaging a whopping 18 ppg with grown men on spectacular efficiency. 

63% TS, 66% at the rim, and a whopping 38 dunks. 24 points per 40 minutes, which would place him 5th across prospects in ESPN’s latest mock draft. He is genuinely a high volume scorer with simply tremendous efficiency and interior dominance. 

Since Leonard is at 63% TS, 38 dunks, and 18 ppg, let’s look at all freshman prospects who have ever hit 60% TS, 30 dunks, and 17 ppg:

1. Zion
2. Marvin Bagley
3. DeAndre Ayton
4. Vernon Carey
5. Jahlil Okafor

Four Duke bigs and Ayton is crazy. Lowering it to 16 ppg adds the following: 

6. Evan Mobley
7. Onyeka Okongwu
8. TJ Leaf
9. Zeke Nnaji

Again, pretty limited company. (Note that no one here had a FT% above 73% and none of them were really operating from the perimeter. That will be important soon.)

I understand that the G League has a different pace, but it’s almost certainly harder to score in the G vs college. You can waffle about rim protection but these numbers should at least contextualize Leonard’s scoring dominance. He was putting up numbers in the G League that only five other freshmen have even come close to in college.

But why does this matter? Why is the combination of youth and productivity so important?

Suppose I gave a group of college students an algebra test. Their scores would generally not be very useful or predictive, for obvious reasons. However, if I gave the algebra test to a group of 6th graders, it’s more likely to hold insights regarding their foundational skills. Obviously it’s not perfect, since access to resources/rate of development can vary dramatically, but it’s at least better at differentiating between performance. 

In the same way, a 19 year old dominating in a league full of grown men is an incredibly important statistical point. The age curve is real, and Leonard was not only the most statistically dominant teenager in the history of the G League, but he did it despite limited high-level experience – he was playing in Canadian youth circuits a year ago. High volume scoring at high efficiency is impressive and very rare among 19 year olds within the NCAA, let alone the G-League, which is littered with former college stars.

In other words:

(Historic Examples: Walker Kessler, Franz Wagner, Tyrese Haliburton, Mikal Bridges, and Shai Gilgeous-Alexander. The relative heterogeneity of the group is a testament to the power of precocious productivity)

Skill: Size + Touch + Youth

Adjust usage of touch indicators based on size and youth.

Leonard is not a good shooter at the moment. He’s a very strongly below average shooter at the moment. This is a player who was below average or worse on jump shots, catch and shoot (both guarded and unguarded), dribble jumpers, early jumpers, runners, and hooks- literally every shot category not at the rim, Leonard was solidly below average. At the combine, Leonard finished dead last in the shooting drill, tied with Oscar Tshiebwe. 

Now that we have that out of the way, I say with as much confidence as I can for a player with such a negative shooting profile: Leonard is a relatively good bet to shoot. Let’s break this skill integration down:

1. Skill: Size + Touch

Leonard’s exceptional touch is most obvious to anyone who has watched even a modicum of Leonard film. I’m assuming readers are somewhat familiar with Leonard’s incredible bevy of floaters, off the glass ambidextrous pushes, and off-foot, off-hand finishes. If not: basically, Leonard Miller has incredible touch, but less in the traditional sense of strictly being a good shooter and more so in the sensuous control and finesse of his release in the short-intermediate area.

Leonard also shoots 80% from the line on strong volume. This is especially impressive considering the G League foul rules generating only one free throw per shooting foul, rather than two FTs/foul as in NCAA. The second free throw is anecdotally easier to make than the first free throw, with some armchair statisticians citing 4-5% increase in accuracy on the second FT vs the first FT. Given the robust sample size and the one FT rule, Leonard’s 80% FT is probably a slight underestimate. That is wild.

There’s obviously touch in terms of shooting, but how does touch operate in regards to ball handling fluidity? 

Well, Leonard has a wildly functional handle at 6’11.  He can genuinely dribble in small spaces extraordinarily well, and can maintain his dribble despite pretty significant pressure. The underlying fluidity of Leonard’s handling (he inadvertently throws  passes with one hand off a live dribble?) indicates another layer of the insanely high threshold of fine motor skills that Leonard possesses. We often tend to abridge dribbling as a learned skill, but it’s just as much of a function of biomechanical/motor underpinnings. Does this mean that he has a higher likelihood of hitting fadeaways and maybe even legitimate pull-ups off an improvised dribble cadence? Is he even going to be able to hit inside the arc fadeaways off hostage dribbles? I think these are legitimate potential outcomes. Nonetheless, Leonard’s fluidity and touch extends beyond just his free throw mastery to his BH craft, and I think his BH upside is significant enough to consider.

2. Skill: (Size + Touch) + Youth

The “coordination curve” is real. Tall players tend to undergo much more drastic skill improvements than shorter players. This is but another generality, but this is either because 1) the wings have been dominating by virtue of physicality for a while and are thereby at a skill disadvantage or 2) said player has grown immensely over a short period of time and is reaping the benefits of activating newfound avenues of scoring by virtue of increased frame and mass. Leonard may be the rare case that fits in both categories.

This might be intuitive, but young, wing sized players need to be graded on a much less harsh shooting curve- they are most prone to making massive in-season shooting leaps. Just look at Brandon Miller 3P volume/%  leap this year, or even Tari Eason’s FT% jump from freshman to sophomore year in 2022. Touch indicators are probably more robust for wings than guards, since the shooting curve is longer for wings. Speaking as someone who had Devon Dotson insanely high, Devon Dotson shooting 80% from the line but only 30% from 3 is not as strong of a shooting bet as someone 6 inches taller than him. Leonard has great touch indicators, he’s 6’10”, and he’s 19 years old. His already strong touch indicators are even more impressive in context of his size and age. He is certainly not destined to be a “bad” shooter.

3. Skill Gap: Shooting woes are a function of mechanics not touch

Leonard’s jumper issues are mechanically a function of energy leakage. The load mechanism is inconsistent from jumper to jumper, leading to a mistimed synchronization between the lower body to the core/upper body. This breakdown of the kinetic chain limits the push-off from the legs. 

The subsequent force generated from the lower body is meant to transfer throughout the hips and core, thereby enabling rotational torque about his center of gravity that thrusts the ball into trajectory. However, Leonard has a low arching push shot that is visibly segmented from the workflow of the kinetic linking, leading to a disparately visible discrimination between the set and push of the shot.

The hitch seems to cause variations in the release point of the ball. The pause disrupts the natural fluidity of the shooting motion, making it challenging to replicate a consistent release point from shot to shot. Leonard appears to over-rely on his upper extremity strength to generate power, bypassing the opportunity to maximize force production from the larger leg and core muscles.

Here’s the bottom line: Leonard is generating virtually no energy transfer between the kinetic linking of the upper and lower body. Part of that is the limited core stability symptomatic of the landing leg kicks and even poor one-legged landing mechanics after dunks. 

Touch + Energy Transfer = Shooting

Touch, which is succinctly the nexus of sensory feedback and coordination, operates synergistically with energy transfer to manifest in shooting goodness. Shots such as free throws and intermediate area shots are somewhat standardized to an extent- neither rely on a consistently dynamic change of energy transfer up the kinetic chain, and they are much more effective in indicating underlying touch.

Essentially, Leonard excels at these kinds of shots, since he has such good touch but not so great control over a homogeneous synchronization of energy transfer. Since his specialty – free throws and intermediate area shots – are more touch based and less dependent on efficient energy transfer, he excels at them.

However, when extending range to long 2’s/threes, there’s a necessity for more fluidity from upper body to release by virtue of the increasing distance. Leonard seems to be over reliant on his touch on the longer range jumpers/threes, which is probably why he seems to be pushing the ball so vigorously; the lack of effective energy transfer necessitates this vigor. The lack of core stability is either a symptom or root cause of the limited kinetic control- its the underlying bridge between the lower and upper extremities. I cannot emphasize how his one leg landings are really really bad, which is further evidence of his limited core stability.

Leonard has good touch and bad energy transfer/rotational torque. I’m no Chip England, but this is a far brighter picture than what the numbers portray. Core stability seems like an issue that can be fixed, and he also has insane touch- not just good touch, but borderline ridiculous touch. Fixing a shot mechanically is tough, but having the underlying elite touch makes it much lower hanging fruit than for a true “non shooter.” 

Skill: Physicality + Dawg

Unorthodox athleticism and motor at a young age is a strong indicator of outlier development.

Leonard is such a strong athlete. He fights hard for every single rebound and loose ball, which is impressive considering how often the Ignite were losing this year. He was ranked sixth in the entire G-League in rebounds a game, averaging 12 per 36 minutes. That is insane. A 19 year old who is quite visibly not even close to filling out physically, is inexplicably out rebounding grown men. For context, he’s averaging as many rebounds as Kenneth Faried. 

His per-game rebound rate is easily the highest among draft-eligible underclassmen, he’s fourth overall among draft eligible players… and he’s doing this against grown men, not against college players.

The intrinsic dawg of Leonard enables his rebounding goodness in the face of his lack of tangible strength and youth. He has an incredibly high motor, and he’s physically gifted (6’11” with a 7’2” wingspan and functionally very very strong, clearly) with seemingly much more room to grow and gain strength. The intersection of Leonard’s insane physicality, potential for even more physicality, and sheer dawg is not only rare, but seemingly ripe for outlier development. 

The most egregious part is that this 6’11” teenager legitimately moves like a guard. With long legs, flexible hips, and an incredible vestibular sense, Leonard can maintain stability while stringing out spins and stepbacks. In every sense of the term, Leonard is an advantage creator. His low shin angles, rapidly veering lower body rotations, and the sheer variance in his weight distribution allow him to lower his center of gravity and generate paint touches off a perimeter standstill. Again, how many 6’10 guys in the league can get a paint touch in the halfcourt?

Refutation: Role Projection is Imprecise

I fundamentally disagree with lowering a player’s projected outcome because of uncertainty regarding their projected role.

When we see a prospect that has an entirely unique set of flaws and weaknesses, role projection becomes much more difficult. There is no one to cross-check with, no one to even remotely compare the prospect and get a sense of what kind of outcomes they can achieve.  An intuitive byproduct of this is that when an unfamiliar, newer type of archetypal prospect emerges, they are mistakenly demonized for not being easily projectable. Here’s the issue though: precise role projection is hard as hell. Besides using general terms such as “future PnR BH”, “cutter”, “connector”, it is extremely difficult to project future roles for players. This is why I find it a bit ridiculous to be low on a player because you can’t project them well: Since when can we effectively project roles to begin with?

Of course, I am speaking in generalities to an extent. But if the biggest question for Leonard is not his productivity, ability to hold up against NBA defenses, or scoring touch, then uncertainty about role is quite a weak reason to limit his outcome projection. And this role uncertainty does seem to be the primary question regarding Leonard.

Closing Pitch: Leonard Miller is Good

Leonard Miller is projected to be picked outside the top 20, which, regardless of evaluatory paradigm of choice, is borderline ridiculous. I believe he has a legitimate top 10 case, and should at least be considered with a lottery selection. 

The issue with historical analysis is overgeneralization: history doesn’t repeat itself. It may follow incredibly similar patterns, making the process of prediction easier to elucidate. But there are far too many confounding variables to project variability by virtue of precedent alone. 

Again, anyone who pretends that precise role projection is somewhat feasible is lying to you. Most people base role projection almost entirely off precedent, which means that when an unfamiliar, newer type of archetypal prospect emerges, they demonize them for not being familiar. We often conflate projecting outcomes with projecting roles. Most role projections are outright wrong, so quite frankly I don’t see too much of an issue with not knowing how Leonard will project.

Who is Leonard Miller at his peak? I honestly have no idea. He’s such an unprecedented player with such wide discrepancies between his strengths and weaknesses; his role is impossible to project. 

What position does he guard? To be honest, I’m not losing sleep at night regarding the primary position that Leonard Miller, a 6’11 teenage wing with a 7’2 wingspan and insatiable motor, will guard. Again, I don’t know what role he will play, but isn’t the most dominant teenager in G-League history a good bet to be a role player at least?

Hollingerian draft analysis is predicated around the idea of stability of floor, wherein there are 20 players who will evolve into feasible contributors, and searching for those 20 players in any given draft should be a primary consideration of any big board. While this approach has its flaws, including overfitting without effectively capturing changing league context, it’s a floor-centric approach that should theoretically favor Leonard. 

This is the beauty of the Leonard Miller draft evaluation. You can be a tools-centric truther, a pure hooper, a calculator boy with a distaste for ahistorical analysis, a Hollinger disciple, or from the Zwickerian tree of making a  series of objective extrapolations off every minutiae of tangible skill. Leonard Miller combines all sectors of evaluatory paradigms with his unprecedented integration of skills.

The post Leonard Miller: Evaluatory Paradigms, Energy Transfer, and the Fallacy of Role Projection appeared first on Swish Theory.

To see where the problems lie, I collected data the only way I know how: watching 1,298 threes across the past three seasons to look for trends, problem areas, or anything else that sticks out. But before we dig into the data, I’ll outline my methodology and some terms that will pop up throughout.

First, there are the types of misses I tracked. The primary three misses are the front rim, back rim, and side rim. Too short, too long, just off. In a general sense, a large number of front rim misses indicate not enough power generation. The back rim misses point towards overcompensation. Side rim misses are largely a question of pure accuracy,

When watching these shots, I broke them into four categories: set shots, movement, off-the-dribble (OTD), and running. Set shots are largely catch-and-shoot looks (C&S), but I chose to add shots where he settled his base for more than a half-second. This added some reload threes with long pauses to that mix because he was squared and still when attempting the shot.

Movement shots are when he’s moving either left or right while shooting, usually coming after a handoff or flare screen. They don’t involve any gather or reload dribbles, unlike (you guessed it) off-the-dribble shots. Any shot with 1+ dribble fell into this category, except for the half-second+ reloads I previously mentioned.

Lastly, we have the runners, where he’s running directly into the shot and makes no effort to slow his momentum. Get it? Got it? Good.

Now let’s get into it.

The Set Shot

This forms the largest share of his shots before and after the injury. 58% of the pre-injury shots I charted came as set shots, and 49% after. That dip is likely explained by the deterioration in roster quality and credible non-Steph spacing options. But what’s really interesting is how remarkably consistent he’s been regardless of the injuries.

When charting the set shots from his 2021-22 season, he got off to a brutal 3/25 start with 13 front-rim misses. Considering those were his first games in over 1,000 days, it makes sense that he was coming up short almost half the time. As he got his legs under him, the results really turned around, hitting 44.5% of the last 202 set shots all the way up through the postseason. He overcame the brutal start to hit 40.9% of set shot looks last year.

Funnily enough, his healthy 2018-19 season followed an eerily similar pattern. He had an identical 3/25 start and was stuck at 30% from deep after his first 100 looks. But over the last 320 shots, he striped a crisp 44.2%, ending up at exactly 40% for the year. Sound familiar?

(Yes, Klay took 420 set shots that season. I’m not making that up.)

In both seasons, he started off with a high proportion of front-rim misses, before evening out as the season went on. A higher number of back-rim misses after an initial slump shows it takes him some time to build a solid base, with or without injury concerns.

Out of his 54 set shots to begin this season, Klay has hit 16, which is just shy of 30%. Does this mean he’s automatically going to hit ~44.5% of his remaining shots down the stretch? Maybe. I’d certainly be willing to bet it’s well over his current 30% mark, and his full-season numbers creep back toward 40% on the whole. If he followed the same pattern pre-and-post injury, it might just be a trend.

I think this is the most explicable phenomenon, and Warriors coach Steve Kerr has provided the answer:

Movement Shots

This is where it begins to get interesting. Before the injury, 24% of Klay’s total threes came off movement. Post-injury, it has risen slightly to 26%, probably explained by the overall spacing around him or just simple statistical deviation. What’s really interesting is how he splits between going right and left.

Of his 177 pre-injury movement shots, 90 were going left, almost a 50/50 split. Post-injury, 93 of his 148 movement looks are going left, a 63% share. Is that a by-product of a new roster or a change in tendency? It’s hard to say without more data, but keep it in mind when we get to OTD shots.

What also interests me is the huge drop in efficacy. He hit 43% of his movement looks before the injury and sits at 31% after. To me, this has two explanations, one that can be seen and one that has to be assumed.

The assumed explanation is the nature of the injuries. Klay tore his right Achilles, which is crucial to forming a base in the leg when shooting. While going to his left off of movement, the right leg is his inside (plant) foot and is relied on for the majority of the strength and balance needed to get square to the basket. If he doesn’t have the same strength in that leg, a big drop makes sense.

Another interesting potential explanation is the change in his shooting base. Though he often changes his base on a shot-to-shot basis, it has been most prominently widened when going to his left.

What really tells me that the problems are coming from the right leg are his splits on movement shots going right. Traditionally he’s 2-3% better going to his right, but that figure has jumped over 5% post-injury. I think this is due to two important factors.

Opposite to the movement left looks, he uses his left leg as the plant foot on these. Though I can imagine it’s still difficult post-ACL injury, he can still generate power from that left Achilles at a normal rate. That has resulted in only a minor change in his shooting base after the injury, as you can see below:

Running Forward

These shots really serve to highlight two things: confidence and momentum.

Most of these runners come when Klay is really feeling himself, and it’s no surprise he shot 43.5% on these very difficult looks pre-injury. What really surprised me is that he hasn’t lost a step on those looks post-injury, hitting a scorching 56% of those attempts. Granted this is a small proportion of his looks (only 6% both pre-and-post), but considering none of his other shots with more than 20 attempts are over 38% post-injury, it certainly stands out.

I think this points to a similar phenomena we see with his righty movement looks. The increased momentum transfer really boosts his accuracy, and no shot involves more momentum than a sprint directly into a pull-up three.

The increased proportion of these shots coming as heat-checks certainly plays a role here, but there’s no denying the results. If you’re not convinced that a higher proportion of momentum is playing a role yet, let’s dig into the final category.

Off-The-Dribble Looks

This category produced by far the most drastic results I found.

Pre-injury, Klay was a killer when dribbling to his left. It gave him a great way to shield the shot from defenders and go against a defender’s instincts by going left instead of right. They were also shots he could hit at a high rate: he cashed 24 of the 52 dribble looks going left I charted, a 46.2% mark, which was the highest of any shot in his pre-injury bag. They also represented a large propostion of his OTD looks at 62.6%.

Post-injury, it’s a completely different story. Not only has he dropped down to 35.9% on those looks, but he’s favoring them more often; 73% of his OTD looks now come going left. What’s even more interesting is he hasn’t changed the base on those shots relative to the others.

Though this certainly points to that lack of strength in the right leg we saw with his movement looks, the proportion of total shots is what interests me the most. Before the injury, 7% of his threes were OTD left. Now, it’s at 14%. In that same time, his OTD right looks have only risen by 1%. He hasn’t even taken an OTD right shot this season. Is he leaning on a shot he’s most comfortable with as he tries to regain his previous form? It’s very possible.

The number of makes also points to the need for increased momentum. When dribbling to the right, he gets a similar amount of energy compared to his movement right shots, getting a little more of a power transfer. Though it represents a small proportion of his overall shots, and could certainly be skewed by sample size, his 10/19 figure on OTD right shots post-injury is worth noting when lumped into the aggregate (which we will get to soon).

Another figure I hesitate to mention because of SSS problems are the step-back looks. He’s never really been one for stepping back, and they represent only 2% of his looks both pre-and-post injury. But he was able to at least hit some with both his legs under him, making 5 of 13. Now, he’s 2/9 post-injury. This by itself is not a significant figure, but certainly follows the larger trends.

The Need for Speed

Outside of the set shots, you can break all these looks into two basic categories: positive and negative momentum shots. His off-the-dribble and movement shots going right would be considered positive momentum looks, along with the runners. OTD, movement left, and step-backs are all negative momentum shots. If you’ve been paying attention, you probably already guessed which one is stronger for him right now.

After the injury, he’s splashed 45.9% of his 111 positive momentum looks. The 180 negative momentum looks drop all the way down to 32.7%. That is a MASSIVE drop compared to his pre-injury self.

The old Klay took 151 positive momentum shots, hitting a crispy 44.3% of those looks. He also managed to hit 43.9% of his 155 negative momentum shots. Notice the split is almost 50/50 between the positive and negative and the near-identical efficiency. The post-injury proportion has risen to 63% being negative momentum shots.

These numbers more than anything point to my two biggest conclusions: he’s really favoring his shots going left out of comfort, and the efficacy of those shots has dropped severely. Meanwhile, his shots with positive momentum have stayed effective because he’s using the left leg as the plant foot instead of his right. His tendencies have changed to favor the left despite the drop in efficacy, but he’s more or less the same going to his right.

So, What Do We Do With This Info?

The set shot really doesn’t concern me. Both the data and the eye test point to a guy struggling to find his legs early in any given season regardless of injury status, and he will only get stronger and better as the season goes on. It would be nice if this roster could get him a larger proportion of set shots relative to motion shots, but that 50% mark is palatable going forward.

Change may be needed regarding his motion shots. Someone needs to get in his ear and tell Klay to lean more into those righty shots and take advantage of a stronger left plant leg. It would also behoove the coaching staff to call more actions that get him flowing towards the ball going right, like Chicago and motion strong actions instead of the flare screens and double drags that usually skew towards his left.

What is clear to me is that patience needs to be exercised, mostly by the fans. If you can temper your expectations and weather the early-season slump, the rewards will be fantastic. Don’t be doom-and-gloom in the early regular season while he tries to figure things out. He has a full year ahead of him to tinker, unlike last season.

My main conclusion? Don’t doubt Klay Thompson. Most players couldn’t even handle starting minutes after this injury, let alone have the confidence to still take their preferred shots, which in his case are very taxing on the lower body. He will figure out a way to be a great shooter by the end of the year; that much I am certain of.

The post What’s Up With Klay Thompson’s Shot? appeared first on Swish Theory.