They’re not entirely wrong. It’s impossible to be a complete developmental determinist given the confluence of factors related to both the drafting team and the mental makeup of the player. These are intuitively important but difficult to decipher without being involved in the draft process with a team.

But what’s frustrating is that “crapshoot” canonically implies utter randomness, as if the entire evaluative and developmental process is entirely unpredictable. It ignores that certain loci of traits are associated with differing rates of development, a principle that forms the basis of my current draft research.

Moreover, even if we know that college production does not exactly scale to pro production, there’s a mountain-load of evidence that suggests stronger age-adjusted production yields better professional results.

This makes the Egor case seemingly open and shut.

At first glance, this is an unmitigated disaster. Egor had a sorta defensible 4.7 BPM… but he was infamously stat-padding against inferior competition. 26 of his 33 games came against top-100 opponents, and in these games, he had a disastrous 1.8 BPM. Against these opponents, he could not score (46.6% TS), he could not rebound (0.7% OREB), and he could not secure the ball (25.2% TO). Re-read those stats. 46% TS and 25% TO is just preposterous. His role is listed here as “scoring PG”, yet it seems that he cannot efficiently score or prevent turnovers?

It’s fair to ask what Egor can reliably do on offense when he isn’t playing shitty teams. Nothing indicates that he can be productive in the NBA.

My initial view on Egor

Full transparency: I ranked Egor 31st on my board. Many analytically-inclined individuals had him far lower. 1.8 BPM vs t100 without scoring upside or outlier athleticism should be a death knell.

Many have lambasted the Nets’ draft, calling it the worst of all time. To me, the bigger issue is accumulating five first-round picks in a single draft: it implicitly punts the value of these picks as they are all competing for the same scant playing time/resources. Even more concerning is that all five of the selected players are fairly low-floor. A few of them will likely bust pretty hard.

Still, it’s nice that there was a coherent vision of accumulating smart, tall guys with reasonable feel. Even if it seemed like they just multiplied height and assist rate, and then took the first 4 guys they saw. While the players they selected were not particularly inspiring, Sam Presti has consistently demonstrated that this size x passing formula has high reward (and also high risk).

Based on some recent conversations and philosophical changes spurred by my year-round historical research, I believe that the incongruence between Egor’s draft capital and my estimated draft capital projection was too large. To be clear, this belief has little to do with his tepid Summer League production, though there were some reasons for cautious optimism. While I still believe the Nets reached to some degree on Egor, and that he has many red flags, I now view him as a strong mid-first option, pumping him up a dozen or so spots on my board.

Here’s why.

The Problem with BPM

Beyond his TO issues, Egor has a terrible BPM, terrible TS%, and terrible 3P%. Altogether, it led to atrocities like the following:

Are these three separate issues? Not quite.

The most underrated part of his profile: Egor’s 3P misery collapsed the rest of his statistical profile.

Egor took tons of 3s. Half his shots came from 3. And yes, he shot an absurdly bad 27.3% from 3. But he was completely fine inside the arc.

This is a legitimately great scoring profile inside the arc. Not only was Egor doing it with over 80% of his two point scoring being un-assisted (anything over 60% un-assisted is notable to me), but he shot 55% on twos. While Egor has picked up a label as a “comp dropper”, his inside-the-arc percentages vs top 100 teams (52.5%) and top 50 teams (55.0%) were perfectly reasonable. Egor was self-creating a huge proportion of his two point makes and converted them at a fairly good rate.

Sure, the vast majority of this scoring came in the PnR with the help of a screen, 150 total 2P attempts is on the lower side, and he has less than optimal burst off the dribble. These are all important considerations, and it would be unwise to treat Egor as a future inside-the-arc scoring maestro. But the fact of the matter is that he was highly efficient without a strong assisted shooting profile, and considering his transition woes, this production almost entirely came in the half-court. There comes a point where efficient HC shotmaking on a strongly unassisted shooting profile must be respected.

And yet, despite his strong inside-the-arc efficiency… Egor shot 46.6% true shooting versus top 100 teams. This is what happens when you shoot 27% from three and those shots make up half your shooting profile. 3P bricklaying should not be excused completely, but we cannot simultaneously champion a high 3PR shot profile and demonize high 3PR shooting profiles with less success.

Egor is a great inside-the-arc scorer, and while he takes many 3s, he fails to convert them at a high rate. This should be the Egor scoring evaluation, rather than taking on overlapping metrics at face value.

Egor shot 22% from 3 and took over half his shots from three vs top 100 comp; it’s immensely obvious that his TS% and BPM were going to tank. BPM is famously prone to react strongly to small sample three point shotmaking. The high volume three point misses strongly diluted his 3P%, TS%, and BPM.

This dilution even applies to offensive rebounding, though to a lesser degree. There is a known and strongly intuitive negative relationship between offensive rebounding and 3PR. When you are hanging out on the perimeter, you will be less likely to be in the proper position to secure offensive rebounds. See: known super-athlete Anthony Edwards and his preposterously low 2% OREB.

So while it’s fair to point out Egor’s relative “softness” via OREB and FTR, it must be done with the contextualization of highly perimeter-oriented scoring style. When 63% of your halfcourt twos come from the PnR and half of your shots are threes, you are not in a position to offensively rebound, nor are you in optimal position to draw fouls. It should also be noted that 15% DREB is far more compelling.

Still, as I will note a multitude of times in this piece, Egor’s softness is concerning. His putrid offensive rebounding may be the single biggest road block to his reaching higher outcomes. 0.7% OREB vs top 100 teams is awful, and even 3PR-maxxed PGs like LaMelo and Kasparas were o-rebounding far better. Decent rebounding priors, elite size, and reasonable blocks/defensive rebounding give Egor some outs to neutralizing his functional timidness.

So will Egor’s shooting improve?

This is the million-dollar question. Sure, Egor’s high volume three point inaccuracy tanked his 3P%, BPM, and TS% to a significant extent, but my point is asymmetry: that strong three point accuracy is going to skyrocket these metrics. How likely is this?

Well, three point volume is a helluva indicator, and Egor had a massive 50 3PR. I don’t find it instructive to call Egor a non-shooter when he is legit taking half his shots from beyond the arc.

Unfortunately, the rest of his shooting indicators aren’t particularly encouraging.

Egor shot 69.5% from the line this year, which is okay. Coupling all his shooting samples together, he’s at 74% FT (260 attempts). Egor shot 27% 3P on 154 3PA at BYU. This is quite bad, but it’s notable that Egor took nearly as many C&S 3s as dribble jumper 3s, and he shot 24% on dribble jumper 3s, which are more prone to variance. This would typically be more encouraging had Egor not shot 30% on C&S 3s.

What’s more concerning is that Egor shot 31.5% 3P on 615 3PA across all samples.

This is a meaningful, multi-year sample of 3P badness. In theory, it’s more than enough attempts for Egor’s 3P% to have stabillized, which makes that 31% 3P look even more damning. If Egor shoots 31% from 3 across his NBA career, I cannot stress enough that his career will be replacement level at best.

The most intuitive refutation, however, is that 3P% cannot reasonably stabilize with a teenage sample. The sole utility of this giant sample is proving that Egor is a bad shooter right now. Shooting development is fickle and hard to understand, and some even view 3PR as the pre-emptive indicator of shooting upside. Contrary to my pre-draft estimation, Egor’s youth, size, and huge 3P tendency gives him a coinflip chance at worst to become a reasonably good shooter. This may seem low, but as I will outline later, this outcome would drastically change his NBA outlook.

The other two indicators of touch are FTs and runners. Egor’s 74% FT is uninteresting at first glance, but 74% FT in conjunction with his age/size/3PR strengthens his shooting outlook even more.

Runners were harder to come by. Egor rarely took runners (3.9% frequency), though he made them at a reasonable clip (0.83 points per shot is ~60th percentile). Prior to BYU, in 17 games with Real Madrid’s U18 team across two seasons, he made just one total runner. Egor’s runner infrequency is especially interesting for two reasons:

1. A gargantuan 44% of Egor’s scoring possessions came as PnR BH (98th percentile frequency). This playtype is especially conducive to runners (fairly intuitive).
2. BYU was one of the best teams in the country at taking (86th percentile) and making (92nd percentile) runners.

A low runner frequency is usually of slight concern for any ball-handler, but this was an offensive context plump for runner liberality. It is a serious red flag that he was unable to get to that runner, and even watching his few runners, it’s clear he’s not comfortable transitioning mid-dribble into the shot.

This lack of dynamic comfort is also seen in his lack of functional pullup two fluidity. Sure, he has a fairly fluid shot when OTD from 3. But he shot 6/22 on pullup 2s, and it’s clear that he favors pausing his dribble near the highpost and doing a turnaround into the pullup rather than fluidly pulling up.

Egor’s ineptitude in fluidly taking pullup twos with his lack of runner volume in a runner-conducive context is reasonable evidence for his touch discomfort in dynamic environments.

The last piece of data is secondary, but I’ve heard from quite a few sources that Egor shot pretty well during workouts. Again, this is anything but a dynamic ecosystem, but it’s a positive datapoint.

Overall, there’s reason to be cautiously optimistic, but there are many warts that diminish Egor’s shooting projection. It’s hard to tell how his shooting development will progress, but I am cautiously optimistic that legitimate strides will be made given his age and volume.

A Brief Note on Turnovers

This is more of a stylistic concern, but not all turnover-prone players should be billed as the same. Consider the following:

There is a clear discrepancy between the badness of Egor’s TO rate and the goodness of his A:TO. Egor was converting passes far more than he was committing TOs, while Kasparas Jakucionis had a slightly lower TO rate but far lower A:TO.

So while Kasparas, Fears, and Demin were all very turnover-prone, Demin was by far the most functionally turnover-avoidant.

We should also understand the issues with TO rate, which is estimated with the following formula:

TO%: 100 * TO / (FGA + 0.44 * FTA + TOV)

It’s basically estimating the share of a player’s scoring possessions that end in a TO.

By virtue of his three-point heavy shooting profile, Egor wasn’t getting to the line particularly much, nor was he scoring with volume inside the arc. This underestimates the value of the denominator here, as there are fewer than expected total possessions. At the same time, Egor’s relative timidness inside the arc is both a product of his pass-heavy nature and his lack of physicality and comfort getting downhill, especially without a screen. Ultimately, his shot diet likely inflated his TO rate to some degree.

While I understand the logic of the formula, Egor’s softness leaking into adjacent parts of his profile demonstrates the issue with taking metrics at face-value. We know that he rarely gets to the line, but his softness has artifically inflated his TO rate. This fits into my larger point that the downstream effects of Egor’s 3P heavy shooting profile are far-ranging and need to be more thoroughly considered.

So is it fair to call Egor “turnover-prone”? Perhaps, but the turnovers are largely a product of his super-high passing volume. His decision-making is fine, and there aren’t nearly as many head-scratching turnovers (or more generally, bad pass turnovers) in comparison to someone like his new teammate, Danny Wolf.

The number I care most about is 1.9 A:TO. As a raw ratio, A:TO is the strongest indication of scalability, and converting nearly two assists for every turnover bodes very well historically, particularly for size. The TO rate is not nearly as important. I am far more worried about Kasp or Wolf’s turnover issues, considering they convert far fewer assists per turnover.

Egor is an insane passer

This is probably the single most underrated and most publicized aspect of Egor’s game. He can really pass. The list of guys who can run PnRs and pass as proficiently as Egor historically is very, very low. The only 6’8+ player in Bart with even career 30% AST% and reasonable PnR BH scoring frequency is Scottie Barnes.

In my database of draft measurements, there has never been a prospect listed as a point guard that comes even close to Egor’s dimensions. Forget point guards, there has never been even a shooting guard that has matched Egor’s height in the history of the NBA Combine. This is the type of historical context that makes me uneasy fading Egor.

Another comparison I’ve seen is Josh Giddey. This one isn’t that bad. Let’s take some time to flesh it out.

Per RealGM, Giddey was at 36.3% AST, and Egor was at 35.3% AST. Giddey was 23.7% TO rate, and Egor was 21.9% TO rate. I’m not sure why RealGM has a lower TO rate than Barttorvik for Egor, but probably dissimilar formulas.

Giddey had a strong edge in rebounding, but Egor clears him in steals. Coincidentally, Egor (84/152, 55% 2P) and Giddey (84/165, 51% 2P) made the same number of twos in the same number of games, but Egor was more efficient.

The parallels don’t stop there. Giddey shot 29% from 3P, 69% FT, and 25.6 FTR. Egor was 27% 3P, 70% FT, and 26.8 FTR. It’s notable that Giddey had such a poor FTR considering his two-point scoring rate was far higher.

I’m not sure if the NBL is even better than the Big 12, and if so, it’s probably not worth sweating. Egor and Giddey both played ~900 minutes, so this is a fairly ethical comparison altogether (see: dunk volume).

Giddey’s rebounding is a large edge, and he was a more efficient passer. But Demin’s combination of wingspan and steal rate is a massive ceiling-raising edge, and he scores far more efficiently inside the arc with better 3PR. Demin offers a much higher ceiling, but Giddey’s floor is probably safer with his elite positional rebounding. These are at least similar caliber of prospects to me. I would prefer Demin, as Giddey’s 3PR+FTR strongly dampens his ceiling.

Giddey ranks 6th in the 2021 class in BPM at 1.3, but much of this is spurred by his career 7.5 rebounds/game. Demin doesn’t have this strength to fall back on, so he really needs to shoot to tap into his upside.

So many good names here. My absolute favorite integration is size x feel, and we approximate this with height/block/2P% to filter out the unphysical players, while A:TO / steal takes care of feel. If we raise the height filter to 6’8, we get:

Some may immediately point out BPM, but I urge them to use their brains: the box-score stats that are fed into BPM can be evaluated by our own eyes, and Demin is generally in the same ballpark as these guys. Still, Demin is the worst prospect here, given that he has by far the worst block and rebounding rates, but he grades fairly well outside of his softness.

The bottom-line is that Egor has legitimate ceiling-raising traits, which is important considering his age-adjusted production according to general impact metrics are poor on the surface.

Underrated Trait #1: Foul Avoidance

Egor’s reaction speed is pretty fire. I assume all readers are familiar with his spectacular passing, but even on defense, Egor has some impressive blocks.

This is a cool clip. Egor’s huge size forced the long initial inbounds pass, and his quick reaction speed helped him get the perimeter block. Despite not being in position to farm blocks, Egor racked up a solid 1.7% block rate.

What’s especially notable is his micro-foul rate.

As always, Egor comfortably cleared these thresholds. 1.7% block, 2.5% steal, 1.8 FC/40, and 6’9. No one has come close to Egor’s combination of stocks+foul avoidance at wing size.

This guy is 6’9 with a 6’10 WS and he can match up against guards. His stocks are solid. He’s at a very reasonable 0.3 blocks/foul. He has the height and instincts to guard up, and he did average ~ 3% BLK/20% DREB in ANGT. There’s enough evidence that if he ever gains enough mass to consistently guard NBA-caliber forwards, he could be a real demon defender. This defensive upside needs to be noted!

Even if we drop the height filter on this query, and throw on an A:TO filter to grab “guards”, it’s a fairly limited group of guys:

By integrating A:TO, steals, and foul rate, this is pretty much the ultimate “high feel” list. It’s just unfathomable that Egor is a whole 3 inches taller than the next closest player. Shai/Haliburton are two of the next three tallest players here. Funny how they find their way into a query yet again.

Remember at the beginning when I noted that “certain loci of traits are associated with differing rates of development”? I think I’ve formed an admissible case that Egor encompasses a particular loci of traits associated with strong feel, reaction time, and potentially, continued strong development.

A better way to explain this is by introducing my new evaluatory framework: outlier cognition per mass. I’ve really grown to value dudes with huge height, length, or weight that can react quickly and process the floor. I will likely write something about this in the future, but something like “cognition-mass index”. BMI, but for cognition. Unsurprisingly, Egor’s immensely feel and huge frame scores quite well within this paradigm.

Overall, beyond this philosophical commentary, my point is that Egor avoids fouls like a guard despite being wing-sized. While this indicates underrated switchable upside, I consider this more importantly a proxy for strong cognition. All signs point to Egor’s cognition-mass index being especially high. We should take note.

Underrated Trait #2: Luck-Adjusted Impact

This is short, but Egor’s offensive impact was strong despite being turnover prone with low true shooting. Here, we luck-adjust for 3P%, but 1.6% TO swing against baseline is notable. For reference, this is versus t200 opponents:

4.0 net rating against baseline is huge. Again, A-B is useful for comparing Egor versus his backups, but A – Baseline shows how much better the team was with Egor. He had a legit positive effect on offense, and if he trims the turnovers/makes 3s at a higher rate, his offensive impact will only increase.

Real On/Off and RAPM tell a similar story. It’s clear that Egor’s TO tendencies are mitigated on a team-wide level, given his strong assist volume, and he had a strong effect on an already good BYU offense.

It’s also interesting how Egor coincided with a drop in 2P rim%, even with real on-off (which adjusts for teammates), but I didn’t pick up on anything when watching. This is something to sorta keep an eye on in the league.

Overall, this is to say that Egor had an inflationary effect on BYU’s offense even with his current warts. This is a good sign indeed, as he has much room to grow as a ball-handler.

A Cause for Concern

To me, the biggest cause for concern is Egor’s athletic profile. He’s not particularly quick (11.31 lane agility + 3.33 sprint), and he is a straight up bad vertical athlete (awful 26.5 inch standing vert + 32.5 max vert). Coupled with his skinny frame, he has the quintessential bust athletic profile: the low BMI bad athlete.

The low BMI, bad athlete is a devastating, ceiling dropping archetype. See for yourself:

Egor falls comfortably within these thresholds. We can see this softness reflected in his oreb, FTR, and perhaps even in his lack of runner volume. This is concerning, and he will need significant mass gains.

Two reasons why this isn’t as much cause for concern:

1. This anthropometric sample is pretty incomplete and is skewed towards less heralded prospects. For many years prior to 2024, prospects who accrued significant draft capital did not participate in combine testing.
   • For instance, we don’t have Giddey’s testing but he’d probably be somewhere here (BMI probably hits a tad above 23 but still).
2. If Egor can accumulate minutes at the 1 or 2, his large size advantage will be more than enough to overcome BMI issues. In other words, positional size will deter disadvantages conferred by his BMI.

He’s also clearly cognizant of all this:

The Elephant in the Room: Positionality

What position does Egor play in the league?

Obviously, Egor could play as a guard. It’s probably not worth discussing too much since he primarily played the 1 at BYU. Egor would need to cut down on TOs and shoot, but it’s a fairly straightforward outcome.

I have seen concern about Egor’s guard viability, on the premise that Egor cannot get downhill without a screen. He’s definitely not the most imposing athlete, but:

1. I question the independent value of getting downhill without a screen in such a PnR centric league.
2. Damn near most of his offense either came out of the PnR or spotting up from 3. Are we sure that scoring out of PnR on a PnR-heavy team means that he is reliant on a screen? Causation seems strong.

However, Egor does not need to play the 1/2 to provide meaningful value. He could be a really good wing.

It goes without saying that Egor needs to make 3s at a far higher clip than he did this season. If Egor cannot make open C&S threes at a reasonable frequency, it is likely over. He needs legit shooting development, and we’re betting a lot on 50 3PR to clutch up as a shooting indicator.

If Egor can make 3s at a reasonable frequency, then he offers real positional versatility. The second coin toss is physicality: Egor needs to bulk up a bit and guard wings with consistency.

And, if Egor can make 3s AND guard wings, he offers basically no lineup friction. You can fit him into so many lineups.

My working theory is that cognitive load per position is rising league-wide, so having someone like Egor may end up more of a necessity in a decade. Even with the current league in mind, Egor would have a huge cognitive advantage at the 3 (the 3 probably has the lowest cognitive load by position), a large size and cognitive advantage at the 2, and an overwhelming size advantage at the 1; this would give him pretty strong staying power.

To be clear, this sort of frictionless upside would only come if he’s able to make 3s AND guard wings.

Conclusion

So, how likely is Frictionless Egor?

Based off the evidence I’ve provided, I would equate the probabilities of making 3s and guarding wings (at reasonable frequency) to ~ 60% each. So, by my shoddy odds, there’s a ~ 36% chance at this frictionless utopia, which is easy for me to swallow and rank top 20 at the absolute worst.

The odds of either 3s or guarding wings coming around is 84%, which is nice. That being said, there’s 40% chance that shooting does not come around, which would be pretty disastrous.

There’s also the point that the shooting thresholds for guards are much higher than for wings, as there is legit off-the-dribble necessity. So the odds of him playing as a guard are probably somewhere near 50%, if not closer to 36%.

Here’s the takeaway: Egor is a pretty high variance player. I’ve called other players in this class high variance but I honestly think that title should go to Egor. He could reasonably be out of the league by the end of his rookie contract. Egor needs to shoot, and he needs to shoot at high volume. And he needs to rely on skill and weight gain to overcome the poor BMI x athlete tag.

Previously, I was over-indexing on Egor’s strong downside. There are quite a few ways this could go badly. But I didn’t fully consider the uniqueness of Egor’s game. He has some (dare I say) generational strengths that I’ve demonstrated with some pretty generous Bart query thresholds. The league is built on outliers, and I do not feel comfortable ranking a fairly well-rounded freshman with huge strengths outside the top 20.

That being said, I sympathize with Nets fans and their front office, as they have invested significant draft capital into a guy who could be pretty bad. I would personally have been more risk-averse with this selection, but the upside is high enough for it to be reasonable. This is not a particularly popular take on Draft Twitter, but Egor’s positional versatility is that compelling.

Also, this is a half-serious point but if a conglomerate like Draft Twitter is so opposed to a single player/concept, then it is probably a good idea to zag a bit to account for the effects of overconfidence bias and consensus bias.

Moreover, one should be wary of a massive delta between perception and draft capital barring a catastrophic pick by “unwell”-intentioned front offices (i.e., anything the Raiders did in the last quarter century, or Nico selecting OMP). I do not believe the Nets to be in this tier of franchise ineptitude. That’s not to say that we should become mock draft warriors, but it’s a sensible sanity check for select prospects. The draft is a tad bit more of a crapshoot than we’d like to believe.

Ultimately, so many of the warts Draft Twitter has ascribed to Egor are by virtue of his 3P bricklaying. He has real red flags, and his floor is far lower than I’d usually be comfortable selecting in the top 10. But Egor is tall and smart, he can accumulate 3s and stocks without fouling, and he can efficiently self-create inside the arc. He passes like very few we’ve seen with his size. He managed to raise the offensive ceiling for a dominant BYU offense. The upside is hard to ignore with Egor, and his unorthodoxy is riveting.

He just needs to make those damn threes.

The post The Case for Egor Demin appeared first on Swish Theory.

Finding commonalities in this group of stars is almost a trick question, as there are myriad reasons why a player may be ranked lower out of high school than is reflective of their long term abilities. However, there is something counterintuitive in these players not just thriving, but specifically as primaries or high-end secondaries. These players are able to shoulder major burdens on offense through combinations of technical prowess and unique athletic profiles, not a secret formula to anyone but important in its ubiquity across programs.

Searching for mid-major primary/secondary bets in 2023 needs to take into account how more likely high usage mid major players are to transfer up to high major given increased transfer portal and NIL incentives. We have in our sights for the 2024 draft two such prospects who will be leaving the Summit League and Conference USA to join the ACC and WCC (technically dubbed mid major still, but with hardly a competition gap to the ACC).

Andrew Rohde has not yet turned 20 and will be transferring to the University of Virginia after helping to lead St. Thomas to a top 200 finish in only its second ever Division I season. The rising sophomore will form a lethal backcourt with Reece Beekman.

Aly Khalifa is older, 21 and finishing his second playing season with the Charlotte 49ers after redshirting there. He will be transferring to Brigham Young University to play center next to Fousseyni Traore.

Both of these players have the primary stuff, it’s just a matter of the game forming around them and refining their athletic tools to unleash the special. Here’s how they do it, and what could get in their way.

Andrew Rohde – Primary Stuff

Rohde is an escape artist with elite touch, shifting with his 6’6’’ frame from attacking to pulling up or kicking out in an instant. Aesthetically, he checks the boxes, a whirlwind of instantaneous playmaking when he’s on, always hunting for ways to heat up.

Checking the boxes for a primary prospect works a little differently. Rather than the toolsy route, these technicians nurture a fluid creativity balanced against constant opportunism. Essentially, primaries need access to a nexus point where they can go from advantage created to advantage capitalized. They need to switch from creating the seam to filling it without the opponent adjusting. The rarity is in the process of climbing that ladder.

To be more literal, primaries have to both get by their opponent and have the skill to make the bucket or right pass, and awareness to know the difference. But most of all, they need to be comfortable repeating their particular brand of advantage over and over. That’s why it has to look easy.

For Rohde, it does not always look easy, at least not yet. But we see forming the outline of that nexus, and when it hits, it’s not just good but great.

The first way Rohde creates advantages is his shiftiness. The first step is good if not great for 6’6” height, and last step can flail with poor planting. We should mention, finally, that Andrew Rohde is very skinny. Listed at 160 pounds, Will Barton could likely outlift the former Tommy, current Hoo. But he is vigilant nonetheless pursuing routes to shake his opponent, and willing to mask his drive against opponents’ cadence before changing the pattern entirely, whether in iso or using screens. When he commits to a move, it typically works.

This ability is also supported by a good core stance in drives, the kind that gives him All-Star upside (yes, you read that right). Despite his slight build, Rohde squares his body as if he wasn’t. He attacks with sharp angles into the body of his opponent, often followed by fadeaways in the paint. He shot 41% on midrange jumpers with only 8% assisted, a number that showcases his physicality sprung out of will and technique.

His strong technique also allows Rohde to shoot with ease from distance. Skinnier guards often struggle with movement shooting with even a smidge of inefficiency in their form, but Rohde can fire from NBA range off of movement without a second’s hesitation. This higher difficulty of shot and, well, the fact that he could indeed benefit from more core strength, led to inconsistent results. But Rohde seemed to figure it out as his endurance grew, shooting 41% from deep from mid-January to end of season. The touch is very good, shooting 62% at the rim with only 19% of makes assisted as well as 81% from the free throw line.

Finally, Rohde is a creative passer, if not a perfect one. His ideas are good, particularly aware of how his drive gravity creates lanes for others. Often he can be seen predicting which help defender will pinch in, kicking to a shooter just as the opponent commits. The limitation here is again lack of strength, as Rohde may plant his feet fuzzily which leads to passing inaccuracy. As the strength improves, expect the assist numbers to as well.

Rohde will be particularly devastating running pick and roll. His sense of timing is sublime, again urged by his urgency, a player you can count on to sniff out an opponent’s weak point. The vision lacks a bit here and there, as he may miss unexpectedly open opponents in favor of predetermined reads, but overall excellent for his age.

The biggest question with primary bets is not just can their defense hold up, but can it in a way that harvests energy for their offensive usage. Rohde, to his credit, is interested in more than that, constantly seeking out ways to strip or tip the ball away from unsuspecting opponents. You almost forget he is closer to 150 than 200 pounds based on his activity, though reminded when he comes head to head with a stronger opponent in the interior.

My biggest confidence in Rohde’s physicality holding up as intensity grows is due to his approach to the game. As a freshman carrying 28% usage, it would be understandable if he caught his breath on the defensive end. Rather, Rohde sported a 3% steal rate, with no other freshman matching that combination of thresholds (Duke’s Kyle Filipowski and Syracuse’s Judah Mintz were the closest). His 11% defensive rebound rate is respectable, speaking to his sense of timing. He tries hard when screened, setting himself up well by taking the same sharp angles that define his driving game on offense.

Aly Khalifa – Primary Stuff

Moving from guard to center, the aesthetics remain elite with the 6’11’’ Khalifa. Perhaps the best passer in all of college basketball, Aly also shot 38% on 126 threes. He is big skill personified, with lack of buzz coming from older age at 21 and also his history of being above optimal playing weight.

A major prospect from a young age, Aly Khalifa was part of Egypt’s U-17 squad and trained with the NBA Academy, playing next to Josh Giddey, Dyson Daniels, Bennedict Mathurin, Olivier Maxence-Prosper and others on the prestigious team selected to compete against top European youth talent (they won the tournament, with Khalifa as a significant contributor). Never considered mobile, Khalifa peaked in weight at a listed 255 pounds at Charlotte, clearly not the best version of his playing self as a freshman post hia redshirt season. He slimmed down some for his second playing season, still not in ideal shape but now dominant on the court regardless.

Uncertainty can be your friend in basketball. Specifically, it can be beneficial to have access to a wide range of outcomes that others don’t, and sometimes it requires leaning into the uncertainty to benefit. While he is still figuring out his optimal basketball build, Aly is already one of the best players in college basketball. Should he continue to advance his physical regimen, it’s difficult to say what the upside is, and why, like Rohde, an All-Star level offensive game is not entirely off the table (yes, you also read that right).

Returning to our analysis of his game and specifically as a potential primary, Aly Khalifa creates space simply by being on the money with his decision-making and advanced with his skills. The passing is the most obvious, with a 22% assist rate, 1.7 assist-to-turnover ratio.

I have confidence saying Khalifa is the best at hitting cutters in the entire NCAA, and perhaps its best overall passer since Sharife Cooper. His passing ability is mediated by lack of dribble drive ability, but Aly hardly needs to manipulate his college opponents considering his passing accuracy, timing and general decision-making.

But Khalifa has a developed scoring repertoire, too. He shot 48 for 126 (38%) from three, 24 for 61 (39%) from midrange, 88 for 125 at the rim (70%) and 32 for 43 (74%) from the line, all indicators of a very good shooter, particularly for his height. Those numbers pop even more considering over half of his rim makes and over 90% of his midrange field goals were self-created, meaning a high degree of difficulty to showcase his touch.

Particularly impressive is his technique, executing flawless no-load threes (where he does not need to bring the ball down below his shoulders) and blind hook shots over his head. With only one dunk on the season despite being 6’11’’, Khalifa had to use every ounce of touch and craftiness to get his points.

His scoring consistency could have been better, as he often settled outside the paint as the team’s best table setter, preferring to stretch the offense with his shooting gravity where he can find streaming cutters. He also has an allergy to drawing fouls, which we’ll get to later. But as far as play finishing technique, Khalifa is clearly studied. No better game showcased this than against Western Kentucky, matched up with the 7’5’’ shotblocking fiend Jamarion Sharpe. Khalifa got up a total 14 attempts from three, connecting on six of them, particularly heating up down the stretch. He showed not just clean catch and shoot ability, but also hit off of some movement or awkward angles, always able to stabilize with his supreme balance and technique.

Essential to both the scoring and passing working though, is Khalifa’s exceptional screening. Here I’ll leave you with one clip to exemplify how he approaches screening. Aly takes out first his man, locking him up momentarily and also misleading his intention. Immediately after, Khalifa instead switches to screening the ball handler’s man, now slowing both parts of the pick and roll to allow his teammate to waltz to the hoop. Khalifa consistently uses his full shoulder when setting screens without fouling, a true art in itself.

Khalifa’s strengths point to his dedication to his craft, but also compensatory necessities to overcome his athletic deficiencies. Reading the above strengths paints a Jokic-esque picture, but Khalifa, while a good handler for his size, does not have the preternatural probing ability off the bounce of his spiritual protégé. Much like Rohde he struggles to draw fouls, but the tools are there to potentially do that as well.

Khalifa’s defense has a better bedrock for stability right now, simply by virtue of Aly being the size he is. He moves well when already moving, but would be around worst in the NBA for abruptly changing direction or accelerating. He can buy good will and keep a scheme together, though, through his above average activity and awareness.

Are They Athletic Enough?

I have little doubt buying the skillsets of both Rohde and Khalifa at face value, convincing in their offensive firepower as prospects. But to even approach primary or secondary usage you need to be able to enforce your will to set up what you want when you want, or at least be ready to take advantage of what the defense allows.

Between them they totaled 11 dunks on the season, and 10 of those were by the guard, Andrew Rohde. Rohde has the length and shiftiness to get rim opportunities, selective but still ready to take advantage. Rohde, in fact, plays with a good bit of physicality considering his low BMI. The free throw rate is not high, but it is not through lack of trying, and with Rohde’s ability to create space with change of direction, not as necessary to perform at a high level.

Rohde needs to add weight, but his strong sense of technique points to a player ready to maximize whatever is added. He has a decently wide frame, although more sharp than rounded shoulders means he will more often be a cut-into-opponent player than bullying with strength. He already has the core strength to shoot from distance, and that additional weight will only help to stabilize the shot and perhaps add consistency.

The key area for Rohde is the paint. He is studied from the school of Jalen Brunson, with a proclivity for attempting to stop abruptly and pivot once two feet in the lane. Despite the sound strategy, this is probably the weakest current part of his skillset, as his lack of core strength means difficulty planting his feet to pivot cleanly. This led to unnecessary turnovers, but also occasional sloppy passing as he tries to regain his footing.

I’m most optimistic about Rohde as an athlete due to his screen navigation. Understanding his own limitations and strengths, Rohde anticipates screens by ducking sharply to the side, with good acceleration to catch up to his man. That understanding shows a player highly aware of how to weaponize what he has, encouraging that he will figure out how to incorporate weight gains in a similar manner.

Aly Khalifa, meanwhile, comes from the other end of the spectrum, playing above optimal weight but on the right trajectory from his freshman season. We have tape of him playing closer to his ideal weight with FIBA and NBA Academy, but still have yet to see his best physique.

On the offensive end, it is difficult to say how much athletic gains will help Khalifa’s odds as an initiator/playmaker. He has learned to succeed while relatively stationary with the ball, ultra-intentional with his decisions. The biggest item he currently lacks is ability to generate quick paint touches, with complete lack of acceleration nor the meandering dribble of a Jokic. That outcome – being so deft with your handle to protect it from much shorter defenders swiping – is unrealistic for anyone 6’11’’.

But the main item that can improve is his interior foul drawing. The pieces seem to be in place here: Khalifa is adept when he decides to post with intention of scoring, bumping shoulders right when his defender is off balance. However his inability to dunk with ease (only 1 the entire season) means he prefers to release contested hooks rather than build his repertoire out of physicality. Khalifa has the craftiness of a grifter, but that has been far from his modus operandi for bucket-getting thus far.

Should he add a modicum of burst, Aly might be able to take advantage of small space advantages better than he does now. But his foundation of scoring is so polished in favor of avoiding these confrontations as a trade-off. Here again we remind that his touch indicators are quite strong, shooting 70% at the rim despite only a single dunk.

The Impact of a Timely Transfer

Finally, both players will be receiving a boost from joining larger programs, both on an off the court. On the court, both players get better front/backcourt mates, with Khalifa likely to start next to the screen and dive big, more mobile Fousseyni Traore. At UVA, Rohde should start next to Reece Beekman, one of the best defenders in college basketball who has improved mightily as a table setter. Both duos are synergistic by type, with Traore and Beekman more physical and mobile than their new offensively talented teammates.

The team playing styles are encouraging as well. BYU loves to have their bigs operate outside the paint, making decisions; UVA keeps things simple for their guards, likely to be fully encouraging of Rohde to maximize his strengths (expect a ton of threes). But not having to worry about the tougher defensive assignments with more defensive-minded teammates should make the leap in competition more than tolerable.

Off the court, the athletic department budgets balloon from comparable measures with these prospects’ incumbent schools. Going from Charlotte to BYU means about double the program budget surrounding Khalifa, while Rohde gets a much more dramatic 20x increase from the newly D1 St. Thomas to the former champion University of Virginia. There is not a 1:1 correlation in athletic gains by university budget, but for players needing more attention to physical development, it can only help, and perhaps drastically.

Conclusion

Looking at our player diagrams (dark gray = current trajectory, light gray = potential), we see the skillsets of likely NBA role players with All-Star potential on offense and starter ceilings on defense. That might be a tough pill to swallow for players you may not have known about before starting this article. But both have impressive pre-NCAA pedigrees – Khalifa with FIBA and NBA Academy, Rohde as ultra-productive HS player and good at EYBL – and shown rare combinations of production, playmaking and shotmaking. And we have not seen either’s optimal physique, with gains available for their driving and foul-drawing. Both are already quite coordinated; additional core strength could make them both three point and midrange shooting monsters, potentially capable of large offensive burdens at any level.

When aesthetics meets production, I pay attention. That’s first and foremost what we have here, as both players simply look the part when they’re launching threes or finding teammates at the perfect time. But the accumulation of tools is convincing as well, and neither of these two is wired to be done. Look for an entire new bag of tricks from both this coming season.

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