They’re not entirely wrong. It’s impossible to be a complete developmental determinist given the confluence of factors related to both the drafting team and the mental makeup of the player. These are intuitively important but difficult to decipher without being involved in the draft process with a team.

But what’s frustrating is that “crapshoot” canonically implies utter randomness, as if the entire evaluative and developmental process is entirely unpredictable. It ignores that certain loci of traits are associated with differing rates of development, a principle that forms the basis of my current draft research.

Moreover, even if we know that college production does not exactly scale to pro production, there’s a mountain-load of evidence that suggests stronger age-adjusted production yields better professional results.

This makes the Egor case seemingly open and shut.

At first glance, this is an unmitigated disaster. Egor had a sorta defensible 4.7 BPM… but he was infamously stat-padding against inferior competition. 26 of his 33 games came against top-100 opponents, and in these games, he had a disastrous 1.8 BPM. Against these opponents, he could not score (46.6% TS), he could not rebound (0.7% OREB), and he could not secure the ball (25.2% TO). Re-read those stats. 46% TS and 25% TO is just preposterous. His role is listed here as “scoring PG”, yet it seems that he cannot efficiently score or prevent turnovers?

It’s fair to ask what Egor can reliably do on offense when he isn’t playing shitty teams. Nothing indicates that he can be productive in the NBA.

My initial view on Egor

Full transparency: I ranked Egor 31st on my board. Many analytically-inclined individuals had him far lower. 1.8 BPM vs t100 without scoring upside or outlier athleticism should be a death knell.

Many have lambasted the Nets’ draft, calling it the worst of all time. To me, the bigger issue is accumulating five first-round picks in a single draft: it implicitly punts the value of these picks as they are all competing for the same scant playing time/resources. Even more concerning is that all five of the selected players are fairly low-floor. A few of them will likely bust pretty hard.

Still, it’s nice that there was a coherent vision of accumulating smart, tall guys with reasonable feel. Even if it seemed like they just multiplied height and assist rate, and then took the first 4 guys they saw. While the players they selected were not particularly inspiring, Sam Presti has consistently demonstrated that this size x passing formula has high reward (and also high risk).

Based on some recent conversations and philosophical changes spurred by my year-round historical research, I believe that the incongruence between Egor’s draft capital and my estimated draft capital projection was too large. To be clear, this belief has little to do with his tepid Summer League production, though there were some reasons for cautious optimism. While I still believe the Nets reached to some degree on Egor, and that he has many red flags, I now view him as a strong mid-first option, pumping him up a dozen or so spots on my board.

Here’s why.

The Problem with BPM

Beyond his TO issues, Egor has a terrible BPM, terrible TS%, and terrible 3P%. Altogether, it led to atrocities like the following:

Are these three separate issues? Not quite.

The most underrated part of his profile: Egor’s 3P misery collapsed the rest of his statistical profile.

Egor took tons of 3s. Half his shots came from 3. And yes, he shot an absurdly bad 27.3% from 3. But he was completely fine inside the arc.

This is a legitimately great scoring profile inside the arc. Not only was Egor doing it with over 80% of his two point scoring being un-assisted (anything over 60% un-assisted is notable to me), but he shot 55% on twos. While Egor has picked up a label as a “comp dropper”, his inside-the-arc percentages vs top 100 teams (52.5%) and top 50 teams (55.0%) were perfectly reasonable. Egor was self-creating a huge proportion of his two point makes and converted them at a fairly good rate.

Sure, the vast majority of this scoring came in the PnR with the help of a screen, 150 total 2P attempts is on the lower side, and he has less than optimal burst off the dribble. These are all important considerations, and it would be unwise to treat Egor as a future inside-the-arc scoring maestro. But the fact of the matter is that he was highly efficient without a strong assisted shooting profile, and considering his transition woes, this production almost entirely came in the half-court. There comes a point where efficient HC shotmaking on a strongly unassisted shooting profile must be respected.

And yet, despite his strong inside-the-arc efficiency… Egor shot 46.6% true shooting versus top 100 teams. This is what happens when you shoot 27% from three and those shots make up half your shooting profile. 3P bricklaying should not be excused completely, but we cannot simultaneously champion a high 3PR shot profile and demonize high 3PR shooting profiles with less success.

Egor is a great inside-the-arc scorer, and while he takes many 3s, he fails to convert them at a high rate. This should be the Egor scoring evaluation, rather than taking on overlapping metrics at face value.

Egor shot 22% from 3 and took over half his shots from three vs top 100 comp; it’s immensely obvious that his TS% and BPM were going to tank. BPM is famously prone to react strongly to small sample three point shotmaking. The high volume three point misses strongly diluted his 3P%, TS%, and BPM.

This dilution even applies to offensive rebounding, though to a lesser degree. There is a known and strongly intuitive negative relationship between offensive rebounding and 3PR. When you are hanging out on the perimeter, you will be less likely to be in the proper position to secure offensive rebounds. See: known super-athlete Anthony Edwards and his preposterously low 2% OREB.

So while it’s fair to point out Egor’s relative “softness” via OREB and FTR, it must be done with the contextualization of highly perimeter-oriented scoring style. When 63% of your halfcourt twos come from the PnR and half of your shots are threes, you are not in a position to offensively rebound, nor are you in optimal position to draw fouls. It should also be noted that 15% DREB is far more compelling.

Still, as I will note a multitude of times in this piece, Egor’s softness is concerning. His putrid offensive rebounding may be the single biggest road block to his reaching higher outcomes. 0.7% OREB vs top 100 teams is awful, and even 3PR-maxxed PGs like LaMelo and Kasparas were o-rebounding far better. Decent rebounding priors, elite size, and reasonable blocks/defensive rebounding give Egor some outs to neutralizing his functional timidness.

So will Egor’s shooting improve?

This is the million-dollar question. Sure, Egor’s high volume three point inaccuracy tanked his 3P%, BPM, and TS% to a significant extent, but my point is asymmetry: that strong three point accuracy is going to skyrocket these metrics. How likely is this?

Well, three point volume is a helluva indicator, and Egor had a massive 50 3PR. I don’t find it instructive to call Egor a non-shooter when he is legit taking half his shots from beyond the arc.

Unfortunately, the rest of his shooting indicators aren’t particularly encouraging.

Egor shot 69.5% from the line this year, which is okay. Coupling all his shooting samples together, he’s at 74% FT (260 attempts). Egor shot 27% 3P on 154 3PA at BYU. This is quite bad, but it’s notable that Egor took nearly as many C&S 3s as dribble jumper 3s, and he shot 24% on dribble jumper 3s, which are more prone to variance. This would typically be more encouraging had Egor not shot 30% on C&S 3s.

What’s more concerning is that Egor shot 31.5% 3P on 615 3PA across all samples.

This is a meaningful, multi-year sample of 3P badness. In theory, it’s more than enough attempts for Egor’s 3P% to have stabillized, which makes that 31% 3P look even more damning. If Egor shoots 31% from 3 across his NBA career, I cannot stress enough that his career will be replacement level at best.

The most intuitive refutation, however, is that 3P% cannot reasonably stabilize with a teenage sample. The sole utility of this giant sample is proving that Egor is a bad shooter right now. Shooting development is fickle and hard to understand, and some even view 3PR as the pre-emptive indicator of shooting upside. Contrary to my pre-draft estimation, Egor’s youth, size, and huge 3P tendency gives him a coinflip chance at worst to become a reasonably good shooter. This may seem low, but as I will outline later, this outcome would drastically change his NBA outlook.

The other two indicators of touch are FTs and runners. Egor’s 74% FT is uninteresting at first glance, but 74% FT in conjunction with his age/size/3PR strengthens his shooting outlook even more.

Runners were harder to come by. Egor rarely took runners (3.9% frequency), though he made them at a reasonable clip (0.83 points per shot is ~60th percentile). Prior to BYU, in 17 games with Real Madrid’s U18 team across two seasons, he made just one total runner. Egor’s runner infrequency is especially interesting for two reasons:

1. A gargantuan 44% of Egor’s scoring possessions came as PnR BH (98th percentile frequency). This playtype is especially conducive to runners (fairly intuitive).
2. BYU was one of the best teams in the country at taking (86th percentile) and making (92nd percentile) runners.

A low runner frequency is usually of slight concern for any ball-handler, but this was an offensive context plump for runner liberality. It is a serious red flag that he was unable to get to that runner, and even watching his few runners, it’s clear he’s not comfortable transitioning mid-dribble into the shot.

This lack of dynamic comfort is also seen in his lack of functional pullup two fluidity. Sure, he has a fairly fluid shot when OTD from 3. But he shot 6/22 on pullup 2s, and it’s clear that he favors pausing his dribble near the highpost and doing a turnaround into the pullup rather than fluidly pulling up.

Egor’s ineptitude in fluidly taking pullup twos with his lack of runner volume in a runner-conducive context is reasonable evidence for his touch discomfort in dynamic environments.

The last piece of data is secondary, but I’ve heard from quite a few sources that Egor shot pretty well during workouts. Again, this is anything but a dynamic ecosystem, but it’s a positive datapoint.

Overall, there’s reason to be cautiously optimistic, but there are many warts that diminish Egor’s shooting projection. It’s hard to tell how his shooting development will progress, but I am cautiously optimistic that legitimate strides will be made given his age and volume.

A Brief Note on Turnovers

This is more of a stylistic concern, but not all turnover-prone players should be billed as the same. Consider the following:

There is a clear discrepancy between the badness of Egor’s TO rate and the goodness of his A:TO. Egor was converting passes far more than he was committing TOs, while Kasparas Jakucionis had a slightly lower TO rate but far lower A:TO.

So while Kasparas, Fears, and Demin were all very turnover-prone, Demin was by far the most functionally turnover-avoidant.

We should also understand the issues with TO rate, which is estimated with the following formula:

TO%: 100 * TO / (FGA + 0.44 * FTA + TOV)

It’s basically estimating the share of a player’s scoring possessions that end in a TO.

By virtue of his three-point heavy shooting profile, Egor wasn’t getting to the line particularly much, nor was he scoring with volume inside the arc. This underestimates the value of the denominator here, as there are fewer than expected total possessions. At the same time, Egor’s relative timidness inside the arc is both a product of his pass-heavy nature and his lack of physicality and comfort getting downhill, especially without a screen. Ultimately, his shot diet likely inflated his TO rate to some degree.

While I understand the logic of the formula, Egor’s softness leaking into adjacent parts of his profile demonstrates the issue with taking metrics at face-value. We know that he rarely gets to the line, but his softness has artifically inflated his TO rate. This fits into my larger point that the downstream effects of Egor’s 3P heavy shooting profile are far-ranging and need to be more thoroughly considered.

So is it fair to call Egor “turnover-prone”? Perhaps, but the turnovers are largely a product of his super-high passing volume. His decision-making is fine, and there aren’t nearly as many head-scratching turnovers (or more generally, bad pass turnovers) in comparison to someone like his new teammate, Danny Wolf.

The number I care most about is 1.9 A:TO. As a raw ratio, A:TO is the strongest indication of scalability, and converting nearly two assists for every turnover bodes very well historically, particularly for size. The TO rate is not nearly as important. I am far more worried about Kasp or Wolf’s turnover issues, considering they convert far fewer assists per turnover.

Egor is an insane passer

This is probably the single most underrated and most publicized aspect of Egor’s game. He can really pass. The list of guys who can run PnRs and pass as proficiently as Egor historically is very, very low. The only 6’8+ player in Bart with even career 30% AST% and reasonable PnR BH scoring frequency is Scottie Barnes.

In my database of draft measurements, there has never been a prospect listed as a point guard that comes even close to Egor’s dimensions. Forget point guards, there has never been even a shooting guard that has matched Egor’s height in the history of the NBA Combine. This is the type of historical context that makes me uneasy fading Egor.

Another comparison I’ve seen is Josh Giddey. This one isn’t that bad. Let’s take some time to flesh it out.

Per RealGM, Giddey was at 36.3% AST, and Egor was at 35.3% AST. Giddey was 23.7% TO rate, and Egor was 21.9% TO rate. I’m not sure why RealGM has a lower TO rate than Barttorvik for Egor, but probably dissimilar formulas.

Giddey had a strong edge in rebounding, but Egor clears him in steals. Coincidentally, Egor (84/152, 55% 2P) and Giddey (84/165, 51% 2P) made the same number of twos in the same number of games, but Egor was more efficient.

The parallels don’t stop there. Giddey shot 29% from 3P, 69% FT, and 25.6 FTR. Egor was 27% 3P, 70% FT, and 26.8 FTR. It’s notable that Giddey had such a poor FTR considering his two-point scoring rate was far higher.

I’m not sure if the NBL is even better than the Big 12, and if so, it’s probably not worth sweating. Egor and Giddey both played ~900 minutes, so this is a fairly ethical comparison altogether (see: dunk volume).

Giddey’s rebounding is a large edge, and he was a more efficient passer. But Demin’s combination of wingspan and steal rate is a massive ceiling-raising edge, and he scores far more efficiently inside the arc with better 3PR. Demin offers a much higher ceiling, but Giddey’s floor is probably safer with his elite positional rebounding. These are at least similar caliber of prospects to me. I would prefer Demin, as Giddey’s 3PR+FTR strongly dampens his ceiling.

Giddey ranks 6th in the 2021 class in BPM at 1.3, but much of this is spurred by his career 7.5 rebounds/game. Demin doesn’t have this strength to fall back on, so he really needs to shoot to tap into his upside.

So many good names here. My absolute favorite integration is size x feel, and we approximate this with height/block/2P% to filter out the unphysical players, while A:TO / steal takes care of feel. If we raise the height filter to 6’8, we get:

Some may immediately point out BPM, but I urge them to use their brains: the box-score stats that are fed into BPM can be evaluated by our own eyes, and Demin is generally in the same ballpark as these guys. Still, Demin is the worst prospect here, given that he has by far the worst block and rebounding rates, but he grades fairly well outside of his softness.

The bottom-line is that Egor has legitimate ceiling-raising traits, which is important considering his age-adjusted production according to general impact metrics are poor on the surface.

Underrated Trait #1: Foul Avoidance

Egor’s reaction speed is pretty fire. I assume all readers are familiar with his spectacular passing, but even on defense, Egor has some impressive blocks.

This is a cool clip. Egor’s huge size forced the long initial inbounds pass, and his quick reaction speed helped him get the perimeter block. Despite not being in position to farm blocks, Egor racked up a solid 1.7% block rate.

What’s especially notable is his micro-foul rate.

As always, Egor comfortably cleared these thresholds. 1.7% block, 2.5% steal, 1.8 FC/40, and 6’9. No one has come close to Egor’s combination of stocks+foul avoidance at wing size.

This guy is 6’9 with a 6’10 WS and he can match up against guards. His stocks are solid. He’s at a very reasonable 0.3 blocks/foul. He has the height and instincts to guard up, and he did average ~ 3% BLK/20% DREB in ANGT. There’s enough evidence that if he ever gains enough mass to consistently guard NBA-caliber forwards, he could be a real demon defender. This defensive upside needs to be noted!

Even if we drop the height filter on this query, and throw on an A:TO filter to grab “guards”, it’s a fairly limited group of guys:

By integrating A:TO, steals, and foul rate, this is pretty much the ultimate “high feel” list. It’s just unfathomable that Egor is a whole 3 inches taller than the next closest player. Shai/Haliburton are two of the next three tallest players here. Funny how they find their way into a query yet again.

Remember at the beginning when I noted that “certain loci of traits are associated with differing rates of development”? I think I’ve formed an admissible case that Egor encompasses a particular loci of traits associated with strong feel, reaction time, and potentially, continued strong development.

A better way to explain this is by introducing my new evaluatory framework: outlier cognition per mass. I’ve really grown to value dudes with huge height, length, or weight that can react quickly and process the floor. I will likely write something about this in the future, but something like “cognition-mass index”. BMI, but for cognition. Unsurprisingly, Egor’s immensely feel and huge frame scores quite well within this paradigm.

Overall, beyond this philosophical commentary, my point is that Egor avoids fouls like a guard despite being wing-sized. While this indicates underrated switchable upside, I consider this more importantly a proxy for strong cognition. All signs point to Egor’s cognition-mass index being especially high. We should take note.

Underrated Trait #2: Luck-Adjusted Impact

This is short, but Egor’s offensive impact was strong despite being turnover prone with low true shooting. Here, we luck-adjust for 3P%, but 1.6% TO swing against baseline is notable. For reference, this is versus t200 opponents:

4.0 net rating against baseline is huge. Again, A-B is useful for comparing Egor versus his backups, but A – Baseline shows how much better the team was with Egor. He had a legit positive effect on offense, and if he trims the turnovers/makes 3s at a higher rate, his offensive impact will only increase.

Real On/Off and RAPM tell a similar story. It’s clear that Egor’s TO tendencies are mitigated on a team-wide level, given his strong assist volume, and he had a strong effect on an already good BYU offense.

It’s also interesting how Egor coincided with a drop in 2P rim%, even with real on-off (which adjusts for teammates), but I didn’t pick up on anything when watching. This is something to sorta keep an eye on in the league.

Overall, this is to say that Egor had an inflationary effect on BYU’s offense even with his current warts. This is a good sign indeed, as he has much room to grow as a ball-handler.

A Cause for Concern

To me, the biggest cause for concern is Egor’s athletic profile. He’s not particularly quick (11.31 lane agility + 3.33 sprint), and he is a straight up bad vertical athlete (awful 26.5 inch standing vert + 32.5 max vert). Coupled with his skinny frame, he has the quintessential bust athletic profile: the low BMI bad athlete.

The low BMI, bad athlete is a devastating, ceiling dropping archetype. See for yourself:

Egor falls comfortably within these thresholds. We can see this softness reflected in his oreb, FTR, and perhaps even in his lack of runner volume. This is concerning, and he will need significant mass gains.

Two reasons why this isn’t as much cause for concern:

1. This anthropometric sample is pretty incomplete and is skewed towards less heralded prospects. For many years prior to 2024, prospects who accrued significant draft capital did not participate in combine testing.
   • For instance, we don’t have Giddey’s testing but he’d probably be somewhere here (BMI probably hits a tad above 23 but still).
2. If Egor can accumulate minutes at the 1 or 2, his large size advantage will be more than enough to overcome BMI issues. In other words, positional size will deter disadvantages conferred by his BMI.

He’s also clearly cognizant of all this:

The Elephant in the Room: Positionality

What position does Egor play in the league?

Obviously, Egor could play as a guard. It’s probably not worth discussing too much since he primarily played the 1 at BYU. Egor would need to cut down on TOs and shoot, but it’s a fairly straightforward outcome.

I have seen concern about Egor’s guard viability, on the premise that Egor cannot get downhill without a screen. He’s definitely not the most imposing athlete, but:

1. I question the independent value of getting downhill without a screen in such a PnR centric league.
2. Damn near most of his offense either came out of the PnR or spotting up from 3. Are we sure that scoring out of PnR on a PnR-heavy team means that he is reliant on a screen? Causation seems strong.

However, Egor does not need to play the 1/2 to provide meaningful value. He could be a really good wing.

It goes without saying that Egor needs to make 3s at a far higher clip than he did this season. If Egor cannot make open C&S threes at a reasonable frequency, it is likely over. He needs legit shooting development, and we’re betting a lot on 50 3PR to clutch up as a shooting indicator.

If Egor can make 3s at a reasonable frequency, then he offers real positional versatility. The second coin toss is physicality: Egor needs to bulk up a bit and guard wings with consistency.

And, if Egor can make 3s AND guard wings, he offers basically no lineup friction. You can fit him into so many lineups.

My working theory is that cognitive load per position is rising league-wide, so having someone like Egor may end up more of a necessity in a decade. Even with the current league in mind, Egor would have a huge cognitive advantage at the 3 (the 3 probably has the lowest cognitive load by position), a large size and cognitive advantage at the 2, and an overwhelming size advantage at the 1; this would give him pretty strong staying power.

To be clear, this sort of frictionless upside would only come if he’s able to make 3s AND guard wings.

Conclusion

So, how likely is Frictionless Egor?

Based off the evidence I’ve provided, I would equate the probabilities of making 3s and guarding wings (at reasonable frequency) to ~ 60% each. So, by my shoddy odds, there’s a ~ 36% chance at this frictionless utopia, which is easy for me to swallow and rank top 20 at the absolute worst.

The odds of either 3s or guarding wings coming around is 84%, which is nice. That being said, there’s 40% chance that shooting does not come around, which would be pretty disastrous.

There’s also the point that the shooting thresholds for guards are much higher than for wings, as there is legit off-the-dribble necessity. So the odds of him playing as a guard are probably somewhere near 50%, if not closer to 36%.

Here’s the takeaway: Egor is a pretty high variance player. I’ve called other players in this class high variance but I honestly think that title should go to Egor. He could reasonably be out of the league by the end of his rookie contract. Egor needs to shoot, and he needs to shoot at high volume. And he needs to rely on skill and weight gain to overcome the poor BMI x athlete tag.

Previously, I was over-indexing on Egor’s strong downside. There are quite a few ways this could go badly. But I didn’t fully consider the uniqueness of Egor’s game. He has some (dare I say) generational strengths that I’ve demonstrated with some pretty generous Bart query thresholds. The league is built on outliers, and I do not feel comfortable ranking a fairly well-rounded freshman with huge strengths outside the top 20.

That being said, I sympathize with Nets fans and their front office, as they have invested significant draft capital into a guy who could be pretty bad. I would personally have been more risk-averse with this selection, but the upside is high enough for it to be reasonable. This is not a particularly popular take on Draft Twitter, but Egor’s positional versatility is that compelling.

Also, this is a half-serious point but if a conglomerate like Draft Twitter is so opposed to a single player/concept, then it is probably a good idea to zag a bit to account for the effects of overconfidence bias and consensus bias.

Moreover, one should be wary of a massive delta between perception and draft capital barring a catastrophic pick by “unwell”-intentioned front offices (i.e., anything the Raiders did in the last quarter century, or Nico selecting OMP). I do not believe the Nets to be in this tier of franchise ineptitude. That’s not to say that we should become mock draft warriors, but it’s a sensible sanity check for select prospects. The draft is a tad bit more of a crapshoot than we’d like to believe.

Ultimately, so many of the warts Draft Twitter has ascribed to Egor are by virtue of his 3P bricklaying. He has real red flags, and his floor is far lower than I’d usually be comfortable selecting in the top 10. But Egor is tall and smart, he can accumulate 3s and stocks without fouling, and he can efficiently self-create inside the arc. He passes like very few we’ve seen with his size. He managed to raise the offensive ceiling for a dominant BYU offense. The upside is hard to ignore with Egor, and his unorthodoxy is riveting.

He just needs to make those damn threes.

The post The Case for Egor Demin appeared first on Swish Theory.

For this article, I interviewed Day’Ron about his journey and skills. I will reference that interview often. You can find it here.

After winning a Class 4A title as a high school junior, Sharpe transferred to the famous Montverde Academy. That 2019-20 roster boasts an incredible six NBA alumni. Four of them went in the 2021 draft: Cade Cunningham 1st overall, Scottie Barnes 4th, Moses Moody 14th, and Day’Ron at 29th. Caleb Houstan was picked 32nd the year after, and Dariq Whitehead 22nd the year after that. Suffice it to say, that is talent few other teams can match. Day’Ron asserts that no other high school could compete with them from any year. With a 25-0 record and 24 of those victories by double digits, they have as good a case as any team.

Sharpe went to UNC for college under the tutelage of Roy Williams. That squad possessed an imposing collection of talent as well. Armando Bacot, Garrison Brooks, and Leaky Black formed an impressive defensive trio in the starting group with a freshman backcourt of Caleb Love and RJ Davis, two future All-Americans. That left Sharpe as one of the first off the bench. Another future NBA talent, Walker Kessler, could only get nine minutes per game. And it wouldn’t be the last time Day’Ron had to sit behind more experienced players.

The 2021-22 Brooklyn Nets team that Sharpe was drafted to felt like a who’s-who of 2010s greats. Headlined by the trio of Kevin Durant, James Harden, and Kyrie Irving, this team was built to contend. Their frontcourt included LaMarcus Aldridge, Blake Griffin, and Paul Millsap. Of all the greats on this team, Sharpe credits James Johnson as the most impactful veteran for his career.

By his own admission, Day’Ron didn’t have his mind right upon entering the league. He wasn’t the first to be there or the last to leave. He didn’t value winning the way he should have. Johnson took the rookie big man under his wing, taught him how to build good habits, and instilled a desire to compete. Four years later, Day’Ron is looking to pass that same spirit to a Nets team rebuilding from the exodus of Durant, Irving, and Harden.

It’s safe to say that Sharpe has dealt with as many changing circumstances and expectations as any fourth-year player can. Most importantly, he’s seen how to stick in this league in many ways. In this article, I’ll break down Sharpe’s strengths and limitations, potential growth areas, and look to the future for this restricted free agent to see where his game can fit best. Let’s dig into it. As usual, all stats I list are per Cleaning the Glass.

Offensive Overview

Sharpe set many career highs offensively this past season. He posted the most points and assists per game of his career. His free-throw percentage also jumped nearly 20 points to 79%. The underlying stats are more noteworthy to me. He took more midrange shots and upped his percentage from 37% to 44%. Sharpe tripled his three-point attempts and increased his percentage as well, from 25% to 28%. Most importantly, his assist percentage and assist-to-usage rate went up with his increase in usage rate.

Individual improvements are essential, but team context is everything. Brooklyn was 6.6 points per 100 possessions better on offense with Sharpe on the floor. That wasn’t due to some massive increase in efficiency, free-throw drawing, or taking extra care of the ball. It was due to Sharpe’s foremost skill.

Offensive Rebounding

When Day’Ron is on the floor, Brooklyn’s offensive rebounding rate increases by 10.8%. That’s the highest on/off OREB% mark of any player in the league. His offensive rebounding rate of 15.4% was a 98th percentile mark in the league. He brings it all: hustle, positioning skill, physicality, and jump timing.

These extra possessions Sharpe creates are immensely valuable. We’ve seen it as a theme throughout these playoffs. When efficiency bogs down and set plays go out the window, that guy who can create a second and third chance at the rim skyrockets in importance. Few players in the league create those chances the way Day’Ron can.

Rim Finishing

This is where things get spottier for Sharpe. In all four years, Sharpe has shot in the low 60s around the rim. He’s never been above the 28th percentile for bigs. Some of that is owed to the nature of his role; constantly tipping the ball around the rim leads to many misses. But there are also controllable aspects. Day’Ron has issues with loading his feet, finding proper positioning, and reading the rim protection.

I don’t expect Sharpe to suddenly become a 75%-ish rim finisher by cleaning up technical aspects of his game. He’s still going to have a lot of tip-ins go awry, and it’s in his nature to try relentlessly to get that final putback. Still, some work on positioning and loading his jumps would significantly improve these numbers.

Screen Actions

The 2024-25 season saw a ton of improvement for Sharpe in screen actions. He has a lot of utility on and off the ball, and sets great picks that free his teammates in a variety of situations.

I came away very impressed with his DHO game. Not only did he set strong screens, he made good passing reads and had a good sense of when to keep the ball and self-create.

His role as a DHO hub was crucial for a team lacking structure. So many new faces searching for offensive roles and identities. Sharpe’s ability to pass, screen, and make himself available for passes significantly raised this group’s floor. A play finisher learning to create those plays for others brings immense value to any team.

Odds and Ends

Most of Sharpe’s offensive value comes from screening, cutting, and offensive rebounding. He’s still finding ways to show skill in other areas, and I’m encouraged by his development as a shooter. He shoots an easy ball and the results have continued to perk up.

Day’Ron told me that the skill he is looking forward to developing the most is his shooting. Becoming an all-around contributor to the offense is paramount to his development. Another way he finds to contribute is in transition. Despite his hulking frame, Sharpe can move quickly in the open floor.

Watching his offensive talent grow with each passing game is a treat. At only 23 years old, it’s hard to put a definite ceiling on his growth, but I see him in the mold of Steven Adams with extra skill. Elite second-chance creation and screening talent can get you far. Adams grew a lot as a passer, but the shooting never materialized. Sharpe may find a way to be more of an outside shooter and DHO keeper threat. It’s the kind of offensive contributor many teams will be looking for.

Defensive Overview

Brooklyn posted a better-than-expected defense for a team that felt like an island of misfit toys. They finished 20th in total defensive rating, largely due to head coach Jordi Fernandez’s instilled competitive factor. The Nets deployed an aggressive style of defense designed to throw other teams off their game, and Sharpe was part of that equation.

With Day’Ron on the floor, the Nets had a 111.7 defensive rating. That’s a 77th percentile mark. Of course, a lot of this came from his best all-around skill.

Defensive Rebounding

Sharpe’s defensive rebounding rate isn’t as stellar as his offensive rebounding rate. A 63rd percentile mark is nothing to sneeze at, to be sure, but it begs questions. Those are largely answered by this Brooklyn rebound scheme, where Sharpe’s job was to find the best offensive rebounder and wipe them out of the play. His determination to box out was apparent on the tape.

I truly enjoyed his determination to box out the league’s most imposing players. Day’Ron said his favorite matchups are Ivica Zubac, Jonas Valanciunas, and the Pistons duo of Isaiah Stewart and Jalen Duren. It’s not just effort here, it’s technical prowess. He works hard to get inside positioning and push as far back as possible. In the worst-case scenario, he gets positioning and refuses to lose ground. Sharpe also uses a good leg bend to make any OREB attempts over his back futile. If he loses inside position, he’s excellent at pushing his man under the rim to reduce their rebounding radius.

There’s more meat on the bone with his defensive rebounding numbers, but the technique and effort are sound. The defensive scheme employed in Brooklyn on ball screen actions can explain some of this gap.

Pick-and-Roll Defense

As previously mentioned, Sharpe had three coaches in three years. That was before the hiring of Jordi Fernandez. Jordi brings a defensive style that maximizes Brooklyn’s athleticism. Bringing in an extra degree of unpredictability helped their defense punch above their weight and win some games they weren’t expected to. That included some aggressive ball screen coverages, with Day’Ron square in the middle of it. The blitzing and showing came with mixed results:

Often, the lineups came with Cam Johnson in the corner rotating to shut off the roller. He’s plenty capable of being a rim deterrent at his size, but that’s not the issue here. Problems arose from Day’Ron’s recovery speed and the angles he chose. This was not an athleticism concern – he’s got that in spades. It’s a question of decisiveness and efficiency in my mind. Before this season, Day’Ron spent far more time in drop, something he’s alright at doing. He does have a block-hunting problem that’s shown up in past tape. Plays like this one were all too common:

But there are the flashes of brilliance, where he chains it all together: play recognition, urgency of movement, precise angles and timing. And they look beautiful.

I don’t mean to imply that things will simply click someday and Day’Ron can become a consistently great ball screen defender. It requires a lot of reps and hard work to get there. But reps and hard work don’t get you superb athletic gifts. Pairing that hard work with Sharpe’s natural talent will take him a long way. It’s an area I’m confident he can build in.

Rim Protection

Sharpe encounters the same problems protecting the rim outside the action as he does in the action. He’s inconsistent with his footwork, load times, and chases blocks too often. I don’t want to harp on that further; instead, I will look at the possessions where things come together. Those are a sight to see.

When his feet are organized and his jump is well-timed, Sharpe has an innate ability to locate the ball at all angles. That kind of ball tracking and length covers up a lot of gaps as a rim protector. With more consistent footwork and positioning, in addition to cleaning up the windows in which he chooses to go for a block, he could be a serious asset at the rim.

Odds and Ends

I also enjoyed Sharpe’s transition defense. He loves getting out and running to commit the right fouls at a minimum. At best, he can contest multiple shots and get some impressive blocks.

I’d like to see more of that engagement off the ball in the halfcourt. He was too prone to losing cutters and being late to recognize off-ball screeners, which is a common issue for young players at all positions. The good thing is the engagement shows up in other areas; Sharpe needs to show the same commitment to stopping easy buckets that he shows when a rebound is up for grabs. That’s easy to translate with the right mindset.

Future Outlook

At 23 years old, Sharpe’s restricted free agency will be an interesting watch. The Nets have a lot of cap space, but things are in flux. They have Nic Claxton paid up as a true center, so the idea of paying two bigs that shared the floor for just 29 possessions (+31 net rating, just saying…) is worth inspection. However, trade speculation around Claxton has continued for years and could come to a head this offseason. There is a real chance Sharpe could leave elsewhere or end up back in Brooklyn as a starter.

These NBA playoffs did him a lot of favors. Physical rebounders and screeners like Steven Adams made a huge statement in the era of shooting and small ball. DHO runners and gap fillers like Isaiah Hartenstein have proven immensely valuable. Sharpe’s work ethic will jump off the page for any team interested in his services, and his desire to improve his skill set is noteworthy. As is, an elite rebounder who sets nasty screens and operates within the flow ot the offense has a lot of utility. An improvement as a paint protector, shooter, and rim finisher could take him to a new level. Watch out for Day’Ron.

The post Finding a Role: Day’Ron Sharpe appeared first on Swish Theory.

Not only will this piece analyze their games up to this point, but also give home remedies to fix what has gone astray. Developmental time when you enter “the league” is highly variable, dependent on draft slot, training staffs and existing personnel. But these players are often already a season behind given poor fitting one-and-done campaigns. Let’s see if we can’t help to set the new crews off on the right foot.

Dereck Lively (RSCI #2, Pick #12 to Dallas Mavericks)

Lively has perhaps the largest discrepancy between strengths and weaknesses in this class, and it wasn’t always clear Duke knew which was which. His up and down season included an early season benching, no longer starting as of the second week of January, but was able to bounce back by season end. His offensive toolset paled in comparison to the more versatile Kyle Filipowski, but defensive dominance is perhaps better suited for the pro game.

My favorite trait of Lively’s is his complete discipline on the defensive end of the court. Watching his pre-college tape alerts one to how this is: playing next to also-elite rim protector Jalen Duren in AAU, Lively learned to move all about the court and have an impact, not just stand near the hoop. Controlled aggressiveness has always been the name of the game for the seven-footer: a description likely worth a lottery pick at face value. His 5.2 fouls per 40 minutes I attribute more to just how many actions he covered, and not unprecedented in elite rim protector prospects (see: Joel Embiid’s 5.8 per 40).

The offensive end is limited in the strictest sense of the word. He is limited in that he has zero post moves and poor touch with the ball, but is able to find areas of value regardless. Returning again to his two-big lineup days, Lively is excellent passing to the interior, a coveted trait for a player of his size. He is able to seek passing windows for drop offs, even occasionally dribbling once or twice to create the space. He truly reminds one of Boston’s Robert Williams III in his ability to let go of the ball quickly despite zero shooting gravity. Expect him to be effective at dribble hand offs as well as empty side pick and rolls, anywhere he will be less rushed with a gap to create even a little.

Rookie Year Remedy: Rim First, Always

There is plenty to like about Lively as an NBA player, #8 on my board. But to insure he sets off on the right path, it’s important to tie him to his livelihood: the rim. Lively is an excellent roamer, but his size and technique better suits a hedge and recover big. If there is one area Lively lacks on defense, it is rim-first approach: he prefers to hunt out the action regardless of where it is. Instilling rim-first defensive principles is essential to him reaching that lofty All-Defense potential, an item Duke failed to preach, harmed by his inconsistent role.

While there was all kinds of hubbub about Lively’s three point shooting potential leading up to the draft, that is a highly unrealistic outcome in my mind for a 60% free throw shooter who made *1* midrange shot all season. In his rookie year with Dallas, Lively should be either 1. In the dunker’s spot, or 2. Hitting a body and rolling to the hoop, at any given point. Oftentimes at Duke he looked in no man’s land, setting a screen into a pre-failed action: that will not be the case with Luka, and makes it all the more important to know exactly where to space.

Brice Sensabaugh (RSCI #49, Pick #28 to Utah Jazz)

It is difficult to understand how Sensabaugh was ranked so low coming out of high school, or why he came off the bench for Ohio State. He has every sign of a unique scoring talent, eating up midrange space as a prospect to then let the feathery touch do the rest of the work. The defense needs work, but that is often the case for premier scoring talents like Brice.

First of all, the numbers – Sensabaugh shot 172 midrange attempts and made just short of half of them. Only Grant Williams and Marcus Morris exceeded his midrange volume and efficiency, and Brice had only 18% of his makes assisted compared to 50% for Grant, 43% for Morris. There is a good case to be made for Brice as the best midrange scorer in recent NCAA history.

So then, why did he fall to the 20s?

The defense, at times, is indeed indefensibly bad. Worst of all is the assignment confusion, a threat to his NBA playing time when player movement is ramped up to a far greater degree. Counteracting this is his defensive rebounding, where his rates of securing boards looks indeed like athletic wings, similar to that of Paul George or Miles Bridges in college. Brice is a big body, and knows how to leverage it in a timely manner when locked in. This gives us hope.

The passing is the other nitpick, and much more nitpicky. Passing is more context dependent than defense at a college setting, and Sensabaugh’s unique scoring traits make him a square peg in round hole for most traditional systems. I saw plenty of talent in him moving the ball, particularly adept at understanding how to make even a shallow drive into a kick. He will never be an offensive conductor, but you want Sensabaugh to finish plays anyways, rather than start them.

Rookie Year Remedy: Work From the Corners

The biggest benefit to Sensabaugh in an NBA system will be how he can no longer be the primary focus of opposing defenses. Sensabaugh struggles to get first steps on opponents, but is excellent at maximizing whatever margin is available. If he can lean into a spot up first, midrange craft second approach as a rookie, he can leverage his teammates’ scoring to help his own, and passing.

On defense as well, keeping Sensabaugh away from the action and close to the tin for rebounding purposes is the way. He will certainly be targeted in switches, where it will be essential for him to stay disciplined – his low steal rate and fairly high foul rate point to a poor decision-maker as it comes to trying to play-make on defense. He can be often found swiping where he shouldn’t, determined to compensate for lack of foot speed.

Utah has a bit of a challenge in finding how to maximize Sensabaugh’s unique talents, but Brice playing inside of his game can help shorten that journey.

Noah Clowney (RSCI #74, Pick #21 to Brooklyn Nets)

Clowney had less of a flawed season and more of a narrowly-defined one. He accepted a role player position at Alabama as a top-100 recruit in Nate Oats’ structured system, a three-and-D power forward between prized Brandon Miller and veteran Charles Bediako. Clowney filled the role admirably, putting up the fifth best Box Plus-Minus grade of any high major freshman.

Watching Noah’s pre-NCAA tape you see mostly the same, but there is intrigue along the fringes. The type that certainly tipped the Brooklyn Nets into seeing more. Most notably, I think Clowney can pass. Not guard-level passing, but adequate for a big, reminding me a bit of Minnesota’s Josh Minott the draft before. He cannot dribble beyond once or, maybe, twice, but when he does he makes the right play more often than you’d expect (for someone who can’t really dribble). The technique needs work, but you can see the outlines of a viable DHO conductor. Clowney got very little practice with the ball on a stacked Bama team, so it’s difficult to say what the ceiling is.

The archetype is swell: Clowney can block some shots, hit some threes, and use his size, strength and touch to finish inside and rebound. Unfortunately, his shotblocking is closer to good than great, three point shot closer to bad than good. But what I was most impressed with is how decisive Noah is when he gets the ball near the basket. His one-step craft to finish is indeed good, and, as Clowney is still not even 19, may end up very good.

Rookie Year Remedy: Play the 5

Now, I just pointed out Clowney lacks high-end polish and consistency across the court…you want him to take on more responsibility? Yes.

Clowney has the physique to hang in the interior, if not the discipline yet. But as a middle-of-the-pack squad lacking a big man floor spacer, the Nets can do worse than giving Clowney some bench run. As the five man, Clowney can refine his interior discipline, often caught contesting on his feet but leaning too far over, allowing his opponent to draw easy fouls. Rep those traits out of him while you have the chance.

Additionally, Clowney with a clean paint will allow him to experiment in ways he was prohibited at Alabama. Despite not being close to a focal point of the offense, Clowney had 27 dunks (6 more than Brandon Miller) and shot a very strong 64% on non-dunk rim attempts. He only took 25 midrange shots but hit half of them, encouraging that his touch is more effective inside the arc. As some more encouraging stats, when Clowney played without Bediako on the floor his free throw rate rose from 0.27 to 0.64; his rim rate from 35% to 56%; his rim finishing from 67% to 74%. He shot fewer threes but gained efficiency everywhere.

Clowney is unlikely to ever be a starting center or power forward, but by letting him run as a backup 5, he may improve both skills. He is strong enough at his core to eventually handle the more physical assignments, let him prove his offense against that.

Cam Whitmore (RSCI #12, Pick #20)

 Whitmore is a high-flying tank, a tornado of activity with a punch, punch to the rim. It’s easy to mix metaphors for a player whose movements make little sense. He’s a stout 232 but has one of the quickest first steps in the class. He is a power mover who can also chop his legs. I would not like to guard Cam Whitmore.

So, why am I lower on him? Well, first of all, he’s quite predictable. Whitmore loves his left, almost always utilizing a combination of a lefty in and out, crossover into either pull-up or straight line acceleration to the rim. The issue is the complexity and flexibility: despite the magic of his movements, it is still tough at the size of a torso to chain together quick moves.

On top of that, Whitmore does not seem like a very creative player. Much of his pre-NCAA production came from transition play, which, yes, that absolutely should be a priority of his NBA game. But he also misses open passes, some obvious rotations, and generally prefers to go from point A to point B without a flexion point in between.

I’m optimistic on him being a plus defensive player simply due to the significance of his physical tools; that quick of a step at that size is going to get blocks and especially steals. Steals are as valuable of a task one can complete outside of putting the ball in the basket. But when it comes down to papering over all the little items opponents can exploit in high-stakes matchups, it is not clear Whitmore is up for the task.

Rookie Year Remedy: Keep It Simple

I run the risk of being low on Whitmore in the same way I was too low on Bennedict Mathurin: NBA teams will be able to cover up for his weaknesses by getting him in his optimal spots. In particular, a young team like the Houston Rockets should be more than happy to run with Whitmore on the wings. Fortunately, he will not need to create many advantages on his own when playing off of Amen Thompson, passing extraordinaire, allowing him to catch the ball when already downhill. The combined pace and vertical talent of those two will be extremely difficult to contain in the open court.

The defensive end might be trickier, on a team that had the second worst points allowed per possession last season. The Rockets still lack an identity on that end, but might do best to lean into their hectic event creators of Tari Eason and Amen as steal mavens: a constantly roaming crew would also make the transition into transition easier.

The minutes breakdown in Houston will be fascinating to watch this year. But they have at their disposal, now, such a dynamic of talent that in order to take advantages of their weakness you may have to first disable their advantages. Leaning into Houston’s collective strengths with quite the store of talent will yield some unexpected results; many of those involve Whitmore as a major player.

Dariq Whitehead (RSCI #1, Pick #22 to Brooklyn Nets)

There was not a single prospect who deserved to have his season tape thrown out than Dariq. With a foot injury that required surgery before the season which never properly healed and a lower leg strain mid-season, Whitehead never looked close to his usual self. It is painful to even watch him try to move around the court wearing a Duke jersey; I cannot imagine what it felt like. Here’s hoping he undergoes the recovery he deserves.

To imagine what he might look like on the other side, we resort more to his high school and AAU tape. Whitehead was arguably the best player in all of high school basketball, rated first in the entire class by RSCI as well as winning the Naismith High School Player of the Year Trophy, back to back national championships and the MVP award for the McDonald’s All-Star Game. While Whitehead’s teams often featured other NBA-level talent, he stuck out consistently for his poise under pressure and contributions across the court.

Dariq is not without flaws as a prospect, but may be without any significant enough to call a true weakness. His athleticism is tilted more towards pace and balance than burst and power, but he is still able to win on first step and dunk above rim protectors here and there. I would advise against putting him on the quicker guards, but he should have no issue finding a suitable assignment on the wing. Whitehead simply contributes across various axes: his constant activity and nose for advantages means locating rebounds, rising and firing in a crowd, excelling at connecting passing but capable of throwing advantage-creating ones as well.

Whitehead has long been a favorite of mine to watch, and I feel a disservice to him in not being selected until the 20s. The NBA draft, first and foremost, is about imagination, even if it’s not obvious on the surface. Whitehead may not recover his full athleticism, but he was always more of a problem-solver than nuclear athlete anyways.

Rookie Year Remedy: Pindowns Galore

For once, it would be nice if things were made easy for Whitehead. From essential connector piece as a HS underclassman to shouldering the usage load as a HS upperclassman to just trying to stay on the court at Duke, he has fought for all he’s taken. I am proposing making it easier on Dariq.

My two favorite Whitehead weapons are the quickness with which he can get his shot off and his ability to stay upright on drives. Wrap those up with some decisive and creative playmaking and you have yourself an excellent play finishing prospect, especially if he stands at 6’6’’. I trust Whitehead perhaps as much as any in the class to make a dribble-pass-shoot decision off the catch while moving through a crowd, so here’s hoping that’s the desired destination for the Nets in getting Dariq up to speed.

Jordan Walsh (RSCI #17, Pick #38 to Boston Celtics)

If you got by Jordan Walsh, no you didn’t. Jordan Walsh has about as ideal as possible recovery tools on the defensive end. Inevitably, even the shutdown defenders lose a step to a true-blue offensive star. The basketball court is tilted towards the offense as the holder of the first move, and how little space it takes for many to get a shot off. But after the gap is created, Walsh will be as good as any at crawling back into perfect position; in fact, many of his steals and blocks came from what would be considered a disadvantageous position.

Walsh is the best shutdown defender prospect in this class, and the best I can remember in recent classes. Unfortunately for Walsh and other such as Usman Garuba, being a lockdown defender does not always guarantee playing time, especially if, as both of them are, you are an offensive liability.

Jordan almost certainly will be a negative on offense, but I am here to argue there is a chance he will not, and perhaps much greater than you think. The shot is where we start, inaccurate but not broken, as there is a lot to like: a simple one-two motion, decently set feet, but inaccuracy due to spatial issues (he throws inaccurate passes here and there) and a bit exaggerated of a form. Both can be fixed by corner three reps, as his 71% from the line, 28% from three and 36% on deep twos point to 33%+ on open threes potential.

The more significant reason for optimism lies in his tape from Link Academy. While inactive most of his time on offense for Arkansas, at Link he was the key to both their transition offense and connecting their half-court offense. He looked far more confident on the move, as with the Razorbacks could get overwhelmed in catch and drive situations. But I see a real passing threat as Walsh is highly creative for a wing and has the athletic tools to take advantage, or else get to the rim. Time to think at Arkansas meant overthinking, but again we see a lane for some offensive value.

Rookie Year Remedy: Just Belong

Walsh gets my most esoteric suggestion, as he simply needs to relax and trust the system on offense. That will be much easier, hopefully, in an ironed out NBA system with a longer view on Walsh’s role. Boston acquiring an early second round draft pick to take the defensive stud – a type they are long familiar with – is encouraging that he will be brought along at the right pace. Obvious from the tape, Walsh loves technique and being in the right place: the Celtics’ infrastructure should encourage that.

To get more concrete about the basketball court, Boston could use some additional front-court athleticism, particularly attacking the rim. Walsh is a stellar vertical athlete, clocking a 33 inch standing vert on top of a 7’1.75’’ wingspan. He is always vigilant on the court, and letting him leak out early in transition could do wonders for his offensive confidence. It may be ugly here and there, but when you have a talent of high athleticism with some creative potential, ugly may be worth putting up with. When remembering we are talking about a potential All-Defense level defender, the rewards of even slight offensive improvements could be spectacular.

Nick Smith Jr (RSCI #3, Pick #27 to Charlotte Hornets)

Nick Smith Jr., perhaps more than anyone on this list, put everything on tape at Arkansas that you would want, if you look for it. Most notably, in his 25 point, 6 assist, 4 steal, 3 rebound, 1 block masterpiece versus Kentucky, or similar 20+ point outputs with stats elsewhere versus Alabama, Georgia, UNC Greensboro and Oklahoma. In these games we see the sell for NSJ, quite obvious: he can score on the ball as easily as off the ball, and will work as hard as he can to be positive everywhere else. The passing is the “swing skill” – if he is indeed the PNR maestro he appeared before Arkansas, which I think he might be, Nick has real All-Star upside.

The shot and, more specifically, the touch is where the pitch starts with Smith, lofty for a guard but instead in a player with a 6’9’’ wingspan. That wingspan and touch mean any shot within 12 feet is available as a floater; his vigilance as a scorer and strong technique make him a threat beyond; his ease of fluidity into pull-up make his range endless despite the wiry frame.

As a pure scoring prospect, there are a few items you could ask for that Nick lacks: his first step is okay (made up somewhat by shiftiness), he has little strength (made up somewhat by aggressiveness) and he can be a bit programmatic getting into his actions. But even that is mediated by Nick’s unique head for finding the right action.

Time and again in watching Nick Smith’s tape, his team used him as a sort of offensive cure-all. Need to set up the primary action? He is a suitable custodian for the ball and adept in PNR. Need to come up with a counter quick? Nick is decisive with good enough handle and passing instincts to set up secondary. Shot clock running out? No shot is a bad shot for a shooter of Nick’s level.

Yes, his shooting efficiency was poor at his time with Arkansas. But knee injuries throw off the entire kinetic chain, making splits tough to judge without proper oomf into gather. At EYBL, Smith shot 56% on 8 twos per game and 38% on 5 threes per game. That is, flat out, both elite volume and efficiency, enough to wipe away any doubts. The tape as well shows ideal technique and the ball time and again falling softly off the rim through the net, if touching the rim at all, from every angle and release point imaginable. Buy it.

Rookie Year Remedy: Let Him Take the Hits

I mean this in a quarterback’s sense, as in, it’s tough to get into a rhythm without taking part in the physical aspects of the game. Nick is an aggressive player by nature, a rarity in his aesthetically-minded offensive archetype and beanpole frame. At every level of competition he can be seen helping aggressively when needed (sometimes when not), flailing around the court and picking up a surprising amount of loose balls and even blocks by virtue of activity. Smith struggled to provide this as often at Arkansas as in years prior, limited particularly in his ability to turn corners, previously much quicker.

NSJ needs not just to grow into his frame, but also continue to find ways to maximize his physicality as a way to win when speed does not. Again unusually for type, Smith has proven capable of finishing through traffic, even yards away from the rim with his touch. If he’s able to get to those spots and hold them down more consistently, that touch can do the rest of the work.

Jalen Hood-Schifino (RSCI #20, Pick #17 to Los Angeles Lakers)

The Schifino section might be the shortest as, well, I have the fewest hard takeaways about his game. JHS was extremely unproductive as a freshman with Indiana, in a context I don’t think was particularly unfair to him. While Hood-Schifino looks the part on the court, good stance and technique generally, he is the single least productive one-and-done first round pick in the barttorvik.com database.

JHS stood out at the NBA Combine with his seven-foot wingspan, which, in conjunction with a strong frame makes him a physical presence. However, the physicality stats lag: he only had 4 dunks all season, only rebound 1.6% of opportunities and had very low steal and block rates. He only took 76 free throws and the exact same number of rim attempts. Hood-Schifino survives, rather, on tough shotmaking.

While falling short of Sensabaugh’s midrange dominance, 90 for 216 (42%) is nothing to scoff at, especially considering JHS struggles mightily to create separation. He gets into his shot pocket almost automatically regardless of position, a rare trait. But scoring prospects need easy buckets, and those were few and far between for Jalen. While his finishing touch and creativity is good, he struggled to hit openings, stuck taking difficult rim attempts. This, along with mixed three point results, dropped his true shooting percentage below 50% – a tough pill for a shotmaking prospect.

If, rather, you view JHS as a table-setter, I have qualms as there too. For someone who looks in ready-set position at any given point, Schifino makes a shocking number of careless errors. Whether not executing a pass fully or not concentrating when catching the ball, a 19% turnover rate for someone with fairly basic offensive responsibilities is another red flag.

Finally, the defense. I want my table-setters to get into their opponent’s body, or at least be constantly roaming to use their length. JHS doesn’t really do either of those, evidenced both by his low stock rates and the tape where he’s seen getting disconnected from his man fairly often. The margins are small for this type with plenty of guard competition; JHS’s wingspan stands out, but is he using it?

Rookie Year Remedy: Shoot, Shoot Some More

The promised land for JHS, as well as the Lakers, relies in Hood-Schifino’s tough shotmaking. It is astounding at times how unbothered he is despite have zero breathing room to get a shot off. With a quick, high release, I trust him to get his tough FGA when he wants it, even if easier creation looks never come.

With LeBron on the team, JHS won’t have to table set if he doesn’t need to, and instead can run off of screen after screen to create that separation. His 6.1 threes per 100 possessions will hopefully be the fewest in his career, as 3s > 2s and JHS has no issue launching from distance.

I struggle to see JHS changing his tune as it comes to productive stats as the precedent would be too severe compared to his stats profile at Indiana, but it is still just one season. His pedigree, playing with the top HS and AAU teams in the country, should help him fit in on a win-now team, as he certainly looks like a pro when he steps on the court. But the carelessness is a quick way to be taken out and lose important development reps.

The post Evaluating the 2023 NBA Draft’s “Flawed Freshmen” appeared first on Swish Theory.

There are quite a few trailing close behind. While also a result of no single runaway team (SRS is calculated relative to all other teams), the five closest trailing the Celtics – Memphis Grizzlies, Cleveland Cavaliers, New Orleans Pelicans, Brooklyn Nets and Philadelphia 76ers – are all within 2 points in SRS of Boston. There was a more significant difference, for instance, between last year’s Celtics who lead the league and the 2021-22 Miami Heat, or the 2020-21 regular season leading Utah Jazz compared to sixth place Denver Nuggets.

The top is as clustered as it’s been, though we have more than half of the season left for one of these teams to make their mark. The closest recent historical precedent was 2010-11, when the Dallas Mavericks overcame having the seventh worst championship odds to take the title led by Dirk Nowitzki.

The post The NBA Entering 2023: Crowded at the Top appeared first on Swish Theory.