A picture is worth a thousand words, but I will keep it to less than that per picture.

At this point, Anthony Edwards has obliterated the point-of-attack defense for a 2-on-1 situation with Rudy Gobert vs Rui Hachimura, encroaching on the restricted area. The gather has been made, and his momentum is downhill. A moment in time for Ant to make his decision, with several options at his disposal. 

Ant has done so much good work to this point. What originated as a handoff from Gobert out of a sideline inbounds, Ant has already left his immediate defenders Austin Reaves and AD dusted.

(Also wanted to note that Ingles set an off-ball screen that put Reaves a half step or more behind the handoff to begin with, to Ingles’ credit)

But for all intents and purposes, Ant has created a full advantage, overcoming both point-of-attack defenders. Rui steps up in help, as he should.

And that leaves Gobert wide open at the rim. The Wolves are one pass away from an open rim finish, one of the best results attainable on any given possession. Rudy is even starting to point up and call for the lob.

Per NBA.com/stats, Rudy was 73/78 on alley-oop dunk attempts last season, good for a 93.6% completion percentage and 1.87 points per shot (PPS). Pretty good. However, when Rudy was forced to adjust to the pass or was unable to easily and securely dunk it, his alley-oop layup numbers fall off dramatically: 6/14 on alley-oop layup attempts (42.9%, 0.86 PPS), cutting expected points down by over a whole point. 

This could be an easy alley-oop dunk. Does Gobert’s notoriously clumsy hands influence Ant’s decision? With a moment to decide, is there trust for the passer to execute the delivery, and the receiver to cap it off?

What defenders have a path to making any sort of play on the potential lob pass? Both Reaves and Knecht are at a huge size and positioning disadvantage to cover Gobert here, and it would be uncharacteristic for either one of them, so it’s safe to count them out on this play. Otherwise the Lakers would need a spectacular recovery to the rim by AD, who does not look like he’s in any heat seeking missile-style stance to explode back into the play.

Think Giannis recovering to block Ayton’s alley-oop in the 2021 Finals. That level of play is rare. Don’t expect AD to summon that in the first game of a long season, but he is one of the handful of players in the league capable of it. 

Another passing option is the corner.

But seeking corner 3’s when you have a 2-on-1 advantage converging on the rim is not the best process. Having the vision and awareness of an open corner shooter is still ideal here, but it would really have to come down to (situation and) convincing shooting personnel – Randle is the one wide open in the corner in this instance. He shot 35.4% on catch-n-shoot 3-pointers last season – 1.06 PPS. This calculus changes when it’s Donte DiVincenco standing there – 40.7% on catch-n-shoot 3’s for 1.22 PPS, but the decision should still be the rim. 

Rui is the one meeting Ant at the rim. It might not matter who is at the rim, Ant will remain undeterred. 

Ant has already created so much expected value at this point, where his uncontainable athleticism has awarded him three great options: the lob to an open Gobert, his own finish at the rim against a rotating defender, and an open corner catch-n-shoot for Randle. 

Ant ends up loading up and rising around Rui for a finish with the foul, and-1. As a 69% finisher in the restricted area last season (1.38 PPS), it’s hard to blame Ant for taking it himself, and credit must be given for the finish. Also have to note that the extra free throw tacked on probably does not happen with the lob, and Ant carries a healthy free throw rate over from last season (0.325 FTr). But there is a higher chance of missing the field goal compared to a pin-point lob.

The decision might not matter – if the shot misses, it appears likely Rudy can mop up the mess since he is best-positioned for a roll off the rim.

Contingent on misses, this naturally dependent facet of Gobert’s game can help prop up team efficiency during poor shooting stretches. But while Gobert’s putback efficiency from last season was strong (67.5 FG% – 1.35 PPS), it is not as potent as a lob dunk.

At the same time, the potential second shot efficiency on this play should be partially credited to Ant, since the defense was beaten so badly, and they were so far out of position for a defensive rebound as well. In this specific instance with no one else around the basket to contest the board, Rudy could comfortably finish a hypothetical miss. 

Ultimately, Ant gets two points on the play, with a chance at a third (which he got). No need for Gobert’s involvement. But over the course of the season, over the course of a playoff series, or even over the course of an individual game, the accumulation of the quality of decisions add up. The margins stack up, so the process of finding the most optimal shots possession-by-possession has to be a concerted, conscientious effort, and a developed habit over time. 

Orlando is starting to pull away from the Heat in the second half. Anthony Black faces an aggressive Miami point-of-attack defense in this instance. With Paolo releasing freely on the roll, the conventional read is available.

AB’s height gives him the ability to simply dump this pass off over the top of Jimmy and Jaquez to Paolo, giving Paolo a rotating defender to attack, and a numbers-advantage on the weakside to potentially make a pass and keep the defense in rotation. 

Bam is the backline defender responsible here for rotating to Paolo. 

Coming over from guarding Wendell Carter Jr., Bam is just beginning to lean towards Paolo for a routine rotation to the short-roller. 

However, AB zigs here where most would zag. Sensing the momentum of Bam – slight as it is towards Paolo in an entirely valid defensive decision by Bam – AB subverts this reasonable intuitive defensive expectation, and zips a pass into WCJ at the elbow.

While Paolo would have received a 2-on-1 situation with WCJ vs Bam (and possibly a 3-on-2 situation if Highsmith rotates to WCJ in a timely manner), WCJ is now the one receiving the pass and the 2-on-1 scenario vs Bam with Paolo the one cutting to the rim. What’s the difference? 

Per NBA.com/stats, Paolo’s points per shot on cuts was 1.28, while WCJ’s was 1.39, the better bet in a vacuum. Last season, Paolo led Orlando with 10.2 potential assists per game, and WCJ had 2.9, not bad for a center. Point being, no matter who here receives the advantage from Anthony Black out of the pick-n-roll, both players are capable of being the one to make the next pass, or the one to finish at the rim off a cut. It speaks to the versatility of the Magic’s frontcourt and their overall play-making ability.

If a hypothetical interior rotation by Highsmith subsequently occurred and the rim was covered, the Heat’s perimeter rotations would then be tested, as KCP in the corner would be the next conventional open read

and then Harris above-the-break following that.

Since the Heat decided to put two defenders on the ball at the point-of-attack off the jump, this is the defensive path they have chosen for themselves. After Highsmith, Herro would need to be on the way to the corner to KCP, with Jimmy or Jaquez heading to Harris. When the rotations are tight, it’s definitely doable.

But the play-making chain never got that far. It didn’t need to – the dominos quickly fell into what resulted in a jam by Paolo.

Bam was caught off-balance by this alternative chain of advantages. Disoriented for a moment and left scrambling, Adebayo could not catch up on the play, as a quick connective pass by WCJ to Paolo resulted in the secure flush (80/88 on dunks last season – 90.9%, and this one was even two-handed), only desperately contested by Bam.

AB was presented with an obvious choice for the standard play, and thus predictable links in the play-making chain, but he used a little imagination and ingenuity to mix things up. AB successfully getting off the ball vs two defenders and following the natural stem of decisions out of this situation is the perfectly right play to make. Credit to him for creating another way though, puncturing the middle of the floor with the pass and giving WCJ great access to options, where he instantly found Paolo flowing to the rim.

AB’s knowledge of defensive assumptions, his size, vision and manipulation all played a factor in what culminated in a dependable two-handed dunk for the Magic’s best scorer. Pretty good. 

Beginning of the fourth quarter and the Spurs are down by double-digits. While double-digit comebacks are becoming more frequent in today’s league, it is still a steep challenge as less than a quarter of teams successfully overcome that type of deficit. San Antonio will need to make the most out of every offensive possession down the stretch, on top of getting stops, to get back into this one. With 21 seconds on the shot clock, Chris Paul is leading the Spurs into their early offense. Expected points on any given possession fall precipitously every second that ticks off the shot clock, and Paul is looking for an early opportunity to strike. 

For the Spurs’ attack, their fifth player Keldon Johnson, who had inbounded the ball, has yet to even cross half-court, let alone enter this snapshot. Still, there is advantage to be had by getting into this drag screen action quickly; the lowest defender three seconds into this possession is Maxi Kleber on the weakside elbow,

which is not particularly low for a low-man. But that is how far back he was able to get in three seconds. Looking further into the paint as a whole, Maxi’s left foot is the only defensive establishment the Mav’s have in the paint at the moment. No other Maverick is near the paint, and all are even further from the rim. 

Chris Paul is already highly aware of the entire defense’s positioning, and the subtle offensive dynamics in motion. The Mavericks are in the middle of switching the Chris Paul-Jeremy Sochan screen.

Klay was up on the screen initially, so his switch assignment becomes more challenging here on out; he has to catch up to the cutting Sochan while simultaneously closing the pocket pass window. Meanwhile Sochan has the head start, slipping out of this screen and diving into the open waters of the current paint. 

Sochan has only just placed his left foot inside the arc,

but he’s already the most dangerous threat for a rim attempt in this moment. Jeremy has turned his hips out of the screen, and he’s now facing the rim as he makes his cut. Klay, now his primary defender, is positioned on the top-side of Sochan, trailing the cut. In a race to the rim, Sochan will beat Klay, and last season Sochan made 72.7% of his finishes stemming from cuts. Pretty good. 

All Chris Paul has to do now is deliver the ball. A temporary, momentary passing window, and perhaps a tight window for many players, but this is Chris Paul. 

Luka could probably do more here to obstruct the passing window. He knows better. 

The Spurs should already be favored to score this possession, even as soon as this moment, but the play is not over. A quick strike on a leading bounce pass by the pick-n-roll maestro to Sochan would threaten a defensive concession and test the recoverability of the Mavericks’ weakside. Kleber, who is not facing the rim like Sochan, and also does not have momentum towards the rim like Sochan, must catch up in a race to the rim for any chance to thwart the Spurs.

Incredibly, Kleber was able to close the gap and make a spectacular block at the rim. 

After receiving the pass, players in Sochan’s position should understand the speed of recovery required by Kleber here to make a play, as well as the instinctual desperation to catch up to the play, and use that momentum against the late, frenzied rim protector. A simple shot fake for Sochan would do the trick to send Kleber out of the picture and/or send himself to the free throw line. 

In the end, the Spurs were not able to string together enough buckets or stops in this one, falling to Dallas 109-120.

The post NBA Freeze Frame: Volume 1 appeared first on Swish Theory.

This piece is not meant to give a firm rubric for how to evaluate players, but to catalogue tried and true methods of contributing on a basketball floor that happen to be present for all our best players. No two superstars are the same; in fact, superstars by their nature should be polarized as solving the problems of how to beat each other. If, then, they are all doing the same thing, over and over again? We should take note.

Trait #1: High Degree of Accuracy on Steals/Blocks

Ingredients: Spatial awareness, hand strength, timing, wingspan, positioning, balance

The game of basketball is about winning battles, but it’s also about how convincingly we do so. Swish Theory’s Roshan wrote about the same in his fantastic piece on margins.

Every superstar player I watched the prospect tape of has one, glaring trait in common: they all have superb hand-eye coordination, and exhibited on strips and blocks. One can pick up on these high degree of difficulty plays a few ways. How fast does the player move his arm or hands to make the play? How difficult was it to do so without fouling? Was this a repeated occurrence?

My favorite, though far from exclusive, way to assess these is “dead arm” steals/blocks. Hakeem Olajuwon is the prime example. Hakeem was not immune to jumpiness on the block, likely majorly to do with him being relatively new to basketball. Regardless, Olajuwon made spectacular plays constantly from his first minutes. These “dead arm” blocks would occur when he left his feet at a sub-optimal time, but was still able to angle his arm to knock the ball loose. An example is at the 12 second mark above: Olajuwon leaves early but is still able to fall in the perfect position to block the shot.

This is the clearest cut and least controversial category: visually, it should stand out dramatically, though not always the case, either.

Why is this so important?

Hand accuracy is essential to playing basketball for obvious reasons, but maybe some less than obvious ones as well. Steals are extremely valuable in completely stopping a possession and starting a favorable offensive set (advantageous transition) but also speak to the incisiveness a player is able to bring to the table.

To step into a play and completely strip your opponent of the ball is a dominant activity, completely going against what your opponent wants you to do. To accomplish that you have to take a timely risk, and the only way it can pay off is if you have the hands and coordination to pounce. This all happens in a flash: either you come out with the ball or you don’t.

These players are not just poking the ball free. They are doing so from awkward angles, or if in good position, convincingly so. The Dwyane Wade clips are my prime example (starting at 1:57 above). We see a strong vertical in clip 1, a “dead arm” block in clip 2, otherworldly timing in clip 3 and hounding on-ball defense in clip 4. In each of these scenarios he risks a negative outcome – fouling – but is so accurate with his hands and is able to move faster than others to get into the optimal spot. All of this is how Wade accumulated 3.5 stocks to 2.4 fouls at Marquette and 2.3 stocks to 2.2 fouls per game as a pro despite being only 6’4”.

These traits speak to how we play basketball, generally. Are we moving fast, are we accurate, are we on point, timing-wise? Even plodding Nikola Jokic is able to perfectly place his hands to the tune of nearly two stocks per game as a prospect. When someone mugs an offensive player to the point of you getting out of your seat, you know we are getting somewhere.

Trait #2: Pass Through Your Defender

Ingredients: Processing, planning, pass accuracy, vertical, manipulation, creativity, footwork

Switching to the offensive side of the ball, this trait speaks to the creativity and spatial reasoning of a player, while also capturing physical tools like pass accuracy. Going through the players chronologically, our earliest superstars all had one obvious trait in common: they loved to jump pass. Jordan, Olajuwon, Barkley, Robinson, O’Neal and Garnett could all be found leaping to then make a read even within small segments of game film.

A proclivity for jump passes may be counterintuitive: isn’t that the first thing youth coaches tell their players not to do? Well, it is also indicative of star upside. Again like hand accuracy on swipes, jump passes put the prospect in a dangerous situation, at risk of traveling, but stars have the complex tools to make the most of it. Jump passes were less common as the century turned, but could still be found in the prospect tape of almost every superstar.

I broadened the trait from just jump passes, however, to also include any ability to pass through your opponent. Meaning, your defender is in perfect position – no advantage has been created – yet you still find a way to sneak the ball through. Let’s call them advantage-creating passes. This may be well-timed lobs above the opponent’s head a la Stephen Curry, over-the-head outlet passes from Tim Duncan or dump-offs after a sequence of pivots from Dwyane Wade. Jokic, for all the complexities of his game, barely clears the ground anyways, so has little benefit for the exaggerated jump passes of Kevin Garnett, for example. But he still, mostly through timing and pass accuracy, is able to pass directly through traffic on command.

Why is this so important?

Assists are great for obvious reasons: they get you points and your teammates involved. But jump passes/advantage-creating passes are special because they require coordination moving dramatically in one direction while hitting a moving target going a different one. You have to adjust on the fly, either manipulating your defender into allowing the pass or finding an unexpected target at the last second. We should have our antennae ready to pick up on the obvious ‘pass through’ players like Jokic. The important point is that the ball goes from point A to point B despite an opponent standing directly in between. Even simply from a geometric standpoint, there is clearly something special happening, especially if the pass works repeatedly.

Trait #3: One-Two Punch

Ingredients: Balance, shooting technique, touch, coordination, vertical, core strength

Now we’re getting to maybe what is considered a more traditional superstar trait. Perhaps the most important of any we will discuss here, this is the building block for a high-level NBA scorer. A one-two punch is when you can make one quick move into a scoring action. Watching through the clips above one can see that change of pace is essential: how quickly can you organize into a bucket?

The most common one-two punch is the post up turnaround jumper, utilizing horizontal space (where you turn to) while also relying on a vertical to shoot over an opponent. But methods vary dramatically, especially as I reached more contemporary tape. Dwyane Wade loves to use hang dribble crossover into his pull-ups, again using that horizontal space into vertical. LeBron posts into turnarounds but also bullies his way closer to the cup. Steph manufactures horizontal space by running dutifully off-ball, with the ability to quickly move into a shot at the key moment. Jokic is again an outlier, a deadly outside shooter who has to do little to get his high-arching shot off. An important reminder: there are always stylistic exceptions.

Perhaps the two cleanest examples are Jordan and Shaq. Jordan was as fluid as anyone getting into his pull-up out of the post or face-up crossovers. Shaq was a devastating scorer already at LSU, bolstered by his unstoppable post into baseline bank shot lay in. These are staples that not only helped both translate immediately but were essential to them reaching the Hall of Fame status. It does not matter if it’s repetitive if it is consistently effective; in fact, repetitive might be preferable.

Why is this so important?

The game, as always, is about buckets. In a video from my childhood I can’t track down, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar talked about how a player only needs four moves: a right, a left, a fake right into left, a fake left into right. It can be tempting to seek out as much scoring versatility as possible, as indeed that will help stabilize a player’s performance too. But everyone needs a fastball, a building block that only makes it easier to branch off to more complex actions.

The first problem any player has to solve is to put the ball in the basket. Through a one-two punch, a player does not have to depend on their teammates to do so. All of the actions shown above require a high level of coordination, balance, touch, technique. If a player can corral all of those to punch in the gaps succinctly and smoothly, they are likely great athletes. The function is pure: to get buckets. But there’s an essential element of self-generated offense as well.

Trait #4: Go Up and Get It

Ingredients: Timing, vertical (max, repeat, instantaneous), hand size and strength, core stability, spatial awareness

Now we get to go back to our old-school fundamentals: let’s admire the classic rebound. Here is a trait exhibited by each and every superstar we watched, with the evidence fairly clear. “Go up and get it” sounds like it means: these players are excellent at snagging the ball at its peak.

Olajuwon is again a prime example, unparalleled in the apex he reached while perfectly timing his boards. You also have players like Charles Barkley, who make up for lack of height by doing a lot of work clearing out space on the ground, but nevertheless are able to leap at the perfect moment. Even Stephen Curry (5.6 board per 40), Dwyane Wade (8.4) and Chris Paul (4.6) punched above their height as guard rebounders, all capable of plucking the ball out of the grasp of taller players.

The most significant deviation, and perhaps surprisingly, was Tim Duncan. Duncan, simply, did not need to high-point rebounds given his superior positioning. Surely he is capable of snagging rebounds at their peak, one of the elite rebounders in NBA history, but it did not pop on the tape like with others. Instead, Duncan could be found carving out large swathes of territory with his picture-perfect boxout technique. Once again, these are more guidelines than hard and fast rules. Duncan did not need to high-point every single rebound due to other outlier traits; appreciate the function over the method.

Why is this so important?

Running up and grabbing a ball, as reductive as it sounds, is a lot of basketball. Simply put, it is difficult to find a star player who is not at least pretty good at rebounding. It is a building block of the game for a reason. But the tape specifically showed high-pointing the ball as the common visual cue. That places an emphasis on timing and vertical. Much like the previous traits, there is a very brief critical period at which the ball can be grabbed by you rather than someone else.

We also see a reiteration of many athletic ingredients from the prior traits: coordination, balance, timing, vertical, hands.

Trait #5: Unstructured Midrange Touch

Ingredients: Fine motor skills, balance, coordination, hand size, vertical

Perhaps the most impressive on tape were David Robinson and James Harden. Robinson was able to swing around in an instant to knock down midrange after midrange jumper no matter the angle or coverage. Harden, meanwhile, was able to use his incredible core strength to pull off plenty difficult attempts from all over the midrange. He was particularly adept at runners, shooting a 77th percentile efficiency on one per game. On tape the degree of difficulty showed.

Why is this so important?

There is once again an intrinsic basketball value – points are scored – while speaking to so much more. Touch is how you coordinate your hand to push the ball towards the basket; highlighting field goal attempts where a shot is less structured (i.e. different from a free throw which relies more on technique) gives us a cleaner glimpse into how successful one is doing so on the fly. Technique is important too, but easier to learn than touch.

In fact, success with touch near the basket seems to correlate with outside shooting improvement, too. David Robinson improved his free throw percentage from 58% as a freshman to 64% as a senior and then, further, up to 74% over his NBA career. Harden, meanwhile, went from 76% in college to 86% in the pros. Much like accuracy on strips/blocks, high level basketball is about having great hands. Skill is only conveyed through how we manipulate the ball, so we need all the help we can get physically.

We are seeking building blocks, and with unstructured short/mid touch, we have found one.

Trait #6: Drive with Force

Ingredients: Strength, balance, handle, coordination, flexibility

Forgive how this video is shorter; this was the category I added the last. But it likely is not the least important. Drive with force means to attack the basket in, well, a forceful manner. This can be Olajuwon and Robinson relentlessly squaring up to the offensive glass, or, more conventionally, James Harden dribbling hard to the basket from the perimeter. But it could also be Stephen Curry driving into his opponent’s shoulder without the ball before popping out for a three. Or Jokic lumbering towards the tin.

LeBron is the obvious example, often compared to a freight train when downhill. But this trait was most essential to note in a young Giannis Antetokounmpo. Extremely slender as malnourished at the time, Giannis nevertheless attacked the basket with the same ferocity we see today. While his role was to jack threes rather than drive to set up offense, Giannis made his chances through activity in transition or broken plays. In the absence of positive midrange touch indicators, Giannis’ driving was essential to preserve his route to superstardom.

Why is this so important?

Force is an important element in basketball, as these are strong players moving fast through space. Driving with force means inviting physicality as the initiator. While people often talk about gravity in basketball as referring to spacing at the three point line, there is a much denser pull towards the rim. An open layup is the best shot in basketball, and a free throw is the second best. Driving with force works towards achieving either one or the other.

Putting It All Together

Tallying up the ingredients shows us some underlying characteristics we can prioritize: balance, vertical, coordination, hands, core strength. While these provide a good baseline for physicality on the basketball court, I would remember that they are only useful tied together with concrete action, such as the six traits I highlighted above. Every one of the six actions involves a critical window which requires an immediate, durable application of these underlying characteristics. The more traits a player exhibits, and the more convincingly they do so, the better.

The goal with this piece, more or less, was to tie together player archetypes, competition contexts and age curves to note standard action items. With the six traits above, I have picked what has stood out to me the most as omnipresent in the prospect tape of past stars.

The post Spotting the Stars appeared first on Swish Theory.

Star Wars has the shameful second and third trilogies (Revenge of the Sith exempt here). Jurassic Park has created a lot of slop. Ghostbusters continues to churn out garbage. The Matrix creators decided a fourth movie was necessary for whatever reason. All devoid of the original magic that made them great.

The Terminator franchise is the most apt when I think about the current Warriors. The first movie was fantastic, something new the masses had yet to experience, much like the 2015 Warriors. They somehow came out stronger with T2, akin to the KD-era title teams. T3 was not as good as the first two, yet they managed to pull it off like the plucky 2022 Dubs.

Then the rebooting began, and the magic was lost. Terminator: Salvation still had their Steph Curry equivalent in Christian Bale, yet everything else failed to live up. Chris Paul did his best Sam Worthington impression, utterly without lift. Bryce Dallas Howard mailed it in like Andrew Wiggins, which I suppose makes The Village her 2022 Wiggins playoff run?

Like the IP holders of the Terminator franchise, the Warriors are faced with a choice: do we keep making the same movie and hope for a different result? Or try something new and reap the potential rewards?

The Crossroads

We’ve all seen the stories by now. Steph wants a winning situation. Klay Thompson is a free agent with suspected suitors. Draymond Green is under contract, but the patience may have run out.

It’s not as hopeless as many would make it out to be. The fans of the other 29 teams have been waiting to ring the death bell of the Warriors for some time. They tried to ring it once before, and that didn’t pan out. But even if the title hopes are gone, this team still has some meat on the bone.

Assuming the core trio stays together, the predictable outcome, GM Mike Dunleavy Jr. has things to work with. Chris Paul, Andrew Wiggins, Gary Payton II, and Kevon Looney have all made themselves expendable. That’s over $73 million that can be moved. Paul’s $30M is completely non-guaranteed, and Looney only has 3 of his $8M guaranteed, making them ideal expiring contracts to move. Wiggins is a tougher sell with one more year at $28.2M, but the right tanking team won’t mind.

I hope for Andrew’s sake that he can continue to cash the checks while spending the time with his family that he needs in these difficult past couple of years.

They’re also possessed with strong trade incentives to go with the salary. They can move at least two first-round picks with Jonathan Kuminga, Moses Moody, and even Brandin Podziemski or Trayce Jackson-Davis if they so desire. I’m not advocating for one deal or another. The point is that options are out there.

The Desired Path

I think I can speak for most Warriors fans in saying the last thing we want to see is the core being shattered this offseason. The chance of returning to a higher contending status is narrow, but it exists. The right trades and use of cap space could see them recover some of the old magic, and title #5 or no we’d all like to see them give it another try.

Equally disastrous as the nuclear option would be to continue chugging along with the current formula. Trotting out the old IP like a lazy studio executive. Make moves on the fringes, use all the draft picks to add more inexperienced talent, and continue to be content with mediocrity. That would be the path that takes a Steph trade decision out of their hands.

Retain the core. Be aggressive with trades and free agency. The rarest thing in basketball is to have a core this accomplished that starts and ends their careers together, and the fans would love to see it happen. It’s something we may never see again in the league. Riding off into the sunset with a whimper would be devastating. The front office must give them a chance to go out on their shield. Hopefully, this soul-crushing end to the season gives them the motivation needed to do so.

Let’s get something new and imaginative to put a bow on this. Don’t have next season be your Terminator: Genisys.

The post The Rebooting of the Warriors appeared first on Swish Theory.