A picture is worth a thousand words, but I will keep it to less than that per picture.

At this point, Anthony Edwards has obliterated the point-of-attack defense for a 2-on-1 situation with Rudy Gobert vs Rui Hachimura, encroaching on the restricted area. The gather has been made, and his momentum is downhill. A moment in time for Ant to make his decision, with several options at his disposal. 

Ant has done so much good work to this point. What originated as a handoff from Gobert out of a sideline inbounds, Ant has already left his immediate defenders Austin Reaves and AD dusted.

(Also wanted to note that Ingles set an off-ball screen that put Reaves a half step or more behind the handoff to begin with, to Ingles’ credit)

But for all intents and purposes, Ant has created a full advantage, overcoming both point-of-attack defenders. Rui steps up in help, as he should.

And that leaves Gobert wide open at the rim. The Wolves are one pass away from an open rim finish, one of the best results attainable on any given possession. Rudy is even starting to point up and call for the lob.

Per NBA.com/stats, Rudy was 73/78 on alley-oop dunk attempts last season, good for a 93.6% completion percentage and 1.87 points per shot (PPS). Pretty good. However, when Rudy was forced to adjust to the pass or was unable to easily and securely dunk it, his alley-oop layup numbers fall off dramatically: 6/14 on alley-oop layup attempts (42.9%, 0.86 PPS), cutting expected points down by over a whole point. 

This could be an easy alley-oop dunk. Does Gobert’s notoriously clumsy hands influence Ant’s decision? With a moment to decide, is there trust for the passer to execute the delivery, and the receiver to cap it off?

What defenders have a path to making any sort of play on the potential lob pass? Both Reaves and Knecht are at a huge size and positioning disadvantage to cover Gobert here, and it would be uncharacteristic for either one of them, so it’s safe to count them out on this play. Otherwise the Lakers would need a spectacular recovery to the rim by AD, who does not look like he’s in any heat seeking missile-style stance to explode back into the play.

Think Giannis recovering to block Ayton’s alley-oop in the 2021 Finals. That level of play is rare. Don’t expect AD to summon that in the first game of a long season, but he is one of the handful of players in the league capable of it. 

Another passing option is the corner.

But seeking corner 3’s when you have a 2-on-1 advantage converging on the rim is not the best process. Having the vision and awareness of an open corner shooter is still ideal here, but it would really have to come down to (situation and) convincing shooting personnel – Randle is the one wide open in the corner in this instance. He shot 35.4% on catch-n-shoot 3-pointers last season – 1.06 PPS. This calculus changes when it’s Donte DiVincenco standing there – 40.7% on catch-n-shoot 3’s for 1.22 PPS, but the decision should still be the rim. 

Rui is the one meeting Ant at the rim. It might not matter who is at the rim, Ant will remain undeterred. 

Ant has already created so much expected value at this point, where his uncontainable athleticism has awarded him three great options: the lob to an open Gobert, his own finish at the rim against a rotating defender, and an open corner catch-n-shoot for Randle. 

Ant ends up loading up and rising around Rui for a finish with the foul, and-1. As a 69% finisher in the restricted area last season (1.38 PPS), it’s hard to blame Ant for taking it himself, and credit must be given for the finish. Also have to note that the extra free throw tacked on probably does not happen with the lob, and Ant carries a healthy free throw rate over from last season (0.325 FTr). But there is a higher chance of missing the field goal compared to a pin-point lob.

The decision might not matter – if the shot misses, it appears likely Rudy can mop up the mess since he is best-positioned for a roll off the rim.

Contingent on misses, this naturally dependent facet of Gobert’s game can help prop up team efficiency during poor shooting stretches. But while Gobert’s putback efficiency from last season was strong (67.5 FG% – 1.35 PPS), it is not as potent as a lob dunk.

At the same time, the potential second shot efficiency on this play should be partially credited to Ant, since the defense was beaten so badly, and they were so far out of position for a defensive rebound as well. In this specific instance with no one else around the basket to contest the board, Rudy could comfortably finish a hypothetical miss. 

Ultimately, Ant gets two points on the play, with a chance at a third (which he got). No need for Gobert’s involvement. But over the course of the season, over the course of a playoff series, or even over the course of an individual game, the accumulation of the quality of decisions add up. The margins stack up, so the process of finding the most optimal shots possession-by-possession has to be a concerted, conscientious effort, and a developed habit over time. 

Orlando is starting to pull away from the Heat in the second half. Anthony Black faces an aggressive Miami point-of-attack defense in this instance. With Paolo releasing freely on the roll, the conventional read is available.

AB’s height gives him the ability to simply dump this pass off over the top of Jimmy and Jaquez to Paolo, giving Paolo a rotating defender to attack, and a numbers-advantage on the weakside to potentially make a pass and keep the defense in rotation. 

Bam is the backline defender responsible here for rotating to Paolo. 

Coming over from guarding Wendell Carter Jr., Bam is just beginning to lean towards Paolo for a routine rotation to the short-roller. 

However, AB zigs here where most would zag. Sensing the momentum of Bam – slight as it is towards Paolo in an entirely valid defensive decision by Bam – AB subverts this reasonable intuitive defensive expectation, and zips a pass into WCJ at the elbow.

While Paolo would have received a 2-on-1 situation with WCJ vs Bam (and possibly a 3-on-2 situation if Highsmith rotates to WCJ in a timely manner), WCJ is now the one receiving the pass and the 2-on-1 scenario vs Bam with Paolo the one cutting to the rim. What’s the difference? 

Per NBA.com/stats, Paolo’s points per shot on cuts was 1.28, while WCJ’s was 1.39, the better bet in a vacuum. Last season, Paolo led Orlando with 10.2 potential assists per game, and WCJ had 2.9, not bad for a center. Point being, no matter who here receives the advantage from Anthony Black out of the pick-n-roll, both players are capable of being the one to make the next pass, or the one to finish at the rim off a cut. It speaks to the versatility of the Magic’s frontcourt and their overall play-making ability.

If a hypothetical interior rotation by Highsmith subsequently occurred and the rim was covered, the Heat’s perimeter rotations would then be tested, as KCP in the corner would be the next conventional open read

and then Harris above-the-break following that.

Since the Heat decided to put two defenders on the ball at the point-of-attack off the jump, this is the defensive path they have chosen for themselves. After Highsmith, Herro would need to be on the way to the corner to KCP, with Jimmy or Jaquez heading to Harris. When the rotations are tight, it’s definitely doable.

But the play-making chain never got that far. It didn’t need to – the dominos quickly fell into what resulted in a jam by Paolo.

Bam was caught off-balance by this alternative chain of advantages. Disoriented for a moment and left scrambling, Adebayo could not catch up on the play, as a quick connective pass by WCJ to Paolo resulted in the secure flush (80/88 on dunks last season – 90.9%, and this one was even two-handed), only desperately contested by Bam.

AB was presented with an obvious choice for the standard play, and thus predictable links in the play-making chain, but he used a little imagination and ingenuity to mix things up. AB successfully getting off the ball vs two defenders and following the natural stem of decisions out of this situation is the perfectly right play to make. Credit to him for creating another way though, puncturing the middle of the floor with the pass and giving WCJ great access to options, where he instantly found Paolo flowing to the rim.

AB’s knowledge of defensive assumptions, his size, vision and manipulation all played a factor in what culminated in a dependable two-handed dunk for the Magic’s best scorer. Pretty good. 

Beginning of the fourth quarter and the Spurs are down by double-digits. While double-digit comebacks are becoming more frequent in today’s league, it is still a steep challenge as less than a quarter of teams successfully overcome that type of deficit. San Antonio will need to make the most out of every offensive possession down the stretch, on top of getting stops, to get back into this one. With 21 seconds on the shot clock, Chris Paul is leading the Spurs into their early offense. Expected points on any given possession fall precipitously every second that ticks off the shot clock, and Paul is looking for an early opportunity to strike. 

For the Spurs’ attack, their fifth player Keldon Johnson, who had inbounded the ball, has yet to even cross half-court, let alone enter this snapshot. Still, there is advantage to be had by getting into this drag screen action quickly; the lowest defender three seconds into this possession is Maxi Kleber on the weakside elbow,

which is not particularly low for a low-man. But that is how far back he was able to get in three seconds. Looking further into the paint as a whole, Maxi’s left foot is the only defensive establishment the Mav’s have in the paint at the moment. No other Maverick is near the paint, and all are even further from the rim. 

Chris Paul is already highly aware of the entire defense’s positioning, and the subtle offensive dynamics in motion. The Mavericks are in the middle of switching the Chris Paul-Jeremy Sochan screen.

Klay was up on the screen initially, so his switch assignment becomes more challenging here on out; he has to catch up to the cutting Sochan while simultaneously closing the pocket pass window. Meanwhile Sochan has the head start, slipping out of this screen and diving into the open waters of the current paint. 

Sochan has only just placed his left foot inside the arc,

but he’s already the most dangerous threat for a rim attempt in this moment. Jeremy has turned his hips out of the screen, and he’s now facing the rim as he makes his cut. Klay, now his primary defender, is positioned on the top-side of Sochan, trailing the cut. In a race to the rim, Sochan will beat Klay, and last season Sochan made 72.7% of his finishes stemming from cuts. Pretty good. 

All Chris Paul has to do now is deliver the ball. A temporary, momentary passing window, and perhaps a tight window for many players, but this is Chris Paul. 

Luka could probably do more here to obstruct the passing window. He knows better. 

The Spurs should already be favored to score this possession, even as soon as this moment, but the play is not over. A quick strike on a leading bounce pass by the pick-n-roll maestro to Sochan would threaten a defensive concession and test the recoverability of the Mavericks’ weakside. Kleber, who is not facing the rim like Sochan, and also does not have momentum towards the rim like Sochan, must catch up in a race to the rim for any chance to thwart the Spurs.

Incredibly, Kleber was able to close the gap and make a spectacular block at the rim. 

After receiving the pass, players in Sochan’s position should understand the speed of recovery required by Kleber here to make a play, as well as the instinctual desperation to catch up to the play, and use that momentum against the late, frenzied rim protector. A simple shot fake for Sochan would do the trick to send Kleber out of the picture and/or send himself to the free throw line. 

In the end, the Spurs were not able to string together enough buckets or stops in this one, falling to Dallas 109-120.

The post NBA Freeze Frame: Volume 1 appeared first on Swish Theory.

Not only will this piece analyze their games up to this point, but also give home remedies to fix what has gone astray. Developmental time when you enter “the league” is highly variable, dependent on draft slot, training staffs and existing personnel. But these players are often already a season behind given poor fitting one-and-done campaigns. Let’s see if we can’t help to set the new crews off on the right foot.

Dereck Lively (RSCI #2, Pick #12 to Dallas Mavericks)

Lively has perhaps the largest discrepancy between strengths and weaknesses in this class, and it wasn’t always clear Duke knew which was which. His up and down season included an early season benching, no longer starting as of the second week of January, but was able to bounce back by season end. His offensive toolset paled in comparison to the more versatile Kyle Filipowski, but defensive dominance is perhaps better suited for the pro game.

My favorite trait of Lively’s is his complete discipline on the defensive end of the court. Watching his pre-college tape alerts one to how this is: playing next to also-elite rim protector Jalen Duren in AAU, Lively learned to move all about the court and have an impact, not just stand near the hoop. Controlled aggressiveness has always been the name of the game for the seven-footer: a description likely worth a lottery pick at face value. His 5.2 fouls per 40 minutes I attribute more to just how many actions he covered, and not unprecedented in elite rim protector prospects (see: Joel Embiid’s 5.8 per 40).

The offensive end is limited in the strictest sense of the word. He is limited in that he has zero post moves and poor touch with the ball, but is able to find areas of value regardless. Returning again to his two-big lineup days, Lively is excellent passing to the interior, a coveted trait for a player of his size. He is able to seek passing windows for drop offs, even occasionally dribbling once or twice to create the space. He truly reminds one of Boston’s Robert Williams III in his ability to let go of the ball quickly despite zero shooting gravity. Expect him to be effective at dribble hand offs as well as empty side pick and rolls, anywhere he will be less rushed with a gap to create even a little.

Rookie Year Remedy: Rim First, Always

There is plenty to like about Lively as an NBA player, #8 on my board. But to insure he sets off on the right path, it’s important to tie him to his livelihood: the rim. Lively is an excellent roamer, but his size and technique better suits a hedge and recover big. If there is one area Lively lacks on defense, it is rim-first approach: he prefers to hunt out the action regardless of where it is. Instilling rim-first defensive principles is essential to him reaching that lofty All-Defense potential, an item Duke failed to preach, harmed by his inconsistent role.

While there was all kinds of hubbub about Lively’s three point shooting potential leading up to the draft, that is a highly unrealistic outcome in my mind for a 60% free throw shooter who made *1* midrange shot all season. In his rookie year with Dallas, Lively should be either 1. In the dunker’s spot, or 2. Hitting a body and rolling to the hoop, at any given point. Oftentimes at Duke he looked in no man’s land, setting a screen into a pre-failed action: that will not be the case with Luka, and makes it all the more important to know exactly where to space.

Brice Sensabaugh (RSCI #49, Pick #28 to Utah Jazz)

It is difficult to understand how Sensabaugh was ranked so low coming out of high school, or why he came off the bench for Ohio State. He has every sign of a unique scoring talent, eating up midrange space as a prospect to then let the feathery touch do the rest of the work. The defense needs work, but that is often the case for premier scoring talents like Brice.

First of all, the numbers – Sensabaugh shot 172 midrange attempts and made just short of half of them. Only Grant Williams and Marcus Morris exceeded his midrange volume and efficiency, and Brice had only 18% of his makes assisted compared to 50% for Grant, 43% for Morris. There is a good case to be made for Brice as the best midrange scorer in recent NCAA history.

So then, why did he fall to the 20s?

The defense, at times, is indeed indefensibly bad. Worst of all is the assignment confusion, a threat to his NBA playing time when player movement is ramped up to a far greater degree. Counteracting this is his defensive rebounding, where his rates of securing boards looks indeed like athletic wings, similar to that of Paul George or Miles Bridges in college. Brice is a big body, and knows how to leverage it in a timely manner when locked in. This gives us hope.

The passing is the other nitpick, and much more nitpicky. Passing is more context dependent than defense at a college setting, and Sensabaugh’s unique scoring traits make him a square peg in round hole for most traditional systems. I saw plenty of talent in him moving the ball, particularly adept at understanding how to make even a shallow drive into a kick. He will never be an offensive conductor, but you want Sensabaugh to finish plays anyways, rather than start them.

Rookie Year Remedy: Work From the Corners

The biggest benefit to Sensabaugh in an NBA system will be how he can no longer be the primary focus of opposing defenses. Sensabaugh struggles to get first steps on opponents, but is excellent at maximizing whatever margin is available. If he can lean into a spot up first, midrange craft second approach as a rookie, he can leverage his teammates’ scoring to help his own, and passing.

On defense as well, keeping Sensabaugh away from the action and close to the tin for rebounding purposes is the way. He will certainly be targeted in switches, where it will be essential for him to stay disciplined – his low steal rate and fairly high foul rate point to a poor decision-maker as it comes to trying to play-make on defense. He can be often found swiping where he shouldn’t, determined to compensate for lack of foot speed.

Utah has a bit of a challenge in finding how to maximize Sensabaugh’s unique talents, but Brice playing inside of his game can help shorten that journey.

Noah Clowney (RSCI #74, Pick #21 to Brooklyn Nets)

Clowney had less of a flawed season and more of a narrowly-defined one. He accepted a role player position at Alabama as a top-100 recruit in Nate Oats’ structured system, a three-and-D power forward between prized Brandon Miller and veteran Charles Bediako. Clowney filled the role admirably, putting up the fifth best Box Plus-Minus grade of any high major freshman.

Watching Noah’s pre-NCAA tape you see mostly the same, but there is intrigue along the fringes. The type that certainly tipped the Brooklyn Nets into seeing more. Most notably, I think Clowney can pass. Not guard-level passing, but adequate for a big, reminding me a bit of Minnesota’s Josh Minott the draft before. He cannot dribble beyond once or, maybe, twice, but when he does he makes the right play more often than you’d expect (for someone who can’t really dribble). The technique needs work, but you can see the outlines of a viable DHO conductor. Clowney got very little practice with the ball on a stacked Bama team, so it’s difficult to say what the ceiling is.

The archetype is swell: Clowney can block some shots, hit some threes, and use his size, strength and touch to finish inside and rebound. Unfortunately, his shotblocking is closer to good than great, three point shot closer to bad than good. But what I was most impressed with is how decisive Noah is when he gets the ball near the basket. His one-step craft to finish is indeed good, and, as Clowney is still not even 19, may end up very good.

Rookie Year Remedy: Play the 5

Now, I just pointed out Clowney lacks high-end polish and consistency across the court…you want him to take on more responsibility? Yes.

Clowney has the physique to hang in the interior, if not the discipline yet. But as a middle-of-the-pack squad lacking a big man floor spacer, the Nets can do worse than giving Clowney some bench run. As the five man, Clowney can refine his interior discipline, often caught contesting on his feet but leaning too far over, allowing his opponent to draw easy fouls. Rep those traits out of him while you have the chance.

Additionally, Clowney with a clean paint will allow him to experiment in ways he was prohibited at Alabama. Despite not being close to a focal point of the offense, Clowney had 27 dunks (6 more than Brandon Miller) and shot a very strong 64% on non-dunk rim attempts. He only took 25 midrange shots but hit half of them, encouraging that his touch is more effective inside the arc. As some more encouraging stats, when Clowney played without Bediako on the floor his free throw rate rose from 0.27 to 0.64; his rim rate from 35% to 56%; his rim finishing from 67% to 74%. He shot fewer threes but gained efficiency everywhere.

Clowney is unlikely to ever be a starting center or power forward, but by letting him run as a backup 5, he may improve both skills. He is strong enough at his core to eventually handle the more physical assignments, let him prove his offense against that.

Cam Whitmore (RSCI #12, Pick #20)

 Whitmore is a high-flying tank, a tornado of activity with a punch, punch to the rim. It’s easy to mix metaphors for a player whose movements make little sense. He’s a stout 232 but has one of the quickest first steps in the class. He is a power mover who can also chop his legs. I would not like to guard Cam Whitmore.

So, why am I lower on him? Well, first of all, he’s quite predictable. Whitmore loves his left, almost always utilizing a combination of a lefty in and out, crossover into either pull-up or straight line acceleration to the rim. The issue is the complexity and flexibility: despite the magic of his movements, it is still tough at the size of a torso to chain together quick moves.

On top of that, Whitmore does not seem like a very creative player. Much of his pre-NCAA production came from transition play, which, yes, that absolutely should be a priority of his NBA game. But he also misses open passes, some obvious rotations, and generally prefers to go from point A to point B without a flexion point in between.

I’m optimistic on him being a plus defensive player simply due to the significance of his physical tools; that quick of a step at that size is going to get blocks and especially steals. Steals are as valuable of a task one can complete outside of putting the ball in the basket. But when it comes down to papering over all the little items opponents can exploit in high-stakes matchups, it is not clear Whitmore is up for the task.

Rookie Year Remedy: Keep It Simple

I run the risk of being low on Whitmore in the same way I was too low on Bennedict Mathurin: NBA teams will be able to cover up for his weaknesses by getting him in his optimal spots. In particular, a young team like the Houston Rockets should be more than happy to run with Whitmore on the wings. Fortunately, he will not need to create many advantages on his own when playing off of Amen Thompson, passing extraordinaire, allowing him to catch the ball when already downhill. The combined pace and vertical talent of those two will be extremely difficult to contain in the open court.

The defensive end might be trickier, on a team that had the second worst points allowed per possession last season. The Rockets still lack an identity on that end, but might do best to lean into their hectic event creators of Tari Eason and Amen as steal mavens: a constantly roaming crew would also make the transition into transition easier.

The minutes breakdown in Houston will be fascinating to watch this year. But they have at their disposal, now, such a dynamic of talent that in order to take advantages of their weakness you may have to first disable their advantages. Leaning into Houston’s collective strengths with quite the store of talent will yield some unexpected results; many of those involve Whitmore as a major player.

Dariq Whitehead (RSCI #1, Pick #22 to Brooklyn Nets)

There was not a single prospect who deserved to have his season tape thrown out than Dariq. With a foot injury that required surgery before the season which never properly healed and a lower leg strain mid-season, Whitehead never looked close to his usual self. It is painful to even watch him try to move around the court wearing a Duke jersey; I cannot imagine what it felt like. Here’s hoping he undergoes the recovery he deserves.

To imagine what he might look like on the other side, we resort more to his high school and AAU tape. Whitehead was arguably the best player in all of high school basketball, rated first in the entire class by RSCI as well as winning the Naismith High School Player of the Year Trophy, back to back national championships and the MVP award for the McDonald’s All-Star Game. While Whitehead’s teams often featured other NBA-level talent, he stuck out consistently for his poise under pressure and contributions across the court.

Dariq is not without flaws as a prospect, but may be without any significant enough to call a true weakness. His athleticism is tilted more towards pace and balance than burst and power, but he is still able to win on first step and dunk above rim protectors here and there. I would advise against putting him on the quicker guards, but he should have no issue finding a suitable assignment on the wing. Whitehead simply contributes across various axes: his constant activity and nose for advantages means locating rebounds, rising and firing in a crowd, excelling at connecting passing but capable of throwing advantage-creating ones as well.

Whitehead has long been a favorite of mine to watch, and I feel a disservice to him in not being selected until the 20s. The NBA draft, first and foremost, is about imagination, even if it’s not obvious on the surface. Whitehead may not recover his full athleticism, but he was always more of a problem-solver than nuclear athlete anyways.

Rookie Year Remedy: Pindowns Galore

For once, it would be nice if things were made easy for Whitehead. From essential connector piece as a HS underclassman to shouldering the usage load as a HS upperclassman to just trying to stay on the court at Duke, he has fought for all he’s taken. I am proposing making it easier on Dariq.

My two favorite Whitehead weapons are the quickness with which he can get his shot off and his ability to stay upright on drives. Wrap those up with some decisive and creative playmaking and you have yourself an excellent play finishing prospect, especially if he stands at 6’6’’. I trust Whitehead perhaps as much as any in the class to make a dribble-pass-shoot decision off the catch while moving through a crowd, so here’s hoping that’s the desired destination for the Nets in getting Dariq up to speed.

Jordan Walsh (RSCI #17, Pick #38 to Boston Celtics)

If you got by Jordan Walsh, no you didn’t. Jordan Walsh has about as ideal as possible recovery tools on the defensive end. Inevitably, even the shutdown defenders lose a step to a true-blue offensive star. The basketball court is tilted towards the offense as the holder of the first move, and how little space it takes for many to get a shot off. But after the gap is created, Walsh will be as good as any at crawling back into perfect position; in fact, many of his steals and blocks came from what would be considered a disadvantageous position.

Walsh is the best shutdown defender prospect in this class, and the best I can remember in recent classes. Unfortunately for Walsh and other such as Usman Garuba, being a lockdown defender does not always guarantee playing time, especially if, as both of them are, you are an offensive liability.

Jordan almost certainly will be a negative on offense, but I am here to argue there is a chance he will not, and perhaps much greater than you think. The shot is where we start, inaccurate but not broken, as there is a lot to like: a simple one-two motion, decently set feet, but inaccuracy due to spatial issues (he throws inaccurate passes here and there) and a bit exaggerated of a form. Both can be fixed by corner three reps, as his 71% from the line, 28% from three and 36% on deep twos point to 33%+ on open threes potential.

The more significant reason for optimism lies in his tape from Link Academy. While inactive most of his time on offense for Arkansas, at Link he was the key to both their transition offense and connecting their half-court offense. He looked far more confident on the move, as with the Razorbacks could get overwhelmed in catch and drive situations. But I see a real passing threat as Walsh is highly creative for a wing and has the athletic tools to take advantage, or else get to the rim. Time to think at Arkansas meant overthinking, but again we see a lane for some offensive value.

Rookie Year Remedy: Just Belong

Walsh gets my most esoteric suggestion, as he simply needs to relax and trust the system on offense. That will be much easier, hopefully, in an ironed out NBA system with a longer view on Walsh’s role. Boston acquiring an early second round draft pick to take the defensive stud – a type they are long familiar with – is encouraging that he will be brought along at the right pace. Obvious from the tape, Walsh loves technique and being in the right place: the Celtics’ infrastructure should encourage that.

To get more concrete about the basketball court, Boston could use some additional front-court athleticism, particularly attacking the rim. Walsh is a stellar vertical athlete, clocking a 33 inch standing vert on top of a 7’1.75’’ wingspan. He is always vigilant on the court, and letting him leak out early in transition could do wonders for his offensive confidence. It may be ugly here and there, but when you have a talent of high athleticism with some creative potential, ugly may be worth putting up with. When remembering we are talking about a potential All-Defense level defender, the rewards of even slight offensive improvements could be spectacular.

Nick Smith Jr (RSCI #3, Pick #27 to Charlotte Hornets)

Nick Smith Jr., perhaps more than anyone on this list, put everything on tape at Arkansas that you would want, if you look for it. Most notably, in his 25 point, 6 assist, 4 steal, 3 rebound, 1 block masterpiece versus Kentucky, or similar 20+ point outputs with stats elsewhere versus Alabama, Georgia, UNC Greensboro and Oklahoma. In these games we see the sell for NSJ, quite obvious: he can score on the ball as easily as off the ball, and will work as hard as he can to be positive everywhere else. The passing is the “swing skill” – if he is indeed the PNR maestro he appeared before Arkansas, which I think he might be, Nick has real All-Star upside.

The shot and, more specifically, the touch is where the pitch starts with Smith, lofty for a guard but instead in a player with a 6’9’’ wingspan. That wingspan and touch mean any shot within 12 feet is available as a floater; his vigilance as a scorer and strong technique make him a threat beyond; his ease of fluidity into pull-up make his range endless despite the wiry frame.

As a pure scoring prospect, there are a few items you could ask for that Nick lacks: his first step is okay (made up somewhat by shiftiness), he has little strength (made up somewhat by aggressiveness) and he can be a bit programmatic getting into his actions. But even that is mediated by Nick’s unique head for finding the right action.

Time and again in watching Nick Smith’s tape, his team used him as a sort of offensive cure-all. Need to set up the primary action? He is a suitable custodian for the ball and adept in PNR. Need to come up with a counter quick? Nick is decisive with good enough handle and passing instincts to set up secondary. Shot clock running out? No shot is a bad shot for a shooter of Nick’s level.

Yes, his shooting efficiency was poor at his time with Arkansas. But knee injuries throw off the entire kinetic chain, making splits tough to judge without proper oomf into gather. At EYBL, Smith shot 56% on 8 twos per game and 38% on 5 threes per game. That is, flat out, both elite volume and efficiency, enough to wipe away any doubts. The tape as well shows ideal technique and the ball time and again falling softly off the rim through the net, if touching the rim at all, from every angle and release point imaginable. Buy it.

Rookie Year Remedy: Let Him Take the Hits

I mean this in a quarterback’s sense, as in, it’s tough to get into a rhythm without taking part in the physical aspects of the game. Nick is an aggressive player by nature, a rarity in his aesthetically-minded offensive archetype and beanpole frame. At every level of competition he can be seen helping aggressively when needed (sometimes when not), flailing around the court and picking up a surprising amount of loose balls and even blocks by virtue of activity. Smith struggled to provide this as often at Arkansas as in years prior, limited particularly in his ability to turn corners, previously much quicker.

NSJ needs not just to grow into his frame, but also continue to find ways to maximize his physicality as a way to win when speed does not. Again unusually for type, Smith has proven capable of finishing through traffic, even yards away from the rim with his touch. If he’s able to get to those spots and hold them down more consistently, that touch can do the rest of the work.

Jalen Hood-Schifino (RSCI #20, Pick #17 to Los Angeles Lakers)

The Schifino section might be the shortest as, well, I have the fewest hard takeaways about his game. JHS was extremely unproductive as a freshman with Indiana, in a context I don’t think was particularly unfair to him. While Hood-Schifino looks the part on the court, good stance and technique generally, he is the single least productive one-and-done first round pick in the barttorvik.com database.

JHS stood out at the NBA Combine with his seven-foot wingspan, which, in conjunction with a strong frame makes him a physical presence. However, the physicality stats lag: he only had 4 dunks all season, only rebound 1.6% of opportunities and had very low steal and block rates. He only took 76 free throws and the exact same number of rim attempts. Hood-Schifino survives, rather, on tough shotmaking.

While falling short of Sensabaugh’s midrange dominance, 90 for 216 (42%) is nothing to scoff at, especially considering JHS struggles mightily to create separation. He gets into his shot pocket almost automatically regardless of position, a rare trait. But scoring prospects need easy buckets, and those were few and far between for Jalen. While his finishing touch and creativity is good, he struggled to hit openings, stuck taking difficult rim attempts. This, along with mixed three point results, dropped his true shooting percentage below 50% – a tough pill for a shotmaking prospect.

If, rather, you view JHS as a table-setter, I have qualms as there too. For someone who looks in ready-set position at any given point, Schifino makes a shocking number of careless errors. Whether not executing a pass fully or not concentrating when catching the ball, a 19% turnover rate for someone with fairly basic offensive responsibilities is another red flag.

Finally, the defense. I want my table-setters to get into their opponent’s body, or at least be constantly roaming to use their length. JHS doesn’t really do either of those, evidenced both by his low stock rates and the tape where he’s seen getting disconnected from his man fairly often. The margins are small for this type with plenty of guard competition; JHS’s wingspan stands out, but is he using it?

Rookie Year Remedy: Shoot, Shoot Some More

The promised land for JHS, as well as the Lakers, relies in Hood-Schifino’s tough shotmaking. It is astounding at times how unbothered he is despite have zero breathing room to get a shot off. With a quick, high release, I trust him to get his tough FGA when he wants it, even if easier creation looks never come.

With LeBron on the team, JHS won’t have to table set if he doesn’t need to, and instead can run off of screen after screen to create that separation. His 6.1 threes per 100 possessions will hopefully be the fewest in his career, as 3s > 2s and JHS has no issue launching from distance.

I struggle to see JHS changing his tune as it comes to productive stats as the precedent would be too severe compared to his stats profile at Indiana, but it is still just one season. His pedigree, playing with the top HS and AAU teams in the country, should help him fit in on a win-now team, as he certainly looks like a pro when he steps on the court. But the carelessness is a quick way to be taken out and lose important development reps.

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With the 37th pick of the 2022 NBA Draft, the Dallas Mavericks selected former 5-star recruit, Jaden Hardy, out of the G League Ignite. Standing at 6’4″, Hardy brings an intriguing skillset to a Mavericks team in desperate need of more ballhandlers. Hardy loves to get to his shot and he flashed advanced shot-making and self-creation throughout his time with Ignite, though not without room for improvement.

While the flashes are nice, Hardy badly needs to improve his efficiency for him to have a positive impact on the offensive side of the floor. In 25 games for Ignite, Hardy rocked a 52% true shooting percentage and took far too many early clock and heavily contested jumpers for my liking.

Despite this, I remain confident he’ll improve his efficiency, as his free throw shooting (82%) and shot volume/diet are both great indicators of ++ touch while I trust an NBA coaching staff and a simplified role to clean up the shot selection a little bit. Where most of my concern lies with Hardy is his finishing at the rim. He shot a paltry 49% at the cup this past season and really struggled with size, length, and contact, pointing to functional strength and vertical pop deficiencies. Finishing against NBA bigs will likely compound this problem, and could seriously limit his upside as an on-ball creator if he doesn’t improve.

Luckily for Hardy, he should thrive in a more off-ball role next to a creator like Luka as his off-ball movement and catch-and-shoot ability are both at a good level at this point in his career. He’s shown the ability to attack closeouts well, and while the rim finishing will continue to hurt him here, his passing game really grew as the G League season went on, suggesting an avenue to success in attacking and making reads against a tilted defense. Meanwhile, his off-the-dribble shotmaking could give the Mavs and Luka a release valve similar to the one Jalen Brunson provided to the team.

Where Hardy has Improved Already

I’m going to quickly outline some areas that Hardy has already improved in to give us a good idea of his current development trajectory and where we can expect his improvements to come.

As I mentioned earlier, Hardy’s passing has improved a bit already, trading tougher shots that he was taking earlier in the season for smarter decisions. Overall, the game just slowed down for him as the season went on, showing some really nice instances of poise, control, and playing at his own pace in situations where he previously panicked or rushed to get to his shot. Continuing to improve in this area will really help his efficiency and even his finishing at the rim as he picks and chooses when to attack a little better.

Defense

The defensive end of the floor is a bit less promising for Hardy. As a point-of-attack defender, he gave up blow-bys far too often, frequently getting beat as a result of a poor gamble, body orientation, or screen navigation. With lackluster strength and recovery skills, a Hardy blow-by almost always guaranteed a good shot opportunity for the opponent and is something to monitor as Jason Kidd attempts to get him acclimated to playing defense at the NBA level. There may be room for optimism as Hardy’s plus wingspan and active hands already bother opposing players at times. A lot of growth could come from simply getting more minutes and understanding as a part of an NBA defense.

As an off-ball defender, Hardy wasn’t great either, rotating and playing passing lanes well at times, but also missing tags or rotations here and there due to ball-watching or lapses in concentration. Again, a lot of this should in theory improve with time, but it is still important to note the level he’s at now.

Conclusion

All in all, Jaden Hardy is a really fun prospect who, if he continues to make improvements to his game, could make a lot of teams regret letting him fall to the Mavericks. While he’s started the season out of the rotation, expect him to grow into a larger role for the Mavs as the season goes on.

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Entering his third season with the Mavericks, Josh Green’s path to positive value is becoming clearer by the day. Green is extremely quick laterally and expertly mirrors ballhandlers all over the court. The 6’5″ guard is a tenacious defender, often picking opponent guards up full court and chasing them around the court. Green is especially adept at making defensive plays in transition: just look at him sneak up on Nemanja Bjelica to regain possession here for the Mavs.

Green is a great defensive playmaker in general, leveraging his crazy quick hands and excellent anticipation to rack up 1.54 steals per 70 possessions, good for the 32nd most among qualified players in 2021-22. Look at the anticipation and hand-eye coordination that make this steal against Steph Curry possible. Not many players across the league are capable of making this play.

While Green still gets caught by screens here and there, he’s shown enough possessions of good screen navigation to make me confident he could soon be a big plus there too (hence the inclusion of the skill up top). As an off-ball defender, Green has displayed excellent instincts and often pokes the ball away from the nail or one pass away. He’s got great defensive feel, rarely missing a rotation and using his anticipation to jump passing lanes. When you put together good defensive instincts AND great physical tools, you get a guy that has an All-Defensive ceiling, and that is exactly what I see in Green even if the minutes are not yet there.

Once he forces a turnover, Green is a weapon in transition, beating his opponents across the floor and utilizing his vertical athleticism to finish strong. The rest of Green’s offensive game, on the other hand, is still a work in progress. As on defense, Green is a ball of energy on the offensive end, crashing the class with force, but also can look jittery with the ball in his hands at times (Mavs fans refer to it as ‘hot-potato’). He’s a really good passer, quick decision-maker and cutter but held back by his limitations as a scorer. Through roughly two seasons thus far, he’s shot 31.7% from three on only 1 attempt per game (2.38 per 70 poss.). This past postseason, he found himself out of the rotation once the Suns decided to pay absolutely no attention to him on offense. Their defense essentially left him unguarded and were able to shrink the court, making generating any sort of offense in the halfcourt extremely difficult. I’ve touched on it before, but in my eyes, Green’s struggles from three and scoring may be more mental than anything. Green struggled with a short leash under Rick Carlisle, letting misses get to his head and discourage him from trying things on offense. With some regained confidence under Jason Kidd last year, Green was able to showcase a bit more, even posting a 10-assist game against the Trail Blazers.

From a purely mechanical view, Green’s shot doesn’t look too bad. His slight valgus collapse appears to have messed with his transfer of energy somewhat. He still has signs of it this year, but the transfer of energy seems cleaner (perhaps a product of a narrower base and more lift) and I’m interested in seeing the results.

If or when he can figure out the shot, everything else should fall into place rather nicely. As I mentioned earlier, he really is a pretty special passer, and forcing stronger closeouts from the defense consistently could allow him to attack them more and weaponize his passing further.

As far as self-creation goes, it’s pretty easily Green’s rawest skill as his handle is rudimentary and his lack of a left-hand greatly limits his finishing in the halfcourt (in addition to the shooting woes). It’s part of why I don’t really buy him as a ‘ball-handling’ option for the Mavs off the bench despite what some of the reports have suggested. Still, Green doesn’t need to be the one driving offense to have a positive impact; his role as a connector is what makes him special.

Conclusion

Josh Green’s breakout feels imminent. As his confidence continues to grow and more and more of those 3s start to fall, Green could quickly become one of the more valuable role players in the entire league. He already plays excellent defense both on and off the ball, is a one-man wrecking ball in transition, has shown to be a willing and capable passer, and is an intelligent mover off the ball. Once that shot starts to go down and he commands stronger closeouts, he’ll be the perfect connective piece for Luka Doncic and the Mavs.

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The NBA draft may be over, but for teams across the league, the development process has just begun. Contrary to what most think, success in the draft is more than just making the ‘right’ pick. What happens after draft night is where the real magic starts to begin. Through this article, I hope to illuminate what this looks like for both the best and worst drafting teams in the league, as we take an up-close and personal look at the cultures, habits, and infrastructures that makes each NBA organization unique.

The Price of a Pick

To understand how teams have performed in the draft relative to expectations, we have to first understand the value of a pick in each draft range. Luckily Seth Partnow from The Athletic has seemingly already done that for us.

Now that we have a rough idea of how players in a certain pick range turn out, let’s see which teams have been able to consistently outperform these pick expectations. To keep my sample size large enough while also accounting for more modern team infrastructures, I’ll be looking at data from 2010-2018.

Right away, we can see some rather obvious underperforming and overperforming teams. Across the board, it’s very clear that average draft position has been nowhere near a guarantee for success, but we’ll get into more of that later.

In an attempt to recreate Partnow’s plot in a more team-specific way, I hand-tracked draft pick outcomes for each team. While teams like the Kings are easy to spot as obvious underperformers, it’s not as simple to see how others have fared. To combat this, I reordered teams based on a very rough ‘relative draft value’ metric shown above. I set up a point system for teams where they were rewarded set points for each outcome they drafted, where they got the most points for drafting a franchise/core player and less for each outcome below that, all the way down to the bust outcome where points were actually subtracted. These values were chosen based on a similar method to the one used in my draft model, which you can read more about here. While it is a pretty rough metric, it gets the job done.

As a caveat, there are some limitations to this exercise due to its imperfect nature. I tried to match Partnow’s process to assign outcomes as much as possible (outlined in more detail here), but it’s impossible to do so completely. As addressed earlier, my sample size is also smaller than his to try to account for modern/current front offices, but some teams didn’t draft enough in the time period to confidently say whether they did well or not. Another important note is that some of these players were developed by teams other than the teams that drafted him (this doesn’t apply to draft day trades, these are accounted for accordingly), but the original drafters received credit. While this might impact results, I don’t think it was severe enough to make a truly big difference. Finally, I didn’t include undrafted players in this exercise, so teams that traditionally do well with undrafted players didn’t shine as brightly (looking at you Miami, and, to a lesser extent, Dallas). With that out of the way, let’s dive into the results.

Is It Good Drafting or Good Developing?

This question is tricky. Are teams that are finding themselves successful in the draft better at identifying talent or developing it? In all likelihood, it’s a mixture of both and varies from team to team, but my aim is to examine different teams’ infrastructures to try and answer this. As a reminder, this is more a review of a team’s past rather than an indictment of their future. Some of the poorly performing teams have recently made the necessary steps to improve their draft strategy and player development infrastructure.

The Best of the Best

Denver Nuggets

Total Picks: 23

Average Draft Pick: 35

Pick Outcomes: 47.83% Bust, 8.7% Just a Guy, 21.74% High Rotation, 13.04% Top Starter, 4.35% Borderline All-Star, 4.35% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 6

Total Data Analysts: 1

G-League Team Affiliation: 2021-Present

Though the Nuggets’ draft success extends past drafting one of only two second-round MVPs in league history, let’s start there for a moment. Nikola Jokic was the least known prospect within a very strong 2014 Nuggets draft class that included both Jusuf Nurkic and Gary Harris. Jokic represents one of the earliest cases I’ve seen of what draft twitter likes to call ‘pre-drafting’. As PD Web explains in the linked article, the practice is essentially selecting a player a year before they become a more ‘mainstream’ prospect. Interestingly enough, according to an article from The Athletic, this practice is a pillar in the foundation of the Nuggets’ draft strategy, with a clear emphasis to draft prospects before their true breakout season.

However, the Nuggets’ draft work doesn’t stop after they identify talent. For former head of basketball operations, Tim Connelly, and the rest of the front office, player development is where they can really gain an edge. Player development for the Nuggets starts and ends with assistant coach John Beckett. Beckett is a former video coordinator with the Hawks who was initially hired by Denver as a player development coach in 2015 before quickly working his way to his current position on Michael Malone’s staff. For Beckett and the Nuggets, game-like situations are the bread and butter of their player-curated development workouts. This means getting a lot of threes up for Jamal Murray and a lot of off-ball work for Michael Porter Jr. Approaching player development through this lens has paid dividends for the Nuggets, helping improve Malik Beasley and Monte Morris in addition to those already mentioned.

With the return of Jamal Murray and Michael Porter Jr. this season, we’ll finally get to see the complete vision of a homegrown Nuggets team shaped by the player development habits and proactive draft strategy cultivated throughout the past decade.

Los Angeles Lakers

Total Picks: 21

Average Draft Pick: 37

Pick Outcomes: 47.62% Bust, 9.52% Just a Guy, 23.81% High Rotation, 14.29% Top Starter, 4.76% Borderline All-Star, 0% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 7

Total Data Analysts: 4

G-League Team Affiliation: 2006-Present

Somewhat to my surprise, the Lakers have done an excellent job of finding value in the draft relative to their average position. Despite picking 37th on average in the draft, the second lowest average selection, the Lakers have managed to find a large number of guys that have stuck in the league. So, how have they done it? The Lakers simply optimized G-League player development quicker than other teams. They were the first NBA franchise to own a G-League (then known as the D-League) team, gaining ownership with their current affiliate, the South Bay Lakers, way back in 2006. Since then, the Lakers have used South Bay as a place for rookies and young players without a path to minutes on the NBA roster to gain valuable game time, experience, and development. As of 2021, a staggering 36 former South Bay Lakers players had been called up to the NBA, with two trips to the G-League finals (2012, 2016) under their belt. Notable South Bay Lakers alumni in the time frame (2010-2018) include Alex Caruso, Ivica Zubac, Mo Wagner, Gary Payton II, Josh Hart, and Thomas Bryant.

Philadelphia 76ers

Total Picks: 28

Average Draft Pick: 26

Pick Outcomes: 46.43% Bust, 14.29% Just a Guy, 25.00% High Rotation, 3.57% Top Starter, 7.14% Borderline All-Star, 3.57% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 8

Total Data Analysts: 5

G-League Team Affiliation: 2013-Present

The Philadelphia 76ers fielded what is probably the most infamous bad team in modern sports history in the early stages of our selected timeframe. The Process Sixers weren’t just known for being bad, they were known for embracing it. Before delving deeper, my first thoughts on the 76ers draft success were “Oh, they just had more opportunities to give their rookies as a historically bad team”. After a little bit of research, I found this could not be the only explanation.

The 76ers do, in fact, play their rookies a lot, to the tune of fourth most in the league over the chosen time period. However, many other franchises that prioritized rookie playing time have not had close to the same level of success. Similarly, there were teams that played their rookies a lot less, on average, yet have had great success in drafting and development. Upon closer inspection, it seems that in addition to giving their rookies ample opportunities, the 76ers are just better at talent identification than most teams. Sometimes, it really is that simple. A lot of their success in the draft has simply come from hitting on almost every single lottery pick they’ve had. From Joel Embiid to Ben Simmons to even Dario Saric, the Sixers have generally nailed that portion of the draft. This outperformance even includes two instances of unusually bad injury luck from the selections of Markelle Fultz and Zhaire Smith. The Sixers are no slouch when it comes to drafting in the second round either, drafting both Jerami Grant and Richaun Holmes before they blossomed on other teams. Not every team has a winning formula when it comes to developing young players, but luckily for the Sixers, they’ve already won half the battle with their excellent eye for talent.

Utah Jazz

Total Picks: 18

Average Draft Pick: 32

Pick Outcomes: 44.44% Bust, 22.22% Just a Guy, 22.22% High Rotation, 0% Top Starter, 0% Borderline All-Star, 11.11% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 20

Total Data Analysts: 1

G-League Team Affiliation: 2014-Present

The most apparent thing about the Jazz is they realize the importance of the draft. They have what can only be described as an army of professional scouts, 20 to be exact, more than any other team I’ve looked at for this exercise. The immediate conclusion to draw here is that the Jazz are just great at talent identification, similarly to the Sixers, but in this case, there’s more to it than what meets the eye.

There is one man arguably more responsible for the Jazz’s draft success than any other and that man is Johnnie Bryant. Similarly to John Beckett with Denver, Bryant was hired as a player development coach back in 2012 by the Jazz before being promoted to assistant coach in 2014. Prior to his hiring, he had gained a reputation for his independent skill development program (Bryant Sports Academy) and worked with multiple NBA players, including All-Stars Damian Lillard and Paul Millsap. His first success story with the Jazz came by working with former Jazz player Gordon Hayward on his way to becoming an All-Star. Since then he’s helped develop many Jazz players, most notably Rudy Gobert and Donovan Mitchell, the latter of which he helped scale to a primary option after being drafted with the expectation of having a smaller role.

For Mitchell, Bryant reportedly conducted “individual workouts, pregame shooting routines and film sessions — scouting opponents, reviewing games, watching other stars to try to learn their tricks.” Bryant’s help with playmaking and capitalizing on shooting gravity quickly made Mitchell one of the more dynamic guards in the league. According to Donovan, Bryant obsessively watches film, combing over hours of footage and taking notes to find ways his players can improve.

Off the court, Bryant develops a close relationship with his players, giving them a member of the staff they know they can trust. This aspect of the game is often overlooked but is of the utmost importance. The more mentally comfortable a player is, the easier it is for them to perform at their highest levels. With Bryant having departed recently to the Knicks, we’ll soon see if the Jazz’s reliance on him was as great as I expect.

San Antonio Spurs

Total Picks: 17

Average Draft Pick: 40

Pick Outcomes: 52.94% Bust, 17.65% Just a Guy, 11.76% High Rotation, 5.88% Top Starter, 5.88% Borderline All-Star, 5.88% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 5

Total Data Analysts: 5

G-League Team Affiliation: 2007-Present

We’ve all heard it a thousand times, but it needs to continue to be said. The San Antonio Spurs are the golden standard. Bar none. The success they were able to maintain for so long without dips in form is nothing short of incredible and a lot of it has been thanks to their success in the draft. Despite having on average the lowest draft position in the whole league and no lottery picks throughout the entire time period, the Spurs managed to draft Kawhi Leonard, Dejounte Murray, Derrick White, Kyle Anderson, and countless other quality NBA players. It goes without being said that development had to be a part of their success with these later draft picks, and after examining the Spurs’ philosophy, it is clearly the main driver.

With many teams, player development is mainly focused on key young players. The Spurs take it to a whole ‘nother level. To put it simply, if you are on the Spurs, your development will be prioritized, all the way down to the end of the bench. Take, for example, Davis Bertans, who, entering the 2017-18 season, was a 25-year-old former 42nd overall pick coming off of a season in which he put up 4.5 points per game in only 12.1 minutes per game. You’d think Bertans would be the last person the Spurs would be focusing on in the 2017 offseason. You’d also be wrong. According to an ESPN report by Michael C. Wright, the Spurs went as far as to send a player development coach all the way to Europe to monitor and work out Bertans as he competed with Latvia in Eurobasket 2017. One $80 million contract later, I’m sure Bertans is glad he landed with the Spurs. This commitment to the development of every last player on the roster, along with ace-in-the-hole shooting development coach, Chip Engelland (the person responsible for revamping Kawhi Leonard’s shot), has allowed the Spurs to continue to win along the margins and keep themselves a leg up over the rest of the teams in the Association. With Engelland recently moving on to OKC, we have the opportunity to see how the Spurs adapt to losing arguably the most important figure to their player development operation as they embark on their first true rebuild in over twenty years.

The Worst

Sacramento Kings

Total Picks: 19

Average Draft Pick: 16

Pick Outcomes: 63.16% Bust, 15.79% Just a Guy, 0% High Rotation, 5.26% Top Starter, 10.53% Borderline All-Star, 5.26% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 8

Total Data Analysts: 5

G-League Team Affiliation: 2016-Present

*Sigh*Roll the video.

Ahhh, the Sacramento Kings. You know we have to start with them. To be blunt, the Kings have been terrible for the better part of two decades now and their inability to draft and develop their lottery picks has left them drowning underwater. On top of that, the Kings have, whether intentionally or not, fostered a culture of instability and uncertainty. Since 2006, the last time the Kings made the playoffs, the franchise has gone through twelve different coaches, alienated two star players in Boogie Cousins and Tyrese Haliburton, and attempted to relocate the franchise to another city. Now, to be this organizationally inept, a lot of things need to have gone wrong, but it all starts at the top. While he should be commended (by Kings fans at least) for fighting to keep the team in Sacramento, Vivek Ranadive’s inability to keep himself out of sporting decisions has led to years of basketball failure. According to the Sacramento Bee, Ranadive has contributed to what has been described as “a ‘toxic’ work environment in which ‘people don’t trust each other’”. The last thing you want from an owner is them meddling in sporting decisions or creating an environment as bad as what’s been described. Luckily, the same report mentioned that Ranadive has backed off somewhat since the hiring of new GM Monte McNair in September 2020, so hopefully greener pastures are ahead for those oh-so-loyal Kings fans.

Dallas Mavericks

Total Picks: 14

Average Draft Pick: 31

Pick Outcomes: 71.43% Bust, 7.14% Just a Guy, 0% High Rotation, 14.29% Top Starter, 0% Borderline All-Star, 7.14% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 12

Total Data Analysts: 4

G-League Team Affiliation: 2009-Present

As a Mavs fan myself, I’ve had a front-row seat view of the bad (and good) decisions they’ve made this past decade. Now, I think there are a couple of things in play here when it comes to their past draft failures. Starting off with what has bothered me the most as a fan, the Mavs simply don’t seem to give their rookies enough opportunities. Looking back at the visual from earlier, they’ve played their rookies a lot less than most other NBA teams, a possible symptom of a team coached by renowned vet-lover Rick Carlisle.

One of my biggest gripes recently has been how they’ve handled Josh Green’s development, at least early on. Coming off a covid-shortened offseason in which he was unable to play in Summer League or have a normal training camp, Green, the last first-round pick the Mavs would have while Luka was on a rookie deal, played 11.4 minutes per game in only 39 total games. This wouldn’t have been much of a problem had he been sent down to the G-League to get meaningful reps, yet the Mavs only briefly sent him down for 5 games. Squandering that much time in a player’s development is inexcusable, especially for a player that clearly needed confidence as Green did. Instead, he played sparing minutes for the Mavs, getting pulled after every mistake, dropping his confidence lower and lower. Luckily, this past year Jason Kidd instilled a little more faith in him and sure enough, Green’s confidence grew and he convincingly solidified himself as a rotation player in the regular season.

Similar to the Kings, the Mavs have also suffered somewhat from owner meddling. These incidents have been well documented with Mark Cuban admitting to being the reason the Mavs passed on Giannis (GM Donnie Nelson wanted him) and the Haralabos Voulgaris situation in 2021 which resulted in a complete overhaul of the Mavs front office, where, like Randadive, Cuban has reportedly ceded a little more control to current GM Nico Harrison and special advisors Michael Finley and Dirk Nowitzki.

Los Angeles Clippers

Total Picks: 16

Average Draft Pick: 36

Pick Outcomes: 75.00% Bust, 0% Just a Guy, 6.25% High Rotation, 6.25% Top Starter, 12.50% Borderline All-Star, 0% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 11

Total Data Analysts: 7

G-League Team Affiliation: 2017-Present

The Clippers’ draft shortcomings seem to be easily explained. At the top of the draft, they haven’t performed too poorly, selecting players like Eric Bledsoe, Reggie Bullock, Al-Farouq Aminu, and Shai Gilgeous-Alexander with their first-round picks. Their issues, instead, come from whiffing on almost every single second-round pick in the same time period which appears largely attributable to under-investment in player development.

Unlike their Los Angeles counterparts, the Clippers didn’t have their own G-League affiliate until 2017 as the Ballmer era got underway, previously sharing the Bakersfield Jam with the Phoenix Suns from 2009-2014. As such, most of these second-rounders either received little to no minutes riding the bench, or were sent to another team’s affiliate where they weren’t developed by members of the Clippers organization. Now with their own G-League team, officially the Ontario (previously Agua Caliente) Clippers as of July 2022, they should be able to flip the script on their second-round success. In fact, we may already be seeing the results of these improvements taking place, with 2019 second-rounder Terance Mann becoming a valuable rotation player after playing 20 games with their new affiliate. In a similar way, Amir Coffey, an undrafted second-rounder in 2019, has been a positive player, contributing 12 points, four rebounds, and three assists per game in 30 games as a starter. Coffey was Agua Caliente’s leading scorer in 2020-21.

Trending in the Right Direction

Memphis Grizzlies

Total Picks: 18

Average Draft Pick: 33

Pick Outcomes: 77.78% Bust, 5.56% Just a Guy, 5.56% High Rotation, 11.11% Top Starter, 0% Borderline All-Star, 0% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 5* (some basketball ops guys are functionally scouts)

Total Data Analysts: 4

G-League Team Affiliation: 2014-Present

Although the Grizzlies were awful at drafting and developing talent in the time period I looked at (2010-2018), the organization has turned a corner since. This change has coincided with executive Zach Kleiman’s rapid ascension to his current position as “lead basketball operations executive and personnel decisionmaker” in 2019 and the subsequent hiring of new basketball ops personnel with fresh ideas (over 30 new hirings to be exact). Since then, the Grizzlies have nailed almost every draft pick they’ve made, drafting franchise cornerstone Ja Morant and surrounding him with a plethora of quality homegrown/drafted talent, including Desmond Bane, Brandon Clarke, Xavier Tillman, and Ziaire Williams. With 2022 draft selections Jake LaRavia, David Roddy, Kennedy Chandler, and Kenny Lofton Jr. already showing promising flashes in preseason, it seems like the Grizzlies have struck gold again.

In regards to player development and infrastructure, the Grizzlies have utilized their Memphis Hustle G-League team well since its inception in 2017, with five members of their 2021-22 roster (including former G-League Player of the Month Kyle Anderson) having spent time in the development league. They rely on their former players’ expertise as well, with Tony Allen hired as a player development coach for the Hustle in January 2020.

What We’ve Learned

When we discuss draft success, talent identification seems to be the main focus, with Bleacher Report redrafts constantly making the rounds on social media. In reality, draft success is the confluence of numerous organizational factors, of which 4 key pillars have emerged: organizational stability/clarity, talent identification, opportunity allocation, and, most importantly, a strong developmental infrastructure. Teams need to be hiring more player development coaches, as the secret to a lot of these good drafting teams is that the players they draft get to work with somebody like Johnnie Bryant, John Beckett, or Chip Engelland the second they arrive in town. Right now, there are simply not enough player dev coaches on most teams to sit down individually with every single player and help them with their development.

The focus tends to mainly be on high-profile prospects like Donovan Mitchell, but so much value could be added by focusing on the others too. The Spurs have perfected this science, using developmental success to sustain a 22-year playoff streak. On the other end of the spectrum, we have the Kings, where organizational instability amongst other things has led to 16 years of playoff despair. Can they close the gap? It’ll be hard, but in a copycat league, the roadmap to success is there for all to follow.

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