It must also be said that these teams have just the right amount of neanderthal DNA to, sure, probably get curb-stomped by OKC in round 2, but to put on a show in the meantime. Through two games, WTF moments in the clutch and jagged edges — like Jokić’s defense and Dunn’s offense…Ben Simmons — have not subtracted intrigue, but added character. With a 1-1 split heading into Thursday’s game 3, each team has lost the game they played better in. These teams are weird! Anyway, let’s get to it.

Denver’s incomplete defense on Kawhi

Let’s start with the big stuff. Kawhi Leonard dropped 39 points in Game 2 after a poor Game 1, and the Denver Nuggets didn’t really adjust how they defended him when he got it going. Though he melted their face off with absurd shot-making, I’ve actually liked Denver’s overall philosophy vs. Kawhi. He got going early in Game 2 by feasting on cross-matches in semi-transition, but the Nuggets didn’t panic because they’ve been conceding switches and loading help toward him anyway.

That’s a fine plan, and they’ve been able to execute it without allowing Kawhi to create easy shots for his teammates, though Kawhi shoulders a chunk of the credit/blame there too. He has not made quick decisions with the ball in his hands.

But that didn’t save Denver in Game 2 because they didn’t finish possessions against Kawhi, hence the “incomplete” tag. The man is inhuman, and has proven that, with healthy legs, he can win series by performing how he did in Game 2, where he shot 15-of-19 from the floor. So Denver has to finish possessions, there is no point in showing help against him if it is indeed just for show (sound on):

Denver shouldn’t fear the possibility of Kawhi putting on a passing clinic by throwing cross-court lasers and manipulating defenders with his eyes. Over his 13 NBA seasons, that’s never been his M.O., and it still isn’t. That’s why LAC stays away from pick-and-roll led by Kawhi, given a near-turnover like this…

Just as important, the Clippers are always playing a poor 3-point shooter. Every single one of Kawhi’s minutes through two games have seen Kris Dunn, Derrick Jones Jr., or Ben Simmons on the floor with him, and occasionally two of those guys. Furthermore, any strategy geared toward forcing turnovers and speeding up the Clippers plays to Denver’s advantage.

They recorded the 7th-fastest pace in the NBA this year (PBP Stats) and had, by miles, the lowest 3PA rate. That’s a formula that limits randomness/shooting variance; playing at a slow pace and allowing Kawhi to get up 16 jumpers is not.

The idea of attacking Kawhi is frightening in any context, but in Game 3, Denver just might have to. They’ve thrown a lot his way thus far, but the kitchen sink remains in their back-pocket.

Limiting LAC’s two-man game

Let’s keep it on this end of the floor, where the Harden/Zubac pick-and-roll feasted in Game 1. Harden, looking quite spry, looked to get all the way to the basket, and in the first half, Nikola Jokić often did little more than escort him there…

Since then, Denver has played Jokić much higher up the floor, if not outright trapping or hedging ball-screens. (An awesome, very minor subplot of this series is Harden finding every angle possible to hit Zubac on the roll while Jokić tries to deflect those passes, just about the best hand-eye coordination battle you’ll find.)

The major subplot is what happens once Zu catches the ball, and it feels like both teams have left something on the table here. Zubac can make rudimentary reads quickly enough, and has gotten Kris Dunn a few layups off baseline cuts. However, they’re nobody’s idea of Draymond Green and Gary Payton II. Dunn has struggled to finish under any defensive pressure, and if they can take away his cut, Zubac has struggled to snap to the next read, a kick-out for three. In fact, his best offense has been simply going to work against whoever steps up to meet him.

Harden is key here, too. The more downhill pressure he applies, the deeper Zu’s catch inevitably is, and these two can play pitch-and-catch as well as any tandem…

After that play in Game 2, Jokić played even higher up the floor, and Denver produced the desired effect: Harden largely stopped trying to get downhill, whether by splitting a screen or by attacking Jokic’s outside hip. Can he dial up the pressure in Game 3 if Denver opens in the same coverage?

How much room do Harden, Zubac, and Dunn have to improve from game 2? To me, it’s a reasonable chunk. If Denver feels the same way, they should try to deny Zubac on the roll altogether. In this first play. Michael Porter Jr. helps off of Dunn to deny Zu, and Norm Powell promptly turns the ball over. In the second play, MPJ doesn’t leave DJJ, Zu catches it, and it leads to a wide-open three:

Yes, DJJ is on the strong-side in play #2, but perhaps gambling off him is worth preventing any sort of deep catch for Zubac.

The Harden/Zubac two-man game that so much of LAC’s offense is built around is in a fascinating spot entering Game 3. Each team has reason to adjust; for the Clips it could be setting the screen higher up the floor or making sure a 3-point threat is weak-side corner. Still, “play better” could simply be the adjustment.

If Denver believes the Clippers will indeed play better, they could get funky and put Aaron Gordon on Zubac, Jokić on Dunn, and switch screens. They’ve tried that on a single possessions so far, and it didn’t end well…

They could send more early help to take away Zu’s roll, but they might just feel confident where they’re at. We’ll soon see.

Will Jokić start launching?

As for that infamous two-man game on the other side, the Clippers have done fairly well defending Jamal Murray and Nikola Jokić so far. Kris Dunn deserves the lion’s share of the credit, as he’s been responsible for chasing Murray into tight, mid-range spaces, but then switching back out onto Jokić when he pops, otherwise known as a veer-switch. It looks something like this:

Jokić hands him three points, but this is the coverage the Clippers opened with in Game 1, and, 101 minutes of hoop later, they’re still leaning on it. Though Jokić shot 4-of-8 from deep in Game 2, it felt like he ignored five or six clean looks, many coming on pick-and-pops like this.

There are other ways for the Nuggets to counter this defense from the Clippers. Jokić simply rolling to the basket and posting Dunn or Derrick Jones Jr. has led to some favorable isolations for him. It also leads to confusion for Dunn and Zubac, when/if they actually commit to the late switch.

But the nuclear code Jokić could push at any time is something he’s always reluctant to do, and that’s to just let it fly. This coverage seems like a bet from the Clippers that, even if goaded into it, Jokić will not launch 12-15 threes in a game, even if he’s shooting just under 42% from deep, like he did in the regular season.

Late in Game 1, the Clippers went another route, pressuring Jamal Murray while meeting Jokić early on his catches. Nekias Duncan did a great job explaining how the Nuggets roasted that coverage; essentially, the Clips were spread too thin, unable to prevent open looks for capable if not elite shooters, and even less able to grab rebounds…

Have the Clippers already found their favorite answer to the Murray/Jokić love affair? Perhaps. The more juice you can squeeze out of Kris Dunn’s defense, the better. But this strategy also keeps them in their shell, keeps Zubac near the rim, and limits the opportunities for James Harden and Norm Powell to get caught ball-watching as cutters sneak behind them.

The real danger is that Jokić melts the Intuit Dome with a 3-point barrage on Thursday night. Does he want to?

Where’s the other two-man game?

Let’s end with a couple quick bites. In Game 1, the Nuggets targeted James Harden on defense by consistently involving Aaron Gordon with Nikola Jokić, either in off-ball screens or inverted pick-and-roll. Perhaps it’s Gordon’s limp calf, but rookie head coach David Adelman went to those actions far less in Game 2.

Why? Perhaps because Harden is the Clippers’ worst defender.

Let me explain: Per Cleaning the Glass, the Nuggets turned it over on a whopping 21.7% of their possessions on Monday, their second-worst mark of the season. Jokić had a rough game with seven of them, and frequently, it was Dunn, Nic Batum, or Kawhi jumping his passing lanes. In other words, the further L.A.’s best defenders were from the ball, the more havoc they wreaked.

The same could not be said of Harden and Powell, who did not provide much help in rotation:

So, with Harden on Gordon, is that why we didn’t see much of Denver’s front-court chemistry in Game 2, or was it an injury? Either way, the Nuggets have to get back to that two-man game, and find Gordon some easy rolls to the rim. The team that shot the highest percentage in the league on shots at the rim (Cleaning the Glass) is shooting just 57% at the rim through two games, which would have ranked as the worst mark in the NBA by light years.

I may know an all-time dunker that can help with that.

Please, Norm

The Clippers will not win this series if Norm Powell and Bogdan Bogdanović continue to struggle so mightily. However, Powell not only hit some huge shots late in the second half on Monday, but was the recipient of an (unscripted) play that stuck in my mind…

It was a rare instance of Norm directly benefiting from the attention his co-stars get, rather than simply trying to emulate them by creating from a stand-still. Even if Jokić isn’t in much drop coverage, the concept still works, getting Norm the ball on the second side with the defense ever-so-slightly out of whack.

There are many more wrinkles to this matchup we could discuss. (Please go look up Kris Dunn’s defensive highlights from this series.) Tyronn Lue has not remotely settled on a substitution pattern, and in Game 2 Ben Simmons was the game’s first sub. Harden also played a chunk of minutes without Kawhi or Zubac, which felt off at the time. The Nuggets are battling injury and fatigue across the board, and seem unsure whether to devote much energy to getting Michael Porter Jr. going.

No matter which of these storylines takes center stage in Game 3 and beyond, we do know that this series has been, and will continue to be awesome.

Prediction: Clippers in 6

The post Round One: Nuggets vs. Clippers appeared first on Swish Theory.

So, this past year, I chose to write about a complement of players, ranging from lottery picks to undrafted free agents, all in various stages of development and with different expectations. I decided the best way would be to continue following these players as their stories in the league were told. There were eight different players I watched film on and wrote about in the past season, and while I continue to follow them, I’ll be adding five new players this season to the watchlist.

I want to capture a variety of teams, skillsets, and sets of expectations in addition to positions. The goal is to blend my expectations for the player with their progress, so while the way I choose to categorize their place in the league is subjective, how their team perceives them is also baked into this. Some show flashes and don’t play often despite opportunities being present, and that has to be accounted for. Conversely, a player who seems trusted in the rotation or empowered to take on certain responsibilities should be recognized as an endorsement of their talent.

So, nearly a quarter of the season, let’s check on how these first 10 players have come along.

Stars In The Making

Bilal Coulibaly

In a series where I focused on role players over rising stars, I didn’t expect to cover multiple players in this category. Yes, Bilal Coulibaly is the highest-drafted player on my list of 13, but few expected the 20-year-old to shift the conversation toward star capabilities so quickly.

Two weeks ago I wrote thoroughly on Coulibaly’s star rise in this league, so there’s not much need to elaborate further. However, I will leave you with this, so draw whatever conclusions you may.

We will check back on Bilal in detail later in the season.

Dyson Daniels

Here’s another unexpected addition to the star list.

After I wrote about Dyson last season, exploring his defensive upside and offensive limitations, Daniels became one of the centerpieces in the Dejounte Murray trade. All at once, his expectations and role changed drastically. He’s an every-night starter now with increased usage on both ends of the floor while also being an 8th overall pick reclamation project.

Daniels had his flashes in New Orleans but was buried on the depth chart and surrounded with similarly skilled wings. He fits their need in Atlanta as a long defensive force on the wings and has been thrown into the fire this year. He’s extinguished the fire defensively. My main question with Dyson scaling up on defense was the fouling relative to the event creation, and how he could stay competitive with primary matchups. He answered by turning into a lockdown cornerback pacing the league in steals with an elite block rate for wings. Enjoy some highlights from what may be the preeminent defensive wing in the league this year.

On the offensive side, there is a mix of good and bad. The usage has scaled up in a major way in addition to his increased minutes, though this is a reflection of a dire lack of offensive options in Atlanta compared to last year’s Pelicans. Last year, 21% of his offense came as the primary handler, dipping slightly to 19.4% despite Trae Young missing a game in Boston where Dyson became the de facto #1 handler.

Many of the same problems persist. He looks great as a connective passer and pinch handler, yet continues to struggle finishing at the rim. The floater is excellent as usual and the corner threes are going down while the above-the-break threes remain below 30% with questionable volume. What has been interesting to monitor is the drastic increase in screening usage.

Last year, New Orleans used Dyson as a ball screening option a mere 5 times across 61 games. That is up to 28 possessions in 25 games this year, and results so far are encouraging, as it opens space for his passing reads and floaters.

In New Orleans, offensive responsibilities were tougher to define for a young player trying to find his niche. Screen for that guy, cut off that guy’s drives, space for him, rebound for another. As a starter in Atlanta the first, second, and third questions are “How do you help Trae?”. Increasing screen usage will help Atlanta keep the wheels turning offensively while Dyson tries to figure out where the rest of his offensive game lands.

Two main questions are on the horizon for Daniels. First, can this defensive explosion keep up and keep him on an All-Defense course? My money is on yes, and each passing game of defensive dominance only seems to indicate so.

Second, can he find a way to consistently raise the floor of the offense? The screening is a fun wrinkle, the passing and transition game keeps him out of offensive disaster territory, and he’s good for some silky floaters. But if he continues to be a low-volume low-efficiency shooter, options are limited. Unless strides are made on taking and making threes it places a lot of pressure on the rim finishing and off-the-dribble passing skills. We will see how the coming weeks go.

Star Flashes, Needs Work

Tre Mann

Man, it was hard to keep Tre out of the top tier, but I’ve been fooled by this kind of player before.

I wrote about Tre’s growth last season after he arrived in Charlotte, a primer of sorts before what felt like a breakout campaign in waiting. The first stretch of the season felt extremely validating as Mann averaged 21/4/4 on 47/41/100 splits through the first 5 games in his new role as sixth-man extraordinaire. Then some of the shine came off.

Mann averaged 10/2/3 on 40/35/79 splits over his next eight games while missing some time due to an illness. Then disc irritation in his back fully sidelined him, and Mann has been inactive for 9 straight contests.

Without much to glean over the recent stretch due to the cloud of injury hanging over his usage patterns, we will look closer at Tre’s adjustment once the film has built up more. One scorching stretch followed by a period of struggle hampered by DNPs is ripe for overreaction, therefore we will hit the snooze button on an update after writing about him so recently.

******* ****** [Name Omitted]

Here’s our first mystery man, who will see his debut article in the series soon. The tape screams breakout and I’m excited to get it out soon so more can notice what’s happening under our noses.

******* ********** [Name Omitted]

And the second of the three mystery men, one who has endured a rough start to the season but continues to show the flashes of a future starter, if not an outright star. Stay tuned on that front as the film continues to build.

Strong Rotation Piece

Aaron Nesmith

Alas, we have another player whose injury struggles muddy the picture. The fifth-year forward has missed 19 straight games after suffering an ankle sprain in game 6 of the year against the Pelicans, halting his development story.

His return will be an interesting one. Indiana is struggling offensively with Tyrese Haliburton taking a noticeable step back in production and the residual absence of Buddy Hield‘s exit at the deadline last year, dropping from 2nd in the league to 12th in the early going. Nesmith is exciting as a shooter and closeout stampeder but may struggle to find rhythm again if the context around him has declined.

Hopefully, the ankle injury won’t hamper his defensive impact as a whirlwind rotation defender and defensive event creator, which Indiana needs to create transition opportunities for the offense. Let’s hope for a speedy recovery and some development to explore in the next edition.

Sam Hauser

No player on this list has seen less change in role than Sam Hauser. His usage pattern speaks to the veritable machine that Boston is, even with Kristaps Porzingis‘ early absence.

In nearly identical minutes per game, Hauser is averaging 7.1 shots per game to last year’s 7.1, with 5.9 threes attempted per game in both seasons. He clocks in, gets threes up, clocks out. His 37% mark from deep is a big dip from the first 3 years of his career, where he made 42.2% of his 4.6 attempts per game. I’d expect it to smooth out as Hauser is one of the more versatile and accurate volume three role players in the game. It’s already heading that way, as Sam is hitting 46% of his looks from deep over the past 8 games.

Little has changed in his offense, and little is generous. As I wrote about in my first exploration of Hauser’s game, he is limited as a closeout attacker and driver, which has continued thus far. The closeout attacks have improved a tick but I want to see a bit more before considering this as a real trend.

What interests me about Hauser are the flashes he’s showing on the other end. Boston employs strong defenders top to bottom and likes to switch often because of this so that lesser defenders like Hauser can take risks and cover up on the back side in rotation. Now there are moments when Hauser is out on an island and looks competent, if not very good, on the perimeter.

Hauser being even a defensive neutral on the perimeter in this scheme would be more than enough to justify his minutes with the shooting he brings. If he can be an outright positive, the rich will continue to get richer as his 4-year $45 million extension may prove to be a steal. There’s already a floor there with his size and presence as a competent rebounder. I’m excited to see how he bounces back offensively and if the defense can be proven as real once the rotation readjustments occur when Porzingis heals.

Nickeil Alexander-Walker

Now here’s a guy on a hot streak.

Alexander-Walker has jumped out to career-high scoring efficiency this season, hitting 59% of his two-point looks and 46% of his threes. Most importantly so far, he’s making 82% of his looks at the rim, a major point of focus in my last analysis of NAW’s game. There are still warts with his drives and live dribble finishes yet there are reasons to believe the improvement is real, provided the shooting numbers keep up. He is certainly confident in his shot and has leveraged that into quality pull-up twos when attacking closeouts.

If Nickeil continues to take and make his threes at a high volume it will open up easier looks, lessening the burden on his dribble which has continued to look suspect. His turnover woes could also be smoothed out with easy reads against a rotating defense.

An uptick in offensive production takes him to a new level of value, considering his defense. He’s been stellar as usual on the perimeter with an ability to affect all kinds of players on the drive with his combination of size, strength, and agility.

The film backs up the numbers, indicating yet another season of elite defense for one of the league’s unheralded defensive gems. I’ll be interested to see if the offense continues to grow to match his capabilities on the ugly end of the floor.

Goga Bitadze

Injury luck struck my list of players hard for this first quarter of the season. At least one player here benefited from the huge swath of injuries across the league. In this case, it may have saved his season.

Across the season’s first seven games, Goga Bitadze played a grand total of 17 minutes, including four DNP-CDs. The brand new 3-year $25M contract seemingly meant little towards his short-term outlook for playing time. Orlando also had Paolo Banchero and Wendell Carter Jr. healthy early in the season, but by game 8 against Oklahoma City, both were out for the foreseeable future. Goga went from the end of the bench to a starter and hasn’t looked back.

He’s been a starting lineup fixture for 18 of the last 19 games, including some games with Wendell as his frontcourt mate. It’s been a very productive stretch for Bitadze who has averaged 9.9 points on 66% shooting to go with 8 boards and 2.7 stocks. One huge offensive improvement I had my eye on was restricted area finishing. This year he’s jumped to career highs in the restricted area (74%) and in the 3-10 foot range (64%), up from 72% and 44% last year.

In addition to his usual roll, cut, and slam prowess that I wrote about earlier this year, he is showing some encouraging touch plays around the basket that show me this might be sustainable growth.

Goga’s limited offensive role leaves few areas of improvement. The finishing is a major point since all he’s asked to do is finish plays. He sets a great screen, can make some nice passes to his cutters from the post and out of the roll, and cleans up in the restricted area. Adding a few percentage points to his paint looks is all Orlando can ask for given the scope of his offense. At the end of the day, he’s out there for what he can do defensively.

Little has changed with his defensive game, and I say this with the utmost respect. I wanted to see improved rebounding, and the numbers are up slightly, but I’ll want to see more to determine if he is becoming a true menace on the glass. The fouls are still up and can hamper his game at times. Yet at this point, the results speak for themselves. Orlando boasts a defensive rating of 103 with him on the floor, and the individual metrics back up his penchant for dirty work. He leads all players in D-LEBRON (a wonderful catch-all courtesy of Bball Index) and has a 92nd percentile D-EPM for the second year running. The film shows a guy who is not to be tested in the restricted area. Goga is a true rim protection maestro.

It remains to be seen if Bitadze will continue to start, or even be in the rotation, upon Paolo Banchero’s return. It speaks to Orlando’s depth in the frontcourt that a center playing at an All-Defensive caliber may be out of the rotation entirely despite his +8.2 on/off rating. I’m excited to see how Jamahl Mosley handles this team when fully healthy and with Goga at this level of production.

Rotation Flashes, Needs Work

Peyton Watson

When I wrote about Watson last month, it was fresh off an injury to Aaron Gordon that thrust Watson into the starting lineup. Though I didn’t see tons of improvement in his play, the box score results certainly stood out. With the Nuggets starters, specifically Nikola Jokic, Watson produced a 12/4/2/1.8 stocks statline on 57/42/71 splits. The consistency was also remarkable – Watson posted double-digit points in 8 of his 11 starts. Funny how playing with an MVP can make you look so much better.

There has been a positive uptick in his cutting, and the defense has looked more consistent on a night-to-night basis. What I want to see is how Watson responds to a return to the bench. Aaron Gordon’s return will reduce his time on the floor with Jokic and I want to see him get up for the bench minutes the same way he got up for starting duties. We’ll take a closer look at Watson’s development around the halfway mark of the season.

Marcus Sasser

The offseason and early goings of the season did not bode well for Marcus Sasser.

When your team replaces the GM who drafted you, adds veterans that eat into your position on the depth chart, and gets a new coach all at once it spells trouble. With DNP-CDs in 8 of his first 12 games and garbage time duties on the menu, it felt like a familiar story. A player with a relatively low draft investment finds himself on the outs as the team heads in a new direction.

But something must have caught the eye of new head coach JB Bickerstaff. Sasser has not only played in 12 of the last 13 games, he’s also averaging 15 minutes per contest while seriously producing. The second-year guard boasts a scorching 53/42/100 slash line over those past dozen appearances. As usual, the shooting on and off the ball has impressed.

What I love to see is Sasser turning this success into a more stable rim-pressure game. In my first article about Marcus over a year ago, I pointed to a lack of rim attempts as a concerning problem. Nobody expects the 6’2″ guard who can’t jump out of the gym to be a huge rim threat, but his 8.8% rim frequency mark from last year was ghastly. Across 211 minutes this year, Sasser has taken 22.4% of his shots at the rim and converted 82% (!!!). The film backs up the numbers: he’s turning more midrange looks, a comfort shot for him, into rim attempts. Thriving while getting uncomfortable is a huge developmental stride.

The guy is also just a pure hustler. He’s had more points coming off cuts this season than last, in 1,100 fewer minutes. Flies in transition and works for his open jumpers, and results have paid off for him and the team; Detroit boasts an offensive rating of 121 with Sasser on the court, compared to 108 last season.

His hustle is also infectious on the defensive end. The screen navigation has ticked up the way I wanted to see. Sasser also continues to get active with his hands at the point of attack and to much better results. Last year he averaged 1.6 steals to 3.7 fouls per 100 possessions; now he’s averaging a cool 3.0 steals to 3.0 fouls.

The aforementioned 6’2″ frame limits his potential defensive matchups, but Sasser falls squarely in the “man, I hate to play that guy” category if you’re an opposing guard.

For a 10-15 Detroit team looking to prove something and crack the play-in tournament, Sasser’s +3.5 net rating combined with the uptick in production and overall hustle points to a consistent rotation spot provided he can keep it up. JB Bickerstaff will reward hustle, and Sasser has plenty of that to go around.

Dominick Barlow

Alas, we come to the truly unknown. Barlow’s spell as a bit rotation player in San Antonio across the last two seasons seems so far away. On his two-way deal with Atlanta, Dominick has seen a total of 11 minutes with the big club. Not ideal.

The good news is his dominance of the G-League continues. Across 11 games with the Skyhawks, Barlow is averaging 20/8/2/2 stocks while shooting 59% from the floor and 82% from the line. Compared to his last two G-League seasons, he’s posting his first positive assist/turnover ratio and positive +/- rating at +4.9. All encouraging signs, but it does beg the question: is Barlow a Quad-A type player, too good for the G but not good enough for the NBA?

I hold out hope that another stint in the league could prove his worth. But for now, we wait and see.

****** ********* [Name Omitted]

And finally, the last unknown player, to be written about at a later date. Every good writer finishes with some mystery, right?

We’ll check back in on these players at the halfway mark of the season, another opportunity to tell their stories of development in the world’s top basketball league.

The post Finding a Role Check-Ins: Quarter Pole appeared first on Swish Theory.

Watson showed himself to be a potent defensive weapon, on and off the ball, and the toolsy 21-year-old proved himself worthy of the defending champs as they sought to replace a departing Bruce Brown. Offensive struggles were there to be sure, to put it mildly; Watson’s -3.4 offensive estimated plus-minus was the worst mark in the league. A year later, Kentavious Caldwell-Pope is gone, and Aaron Gordon is sidelined for at least a month with a calf injury. More than ever the Nuggets need Watson to step into his own.

The move into the starting lineup will be an inflection point for how Denver views Watson’s long-term potential. The thrifty Nuggets front office will look closely at how he responds before an extension-eligible offseason. Is Watson proving himself as a potential starting-type piece, or just another defensive wing struggling to find an offensive niche?

We will focus heavily on the offensive skills here to see how Watson can justify his spot on the floor and prove himself as a capable cog in the machine.

Defense Check-In

Guess what – it’s still great!

At the end of the day, this is a development-based series, so I place very little value in “guy who kicks ass at X skill still kicks ass”. If things had changed, I would indicate otherwise, but Watson is again showing why he is one of the most exciting defensive wings in the league.

The underlying stats are very good. Watson’s 2.4% block rate, a 98th percentile mark amongst forwards, is somehow a career-low for the third-year UCLA alum. The steal rate has increased to an 83rd percentile mark as Watson continues to grow as an event creator. Film backs up what has been an impressive season in rotation, making impact plays all over the floor.

I’ll have my eye on some underlying numbers concerning his off-ball defense; the foul rate is once again troublesome and he’s failing to make a consistent impact as a rebounder. But that’s for another time – we are here to focus on Watson trying to find himself offensively.

Offense Check-In

Cutting

The change over to the starting lineup has placed even more emphasis on this facet of Watson’s offensive game. If you play off Nikola Jokic and you can’t shoot (3/16 from deep this year), you’d better be moving around. Peyton has done a pretty solid job at finding open space and can take advantage of being ignored by the defense.

Consistently finding the right space is already an issue, however. I expect this to improve during his stint as a starter while playing with better spacing and off Nikola but it’s iffy at times. What’s more concerning are the bad finishes at the rim once he finds the space.

Watson is finishing only 43% of his looks at the rim this year, a brutal mark especially when factoring in his size and athleticism. He needs to work on staying within himself as a finisher by not trying to do too much. A little slow-down now and then to draw some fouls would be a boost as well.

An interesting wrinkle to his offensive game has developed over the past few games, one that could help alleviate some of his rim-finishing concerns.

Screening

In 80 games last year, Watson acted as a screen-and-roll option on 15 total possessions. Now through 8 games, he’s been the screener on 5 possessions. For #onpace math-doers, that would put him well on pace to triple that number from the previous season.

There’s been some experimentation with Watson as a guard screener for Russell Westbrook and Jamal Murray early in the season.

What interests me more is the 5-4 screening actions with Jokic. Nikola’s two-man game with Aaron Gordon is a crucial part of the offense, and coach Michael Malone is trying to incorporate those elements in Gordon’s absence with Watson as a substitute.

By no means will Watson screen actions become a focal point of the offense anytime soon, but anything and everything should be tried to overcome his woeful half-court offense.

At least there is one area of the offense he can make a real difference in.

Transition

Watson still looks quite good as a transition weapon, and his bounce has led to most transition defenders hacking him hard to prevent finishes – provided they can catch him.

What concerns me about Watson’s development as a transition weapon is his failure to make the right passing reads. Forcing teams to foul is great, but too often he flies into a crowd while missing easy passes.

He’s made some decent reads out there to be sure, and looks pretty good when keeping his head up to find his passing lanes.

The open floor may be the best way for Watson to contribute to this offense in the short term while finding ways to be useful in the halfcourt. But like his halfcourt game, the lack of overall feel shows.

Here’s hoping Watson can use this time in the starting lineup to further develop his offensive game and find ways he can help his teammates by cutting, screening, rebounding, and filling every gap he can. He shows so much promise on the defensive end of the floor, and much like the Nuggets, I am hoping he can show enough offensively over the next month to warrant his place as a rotation fixture.

The post Finding a Role Check-In #1: Peyton Watson appeared first on Swish Theory.

That’s how ex-NBA’er Tim Legler described his baseline requirements for a championship-level NBA defense on JJ Redick‘s podcast, The Old Man and the Three. And all Leglar has to point to for evidence is the NBA’s most recent champion, the Denver Nuggets.

Denver’s defense was the definition of ‘adequate’ in the 2022-’23 regular season, finishing 15th in defensive rating. But try telling that to the Los Angeles Lakers and Miami Heat; each of those teams scored just 38 points in the second half of their respective season-ending losses to Denver. Their defense didn’t just “ramp it up,” they shut it down.

The Nuggets did it again in their most recent win, a mere regular-season triumph over the Golden State Warriors on Sunday night. Their moment of truth didn’t come at half-time of an NBA Finals closeout-game, though, but when Head Coach Michael Malone chided his group for their poor defensive start, down 45-32 after 14-and-a-half minutes of play.

“I don’t know if you guys are watching. Klay’s got 21, five threes. Make him work for it. “

Over the final 33-and-a-half minutes, the Warriors scored just 58 points. Klay Thompson scored two more points, and zero after half-time. Switch: flipped.

The Warriors remain the pre-eminent test for NBA defenses. Not because they are still the league’s most fearsome offense, but because the Dubs exist to force mistakes. Splash Bro Ridiculousness aside, Golden State’s buckets are often the result of clear defensive breakdowns. Sure, it’s hardly a sin to overcommit to Steph Curry and let his screener slip to the rim, but mistakes are mistakes, and the Warriors give defenses ample opportunity to make them.

In Sunday’s contest, Denver either didn’t take the bait, or hastily covered their tracks. In doing so, their defense took the shape of their offense; Nikola Jokić led the way, and his teammates were everywhere they were supposed to be.

This started, naturally, on Steph Curry’s pick-and-rolls. With Jokić in the action, the Nuggets showed two to the ball as many teams do, but with a wrinkle. In an effort to prevent some of the 4-on-3 mastery that Draymond Green has long showcased, Denver had Curry’s defender go under the screen to jam Green before recovering to Curry. Watch Kentavious Caldwell-Pope body Green up before stealing the ball here:

In order to throw two bodies at Curry and slow down Green’s prolific short-roll ability, the Joker had to hold up on one of the toughest individual covers in the world. At least, for the split-second after Curry sees Green isn’t an immediate release valve and thinks he has space to attack, a scary proposition for a seven-footer.

Here, Jokić doesn’t fall for Curry’s hesitation move and forces a change-of-direction back toward an oncoming KCP, which results in a turnover:

Caldwell-Pope was characteristically terrific on D, whether it was nailing off-ball switches or going under these ball-screens while still providing pressure.

So too was Aaron Gordon, AKA chicken soup for Michael Malone’s soul. How easy it must be to trap ball-screens with Jokić when Gordon is on the back-line, capable of both recovering to the rim for a block…

…and recovering to the perimeter to make a textbook closeout, as the Nuggets ultimately stifle the 4-on-3 advantage Golden State spent a dynasty perfecting:

The Nuggets couldn’t prevent every 4-on-3 advantage for the Dubs — the accepted cost of trapping/hedging vs Curry — but Gordon consistently de-escalated those situations.

Yet, it was Nikola Jokić who played the role of Denver’s biggest neutralizer.

Players like Sabrina Ionescu and James Harden, both possessing outlier hand-eye coordination but regarded as poor defenders for the majority of their careers, don’t suddenly lose their athletic ability when defending their basket. For all their flaws on that end of the floor, each can rack up deflections, using that same skillset that allows them to be such prolific off-the-dribble shooters on offense.

Nikola Jokić is cut from the same cloth, but has turned it up a notch. The notion that he is a negative defender is long gone. Are we surprised that his singular feel for the game is now apparent on both ends of the court?

Draymond Green just had to learn the hard way. Here, Big Honey punks Green in a vaunted 2-on-1 opportunity, feigning at his drive before breaking up the lob, forcing a turnover:

The Warriors had won that possession. A high ball-screen for Curry in early offense created the roll opportunity Denver had been trying to eliminate all night: Green storming downhill unimpeded, with a lob threat in the dunker spot. We’ve seen this movie on an infinite loop, but Jokić changed the ending.

Denver forced Golden State’s hand. Not only is Jokić now nimble enough to run aggressive schemes on the perimeter, but he has defenders like Aaron Gordon and Kentavious Caldwell-Pope to fill the gaps. Let him roam around the basket, and the mistakes Golden State forces don’t amount to much. Slip your little off-ball screens, sure, and slip right into the hands of Nikola Jokić:

The defining sequence of the game — and perhaps this new era of Western Conference supremacy — came with eight minutes left in the fourth quarter. The Nuggets led by five points, and each coach had subbed their big guns back in for the stretch run. Curry and Green checked in, as did Jokić and Caldwell-Pope.

As Golden State got into the meat of their out-of-timeout play, Curry floated off a flare screen from Trayce Jackson-Davis. Green watched Caldwell-Pope get caught on said screen, and passed it to a soon-to-be wide-open Curry.

Only, Jokić broke the rules. Green knew Jokić was too smart to get beat on the slip from Jackson-Davis, but didn’t consider the obviousness of that line of thinking. So the two-time MVP picked off Green’s pass and headed the other way to run a 2-on-1 fast-break against the greatest defender of his generation. The roles had been reversed, and the two basketball savants locked into a three-second chess match.

It was over before it started:

The Denver Nuggets still have it. Their defense is much like their offense, led by Nikola Jokić and capable of exploding for game-breaking stretches.

And of course, they’ll still dunk on you.

The post How the Denver Nugget Defense Dominates appeared first on Swish Theory.

I want to dig into some of the film to explore how Watson has become one of the premiere defensive event-creating forwards, along with quality perimeter stopping. There has also been an increasing sense of finding the offensive niche that I want to take a look at.

Defensive Event Creation

Oh boy, is this some fun stuff.

Peyton Watson paces the league amongst all qualifying forwards with a 3.8% block rate, improving from his 3.3% rate this past season (also a league-leading mark, albeit in 9 games). Not only does he rack up a hefty amount of swats, but he seems to do it in highlight-reel fashion every time.

For those counting at home, that’s three (3) blocks on Derrick Rose in a single possession. I labeled this clip “massive disrespect” in my files.

What impresses me the most about the blocks is the variety of situations they come in. Most come in trail defense; when he loses a step on a driver, he’s never truly out of the play.

Watson also has a knack for making the right rotations after a ballhandler has committed to the drive, using his ridiculous length to erase shots:

Jamal Murray gets beaten handily on the drive by Russell, so Watson fully commits off Gabe Vincent, gambling that D-Lo won’t make the wrap pass back to the perimeter. Finding the ball at the absolute apex, he sends a gift into the crowd. That’s outstanding awareness to pick up his teammate.

Peyton also has a penchant for ridiculous recovery blocks, especially in transition. Once again, he victimizes Derrick Rose, flying back into the play with the speed and explosion of a panther:

Getting put in a help position on a Luka Dončić? Not a problem for Wats:

The patience to wait out the drag-step and still meet the shot at the apex is so, so impressive.

How about a transition 2v1 block for the road, as Peyton does his best Draymond Green impression?

It feels like he manages to meet every shot at the exact right moment. That kind of awareness for a player with 18 career games cannot be taught.

Watson being a shot-blocking threat both on and off the ball is a huge boon for this Denver defense. You might have him beat on the perimeter, but he will still find a way back into the play. You can beat his teammates on the drive, but he will get there and affect your shot. Considering how many subpar perimeter defenders are in Denver’s rotation (especially the starting lineup), Watson has an important ability to plug up the holes they create.

His steal rate is also 80th percentile amongst forwards through the first tenth of this season, showing a solid dig/tag ability to get strips. I came away impressed with his ability to anticipate passes and break them up as they arrive, as you can see below:

Watson has incredible strength, often using that to his advantage in help. Jevon Carter is no slouch when it comes to his strength, but Peyton looks like he’s bullying a middle schooler on this play:

He also has a knack for creating steals on the ball, which we will explore in our next category.

Perimeter Stopping

Though still working on general technique, Watson’s strength and lateral athleticism give him plenty of room to make up for that. He has a few distinctive plays when watching the tape where he purely overwhelms the ballhandler with his strength:

There weren’t a ton of standout technique-based perimeter stops that caught my eye, but this one in particular on Vasilije Micić showed a lot of the goods:

The quick hip flips and foot speed, the hand placement, and how low he gets to increase his mobility. That is the sort of technical skill that will turn him into an elite perimeter stopper in the coming years. I’m very excited to see him put more pure stopping tape on this year, but already teams are learning that it’s wise to just avoid him entirely if they can help it.

Here’s a play that I think well-summarizes the technique being a step behind his athleticism: trying too hard to force Kyrie left, he still gives an opportunity to reject the screen and go back to the right.

You can see how athleticism helps to bridge the gap. He closes down all of the space Irving gains on the drive, and makes it a tough layup attempt with the help arriving. Soon, when the technical aspects catch up, he’ll have to make these plays less often. It’s good knowing he can make them when needed though.

Filling in Gaps

This is where I’m waiting for some improvement from Peyton. He’s a pretty middling rebounder (38th percentile amongst forwards) and generally inconsistent with his rotations and positioning. It’s great that the explosive impact plays are there already, but the learning from Peyton will come in terms of general court awareness, when to crash the glass, where to be, and at what times.

It’s not going to happen overnight, but he has as strong of a base as any for exponential defensive growth.

Now, let’s see how Watson has figured some things out on the offensive side of the ball.

Corner-Based Offense

Watson for the moment is your classic low-usage off-ball wing. Operating out of the corners (predominantly the left), his job is to shoot when open and make slashing/cutting reads based on how the defense plays him. It’s not glamorous, but it’s honest work.

His shot chart, per Cleaning The Glass, gives a better idea of what that usage looks like:

He’s still struggling to make the shots needed from the perimeter (2/8 from the corners, 3/11 above-the-break) but it’s what he can do with or without the shooting that intrigues me.

Teams are largely going to forget him in the corners, but he will still draw a closeout from time to time. Defenders aren’t perfect; when split-second decisions have to be made, sometimes you see a guy in the corner and want to close him down. And when that happens, Peyton knows how to take advantage.

Jaden Hardy is stashed on Watson, and instinctively closes him down in the corner, opening up a chance for the drive. Josh Green makes a great rotation to draw the charge, but Watson side-steps just enough to avoid the contact and finds Nikola Jokić filling the lane for the bucket. That’s an awesome chain of decisions in quick succession: driving the closeout, avoiding the charge, and finding the open man.

On the more basic side of things, Peyton can leverage that same athleticism and length on the closeout attack to draw contact on the rim, even if he’s not the most adept finisher:

Teams often stash Watson on their roamers, which was especially evident against the Thunder and Chet Holmgren. Even with all of Chet’s length, Watson’s athleticism is tough to contain.

He’s got the coordination to stay tight to the baseline, and again seeing the athleticism pop with the reverse slam that not many NBA guys can pull off.

If teams get REALLY lazy with who they try to stash on Watson, he’s shown enough chops on the drive to make bigger, slower guys pay for it:

This is a nice bit of functional athleticism to boot: avoids the travel by slowing his drive, then kicks out to the open shooter. He’s not exactly a dazzling playmaker, but you can see the potential to make some solid reads off the drive.

Watson already having sufficient skill to make plays out of corner drives and closeout attacks is a huge boon. It’s a cliche at this point for off-ball players, but the lethality of his perimeter shot will define a lot of his growth in these areas. If teams let him shoot and he continues to be in the mid to high 20s, opportunities like the ones above will be few and far between. But every percentage point he can raise that shot will only add more to his potential as a driver.

Cut/Fill Synergy with Nikola

This stuff really excites me about Watson’s long-term offensive potential in Denver. With a player like him on the floor next to Jokić, teams are going to send hard doubles at the two-time MVP and force others to beat them. Watson has shown a good sense of when to make himself available, especially by cutting into open space:

He fills the space abandoned by John Collins as Jokić spins out of one double and into another, leading to an easy basket. These kinds of simple reads will be made available to him when playing alongside the Joker, and you know the man from Sombor is going to find him.

It’s much of the same coming out of Jokić rolls. The defense is going to collapse at all costs to prevent Joker from getting into a clean roll, so it’s up to guys like Watson to make themselves available by cutting out of the corners and taking advantage of an empty weak side as you see here:

Similar cuts will also be available off the drives of his teammates, and you can once again see how Watson recognizes opportunities to fill the space given to him for easy baskets:

Considering the attention that teammates like Jokic and Murray will consistently be drawing, Watson’s cutting and filling will be heavily rewarded if he can keep this kind of timing up. Of course, his finishing around the rim shouldn’t be forgotten as a skill; an 80% mark on the season is nothing to sneeze at.

Leakout Specialist

The last component of Watson’s offensive repertoire (at the moment) is the transition running. It’s also the most tied to his defense. Watson can run out after shot contests, rotations, or even after creating steals/blocks. This is another way for Peyton to create offensive value in his low-usage role, because he can gallop like a thoroughbred in the open floor and put his ridiculous athleticism on display.

It doesn’t hurt to have the best passer in the league running these breaks, but that shouldn’t take away from the good Watson does by filling lanes and making himself available for easy finishes. Jokić is constantly on the hunt for leakout passes, and it’s up to players like Peyton to make the runs needed.

Overall, I’m maintaining cautious optimism about Watson’s offensive game. He knows how to find gaps, when to leak out, and shows strong coordination and power in his finishes. Even if the shot doesn’t come around, he will find a way to make his impact felt. For now, Denver is going to have to find a way to build lineups around him that can bring enough offensive talent to make up for his deficits. Their offense is -17.7 points per 100 possessions worse with him on the floor, and that’s not entirely on Peyton: Denver has the kind of offensive talent to make up for that gap.

Potential For More

With such limited available tape and play experience on Watson’s part, it is hard to predict where his overall ceiling lies. It’s clear that he has All-Defensive kind of upside if he can maintain consistent minutes, but much of that falls back on the offense. Can he develop skills beyond cutting and closeout attacking to stay on the floor?

Denver is the right environment to bolster his overall potential, and the minutes are there for the taking. I’ll be watching him closely throughout the season, excited to see what Peyton Watson has in store for us.

The post Finding a Role: Peyton Watson appeared first on Swish Theory.

The eyes of the basketball world are trained on the Finals. Obviously. And we all have the same 48 minutes of game-tape to analyze and over-analyze. So, unique observations, at this point in the season, are few and far between – with that said, here are a couple of Game Two tidbits I found to be both interesting and key to a Heat victory.

Zone Defense

Ah yes, the infamous Miami zone vs. Denver’s unstoppable offense. Whether you believe zone defense at the NBA-level is an affront to professional sports or not, this was a matchup hyped up by the nerdiest among us. The Heat have played the most zone defense in the NBA in both this regular season and post-season. Zone is part of their Dark Magic, concocted in Pat Riley’s sunken living room.

Denver meanwhile…well, I’ll just borrow the words from CBS Sports writer Jack Maloney: “In the regular season, [the Nuggets] were second in the league in zone offense, scoring 1.156 points per possession, and in the playoffs that mark has jumped to a stunning 1.385 points per possession.”

This is less of a mystery, of course. The Nuggets are led by a lab-designed zone-buster, a 7-foot-tall wizard with soft hands, sharp vision, and a lethal mid-range jump-shot. Step one: Put that guy in the middle of your zone offense. Step Two: Profit! This, prior to the series, was much of the discussion around Miami’s zone defense and how Denver might counter it: “Well, they have Nikola Jokic, so, yeah.”

While excellent analysis, that misses one thing: The Heat do not play your run-of-the-mill zone. When you hear “zone defense” in the NBA, you imagine a red-faced head coach so perturbed by his team’s effort that he says “[expletive] this, just play some 2-3. You guys remember that from high school, right?” Well, that is not Erik Spoelstra and the Heat.

Spo’s squad change their zone, seemingly, from possession to possession, but a principle often prevails. Deny dribble penetration in the middle without sacrificing corner threes. How? Have your weak-side guards flock to the ball-side, no matter where they are. An obvious but difficult challenge, one that places heavy onus on the wings of the operation. Here’s a possession from the first half of Game Two, one that ends with an Aaron Gordon three:

That’s an outcome that the Heat will surely take. Rather than have Jamal Murray fire up a corner 3-pointer, a below average shooter in Gordon is taking one, lightly contested. That play exhibits the general structure the Heat rely on when going zone in these playoffs, specifically vs. Denver’s bench units.

But in the fourth quarter, they trotted out a zone agains Nikola Jokic & co., and boy did it make my brain hurt. Well, me and the Nuggets:

Gabe Vincent does a hell of a job fronting Jokic in the first clip, which was the tenet of Miami’s zone concepts in the fourth quarter. On a subsequent possession, Denver decides to let Jokic handle it up top, a much easier path to getting the ball in his hands. Welp, that results in Vincent applying extreme ball pressure and forcing a (questionable) charge.

What even is that zone? I’m damn near tempted to call it the world’s strangest-looking box-and-one, though in reality it’s more of a 2-1-2 where the ‘1’ is interchangeable. Just take a look at this possession, where Caleb Martin and Vincent switch the Jokic assignment mid-possession:

Zone defense, once you get past the high school level, is polarizing. And I get the argument; it feels almost cheap to remove the sanctity of guarding your man and taking pride in shutting him down from defense. “That ain’t basketball at its purest,” the detractors shout. But even the haters have to admit it’s a beautiful thing to watch the Heat maintain their core principles no matter what kind of funky zone they’re throwing out there.

Here, the Nuggets get creative with it, and screen for Jokic after he catches it off an inbounds, but the Heat snuff it out:

If any other team had the otherworldly gall to play zone against Nikola Jokic and the Nuggets, then their center certainly would’ve stepped up on that creative ball-screen from Denver. But Bam Adebayo and the Heat scoff at the notion. Why, so Jokic and Gordon can essentially run their famous inverted pick-and-roll? Or so Jokic can hit a devious back-cutter as the rim protector vacates the area? Nope. Erik Spoelstra’s guards are going to prevent dribble penetration – even when Jokic is on the floor, whether that means fronting him or not – and his wings are going to handle their business (although Kyle Lowry’s job here is admittedly made easier by Jimmy Butler’s recovery.)

I’ll say it. It’s a treat to watch the Miami Heat play zone defense, even on the biggest stage. Especially against one of the most fearsome zone-busters this game has ever known.

One more thing, really quick. As important as Miami’s zone defense was (a huge reason the Nuggets’ offense hovered around a pedestrian 111 offensive rating with Jokic on the court), their outside shooting was far more crucial. 49% from deep on 35 attempts? On the road? Especially when, per Cleaning the Glass, a minuscule 14% of their shots came inside the restricted area, meaning they were entirely reliant on jump-shooting? As boring as this may sound, there cannot be an explanation for Miami’s victory that doesn’t start with, “They shot the hell out of the rock.”

There are a few reasons why that happened, other than the pure shot-making talent 8-seeds are now dripping with. I tweeted a cut-up of all their 3-point attempts…

…and surmised, among other things, that the Heat successfully targeted Michael Porter Jr and Jamal Murray. You can draw your own conclusions, but it’s clear that Miami challenged those two to talk through countless screening actions and make long closeouts. Neither one did either task successfully. Aside from Bruce Brown, perhaps, the whole Denver squad was sloppy rotating and closing out to shooters. There’s a reason Jeff Green and Head Coach Mike Malone each ripped their team’s effort in postgame pressers.

But, to give the Heat some credit here, I thought they forced sloppy closeouts and missed rotations by paying careful attention to their spacing. Miami’s shooters consistently spaced multiple feet beyond the arc, and it caused problems for the Nuggets. Roll the tape:

Spacing farther away from the line not only creates longer closeouts for defenders, many of which various Nuggets botched repeatedly in their Game Two defeat. It also creates more opportunities for shooters to move without the ball – I don’t mean sprinting around screens like Steph Curry, the most commonly recognized form of off-ball-movement.

Rather, I’m talking about the art of subtly relocating, an art that Miami’s role players have perfected: Just look at Max Strus in that first clip. Relocating along the perimeter is about reading two players at once, and instinctually moving to a spot that makes the defender’s job harder but the passer’s job easier. Stus & co. did a great job of that in Game Two, and it was the cherry on top of a…Poop Sundae for Denver’s defenders. When the Nuggets weren’t busy closing out to shooters recklessly and jumping at every ball-fake, they were losing their assignments before then, unaware of perimeter relocations.

Yes, the Miami Heat shot the lights out, and that is the reason they were able to tie the series against the rightfully favored Nuggets. But don’t lose sight of the fact that Erik Spoelstra’s squad did all the little things right, executing their offensive and defensive game-plan on Sunday night. Whether they were setting up 3-point bombs or falling back into zone defense, the Heat certainly sweat the small stuff in Game Two. And it was beautiful to watch.

The post Heat in the Zone: How Miami Locked in to Take Game 2 appeared first on Swish Theory.

Taking AD off of Jokic is also the rare tactic that straddles the line between effective and overly simplistic. There are clear benefits to allowing Davis, a Hall-of-Fame rim protector, to, well, protect the rim. For stretches, it has absolutely worked in this series, keeping Davis out of foul trouble and stymieing Denver’s spacing. Combine that with its aforementioned obviousness, and you’re gonna get fans pleading for Darvin Ham to make the adjustment, then patting themselves on the back when he does. But not in the way that such fans (or even writers like myself) may plead for Steph Curry to run 50 pick-and-rolls a game, then celebrating when he runs a successful one. There are limits to reason.

So, you have an inherently noticeable tactic that the Lakers deployed towards the end of Game One and frequently went to in Game Two, occasionally to positive results. It’s easy to see why deploying AD as a roamer has been the story of the series so far; it’s easy to see why Michael Malone has made some quips about it too. But there’s something even more plain, even more significant happening on the court, perhaps the reason the team up 2-0 in the series has won those two games: The Lakers are not scoring against Nikola Jokic in the pick-and-roll.

Worse yet, the Lakers haven’t set themselves up to crash the offensive glass either, especially in Game Two. This hasn’t been a typical defensive series from Denver in regards to defending the PnR, with Jokic playing at the level. Instead, he’s largely bee playing drop, with aggressive, almost disrespectful gap help from his supporting Nuggs:

Some tactical analysis goes out the window here. Jamal Murray, Bruce Brown, and Kentavious Caldwell-Pope’s screen navigation thus far? Good! Lakers wings and guard shooting thus far? Bad! For the series, Los Angeles is shooting just over 30% on above-the-break 3-pointers, a mark they couldn’t even clear on Thursday night.

Denver employing this strategy to great success in Game 2 did more than just discourage L.A.’s guards from getting downhill, as they saw a see of blue when peering into the paint. The were able to keep Jokic nestled under the glass, ready to battle AD, which contributed to the Lakers rebounding just 11.1% of their misses. For context, that was L.A.’s second-lowest ORB% of the whole season, which has comprised 96 total games.

There were some glimpses of faulty gap help from various Nuggets, highlighting how imperative their early help is. Just as much as it is a physical battle, forcing the Lakers to drive through a crowd, it is a mental one too: Discourage them from trying altogether. Here, Murray is late to get to the nail, and LeBron revs it up for the easiest two he’s seen all series:

The simplest answer for L.A. would be to make some damn shots. #Analysis. But really, how else are you supposed to stop defenders cheating off you from just one pass away? Another answer would be to space closer to the arc, ‘stampeding’ on the catch, which is to say catching the swing pass already in motion towards the basket. In the first set of clips, LBJ is spacing about five feet behind the line with no hope of creating the downhill pressure a high ball-screen hopes to initiate. Look to see that as an early focus for the Lakers in Game Three.

Their immediate fixes to the heavy gap help Denver displayed in Game Two was to run fully spread-PnR from the top of the key, with a potential third spacer in the dunker spot. For a split second, this seemed to be a solution. Jokic reverted back to trapping the ball-handler, and Anthony Davis, now playing 4-on-3, got an And-1 bucket over the resultant help defense:

That panacea didn’t last long, however. Just as the Nuggets had disrespected the L.A.’s shooters, they continued to play Jokic in drop coverage, daring Davis to hit the shots off the short roll that turned Jokic into an MVP (first clip), or daring LeBron to, at age 38 on one foot, get all the way downhill, now having to navigate an extra defender parked near the dunker sport (second clip):

To me, this is the story for the (potentially short) remainder of this series. Hachimura guarding Jokic is cute and all, but the Serbian supernova is figuring out that he just has to shoot over Rui, and with each passing game, his surrounding Nuggets will figure out their spots on the floor. Even if they don’t, though, it won’t matter if Los Angeles’ half court offensive rating is around 90.

Attacking the two-time MVP in the pick-and-roll was supposed to be his kryptonite, Denver’s kryptonite. Even with Jokic’s gradual defensive improvements in his career, he was thought to be best suited playing at the level of the screen, trapping or aggressively hedging against ball-handlers. How, then, could Denver survive by scrambling all the time, often defending four players with three frantic dudes? And how valuable is defensive rebounding if you start every play 25 feet from the basket?

Well, in this Western Conference Finals, none of that appears to be an issue for the Nuggets. In Game Two, Mike Malone comfortably dropped his superstar back in the paint, watched him gobble up 17 rebounds, watched his guards fight viciously over screens, and enjoyed brick after brick from the Lakers. It’s up to the purple and gold to figure out how to attack what was supposed to be the exploitable weakness of the Wester Conference’s best team. They haven’t yet. And if they don’t, this may be a shorter series than we were all hoping for.

The post One Glaring Weakness for the Los Angeles Lakers appeared first on Swish Theory.

This conference finals matchup is bound to be a great battle focusing on the dualities of each team’s approach. Denver with their offense centering around, well, a center in Nikola Jokić as he’s literally in the middle of everything they do. Whether it be in the middle of the free throw line, on the block, or on the perimeter—when Jokić is on the court, he’s the center of attention, and for very good reason. 

Whereas for LA, their offense is more of an egalitarian approach where their leading scorer, LeBron James, is only at 23.8 points per game for this playoff run, compare that to Jokić who is at 30.7 points per game. James also leads the Lakers in touches at 71.6 per game which pales in comparison to the Nuggets’ two stars with Jokić at 110.9 touches per game (1st in the league this postseason with the difference between #1 and #2 being the difference between #2 and #27) and Jamal Murray at 85.6 (9th in the league this postseason). 

These two teams offer different questions for the other to solve which should make for a super entertaining chess match between two of the league’s best.

Matchups

For Denver:

• Kentavious Caldwell-Pope on D’Angelo Russell
• Jamal Murray on Austin Reaves
• Michael Porter Jr. on Jarred Vanderbilt
• Aaron Gordon on LeBron James
• Nikola Jokić on Anthony Davis

For Los Angeles:

• Austin Reaves on Jamal Murray
• D’Angelo Russell on Kentavious Caldwell-Pope
• Jarred Vanderbilt on Michael Porter Jr.
• LeBron James on Aaron Gordon
• Anthony Davis on Nikola Jokić

With Denver having a stout defender in Aaron Gordon to matchup with LeBron, the rest of the frontcourt comes into question. And a question that could have an important outcome in this series is “Who is ‘guarding’ Jarred Vanderbilt?” 

Why should you pay attention to the person guarding a 25% 3PT shooter, you ask? 

Well, it is a question of whether Denver wants to help off of Vanderbilt or hide on Vanderbilt. In LA’s previous series, Vanderbilt’s spacing issues were causing a big problem for the Lakers offense as both series went on, and ultimately reached an inflection point in Game 6 of the 2nd round vs the Golden State Warriors where they pulled the plug on Vanderbilt as a starter and replaced him with Dennis Schröder, the veteran speedy ballhandler. The Warriors were helping off of Vanderbilt at any chance they could get if that meant it would slow down an attack from LeBron or Davis. And well, I would assume that would be the same approach from Denver and the Eastern Conference team the Lakers would face if they make it to the Finals. 

However, Denver is known to mix up their matchups particularly when it comes to who Jokić is assigned to. Jokić had multiple sequences in their series against Phoenix where he was guarding a non-shooter like Josh Okogie and it threw an interesting wrench into the Suns’ offense when it happened. 

As for the Lakers, these are the standard matchups and I would not be surprised if these are different even in Game 1. With Vanderbilt’s questionable fit alongside LeBron and AD, Darvin Ham could look to another starter to begin this series and would change the matchups completely. But if Vanderbilt still does start, I could definitely see him guarding either one of Murray or Porter Jr. as the coaching staff pretty much trusts him on anybody. 

As Davis will have his hands full with Jokić, I would look to LeBron guarding Gordon to a similar degree that the Nuggets will guard Vanderbilt and also how the Lakers guarded players on the Warriors and Grizzlies — simple not caring if they were to launch threes. LeBron’s best defensive role for a good amount of years now is as a helper and potential roamer where he can be a pest in passing lanes, take charges in driving lanes, and come over for huge blocks if that is the last resort. LeBron will also have to be wary though of Gordon’s cutting and his impeccable chemistry with Jokić where the latter will find the former as soon as there is an opening in the defense. 

Denver’s Advantages

Going into this matchup as the #1 offense in the playoffs, Denver will pose a different threat to the Lakers’ defense they really haven’t seen this postseason. Not only is it pretty post-centric but the guy that can post up can also space you out and that could be the real concern. 

In the recent years of Jokić’s dominance throughout the league, which incidentally came after the loss to the Lakers in the 2020 Bubble, he has been a tough matchup for AD and he is of the build of player that AD can have trouble against. With his high center of gravity, Davis can often look light when going against bulky 7-footers will a low center of gravity and they can move him around a bit. Guys like Jokić, Ivica Zubac, or Jusuf Nurkić all fit the description and have given AD more trouble than you would think from a defensive player of his caliber. While Davis will definitely make him work, I think Jokić will have the edge over him in those 1-on-1 battles in the post that will inevitably happen.

If Jokić is not in the post, however, he can still stretch Davis out with his ability to shoot and if Davis provides no pressure to Jokic on the perimeter, it will give him ample amounts of time to read the floor and play make as one of the league’s best in that category. This will be a challenge the Lakers will have to solve throughout the series since they won their first two series by stationing Anthony Davis near the rim as best as they could through all methods and it worked to near perfection. With Jokić operating a lot from the top of the key and elbow, that alone can pull Davis out from under the rim and other Nuggets’ players will feel much more free at the rim when Davis’ presence isn’t near. 

Denver is also a more controlled and secure offense in comparison to the Grizzlies and Warriors who both ranked in the bottom-7 in most turnovers per game by playoff teams, meanwhile, Denver ranks 1st, giving up the fewest amount of turnovers this postseason. This matters a ton for the success rate of the Lakers’ defense of course but also hinders their transition game as well if they don’t turn the Nuggets over enough. 

With Aaron Gordon’s phenomenal work on Kevin Durant in Denver’s previous series, he will be a formidable defender to have the LeBron assignment. Strangely enough, Gordon is one of the few defenders who actually match up in stature and frame to LeBron which could provide an interesting challenge for the legend at this stage of his career. 

I expect Denver to be flying up the court in transition at every opportunity that arises. The Lakers’ transition defense has left a lot to be desired with the number of athletes and high-IQ players on the team. If Denver is able to fly in transition while also being a problem in the halfcourt offense and on the offensive glass, they could spell trouble for the underdogs very quickly.

Lakers’ Advantages

Throughout the LeBron and AD era, the Lakers have had one offensive identity—attack the rim. In the regular season, the Nuggets allowed the 3rd highest FG% at the rim and it has always been a weakness of theirs in recent years. In the regular season with LeBron and AD both healthy and playing, the Lakers have had a 4-1 record over the Nuggets since 2019-20 and that doesn’t include the 4-1 series win over Denver in the Bubble. During the regular season and postseason, the Lakers have always been a tough matchup for the Nuggets although this year, Denver is fielding easily their best supporting cast around Jokić since his birth as a star in this league. 

Rim protection is one of Jokić’s biggest weaknesses as a player and the Lakers will make sure to exploit that when they have the chance. With LeBron and AD being two of the best rim attackers in the league, I’m sure their minds will be made up on getting to the rim and it will be up to the Nuggets to stop them from getting there which was their plan in that 2020 series. 

In that 2020 Western Conference Finals, the Nuggets stunted extremely hard off the Lakers’ role players whenever LeBron had the ball in a concerted effort to make him beat them off of jumpers and it was a good strategy. Before Game 5, LeBron only averaged 24 points per game and in Game 4, he shot 7-of-18 from the field. But in Game 5, James had one of those statement games where he reminds you that sometimes, it just doesn’t matter. 

That’s how the previous series ended off and one might ask, what has changed since then? Well, the Lakers have shooters. And those shooters are also ballhandlers that can create for themselves and for others. And LeBron is not as on-ball dominant as he once was which can throw the defense for a loop in that his attack will not be as predictable. 

In the December 16th matchup between the two teams, LeBron how devastating that versatile skillset can be especially when he has a favorable matchup at the rim. He killed Denver on cuts through the defense when the attention shifted off of his which made for some highlight dunks and uber-efficient possessions. 

With this current version of LeBron in the postseason, I think we could see this a lot as a way of offense for him when not creating on-ball like so many of us are used to him doing. 

And while there is so much talk around how the Lakers will guard the Nuggets, Denver will probably be the most advantageous defense to the Lakers that they will see this postseason. In the Grizzlies and Warriors series which feature two top defenses and two All-Defensive defenders, the Lakers got stuck in the mud a few times and the other teams were able to stall out LA’s pick-and-roll offense and pet actions. I just don’t see that being the case in this series. 

In the regular season, the Lakers were able to go back to an ol’ reliable play from the ‘19-20 season when nobody really had an answer for it: the LeBron and AD pick and roll. Ever since then, teams have just switched that action and would much rather one of those two attack individually vs help instead of combining to convert a masterful possession. Now, with Davis sliding to be a full-time center, that means Jokić will match up with him and if the Lakers run that LeBron and AD pick and roll, would Denver want to switch Nikola Jokić onto LeBron James? No! At least that’s what the film says and it drew great results for the Laker offense. 

Also with Jokić being on AD, that opens up a Lakers pet action of the AD wide pin-down where he sets up in the corner and a guard sets a pin-down screen for AD to curl off of and attack while on the move. I’d imagine this would be a difficult action for Jokić to guard given that centers usually aren’t used to running around screens and that’s why it’s so effective. 

On top of the offense being unlocked a bit, the Lakers’ defense has sneakily been one the best in the league at slowing down the Joker with smart tactics from the coaching staff. While some think letting Jokić cook in the post 1v1 all game is the key to beating Denver, LA has actually found success in smartly sending help to Jokić to effectively get the ball out of his hands without him realizing the advantage quick enough and also the Nuggets players not executing quick enough either. 

The Lakers used a heavy diet of helping from the strong side then bumping the next defender over to help the helper. This causes a chain reaction within the defense and the original helper’s new man will be the one in the weakside corner after he helps on Jokić. Since some of Joker’s first reads were taken away and the Nuggets didn’t weren’t ready to be thrown a Jokić pass that didn’t really create that much of an advantage, the offense sputtered at times in those regular season matchups and it was pretty much all due to the gameplan and the execution from the players.

X-Factors

Nuggets:

• The Others

Yep. That’s right. Literally every single player not named Nikola Jokić is an x-factor for the Nuggets because simply he will need all the help he can get. If Jamal Murray can tap into that efficiency he had when in the Bubble it would go a long way. He does not have the margin of error that he had in the series against Phoenix to have ice-cold games and still come out with a win. Michael Porter Jr. and Kentavious Caldwell-Pope have to be consistent shooters and consistent decision-makers when the ball is put in their hands. Aaron Gordon can’t be afraid to shoot the ball and has to always make himself a threat through cutting or his outside shot. How much can the bench help? How much can Bruce Brown and Christian Braun contribute offensively? They’ll need everybody to chip in in some ways that aren’t normal for them and they may be put into uncomfortable situations where they will still have to succeed if they want a trip to the Finals.

Lakers

• LeBron James
• Timely adjustments (both)

Anthony Davis has unequivocally been the best player for the Lakers in this playoff run but he will need all the help where he can get it as well and I think LeBron has a chance to make a huge imprint on this series. With his athletic advantages and as a prime pressure point for the Nuggets’ weakness, his production, and primarily his health, could swing the series one way or the other.

Michael Malone is one of the best coaches in the league and this should not be a pushover matchup (like the 2020 series). These two teams are pretty evenly matched to where if you don’t counter an adjustment or don’t execute enough of the gameplan, the other team will send you right on home. Neither team has the margin for error to mess around and drop games because of an unplanned-for coverage or the team can’t execute the proper coverage or offensive exploits.

Prediction

Lakers in 6.

Much like the series against Golden State, LA is coming into this series with an optimal gameplan that we have seen work in the regular season and should be put in place again in the upcoming series. I do expect Denver to be ready for the Lakers’ first move and they have the coaching to be able to counter as best as they can then it will be on the Lakers to make their move once again. I believe the Lakers have the tactical advantage, weakness advantage, and rotation/versatility advantage with the Nuggets at a strict 8-man rotation while the Lakers have nine or even 10 guys they can go to on a nightly basis and tweak their style of play just a bit to accommodate that player and play him into their advantage. On top of that, the last game that LeBron played was his best game of this postseason and he ended the series off shooting 39% from three after Game 1. Who’s to say that can’t carry over?

Either way, this should be an extremely entertaining series that will have many plenty of adjusting and countering and best of all we get to see another series of just some of the best in the world go at it. Jokić has grown a lot since that series in Orlando and it would be a pretty good story if he were to beat the same team that knocked him out for a spot in the Finals a while back. But unfortunately for the Joker, I think his road will stop at the same spot and we will see the first 7th seed in NBA history claim their spot in the NBA Finals.

The post Clash of the Titans: Nuggets vs Lakers Series Preview appeared first on Swish Theory.

“Wow! Jock Landale is a truly dominant center! Not one of the Denver frontcourt players can box him out, Denver must lack an interior presence to negate his offensive rebounding.” 

And our extraterrestrial friend wouldn’t be wrong, either.

In the first two and a half minutes of the 4th quarter, the Suns took six shots while the Nuggets only took two, with Phoenix bench big Landale drawing three fouls (two while attacking the glass and one while sealing Christian Braun) in that stretch. The Nuggets’ Jeff Green-Aaron Gordon backline is structureless, flimsy against any sort of quasi-meaningful size. A strategy that, on a night where the typically dynamic Denver offense was unusually sluggish, may have lost Denver home court advantage against the star-powered Suns.

Enter, then, one Nikola Jokic. Jokic checked in with 9:25 to go in a game tied 73-73, the only points scored thus far in the frame was a Kentavious Caldwell-Pope three pointer. His first play upon checking in? A demeaning one-handed rebound, casually repelling Landale with his free arm, into a Jokic-Jamal Murray two-man game resulting in another KCP three point bomb. 

The Nuggets would go on to win 97-87, but within a 30 second frame, Jokic immediately stabilized both ends of the court for the Nuggets. In a critically important Game 2 with Murray, Michael Porter Jr., and Aaron Gordon combining to shoot 9/31, Jokic needed to be the best version of himself: the NBA’s foremost supercomputer processing solutions to his team’s needs on both ends of the floor.

Yes, both ends of the floor. For as much as Jokic has been the league’s most reliable offensive hub in 2023, the fourth quarter against the Suns demonstrated that his feel for the game is not limited to offense. When the Suns attacked Denver’s no-middle defense with Josh Okogie as the short-roller/decision maker, Aaron Gordon jumped on an Okogie fake and left Deandre Ayton wide open for the jam.

I’m unsure exactly what Jokic said to Gordon, but I would like to believe it was something along the lines of, “It’s Josh f****** Okogie man.” It clearly had an impact on Gordon’s strategy on the rotation to the short roller. Later in the quarter, still applying no-middle but this time blitzing the ball screen, Gordon shaded toward Okogie instead of committing, forcing the worst offensive option for the Suns to make an important decision late in the game. The result was a bad shot and a won possession for the Nuggets:

Jokic’s recognition of personnel and concepts is key to the Nuggets defensive strategy against the Suns. The moments where Devin Booker and Kevin Durant go nuclear are unstoppable, but exploiting weaknesses around the edges is how the Nuggets can contain Phoenix’s explosive offense. Despite his athletic limitations, he solves so many problems just by recognizing the offensive potency of each opposing player. 

Against Cameron Payne (who is decidedly not Chris Paul), Jokic relied on heavy drop concepts and his underrated strength to man the paint. Against Booker, he hedged until the defender had a chance to recover, forcing Book to at least consider making a decision and delaying his process while the weakside defenders got organized. And against Durant, Jokic hard blitzed the PnR to get the ball out of his hands and into Okogie’s. All the while retreating to the paint to establish early positioning for rebounds. Positioning, the thing that the Nuggets couldn’t stop Jock Landale from establishing without Jokic.

And offensively, Jokic has no equal. He had 39 points on 17/30 shooting in 41 minutes. When the Nuggets needed his completely singular skillset the most, he delivered. The earlier clip–where Jokic processes Booker’s rotation before he does and gets KCP a wide open corner look–is a small sample of how Jokic’s offensive mastery ushered the Nuggets to victory.

Poor, poor Deandre Ayton. Despite some pretty sound defense, or what would be sound defense against most centers, Jokic routinely found space to attack and took complete advantage of how Ayton was utilized in Phoenix’s scheme. In the PnR, Jokic took up just enough space to get the best shot possible without a meaningful contest from Ayton:

In one-on-one defensive contexts, Ayton stood no chance. Despite possessing a myriad of athletic advantages, Jokic simply overpowered the former number-one overall pick. 

In the first clip, while obviously a tough shot, Jokic waits until Murray spaces to the three-point line to attack that gap in between the free throw line and the right block. The second shot is humiliation on national television. The aggressive hips and early seal in semi-transition puts the Suns’ defense irreparably behind the eight-ball. Barbecue chicken. He’s hunting an iso matchup against the only reliable two-way big the Suns roster. 

The third clip is just Jokic being a cheat code. After some initial off ball action, Denver runs Horns Out (where the player at one elbow sets a screen for the player at the opposite elbow, a play that Phoenix runs a lot for Durant) for Jokic, who immediately attacks Ayton’s chest and draws a foul. There is exactly one other center in the NBA who you can reliably run this set for and he’s the MVP of the Association. Back to our E.T. correspondent after watching the rest of the 4th quarter:

Jokic is become PnR death, destroyer of worlds defenses.

Profound words, but there are still some counters the Suns could employ to contain Jokic’s impact. While it sounds nonsensical, establishing a smaller defender on Jokic may actually short circuit the Nuggets’ offense. Placing Ayton, Bismack Biyombo, or even Durant as the weak side helper and matching up Torrey Craig as the primary could deter his decision-making and ultimately afford the defense more time for recovery. 

The Sixers implemented this strategy during the regular season (as analyzed by the great team at Thinking Basketball) to great effect, and while Craig is no P.J. Tucker and Ayton is certainly no Joel Embiid, the concept of forcing Jokic to see the biggest body possible on the help has its merits. Though I’m sure Jokic will crack that code too. Game 3 on May 5th.

The post Nikola Jokic: Destroyer of Worlds appeared first on Swish Theory.

The NBA draft may be over, but for teams across the league, the development process has just begun. Contrary to what most think, success in the draft is more than just making the ‘right’ pick. What happens after draft night is where the real magic starts to begin. Through this article, I hope to illuminate what this looks like for both the best and worst drafting teams in the league, as we take an up-close and personal look at the cultures, habits, and infrastructures that makes each NBA organization unique.

The Price of a Pick

To understand how teams have performed in the draft relative to expectations, we have to first understand the value of a pick in each draft range. Luckily Seth Partnow from The Athletic has seemingly already done that for us.

Now that we have a rough idea of how players in a certain pick range turn out, let’s see which teams have been able to consistently outperform these pick expectations. To keep my sample size large enough while also accounting for more modern team infrastructures, I’ll be looking at data from 2010-2018.

Right away, we can see some rather obvious underperforming and overperforming teams. Across the board, it’s very clear that average draft position has been nowhere near a guarantee for success, but we’ll get into more of that later.

In an attempt to recreate Partnow’s plot in a more team-specific way, I hand-tracked draft pick outcomes for each team. While teams like the Kings are easy to spot as obvious underperformers, it’s not as simple to see how others have fared. To combat this, I reordered teams based on a very rough ‘relative draft value’ metric shown above. I set up a point system for teams where they were rewarded set points for each outcome they drafted, where they got the most points for drafting a franchise/core player and less for each outcome below that, all the way down to the bust outcome where points were actually subtracted. These values were chosen based on a similar method to the one used in my draft model, which you can read more about here. While it is a pretty rough metric, it gets the job done.

As a caveat, there are some limitations to this exercise due to its imperfect nature. I tried to match Partnow’s process to assign outcomes as much as possible (outlined in more detail here), but it’s impossible to do so completely. As addressed earlier, my sample size is also smaller than his to try to account for modern/current front offices, but some teams didn’t draft enough in the time period to confidently say whether they did well or not. Another important note is that some of these players were developed by teams other than the teams that drafted him (this doesn’t apply to draft day trades, these are accounted for accordingly), but the original drafters received credit. While this might impact results, I don’t think it was severe enough to make a truly big difference. Finally, I didn’t include undrafted players in this exercise, so teams that traditionally do well with undrafted players didn’t shine as brightly (looking at you Miami, and, to a lesser extent, Dallas). With that out of the way, let’s dive into the results.

Is It Good Drafting or Good Developing?

This question is tricky. Are teams that are finding themselves successful in the draft better at identifying talent or developing it? In all likelihood, it’s a mixture of both and varies from team to team, but my aim is to examine different teams’ infrastructures to try and answer this. As a reminder, this is more a review of a team’s past rather than an indictment of their future. Some of the poorly performing teams have recently made the necessary steps to improve their draft strategy and player development infrastructure.

The Best of the Best

Denver Nuggets

Total Picks: 23

Average Draft Pick: 35

Pick Outcomes: 47.83% Bust, 8.7% Just a Guy, 21.74% High Rotation, 13.04% Top Starter, 4.35% Borderline All-Star, 4.35% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 6

Total Data Analysts: 1

G-League Team Affiliation: 2021-Present

Though the Nuggets’ draft success extends past drafting one of only two second-round MVPs in league history, let’s start there for a moment. Nikola Jokic was the least known prospect within a very strong 2014 Nuggets draft class that included both Jusuf Nurkic and Gary Harris. Jokic represents one of the earliest cases I’ve seen of what draft twitter likes to call ‘pre-drafting’. As PD Web explains in the linked article, the practice is essentially selecting a player a year before they become a more ‘mainstream’ prospect. Interestingly enough, according to an article from The Athletic, this practice is a pillar in the foundation of the Nuggets’ draft strategy, with a clear emphasis to draft prospects before their true breakout season.

However, the Nuggets’ draft work doesn’t stop after they identify talent. For former head of basketball operations, Tim Connelly, and the rest of the front office, player development is where they can really gain an edge. Player development for the Nuggets starts and ends with assistant coach John Beckett. Beckett is a former video coordinator with the Hawks who was initially hired by Denver as a player development coach in 2015 before quickly working his way to his current position on Michael Malone’s staff. For Beckett and the Nuggets, game-like situations are the bread and butter of their player-curated development workouts. This means getting a lot of threes up for Jamal Murray and a lot of off-ball work for Michael Porter Jr. Approaching player development through this lens has paid dividends for the Nuggets, helping improve Malik Beasley and Monte Morris in addition to those already mentioned.

With the return of Jamal Murray and Michael Porter Jr. this season, we’ll finally get to see the complete vision of a homegrown Nuggets team shaped by the player development habits and proactive draft strategy cultivated throughout the past decade.

Los Angeles Lakers

Total Picks: 21

Average Draft Pick: 37

Pick Outcomes: 47.62% Bust, 9.52% Just a Guy, 23.81% High Rotation, 14.29% Top Starter, 4.76% Borderline All-Star, 0% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 7

Total Data Analysts: 4

G-League Team Affiliation: 2006-Present

Somewhat to my surprise, the Lakers have done an excellent job of finding value in the draft relative to their average position. Despite picking 37th on average in the draft, the second lowest average selection, the Lakers have managed to find a large number of guys that have stuck in the league. So, how have they done it? The Lakers simply optimized G-League player development quicker than other teams. They were the first NBA franchise to own a G-League (then known as the D-League) team, gaining ownership with their current affiliate, the South Bay Lakers, way back in 2006. Since then, the Lakers have used South Bay as a place for rookies and young players without a path to minutes on the NBA roster to gain valuable game time, experience, and development. As of 2021, a staggering 36 former South Bay Lakers players had been called up to the NBA, with two trips to the G-League finals (2012, 2016) under their belt. Notable South Bay Lakers alumni in the time frame (2010-2018) include Alex Caruso, Ivica Zubac, Mo Wagner, Gary Payton II, Josh Hart, and Thomas Bryant.

Philadelphia 76ers

Total Picks: 28

Average Draft Pick: 26

Pick Outcomes: 46.43% Bust, 14.29% Just a Guy, 25.00% High Rotation, 3.57% Top Starter, 7.14% Borderline All-Star, 3.57% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 8

Total Data Analysts: 5

G-League Team Affiliation: 2013-Present

The Philadelphia 76ers fielded what is probably the most infamous bad team in modern sports history in the early stages of our selected timeframe. The Process Sixers weren’t just known for being bad, they were known for embracing it. Before delving deeper, my first thoughts on the 76ers draft success were “Oh, they just had more opportunities to give their rookies as a historically bad team”. After a little bit of research, I found this could not be the only explanation.

The 76ers do, in fact, play their rookies a lot, to the tune of fourth most in the league over the chosen time period. However, many other franchises that prioritized rookie playing time have not had close to the same level of success. Similarly, there were teams that played their rookies a lot less, on average, yet have had great success in drafting and development. Upon closer inspection, it seems that in addition to giving their rookies ample opportunities, the 76ers are just better at talent identification than most teams. Sometimes, it really is that simple. A lot of their success in the draft has simply come from hitting on almost every single lottery pick they’ve had. From Joel Embiid to Ben Simmons to even Dario Saric, the Sixers have generally nailed that portion of the draft. This outperformance even includes two instances of unusually bad injury luck from the selections of Markelle Fultz and Zhaire Smith. The Sixers are no slouch when it comes to drafting in the second round either, drafting both Jerami Grant and Richaun Holmes before they blossomed on other teams. Not every team has a winning formula when it comes to developing young players, but luckily for the Sixers, they’ve already won half the battle with their excellent eye for talent.

Utah Jazz

Total Picks: 18

Average Draft Pick: 32

Pick Outcomes: 44.44% Bust, 22.22% Just a Guy, 22.22% High Rotation, 0% Top Starter, 0% Borderline All-Star, 11.11% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 20

Total Data Analysts: 1

G-League Team Affiliation: 2014-Present

The most apparent thing about the Jazz is they realize the importance of the draft. They have what can only be described as an army of professional scouts, 20 to be exact, more than any other team I’ve looked at for this exercise. The immediate conclusion to draw here is that the Jazz are just great at talent identification, similarly to the Sixers, but in this case, there’s more to it than what meets the eye.

There is one man arguably more responsible for the Jazz’s draft success than any other and that man is Johnnie Bryant. Similarly to John Beckett with Denver, Bryant was hired as a player development coach back in 2012 by the Jazz before being promoted to assistant coach in 2014. Prior to his hiring, he had gained a reputation for his independent skill development program (Bryant Sports Academy) and worked with multiple NBA players, including All-Stars Damian Lillard and Paul Millsap. His first success story with the Jazz came by working with former Jazz player Gordon Hayward on his way to becoming an All-Star. Since then he’s helped develop many Jazz players, most notably Rudy Gobert and Donovan Mitchell, the latter of which he helped scale to a primary option after being drafted with the expectation of having a smaller role.

For Mitchell, Bryant reportedly conducted “individual workouts, pregame shooting routines and film sessions — scouting opponents, reviewing games, watching other stars to try to learn their tricks.” Bryant’s help with playmaking and capitalizing on shooting gravity quickly made Mitchell one of the more dynamic guards in the league. According to Donovan, Bryant obsessively watches film, combing over hours of footage and taking notes to find ways his players can improve.

Off the court, Bryant develops a close relationship with his players, giving them a member of the staff they know they can trust. This aspect of the game is often overlooked but is of the utmost importance. The more mentally comfortable a player is, the easier it is for them to perform at their highest levels. With Bryant having departed recently to the Knicks, we’ll soon see if the Jazz’s reliance on him was as great as I expect.

San Antonio Spurs

Total Picks: 17

Average Draft Pick: 40

Pick Outcomes: 52.94% Bust, 17.65% Just a Guy, 11.76% High Rotation, 5.88% Top Starter, 5.88% Borderline All-Star, 5.88% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 5

Total Data Analysts: 5

G-League Team Affiliation: 2007-Present

We’ve all heard it a thousand times, but it needs to continue to be said. The San Antonio Spurs are the golden standard. Bar none. The success they were able to maintain for so long without dips in form is nothing short of incredible and a lot of it has been thanks to their success in the draft. Despite having on average the lowest draft position in the whole league and no lottery picks throughout the entire time period, the Spurs managed to draft Kawhi Leonard, Dejounte Murray, Derrick White, Kyle Anderson, and countless other quality NBA players. It goes without being said that development had to be a part of their success with these later draft picks, and after examining the Spurs’ philosophy, it is clearly the main driver.

With many teams, player development is mainly focused on key young players. The Spurs take it to a whole ‘nother level. To put it simply, if you are on the Spurs, your development will be prioritized, all the way down to the end of the bench. Take, for example, Davis Bertans, who, entering the 2017-18 season, was a 25-year-old former 42nd overall pick coming off of a season in which he put up 4.5 points per game in only 12.1 minutes per game. You’d think Bertans would be the last person the Spurs would be focusing on in the 2017 offseason. You’d also be wrong. According to an ESPN report by Michael C. Wright, the Spurs went as far as to send a player development coach all the way to Europe to monitor and work out Bertans as he competed with Latvia in Eurobasket 2017. One $80 million contract later, I’m sure Bertans is glad he landed with the Spurs. This commitment to the development of every last player on the roster, along with ace-in-the-hole shooting development coach, Chip Engelland (the person responsible for revamping Kawhi Leonard’s shot), has allowed the Spurs to continue to win along the margins and keep themselves a leg up over the rest of the teams in the Association. With Engelland recently moving on to OKC, we have the opportunity to see how the Spurs adapt to losing arguably the most important figure to their player development operation as they embark on their first true rebuild in over twenty years.

The Worst

Sacramento Kings

Total Picks: 19

Average Draft Pick: 16

Pick Outcomes: 63.16% Bust, 15.79% Just a Guy, 0% High Rotation, 5.26% Top Starter, 10.53% Borderline All-Star, 5.26% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 8

Total Data Analysts: 5

G-League Team Affiliation: 2016-Present

*Sigh*Roll the video.

Ahhh, the Sacramento Kings. You know we have to start with them. To be blunt, the Kings have been terrible for the better part of two decades now and their inability to draft and develop their lottery picks has left them drowning underwater. On top of that, the Kings have, whether intentionally or not, fostered a culture of instability and uncertainty. Since 2006, the last time the Kings made the playoffs, the franchise has gone through twelve different coaches, alienated two star players in Boogie Cousins and Tyrese Haliburton, and attempted to relocate the franchise to another city. Now, to be this organizationally inept, a lot of things need to have gone wrong, but it all starts at the top. While he should be commended (by Kings fans at least) for fighting to keep the team in Sacramento, Vivek Ranadive’s inability to keep himself out of sporting decisions has led to years of basketball failure. According to the Sacramento Bee, Ranadive has contributed to what has been described as “a ‘toxic’ work environment in which ‘people don’t trust each other’”. The last thing you want from an owner is them meddling in sporting decisions or creating an environment as bad as what’s been described. Luckily, the same report mentioned that Ranadive has backed off somewhat since the hiring of new GM Monte McNair in September 2020, so hopefully greener pastures are ahead for those oh-so-loyal Kings fans.

Dallas Mavericks

Total Picks: 14

Average Draft Pick: 31

Pick Outcomes: 71.43% Bust, 7.14% Just a Guy, 0% High Rotation, 14.29% Top Starter, 0% Borderline All-Star, 7.14% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 12

Total Data Analysts: 4

G-League Team Affiliation: 2009-Present

As a Mavs fan myself, I’ve had a front-row seat view of the bad (and good) decisions they’ve made this past decade. Now, I think there are a couple of things in play here when it comes to their past draft failures. Starting off with what has bothered me the most as a fan, the Mavs simply don’t seem to give their rookies enough opportunities. Looking back at the visual from earlier, they’ve played their rookies a lot less than most other NBA teams, a possible symptom of a team coached by renowned vet-lover Rick Carlisle.

One of my biggest gripes recently has been how they’ve handled Josh Green’s development, at least early on. Coming off a covid-shortened offseason in which he was unable to play in Summer League or have a normal training camp, Green, the last first-round pick the Mavs would have while Luka was on a rookie deal, played 11.4 minutes per game in only 39 total games. This wouldn’t have been much of a problem had he been sent down to the G-League to get meaningful reps, yet the Mavs only briefly sent him down for 5 games. Squandering that much time in a player’s development is inexcusable, especially for a player that clearly needed confidence as Green did. Instead, he played sparing minutes for the Mavs, getting pulled after every mistake, dropping his confidence lower and lower. Luckily, this past year Jason Kidd instilled a little more faith in him and sure enough, Green’s confidence grew and he convincingly solidified himself as a rotation player in the regular season.

Similar to the Kings, the Mavs have also suffered somewhat from owner meddling. These incidents have been well documented with Mark Cuban admitting to being the reason the Mavs passed on Giannis (GM Donnie Nelson wanted him) and the Haralabos Voulgaris situation in 2021 which resulted in a complete overhaul of the Mavs front office, where, like Randadive, Cuban has reportedly ceded a little more control to current GM Nico Harrison and special advisors Michael Finley and Dirk Nowitzki.

Los Angeles Clippers

Total Picks: 16

Average Draft Pick: 36

Pick Outcomes: 75.00% Bust, 0% Just a Guy, 6.25% High Rotation, 6.25% Top Starter, 12.50% Borderline All-Star, 0% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 11

Total Data Analysts: 7

G-League Team Affiliation: 2017-Present

The Clippers’ draft shortcomings seem to be easily explained. At the top of the draft, they haven’t performed too poorly, selecting players like Eric Bledsoe, Reggie Bullock, Al-Farouq Aminu, and Shai Gilgeous-Alexander with their first-round picks. Their issues, instead, come from whiffing on almost every single second-round pick in the same time period which appears largely attributable to under-investment in player development.

Unlike their Los Angeles counterparts, the Clippers didn’t have their own G-League affiliate until 2017 as the Ballmer era got underway, previously sharing the Bakersfield Jam with the Phoenix Suns from 2009-2014. As such, most of these second-rounders either received little to no minutes riding the bench, or were sent to another team’s affiliate where they weren’t developed by members of the Clippers organization. Now with their own G-League team, officially the Ontario (previously Agua Caliente) Clippers as of July 2022, they should be able to flip the script on their second-round success. In fact, we may already be seeing the results of these improvements taking place, with 2019 second-rounder Terance Mann becoming a valuable rotation player after playing 20 games with their new affiliate. In a similar way, Amir Coffey, an undrafted second-rounder in 2019, has been a positive player, contributing 12 points, four rebounds, and three assists per game in 30 games as a starter. Coffey was Agua Caliente’s leading scorer in 2020-21.

Trending in the Right Direction

Memphis Grizzlies

Total Picks: 18

Average Draft Pick: 33

Pick Outcomes: 77.78% Bust, 5.56% Just a Guy, 5.56% High Rotation, 11.11% Top Starter, 0% Borderline All-Star, 0% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 5* (some basketball ops guys are functionally scouts)

Total Data Analysts: 4

G-League Team Affiliation: 2014-Present

Although the Grizzlies were awful at drafting and developing talent in the time period I looked at (2010-2018), the organization has turned a corner since. This change has coincided with executive Zach Kleiman’s rapid ascension to his current position as “lead basketball operations executive and personnel decisionmaker” in 2019 and the subsequent hiring of new basketball ops personnel with fresh ideas (over 30 new hirings to be exact). Since then, the Grizzlies have nailed almost every draft pick they’ve made, drafting franchise cornerstone Ja Morant and surrounding him with a plethora of quality homegrown/drafted talent, including Desmond Bane, Brandon Clarke, Xavier Tillman, and Ziaire Williams. With 2022 draft selections Jake LaRavia, David Roddy, Kennedy Chandler, and Kenny Lofton Jr. already showing promising flashes in preseason, it seems like the Grizzlies have struck gold again.

In regards to player development and infrastructure, the Grizzlies have utilized their Memphis Hustle G-League team well since its inception in 2017, with five members of their 2021-22 roster (including former G-League Player of the Month Kyle Anderson) having spent time in the development league. They rely on their former players’ expertise as well, with Tony Allen hired as a player development coach for the Hustle in January 2020.

What We’ve Learned

When we discuss draft success, talent identification seems to be the main focus, with Bleacher Report redrafts constantly making the rounds on social media. In reality, draft success is the confluence of numerous organizational factors, of which 4 key pillars have emerged: organizational stability/clarity, talent identification, opportunity allocation, and, most importantly, a strong developmental infrastructure. Teams need to be hiring more player development coaches, as the secret to a lot of these good drafting teams is that the players they draft get to work with somebody like Johnnie Bryant, John Beckett, or Chip Engelland the second they arrive in town. Right now, there are simply not enough player dev coaches on most teams to sit down individually with every single player and help them with their development.

The focus tends to mainly be on high-profile prospects like Donovan Mitchell, but so much value could be added by focusing on the others too. The Spurs have perfected this science, using developmental success to sustain a 22-year playoff streak. On the other end of the spectrum, we have the Kings, where organizational instability amongst other things has led to 16 years of playoff despair. Can they close the gap? It’ll be hard, but in a copycat league, the roadmap to success is there for all to follow.

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