In the previous article I wrote analyzing Tre Johnson, I alluded to the changing perspective of front offices and fans alike regarding the draft. The 2024 cycle was an emphatic indication of the sea change in teams’ approach to the event. With players from Reed Sheppard to Zach Edey being selected with high picks, it became apparent that teams were prioritizing cerebral players with analytically sound profiles over those with traits more traditionally associated with high upside.

What drove me to write about Kon was how representative his journey was of this shifting dynamic. Widely recognized as a subpar athlete by NBA standards, due to the optics of Knueppel’s game, I doubt he would have ever been considered worthy of a top-5 pick even as recently as a decade ago. However, because of his stellar efficiency and deserved reputation as an intelligent player, the Hornets’ selection of Knueppel was seen as a no-brainer.

My intent with writing this piece was to figure out one thing: has the pendulum swung too far? At what point is it acceptable to go against conventional draft logic and select a player whose deficiencies would have been considered disqualifying in previous eras? By investigating both contextual and individual statistics, in tandem with tape dating back 2 years, I found myself in firm disagreement with the direction the Hornets ultimately went in.

The Beginning

Standing slightly over 6’6 in shoes with a 6’6.25″ wingspan, Kon Knueppel may have left this draft with the highest approval rating of any non-Cooper Flagg prospect. Knueppel’s playstyle eschewed norms typically associated with star level production, he relied on technique and guile in lieu of dynamic physical traits. His fundamentally sound game, paired with an inscrutable demeanor, and an overwhelming amount of team success quickly earned Knueppel fans. And Kon would finish with one of the most impressive underclassman seasons from a perimeter player in recent memory, inserting himself into the group below along with fellow one-and-done Jase Richardson.

What makes Kon such a compelling case study isn’t just his ascension from fringe top-40 recruit at the beginning of his final AAU campaign, to top-5 draft pick 2 years later, but the rapid and tangible development he made in that span.

To gain a complete understanding of Kon’s game we must begin with his time spent on the grassroots circuit. Knueppel’s scoring and scoring efficiency have remained constants over the course of his career, having led his EYBL age group in scoring for 3 consecutive years and never once dipped under 60% True Shooting. However, outside of the high-volume flamethrowing from deep, Knueppel’s utilization at Duke held a faint resemblance to his time playing AAU.

During Kon’s time playing his AAU team, Phenom University, he served as the focal point of a motion offense. PhenomU would run concepts broadly similar to Duke, but with drastically different objectives. PhenomU frequently schemed looks for Knueppel to post-up in the middle of the floor, where his combination of size, strength, and touch were enough to overwhelm opponents at the high-school level. Actions like ‘Cross Punch’..

Outside of these schemed looks Knueppel was the frequent recipient of opportunistic buckets made possible by the Motion Offense and the miscommunication it brought about in opposing defenses.

And although these principles aren’t incompatible with quality offense at the collegiate or professional level, they did leave Knueppel unrefined in certain areas which became significantly more relevant during his time at Duke. One example would be Kon’s relative inefficiency attacking closeouts, where he was comfortable settling for short range jumpers and would seldom applied pressure on the rim.

Starting at Duke

Kon’s shift in usage once arriving at Duke was abrupt and apparent, the aforementioned post-ups and cuts were largely replaced with PNR ballhandling reps, as evinced below.

And for someone who came into the season a vocal proponent of Kon, frankly, the beginning of his Duke career was largely underwhelming. Duke almost exclusively schemed two plays for Knueppel, the first of which being ‘Zipper Stagger PNR‘, which exposed his inexperience operating out of ballscreens,

and the second play which comprised the majority of Knueppel’s organized offense was ‘Pin Ricky Flare‘, where again Knueppel struggled to generate quality looks if he wasn’t provided the requisite space to attempt a 3.

There definitely wasn’t a singular culprit behind Knueppel’s ineffectiveness as a driver, but the most obvious contributing factor was the misalignment between Duke’s offensive approach and Knueppel’s habits inside the arc. As previously mentioned, when Kon was ran off the 3-point line in highschool he expressed no urgency in getting to the rim, and was perfectly content with taking longer 2PA. Duke was the first setting where this characteristic of Knueppel’s game was met with resistance. In Jon Scheyer’s short time at the helm, an early emphasis he has made known is his desire for his teams to maintain a modern shot profile. In every subsequent year of Scheyer’s tenure, Duke has reduced their volume of midrange attempts.

The clash between the playstyle Scheyer had implemented within his team, and Knueppel’s personal style of play lead to ugly moments early on. With Knueppel’s ballhandling skills being fairly underdeveloped for his new, more perimeter oriented role, Kon attempted to rely on his physicality on create space and find finishing windows on drives. Knueppel’s forays towards the rim often lacked pace, and oftentimes Kon would over-penetrate and place himself in compromising positions inside the paint.

At roughly the halfway mark of the season, Knueppel’s statistical profile was far from the stellar marks he would finish the season with.

The Transformation

The defining change in Kon’s game this past season was undoubtedly his ability and effectiveness getting to the rim. Not only did his rim-rate increase by 8% from his final season of AAU to this past season, the complexion of these rim attempts also radically changed. Hand-tracking Knueppel’s rim-finishes reveals a player progressing from a forward to an out and out guard.

Knueppel having his playtype distribution significantly altered, while being forced to largely abandon his most reliable interior counters, AND STILL maintaining the efficiency he’d displayed at previous levels is borderline miraculous. And the catalyst for this improvement were the gains Knueppel made as a ballhandler.

While I still wouldn’t view Knueppel as an elite ballhandler by any means, the strides he made in this area, in conjunction with his physicality, made him a potent driver by season’s end.

For large swaths of the season, Knueppel’s inability to handle ball pressure or digs on his drives consistently prevented him from creating quality paint touches.

And I have a theory as to what was behind Knueppel’s leap as a ballhandler and driver. Kon seems to have married the technical gains he made, specifically developing better ball-control and an improvement altering ball-speeds, with the strong footwork foundation he already possessed from all the years spent playing out of the post. Post footwork translating to other facets of the game is an axiom espoused by coaches everywhere, and Knueppel seems to be the most recent testament to this. As the season progressed Knueppel was more capable of keeping his dribble alive inside the arc, making him a more potent scorer and playmaker.

Towards the end of the season, Knueppel started to thrive in the same actions that he’d previously been out of his depth in. Below is a succession of ‘Zipper Stagger PNR‘ plays conducted sublimely by Kon. Even when he isn’t able to finish the play with a basket it is abundantly clear the process is better.

When faced with slightly more exotic coverages Knueppel showed to be up to the task. Compare the clips compiled below, in the initial play versus Kansas. Knueppel is hedged as he runs the ballscreen and immeditely swings the ball at the first sign of ball pressure. The subsequent plays Knueppel keeps his dribble alive, turns the corner, and either draws a foul at the rim or finds an open teammate.

Knueppel’s enhanced foul-drawing compared to previous seasons was evident,

but what I found most impressive about this was how the in-season free-throw rate progression was equally significant.

What this shows is Knueppel recognized the respect he had as a shooter and parlayed the hard closeouts he was receiving into rim-attacks.

As delved further and further into Kon’s career, his self-awareness and work ethic became increasingly apparent. To acclimate this quickly when confronted with change is impressive from any player, never mind a freshman being thrust into the greatest pressure cooker program in college basketball.

A point raised by the always insightful Mike Gribanov (@mikegrib8 on X) was how notable it was for a team to achieve the level of success 2024-25 Duke did while primarily featuring underclassmen. Especially considering how veteran-laden the current college basketball landscape is, I wanted to establish a frame of reference for exactly how rare it was for a player to produce at the level Kon did this past season without the benefit of having experienced teammates. Using KenPom’s ‘Experience Rankings’, which weighs the age of their roster by minutes played, along with some other offensive efficiency and self creation metrics yielded the list below.

Unsurprisingly these thresholds produced a list of offensively slanted perimeter players, but at first glance what caught my eye was how size seemed to have a polarizing effect on this group’s NBA translation. The majority of players who returned overly positive EV from the query seemed to be clustered on the shorter end of the height distribution. However, height having a negative correlation with an all-in-one metric like Estimated Wins goes against all I know about these catch all stats, so I looked elsewhere. And what emerged as the obvious contributing factor to this relationship was the share of a player’s shots which were assisted.

Here lie my Koncerns

To see the strength of the relationship between this group of players’ NBA impact and their pre-NBA self-creation burdens I ran a simple linear regression.

While the  r² here is moderately strong, again there are only so many conclusions to be drawn from what was already a small and fairly curated sample. Where the value lies in this cursory analysis is in illuminating how misleading scoring efficiency can be. The list above is littered with players who couldn’t shoulder a higher creation burden and were too deficient in other areas to warrant serious consideration for playing time. Herein lies the challenge in projecting Kon Knueppel, will he be able to become a load-bearing player for an elite offense and/or round out his game enough defensively to avoid being placed in basketball purgatory?

The Case for Helio-Kon

A case frequently made in support of Kon’s primary upside was his potential to develop into a high volume foul-drawer. We’ve already addressed the strides he’s made in this department, so could this trend continue in the league? In short, I am skeptical Knueppel is next in line of the Morey-ball disciples. Of course the absence of dunks in Kon’s resume has been discussed ad-nauseam (this past season Knueppel actually doubled the number of dunks he’d made over the course of his entire AAU career, with 2), its how often Kon has his shot-blocked at the rim that is my greatest cause for concern. Knueppel had 7% of his FGA blocked at Duke, per Synergy, which isn’t a particularly disqualifying number on its own, but puts him in a precarious position when compared to his now peers in the NBA.

Again, this is not an exhaustive sample we’re drawing from, but there’s no recent precedent for a player with Knueppel’s lack of vertical explosion becoming a formidable rim-pressure guard. In fact I think Knueppel, and the majority of the Duke players this past season, saw their driving efficacy greatly augmented by the presence of Khaman Maluach. Individually, Duke did not roster any players known for their prowess getting downhill, and Maluach was chiefly responsible for providing rim-pressure for the team. Clips like the ones below are examples of the attention Maluach demanded on the interior. In each clipped possession there’s a freeze frame on Maluach’s defender showing the defense’s approach, they were almost never willing to send help on Knueppel’s drives should they risk giving up an easy putback or dumpoff to Maluach.

Duke lead the nation this past season in Wide Open threes, and while their connective passing and willingness to forgo good shots for great ones definitely deserves credit, the attention Maluach demanded as a roller greatly simplified reads for Duke ballhandlers.

Again my friend and tan incredible draft mind in his own right @NileHoops beat me to the presses in writing about the inflation in perception many Duke prospects were granted due to Maluach’s gravity, and I would strongly recommend reading his draft notes here on the matter: https://medium.com/@Nile/nile-presents-2025-nba-draft-master-notes-part-2-of-3-626ef75aefbb.

Knueppel’s statistical fluctuations corroborate this relationship. Per Hoop -Explorer Knueppel’s AST% and rim-rate declined substantially in minutes without Maluach versus the minutes he shared with the superstar big.

This effect reverberated throughout the Duke squad, with the team’s mid-range frequency skyrocketing while their PNR frequency plummeted. Recall earlier when Jon Scheyer’s mid-range aversion was mentioned, without Maluach on the court Duke was forced into taking shots they were explicitly advised against.

Debunking the notion that Knueppel will develop into a prolific driver and free-throw grifter at the next level doesn’t necessarily preclude offensive primacy. After all, many of the players presented early as potential analogues found their way by becoming elite pull-up shooters. Knueppel’s shooting profile definitely makes this the likeliest outcome, but there’s still evidence his stellar touch indicators may belie how long a process it will be for Knueppel to reach these heights.

While Knueppel shot 12/30 on pull-up 3s in his final year of AAU, 10 of these makes came in transition or semi-transition, where he had a cleaner platform to self-organize for these attempts.

In the half-court Knueppel’s issues regaining balance on the move and creating space in close quarters were more evident. Even at lower levels Knueppel struggled getting his shot off cleanly under duress, the aforementioned 7% blocked FGA rate at Duke was identical in AAU.

And of course this isn’t to say Knueppel will be easily neutralized as a shooter at the next level, these are somewhat granular issues I fully believe will be addressed and ameliorated in the long run. But my thinking is the tandem of weaker change-of-direction ability and a drastically slower pace (Duke was 266th in Adjusted Tempo) was behind Knueppel’s precipitous fall from a 42% (30/72) off-the-dribble 3P shooter during AAU, to only making 1/18 3PA off the bounce in college. And the acclimatization period Knueppel would need to round his shooting into form could muddle his long-term offensive projection.

The Defense

As limiting as Knueppel’s change-of-direction is offensively, I think it could be truly debilitating on defense. For as much as Duke’s offensive scheme placed Knueppel in an uncomfortable situation early, the defensive scheme greatly compensated for his flaws. Duke’s conservative switching scheme paired with their ++ positional size (1st in the country in average height and 10th in effective height) masked Knueppel’s deficiencies. The team’s penchant for dragging out possessions with their constant switching, along with the deterrence afforded by their backline size, left a minimal amount of ground for Knueppel to cover in any given possession. I think plays like the clips below are responsible for some overstating Knueppel’s defensive ability, in these possessions Kon is guarding under circumstances where Duke’s already effectively ‘won’ the possession by merit of these players either attacking Knueppel in isolation or driving into a congested paint.

The areas where Knueppel’s difficulties changing speed and direction manifested most consistently were guarding capable pull-up shooters. Knueppel’s inability to mirror these smaller players forced him to give them a cushion, without the length to compensate for the distance he provided Knueppel was prone to ceding acres of space on these attempts.

Maybe even more glaring than Knueppel’s issues guarding pull-up shooters was his total inability to navigate screens. Kon almost never remained attached when tasked with working over screens, and when a teammate wasn’t in position to immediately switch onto Knueppel’s assignment an immense pressure was placed on help defenders to correct for the breakdown. Screen navigation for Kon is another struggle which has persisted since high school.

Predictably Knueppel’s issues changing direction were reflected in his agility testing. Although Kon’s jumps impressed relative to expectations, his 3/4 court sprint and lane agility only added to what was already a bleak defensive projection.

Final Takeaways

My intention with writing this piece is not to pan the Hornets for selecting Kon, but in the wake of Summer League I think now is an appropriate time to adjust expectations before a few inconsequential games dilute any evaluation. As it stands currently, there’s an overwhelming amount of data suggesting that even projecting Kon as a neutral defender may be unrealistic. The most likely outcome seems to be that Kon will be left in limbo defensively, he’ll unable to guard backcourt players because of his poor footspeed, and with no supplementary rim-protection or rebounding skills to speak of Kon will bleed possessions as a frontcourt defender. In search of players at Kon’s size who were also lacking in athletic traits yielded a mixed bag. There’s a handful of positive defenders here, even amongst the highlighted players who hit these thresholds in their pre-draft season. But outside of Cameron Johnson and Khris Middleton, who only hit this threshold in their freshman year (and Middleton was 0.3 DRBD% away from falling out entirely), there’s no other players who would be considered top 5 in their respective draft.

The list of players with Kon’s offensive resume to justify such high draft capital is even slimmer.

While it may seem encouraging that Desmond Bane is included in this group because Kon was frequently compared to him throughout the cycle, Bane’s dunks only bottomed out when he was thrust into a primary role. Bane saw his PNR volume almost quadruple from his Junior to Senior year, and this shit in usage coincided with the lowest number of dunks in his college career.

As heavily as I rely on these statistical queries to inform my opinion, I think its necessary to include all players’ seasons as a reminder of the developmental dichotomy. It seems as often as players undergo these outlier developmental arcs there are as many, if not more, players whose weaknesses crystallize much quicker than we’re willing to acknowledge. In Kon’s case, there’s little reason to believe an athletic transformation is on the horizon. And if he’s going to be a defender who needs specific lineup configurations to stay on the floor will his offense warrant those accommodations? The in-season improvement previously outlined gives me more confidence in Kon eventually ‘guard-ifying’ his shot profile and becoming a more capable creator off the bounce. But the idea that the self-sustainability of Kon’s offense can be reasonably doubted is enough to preclude from being a top 5 pick.

The post Summer League Primer: A Comprehensive Kon Knueppel Scouting Report appeared first on Swish Theory.

The sample for NBA draft prospects is tiny. Even if we have perfect data for a player’s prep and pro careers, the top draft prospects are typically aged 18-22, undergoing massive changes to their games and lives over the span of mere months, over and over in evolving environments and around new personnel.

Combing through that limited data, we search for narratives, precedents, guys that “just have it,” from a scout’s perspective.

In search for a method to the madness this cycle, I’m splitting my draft analysis pieces into three:

• “Whiteboard” Prospects: those whose stats improve as they play worse competition, declining, then, against the top teams
• “Green Flags Only” Prospects: those whose stats exceed certain thresholds regardless of level of competition
• Everyone Else

This, first of two pieces, looks at what I’m calling Whiteboard prospects. Their top-end traits are obvious, but for that reason can be prepared for by the better opponents. As I watch this group, I seek to answer two questions:

• Do they struggle against increasing competition in a way that would be a problem in the NBA?
• Do they simply dominate lower-ranked competition that much?

Definition

I defined Whiteboard Prospects as having a certain set of traits decline against good competition, increase against bad competition:

• Box Plus-Minus
• Percentage of teammates’ FGM assisted
• True shooting percentage
• Steal rate.

As long as these decline from all competition to games against top-100 teams, then again against top-50 teams, and are also on Swish Theory’s Big Board 1.0, they’re a Whiteboard Prospect.

Let’s get to it.

Brandin Podziemski, Santa Clara

• vs. all competition: 10.0 BPM
• vs. top 100 teams: 6.5 BPM
• vs. top 50 teams: 3.9 BPM

Podziemski I thought was going to be an easy read, especially given the severity of decline, the single largest from overall comp to top-50 in our sample. But it was far from that.

Against bad competition, “Podz” did everything. Shooting at a 66% effective field goal percentage and 28% usage, he also maintained a 25% assist rate, 21% defensive rebound rate and 3% steal rate. His stats were heavily buoyed by, simply, never missing from three, where he took over half his shots and made over half of those attempts. That is basically impossible to stop, especially if you are a team ranked in the 200-400 range.

Against better competition, the athletic limitations showed, as expected. He struggles to create much distance on his dribble moves, leading to forced tough angle floaters, but those still go in at decent rates. Truly, Podz put up a historically efficient scoring season.

Projecting that at the next level is tricky. 80-179 (45%) from three, 62-146 (42%) from midrange, 75-121 (62%) at the rim is tough to argue with, but 8-17 (47%) from three, 7-25 (28%) from midrange and 7-19 (37%) from close range is what he tallied against top-50 teams. Another reminder of the inherent uncertainty in percentages.

However, Podziemski is armed with a mighty weapon to limit this downgrade against better competition: he plays really hard, and processes the game very quickly. There is one type of game processing that is Chris Paul-like, setting up one play to set up the next, and then there is Podz’s sharklike approach, always advantage-seeking from all angles. He goes for the kill with his hit-ahead passes or finding cutters, which leads to some sloppy turnovers, but, when coupled with his nose for the ball, means Podziemski will pick up change wherever it comes loose.

Finally, his pull-up three is legit. The release is low, but he needs little room to get it off and has enough 1-2 release patterns to get there.

Results: Primary odds fade, but secondary and especially tertiary shine. He’ll find a way to contribute, I’m sure

Brandon Miller, Alabama

• vs. all competition: 11.0 BPM
• vs. top 100 teams: 9.9 BPM
• vs. top 50 teams: 6.5 BPM

We move from Brandin to Brandon, first to second largest decline in overall production as NCAA competition increases. This exercise was less kind to Alabama’s Miller, placed in a cushier position and, given he is a 6’9’’ ballhandler projected to go in the top 5, the light is naturally a bit harsher.

The obvious knock on Miller this season was his rim finishing. He shot 74% at the rim against teams ranked 50-400, an elite figure that fits a top scorer prospect. But only 44% at the rim against teams in the top 50, representing about half of his possessions. Considering Brandon is also old for a freshman, this is a bit concerning for a player with his level of touch and fluidity with the ball.

Miller’s drives tend to develop slowly. His handle is strong, as are his ball custodian instincts, making him a decent point forward option to kick off an offense with a pull-up threat. But, while he can create initial separation, he lacks the flexibility to lower his shoulder to turn angles to the rim or burst to hit those openings, and his vertical takes long to load. Both of these factors combine to mean forced difficult finishes, which he figured out to some extent but will remain a problem in the NBA.

Perhaps more concerning, however, was the defensive tape as competition increased. Alabama is full of rangy, athletic wings who can handle tough matchups. This allowed them to let Miller, with his team-leading usage, take easier assignments. One of the main consequences of going up in competition is stronger worst option, and this showed with Miller’s defense. The same lack of flexibility and burst that limits his finishing also make Miller a worse chaser from interior to perimeter. His help was often too conservative into the paint, with not enough burst to then close out effectively.

His long wingspan and overall solid instincts mediate this, but I would not be surprised if Miller would be targeted significantly in a playoff series in his prime. That may be an aggressive take, again considering his feel for the game is strong overall, but I think it is more representative of his ability than the current top 3 talk.

Miller has a lot to like, especially how good he is at locating shooters off the dribble while he probes for his shot, or how he gets set off the move into his three. But the overall state of his game reads more like a #10 pick than top 5.

Results: some rust to the star shine

Judah Mintz, Syracuse

• vs. all competition: 1.5
• vs. top 100 teams: -0.2
• vs. top 50 teams: -2.5

Judah Mintz has a space creation and space maintenance problem. His touch is legit, but opponents know it, and with limited volume from three point range for a guard, he can be predictable in how he gets into it.

Mintz is young and has time to build counters for this, as there are plenty, but I would not feel comfortable rolling him out on an NBA court next season until there is much more evidence of that. He shot 43% on 67 runners, a figure I’d be comfortable penciling in as Mintz’ floor for the shot type. The average degree of difficulty, particularly as competition ramped up, was sky high.

He has built his game around a shot that will always be available to him – tough floaters – but that is still unlikely to be very efficient offense on its own, particularly with a lack of strong acceleration. But, Mintz is also blessed with an advantage-seeking type of passing creativity. Not necessarily the best at setting up an offense, Mintz has a keen eye for brief moments of openings, and also how his shotmaking creates them.

That is a potent combination for a scorer, but the scoring needs more supports. The easiest solution, by far, is to up the three point volume. Judah took more midrange attempts (189) than any freshman with so few three point attempts (66). When factoring in his strong FTA and rim attempt counts, that puts him in the company of De’Aaron Fox and Tony Wroten as far as previous draft picks, Elfrid Payton when including sophomore seasons. Mintz’s burst is certainly closer to that of Payton than Fox or Wroten, and we saw what happened to Elfrid without credible three point volume.

Mintz shot 6 of 24 (25%) from catch and shoot and 11 of 35 (31%) from pull-up threes. Not great. He seems hamstrung by a lack of strength, a lanky build but time to add on. Adding core strength should be Judah’s priority #1, helping both with his burst and ability to launch when opponents go under on pick and roll.

Suffice it to say, Mintz has a strength issue on defense as well. He has good passing lane instincts, once again making up for his lack of consistent presence with timely high-value plays.

Mintz has a route to being a very potent scorer, but I think it would benefit him to spend either another year in college or significant time in NBA weight rooms to get there.

Results: Potential end of shotclock star, with a 1-2 year path to get there

Terrence Shannon Jr., Illinois

• vs. all competition: 6.1 BPM
• vs. top 100 teams: 5.1 BPM
• vs. top 50 teams: 2.1 BPM

I was a bit shocked the degree to which Shannon’s stats declined as competition increased, given his athletic profile and semblance of shotmaking, playmaking on both ends. But the tape revealed clear limitations to TSJ’s handle in particular that make me concerned for his ability to fit into an NBA team quickly.

Terrence Shannon Jr. is fast, perhaps the burstiest player in all of college basketball. That is an extremely, often underrated quality for an NBA player to have, one I just complained about lacking in Judah Mintz’ game currently. If you give the ball to TSJ as he gets downhill, he’s gonna get downhill. He can hit any straight line gap and keep the space with his strength. He will get open court NBA steals this way.

However, the cupboard is a bit bare when it comes to options for maximizing this advantage. In particular, Shannon is extremely left-handed, and with few handle counters beyond his pull-up if opponents sit on it. Another fortunate trait of Shannon’s, though, is his touch is indeed good. I’d bet he shoots among the best in the class for those with shortest load time into pull-up threes: a hand-tracked stopwatch estimate places him often around 0.4 seconds from plant to release, about a tenth of a second quicker than Mintz.

On defense as well, I hope for more from TSJ. I’ve long been a fan of his versatility as a big guard, but on this watch found myself having doubts on his ability to handle difficult matchups in the NBA. He knows how to be physical when engaged, but often floats near his mark and gives up space he shouldn’t. Perhaps with NBA-level training this can improve, but still disappointing for an upperclassman who could have been more of a stalwart for the Illini.

TSJ is a Whiteboard prospect, but likely shouldn’t be at this point in his career. He has had success with his pull-up (88th percentile) but at the cost of refining his catch and shoot mechanics (29th percentile), the latter of which will be more important for his life as an NBA role player. Without the star equity that a developed driving game (0.8ppp) would enable, his inconsistent presence on defense becomes a greater concern as well.

Results: NBA athlete, but the skills development has to continue

Maxwell Lewis, Pepperdine

• vs. all competition: 1.2
• vs. top 100: -2.2
• vs. top 50: -2.4

First of all, we have to address the baseline of production. That degree of negative box plus-minus – a box score measure meant to estimate plus-minus – is extremely concerning for a prospect mocked in the first round. I have wanted to believe in Max as even a lottery level prospect, as his tools are that enticing, particularly his stride length, length for position and shotmaking abilities. The combination of qualities he has is rare. Extremely rare. And a good star predictor too. But having 13 games against top 100 competition and only shooting an effective field goal percentage of 46% and turning the ball over at a 23% clip to 14% assist rate, only 1.3% steal rate despite those tools is a major red flag.

To my dismay, this showed up in the tape. To be fair to Lewis, he has not been in organized basketball for as long as many he faced and Pepperdine had many flaws in the roster. He often faced completely stacked defenses, so that when the shot clock dwindled, he would face endless help. But that is the archetype he will be expected to succeed in, and the numbers when under pressure (0 shooting fouls to 8 turnovers in late shot clock situations) showed up in the tape as he often stepped out of bounds when rushed.

But, man, he has such creativity in finding his shots I almost don’t want to care. When we write about Whiteboard prospects, this is exactly the prototype. I believe Lewis has as good of instincts as any his age at finding a gap to attack automatically as he drives, it’s just cleaning up the rough edges around that which need a lot of work.

The reward here is high, and tangible: Max can hit difficult shots with the best of them. But a team needs to be keenly aware of what to expect as far as his year one usage. He will be targeted on screens. He will turn the ball over if help takes him by surprise. But he’ll teleport across the floor with the ball before gracefully dropping it in, too.

Results: Whiteboard prospect embodied, elite shotmaker potential but little faith in being a consistent foundation piece without major improvements

Adem Bona, UCLA

• vs. all competition: 5.0 BPM
• vs. top 100 teams: 4.6 BPM
• vs. top 50 teams: 2.8 BPM

Bona is a bit surprising to be found on this list, by all accounts a solid rim protector who does his dirty work and doesn’t overextend elsewhere. That remained the case during my tape watch, but I see why his stats changed so much, as well.

A big factor is his role in UCLA’s system. They have elite wing defenders in Jamie Jacquez Jr. and Jaylen Clark to rack up stocks, and Tyger Campbell, while not imposing in size, is a ball demon to create transition offense. Against bad teams, adding Bona into the mix is simply not fair. UCLA rarely lets up clean paint touches against sub-100, even opponents in the 50-100 range. And when they do, Bona is ready to pounce.

Against the top 50 squads, where UCLA faces more of a challenge, Bona was used in many different ways. This is his genius: you can throw Bona in a full blitz, in a hedge, drop, man on the perimeter, helpside rotator, whatever, and he’ll be useful. Bona understands how to use his length, strength and speed as instruments in whatever task, an ability that will benefit playoff teams in particular with his defensive versatility.

There are cracks that form, however, particularly in his often overzealous rotations, throwing off the timing in sync with the team defense a bit, and I think his timing on blocks is more very good than top 1% among shotblockers. This can mean having to recover from distances longer than he needs, and not being quite able to pull it off. That can be developed, but does mean I could see him struggling a bit to kick off his NBA career even if playing even harder.

Then, there’s the offense. I struggle to see him ever been a true positive offensive player, but can make it work with constant screens and vigilance to look for lobs. His box outs are spectacular, as well, using his body to create space as well as anyone I’ve seen this draft cycle. However if he gets the ball and doesn’t know immediately what to do with it, things can get ugly, as he is simply not comfortable doing things beyond catch and finish.

With his special defensive versatility, he’ll find his way to NBA relevance at some point. Keeping things simple would help him fit neatly into a very valuable type of rim protector.

Result: NBA-ready rim protector, just needs to slow things down

Taylor Hendricks, UCF

• vs. all competition: 7.1 BPM
• vs. top 100 teams: 6.4 BPM
• vs. top 50 teams: 5.1 BPM

Being further down this list means “less dynamic,” or, most consistent across components, and that is exactly what I discovered in watching Hendricks’ tape. The primary trend being picked up, I believe, is that as a member of a #63-ranked team by barttorvik.com, UCF was a cuspy NCAA team that could take out lower ranks with ease but struggle against the top 20s.

An interesting phenomenon took me by surprise, though: as his teammates struggled increasingly against future professional basketball players, Hendricks’ uniqueness popped. After all, his 5.1 BPM against top 50 teams is still second best on this list so far.

Hendricks has two traits that will serve him very well early in his career. First, his shot has an automatically stabilizing quality to it, as if a string goes directly through his shot pocket. It is light into the loading and skies maximizing Hendricks’ seemingly over seven-foot wingspan. Second, he has unbelievable lateral movements combined with elite hand-eye placement on blocks or steals. Physically, I feel like he is one of the more underrated athleltes, even as he is considered universally a very good athlete. Behind Wemby, Scoot, Amen and Ausar, Hendricks provides instantaneous movements and blankets entire sections of the court.

His help rotations need some work, too often pinching in too far or struggling with the complexity of multiple screens, but seemed to do increasingly well as his responsibilities increased. He always plays hard and is ready to be challenged. He does not let up easy layups, as he has the tools to make plays at the rim from distance.

The biggest issue with Hendricks is his lack of any real craft inside on offense, defaulting to a quick jumper instead of trying to solve those problems. But mitigating that is that fact that, well, his quick jumpers are really good. He has displayed some passing creativity, if not consistent advantage creation, but also hunts drive angles and is able to get his body lower to the ground than you’d think to maximize angles.

I came into this watch considering Taylor Hendricks an easy top 20 but probably not top 10, certainly not top 8 prospect. Now I think he could finish top 5 in the class eventually, and his warts are maybe not as bad as those talked around him, given the flashes of sky-high upside.

Results: a top 10-worthy pick

Keyonte George, Baylor

• vs. all competition: 4.7
• vs. top 100 competition: 3.9
• vs. top 50 competition: 2.9

Keyonte George’s projection is complicated by unusual usage, often the third guard on Baylor parked in the slot. At IMG Academy he had more clearcut combo guard duties, where he had more priority in the offense to take advantage of above-the-break spacing. George, as well as upperclassmen Adam Flagler and LJ Cryer, took turns initiating, and with little interior threat, often had to do so within single possessions.

A more fluid offense will benefit George mightily at the next level, where his combination of skills is compelling. In particular, Keyonte has lightning quick processing off the catch, able to whip the ball to open teammates in a flash or rise into his smooth, technically sound release. That optionality, in addition to proficiency out of the pick and roll, where Synergy ranks him in the 81^st percentile on possessions that ended in his shots or passes, give him a valued skillset at the NBA level.

Where the tape turns against George, however, is placing his athleticism against NBA athletes, a major part of the story when his production drops against better competition. First, it’s simply easy to get Keyonte out of frame by targeting him on defense. At 6’4’’ and more SG than PG, Keyonte does not have the lateral quickness or length to contest after being screen or on distance close-outs.

On offense, again we see the combination of short for position and slow-footed for position reflect poorly on his ability to create much distance off the dribble. His side step into a three is very good, an important sign of developing counters to otherwise lackluster space creation. In particular, if he can develop a stampede step or heavy crossover into a Harden-style double-stepback (first onto one foot, then two), those types of menu items could launch him into stardom.

Right now, however, I see an extremely useful offensive player who could grease the wheels regardless of landing spot.

Results: The elite is elite and obstacles are obvious; what level of starter could he be remains a major question mark

GG Jackson, South Carolina

• vs. all competition: -0.5 BPM
• vs. top 100 teams: -1.6 BPM
• vs. top 50 teams:  -1.9 BPM

GG’s numbers were ugly no matter how you sliced the competition, but saw his assist and steal rates deteriorate the most as the opponents improved. Jackson was in a rare spot for a freshmen, with only Collin Sexton, Markelle Fultz, Jabari Parker, RJ Barrett, Jaylen Brown and D’Angelo Russell taking on greater usage all over the court as high major freshmen. That entire crew had over 100 attempts from the rim, midrange, three and free throw line in their sole NCAA season with usage at 30% or higher, an astronomical task for a freshman-aged player. Factor in how GG was not just young, but the youngest player in all of college basketball, and you get an even more unusual burden. Then, put on top of that the context of South Carolina being not just bad, but not even a top 200 team, and I understand if you’re throwing up your hands in confusion.

GG has earned a reputation as a chucker with low feel for the game, descriptions that may be correct at cursory glance but I believe to not hold up to further inspection. First of all, the context around him really is that bad. Factoring into how tight he was covered, his efficiency for both guarded and unguarded catch and shoot is both exactly league average.

Jackson’s efficiency was worst in isolation possessions, as, on a team with no other advantage creators outside of him, opponents could send as much help as they wanted. Lack of entry passing ability meant early seals or hard cuts would go unrewarded, though Jackson still kept making them. So he not just leaned on isolation possessions, but ended up #15 in the NCAA in iso possessions at 103.

When South Carolina’s lone traditional big sat, Jackson’s efficiency improved a significant degree (). It is true his passing creativity and vision is poor, but he is still able to zip establishing passes to keep an offense in rhythm (when he’s not in iso). An off-ball role would benefit him tremendously, as his turnover rate dropped significantly and efficiency was average to excellent in all of off-screen, roll man, putback, cut and spot up opportunities.

I believe in Jackson as a lottery bet on his ability to even take up this amount of offense on his shoulders, built with broad shoulders and a lightning quick second leap to make his presence consistently felt. His shooting form looks great to me, and ability to execute complex footwork at his size is often shocking. Those traits are what are valuable in isolation, with an inevitably better team context giving him upside we likely cannot yet discern.

Results: the most unusual context, but I see a future NBA scorer

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