The usual issue with pumping up a young player that scored a lot on a terrible team is that they often only know how to contribute as an on-ball scorer. When they start playing with better talent, their time spent on-ball shrinks and so does their impact/production. The good news about GG is that he’s already a good off-ball player. He was solid as a spot up option both as a shooter (37% on C&S 3s) and attacking closeout. His combination of size and body control lets him overwhelm smaller players at the rim while slithering around larger rim protectors.

His analytics look great for a first year player. Jackson was a slightly above average offensive player in O-LEBRON (58th% in Basketball Index’s offensive all-in-one metric). He was a good scorer at the basket, posting above average grades in Rim Shot Creation and Rim Shot Making (Shot making metrics look at how you shoot versus expectations via shot quality). He quickly garnered respect off-ball finishing 73rd% in Off-Ball Gravity (This metric looks at how much defensive attention you get). He was lethal on cuts (97th% in Cut PPP) and respectable as a C&S 3pt option (68th% in C&S 3PT Shot Making). 

What makes all this insane is that he’s only 19 years old. Here is the same graph looking at 19 year olds over the last 10 years in the same stats. (Devin Booker and Jayson Tatum for reference)

The metric that put GG on my radar as a potential star is his Drive Foul Rate Drawn%. This stat does exactly what it sounds like, it looks at how often a player is fouled when they drive to the basket. This number is a good proxy for dominance when coupled with a high drive rate. He not only has the highest Drive Foul Rate Drawn% for a 19 year old over the last decade (seven Drives/75 to qualify), only four players posted a better rate this season: Jayson Tatum, Joel Embiid, and Paolo Banchero. Elite company for the young forward.

His off-ball skills combined with his elite foul drawing on drives paint’s a bright future for Jackson. The former 5 star recruit was able to put together a lengthy highlight tape in only 48 games as a rookie. Next season he will benefit from playing alongside elite playmaker Ja Morant, which will hopefully boost his shot quality (35% in Overall Shot Quality). The physical tools are there and the analytics highlight some extreme bright spots. With some more seasoning and improved roster around him, GG Jackson II could soon find himself on his way to an All-Star game.

The post GG Jackson: The Next Second Round Star appeared first on Swish Theory.

I’ll also touch on my misses from last year, and how I hope to correct for shortcomings next cycle. Let’s waste no more time and dig in.

2023 Values

This section covers the players I ranked highest relative to the actual draft results, utilizing Kevin Pelton’s draft selection value table. Is there a common theme, am I missing or onto something?

Drafting with One Eye Closed

GG Jackson (my #12, drafted #45), Trayce Jackson-Davis (my #26, drafted #57), Leonard Miller (my #9, drafted #33), Jalen Slawson (my #28, drafted #54)

My biggest difference this cycle from last was trying to have a more holistic approach to a player’s own role curve. That is to say, comfort with a role (particularly in the NCAA) is not automatic, unlikely chosen by a player and often different than presented in recruiting efforts. College teams need players to win, development systems need player to develop, players just want to be selected as high as they can while balancing the goals of stakeholders around them. It can be messy, and often is.

The group I’m discussing here did not all have sub-optimal roles, but perhaps ones that masked their appeal as prospects, or distorted viewpoints of how they might contribute.

My single greatest difference to actual draft results was one Gregory Jackson the Second. At #12 on my board, Jackson was not selected until the second round by the Memphis Grizzlies. While rumors abound of immaturity from GG during team workouts, I’m less bothered given the substantial talent, obvious at his young age.

The most significant obstacle to draft analysis, in my view (beyond not knowing ball) is to make a one-to-one connection between items you notice and items of significance. Watching GG, it is not difficult to spot places where he could do better. Passing is the most obvious, often tunnel-visioned in his scoring approach, amplified at South Carolina by few other legitimate options but still clearly present in Summer League play as well. But if one were to ding Jackson for each and every missed pass, one might come away with a more negative view than is accurate in consideration of his star power, and that’s really what we’re here for.

It is more damaging to not take major swings than it is to have the occasional bust. If a player busts, his on-court impact simply goes to zero – there is a natural downside limit in that you’re not forced to give a player playing time, nor does it necessarily hurt your odds of acquiring more talent. But if he hits, and I mean truly hits, as in worth a max contract, that changes your franchise’s profile over a decade or more. This asymmetry runs up against basic human intuition: risk aversion means we are naturally suited to play it safe. But for that exact reason can be the source of extreme value in the NBA draft.

GG was third in usage of all freshmen as the youngest player in all of college basketball. He never looked overwhelmed athletically, consistently hitting the boards (17% defensive rebound rate) while using up a mega amount of iso (100), PNR (107) and spot up (143) possessions. Simply put, senior year HS aged players are not built like GG, not often. While a scout may see a sea of red marking up his execution on complex plays, he is able to put himself in those scenarios over and over with the flexible tank that is his hulking 6’9’’, 215 pound frame.

GG has a combination of traits I view highly in combination: when he has his nose in a play, he is determined to finish it (dawg factor); a frame to play power forward or small-ball center; the flexibility to get low into drives; an elite second jump; good shooting mechanics. Those are the traits of a scoring engine – as I put it in my scouting report of Jackson early in the season, “GG wants to be your team’s leading scorer,” and he has the mold for it. There are simply not many people in the world who have that combination of traits at an NBA level, and it takes two seconds watching GG move in Summer League to see how easily he belongs, physically.

Moving on to the rest of the group, the theme remains of swinging into uncertainty, where you have tangible evidence of NBA player-ness. By that last term I mean a collection of base skills that would be surprising to find in a non-NBA player. Let’s go through them quickly.

• Trayce Jackson-Davis: production, production and production; second jump; balance; sparks of creativity and touch at size
• Leonard Miller: dawg factor; production at age and competition; elite flexibility; sparks of creativity and touch at size
• Jalen Slawson: production and athletic versatility; team success; sparks of creativity and touch at size

The common trait for these remaining three is having some passing and some shooting touch but also defensive creativity, capable of picking up unexpected assists, steals or blocks in ways that took their opponents by surprise. Being two steps ahead of processing at lower levels, or even just hanging in at a higher level (in Miller’s case) is a good sign of being able to pick up NBA schemes, and the size of all three makes it easier to get the reps to showcase that. The flashes of touch and passing are simply compounding benefits as different areas of value on the court and expanding number of schemes in which they fit.

All four of the players here have role questions. “Can GG play off-ball?” (Summer League answer: yes); “Does Lenny fit cleanly into the 3, 4 or 5?” (Summer League answer: yes); “Can Trayce Jackson-Davis protect the rim as a 5?” (tbd); “Can Jalen Slawson shoot well enough to be a 3?” (tbd). But I also think these questions oversimplify what is a chaotic process in scouting. As Avinash said in his stellar Leonard Miller piece, “since when can we effectively project roles to begin with?”

That is not to say we shouldn’t try to project role, but we certainly shouldn’t let confusion in the exercise stop us from ranking a prospect highly.

I call this section “Drafting with One Eye Closed” as drafting is foremost an act of imagination, but that includes some willful optimism at times. The balance of cost relative to benefit of trying to make an unusual player work is lopsided, assuming the talent is indeed there. We draft players to try to alter the path of franchises, and the only way to do that is to try where others do not. Role occlusion, whether established upperclassmen or molds-of-clay youngsters, can be an opportunity masked by the same risk that drives people away.

To put the concept in more human terms, the game of basketball evolves in unexpected ways, and you need unexpected players to fit that evolving vision. The talent and effort side is the player’s job; fitting them onto the basketball court is the role of those around them.

Make Something Happen

Nick Smith Jr. (my #13, drafted #27), Amari Bailey (my #19, drafted #41), Sidy Cissoko (my #25, drafted #44)

Decision-making can be the most maddening NBA skill to dissect, making it all the more important in our evaluation of guards specifically. Guards typically survive on being nimbler, better handlers, shooters than their taller brethren, but this also means they have to make a greater number of decisions with or near the ball. If their decision-making is sound, they will make the product better, scheme running smoothly each time; if poor, the whole system can collapse. Repeat the process not once or a few times but dozens of times per game, thousands over a season. Despite having only middling 17% usage (7^th on his own team), Kyle Lowry still touched the ball over a thousand times in the 2023 playoffs, as an example. Whether or not a guard is a true lead initiator, they are going to be making countless decisions for your team.

Nick Smith Jr., Amari Bailey and Sidy Cissoko all make decisions in vastly different ways, which mixes differently for each of them with their differentiated skillsets. Sidy Cissoko is tall and strong for a guard but a poor shooter, Nick Smith Jr. is shorter and very skinny but a great shooter, Amari Bailey falls in between for all three traits.

Their playing cadences are vastly different, with NSJ being an elixir, playing like white blood cells seeking out weaknesses; Sidy is a maniac, unpredictable-squared; Amari Bailey is consistent in effort first and last. All are deviants from the expected in their own ways: given Nick Smith’s elite touch and handle creativity, one would expect him to be a pure hooper. Sidy one could easily cast aside as an unreliable project. Amari’s consistency of effort could prevent an analyst from noticing the flairs of upside.

My source of comfort in ranking them highly varies for each of them, as well. But it is consistent in one thing: the route-making of offensive schemes has always been a jagged line rather than a straight one. The ideal basketball play is a run to the basket and dunk, or run to the three point line and swish. But with the constancy of movement and ten athletes making decisions simultaneously, the way forward is rarely straight through.

This section is a dedication to the basketball weirdos, or irregularities in subtle ways. Amari Bailey may seem like the outlier in his inclusion, as Sidy and NSJ’s funkiness jump off the page. But Amari covers a ridiculous amount of ground as an athlete, both laterally and vertically, the type of athlete which would thrive as a cornerback or an outfielder or tennis player or…really anything. But Bailey plays subtly, workmanlike to the point of nearly hiding this fact. One is used to athletes of Bailey’s versatility taking up usage wherever they can, testing the limits of the dynamic fun that it must be to have those tools at one’s disposal. But Bailey, for whatever reason, does not seem to care about all of that, or else finds such enjoyment from applying them, not bluntly nor florid, but simply so. That aspect is maybe the easiest to look over: someone simply doing their job for its own sake. Especially in a freshman one-and-done, highly touted from a celebrity program. Don’t miss it with Amari.

Role Reducers: Priority UDFAs

Craig Porter Jr. (my #33), Adama Sanogo (#38), Terquavion Smith (#36), Justyn Mutts (#42), Ricky Council IV (#43), Taevion Kinsey (#45), D’Moi Hodge (#46)

Here we have a group of undrafted players I had ranked in my top 50. I’m not sure if there’s a common thread here beyond role players who I believe have a shot of being starters, even if miniscule.

All have their quick pitches as NBA role players: Porter Jr. makes sense as a defensive play-maker and creative passer next to a high usage guard. Sanogo if a team wants to run a five-out scheme on either end with a hybrid big. Terq is the obvious, nuclear pull-up shooting threat. Mutts is one of the best passing big wings in the country. Council had perhaps the best slashing tools in college hoops. Kinsey may be the most unusual, a stellar athlete ball custodian type with funky shot. D’Moi Hodge the cleanest role fit, and the most surprising undrafted for that reason as a steals & threes maven.

I mention the concept of “false ceiling” prospects, a term I coined to mean prospect commonly seen as low ceiling but with tougher-to-see avenues to outperform those expectations. I believe this entire group qualifies, let’s run through the list again. Porter Jr. does not make sense as a shotblocker, at 6’2’’ putting up a 5% block rate (one of every 20 opponent two pointers) while only fouling 2.3 times per 40(!!!). Sanogo has rare touch, shooting 77% at the rim on gigantic volume and above average everywhere else. Terq has become underrated as a passer, improving his A:TO from 1.2 to 1.9 and assist rate from 14% to 23%, all while shooting 14 threes per 100 possessions. Mutts is a rare breed, a strength-based wing with soft passing touch, perfect for motion-based, precise systems. Council’s athleticism shines in transition where he can improvise to the hoop for an acrobatic finish, at 1.2ppp on 114 transition attempts. Kinsey played in a lower conference, but that may mask his NBA athleticism, dunking over 200 times across his five college seasons. Hodge is underrated in his aggressiveness, with over 100 rim attempts finished at a 72% rate this past season.

The entire group are sophomores or older and non-premium selections as UDFAs, as it is safe to say you won’t build your team around this group. But if I were to bet on anyone undrafted ending up a useable starter at some point in their careers, it would be from this crew. The avenue to that happening has been laid out roughly in their previous spots, but amplified by further conforming to a reduced role and playing with greater talent around them.

Lessons of the Past

The 2022 draft cycle I spent obsessed with archetypes, attempting to break down the roles on the court into four: 1. Rim Protectors, 2. Connectors, 3. Shotmakers and 4. Engines. As I felt already by the time that draft day arrived, this approach had clear shortcomings. Prospects are not fully formed into their archetypes yet, and flashes of potential can be more important than fully fleshed out skills.

My three biggest misses all came from this too narrow of a sorting process. For Walker Kessler, I zoomed in too far on his inconsistent rim protection footwork technique, missing how he was blocking a gargantuan quantity of shots despite it due to advanced hand-eye coordination, size and effort. He also was able to quiet my mobility concerns by slimming down some, bringing us to another point of analysis: at the ages of prospects, they are still getting used to their athletic bodies.

Jalen Williams is another illustration of this, showcasing a major athletic leap from Santa Clara to the pros. The tape transformed almost overnight, as before when his closeouts lagged and he may have settled as a table-setter, now he looks a full power primary. The signal here was the Combine scrimmages, where J-Dub adapted to a more off-ball slashing role the second he hit the floor, using his plus wingspan to dunk in traffic with ease. The archetypes system over-fit for his Santa Clara role, not adaptive enough to appreciate his flashes of elite versatility.

Finally, a player I was too high on: Johnny Davis. At the risk of reacting too early, Johnny appears at the nexus of both of these points as well. From an archetype approach, JD is interesting. He was super physical in college, capable of some dribbling, passing, shooting, if not dominant anywhere. But he looked like he could carry a large load, and had enough clips of looking like a dynamic athlete, all the while fighting hard on the defensive end. The script has completely flipped between him and J-Dub, as Davis has been losing on the margins at the first line and without tools to salvage missteps. Where before he looked like a potential to hit in multiple archetypes, now he looks more like a mediocre prospect for each. The difference in athletic and skill profile from NCAA to NBA makes previous roles potentially untenable while also opening up new avenues for what were only flashes before.

Lessons for the Future

My goal this past cycle was to take a more holistic approach to a player’s basketball narrative. Where are they in their own cycle? A draft cycle involves only 6-8 months of new tape to indicate what a player might be for an entire career, and we need to imbue that with the appropriate lack of certainty. Imagination is the name of the game for draft work, something I’ve reminded myself constantly this past year, and helped me to be more comfortable with the one-eye-closed upside swings. Similarly, I have been keener to extrapolate those flashes out, as a player’s developmental trajectory can be as dynamic as their playing style.

The one item that remains elusive to me is projecting athletic profiles to the future. Already in Summer League I see a potential miss in Keyonte George, adapting quickly to weight loss with a more explosive playing style than we saw at Baylor or IMG. Athletic projection, again, a source of my miss on all of Kessler, J-Dub and (in the other direction) Johnny Davis, requires a technical level of biomechanical knowledge I have not attained. We have in our sights a theme for the 2024 cycle: how does the body develop amid intense athletic demands, and how can you tell who can incorporate these changes better than others? Stay tuned.

The post Lessons from the Draft Cycle appeared first on Swish Theory.

The Metrics

Todd Whitehead (@crumpledjumper on Twitter) and the people of Synergy Sports recently created a Synergy Shot Quality metric, measuring the quality of each and every shot. Through various components explained below, shots are compiled into a single score, ranging from high (>80th %tile of shot quality) to low (<20th %tile of shot quality). Swish Theory’s Tyler recently used this metric for a piece on shotmaking prospects Brandon Miller and Jett Howard, for example.

Along with the metric, Synergy has labeled each player with an offensive archetype that best resembles their playstyle/role, analyzing their usages and tendencies to develop 3 primarily roles: Ball Handlers, Wings, and Bigs, including sub-archetypes within each role. 

The Data

Coming back to the original topic of difficult shot-making, I wanted to see how college players in Swish Theory’s Top 40 Prospects stacked up in their frequency of low quality shots and the efficiency of these shots. The x-axis measures the share of each player’s field goal attempts categorized by Synergy as low quality looks, while the y-axis displays how well each player shot on those attempts.

The further to the right on this graph, the greater share of difficult attempts; the further up near the top, the better the shotmaking.

I divided the results by archetype as well to best compare each player relative to their own role. To add the finishing touch, I included multiple historical examples to see how some of the NBA’s best match up. 

The number one standout in this study is Jalen Hood-Schifino, terrorizing drop coverages with his mid-range prowess (sad Purdue noises) with the highest share of shots being difficult. While Nate Oats preaches the paint-and-three approach more than maybe any other coach, seeing Brandon Miller in the lower left corner is slightly concerning for hopes as a late shot-clock creator. Nick Smith Jr. had a messy freshman campaign battling injuries and consistent playing time, but his main sell circling around his tough shot-making spells some concerns as he lands at the bottom of this graph (albeit on limited volume compared to others).

If you look up a bit higher you can see ol’ Jalen Brunson hanging around on an island. His upper echelon functional strength, change of pace, and sweet footwork worked wonders in the trenches, and his outlier shot-making was one of the key indicators of his future success. 

Jarace Walker did not have an easy shot diet, especially for an athletic/defensive inclined big wing, but maintaining respectable efficiency in spite of that provides some hope of a higher-end offensive outcome. Brice Sensabaugh was made for this graph, and his elite in-between and pull-up game scorched the Big Ten. Mikal Bridges is an interesting case study, as he was rarely tasked with difficult shots in college, but showcased elite efficiency that has shown to pay dividends for his self-creation jump.

As we move to bigs, we see a massive increase in the quality of looks these bigs are getting, as the high-percentile shots right at the rim occur at a sizably higher rate than their counterparts. No surprise to see the rim-running Dereck Lively and Adem Bona slotted in the top left corner, with a combined mere 13 low-quality shot attempts between the two. Domantas Sabonis is the biggest outlier of any NBA player I’ve looked at, the soft touch + bruising strength steamrolled over the poor WCC. Taylor Hendricks and DaRon Holmes II are the only two bigs in this class with over 10% of their looks being difficult shots and above average efficiency with those shots, though one can be certain Victor Wembanyama would break this graph entirely.

Conclusion

While more research needs to be done to truly make an assessment whether these low quality metrics can stand as a predictor for self-creation/difficult shot-making, there is value in locating those flashes of outperformance. Whether it be in volume or efficiency, taking shots late in the shot-clock, off the dribble, in isolation or contested with some degree of success is a bright green flag for future NBA contributions.

It is worth a reminder that these are small samples by their nature, and may say as much about a prospect’s context as their performance. As well, taking a more difficult shot diet is neither a good or bad thing, but a means of the talent of a player and the needs of a team.

At the end of the day, you can look at these stats as glass half-empty or half-full: a player takes too many bad shots or it shows promise of higher usage at the next level. Or, a third option: lean into your inner hooper, shatter the glass on the floor, make some popcorn, and delight yourself to a BallDontStop highlight mix. Something we should all do a bit more.

The post The Pure Hooper Index appeared first on Swish Theory.

The sample for NBA draft prospects is tiny. Even if we have perfect data for a player’s prep and pro careers, the top draft prospects are typically aged 18-22, undergoing massive changes to their games and lives over the span of mere months, over and over in evolving environments and around new personnel.

Combing through that limited data, we search for narratives, precedents, guys that “just have it,” from a scout’s perspective.

In search for a method to the madness this cycle, I’m splitting my draft analysis pieces into three:

• “Whiteboard” Prospects: those whose stats improve as they play worse competition, declining, then, against the top teams
• “Green Flags Only” Prospects: those whose stats exceed certain thresholds regardless of level of competition
• Everyone Else

This, first of two pieces, looks at what I’m calling Whiteboard prospects. Their top-end traits are obvious, but for that reason can be prepared for by the better opponents. As I watch this group, I seek to answer two questions:

• Do they struggle against increasing competition in a way that would be a problem in the NBA?
• Do they simply dominate lower-ranked competition that much?

Definition

I defined Whiteboard Prospects as having a certain set of traits decline against good competition, increase against bad competition:

• Box Plus-Minus
• Percentage of teammates’ FGM assisted
• True shooting percentage
• Steal rate.

As long as these decline from all competition to games against top-100 teams, then again against top-50 teams, and are also on Swish Theory’s Big Board 1.0, they’re a Whiteboard Prospect.

Let’s get to it.

Brandin Podziemski, Santa Clara

• vs. all competition: 10.0 BPM
• vs. top 100 teams: 6.5 BPM
• vs. top 50 teams: 3.9 BPM

Podziemski I thought was going to be an easy read, especially given the severity of decline, the single largest from overall comp to top-50 in our sample. But it was far from that.

Against bad competition, “Podz” did everything. Shooting at a 66% effective field goal percentage and 28% usage, he also maintained a 25% assist rate, 21% defensive rebound rate and 3% steal rate. His stats were heavily buoyed by, simply, never missing from three, where he took over half his shots and made over half of those attempts. That is basically impossible to stop, especially if you are a team ranked in the 200-400 range.

Against better competition, the athletic limitations showed, as expected. He struggles to create much distance on his dribble moves, leading to forced tough angle floaters, but those still go in at decent rates. Truly, Podz put up a historically efficient scoring season.

Projecting that at the next level is tricky. 80-179 (45%) from three, 62-146 (42%) from midrange, 75-121 (62%) at the rim is tough to argue with, but 8-17 (47%) from three, 7-25 (28%) from midrange and 7-19 (37%) from close range is what he tallied against top-50 teams. Another reminder of the inherent uncertainty in percentages.

However, Podziemski is armed with a mighty weapon to limit this downgrade against better competition: he plays really hard, and processes the game very quickly. There is one type of game processing that is Chris Paul-like, setting up one play to set up the next, and then there is Podz’s sharklike approach, always advantage-seeking from all angles. He goes for the kill with his hit-ahead passes or finding cutters, which leads to some sloppy turnovers, but, when coupled with his nose for the ball, means Podziemski will pick up change wherever it comes loose.

Finally, his pull-up three is legit. The release is low, but he needs little room to get it off and has enough 1-2 release patterns to get there.

Results: Primary odds fade, but secondary and especially tertiary shine. He’ll find a way to contribute, I’m sure

Brandon Miller, Alabama

• vs. all competition: 11.0 BPM
• vs. top 100 teams: 9.9 BPM
• vs. top 50 teams: 6.5 BPM

We move from Brandin to Brandon, first to second largest decline in overall production as NCAA competition increases. This exercise was less kind to Alabama’s Miller, placed in a cushier position and, given he is a 6’9’’ ballhandler projected to go in the top 5, the light is naturally a bit harsher.

The obvious knock on Miller this season was his rim finishing. He shot 74% at the rim against teams ranked 50-400, an elite figure that fits a top scorer prospect. But only 44% at the rim against teams in the top 50, representing about half of his possessions. Considering Brandon is also old for a freshman, this is a bit concerning for a player with his level of touch and fluidity with the ball.

Miller’s drives tend to develop slowly. His handle is strong, as are his ball custodian instincts, making him a decent point forward option to kick off an offense with a pull-up threat. But, while he can create initial separation, he lacks the flexibility to lower his shoulder to turn angles to the rim or burst to hit those openings, and his vertical takes long to load. Both of these factors combine to mean forced difficult finishes, which he figured out to some extent but will remain a problem in the NBA.

Perhaps more concerning, however, was the defensive tape as competition increased. Alabama is full of rangy, athletic wings who can handle tough matchups. This allowed them to let Miller, with his team-leading usage, take easier assignments. One of the main consequences of going up in competition is stronger worst option, and this showed with Miller’s defense. The same lack of flexibility and burst that limits his finishing also make Miller a worse chaser from interior to perimeter. His help was often too conservative into the paint, with not enough burst to then close out effectively.

His long wingspan and overall solid instincts mediate this, but I would not be surprised if Miller would be targeted significantly in a playoff series in his prime. That may be an aggressive take, again considering his feel for the game is strong overall, but I think it is more representative of his ability than the current top 3 talk.

Miller has a lot to like, especially how good he is at locating shooters off the dribble while he probes for his shot, or how he gets set off the move into his three. But the overall state of his game reads more like a #10 pick than top 5.

Results: some rust to the star shine

Judah Mintz, Syracuse

• vs. all competition: 1.5
• vs. top 100 teams: -0.2
• vs. top 50 teams: -2.5

Judah Mintz has a space creation and space maintenance problem. His touch is legit, but opponents know it, and with limited volume from three point range for a guard, he can be predictable in how he gets into it.

Mintz is young and has time to build counters for this, as there are plenty, but I would not feel comfortable rolling him out on an NBA court next season until there is much more evidence of that. He shot 43% on 67 runners, a figure I’d be comfortable penciling in as Mintz’ floor for the shot type. The average degree of difficulty, particularly as competition ramped up, was sky high.

He has built his game around a shot that will always be available to him – tough floaters – but that is still unlikely to be very efficient offense on its own, particularly with a lack of strong acceleration. But, Mintz is also blessed with an advantage-seeking type of passing creativity. Not necessarily the best at setting up an offense, Mintz has a keen eye for brief moments of openings, and also how his shotmaking creates them.

That is a potent combination for a scorer, but the scoring needs more supports. The easiest solution, by far, is to up the three point volume. Judah took more midrange attempts (189) than any freshman with so few three point attempts (66). When factoring in his strong FTA and rim attempt counts, that puts him in the company of De’Aaron Fox and Tony Wroten as far as previous draft picks, Elfrid Payton when including sophomore seasons. Mintz’s burst is certainly closer to that of Payton than Fox or Wroten, and we saw what happened to Elfrid without credible three point volume.

Mintz shot 6 of 24 (25%) from catch and shoot and 11 of 35 (31%) from pull-up threes. Not great. He seems hamstrung by a lack of strength, a lanky build but time to add on. Adding core strength should be Judah’s priority #1, helping both with his burst and ability to launch when opponents go under on pick and roll.

Suffice it to say, Mintz has a strength issue on defense as well. He has good passing lane instincts, once again making up for his lack of consistent presence with timely high-value plays.

Mintz has a route to being a very potent scorer, but I think it would benefit him to spend either another year in college or significant time in NBA weight rooms to get there.

Results: Potential end of shotclock star, with a 1-2 year path to get there

Terrence Shannon Jr., Illinois

• vs. all competition: 6.1 BPM
• vs. top 100 teams: 5.1 BPM
• vs. top 50 teams: 2.1 BPM

I was a bit shocked the degree to which Shannon’s stats declined as competition increased, given his athletic profile and semblance of shotmaking, playmaking on both ends. But the tape revealed clear limitations to TSJ’s handle in particular that make me concerned for his ability to fit into an NBA team quickly.

Terrence Shannon Jr. is fast, perhaps the burstiest player in all of college basketball. That is an extremely, often underrated quality for an NBA player to have, one I just complained about lacking in Judah Mintz’ game currently. If you give the ball to TSJ as he gets downhill, he’s gonna get downhill. He can hit any straight line gap and keep the space with his strength. He will get open court NBA steals this way.

However, the cupboard is a bit bare when it comes to options for maximizing this advantage. In particular, Shannon is extremely left-handed, and with few handle counters beyond his pull-up if opponents sit on it. Another fortunate trait of Shannon’s, though, is his touch is indeed good. I’d bet he shoots among the best in the class for those with shortest load time into pull-up threes: a hand-tracked stopwatch estimate places him often around 0.4 seconds from plant to release, about a tenth of a second quicker than Mintz.

On defense as well, I hope for more from TSJ. I’ve long been a fan of his versatility as a big guard, but on this watch found myself having doubts on his ability to handle difficult matchups in the NBA. He knows how to be physical when engaged, but often floats near his mark and gives up space he shouldn’t. Perhaps with NBA-level training this can improve, but still disappointing for an upperclassman who could have been more of a stalwart for the Illini.

TSJ is a Whiteboard prospect, but likely shouldn’t be at this point in his career. He has had success with his pull-up (88th percentile) but at the cost of refining his catch and shoot mechanics (29th percentile), the latter of which will be more important for his life as an NBA role player. Without the star equity that a developed driving game (0.8ppp) would enable, his inconsistent presence on defense becomes a greater concern as well.

Results: NBA athlete, but the skills development has to continue

Maxwell Lewis, Pepperdine

• vs. all competition: 1.2
• vs. top 100: -2.2
• vs. top 50: -2.4

First of all, we have to address the baseline of production. That degree of negative box plus-minus – a box score measure meant to estimate plus-minus – is extremely concerning for a prospect mocked in the first round. I have wanted to believe in Max as even a lottery level prospect, as his tools are that enticing, particularly his stride length, length for position and shotmaking abilities. The combination of qualities he has is rare. Extremely rare. And a good star predictor too. But having 13 games against top 100 competition and only shooting an effective field goal percentage of 46% and turning the ball over at a 23% clip to 14% assist rate, only 1.3% steal rate despite those tools is a major red flag.

To my dismay, this showed up in the tape. To be fair to Lewis, he has not been in organized basketball for as long as many he faced and Pepperdine had many flaws in the roster. He often faced completely stacked defenses, so that when the shot clock dwindled, he would face endless help. But that is the archetype he will be expected to succeed in, and the numbers when under pressure (0 shooting fouls to 8 turnovers in late shot clock situations) showed up in the tape as he often stepped out of bounds when rushed.

But, man, he has such creativity in finding his shots I almost don’t want to care. When we write about Whiteboard prospects, this is exactly the prototype. I believe Lewis has as good of instincts as any his age at finding a gap to attack automatically as he drives, it’s just cleaning up the rough edges around that which need a lot of work.

The reward here is high, and tangible: Max can hit difficult shots with the best of them. But a team needs to be keenly aware of what to expect as far as his year one usage. He will be targeted on screens. He will turn the ball over if help takes him by surprise. But he’ll teleport across the floor with the ball before gracefully dropping it in, too.

Results: Whiteboard prospect embodied, elite shotmaker potential but little faith in being a consistent foundation piece without major improvements

Adem Bona, UCLA

• vs. all competition: 5.0 BPM
• vs. top 100 teams: 4.6 BPM
• vs. top 50 teams: 2.8 BPM

Bona is a bit surprising to be found on this list, by all accounts a solid rim protector who does his dirty work and doesn’t overextend elsewhere. That remained the case during my tape watch, but I see why his stats changed so much, as well.

A big factor is his role in UCLA’s system. They have elite wing defenders in Jamie Jacquez Jr. and Jaylen Clark to rack up stocks, and Tyger Campbell, while not imposing in size, is a ball demon to create transition offense. Against bad teams, adding Bona into the mix is simply not fair. UCLA rarely lets up clean paint touches against sub-100, even opponents in the 50-100 range. And when they do, Bona is ready to pounce.

Against the top 50 squads, where UCLA faces more of a challenge, Bona was used in many different ways. This is his genius: you can throw Bona in a full blitz, in a hedge, drop, man on the perimeter, helpside rotator, whatever, and he’ll be useful. Bona understands how to use his length, strength and speed as instruments in whatever task, an ability that will benefit playoff teams in particular with his defensive versatility.

There are cracks that form, however, particularly in his often overzealous rotations, throwing off the timing in sync with the team defense a bit, and I think his timing on blocks is more very good than top 1% among shotblockers. This can mean having to recover from distances longer than he needs, and not being quite able to pull it off. That can be developed, but does mean I could see him struggling a bit to kick off his NBA career even if playing even harder.

Then, there’s the offense. I struggle to see him ever been a true positive offensive player, but can make it work with constant screens and vigilance to look for lobs. His box outs are spectacular, as well, using his body to create space as well as anyone I’ve seen this draft cycle. However if he gets the ball and doesn’t know immediately what to do with it, things can get ugly, as he is simply not comfortable doing things beyond catch and finish.

With his special defensive versatility, he’ll find his way to NBA relevance at some point. Keeping things simple would help him fit neatly into a very valuable type of rim protector.

Result: NBA-ready rim protector, just needs to slow things down

Taylor Hendricks, UCF

• vs. all competition: 7.1 BPM
• vs. top 100 teams: 6.4 BPM
• vs. top 50 teams: 5.1 BPM

Being further down this list means “less dynamic,” or, most consistent across components, and that is exactly what I discovered in watching Hendricks’ tape. The primary trend being picked up, I believe, is that as a member of a #63-ranked team by barttorvik.com, UCF was a cuspy NCAA team that could take out lower ranks with ease but struggle against the top 20s.

An interesting phenomenon took me by surprise, though: as his teammates struggled increasingly against future professional basketball players, Hendricks’ uniqueness popped. After all, his 5.1 BPM against top 50 teams is still second best on this list so far.

Hendricks has two traits that will serve him very well early in his career. First, his shot has an automatically stabilizing quality to it, as if a string goes directly through his shot pocket. It is light into the loading and skies maximizing Hendricks’ seemingly over seven-foot wingspan. Second, he has unbelievable lateral movements combined with elite hand-eye placement on blocks or steals. Physically, I feel like he is one of the more underrated athleltes, even as he is considered universally a very good athlete. Behind Wemby, Scoot, Amen and Ausar, Hendricks provides instantaneous movements and blankets entire sections of the court.

His help rotations need some work, too often pinching in too far or struggling with the complexity of multiple screens, but seemed to do increasingly well as his responsibilities increased. He always plays hard and is ready to be challenged. He does not let up easy layups, as he has the tools to make plays at the rim from distance.

The biggest issue with Hendricks is his lack of any real craft inside on offense, defaulting to a quick jumper instead of trying to solve those problems. But mitigating that is that fact that, well, his quick jumpers are really good. He has displayed some passing creativity, if not consistent advantage creation, but also hunts drive angles and is able to get his body lower to the ground than you’d think to maximize angles.

I came into this watch considering Taylor Hendricks an easy top 20 but probably not top 10, certainly not top 8 prospect. Now I think he could finish top 5 in the class eventually, and his warts are maybe not as bad as those talked around him, given the flashes of sky-high upside.

Results: a top 10-worthy pick

Keyonte George, Baylor

• vs. all competition: 4.7
• vs. top 100 competition: 3.9
• vs. top 50 competition: 2.9

Keyonte George’s projection is complicated by unusual usage, often the third guard on Baylor parked in the slot. At IMG Academy he had more clearcut combo guard duties, where he had more priority in the offense to take advantage of above-the-break spacing. George, as well as upperclassmen Adam Flagler and LJ Cryer, took turns initiating, and with little interior threat, often had to do so within single possessions.

A more fluid offense will benefit George mightily at the next level, where his combination of skills is compelling. In particular, Keyonte has lightning quick processing off the catch, able to whip the ball to open teammates in a flash or rise into his smooth, technically sound release. That optionality, in addition to proficiency out of the pick and roll, where Synergy ranks him in the 81^st percentile on possessions that ended in his shots or passes, give him a valued skillset at the NBA level.

Where the tape turns against George, however, is placing his athleticism against NBA athletes, a major part of the story when his production drops against better competition. First, it’s simply easy to get Keyonte out of frame by targeting him on defense. At 6’4’’ and more SG than PG, Keyonte does not have the lateral quickness or length to contest after being screen or on distance close-outs.

On offense, again we see the combination of short for position and slow-footed for position reflect poorly on his ability to create much distance off the dribble. His side step into a three is very good, an important sign of developing counters to otherwise lackluster space creation. In particular, if he can develop a stampede step or heavy crossover into a Harden-style double-stepback (first onto one foot, then two), those types of menu items could launch him into stardom.

Right now, however, I see an extremely useful offensive player who could grease the wheels regardless of landing spot.

Results: The elite is elite and obstacles are obvious; what level of starter could he be remains a major question mark

GG Jackson, South Carolina

• vs. all competition: -0.5 BPM
• vs. top 100 teams: -1.6 BPM
• vs. top 50 teams:  -1.9 BPM

GG’s numbers were ugly no matter how you sliced the competition, but saw his assist and steal rates deteriorate the most as the opponents improved. Jackson was in a rare spot for a freshmen, with only Collin Sexton, Markelle Fultz, Jabari Parker, RJ Barrett, Jaylen Brown and D’Angelo Russell taking on greater usage all over the court as high major freshmen. That entire crew had over 100 attempts from the rim, midrange, three and free throw line in their sole NCAA season with usage at 30% or higher, an astronomical task for a freshman-aged player. Factor in how GG was not just young, but the youngest player in all of college basketball, and you get an even more unusual burden. Then, put on top of that the context of South Carolina being not just bad, but not even a top 200 team, and I understand if you’re throwing up your hands in confusion.

GG has earned a reputation as a chucker with low feel for the game, descriptions that may be correct at cursory glance but I believe to not hold up to further inspection. First of all, the context around him really is that bad. Factoring into how tight he was covered, his efficiency for both guarded and unguarded catch and shoot is both exactly league average.

Jackson’s efficiency was worst in isolation possessions, as, on a team with no other advantage creators outside of him, opponents could send as much help as they wanted. Lack of entry passing ability meant early seals or hard cuts would go unrewarded, though Jackson still kept making them. So he not just leaned on isolation possessions, but ended up #15 in the NCAA in iso possessions at 103.

When South Carolina’s lone traditional big sat, Jackson’s efficiency improved a significant degree (). It is true his passing creativity and vision is poor, but he is still able to zip establishing passes to keep an offense in rhythm (when he’s not in iso). An off-ball role would benefit him tremendously, as his turnover rate dropped significantly and efficiency was average to excellent in all of off-screen, roll man, putback, cut and spot up opportunities.

I believe in Jackson as a lottery bet on his ability to even take up this amount of offense on his shoulders, built with broad shoulders and a lightning quick second leap to make his presence consistently felt. His shooting form looks great to me, and ability to execute complex footwork at his size is often shocking. Those traits are what are valuable in isolation, with an inevitably better team context giving him upside we likely cannot yet discern.

Results: the most unusual context, but I see a future NBA scorer

The post The 2023 NBA Draft’s “Whiteboard” Prospects appeared first on Swish Theory.