It must also be said that these teams have just the right amount of neanderthal DNA to, sure, probably get curb-stomped by OKC in round 2, but to put on a show in the meantime. Through two games, WTF moments in the clutch and jagged edges — like Jokić’s defense and Dunn’s offense…Ben Simmons — have not subtracted intrigue, but added character. With a 1-1 split heading into Thursday’s game 3, each team has lost the game they played better in. These teams are weird! Anyway, let’s get to it.

Denver’s incomplete defense on Kawhi

Let’s start with the big stuff. Kawhi Leonard dropped 39 points in Game 2 after a poor Game 1, and the Denver Nuggets didn’t really adjust how they defended him when he got it going. Though he melted their face off with absurd shot-making, I’ve actually liked Denver’s overall philosophy vs. Kawhi. He got going early in Game 2 by feasting on cross-matches in semi-transition, but the Nuggets didn’t panic because they’ve been conceding switches and loading help toward him anyway.

That’s a fine plan, and they’ve been able to execute it without allowing Kawhi to create easy shots for his teammates, though Kawhi shoulders a chunk of the credit/blame there too. He has not made quick decisions with the ball in his hands.

But that didn’t save Denver in Game 2 because they didn’t finish possessions against Kawhi, hence the “incomplete” tag. The man is inhuman, and has proven that, with healthy legs, he can win series by performing how he did in Game 2, where he shot 15-of-19 from the floor. So Denver has to finish possessions, there is no point in showing help against him if it is indeed just for show (sound on):

Denver shouldn’t fear the possibility of Kawhi putting on a passing clinic by throwing cross-court lasers and manipulating defenders with his eyes. Over his 13 NBA seasons, that’s never been his M.O., and it still isn’t. That’s why LAC stays away from pick-and-roll led by Kawhi, given a near-turnover like this…

Just as important, the Clippers are always playing a poor 3-point shooter. Every single one of Kawhi’s minutes through two games have seen Kris Dunn, Derrick Jones Jr., or Ben Simmons on the floor with him, and occasionally two of those guys. Furthermore, any strategy geared toward forcing turnovers and speeding up the Clippers plays to Denver’s advantage.

They recorded the 7th-fastest pace in the NBA this year (PBP Stats) and had, by miles, the lowest 3PA rate. That’s a formula that limits randomness/shooting variance; playing at a slow pace and allowing Kawhi to get up 16 jumpers is not.

The idea of attacking Kawhi is frightening in any context, but in Game 3, Denver just might have to. They’ve thrown a lot his way thus far, but the kitchen sink remains in their back-pocket.

Limiting LAC’s two-man game

Let’s keep it on this end of the floor, where the Harden/Zubac pick-and-roll feasted in Game 1. Harden, looking quite spry, looked to get all the way to the basket, and in the first half, Nikola Jokić often did little more than escort him there…

Since then, Denver has played Jokić much higher up the floor, if not outright trapping or hedging ball-screens. (An awesome, very minor subplot of this series is Harden finding every angle possible to hit Zubac on the roll while Jokić tries to deflect those passes, just about the best hand-eye coordination battle you’ll find.)

The major subplot is what happens once Zu catches the ball, and it feels like both teams have left something on the table here. Zubac can make rudimentary reads quickly enough, and has gotten Kris Dunn a few layups off baseline cuts. However, they’re nobody’s idea of Draymond Green and Gary Payton II. Dunn has struggled to finish under any defensive pressure, and if they can take away his cut, Zubac has struggled to snap to the next read, a kick-out for three. In fact, his best offense has been simply going to work against whoever steps up to meet him.

Harden is key here, too. The more downhill pressure he applies, the deeper Zu’s catch inevitably is, and these two can play pitch-and-catch as well as any tandem…

After that play in Game 2, Jokić played even higher up the floor, and Denver produced the desired effect: Harden largely stopped trying to get downhill, whether by splitting a screen or by attacking Jokic’s outside hip. Can he dial up the pressure in Game 3 if Denver opens in the same coverage?

How much room do Harden, Zubac, and Dunn have to improve from game 2? To me, it’s a reasonable chunk. If Denver feels the same way, they should try to deny Zubac on the roll altogether. In this first play. Michael Porter Jr. helps off of Dunn to deny Zu, and Norm Powell promptly turns the ball over. In the second play, MPJ doesn’t leave DJJ, Zu catches it, and it leads to a wide-open three:

Yes, DJJ is on the strong-side in play #2, but perhaps gambling off him is worth preventing any sort of deep catch for Zubac.

The Harden/Zubac two-man game that so much of LAC’s offense is built around is in a fascinating spot entering Game 3. Each team has reason to adjust; for the Clips it could be setting the screen higher up the floor or making sure a 3-point threat is weak-side corner. Still, “play better” could simply be the adjustment.

If Denver believes the Clippers will indeed play better, they could get funky and put Aaron Gordon on Zubac, Jokić on Dunn, and switch screens. They’ve tried that on a single possessions so far, and it didn’t end well…

They could send more early help to take away Zu’s roll, but they might just feel confident where they’re at. We’ll soon see.

Will Jokić start launching?

As for that infamous two-man game on the other side, the Clippers have done fairly well defending Jamal Murray and Nikola Jokić so far. Kris Dunn deserves the lion’s share of the credit, as he’s been responsible for chasing Murray into tight, mid-range spaces, but then switching back out onto Jokić when he pops, otherwise known as a veer-switch. It looks something like this:

Jokić hands him three points, but this is the coverage the Clippers opened with in Game 1, and, 101 minutes of hoop later, they’re still leaning on it. Though Jokić shot 4-of-8 from deep in Game 2, it felt like he ignored five or six clean looks, many coming on pick-and-pops like this.

There are other ways for the Nuggets to counter this defense from the Clippers. Jokić simply rolling to the basket and posting Dunn or Derrick Jones Jr. has led to some favorable isolations for him. It also leads to confusion for Dunn and Zubac, when/if they actually commit to the late switch.

But the nuclear code Jokić could push at any time is something he’s always reluctant to do, and that’s to just let it fly. This coverage seems like a bet from the Clippers that, even if goaded into it, Jokić will not launch 12-15 threes in a game, even if he’s shooting just under 42% from deep, like he did in the regular season.

Late in Game 1, the Clippers went another route, pressuring Jamal Murray while meeting Jokić early on his catches. Nekias Duncan did a great job explaining how the Nuggets roasted that coverage; essentially, the Clips were spread too thin, unable to prevent open looks for capable if not elite shooters, and even less able to grab rebounds…

Have the Clippers already found their favorite answer to the Murray/Jokić love affair? Perhaps. The more juice you can squeeze out of Kris Dunn’s defense, the better. But this strategy also keeps them in their shell, keeps Zubac near the rim, and limits the opportunities for James Harden and Norm Powell to get caught ball-watching as cutters sneak behind them.

The real danger is that Jokić melts the Intuit Dome with a 3-point barrage on Thursday night. Does he want to?

Where’s the other two-man game?

Let’s end with a couple quick bites. In Game 1, the Nuggets targeted James Harden on defense by consistently involving Aaron Gordon with Nikola Jokić, either in off-ball screens or inverted pick-and-roll. Perhaps it’s Gordon’s limp calf, but rookie head coach David Adelman went to those actions far less in Game 2.

Why? Perhaps because Harden is the Clippers’ worst defender.

Let me explain: Per Cleaning the Glass, the Nuggets turned it over on a whopping 21.7% of their possessions on Monday, their second-worst mark of the season. Jokić had a rough game with seven of them, and frequently, it was Dunn, Nic Batum, or Kawhi jumping his passing lanes. In other words, the further L.A.’s best defenders were from the ball, the more havoc they wreaked.

The same could not be said of Harden and Powell, who did not provide much help in rotation:

So, with Harden on Gordon, is that why we didn’t see much of Denver’s front-court chemistry in Game 2, or was it an injury? Either way, the Nuggets have to get back to that two-man game, and find Gordon some easy rolls to the rim. The team that shot the highest percentage in the league on shots at the rim (Cleaning the Glass) is shooting just 57% at the rim through two games, which would have ranked as the worst mark in the NBA by light years.

I may know an all-time dunker that can help with that.

Please, Norm

The Clippers will not win this series if Norm Powell and Bogdan Bogdanović continue to struggle so mightily. However, Powell not only hit some huge shots late in the second half on Monday, but was the recipient of an (unscripted) play that stuck in my mind…

It was a rare instance of Norm directly benefiting from the attention his co-stars get, rather than simply trying to emulate them by creating from a stand-still. Even if Jokić isn’t in much drop coverage, the concept still works, getting Norm the ball on the second side with the defense ever-so-slightly out of whack.

There are many more wrinkles to this matchup we could discuss. (Please go look up Kris Dunn’s defensive highlights from this series.) Tyronn Lue has not remotely settled on a substitution pattern, and in Game 2 Ben Simmons was the game’s first sub. Harden also played a chunk of minutes without Kawhi or Zubac, which felt off at the time. The Nuggets are battling injury and fatigue across the board, and seem unsure whether to devote much energy to getting Michael Porter Jr. going.

No matter which of these storylines takes center stage in Game 3 and beyond, we do know that this series has been, and will continue to be awesome.

Prediction: Clippers in 6

The post Round One: Nuggets vs. Clippers appeared first on Swish Theory.

This piece is not meant to give a firm rubric for how to evaluate players, but to catalogue tried and true methods of contributing on a basketball floor that happen to be present for all our best players. No two superstars are the same; in fact, superstars by their nature should be polarized as solving the problems of how to beat each other. If, then, they are all doing the same thing, over and over again? We should take note.

Trait #1: High Degree of Accuracy on Steals/Blocks

Ingredients: Spatial awareness, hand strength, timing, wingspan, positioning, balance

The game of basketball is about winning battles, but it’s also about how convincingly we do so. Swish Theory’s Roshan wrote about the same in his fantastic piece on margins.

Every superstar player I watched the prospect tape of has one, glaring trait in common: they all have superb hand-eye coordination, and exhibited on strips and blocks. One can pick up on these high degree of difficulty plays a few ways. How fast does the player move his arm or hands to make the play? How difficult was it to do so without fouling? Was this a repeated occurrence?

My favorite, though far from exclusive, way to assess these is “dead arm” steals/blocks. Hakeem Olajuwon is the prime example. Hakeem was not immune to jumpiness on the block, likely majorly to do with him being relatively new to basketball. Regardless, Olajuwon made spectacular plays constantly from his first minutes. These “dead arm” blocks would occur when he left his feet at a sub-optimal time, but was still able to angle his arm to knock the ball loose. An example is at the 12 second mark above: Olajuwon leaves early but is still able to fall in the perfect position to block the shot.

This is the clearest cut and least controversial category: visually, it should stand out dramatically, though not always the case, either.

Why is this so important?

Hand accuracy is essential to playing basketball for obvious reasons, but maybe some less than obvious ones as well. Steals are extremely valuable in completely stopping a possession and starting a favorable offensive set (advantageous transition) but also speak to the incisiveness a player is able to bring to the table.

To step into a play and completely strip your opponent of the ball is a dominant activity, completely going against what your opponent wants you to do. To accomplish that you have to take a timely risk, and the only way it can pay off is if you have the hands and coordination to pounce. This all happens in a flash: either you come out with the ball or you don’t.

These players are not just poking the ball free. They are doing so from awkward angles, or if in good position, convincingly so. The Dwyane Wade clips are my prime example (starting at 1:57 above). We see a strong vertical in clip 1, a “dead arm” block in clip 2, otherworldly timing in clip 3 and hounding on-ball defense in clip 4. In each of these scenarios he risks a negative outcome – fouling – but is so accurate with his hands and is able to move faster than others to get into the optimal spot. All of this is how Wade accumulated 3.5 stocks to 2.4 fouls at Marquette and 2.3 stocks to 2.2 fouls per game as a pro despite being only 6’4”.

These traits speak to how we play basketball, generally. Are we moving fast, are we accurate, are we on point, timing-wise? Even plodding Nikola Jokic is able to perfectly place his hands to the tune of nearly two stocks per game as a prospect. When someone mugs an offensive player to the point of you getting out of your seat, you know we are getting somewhere.

Trait #2: Pass Through Your Defender

Ingredients: Processing, planning, pass accuracy, vertical, manipulation, creativity, footwork

Switching to the offensive side of the ball, this trait speaks to the creativity and spatial reasoning of a player, while also capturing physical tools like pass accuracy. Going through the players chronologically, our earliest superstars all had one obvious trait in common: they loved to jump pass. Jordan, Olajuwon, Barkley, Robinson, O’Neal and Garnett could all be found leaping to then make a read even within small segments of game film.

A proclivity for jump passes may be counterintuitive: isn’t that the first thing youth coaches tell their players not to do? Well, it is also indicative of star upside. Again like hand accuracy on swipes, jump passes put the prospect in a dangerous situation, at risk of traveling, but stars have the complex tools to make the most of it. Jump passes were less common as the century turned, but could still be found in the prospect tape of almost every superstar.

I broadened the trait from just jump passes, however, to also include any ability to pass through your opponent. Meaning, your defender is in perfect position – no advantage has been created – yet you still find a way to sneak the ball through. Let’s call them advantage-creating passes. This may be well-timed lobs above the opponent’s head a la Stephen Curry, over-the-head outlet passes from Tim Duncan or dump-offs after a sequence of pivots from Dwyane Wade. Jokic, for all the complexities of his game, barely clears the ground anyways, so has little benefit for the exaggerated jump passes of Kevin Garnett, for example. But he still, mostly through timing and pass accuracy, is able to pass directly through traffic on command.

Why is this so important?

Assists are great for obvious reasons: they get you points and your teammates involved. But jump passes/advantage-creating passes are special because they require coordination moving dramatically in one direction while hitting a moving target going a different one. You have to adjust on the fly, either manipulating your defender into allowing the pass or finding an unexpected target at the last second. We should have our antennae ready to pick up on the obvious ‘pass through’ players like Jokic. The important point is that the ball goes from point A to point B despite an opponent standing directly in between. Even simply from a geometric standpoint, there is clearly something special happening, especially if the pass works repeatedly.

Trait #3: One-Two Punch

Ingredients: Balance, shooting technique, touch, coordination, vertical, core strength

Now we’re getting to maybe what is considered a more traditional superstar trait. Perhaps the most important of any we will discuss here, this is the building block for a high-level NBA scorer. A one-two punch is when you can make one quick move into a scoring action. Watching through the clips above one can see that change of pace is essential: how quickly can you organize into a bucket?

The most common one-two punch is the post up turnaround jumper, utilizing horizontal space (where you turn to) while also relying on a vertical to shoot over an opponent. But methods vary dramatically, especially as I reached more contemporary tape. Dwyane Wade loves to use hang dribble crossover into his pull-ups, again using that horizontal space into vertical. LeBron posts into turnarounds but also bullies his way closer to the cup. Steph manufactures horizontal space by running dutifully off-ball, with the ability to quickly move into a shot at the key moment. Jokic is again an outlier, a deadly outside shooter who has to do little to get his high-arching shot off. An important reminder: there are always stylistic exceptions.

Perhaps the two cleanest examples are Jordan and Shaq. Jordan was as fluid as anyone getting into his pull-up out of the post or face-up crossovers. Shaq was a devastating scorer already at LSU, bolstered by his unstoppable post into baseline bank shot lay in. These are staples that not only helped both translate immediately but were essential to them reaching the Hall of Fame status. It does not matter if it’s repetitive if it is consistently effective; in fact, repetitive might be preferable.

Why is this so important?

The game, as always, is about buckets. In a video from my childhood I can’t track down, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar talked about how a player only needs four moves: a right, a left, a fake right into left, a fake left into right. It can be tempting to seek out as much scoring versatility as possible, as indeed that will help stabilize a player’s performance too. But everyone needs a fastball, a building block that only makes it easier to branch off to more complex actions.

The first problem any player has to solve is to put the ball in the basket. Through a one-two punch, a player does not have to depend on their teammates to do so. All of the actions shown above require a high level of coordination, balance, touch, technique. If a player can corral all of those to punch in the gaps succinctly and smoothly, they are likely great athletes. The function is pure: to get buckets. But there’s an essential element of self-generated offense as well.

Trait #4: Go Up and Get It

Ingredients: Timing, vertical (max, repeat, instantaneous), hand size and strength, core stability, spatial awareness

Now we get to go back to our old-school fundamentals: let’s admire the classic rebound. Here is a trait exhibited by each and every superstar we watched, with the evidence fairly clear. “Go up and get it” sounds like it means: these players are excellent at snagging the ball at its peak.

Olajuwon is again a prime example, unparalleled in the apex he reached while perfectly timing his boards. You also have players like Charles Barkley, who make up for lack of height by doing a lot of work clearing out space on the ground, but nevertheless are able to leap at the perfect moment. Even Stephen Curry (5.6 board per 40), Dwyane Wade (8.4) and Chris Paul (4.6) punched above their height as guard rebounders, all capable of plucking the ball out of the grasp of taller players.

The most significant deviation, and perhaps surprisingly, was Tim Duncan. Duncan, simply, did not need to high-point rebounds given his superior positioning. Surely he is capable of snagging rebounds at their peak, one of the elite rebounders in NBA history, but it did not pop on the tape like with others. Instead, Duncan could be found carving out large swathes of territory with his picture-perfect boxout technique. Once again, these are more guidelines than hard and fast rules. Duncan did not need to high-point every single rebound due to other outlier traits; appreciate the function over the method.

Why is this so important?

Running up and grabbing a ball, as reductive as it sounds, is a lot of basketball. Simply put, it is difficult to find a star player who is not at least pretty good at rebounding. It is a building block of the game for a reason. But the tape specifically showed high-pointing the ball as the common visual cue. That places an emphasis on timing and vertical. Much like the previous traits, there is a very brief critical period at which the ball can be grabbed by you rather than someone else.

We also see a reiteration of many athletic ingredients from the prior traits: coordination, balance, timing, vertical, hands.

Trait #5: Unstructured Midrange Touch

Ingredients: Fine motor skills, balance, coordination, hand size, vertical

Perhaps the most impressive on tape were David Robinson and James Harden. Robinson was able to swing around in an instant to knock down midrange after midrange jumper no matter the angle or coverage. Harden, meanwhile, was able to use his incredible core strength to pull off plenty difficult attempts from all over the midrange. He was particularly adept at runners, shooting a 77th percentile efficiency on one per game. On tape the degree of difficulty showed.

Why is this so important?

There is once again an intrinsic basketball value – points are scored – while speaking to so much more. Touch is how you coordinate your hand to push the ball towards the basket; highlighting field goal attempts where a shot is less structured (i.e. different from a free throw which relies more on technique) gives us a cleaner glimpse into how successful one is doing so on the fly. Technique is important too, but easier to learn than touch.

In fact, success with touch near the basket seems to correlate with outside shooting improvement, too. David Robinson improved his free throw percentage from 58% as a freshman to 64% as a senior and then, further, up to 74% over his NBA career. Harden, meanwhile, went from 76% in college to 86% in the pros. Much like accuracy on strips/blocks, high level basketball is about having great hands. Skill is only conveyed through how we manipulate the ball, so we need all the help we can get physically.

We are seeking building blocks, and with unstructured short/mid touch, we have found one.

Trait #6: Drive with Force

Ingredients: Strength, balance, handle, coordination, flexibility

Forgive how this video is shorter; this was the category I added the last. But it likely is not the least important. Drive with force means to attack the basket in, well, a forceful manner. This can be Olajuwon and Robinson relentlessly squaring up to the offensive glass, or, more conventionally, James Harden dribbling hard to the basket from the perimeter. But it could also be Stephen Curry driving into his opponent’s shoulder without the ball before popping out for a three. Or Jokic lumbering towards the tin.

LeBron is the obvious example, often compared to a freight train when downhill. But this trait was most essential to note in a young Giannis Antetokounmpo. Extremely slender as malnourished at the time, Giannis nevertheless attacked the basket with the same ferocity we see today. While his role was to jack threes rather than drive to set up offense, Giannis made his chances through activity in transition or broken plays. In the absence of positive midrange touch indicators, Giannis’ driving was essential to preserve his route to superstardom.

Why is this so important?

Force is an important element in basketball, as these are strong players moving fast through space. Driving with force means inviting physicality as the initiator. While people often talk about gravity in basketball as referring to spacing at the three point line, there is a much denser pull towards the rim. An open layup is the best shot in basketball, and a free throw is the second best. Driving with force works towards achieving either one or the other.

Putting It All Together

Tallying up the ingredients shows us some underlying characteristics we can prioritize: balance, vertical, coordination, hands, core strength. While these provide a good baseline for physicality on the basketball court, I would remember that they are only useful tied together with concrete action, such as the six traits I highlighted above. Every one of the six actions involves a critical window which requires an immediate, durable application of these underlying characteristics. The more traits a player exhibits, and the more convincingly they do so, the better.

The goal with this piece, more or less, was to tie together player archetypes, competition contexts and age curves to note standard action items. With the six traits above, I have picked what has stood out to me the most as omnipresent in the prospect tape of past stars.

The post Spotting the Stars appeared first on Swish Theory.