That’s what this annual column is for (see 2022, 2023 and 2024 versions): How did I evaluate this NBA draft cycle, how does it compare to years’ past and how will I adjust for 2025-26? Where does my process fit into the greater universe of basketball understanding, and how can it get better? These are questions I believe more should ask.

I published the below graphic at the end of my last piece with The Stepien before it shut down. It is easy to get bogged down with the evaluatory framework I outline on the far right. You read consensus views from major outlets, then either take them at face value or come up with a shortcut reason why this is not the case. Many use the middle approach, relative scouting, ordering by category / archetype (i.e. primaries first) and then comparing within that group. I have aimed for something I like to call absolute scouting, that is, looking at a player’s current ability while assessing with an eye to what they may become. This process can be amplified by the other two, but is ultimately the “truest” evaluatory framework, giving the player himself center stage.

But even within absolute scouting there are endless approaches. This column tracks the evolution of my evaluatory framework to better project NBA careers at the time of the draft.

Forbidden Knowledge

My thesis last year went something like this: if a player is productive on the court, making things happen almost by accident, exhibits high feel, and also demonstrates a high level of athleticism, that is the type of prospect I would want to invest in. The draft is about chasing outliers, and outliers tend to show themselves in those three arenas.

This strategy led to some major out-of-consensus calls. The highest profile call was placing Zach Edey #1 atop my 2025 NBA draft board. Edey was productive in a way I expected to translate at the next level, particularly his rim volume, offensive rebounding and screen-setting. He has made significant improvements to both his feel and athleticism over his college career, items you could notice even evolving over the course of his rookie season, and despite a nagging foot injury. Finding a way to be useful for an above-average Grizzlies team while drastically shifting from his college role, I still have high hopes for the big.

I also had Jonathan Mogbo as a clear-cut lottery talent, finishing as my #5 prospect, then drafted by the Toronto Raptors to kick off the second round. Mogbo finished #18 in the class in minutes played, able to get rotation and occasional starter playing time. While only 22nd in the class in points scored, Mogbo is #8 in the class in rebounds, #7 in assists, #5 in steals and #12 in blocks after his rookie season. While still a bad player overall – he was one of the worst finishers in the league, exchanging his lob finishes in college for off-the-dribble lays too far from the hoop – Mogbo has quickly proven he can do as many non-scoring things on the court as anyone in the class. In some ways, he’s adapted from mid major to NBA competition better than I expected. I’d still bet on him, particularly given his immediately above-average defense and the weakness of the 2025 class otherwise. Should the passing continue to click and his teammates become more comfortable finding him on lobs, the path to offensive value is there. He came out of the gate as one of the NBA’s most bothersome defenders.

My other two big swings near the top were Oso Ighodaro and Terrence Shannon Jr. as late lottery bets, consistent rotation players. While minutes for both were up and down, both showed enough for me to remain encouraged.

The Ten Dimensions

This year, however, I wanted to become more literal in assessing player value. This led me to inspecting the game by “dimensions of impact,” where I categorize each type of contribution into ten groupings. I based these on how one interacts with the ball and court in literal manners, inspecting each realm in close detail, creating clear as possible delineations among categories.

The ten categories within three skill groupings:

• On-Ball Interactions: Three point shooting, midrange shooting, rim finishing, handle, passing
• Off-Ball Interactions: Grabbing/deflecting the ball, ground coverage, positioning
• Physical Force: Pace-force, strength-force

However, no two traits have the same impact of the game; I would have to weight each area of impact. I constructed these weights and inputted values for each player on my board with endless tinkering, informed by tape watch, statistical assessment, philosophical inquiries into how the game is won. The heaviest weights went to three point shooting and positioning, two areas of impact I only added more and more weight to as I back-tested to current and historical NBA players.

But this has limits, too. Namely, skills on the court interact with each other in varied and unusual ways. Even though both combinations provide additional value, a player’s ability to finish at the rim is more advantageous when mixed with a strong handle than if it were mixed with great rebounding. While rim touch + rebounding equals putback potential, handle + rim touch means an extremely deadly drive threat. A team is able to scale that up and gain secondary benefits off of that more than the other combo. There are synergies and frictions across skillsets that make performance better or worse. You can’t just add up skills.

How Good Are You?

My solution? To throw away the ladder, yet again, to construct a new one. Having advanced my ability to inspect skillsets by interaction type, how each player impacts the game became much clearer. But basketball evaluation is even more mystical than that, especially in the absence of a well-constructed statistical model.

So, my answer was simple: ask myself, “how good is this player, on offense and defense?”

I decided to use Estimated Plus-Minus projection as my peg, not taken too literally but a useful impact curve where one can ascertain, as long as with context on role, a rough approximation of how good a player is. Not perfect, but more dynamic than skillset grading.

I’ve said it before, but draft projection is primarily an exercise in imagination. Even if I graded each player’s current skillset perfectly, there are more complex interactions between qualities shown today as it relates to future skill development. For example, a high feel, coordinated player may be more likely to develop a shot than one who doesn’t have those underlying foundations.

It is also extremely difficult to anticipate where development may arise, to the point of it being easier to rather say, here are the way this player might improve, and here are the odds of each happening. I back into this assessment by projecting into multiple scenarios: the future has not been set.

A New Dynamic

My philosophy has generally been extremely pro-risk, for two simple salary arbitrages, in addition to the fact that I can’t get fired: 1.) a team gets its most value out of paying only a max contract amount to a player worth far more, and 2.) if a player doesn’t work out, his minutes go to zero, limiting the downside impact. These are two HUGE incentives, as it is very difficult to compete if you aren’t getting plus-max value out of one player, making even multiple busts less damaging.

However, my strategy did evolve somewhat towards the end of this cycle. I changed my board to become dynamic, first ranking the top of my board by 80th percentile outcomes only – still keeping it high risk for the players whose talent makes it worthwhile. Then, towards the end of the lotto, the assessment becomes 50/50 between a player’s 80th percentile outcome and 50th percentile outcome. By pick 30, my calculation will only be considering median outcome, omitting the ceiling factor at all.

I made this change for an obvious reason I had been ignoring: it is simply impossible to develop an entire roster of projects at the same time. If a player isn’t deemed as high ceiling, he simply will not get the developmental reps to push through to those higher percentile outcomes. In this way, it is more worthwhile to take the bird-in-hand once you get past the obvious star bets. My changed formula accounts for this.

In addition, I should not be ranking my board, as an outsider not working for a team, based on salary arbitrage opportunities, rather than by how I expect the long-term results to shake out.

The Winners and Losers

My outlier calls this year included four bigs or big wings with shooting questions: South Carolina’s Collin Murray-Boyles, Georgetown’s Thomas Sorber, Creighton’s Ryan Kalkbrenner and Arkansas’ Adou Thiero. They went #9 to Toronto, #15 to Oklahoma City, #34 to Charlotte and #36 to Los Angeles Lakers, respectively, but I would have taken all four much higher.

Collin Murray-Boyles is perhaps my boldest take, finishing #2 on my Big Board. “CMB” is a tank at Draymond Green dimensions, and has shown a non-shooting skillset, defensive acumen and physicality that indeed do remind one of the Hall of Famer. Draymond is one-of-one as a processor, but Murray-Boyles has lightning quick reaction time and excellent understanding of the floor, too. He does not have the vertical pop of Charles Barkley, but CMB does mimic him in carving out space around the basket, constantly. The most important commonality is the physicality and processing speed, and CMB is far ahead of his age for both.

For a glimpse into the degree of impact CMB had on South Carolina’s woeful squad, I calculated the number of points at the rim SC would score or allow when Murray-Boyles was on or off. South Carolina scored THIRTEEN more points at the rim when he was on than off, and allowed SEVEN fewer points at the rim in the same scenarios. That offensive figure is more than double the second most among his 2025 comps, and defensive figure third to stalwarts Thomas Sorber and Amari Williams.

CMB has perhaps the best hands in the class, and they synergize nicely with not just his defensive but also his offensive game. Murray-Boyles learned how to better manipulate the ball when driving to the basket over the season, using his intelligence for when to attack to find seams just large enough to let his stellar touch take over. CMB was in the 85th percentile for layup efficiency, and top ten in the country in rim finishing among anyone with 150+ makes. Only Derik Queen was close among underclassmen, and CMB is six months younger despite being the higher grade.

Murray-Boyles is able to conduct traffic, palming the ball in the high post, one spin away from the hoop. He will operate more out of the short roll in the NBA, and thankfully with better shooters (even with the Raptors’ subpar personnel, they exceed his 31.6% three-point shooting college team). He is better than a connective passer, able to hit small windows and create advantages with his sense of timing, leading his teammate into space.

CMB provides rim protection, elite rebounding, on-ball disruption (he is particularly strong blitzing and recovering) and leads the defense when guarding away from the ball. He is the best defensive prospect in a class full of very strong bets in Cooper Flagg, Thomas Sorber, Noah Penda, or perhaps second to Joan Beringer. He does that while being one of the best driving big men in the country, putting up a very strong 0.92ppp on over 100 drives. He thrived out of isos as the season went on, scoring nearly five points per game out of the play type over South Carolina’s final six games. Check out the versatility in the clips below.

It is rare to find obvious defensive disruptors of this level who also have this kind of offensive potential. He almost certainly won’t be a very useful three point shooter, but he has nearly everything else (I’m even hopeful about the midrange).

On the downside, I thought players like Ace Bailey, Egor Demin, Nolan Traore, Hansen Yang and Will Riley went over-drafted. A common theme for these players is being young and high-risk while needing a good amount of touches to approach their ceiling. With my new system, their upside outcomes do not quite drag them up the list high enough to use the 80th percentile calculation, rather being graded on their less thrilling median outcomes.

Four of the five are skinny for NBA players at their heights, with the exception of the slow-footed Hansen Yang. Returning again to our synergies, a weaker frame mixes extremely poorly with on-ball potential, unless you’re a Haliburton-esque conductor, or Shai-esque scorer, both nearly perfect at capitalizing on space creation specificity. This does not mean the path is closed – I’m especially still high on Ace Bailey as a late lottery option – but not the bets I would make with the group compared to where they were drafted unless you can spot the magic. All five have magical moments, no doubt, but lack consistency and are likely to face struggles as they adjust to NBA physicality.

CMB is, on the other hand, extremely difficult to tilt off his spot, making those on-ball reps more consistent and allowing him to explore the studio space in a safer manner. I was also high on Javon Small, Max Shulga and Joan Beringer, all with BMIs higher than all but Yang from the group of players I was lower on. Small’s physicality allows him to drive and dunk through traffic, set up offense without being knocked off his spot. Shulga is broad-shouldered, allowing him to wall off drives and switch up. Joan Beringer, despite being one of the youngest in the class, has been able to bulk up some, on his way to becoming one of the NBA’s best rim protectors. If I have one regret so early, it would be not ranking Beringer in my top ten. The defensive instincts and physical tools give him an extremely lofty ceiling, even with mediocre offense, and he already seems good enough to say his defensive floor is safe, too.

An Eye to 2026

2025 was a fantastic class to evaluate, extremely deep in starter bets. I ended up ranking Jase Richardson around 20, and even so would not be surprised at all if he carved out a starter spot, overcoming his 178-pound frame by being so effective and technical playing off the ball. He was a painful player to rank even that low, given how high his feel for the game is and proven technique, though I remain concerned about his lack of a right and limited defensive ceiling.

2026 promises to be thrilling at the top, as Cameron Boozer, Darryn Peterson and AJ Dybantsa all vie for the top spot. My early leanings rank them in that order, with Boozer vs. Darryn vs. Flagg being very tough to discern.

My biggest adjustment will be getting more accustomed to projecting peak impact, but I want to tweak my ratings system to become even more risk-averse as you go down. I will do so by implementing a 20th percentile outcome which becomes the ranking priority starting at pick 30. With each round of new tape or statistical analysis, making those projections gets a little easier.

As usual, I expect that evaluation criteria to evolve over time.

The post Lessons from the 2025 NBA Draft Cycle appeared first on Swish Theory.

“My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)

He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.”

Or, as I probably oversimplify it, “climb the ladder to forget the ladder.” This passage has always stuck with me. Climbing the ladder refers to the constructs we use to advance our knowledge. In essence, once you have used certain tools to conceptualize an issue, you should focus on what you’ve learned rather than fixate on what got you there.

In draft work we are constantly climbing ladders. The name of the game is summarizing a player’s entire future performance in an ever-changing sport in a single numerical number: their rank. To do this we must conceptualize, using shorthand to assign values to various aspects of a player’s game. “Strong handle” we may label to several players on a big board. We give players these labels through visual cues, box score watching, media consensus, etc., all which color in the lines of our conceptualizations of a player. When you rank someone, you imagine their game in your head, but have to shorthand it through a skill grouping (“he’s the most versatile, therefore he’s a lottery pick”), player type (“he’s the best advantage creator, therefore he’s first overall”) or player comparisons (“he’s a Jaren Jackson Jr. type, therefore he is a top five prospect”).

We all do this, it’s the only way to get through it as there is no single perfect measure to represent this complex answer. What I am proposing, however, is to be more explicit about it. This is why I made a major change to my philosophical framework this draft cycle. I took all that I had learned from prior cycles where I had used a top-down model to assign discrete values. I climbed the ladder by internalizing the lessons from this framework, but left it behind to construct an original, new model.

My top-down model in the past worked like this: for every prospect, I would assign probabilities of them being anywhere from a -8 to +8 impact per 100 possessions player at their peak. I then assigned values to each outcome, where +8 was more valuable relative to +6 than +6 was relative to +4, and so forth down the line. There is a limit to how negative a player will be, so everything -4 and worse was scored as a zero.

The goal was to better capture the extreme outcomes, but ultimately fell prey to the same biases that are involved with a pure rank. This system led me to being far too low on Brandin Podziemski, for example. While I liked everything about Podz’ game, I did not assign him any star odds given his mid major competition and seemingly mediocre lateral quickness. I let these two concerns convince me that even in an optimistic scenario he would have limitations keeping him from star upside. Now I’m not so sure.

My 2023-24 model, rather, is bottom-up. It looks at underlying components that make up a player’s relation to the game of basketball. Instead of handing out odds, I grade three factors on a scarcity scale. While I’m still coming up with numbers in a way that’s likely subject to biases, the hope is that this factor-driven approach can drastically reduce them.

The first factor is production. This is essentially how many good things the player makes happen on the court. There are many attempts (such as Box Plus-Minus) to measure this which offer helpful aids in analysis. But there are also non box-score events like screens, deflections, box outs which are technically still production even though not counted. The way I liked to think about production is “how many things does this player make happen almost by accident” to capture the moving block of skill that is a productive player.

The second factor is feel. Now, we already see issues limiting the utility of my model. How does one produce without feel? How can you gauge it separately? Well, I can try. There are some measures that give clues, like assist to turnover ratio and stocks to foul ratio, but that is far from the full picture. Like productivity, but even more so, we must rely on the tape.

Third is dynamic athleticism, i.e. how much dominance a player can assert through physical means. Once again, overlap with the other two, but other clues available like number of dunks, offensive rebounds, drives, free throw rate. But I again find tape-watching essential: how does a player move and will it hold up at the next level?

I took public notes on my process, writing the three pieces linked above to show examples that were helping me determine the definitions. A quick reaction time to swipe a ball away: that is productive but also high feel, and if employing physicality then a plus for athleticism as well.

One major source of comfort in this methodology is that, even if there are overlaps in my grading, it would likely be in fertile territory for growth. The goal is not to measure current performance but that of a player over the course of their NBA career. The traits that fit into all three categories are likely solid foundations to grow upon. These are the undisputed tools that feed into development as much as current production.

One example of how the tri-factor process plays out, obvious to anyone following my content this season, is Jonathan Mogbo. He grades very well in all three factors: he was a highly productive NCAA player (though with competition level questions leading to a very good rather than elite grade); he was a highly effective passer, nailing teammates on structured and improvised reads alike (though his occasionally poor defensive reaction time keeps him from elite territory); his athleticism is unquestionable, third in the NCAA in dunks at 6’6.25’’ and a 7’2’’ wingspan. Why wouldn’t he be a successful NBA player?

However, the issue still persists: this is not a clear measurement of basketball value, more like a fuzzy approximation of ability and developmental slope. The overlap between factors will lead to misses, as my biases inevitably will assign points for gray area traits in multiple categories for some players. A full cycle of providing these grades certainly helped make the lines between factors are clear as possible, but there are still limitations. While the model is bottom-up in dissecting a player’s characteristics, it does not map cleanly to on-court happenings.

That’s why we’re mixing it up again, babyyyy.

I am more than happy with my board outcome, with Zach Edey at the top, and other sleepers in Oso Ighodaro, Terrence Shannon Jr., Dylan Disu and Tristen Newton. But can we do better?

This time, we’re staying completely on the floor in the most literal way imaginable. Once again, we have three factors, but we’re splitting apart by dimensions of basketball impact. Expect a new series of three detailing this new process but the essence is this: how does a player move their skillful self around with pace while applying force? A mouthful to say “how good are they at basketball,” but a better definition of what we’re trying to measure.

In this way we can separate impact by stationary skillsets, movement traits and physical force. All items are indirectly observable through film and box score watching, and therefore have less overlap with each other as tied to direct observation. It will take some training to translate each factor distinctly, but that’s what Swish Theory is for.

Implementing a beta version of this model shows one clear beneficiary who my previous method may have been too low on: Gonzaga’s Anton Watson. While I was still higher than consensus before, now I wonder if he is a legitimate rotation piece. Here’s why.

In my previous model, I ranked Watson low in production, high in feel/processing and mediocre in athleticism. The low usage rate for a super senior was the production red flag in particular. But considering the new model, what exactly does Watson not accomplish on the court?

Anton Watson had a 9.2 Box Plus-Minus, second in the WCC to Mogbo, which he accomplished partially by being skilled for his size. At 6’7’’, Watson can dribble some, shoot some and pass some, all while being a high stocks player on defense. Getting steals is skillful, and Watson has some of the best hands in class to help him do so. While not much of a shooter over his college career, he came alive this season as a 67th percentile efficiency spot up shooter and 74th percentile efficiency on runners. His touch was elite on layups, at 92nd percentile efficiency. He can set strong screens. There are not many areas of the court where Watson can’t have an impact. There is our first dimension.

Watson is also a good mover, not necessarily through mobility (though that’s fine) but intentionality. Watson is always in the right spot, leading to a very good 2.8% steal rate and 2.1% block rate while only fouling three times per forty minutes. He also advanced his driving, up by 40% per game from the season before. Not only is he skilled, but he moves to the right spot to utilize that skill. There is our second dimension.

Finally, Watson is strong as f*ck. He is a menace when he has a head of steam, a perfect 30 for 30 on dunks this season, and with a strong 0.44 free throw rate over his college career. Watson is skillful and able to be in the right place and also strong enough to enforce his will. There is our third dimension.

There were other major shifts in my ranking, too.

Players with substantial rises up my board: Anton Watson, Jaylin Williams, Ulrich Chomche, Dillon Jones, Reece Beekman, Kevin McCullar, Jared McCain, DaRon Holmes II, Dylan Disu.

Players with substantial falls down my board: Baylor Scheierman, Cody Williams, Zaccharie Risacher, Dalton Knecht, Matas Buzelis, Carlton Carrington, Alexandre Sarr.

Let’s see what trends we can parse from these differences.

Summarizing all the stats for these groups shows the risers exceling in two areas in particular compared to the fallers: steals (+47% in steal rate) despite a decline in fouling (-9%) and assists (+33% assist rate, +21% assist to turnover ratio). The increase in steals while declining in fouls points to surgical physicality and movement ability, as does the increase in assists with only modest increase in turnovers. This fits nicely with our new conceptualization of “skillful self moving with pace and force.”

The increase in assists, particularly to this degree, may be surprising, but passing is a substantial factor for covering ground. In particular, this method puts a premium on passers with a variety of deliveries, like Tyler Kolek, Reece Beekman and Dillon Jones. The more ways a player can make the ball move, the more space the opponent has to cover.

While Carlton Carrington has a very high assist rate, he still tumbled down my board due to very poor applied physicality: Carrington has the lowest steal rate of the groups and a sub-1% block rate. A player of Ajay Mitchell’s mold, meanwhile, struggles to pick up stocks without fouling (highest foul rate in both groups at 4.7 per 40 minutes). But he makes up for it in applied force due to his shiftiness on offense. With his flexibility and change of direction ability, his defender feels as if he was pushed backwards: that’s force applied by the ballhandler.

It may be surprising to see some names I was already low on among the fallers, specifically Williams, Risacher, Knecht and Buzelis. All four of them have limitations with their passing and steal rates and are below average in applied force. There is a good chance one of the four proves me wrong, but right now I view them as borderline undraftable players. A major divergence from consensus, with validation depending on the eventual results.

Ulrich Chomche is another standout name, rising from UDFA territory to first round consideration. Chomche is very young at 18.5, playing with NBA Academy Africa this past season. A very unusual profile for the three games with stats available, Chomche shot 33% on few attempts from two but 38% on many attempts from three. He did this while also blocking a ton of fouls and almost never fouling. Watching him, this applied physicality jumps off the page, especially for his age. His passing ability and shooting form are both excellent for a 6’10.25” player of his age as well. In the little game tape that is available of Chomche, he can be found making hit ahead passes in transition, operating out of the top of the key and just generally trying things. While still raw, he may be quite difficult to play against in his prime. The bet is appealing because if he hits, he has access to much more of the game and with more tools to act than someone like the 2024 draft’s number one pick.

There will certainly be flaws in this methodology as well, which is what the next cycle is for. We all use a lens to watch the game, whether aware of it or not, so might as well be explicit about it. This new model does not replace tape or data-based prospect analysis; in fact, it supplements it as the exact purpose. While there remain points of clarification, still, let’s check back in a year from now and see if we have gotten any closer.

The post Lessons from the Draft Cycle appeared first on Swish Theory.

Following this line of thought, I decided to gauge the roster complexion of the league’s contenders, defining ‘contenders’ as any playoff participant. Amongst the 16 playoff qualifiers this past season, the average draft capital spent on the top 7 players in their rotation was the 20th pick. However, each team had an average of roughly 3.5 lottery picks in their rotation. Considering about half of each team’s rotation was composed of lottery picks, this discrepancy demanded further investigation. Further examination of roster make-ups would show 14/16 playoff teams featured a second round pick in their rotation and 7/16 had a former UDFA (Undrafted Free Agent) receiving significant playing time.

‘Winning at the margins’ is a commonly understood pillar, and borderline platitude, of teambuilding; lottery picks on 2nd and 3rd contracts, which are undoubtedly present on these rosters, present such a burden to teams’ salary-caps they are forced to roster and play inexpensive players. While cap conservation is certainly a major factor in constructing these teams, it is only a partial explanation. There are teams with untenable salary-cap figures, littered with the extensions of former lottery picks, who weren’t able to make the playoffs. As for the players who weren’t heavily invested into with draft capital, we can infer they were also available to these non-playoff teams. And if these players were available, are currently able to contribute to a playoff team, what prevented these lesser teams from acquiring them?

This may seem like a circuitous line of thinking, but I believe the issues facing these moribund teams to be interconnected. Not only were they unable to identify lottery picks worth defining the context of their roster, they were unable to acquire talent on the periphery who could easily acclimate, and produce, in their specific context. Reed Sheppard and Jonathan Mogbo are two prospects who on the surface have little in common, but in both of them I see unique solutions to the previously described predicament. While Mogbo and Sheppard find themselves on opposite ends of the draft spectrum, with Sheppard being projected to be taken within the top 5 picks and Mogbo a consensus second rounder, I believe they’re both undervalued compared to their respective positions. Both players possess portable skillsets, easily transferrable into any setting and this, in my estimation, supersedes the need to meet any archetypal qualifications.

Reed Sheppard

In many ways Kentucky guard Reed Sheppard has become an avatar for the public perception of the 2024 draft class. Standing at 6’1.75 (without shoes) with a +6’3.25 wingspan, Sheppard’s substandard positional size (per DraftExpress, average point guard measurements are 6’2.25 and a 6’6.75 wingspan), and modest scoring output (averaged 12.5 points per game) are a far cry from typical expectations of a projected top-5 pick. Even Sheppard’s jaw dropping efficiency from this past season has been met with skepticism in the public draft-sphere, with many questioning the feasibility of drastically increasing his shooting volume. Along with only shooting a hair over 8 threes per-hundred-possessions, scattered throughout his tape are instances of Sheppard stymying advantages with his reluctance to score, as seen in the compilation below.

Even the methods by which Sheppard goes about playmaking have been met with scrutiny. So often the hallmarks of a high level guard prospect are a player who consistently creates decisive advantages, and can utilize an array of passing deliveries to capitalize on them. Sheppard decidedly doesn’t abide by this convention, and in fact, rarely throws passes off a live dribble. Sheppard’s rote style of playmaking, shown below, has understandably sparked criticism of whether Sheppard will be able to fit passes into NBA windows.

And this is to say nothing of whether Sheppard will be able to reliably create advantages in the first place. At the moment Sheppard is without an especially advanced handle, routinely struggling going to his left hand and contending with gap help on drives.

So with all these uncertainties calling into question Sheppard’s legitimacy as a top 5 pick, what reason is there to believe he’s actually UNDER-rated as a prospect?

Contextualizing Production

Being fully transparent, many of the previously mentioned concerns were my own. Advantage creation and positional size are two heavily considered factors in the guard evaluation rubric, and Sheppard’s failure to meet this criteria made it easy to dismiss his case for a top-5 pick as a byproduct of an especially weak draft class. However, as Sheppard’s lone collegiate season progressed and the production didn’t waver I was forced to reassess my stance. Reconciling my beliefs of what a top-flight guard SHOULD play like with the tendencies Sheppard continued to display on tape proved difficult, so in search of clarity, I took a look at the numbers.

In order to establish a frame of reference for Sheppard’s statistical profile, I compiled stats I believed were pertinent to a guard’s pre-draft profile. The sample consisted of 41 guards listed 6’3 or smaller who were either: first round picks, or played 18 minutes/game, only guards without Barttorvik.com profiles being omitted from the sample (sorry Mike Conley). The categories tracked consisted of: PNR (Pick-and-Rolls) run per-game, PNR/game (including passes), Half-court rim attempts/game, Drives/game, Free Throw rate, Steal rate, Block rate, and Off-the-dribble 3’s attempted/game. In virtually every category Sheppard’s positioning was polarized, revealing some interesting trends.

For example, take the scatter plot below comparing PNR scoring rate (share of a player’s PNR reps that ends in a shot attempt by the ballhandler) and total PNR reps received by a player per-game.

As PNRs/game increase the less scoring oriented these reps become. This is to be expected, generally players receiving a high volume of PNRs are thought to be a team’s primary facilitator. In spite of this, here we find what is the first of a series of trends bucked by Reed Sheppard. Sheppard had the 4th lowest PNR scoring rate of the entire sample, and was comfortably lower than anyone who’d seen similar PNR volume to him. The average scoring rate amongst players who’d averaged 8 PNR/game or less was 53%. Sheppard, who’d averaged 6.1 PNR/game, had a scoring rate of 39%. Sheppard found himself in the company of Andrew Nembhard and Tyrese Haliburton once again when I’d ranked these 41 guards by Drives and Half-court Rim attempts per game.

Again these are two stats where the correlation seems obvious on its face: the more a player drives to the basket, the more rim attempts they should have. But what commonalities are there in players who do both sparingly? For the 7 players who reside near the bottom of both rankings above, size seems like an obvious culprit. But this explanation didn’t hold up to scrutiny, especially after seeing the players ordered by free throw rate.

Along with Sheppard, Haliburton, and Nembhard, Cason Wallace and TJ McConnell were the only players to fall in the bottom 13 in all 3 categories. And with Sheppard and the Pacers trio being in the bottom 10 of each stat, prompting the question of what’s behind the similarity in these player’s statistical profile? I believe the answer in this case is what I can best describe as ‘Advantage Perception‘.

Typically when advantage creation is discussed what comes to mind are clips like the following, where Ja Morant collapses the defense after rejecting the ballscreen and makes the kickout to Desmond Bane for a wide open 3.

Where advantage perception diverges from advantage creation is the skill doesn’t necessarily require the player to spend much time on-ball, and is as much about navigating offensive pitfalls as it is manufacturing something out of nothing. It is in this area where Reed Sheppard excels, evident in his stellar 2.25 Assist-to-Turnover ratio, but also in his tape. Sheppard was persistent in keeping defenses on their backfoot with pinpoint outlet passes which sparked transition opportunities.

This kind of subtle playmaking is a staple of all 3 previously mentioned Pacers guards, and one of the defining features of an offense which ranked 2nd in the NBA in both pace and offensive rating over the regular season. All 3 of these Pacers guards embody the basketball adage of ‘the ball moves faster passing than dribbling’, and create many easy opportunities with simple hit-ahead passes like the play below.

Sheppard’s effect on the Kentucky offense’s pace is apparent going by the numbers as well. Per Hoop-Explorer, with Sheppard on the court Kentucky ranked in the 99th and 98th percentile in transition frequency and efficiency. In non-Sheppard minutes they still played in transition a healthy amount ranking in the 96th percentile, however their efficiency plummeted into the 17th percentile, an astronomical fall.

This ability to perceive advantages extends to Sheppard’s ability off-ball as well, Sheppard’s adept in relocating off-ball and is well suited to complimenting other creators. The clip below is emblematic of Sheppard’s knack for maximizing his role off-ball. DJ Wagner runs a spread PNR where Sheppard lifts from the corner to remove the tagger, a basic enough task for an off-guard. However, Sheppard recognizes the defense loading up the paint and sinks into the corner, into Wagner’s line of vision, where he attacks the closeout and draws a foul on the shot attempt.

Ultimately all these are microskills, which in a way reaffirms the notion of Sheppard having a high floor but not the high-end creator outcomes associated with a top 5 pick. With low PNR volume, minimal downhill presence, and what seems to be a risk-averse offensive approach, what separates Sheppard from the ‘game-manager’ guards like TJ McConnell (and to a lesser degree Andrew Nembhard)? What avenues are there for creation?

Contextualizing Production: The Kentucky Factor

Similarly to how I’d noticed a trend in the names Sheppard was grouped with when it came to rim pressure stats, over time I’d come to realize near the bottom of both off-the-dribble 3’s and PNR/game was a strong Kentucky contingent. Of the 8 Kentucky guards in the sample 6 were in the bottom 10 of OTD 3’s taken per game and none were in the top half, with Rob Dillingham placing the highest at 21st.

And for PNR/game, 5 Kentucky guards were in the bottom 13, with De’Aaron Fox pacing the group in 17th place out of 41.

Kentucky players being amongst the lowest in PNR reps makes a good deal of sense with how prolific a recruiter John Calipari was during his tenure as Head Coach. With a glut of ballhandling talent, naturally their offense would take a more egalitarian approach. But the absence of any Kentucky players near the top of the OTD 3-point shooting list warranted further investigation, especially considering how integral this shot became to many of these players at the next level.

What I found as I looked into Kentucky’s shot diet over the Calipari years was these kind of shots seem to be explicitly discouraged within the Kentucky offense. Over the past 15 years, per Synergy, Kentucky was in the 42nd percentile of off-the-dribble shots, and this figure is including off the dribble 2’s! And this past season Kentucky was in the 37th percentile of OTD shots taken, despite being in the 93rd percentile in efficiency, and 177th in the country in 3-point rate. The implications this has on Reed Sheppard’s projection cannot be understated, because it’s these shots where Sheppard’s avenue for creation lie.

The reason I’m more confident in Sheppard’s shooting development, even compared to past Kentucky prospects, is the growth in confidence and comfort in these shots he demonstrated over the course of the season. Compare the two PNR frames below, the first from an early season game versus Saint Joseph’s and the latter from a late season conference game at Mississippi State.

Take note of the level of the ballscreen, with Tre Mitchell setting the screen with a foot inside the arc. Versus the frame below where the screener, Ugonna Onyenso, is a few feet outside of the paint.

As the season progressed and Sheppard saw more usage as a PNR ballhandler, Kentucky adjusted their scheme accordingly to fully weaponize Sheppard’s shooting ability. Sheppard acclimated to the uptick in volume well, with each passing month of the season the percentage of Sheppard’s 3s taken inside the first 20 seconds of the shot-clock increased. And this progression was apparent on tape.

Look at the following plays, both instances of Kentucky running ‘Horns’ with Sheppard as the ballhandler. In the initial clip Kentucky is playing an early season game vs Texas A&M Commerce, Sheppard’s defender goes under the ballscreen while the big, who is in a shallow drop coverage, helps. Even with the cushion Sheppard turns down the shot and swings the ball to Justin Edwards. In the clip immediately after this though, UNC Wilmington late switches the Horns action and Sheppard reactively takes the 3.

As Sheppard’s shooting reputation grew in conference play he saw more aggressive coverages and this created closeouts which lead to clearer driving lanes for his teammates.

Sheppard gradually expanded his versatility shooting off the dribble as well. In the comparison clip below, versus Florida Kentucky runs 77 (a double ball screen action), with the x4 (Tre Mitchell’s defender) switching onto Sheppard. You can see Sheppard briefly attempt to get into a stepback 3 before abandoning the idea and swinging the ball. Compare this with the following play where Sheppard does a much better job setting up and selling the drive before hitting the stepback 3.

Projecting this shooting versatility with the improvements Sheppard made as a PNR operator, as he improved his pace and timing making reads out of the core actions Kentucky ran for him.

This development can be seen comparing the two clips above. The first clip from early in the season Kentucky is running 77, Sheppard rejects the first screen, sees the low man cheating over from Antonio Reeves in the corner, but the gap help forces him to make the skip pass early and slightly off target. The lack of patience here causes the pass to be slightly off target and shrinks the window for Reeves to get the 3 off unencumbered.

Versus the 2nd clip, Sheppard is running a spread PNR, but waits for the big Zvonimir Ivisic to twist the screen to create more separation from the POA defender. This simple decision allows Sheppard to place slightly more pressure on the defense (drop coverage), Justin Edwards lifts to the wing in reaction to his defender tagging the roller, and Sheppard finds him with a better timed and more accurate left-handed skip pass.

Sheppard’s reliable decision making and OTD shooting over time can unlock his potential as a driver. As fraught as comparisons can be, I believe Sheppard’s progression could be similar to a player he’d previously linked with in this article, Tyrese Haliburton. Haliburton, similarly to Sheppard, was not treated as a potent OTD 3-point shooter upon arriving in the league. Take the frame below for example rookie Haliburton is running the PNR vs the Nuggets and look at the level of the ballscreen and the depth of Nikola Jokic’s drop…

…compared to the screen being set and the respective coverage Haliburton saw in this past playoffs.

The additional spacing in concert with this shooting gravity can unlock Sheppard’s driving potential in a similar way to Haliburton as well. Indiana frequently utilized Haliburton in these ‘Stack’ actions, especially when another dynamic shooter in Buddy Hield was on the roster. The force multiplier shooters of Hield and Haliburton’s caliber expands creases for ballhandlers to penetrate and create.

Along with actions like ‘Stack’ maximizing Sheppard’s shooting talent, there are actions to accommodate for Sheppard’s lack of an advanced handle. Many teams use ‘Get’ actions in early offense to lower the burden on ballhandlers by allowing them to initiate against a shifting defense versus a set defense. Comparing the following two plays is instructive because not only does it place Sheppard next to a player he’d been previously grouped with in TJ McConnell, you can the limitations of the latter compared to Sheppard.

In both clips ‘Strong Motion Get’ is ran, however when McConnell receives the pitchback his defender, Dennis Schroeder, is well inside the arc rendering Indiana incapable of creating an advantage. McConnell’s limited shooting range will often see teams shift into a zone defense to counter his rim pressure. However comparing this to second clip of Sheppard running the same action, the POA defender not only has to go over the screen, Mississippi State’s big has to hedge-and-recover to deny Sheppard a shooting window. This, along with Kentucky preventing nail help by stationing a respected shooter in Antonio Reeves at the wing, provides Sheppard a crease to drive and create separation for a snatch-dribble jumper.

This is of course not to say Sheppard will mirror Haliburton or McConnell’s developmental trajectory completely. However I do think its valuable to reference how both players, undeniably undervalued as prospects, improved upon their strengths and had their weaknesses accounted for.

Sheppard’s defensive projection isn’t nearly as clear, but similar to previous statistical comparisons to his peers his profile is unique.

Sheppard, of the 41 guards who’s steal and block rates were logged, had the highest steal rate and second highest block rate. Candidly though I believe these numbers slightly misrepresent Sheppard’s defensive impact this past season. Possession by possession Sheppard revealed many defensive flaws, as his suboptimal size and length gave him extremely thin margins navigating screens, and he was inconsistent at the point of attack and off-ball. Despite all these deficiencies, Kentucky’s defense was 11.4 points worse with Sheppard off the floor. This speaks to the value of creating, and consistently capitalizing, on turnovers. Sheppard’s size will more than likely keep him from being among the elite perimeter defenders in the league. Even if he’s hidden on non-shooters, the propensity for defensive playmaking should allow him to tread water on this end compared to other offensively slanted small guards in the league.

Jonathan Mogbo

While I believe the misevaluation of Reed Sheppard lies in what KIND of perimeter creator he is, viewing 6’7 combo-big Jonathan Mogbo through the lens of conventional big-man archetypes is responsible for repressing his draft stock. Just as I’d done with Sheppard, I’d wanted to establish a statistical frame of reference for Mogbo by compiling and comparing him to his peers. Instead of using a strict size threshold I used a looser set of parameters on size and selected players based on role, looking for players who had played both the 4 and 5 positions. This group consisted of 45 players and the categories taken were Offensive and Defensive Rebounding%, Assist%, Turnover Rate%, Block%, Steal%, Dunks/game, Halfcourt layups/game, and Halfcourt layup shooting efficiency, all from the player’s pre-NBA season.

Across the board Mogbo was an outlier. The chart below is the Offensive and Defensive Rebounding% of each of the player combined into one bar. Contradicting expectations given Mogbo’s size, he actually tops this group of bigs when these categories are aggregated.

The exceptionalism of Mogbo’s paint production isn’t limited to just crashing the glass, though, as portrayed by the scatter plot below which depicts Halfcourt layups + dunks on the X-axis and the conversion rate on Halfcourt layups on the Y-axis (as a proxy for touch around the basket).

Zach Edey may seem to be a confusing addition, considering the remaining players distinguished are more aligned with Mogbo’s presumed role in the league as an undersized combo-big, but the choice was intentional as to put into perspective the interior presence Mogbo has been. The only players who accumulated more HC layups and dunks/game AND were more efficient on HC layups than Mogbo were Edey, Jock Landale, and Marvin Bagley. Below is a comparison between a stylistic stat (Free Throw Rate) and efficiency stats (3-point shooting and Adjusted Offensive Rating) of the 4 players’ respective teams.

Numbers represent team ranks.

Mogbo’s San Francisco team lands at the bottom of all of these stats, which aligns with the observations I’ve made of San Francisco’s perimeter players being incapable of reliably creating space or advantages for easy opportunities. With Mogbo off the court San Francisco took 6% less shots at the rim, a precipitous drop off, and despite taking less shots at the rim they were drastically LESS efficient as well. In non-Mogbo minutes San Francisco went from 80th percentile efficiency in High-Low efficiency (PPP) to the 51st percentile, and from the 60th percentile in Post-up efficiency to the 40th percentile.

So what relevance does this have to the article’s premise? Why does Mogbo being particularly effective near the basket differentiate his outlook from other undersized bigs? What separates Mogbo from previous undersized big men is the convergence of his interior presence and passing ability. Mogbo ranked 2nd out of the sample of bigs in Assist%, and had the most dunks/game of any big above a 15% assist rate.

While Mogbo won’t be deployed often as an on-ball creator, an exceptional Assist% compared to his peers represents a level of feel which enables him to capitalize on cleaner looks provided by improved spacing and advantage creators. Simple avenues for scoring present themselves like the clip below, where the Memphis Grizzlies run Horns Flare and Brandon Clarke recognizes the opportunity to cut baseline as his defender aggressively helps off him in the strong side corner.

Another crucial factor to take note of in the previous clip is the personnel. Notice Clarke gets this open dunk with Xavier Tillman on the floor, another non-spacing frontcourt player.

This leads into my next major point with Jonathan Mogbo and his overstated difficulty of fitting into lineups. The confluence of off-ball awareness, ballhandling ability, and dynamic athleticism makes Mogbo a prime example of how often the relationship between spacing and modern frontcourt players is misunderstood.

In traditional 2-3 and 5-out alignments, frontcourt players, no matter their ability to shoot from distance, are placed in the corner. This frequently gives opposing teams the upper-hand in game-planning, allowing them to either hide their weakest defensive player on this negative-spacer. Teams may also place their primary rim protector on this player to keep them stationed close to the basket, like in the clip below where Rudy Gobert is assigned to ‘guard’ Peyton Watson in the corner. Gobert is allowed to rotate hard to protect the basket with minimal concern of Watson’s shooting hurting the Timberwolves, and in fact a Watson 3 is considered an ideal outcome for the possession.

Even when the shooter is more respected than Watson in a 5-out alignment, the ‘automatics’ (schemed defensive rotations), allow teams to have their cake and eat it too. Teams can not only help off these average frontcourt shooters; if they are forced to over-help it is with the understanding that their teammate will help and allow them to recover.

The following play is a perfect example of this playing out. After some strained early offense, the Magic flow into an inverted empty corner pick-and-pop between Paolo Banchero and Jalen Suggs, which isn’t successful unto itself but does coincide with a miscommunicated switch between Darius Garland and Donovan Mitchell. This break in communication starts a domino effect, forcing Evan Mobley to quickly help on the open man in the corner, opening a crease for Banchero to drive as the ball is swung to him.

HOWEVER, Banchero gets downhill Jarret Allen helps off his man, Wendell Carter Jr., in the weakside corner. This sequence of events triggers an easy kickout to Carter Jr. in the corner, but this is what the defense wants! Simultaneously to Carter receiving the pass, the Cavaliers execute their weakside ‘sink-and-fill’ rotation, with Mitchell sinking into the corner, Garland rotates one pass over to Mitchell’s vacated man, and the Cavaliers defensive shell is able to resume its shape as the remaining players rotate behind Garland. This results in a late shot-clock contested 3.

These automatics play out countless times every game, with mediocre spacers serving as a release valve for opposing defenses. Below is another example of a common weakside defensive rotation taking place but against an offense situated into a 2-3 alignment. In this play the Houston Rockets are switching, and when Frev VanVleet is switched onto Rudy Gobert, Jabari Smith provides early help on Gobert under the basket, leaving Naz Reid open in the corner. This prompts a cross-court skip pass, triggering a perfect ‘X-out’ rotation, with Jalen Green and Smith exchanging assignments on the weakside.

Over the course of the NBA season teams developed a unique offensive wrinkle to throw a wrench into these defensive automatics. The term for this schematic wrinkle is called a ‘4.5-out alignment’ has been documented, discussed and coined by the great Bowser2Bowser (@bowser2bowser on X/Twitter). 4.5 spacing is an alignment uniquely suited to Jonathan Mogbo’s skill, but first I want to layout the basics of this alignment. 5-out spacing, pictured below, has 2 players in the slot, 2 in the corners, and one player at the top of the key.

4.5 out spacing simply takes one of the frontcourt players, typically a non-spacer, and places them into the short corner area (in between the 3-point line and the lane line). The following frame is of the Atlanta Hawks in a 4.5 out alignment with Onyeka Okongwu as the lone big placed in the ‘.5’ role.

4.5 out, and its value can be seen below, in a clip taken from the same Magic-Cavaliers playoff game as the previous clip. Once again the Magic begin in a 5-out alignment until Wendell Carter Jr. relocates to the dunker-spot as Paolo Banchero and Franz Wagner run an empty corner PNR. With the Magic finding no success in the initial action, Franz drives and manages to connect with Wendell Carter on a lob.

Now the last few seconds of this play are where the edge is gained from the Magic utilizing 4.5 out spacing on this play. Notice Donovan Mitchell instinctively going to sink into the corner to help on what he assumes will be Wendell Carter Jr parked in the corner. This is a long time defensive axiom being broken in real time!

Jonathan Mogbo’s previously mentioned excellence as a finisher makes him a great fit for this role, with the vertical spacing component being crucial to a non-spacing big’s fit into a 4.5 out role. On top of Mogbo’s quick leaping ability, his ability as a passer unlocks another dimension in 4.5 out alignments. At San Francisco, Mogbo had primarily been used as a short roll passer or the trigger man in High-Low actions.

But I believe Mogbo’s ability to not only pass, but pass off a live dribble…

…lends itself extremely well to expanding this role past simply catching lobs. Similarly to how Amen Thompson has been effective as a 4.5 out ‘big’, being able to connect plays and make a variety of passing reads enables him to play with other bigs.

The following play for instance, Houston runs a RAM (an off-ball screen set for a player before they set a ballscreen) PNR with Jock Landale as the screen setter/roller and Thompson sets an exit screen for Fred Vanvleet before settling into his role as the 4.5 out big. The passing window to Landale’s roll to the basket is well covered so Jalen Green makes the pass to Thompson in the short corner. The paint presence of Landale forces the weakside defender, Gordon Hayward, to crash down as Thompson makes the interior pass.

Thompson cleans up Landale’s miss, but you can see the attention the concentration of size between Thompson and Landale demands. And how 4.5 out lineups can be a counter to teams like Oklahoma City who are comfortable playing smaller. Not only is the interior feed a viable decision for Thompson, because of how hard Hayward is forced to rotate to help, the skip pass to his vacated assignment (Dillon Brooks) is also an option for Thompson.

Paired with an explosive off-the-dribble scoring threat Mogbo’s passing skills can be blended into lineups with another big as well. Like here, where the Mavericks run a spread PNR after their initial double-drag action is snuffed out. Kyrie Irving draws two defenders to the ball opening up the opportunity for PJ Washington to throw a lob on the short roll. Naz Reid uses his excellent recovery skills to break up the pass, but this play puts into perspective how well suited Mogbo is for these asymmetrical alignments. Not only is he fully capable of throwing the lob in the short roll, he can play the Daniel Gafford role as the vertical spacer in the short corner.

Another non-traditional alignment that’s risen in popularity around the league and has bearing on Mogbo’s pro projection is the ‘5-Slot’ alignment. Like 4.5-out alignments, 5-slot helps mitigate the spacing concerns of non-shooting big men while appropriately utilizing the gravity of the big’s paint finishing. As the alignment’s title dictates, the center is simply placed in the slot. With this placement not only does the 5 pull the x5 (player defending the center) away from the basket, it places the center in a position to utilize their ballskills to be a downhill creator. Like in the play below, where Clint Capela gets the ball in a 5-slot alignment and calls his own number on a DHO keeper to get the driving dunk.

Not only does Mogbo possess the handling skills to apply pressure on the rim from these sorts of alignments, he can use his aforementioned passing vision to find teammates when collapses the defense on these drives.

Moments where Mogbo found himself in these asymmetrical alignments were few and far between though, and the typical formatting for San Francisco’s offense found Mogbo playing out of a Horns alignment with conventional Princeton offense principles. The nature of the San Francisco offense made it especially easy for opposing defenses to load up the paint, clog rim running lanes and load up on post-up possessions.

Possessions like the clip above were mainstays in San Francisco’s tape with big’s positioning allowing opponents to place all 5 defenders inside the arc. Even with San Francisco having perimeter players who shot well from 3 this past season, shot versatility from these players was severely lacking, and this greatly simplified closeouts for opposing defenders.

Defensively, Mogbo is uniquely equipped to serve as a switch big when he’s deployed as an undersized center, due to his gargantuan wingspan. In spite of Mogbo standing around 6’8 in shoes, his standing reach of 9’0.5 is only an inch shorter than Jarrett Allen, half an inch shorter than Naz Reid and Wendell Carter Jr., and actually half an inch LONGER than Bam Adebayo. While I don’t see Mogbo’s rim protection being sustainable for long stretches, as it pertains to lineup flexibility his lateral movement enables him to stick with smaller players on the perimeter and impact shots with his length.

Here Mogbo switches onto the ballhandler in the first ballscreen, scram (off-ball) switches back onto his initial assignment when the ball is swung, and switches onto the eventual shooter to contest the shot. Mogbo had one of the lowest block rates of the group of bigs I’d catalogued from earlier, but also had the highest steal rate amongst the group. This speaks to his activity off-ball, where he uses his length to get into passing lanes and force deflections.

Conclusion

Associating Jonathan Mogbo and Reed Sheppard probably seems like a bizarre decision but they are both representative of what has been my greatest shift in philosophy over the course of the cycle. After starting out with a tepid assessment of both prospects, I realized many of my concerns were rooted in archetypal bias. So much of my evaluation of Mogbo and Sheppard was spent trying to explain away production, solely due to their NBA role being murkier than most players in their position. When in reality these player’s were extremely productive DESPITE their respective college programs not catering to their distinct skillsets. Evaluating these two forced me to internalize that uniquely productive players will find unique ways to contribute. In the case of Mogbo and Sheppard, their specific avenues to NBA production: Mogbo as a Swiss Army knife big-man, and Sheppard as an off-the-dribble shooter and rapid-fire decision maker, are additive to virtually any lineup configuration. These attributes fulfill the core tenet of my teambuilding philosophy, the most valuable players are consistent performers who don’t require significant personnel accommodations to realize their potential. This rationale places Reed Sheppard atop my board as the #1 overall player and Jonathan Mogbo firmly in the lottery at #7.

The post Breaking Convention: Reed Sheppard, Jonathan Mogbo, and Identifying Stable Production appeared first on Swish Theory.

The board below contains archetype tags, sourced from my articles for the Stepien discussing rim protectors, shotmakers, connectors and offensive engines. Also included are four custom metrics, gauged subjectively rather than statistically. Scalability is one’s ability to scale up or down in usage on either end of the court. Readiness is where on the contribution timeline a player lands. Specialness is the collective rarity of skills (or, on the flipside, commonness of other traits). Versatility is what it sounds like.

Big Board Spots 1 through 20:

Big Board Spots 21 through 40:

The post Matt Powers’ 2024 NBA Draft Big Board appeared first on Swish Theory.

Every year a plethora of players declare for the NBA draft. In fact, 242 players declared for the draft in 2023 but only 58 were formally selected by NBA teams. Some of these players get picked up in the undrafted market but that still leaves a large percentage of the pool. So what makes it so difficult to attain this level? Why are the benchmarks so high, when in most cases, players are transitioning from the next best level of competitive basketball? Two words answer these questions: scarcity and margins.

The two causes are interdependent, with only 450 guaranteed roster spots and an additional 90 spots for two-way contracts, the competition for each single NBA roster spot is cutthroat. In economics, scarcity occurs when demand dramatically outweighs the supply causing the lack of availability of a resource. Here, the demand for roster spots is exceptionally high and yet there’s an abundance of players that enter the draft pool each year, so how do teams navigate what players are worth giving attention to and then acquire the resources to aid them in their development curves?

While it is a league that loves to imitate, each NBA team has its own unique drafting and development philosophy, however, at the same time there are a few principles that are underlying across the foundations of these teams’ ideologies. With the lack of roster spots, this means only the best of the best in the world can truly attain this level of play, causing the margins to be effective on an NBA court to become razor thin. Teams have to make decisions on prospects with these margins in mind. Questions about how a player works in narrow NBA windows have to be consistently recalibrated throughout the scouting process to effectively project a player.

For teams at the top of the draft, it can be an easier time to navigate this with more well-rounded prospects and “sure-fire” talents at the top of the draft such as Wembanyama, Doncic, and Zion in recent history. Teams have become far more effective at drafting even when comparing it to draft classes from 7-8 years ago. From there, when the “sure-fire” prospects are off the board, teams try to look into prospects that are highly talented and skilled but maybe one or two swing skills away from becoming far more threatening in their roles as NBA players. The Thompson Twins, Tyrese Haliburton, and Jayson Tatum are astute examples of this where teams can deploy the resources to severely alter a player’s development curve and hone in on those players’ weakest link, and this is generally why these prospects are taken in the lottery. Whether that comes in shooting, handling, playmaking, or even feel development, improvement is only possible so long as there is a feasible, achievable pathway to said development.

For instance, to project that a player may improve in a given skill ‘A’, there needs to be an implied pathway where the player is consistently put in positions to develop skill ‘A’ while also ensuring that the prospect even possesses the requisite toolset that gives them the gravity to draw those situations. For example, it does not take much intellectual prodding to realize that a player cannot meaningfully improve as a short roll passer if they can not effectively get downhill, roll to the rim, collapse, draw the defense in, and find the advantage created. If the player does not have the requisite tools to even draw the advantage in the first place, how are they expected to improve on the pattern recognition aspects of feel in those situations? This is where margins kick in from a developmental perspective.

Margins are the crux of how I project NBA players. Essentially, margins are the bandwidth to make errors that do not detract from a player’s immediate on-court value and their development curve, stemming from how a player’s blend of tools and skills aligns with the demands of an NBA context. For instance, it’s been much easier for Jaden Ivey to make handle improvements because of how quickly he gets downhill and gets through the first layer of defense. This enables Ivey to operate with way more space, and his elite burst has warranted the Pistons to run more creation reps through him. In contrast, a far less bursty prospect like Jalen Hood-Schifino doesn’t have the same extent of tools, and that has consequently lagged the development of his handle due to how much thinner his margins for error are.

Margins have always been more of an innate understanding to me but I would like to quantify and systematically visualize how I do that in this piece, highlighting some sneaky returners in the 2024 draft class who fit the margins to be an NBA player along the way. 

Before I begin, I would like to put out a disclaimer. The framework I am laying out is not a one-size-fits-all glove that you can apply on a 1:1 basis to every NBA draft prospect. With how archetypes and comparatives are used to describe prospects, I want to emphasize that evaluating prospects should not be treated like the bottle of Irish Spring 5-in-1 you would use as a swamped college kid because you did not have the time nor the effort to take care of yourself as you trucked along to your 8:00 AM “Intro to Sociology” class. This is only to streamline the process of identifying NBA players and how they could potentially grow and should be applied as a template to do so. Too often archetypes and comparatives are used to put prospects in these neatly defined, cookie-cutter frameworks, and due to the innate biases that this creates, it takes away from the minutiae of evaluation. Each prospect is completely unique in their own way like the crystalline structure of every snowflake; no two prospects are the same and neither will their margins to play in the NBA and grow.

FRAMEWORK: The ‘Funnel’ Method

Once these players who are one or two skills away are drafted, finding NBA players gets even tougher, akin to finding a needle in a haystack the size of Texas. This is not because there is any massive dropoff in talent; rather, the differences in talent and skill sets become so marginal at that point that it truly depends on how a team invests in that player and the team context the player inherits. In these instances when the player is not a primary advantage creator or does not warrant the ball in their hands consistently, I find that betting on outlier production or outlier skills allows a player to carve out a niche on the court and consistent playing time as they scale up to their NBA context. Betting on the outlier gives the player the margins to both play on the court, directly affecting their ability to exponentially grow their development curve.

First, let’s take a stroll down High School Lane. Bad memories incoming? Don’t worry, I just need you to remember a couple of lessons from your math and science classes from back then. This framework takes some inspiration from two key concepts: bell curves and the separating funnel experiment. A bell curve is a graph that depicts a normal distribution, essentially presenting the distribution of a set of values across a sample. It can show a sample’s central values, the highs, and the lows over a symmetrical graph based on deviations from the average. 

On the other hand, the separating funnel experiment is used to separate liquids with different densities. Due to the difference in densities, liquids such as oil and water are easier to separate. Here’s a graphic to explain these ideas better.

While scarcity is a primary consideration from a roster spot standpoint, the issue from a player and roster management standpoint is better defined through saturation. Saturation refers to the chemical principle that nothing extra can be absorbed by a substance. In this scenario, the teams are the substance and there is such an abundance of players with talents and skillsets that fit, teams can do nothing more with their limited roster spots. In the separating funnel experiment, saturation does not occur because when substances cannot mix or be absorbed by one another. Instead, they separate into different levels which can then only be separated to intricate detail through apparatus like the separating funnel. For teams to solve this problem in the same intricate detail, I present the Funnel Framework, combining the ideas of distribution from bell curves and the separation ideology of the funnel experiment.

Let’s flip that bell curve onto its side and map it to the sample of all potential NBA players. The deviations from the average (depicted as standard deviations) are the range of values a player can have on the NBA court and that can be further envisioned with the help of the funnel, where each level is like an immiscible liquid of different densities. These differences in ‘densities’ and how each player separates into each of these levels is how their margins affect the NBA court. As the margins increase for players, they trickle down into the lower levels of the funnels. While I plan to do a more analytical approach to qualify and apply this framework through statistical analysis of the NBA sample in a future piece, this is more of a way to visualize how margins functionally work in the NBA. Each colored level represents a specific set of qualities that improves a player’s margins, intrinsically changing the degree to which a player can carve out a role on the court.

For the sake of simplicity, I have used differentiators for margins at a more surface level rather than pointing out specific tools or skill sets that can provide more value whether in an immediate sense or developmental context. For example, the funnel will not break down whether a player has more touch or burst, or which of those skills is more valuable because the requirements can vary highly between NBA roles. Instead, the framework will focus on what is required for a player at each level, defining how the margins let them trickle down the funnel from both the offensive and defensive sides of the ball from a playoff perspective. Remember as we go through the framework, each level of the framework compounds similarly to the added density of each liquid. This means that each prior level still applies to a player even as they get deeper into the levels of the funnel.

Range of On-Court NBA Value

Functional Basketball Athlete:

This is what gets a player’s foot through the front door of the NBA landscape, what even gets them on the radar of NBA teams. What this level talks about is whether a player’s athleticism functionally allows them to play basketball at an NBA level. I relate this idea to the concept of performance outcomes. From a biomechanics perspective, performance outcomes talk about how effectively an athlete can operate an action or function of the sport they are playing. For example, with basketball, this can be how a player’s biomechanics allow them to effectively lift the ball, swing it up to their shot platform, and being able to release the shot. Another example is whether a player has the leaping mechanics to perform a dunk functionally.

What separates a player who is only a functional basketball athlete versus the levels below this one in the funnel, is that these players can functionally operate the biomechanics function but that performance outcome does not lead to a good basketball outcome. This is where the idea of being “skilled” comes through; just because a player can functionally release the basketball using his biomechanics, it does not mean that the player is accurately getting the ball through the hoop consistently. To be a consistent NBA player, the player needs to have the requisite athleticism to function in their role but they also need to be skilled enough to consistently reach a good basketball outcome.

One-Dimensional Player:

This next level talks about players who tend to be functional NBA players on one side of the ball but they actively take away from their team with how ineffective they are on the other side of the ball. These players can carve out a niche with their functional athleticism and skill on one side of the ball but their longevity in the league tends to be short because of how often they often lose their team’s possessions on the other side of the ball. An example of these types of players can be someone like Shake Milton who can be a microwave scorer off the bench but is consistently hunted on defense or Killian Hayes who was a great team defender but will consistently be sagged off of as an offensive player, taking away from his team’s spacing.

Functional NBA Player:

The next level of the funnel talks about players who can functionally operate on both sides of the ball but do not give a team outlier value in any form. These players are often at the back end of rotations of high-level teams because they can be playable without being a detriment on either side of the ball but they can not drive a team’s identity or provide enough value to help change the outcome of a game. An example of a player like this is someone like Drew Eubanks who can operate as an effective rim protector and as a roller offensively but his ability to do these things does not drive the complexion of a defense or offense which makes him quite replaceable from a team context.

Advantage Creator/Advantage Mitigator (With Help):

The average NBA player on a real playoff rotation can create advantages offensively or mitigate advantages on the defensive end with the help of their team. As PD Web defines it, advantage creation is the ability to create extra rotations for a defense and easy buckets for the offense. Advantage mitigation is the other side of the advantage creation coin where a defensive player can take away the opportunity for an offense to create those extra rotations and get easy buckets, often by mitigating the space an offensive player can operate in. The players at this level are often functional on one side of the ball and can create/mitigate advantages on the other end, for example with the help of a screen to get downhill offensively or when a team uses peel-switching to take away advantages and enable a defender to accentuate their ground coverage. The upper threshold of players at this level tends to create offensively and mitigate advantages defensively effectively with team help. High-end examples are players like Kentavious Caldwell-Pope, Andrew Nembhard, and Isaiah Hartenstein.

Advantage Creator/Advantage Mitigator From A Standstill:

The best players in the NBA can create advantages from a standstill or mitigate advantages solely using their margins. This level talks about the players who have high margins for error because of the combination of their tools/skills allowing them to create truly outlier value for their team. When creating advantages, these offensive players can automatically draw two players due to the gravity they have with the ball in their hands without needing the team to help them. This can be through shooting gravity like Tyrese Haliburton, downhill explosion to collapse defenses like Ja Morant, or even using strength and size in the post like Anthony Davis. On the flip side, advantage mitigators at this level can take away these extra rotations without the team over-helping using their tools/skills, whether that’s through high-level rim protection like Rudy Gobert or outlier point-of-attack defense like Jimmy Butler. These are high-end examples that help paint a clearer picture of these margins but there is again variance within this level due to the degree of value you can provide as a standstill advantage creator/mitigator. I have defined this variance in value through the two blue levels on the funnel diagram, with the darker blue representing higher-end examples like Haliburton, Gobert, and Morant. Examples of players lower on this spectrum and within the lighter blue level would be someone like Marcus Smart or Desmond Bane where the margins do create some of this value but not to the degree of the aforementioned examples.

The Outliers Within The Outliers:

When a player can create advantages or mitigate advantages to a historic level, it is due to a combination of highly unique tools and skills that enable them to attain this level of production. These tools and skills intersect in such a strong manner that these players can determine the outcome of a game through their margins. Often the players at this level can create advantages or mitigate them through different facets like feel, coordination, strength, speed, length, etc. This causes the margins to be truly unique and therefore affect the game at a historic level. Examples of players like this are Lebron James, Stephen Curry, Michael Jordan, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, Hakeem Olajuwon, and Larry Bird. In today’s NBA, players like Nikola Jokic and Victor Wembanyama seem to be on this trajectory as long as health remains their friend.

Developmental Margins

“The grass may be green on the other side, but the grass is always greener where you water it.”

– Wolfgang Puck

The funnel framework helps define the range of on-court value across the NBA sample using margins, but a crucial aspect of this framework is how margins also help slide players down the funnel. Margins are key to helping initially carve a role in the NBA but it is also vital in setting up thresholds for skill development. Margins open up the developmental pathways to add micro-skills or even new skills altogether due to the margin of error caused by their tools, to add onto the initial role they’ve carved out. Having outlier margins in certain areas should allow a player to improve on their flaws because the combination of their tools and skills inherently puts them in a position to have those flaws improved.

An example of this is how I talked about how a lob threat with outlier vertical gravity has the pathway to improve as a passer on the short roll due to the defensive attention they would require. This could also be applied to all types of toolsets if they are outliers. For example, a player with elite burst can expand on their handle due to the defensive attention the player will get as he slices through the earlier lines of defense. Think of Jaylen Brown and how he developed his handle from his days at Cal to where it is now on the Boston Celtics; it’s a byproduct of the defensive attention the combination of his burst, size, and shooting touch provides. These margins to develop are available to the outliers and are often not to players who are not because they do not have the same thresholds to make those same errors due to the depth and quality of talent in the NBA, and this is why it is also a crucial part of how I project players in the NBA Draft.

The Sleepers Of The 2024 NBA Draft

Now that we’ve gone over how margins affect development and playtime in the NBA, how do these concepts project to the 2024 NBA draft?

The average draft class produces approximately 20 NBA players, and these are the guys who often play beyond their rookie-scale deal. Correlating this to the funnel framework, the majority of these players would be defined under the level of players who can create or mitigate advantages to outlier value with team help. When projecting an NBA draft class and creating a draft board, I grade the players that will be at this level of outcome or have the opportunity to reach this level of outcome as first-round grades. The rest of this piece will use the funnel framework and the idea of margins to spotlight a few players I believe fit this mold while also being mocked outside of the top 30 picks on Rookie Scale’s Consensus Big Board:

Honorable Mentions: KJ Simpson, Jaylon Tyson, Melvin Ajinca, and Adem Bona.

Isaiah Crawford

Positive margins: strength, feel, length, coordination, and touch. | Potential pitfalls: vertical explosion and medical history.

Isaiah Crawford is a 6′ 5.25″ (without shoes) wing/forward with a 7′ 0.5″ wingspan who has dominated as a defender and primary creator for Louisiana Tech this past college season. While he has been tasked to create a high degree of offense for Louisiana Tech, he shines as an exceptional advantage mitigator on the defensive side of the ball. Crawford is very effective at ending offensive possessions and creating events as a defender which is apparent from his 5.7 block rate and 3.5 steal rate.

So how does he do this? This is where Crawford’s margins kick in as he combines his feel and athletic traits to consistently create events that lead to early offense for his team. Using his excellent strength, he can impede drives from the perimeter or absorb contact from drivers as a low man. Crawford also stifles offensive players using his hand-eye coordination and length to mitigate scoring advantages, whether it is in a context where he has to recover and block shots or take away space to dribble the ball.

Just look at this play where Crawford (#22) operates as a weakside tagger. For most players, the pass to the weakside corner is available because of how deep the roller has gotten into the paint and collapsed the defense. Crawford completely erases that passing window within the blink of an eye, targeting the ball extremely accurately mid-air with his length and restricting any angle that could have made the pass possible.

As an on-ball defender, Crawford can slide his feet well and move laterally. However, he mainly mitigates advantages here by using his balance and strength to absorb contact to get drivers off balance on the initial bump, where he then uses his length to dislodge the ball and create steals. Even when Isaiah Crawford initially gets beat on drives or space-creating moves from the perimeter, he’s able to consistently recover with his ground coverage and length to get back into the play and take away that scoring advantage. If I had to use one word to describe Crawford’s defensive prowess, it would be the word protean. He’s someone who can be extremely malleable on this end whether it is as someone who can rotate backline and protect the rim, help at the nail, or guard on-ball.

On the other side of the ball, Crawford gives you everything you want out of a dribble-pass-shoot wing. As a driver, he leverages his strength to carve space on drives which enables him to weaponize his touch and body control around the rim and in the intermediary.

Crawford’s driving is accentuated by the threat of his shot from the perimeter; it gives him the momentum to get downhill and further leverage his strength in advantage situations. There shouldn’t be too many questions about Crawford’s shooting where he has had a strong sample throughout his college career of being efficient as a shooter from multiple areas of the court:

His feel is prominent defensively but it also exudes itself with his passing, processing decisions quickly, and acting upon passing windows consistently. Making passes on the move on drives is no stranger to Crawford, consistently making dump-off passes to the roller and kickouts to the perimeter when the advantage is created.

At the NBA level, Crawford will not be asked to create every advantage for his team, and his role will scale down to an off-the-catch scorer who will process decisions well and use his scoring in the intermediary as a counter on drives. Being able to provide positive value in these facets of offense while being a defender who can change the complexion of a defense makes Crawford a highly valuable player within any team context.

The main concern with Isaiah Crawford is the extent of his vertical athleticism, especially after dealing with two ACL tears in the same knee. At the NBA level, this could somewhat affect his ability to protect the rim but as you can see from the tape, these injuries have not taken away from his impact as a rim protector. Teams will have to do their due diligence on his medical history but the combination of Crawford’s tools should alleviate these vertical limitations and give him a higher margin for error.

Ajay Mitchell

Positive margins: positional size, feel, touch, and change of direction | Potential pitfalls: vertical explosion, defensive versatility, and complexity of passing reads.

Complementary guards with size, touch, and strong processing are often tough to find in the NBA, and they are often quite valuable when they can play off of bigger advantage creators. Enter Ajay Mitchell, a 6′ 3.25” (without shoes) guard with a 6’6.25” wingspan tasked with the primary advantage creation responsibilities for UCSB this past college season.

Mitchell is not someone who will create advantages from a standstill in the NBA but it is more about what he can do once he is provided a screen to create space for him. He uses a combination of handling craft, size, and touch to score at all three levels of the court which he leverages with his outlier change of direction and lateral movement. Mitchell can often find finishing avenues in short, tight areas with how well he decelerates and can swivel on the transverse body plane (the plane that passes through the middle of the body and divides the body horizontally). His 58.8% on halfcourt drives, a whopping 3.89 unassisted rim attempts per 40, is a product of these movement patterns that allow him to jostle into tight, but open spaces.

Apart from scoring on drives, Ajay Mitchell (#13) has exceptional passing feel where he mixes in quick trigger single-level reads with manipulation. He does well at maintaining advantages while being able to use hesitation and his eyes to throw off defenders and create new passing windows.

Coming into this college season, Mitchell made huge improvements to his athleticism and shooting efficiency from 3. He had improved on his verticality, strength, and even straight-line burst with more optimal shin angles.

Mitchell does not have the burst to create advantages, but take a look at how much his straight-line burst has improved in the span of two years. His shin angles are far better and due to how much closer they are to being an acute angle from the floor, his ability to generate more explosion laterally from the floor (lateral banking) is improved.

Outside of his athleticism, Ajay Mitchell’s shooting has improved over the years at UCSB. He always had good touch but now that is parlaying into his 3-point efficiency with increased volume each year, his increased strength being a reason for the potential improvement from distance:

On the defensive end, Mitchell often struggled not being able to contain ballhandlers. However, I believe this is at least partly due to being overtasked on the offensive end while being asked to guard up a position in most possessions.

The defense should improve at the NBA level when he’s not being asked to create most of his team’s offense and instead used as a secondary or tertiary creator in lineups, thus enabling him to leverage his lateral movement skills on defense while benefiting from easier scoring opportunities. This could be a potential pitfall with Mitchell if this never improves, which would put more emphasis on the offensive traits that are lacking like being a sub-par leaper in traffic and a lack of volume with multi-layered reads while on the move.

However, as long as the defense is not a detriment, the margins with his touch, positional size, and change of direction should allow him to reach an outcome where he is an advantage creator who uses team help and can functionally operate on the defensive end.

Jonathan Mogbo

Positive margins: vertical explosion, feel, ground coverage, and standing reach. | Potential pitfalls: positional size and shooting gravity.

Jonathan Mogbo is probably the ‘weirdest’ prospect in the 2024 NBA draft. Weird is good though: it’s just another way of saying he is an outlier in multiple areas. Standing at 6′ 6.25” without shoes and a 7′ 2″ wingspan, Mogbo has been the crux of the San Francisco Dons’ offense. He’s an explosive athlete both vertically and in a straight line, which is why the Dons used him as their rim-runner, often springing over the top of the defense for lobs with his elite catch radius. He has some special qualities as a vertical threat: a near-zero load time off of one or both feet, great hang time that allows him to catch lobs that are poorly placed, highly syncopated footwork, and a 9′ 0.50” standing reach that allows him to extend into finishes with ease.

What’s especially intriguing about Mogbo is that he started college as a 6′ 4″ guard but had a huge growth spurt that catapulted him to a smidge under 6′ 8″. All of the skills he acquired as he played as a guard for the longest time like handling creativity and passing feel stayed. For that reason, Mogbo (#10) is an outlier ball handler for a big and when that is coupled with his tremendous vertical gravity, the results tend to look like this:

Where Mogbo really shines is his processing and passing reads. Lob threats that tend to put the amount of pressure that Mogbo does on the rim do not usually have the passing volume or the complexity of reads that can shift defenses. In fact, the group of players who have had over 50 dunks and an assist percentage above 20 is miniscule.

Given the popularity of the Delay action in the modern NBA, Mogbo should be able to weaponize his passing by operating handoffs and finding cutters. This would also enable him to counter with his handle when there are open lanes to the rim out of fake handoffs. When his defender sags off of him, this should give Mogbo the runway to get downhill and collapse the defense, where he can find open passing opportunities to the perimeter on the short roll. Another valuable indicator of Mogbo’s passing is that he throws a good volume of high-risk~high-reward passes while keeping his error rate low at an assist-to-turnover ratio of 2.0.

Mogbo also projects to have a high impact on transition offense. As a good defensive rebounder (29.6 defensive rebounding rate), he is fantastic in grab-and-go situations where he can use his handle and open-court athleticism to shift defenses early and open up easier opportunities once the half-court offense is set. Playing him out of the dunker spot can also give Mogbo better opportunities to position himself for offensive rebounds off of misses.

The questions about Mogbo that persist are his lack of shooting and what defensive role he can translate to in the NBA. Mogbo covers ground well and moves in space well enough to mirror the movements of wings and forwards, which can be functionally seen in his 3% steal rate. The common idea is that Mogbo will be an undersized big as an anchor but I believe he projects more as a team defender who erases shots at the rim from the weakside and is switchable enough to guard similar-sized players out on the perimeter.

Playing as a guard for most of his life, Mogbo used to take jump shots but that volume drastically reduced as he grew larger and his role morphed into more of a traditional big. He took no threes this past year, but he notably shot 24 jump shots in 2018 at the Under Armour circuit and 79 attempts throughout his career in JuCo. Although I would not bet on his shooting to improve in a vacuum, there could be an avenue for Mogbo to become a low-volume catch-and-shoot 3-point shooter if a team believes they can improve Mogbo as a shooter and alter his chain of skills. Typically, I would not bet on a 22-year-old to improve their shooting acumen to change this drastically but Mogbo is anything but your typical player. He’s clearly an unorthodox prospect and he’s had an unorthodox development curve as a college basketball player. Perhaps, Mogbo’s physical changes have delayed his functional touch development, with some evidence in his improving free throw shooting: 42.5% on 80 attempts from the charity strike the year before but now at 69.6% on 102 attempts.

Regardless of whether Mogbo shoots or not, his margins with verticality, passing, handling creativity, ground coverage, and reach should help overcome some of his issues of scalability on either side of the ball. Mogbo can scale next to the bigs due to his handle, enabling him to operate as a tertiary handling valve and create advantages with his creativity and explosion.

All in all, these three players have the margins to carve out extremely effective and valuable roles within most team constructs. They can give teams outlier value in different ways while not being a detriment on the other end, expanding their margin for error on the court. While they bring high-level skillsets from day 1, these same margins can allow them to expand their game in NBA spacing, granted that the team that drafts them invests resources in the development of these skills. It could be Mogbo’s shooting improving due to the number of open reps he will get being sagged off of, Ajay Mitchell’s defense improving through better technique and leveraging his tools more as his scaled-down offense keeps him on the floor, or even Isaiah Crawford making multi-layered passing reads on drives because his pattern recognition improves with the number of off the catch drives he’ll need to operate. Using the ideas I have talked about through the funnel framework, I believe these three players will bring back first-round value for teams, and drafting them anywhere beyond the first round will give those teams a true steal in on-court value relative to the players’ contracts.

The post The Importance of Margins and Some 2024 Sleepers appeared first on Swish Theory.

We will cover four aspects of athletic display in basketball: offensive rim dominance, offensive midrange dominance, offensive perimeter dominance and defensive dominance. Each of our four examples demonstrate their “flex” in vastly different ways, but to the same result: getting or preventing buckets in a way that will persist as competition rises dramatically.

We’ll define the term athletic dominance as we go.

Rim Dominance: Jonathan Mogbo, San Francisco

Rims are not safe around Jonathan Mogbo. The guard-turned-big is only third in the NCAA to Zach Edey and Ryan Kalkbrenner in dunks, despite being seven and four inches shorter, respectively. Mid-major teams have elite athletes, too.

The number one most important tool for Mogbo is his catch radius. Catch radius defines how big your target is as a roller, and is constructed of several factors: max and standing verticals, vertical load time, wingspan, hand size. Mogbo scores highly on all of these. But catch radius is also about timing, and being physically able to change your location at a moment’s notice. That is a cognitive aspect, namely one’s reaction time, but a physical one too.

Can you change your short strides into long ones, and vice-versa? Mogbo can. He is capable of skying a foot or more above the rim to crash upon the rim. But he can also sneak in quicker oops, reminiscent of a middle hitter in volleyball. He can catch bad passes with his range but also very good ones with precision and timing.

A framework around – “outflexing” or “physical dominance” – whatever term you prefer, lies in how your body relates to others. Namely, how your body can physically withstand abrupt change but also resist a counterforce. Mogbo, in his true versatile fashion, is capable of both. Despite his bulky, wide-shouldered frame, Mogbo is capable of getting low to the ground and into an opponent’s body. Then, uprighting himself with great balance to sling a pass or attack the rim.

With alley oops he’s skyrocketing himself upward, but getting low-to-high near the basket is a major advantage, too.

Finally, the withstanding force. Mogbo has quick feet, which, again, are capable of chopping in an instant. This combined with his wide frame and great balance mean he is difficult to blow by, especially good at absorbing drives, hitting a roller or boxing out.

Essentially, Mogbo is capable of surpassing final walls of defense with his catch radius and sneaking through with his timing. His agility, foot speed and balance allow him to be specific in his movements; his strength allows him to withstand drives while driving himself into an opponent’s chest. Despite being only 6’9”, Mogbo is the premiere vertical threat in his class (with respect to Edey and Holmes) by blending in all these aspects.

Midrange Dominance: Isaiah Collier, USC

Just, and likely more important, than shooting a high percentage in the midrange is the ability to get there in the first place. Often the first item young ballhandlers struggle with at Summer League or the pre-season is getting past that first line of defense. As guards rise through competition levels, the ground coverage and ground resistance capabilities of their median point of attack defender rise exponentially.

Enter Isaiah Collier.

If Zay wanted to, he could have a picnic, take a nap, read a book in the paint. He is as comfortable breaking down a first line of defense as anyone in college basketball. Not built like a freshman, Collier can withstand a hard hand-check once, twice, however many times is needed to either power his way with a drive or power his way with a post up.

No size of defender is capable of withstanding Collier’s force, routinely pushing bigs backwards into the paint with choppy but strong strides. Because of this, no door is truly closed for Collier.

We see again the importance of being able to get low in an instant before popping back up at will. Collier is capable of doing this with short, quick steps to better position his heavy frame, with rare lower body stability to withstand the shifting of weight.

Collier weaponizes his paint touches well, particularly improving in efficiency as the season went on. He has the second best two point shooting percentage of any high major freshman with 200+ two point attempts. In fact, of all the players since 2008 who are categorized as Scoring Guards in the barttorvik.com database, Collier shoots the best on twos. He is also sixth in assist percentage. These inside the arc numbers combined with his passing is similar, at least statistically, to De’Aaron Fox and D’Angelo Russell’s NCAA profiles.

Collier is highly creative, which combines perfectly with his paint pressure. He is capable of getting to the “flex” spots of the floor that most bend the defense, and then is inventive in finding the best thing to do with the ball. When he uses his burst directly into a high speed pass, it may lead to turnovers here and there but the reward is often wide open layups.

This creativity is a big reason why Collier can get to finishing angles inside the arc, in spite of being a limited vertical athlete.

He can simply burst by his opponent, back him down, take elongated strides, create space with an arm bar, by backpedaling, or spinning into his body, or a hip check.

When he uses his acceleration in combination with appropriate application of strength, Collier is nearly impossible to contain. That’s what we’re looking for in midrange dominance, and easy bets say Collier will do just fine getting into his strength areas at the NBA level, too.

Perimeter Dominance: Rob Dillingham, Kentucky

Rob Dillingham has taken 128 threes and made 45% of them. He has taken 98 deep twos and made 44% of them. But it’s not the efficiency that stands out, but rather how Dillingham is getting his looks. It looks like he is playing on ice skates.

Dillingham’s movement ability is impressive. Not just bursty, not just quick, but also agile, nimble, shifty. When most players would be disoriented playing with such pace and skittishness, these traits are automatic for the Kentucky freshman. With space to operate, Dillingham is the best in class at hunting for perimeter openings.

His athleticism permits him to create horizontal space: with a wide cross or tween, he can shift his weight seamlessly to cover more distance than the opponent expects out of the listed 6’3” Dillingham. His body swings violently back and forth, as Rob utilizes his true superpower: his balance.

He uses this balance (in combination, again with a tight handle) to toy with opponents, exemplifying the hunting part of out-flexing.

His athleticism also allows him to create negative space: decelerating at full speed, Dillingham is able to go from low to the ground to upright in an instant. Yet again, the balance. Not just to be able to stop on a dime, but to then *reload* for your shot, requires moving in three distinct directions (sprint forward -> decelerate to a halt -> leap forward into a shot) in a second.

The important part of Dillingham’s game is not just that he has the arsenal, but is clever in deploying it. That functionality appears automatic as he predicts where his opponent will stick their top foot, already attacking as they do.

I have harped on the importance of changing your body shape from low to high, small to big and vice-versa, but Dillingham adds dimensionality to that. When he’s in his perimeter playground, Dillingham can change from slow to fast, low to high, high to low, left to right, front to back, accelerating fast, decelerating on a dime, all of that. While closer to the basket dominance requires more power, Dillingham is both sleek and stable in hunting perimeter openings.

One additional, significant benefit to that comes in his foul-drawing. While his free throw rate is still low for a given prospect, in consideration of his predilection for distance shooting and small stature, even a 0.25 free throw rate is enough to provide another dimension of value. The aesthetics stand out again, as does the method. When Dillingham attacks, he attacks. Weaponizing his deceleration but also shiftiness in general, Dillingham is able to get into a bigger opponent’s body with ease. The physical toll is likely a lot to manage over a full NBA season, but it is an important part of the arsenal. His ability to seek out physicality keeps defenders honest as they try to blanket his perimeter space.

Defensive Dominance: Ryan Dunn, UVA

Take everything we’ve learned about offensive dominance. How sleek while bursty movement creates force. Now, try to negate it – all of it – in a single player. That player looks like Ryan Dunn.

The first important quality is stickiness. How much can you stay glued to the hip of a perimeter creator without fouling? Opponents shoot a remarkably low 22% from two on drives when guarded by Ryan Dunn. He suffocates with long strides, chopping feet to then react in an instant, sliding in lockstep with the offensive player.

It’s partially his high feel overlapping here, as his instantaneous reaction speed allows him to gamble in ways that still keep him in the play. It would be bad technique, but Dunn recovers better than anyone. His 10.6% block rate, despite being only 6’8”, speaks for itself.

His wingspan also helps to close gaps quickly. He springs into action with his 7’1” length which matches well with his burst and second jump speed. The court shrinks for Dunn, where he is a beat away from making his presence felt at any given point. This is the ideal for a defensive forward: blocking off space with length; covering space with speed.

He can withstand force, too. His lower body maintains its springiness while also being extremely durable, a rare combination. Dunn was built to prevent buckets all over the court.

On any given possession, UVA trusts Dunn to play like an aggressive strong safety, hedging, icing, blitzing, trapping, monitoring whatever gaps. Dunn has done it all as he patrols the court. Some may saw this is a negative – NBA players shouldn’t gamble with abandon like this. But that is what Dunn has been asked to do, and he performs it magnificently. We know what happens when you ramp up his activity, and it’s only good things. Despite being top 5 in the NCAA in block rate and top 50 in steal rate, Dunn only fouls three times every forty minutes. In fact, no other high major player in the barttorvik.com database has improved upon his combination of steals, blocks and foul rate, with only Nerlens Noel coming close.

Putting it all together, Dunn stops rim dominance with his length, quick first/second/third leaps and his ability to withstand force. He cuts off drives preventing access to the midrange, while also blocking off passing lanes that would create easy looks. On the perimeter he is able to stick with guards with timely sliding. His long lower legs propel him back and forth while also staying on balance after dramatic movements over a distance. He is nearly the perfect defensive wing, capable of stopping actions from any angle. The offense may be nearly nonexistent, but there are few better defensive prospects than Ryan Dunn.

The post How Prospects Outflex Their Opponent appeared first on Swish Theory.

When I evaluate a prospect’s offense, I ask myself these two questions first:

1. Will this prospect ever be a primary initiator/decision-maker?
2. If the answer to question one is no, how does he impact winning next to other primaries?

Aside from nabbing stars, locating players who contribute to winning, especially in the postseason, is what teams should seek in the draft. The vast majority of elite teams roster one (or two) players who command high usage, either as the offensive orchestrator or deadly scorer. The best players in the NBA are both.

From there, we can understand the value of drafting players with additive skills – shooting, passing and defending being the three most notable. Scouts traditionally discuss scalability, or the ability to move up and down the offensive hierarchy as needed, through the lens of three-and-D wings. 

Now more than ever, centers with expansive offensive skill sets are ubiquitous among great offenses. Going beyond the Joel Embiids and Nikola Jokics of the world, the decision-making ‘hub’ big sill feels like an undervalued archetype. The value of ones like Wendell Carter Jr, Chet Holmgren, Draymond Green and Jusuf Nurkic are clear.

Centers also must add value playing next to other ball-dominant stars, no matter the position. So how can bigs, especially non-shooting bigs, add value without the basketball? 

In the two years since I first discussed modern, scalable NBA bigs, the archetype is as crucial as ever. Big men orchestrate more and more NBA offense, burning defenses with dribble handoffs, short rolls, above-the-break threes and inside-out passing. We can evaluate and project frontcourt prospects through this lens. Centers aren’t exempt from joining the off-ball revolution. 

As I wrote before: 

“Conversations about scalability must extend beyond sharp, spacing wings. They must include these traditional-sized big men who may not be spot-up artists, but who maximize offensive harmony with flowing offense from the mid and high post.”

Maintaining a scoring threat is paramount to commanding defensive attention even for connective bigs, even more so than I realized when I wrote the first part in 2022. Many of the bigs in this archetype who do not become long-term NBA rotation staples (Trevion Williams, Jaylin Williams, etc) can’t punish defenses as a shooter or a play finisher.

Still, I see five main areas modern off-ball bigs should excel:

Advantage extender

I previously titled this category ‘short roll,’ though I think advantage extender better captures this skill. Can you punish a defense at a numbers disadvantage? Bigs who amplify their teammates’ pull-up shooting gravity and playmaking while thriving in the scramble drill match perfectly with stars. Rather than commanding possessions, they increase the odds of their advantage creation leading to points.

A key for this skill: can you command defensive attention as a scoring threat? If a playoff defense doesn’t respect a player’s scoring, they can neutralize their playmaking skill.

DHO Keep/Flow

Potent offenses seek to attain north-south movement, hoping to end as many possessions possible at the bucket, East-west flow opens up creases to run through, commandeered by bigs screening, handing off and creating with their handles. Can you compromise a fooled defense? Can coaches rely on you to initiate offense?

Close quarters finishing

Converting advantages created by stars is the easiest, most classic path to scaling down. In the case of centers, that often means finishing high-value shots at the cup and drawing fouls. Can you finish from a variety of angles with either hand? Do you have the catch radius to snare bad passes?

Force that closeout!

Shooting is a cherry on top for off-ball bigs, assuming they are true center-sized (shooting needed and height are inversely related). Bigs can compensate with their height and size, but threatening a defense from the outside and forcing them to pay attention is a plus.

Can you hit shots from different spots and different platforms? Can you force and attack a bad closeout? What about a good one?

Transition

Pushing the break after a block or rebound eliminates the need to pass to the PG, speeding up transition opportunities. Can you threaten the defense with speed as a transition attacker? Maybe more importantly, can you flow into actions and make decisions to set up teammates? 

With that out of the way, let’s discuss how the bigs of the 2024 draft class fare.

Alex Sarr: Advantage extender, DHO Keep/Flow, Force that closeout!*, Transition

From his single NBL season, Sarr grew as a functional dribbler and playmaker out of the short roll. He’s a far more confident decision-maker on the catch, punishing defenses at a numbers disadvantage with quick kicks and laydowns. Sarr doesn’t need to shoot the lights out to excel on offense, though his low volume especially is troubling.

Freakish coordination and movement skill turn Sarr’s ceiling into an endless staircase. At the moment, Sarr already burns defenders down the court after a defensive stop and wins in isolation against pro bigs. Sarr is building modern NBA offense habits, dribbling into dribble handoffs and screens as a reverse initiator.

Dribbling centers unlock offensive options and Sarr’s mobility plus the counters and creativity he already has are auspicious signs. He might not finish with strong efficiency due to his limited vertical pop, but his potential to initiate modern NBA-style actions only adds to his best-in-class upside. 

Donovan Clingan: Close-quarters finishing

Donovan Clingan’s main ways to pressure defense without the ball include screening and rolling. But without the ball, Clingan fades into the background on offense. He’s unfortunately not a great post scorer as his stiffness limits his angle carving ability. There’s no semblance of a jumper there either.

Thankfully for Clingan, his defense is phenomenal. That’s a topic for another day. We’ve seen plenty of defensive anchors succeed with limited offensive games like Gobert, Capela, Kessler etc. Clingan’s play finishing and height should always keep him somewhat afloat offensively.

Yves Missi: DHO Keep/Flow, Close-quarters finishing, Transition*

Though Yves Missi likely is closer to his 6’10 high school measurement, he plays well above his height with vertical pop and length. Catch radius is critical for lob targets and rim runners, which will be Missi’s main path to offensive value. 

Missi skies above the rim, catching passes well outside his frame for lobs and soft finishes. He’s efficient around the rim — Missi is one of 21 college basketball players this year with 50 or more dunks shooting over 70% at the rim and the only freshman to do it.

Processing speed will be a major swing skill for Missi, especially given his advanced ball-handling flashes, whipping out counters to beat bigs to the bucket and set into post position. If the feel progresses, the sky is the limit for Missi.

Daron Holmes: DHO Keep/Flow, Close-quarters finishing, Force that closeout!, Transition

The case of Daron Holmes’ draft stock is mysterious. According to the Rookie Scale consensus board, Holmes sits at 31 in the eyes of the mainstream with his spot on many prominent mocks even lower. I can’t figure out why for the life of me, especially given his snug fit in the modern game.

Offenses operate through big men more than ever, planting them as hubs for off-ball motion and simple advantage creation. And Holmes, a spacing big with a unique handle, should pique the interest of offensive coordinators. Unlike most lean perimeter-oriented bigs, Holmes possesses traditional big skills — screening, sealing, pick-and-roll defense, finishing — developing those before his metamorphosis.

Aside from spacing the floor and finishing at the rim, Holmes’ varied handle should allow him to function as a genuine hub. How many bigs in college run invert pick and roll as the ball-handler and move downhill to finish, shoot or pass?

Holmes isn’t the smoothest processor which could limit his ceiling as a playmaker. Regardless of any high-end feel limitations, the dribbling, strength and shooting could beget Naz Reid-esque offensive impact.

Kyle Filipowski: Advantage extender, DHO Keep/Flow, Close-quarters finishing, Force that closeout!*, Transition

In theory, Filipowski could easily hit all five tools of scalability. It will depend on the degree of his shooting and finishing — can Filipowski reliably force closeouts and finish through traffic? His volume and efficiency improved from deep this past season though the percentages across his career aren’t stellar. Filpowski is a good, not great finisher among centers (58.6% HC at the rim) and his limited vertical pop and stiffness could trouble him against NBA length.

If he draws defenses as a scoring threat, his passing and ball-handling are among the best in the class. He’s a passing virtuoso, firing assists from the post, on the short roll, in transition and as a primary ballhandler. Few players with Flip’s physicality and strength handle and pass how he can. His potential offensive versatility is massive.

Kel’el Ware: Close-quarters finishing, Force that closeout!

Shooting is the key to unlocking Ware’s scalability. Like a few other bigs on this list, he’s best with the ball in his hands, facing up and swiveling into shots from the post. He’s a springy vertical athlete, rendering him a seamless pairing with great passer (something he hasn’t had in college).

Ware’s three-point volume dipped, though he has a history of deep-range shooting going back to his days at Oregon and in high school. Threatening defenses as a spacer will be all the off-ball value he needs if Ware hits a high defensive outcome.

Zach Edey: Close-quarters finishing

I’m concerned about Zach Edey’s ability to scale down and impact winning without the ball in his hands. Edey’s touch is undeniable and paired with his gargantuan status, he should be a good finisher at the next level. But when passes don’t feed Edey post touches, how does he contribute in a meaningful way?

Historically, high-usage college players who aren’t great passers tend to fail. Take this Barttorvik query of college players with +30% usage and -15% assist rate:

It’s a mixed group, with one mega-star and a few busts. Aside from the Boogie outlier, the ones who stuck in the league shot the ball and spaced the floor (McDermott, Warren). How will Zach Edey share the floor with ball-dominant players? If he improves his processing speed, Edey could connect teammates and extend plays rather than finish them. If not, he feels like a microwave scorer sixth man at his ceiling.

Oso Ighodaro: Advantage extender, DHO Keep/Flow

Does unathletic Brandon Clarke pique your interest? That’s the question we’re pondering about Oso Ighodaro, In theory, his connective skills are abundant — Oso’s floater game is advanced (54.5% on runners) and he’s a capable passer to cutters from a handoff. There’s a recipe for a useful release valve, especially with a pull-up shooting threat.

Ighodaro struggles to elevate through contact and his finishing in the restricted area. He doesn’t space the floor. If Ighodaro can’t threaten defenses as a scorer, he likely won’t stick. But if the floater hints at shooting development, Ighodaro could find a role as a valuable rotation player, lubricating his team’s offensive flow.

Jonathan Mogbo: DHO Keep/Flow, Close-quarters finishing, Transition

Jonathan Mogbo is a dunk machine. Only two players in the country dunked more than Mogbo, whose NBA intrigue comes largely from his bounce and explosion. With a capable handle, Mogbo flashed pro vision and some high-post chops. Gen-Z Kenneth Faried juices up offenses with great passers.

Watching Mogbo in person further illuminated his stature. Despite being fairly short at 6’7, Mogbo is a brick wall with springs in his shoes. Mogbo snags balls out of the air like a wide receiver. He operated primarily from the post, so working to extend advantages will help him find a home in an NBA rotation. There’s some wacko creator upside if Mogbo truly harnesses his handle to maximize his athletic gifts, expanding his possible utility to on and off the ball.

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