And it got the wheels spinning. We all remember the Warriors’ two-timeline plan: one championship core supplemented with a cast of young players being asked to fill in as role players, with the eventual goal of that young talent forming a new future for the team once the core retires or moves on. It was brimming with hubris but somehow worked with the 2022 championship.

The Utah Jazz are running two timelines of tanking, and I’m not fond of it on principle. I want to explain how Utah got here, their process, why I fundamentally disagree, and what should be done differently.

The Prelude

Let’s go back to 2017 to properly tell the story. The Jazz hit things big in their buildup of a contending squad. Rudy Gobert was ready to anchor an elite defense, coming off a DPOY runner-up season. Gordon Hayward was coming off his first All-Star appearance and provided strong offense from the wing. They were filling in gaps well with quality starters like George Hill, Derrick Favors, Alec Burks, and Joe Ingles. It was a squad that managed to win 51 games before running into the juggernaut Warriors in the conference semifinals, ending in a prompt sweep.

They encountered the problem many a small market team has encountered. You draft well, you hit moves on the margins, and you retain who you need to. Then you find yourself up against a team with a true superstar and it all falls apart. Gordon Hayward is not the kind of #1 option that can get you over the hump against championship-level teams.

Then Utah hit it big.

In the 2017 draft, they acquired the 13th overall pick for Trey Lyles and the 24th pick, using that selection on Donovan Mitchell. With Gordon Hayward leaving for his ill-fated Boston sojourn, Utah desperately needed an infusion of star talent. Mitchell immediately became the #1 option and the team hardly lost a step.

Despite the crushing blow of losing Hayward, Utah managed their most sustained run of success since the Stockton/Malone days. With Mitchell at the helm of the offense and Gobert anchoring the defense, Utah averaged 48.6 wins over their five seasons with Mitchell, including the Covid-shortened season. They managed a #1 seed in the west for the first time in over 20 years. Yet they could never get over the hump, crashing out 3 times in the first round and twice in the conference semifinals. New faces, familiar story.

One fated hire seemed to indicate where this was headed. Before the 2021/22 season, general manager Dennis Lindsey stepped down amid allegations of inappropriate racial comments. Assistant GM Justin Zanik was promoted, but not before they added Danny Ainge of trade crime fame to run the show.

The Breakup

Utah won 49 games in that final season of the Mitchell and Gobert tandem, but rumors flew about their discontent with the organization and alleged inability to get along together. A first round loss to the upstart Luka Doncic-led Mavericks spelled doom. Utah traded Mitchell away to Cleveland, seemingly against his wishes to make his way to New York, and Gobert was sent to the Minnesota Timberwolves.

As far as blowing up cores go, Utah made off like bandits as Ainge maximized their position. The two brought back a haul of draft capital including seven first-round picks, three pick swaps, rookie Walker Kessler, plus recent draftees Ochai Agbaji and Leandro Bolmaro. Just as importantly, Utah also acquired Collin Sexton and Lauri Markkanen from Cleveland, two former lottery picks in desperate need of a new situation. From the Timberwolves, Utah netted Malik Beasley, Jarred Vanderbilt, and Patrick Beverley.

The rebuild was on, the assets were acquired, and the strategic teardown was in motion. But with all of the players acquired, Utah didn’t quite have the look of a team ripping things down to the studs. 35-year-old Mike Conley was in the fold. Collin Sexton had flaws but could still run an offense. And Lauri Markkanen, arguably the crux of this entire article, broke out in a major way. With new coach Will Hardy looking like a budding star behind the bench, Utah managed to win 37 games and flirted with a play-in appearance.

This is where the issues with the process begin to show.

Limbo State

It’s not the worst thing in the world to be somewhat competent in a rebuild. What is frustrating about Utah’s process was the timing.

That 2022-23 team could have ripped the roster to shreds, been as bad as possible, and gotten a legitimate shot at the Wembanyama sweepstakes. Instead, they retained Conley, Sexton, Malik Beasley, and other positive contributors who kept the team from a true tank. That took them from Wemby/Scoot/Brandon Miller territory into drafting Taylor Hendricks with their No. 9 choice. I have nothing against Hendricks, but nobody will argue that his potential isn’t coming close to that top three.

Their three total choices in that draft are fine in a vacuum. Hendricks was always a project, Brice Sensabaugh has interesting potential, and Keyonte George looks like one of the steals of the class. But now a logjam is beginning to form, and the two timelines of bad are appearing.

To their credit, Utah un-jammed some of the logs this past offseason by dealing away Conley, Beasley, and Vanderbilt in a three-team deal that netted a 2027 Lakers first-round choice. Yet some of the holdovers remained. Lauri Markkanen and his budding star potential occupied a forward spot, Collin Sexton still demands minutes, and Jordan Clarkson has somehow stayed through the entire teardown, the last remnant of the Mitchell/Gobert teams.

In the spirit of beating the analogy to death, Utah inexplicably added giant log John Collins to the jam, albeit for next to nothing. Collins has flaws but is a quality piece in his own right. That’s not a move that tanking teams with a massive cache of draft capital make, even if they believe Collins can be flipped at a later date.

Going into the 2023/24 season, Utah had two distinct groups of players. There’s the group of players that belong on playoff-caliber teams in Markkanen, Sexton, Clarkson, Collins, and Kelly Olynyk. Behind them is the true rebuild group: George, Hendricks, Sensabaugh, Kessler, Agbaji, and an assortment of other lottery tickets. The quality of that first group led to another season of “not quite bad enough or good enough”, winning 31 games and being equally as far away from a top draft choice as the play-in tournament.

This sets them on a tough path.

The Crossroads

Being outside looking in at the top of this 2024 draft isn’t the worst thing ever. There was nobody worth truly bottoming out a roster for. That all changes with the upcoming 2025 and 2026 drafts, where premiere talents like Cooper Flagg, Ace Bailey, Cam Boozer, and AJ Dybantsa will be ripe for leading a rebuild.

Therein lies the problem. Utah has rebuffed multiple offers for the 27-year-old extension-eligible Markkanen, including a rumored offer from the Oklahoma City Thunder that would have netted 3 more first-round picks. There has been little reported movement on dealing Sexton or John Collins. Clarkson seems likely to go, but that still leaves some quality players at the top of the depth chart, players good enough to once again push Utah into limbo. The first part of the tanking timeline is being pearl-clutched by Ainge.

Then comes the second part of the issue. Utah added Cody Williams at 10th overall, Isaiah Collier at 29th, and Kyle Filipowski at 32nd overall, leaving them with 7 total players on their rookie-scale contracts. The logjam only becomes jammier next year, with potentially 3 more first-round picks incoming next season. That second timeline is full of talent but is starting to become muddy as more and more players are added and minutes become scarce.

How Can This Be Fixed?

There is a clear path here in my opinion. Whether or not Utah’s brain trust realizes this is the problem.

First, addressing the primary timeline. Markkanen, Sexton, and Clarkson should have been traded yesterday. If all three of them are on the roster come opening night, Utah has made a mistake. Even if they’re moved at the deadline, that might hamper their chances of securing a top choice in 2025. Ideally, they should be moved for more future picks or rookie-scale developmental prospects without taking on the salary of older players who would demand minutes and be a part of the rotation.

That opens things up for the second tanking timeline. Utah’s pick is top 10 protected this year and top 8 protected in 2026, and risking that pick by being a 30-35 win team would be a massive mistake. It also clears the way for a total free-for-all of young players competing for roles and playing time in the upcoming season. A final teardown has the dual purpose of improving Flagg-to-Utah chances and improving the developmental chances of their existing prospects.

Ripping things down to the studs sets Utah up well for pole position to wrangle a franchise-altering prospect in the next two drafts. It also means the 3 players they may add through next year’s class will have a better path to real playing time. They need that genuine shot at a star instead of continuing to sit at the end of the lottery. Lightning rarely strikes twice in quick succession, and Donovan Mitchell was their lightning strike. It’s time for them to get serious about the chances of getting another superstar.

The alternatives make little sense. Extend Lauri, who is unlikely to remain in his prime before Utah can contend? Hold on to Clarkson and Sexton to take minutes from George and Collier? Keep nibbling at the draft and collecting more prospects with longer developmental curves? What happens when the 2027 draft rolls around, when Utah has a whopping four first-round picks?

Utah needs to take a hard look at themselves and around the league. The Spurs rebuild changed entirely with Wembanyama. They’re armed with a budding superstar, a relatively clean cap sheet, and a haul of draft picks they can use to accelerate the rebuild by consolidating around their young stars. If the Jazz can snag Flagg, Boozer, or any of the other blue-chippers, things begin to come into focus. Those future picks can be used to accelerate things around that new star. Roles and outlooks of the current prospect crop they possess begin to solidify. They could find themselves with a core of players and picks that would make other rebuilding franchises jealous.

Or they could stay on this path, stick in limbo, and make this rebuild even more difficult. Your call, Mr. Ainge.

The post Utah’s Two Timelines of Bad appeared first on Swish Theory.

Player B.

If asked to pick between the two players without added context I’m sure many (myself included) would choose Player A. The gap in three-point shooting efficiency combined with the wide disparity in dunks paint Player B as a much more athletic, play-finishing wing. Considering the similarity in age, this may indicate more potential in Player A than Player B, despite Player B’s self-creation proxies (percentage of unassisted shots) being more impressive. For the reveal…Player A is Ben McLemore (the 7th pick in the 2013 draft), and Player B is Tyler Herro (the 13th pick in the 2019 draft).

Both 2013 and 2019 were considered relatively weaker draft classes at the time, and both Herro and McLemore had high draft capital invested in them mainly due to their shooting ability. So if shooting production is so easily forecasted why did these two players yield such wildly different results, and why are past drafts littered with highly touted shooters who either flamed out early into their NBA careers, or simply didn’t return anywhere near the value expected from their draft placement? What separates the Ben McLemores, Jimmer Fredettes, and Nik Stauskases of the world from the luminary shooters who came to define this era of basketball? Is there something that inherently makes shooting more inconsistently translatable than we’ve acknowledged or are aware of?

In an attempt to answer these questions I want to examine the shooting profiles of three 2024 draft prospects whose primary sell has been their shooting. The three players I’ve decided to dive into for this exercise are Ja’Kobe Walter, Melvin Ajinca, and Rob Dillingham.

Mechanic Specifically

In the past I have relied on my traditional understand of shooting mechanics to judge and grade shooting ability in different players. As the years pass and I see more and more players develop into anywhere from passable to potent shooters with unconventional shot mechanics, I realized while there is value in having some core shooting principles in your evaluations, flexibility is necessary. Confining the definition of a ‘good’ shot to an antiquated understanding of follow-throughs, foot placements and guide hand positioning will more than likely exclude high-level shooters from your rigid rubric. This realization drove me to developing a much more fluid grading system when it comes to differentiating shooters, based on these three tenets:

• Speed
• Versatility
• Volume

Shot Speed

Shooting speed is an essential component, and while it isn’t tracked in any widely available database, I am of the belief that shot speed is a great indicator of muscle memory which is closely tied to how immediately a player’s shot may translate and how far I feel comfortable projecting the potency of a player’s shot. This idea was brought about during the process of researching this piece. I had gone back to look into past prospects’ tape and see if there was a through-line in their shots which could have indicated they’d become the level of shooter they eventually developed into in the NBA. Take the clip below, for example:

The complete absence of load time physically or indecision in the process of shooting provides insight into the hardwiring of the shooter. For those who don’t recognize the shot mechanics due to the video quality (best I could find of 2012 WAC tape) the shooter here is Damian Lillard! While Dame’s shooting proficiency is an unrealistic bar to measure shooters by, there is value in recognizing how his ability to get into his shot, no matter how tight the window, was relevant to his development into a nuclear shooter.

Volume & Versatility

While all three of these core shooting principles are interrelated, it is necessary to discuss shooting volume and versatility in the same breath because one precipitates the other. It is impossible to attain sustainable shooting volume without an expansive shooting repertoire. Researching this piece I noticed a common theme amongst a lot of shooting prospect ‘misses’: an overreliance on shots from a specific play-type, whether it be shots off the dribble or catch-and-shoot attempts.

A player I had considered including in this piece was Zeke Mayo, a junior guard playing for South Dakota State. Initially enticed by his high shooting volume (11.5 3’s attempted per 100 possessions) on a diet of largely self created 3-point attempts (only 28% assisted threes), I dug into Mayo’s tape expecting to find a high-level shot creator forced into a lot of suboptimal attempts due to the lack of creation ability surrounding him. And while this was in large part the case, I also noticed an interesting trend. While Mayo was forced to take a significant amount of threes off the dribble because he was the only SDSU player capable of consistently creating their own shot, when he was provided opportunities to shoot open spot-ups they all too often looked like the plays below.

These plays, which individually may seem benign, standard cases of a player turning down a shot in search of a better look for himself or his teammates, is actually symptom of a larger issue in Mayo’s process as a shooter. After delving deeper into Mayo’s tape I eventually came to the conclusion that his low assist rate on threes was actually a function, not a bug, of his value system as a shooter. Mayo was undeniably more comfortable taking threes off the dribble, and almost always required a rhythm dribble to take an attempt. Any hard closeout which disrupted Mayo’s routine would cause him to pass up the shot attempt. This tendency not only represents a limitation in shot versatility, but also suppressed his volume. While this wart in Mayo’s shooting habits would be much easier to look over for most draft candidates, for a prospect whose shooting ability is central to their value, any minor flaw can be accounted for and exploited at the NBA level, hindering their viability as a spacer.

The best analogy I could use to describe the effect a player has when they possess all these qualities as a shooter is the Patellar-Reflex Test, or the Knee-Jerk Reflex Test as a layman like myself had known it as. This terminology probably sounds foreign but bear with me, we’ve all probably undergone this reflex test at some point over the course of a routine doctors visit. The doctor takes a rubber mallet to your kneecap, and as long as you deliver the expected reaction by kicking out your leg the physician carries on with the rest of the check-up. For anyone not following, the test is clipped below.

While any swing of the mallet will cause the knee to move, the more force applied the greater the reaction will be. In this analogy think of the shooter as being the doctor with the rubber mallet and the defense being the patient’s knee. The greater the volume, versatility, and speed of the shooter, the more pressure they will be able to apply to the defense and the more pronounced of a reaction they will be able to elicit from the defense.

For a demonstration of this idea playing out in a game lets compare two shooting specialists, Caleb Houstan and Buddy Hield. Both rank in the 78th and 74th percentile in three point shooting Points Per Possession (PPP), per Synergy. However, a closer look at the tape will show a drastic difference in the kind of reaction they elicit from the defenses they face. The two clips below for example, both plays feature Houstan and Hield running ghost screens intended to create seams for their ballhandlers to drive to the basket and create.

However, notice only Hield is able to get the on-ball defender, in this case Bam Adebayo, to open his stance and provide Tyrese Haliburton with a driving lane. Haliburton not only has a lane to drive to his strong hand, but enough space to take a pull-up 3.

Even the best shooting specialists in the league have seen their value fluctuate almost season by season depending on swings in efficiency. Duncan Robinson parlayed one hot shooting season into a substantial contract, was unable to maintain his efficiency as a shooter, and was almost immediately deemed ‘one of the worst contracts in the league’. Only after expanding his game off the dribble was he able to regain status as a valuable offensive weapon. Davis Bertans boasted one of the most stellar shooting resumes in the NBA before a prolonged shooting slump rendered his contract a massive albatross. These examples are crucial show why having a clear understanding of a player’s shooting is essential. By examining the three players central to this piece I hope to shed some light on A.) whether their shot possesses the factors necessary to remain effective as they transition to the NBA, and B.) what qualities in the rest of their offensive game separate them as shooters.

Ja’Kobe Walter vs Melvin Ajinca

At first glance Ja’Kobe Walter and Melvin Ajinca do not seem to have many similarities outside of being two 19-year-old prospects who will most likely be entering the 2024 draft. Walter is a sinewy 6’5 guard/wing, former 5-star recruit, who is currently playing for Baylor. Melvin Ajinca is a 6’7 lefty wing playing in the LNB ProA league (the highest division in France) for Saint-Quentin. Both players are touted for their shooting ability first and foremost and will be expected to serve as high-level floor-spacers for their respective NBA teams upon being drafted. However, their divergent routes to prospect-dom help shed light on how able they will be to able to meet this expectation.

Melvin Ajinca

Melvin Ajinca first came onto draft radars after an extremely impressive showing in the FIBA U19 World Cup this past summer, where he lead the French team to the championship game while shooting a blistering 71.6 (!!) true shooting percentage. While the majority of Ajinca’s scoring was of the play-finishing variety, consisting of hitting spot-up threes and getting out in transition, there were some flashes of high level self-creation. Take the play below, for example: France clears out the left side of the floor for what appears to be an empty-corner pick and roll for Ajinca. He quickly rejects the screen and counters the defender closing off the baseline by fluidly transitioning into a stepback three.

Displays of shooting off the bounce such as this, combined with Ajinca’s indifference towards contests and his willingness pulling from range well beyond that of his peers…

…quickly vaulted him into early draft conversations and captured my attention as a potentially outlier shooting prospect.

From here I attempted to gain a deeper perspective of Ajinca’s career prior to and since the U19 tournament, watching games from his time with Saint-Quentin in the French LNB Pro B league to now where they’ve earned promotion to the Pro A ranks. Ajinca, as with many young European prospects, has been confined to filling the specific role of an off-ball spacer, and actually his seven-game stint with the U19 team had been the most freedom he’d been afforded on-ball up to that point of his career. In 41 games logged in Synergy, Ajinca had been used in Isolation or as a P&R ballhandler 39 times; over the course of seven games in the U19 World Cup he’d seen 14 possessions in the same play-types.

Ajinca’s previous usage aligns with how we conventionally think of shooters being deployed. Ajinca saw the majority of his shots in the halfcourt come from deliberate set plays, such as the possession below where Saint-Quentin runs Horns Flare Spain, where Ajinca cuts from the right corner to serve as the second screener in the Spain action. Evident in this action is Ajinca’s lightning quick release, allowing him to catch and shoot in one motion.

If Ajinca wasn’t being used in Spain he was being run off double staggers…

Or a simple pindown with some window dressing, such as this Rip (backscreen) Screen-the-Screener action.

I would say these three actions are generally representative of how Ajinca has been utilized for Saint-Quentin, and, while I was initially captivated by how efficient Ajinca was in getting into his shot due to his quick mechanics and efficient energy transfer, as I watched more tape a trend started to become apparent. If you noticed a similarity in all of these clips, the plays are meticulously diagrammed, with Ajinca placed as a feature, not the focus of the action. While the speed component of Ajinca’s shot is certainly NBA caliber, to consistently place pressure on defenses these kind of plays are not best suited to answering the questions of volume and versatility essential to any high level NBA shooter.

Realizing this can sound kind of counterintuitive, if a player shoots with good efficiency and can get their shot off under duress, why would their be any uncertainty as to whether or not they can maintain their volume as they transition to the NBA? Wouldn’t it be in their team’s best interest to implement a steady diet of shooting opportunities into their offense for said player? The answer to this is complicated. In the NBA offenses typically subscribe to the philosophy of “path of least resistance”, meaning the bedrock of most team’s offenses comes down to “what is the most direct path which will yield the most consistent results.”

With shooting specialists, if they are schemed a shot it is with the understanding that the advantage typically begins and ends with the player receiving an open shot. And while this will work on occasion, frequently depending how well the play is diagrammed, there is a ceiling to how consistently these playtypes will bear fruit for an offense. The best phrasing I could think of to describe this difference is active versus passive spacing.

Compare these two clips below, for instance, of Desmond Bane and Simone Fontecchio stationed in the corner.

In the first clip, Kris Dunn drives from the middle of the floor, beats his man, and Fontecchio’s defender Fred VanVleet ‘helps the helper’ by rotating over from his initial assignment to prevent the dump-off passing angle to John Collins, all the while leaving Fontecchio open for the corner three. In the second clip, the Grizzlies run a spread pick-and-roll with Bane spaced in the corner. At first glance it seems Fontecchio’s three was the result of a defensive error by VanVleet. Whereas in the second clip Hardaway Jr doesn’t even briefly entertain the idea of leaving Bane to tag the roller in the second clip.

While it seems obvious the ideal execution in these similar positions is to remain closely attached to the shooter as Tim Hardaway Jr. does to Bane, VanVleet was doing what was asked of his defensive scheme as well. The main difference in these two clips isn’t so much the result of the play as the variety of shooter being covered in the play. While Simone Fontecchio is a respectable shooter (shooting 40% from three on the season on 305 attempts to date), what makes him a passive versus an active spacer is the understanding defenders have of how limited their responsibilities are when guarding Fontecchio.

As previously mentioned, usually when shooting specialists are schemed open, the advantage is confined to the three which was drawn up. As seen below, Simone Fontecchio is no exception to this. When the defense runs him off the line, the advantage is effectively ended.

Defenders knowing that a hard closeout, which gets Fontecchio to relocate, or even run off the three-point line, is effective in neutralizing his shooting threat, greatly reduces the strain Fontecchio can place on a defense. This simplified thought process for defenders manifests on the court in plays like the clip below. Michael Porter Jr. is Fontecchio’s initial defender, however he has no qualms helping off Fontecchio to stunt (provide help on a post-up) towards John Collins.

This play embodies the active versus passive spacing dichotomy, as while Fontecchio demands the respect of the closeout, the shooting threat isn’t so great that Fontecchio can carve out space for others outside of a very specific usage. Constant application of these kind of plays isn’t feasible for the simple fact that they introduce perhaps the hallmark of a bad NBA offense, predictability. And while implementing movement shooting elements into an offense is crucial, it is typically used as a feature, not the foundation of an offense.

Take the play below: the Cavaliers run a Ram Veer Exit play, where Georges Niang receives an off-ball screen from Max Strus en-route to setting an on-ball screen for Craig Porter Jr. (this is the Ram part of the action). After setting the screen for Porter Jr., Niang sets a pindown for Sam Merrill (Veer action), while Strus simultaneously receives an exit screen from Isaac Okoro. This play is beautifully designed, and all of these moving parts create a seam for Craig Porter Jr. to drive and score an easy layup. By expertly blending the shooting capabilities of these three players who individually demand respect, Cleveland is able to breakdown the defense without any conventional advantage creators on the floor.

However, if you were to remove all the scaffolding which comes with a well diagrammed play being combined with multiple potent shooters, what would it look like?

Take the play below, for example, a baseline out of bounds play in what is a much less shooting slanted lineup. Cleveland runs Ram Ghost, where Sam Merrill inbounds the ball receives a pindown from Niang and ghosts the on-ball screen. It is apparent from the play that this action doesn’t place nearly the same strain on the defense, with Boston switching 1-4 and not even momentarily hesitant on abandoning their scheme to pursue Merrill. Even with a heavier-footed big like Al Horford switching onto a perimeter player, the lacking off-the-bounce threat of Merrill makes this a simple rotation to execute.

I felt it necessary to reference these players not to undermine their abilities or paint them as devoid of value, but to provide a frame of reference for my concerns with Melvin Ajinca. As I went through his tape a persistent theme, similar to these shooting specialists cited above, was the absence of production when Ajinca was adequately covered out to the three-point line. There were numerous instances of Ajinca hamstringing the offense when he was forced to counter after meeting resistance on the initial action, such as this Spain PNR below…

Or when Ajinca was incapable of capitalizing on an opportunity to attack a short closeout when run off the line.

These clips may be seen as isolated instances, and Ajinca optimists may even interpret these plays as a natural byproduct of a younger player who has received limited on-ball reps. However, I remain skeptical of Ajinca’s potential to drastically improve this skill, as Saint-Quentin has actually attempted to integrate Ajinca more as a ballhandler into their offense. While he has almost exclusively seen these opportunities come in simple, two-man actions such as this empty corner pick-and-roll below, the results have left much to be desired with Ajinca scoring only .784 PPP as a PNR ballhandler this season.

As stated earlier, Ajinca still possesses the qualities of a viable off-ball spacer, but I see these limitations preventing him from ever seeing a usage higher than the current 16% usage he’s sporting for Saint Quentin. For Ajinca, as with most shooting specialists at the highest levels, their inability to adapt when forced to play out of structure curbs their volume, and as a result their impact on a possession to possession basis.

Ja’Kobe Walter

As stated earlier, both Ja’Kobe Walter and Melvin Ajinca’s primary appeal as prospects are their utility as shooters. However, both players have seen drastically different usages and the dichotomy between their respective shooting profiles would show as much. Below is a table of both Ajinca and Walter’s shooting splits over the past two seasons (2022-23 and the current season).

At first these splits seem to represent two players with somewhat similar shooting pedigrees, and in fact this table may stir some confusion as to why there’s such a great deal of separation between the two prospects in general draft media perception, judging by draft boards. Walter has shot a greater volume of 3s compared to Ajinca, however Ajinca’s been more efficient from a more standardized distance (all of Ajinca’s 3s are from the FIBA line of 22.15 feet, whereas a substantial portion of Walter’s long distance attempts are from the high school line of 19.75 feet). Initially I came into this process expecting to see similar calibre of shooters, with the gap in shooting ability between the two players to be equally represented on film; however in reality the effect these players had on defenses held stark contrasts.

To fully grasp the difference between Walter and Ajinca’s shooting ability, a holistic approach is necessary. While Ajinca has more or less seen identical usage in every team context he has been placed in, Walter’s role has varied greatly over the course of his young career. The different levels of usage are apparent in the difference between the number of non-threes Walter has taken compared to Ajinca. The scope of this article so far has mainly focused on these players ability to space the floor from three, but Walter’s shot diversity amplifies his effectiveness as a spacer.

Previously Melvin Ajinca’s processing and ability to adapt off the catch had been greatly scrutinized, and mentioned as a potential limiting factor to his utility to an offense. Ja’Kobe Walter, on the other hand, has a well-refined game off the catch and has melded other aspects of his scoring repertoire to fully exploit his shooting. The disparity between how reliable the two are at parlaying the shooting threat they present is evident in their respective free throw rates, as Walter has posted a robust 0.46 ratio of free throw to field goal attempts compared to a paltry 0.20 for Ajinca. The clips below are a prime examples of how Walter is able to convert these hard closeouts into quality offense.

In the first clip, Baylor runs a simple spread pick-and-roll, with Walter positioned in the weakside corner. Cincinnati’s big is in a high-drop coverage, and because of the angle he takes Walter’s defender (the low-man) has to over-help to prevent the wraparound pass. Once Walter receives the kickout in the corner, he fully capitalizes on the long closeout his man has to make by immediately getting downhill and drawing the foul

What is not visible in this clip, however, is Walter’s excellent footwork attacking these closeouts. Walter consistently is able to deploy ‘negative step’ footwork, where he uses his rear-foot to springboard his drives and mitigate some of his lackluster burst. The play below exemplifies this: the Baylor point-guard RayJ Dennis is able to break his man down off the dribble, triggering Walter’s man to help on the drive. As Walter receives the pass in the corner, his defender simultaneously recovers and is shading Walter towards the baseline. However, the defender’s top-foot is too high on the closeout, enabling Walter to attack and open up a driving lane to then draw the foul and finish for an and-one opportunity.

Why I initially thought it necessary to delve into the different developmental contexts between Walter and Ajinca, beyond their ability to attack closeouts, is how capable they are of adapting to the defense once run off the line. Walter isn’t just fixed to foul drawing when attacking closeouts. His previous time spent as a primary offensive option afford him a bevy of alternatives to place pressure on the defense.

Below is an example of exactly this, Baylor once again is running a spread PNR with RayJ Dennis as the ballhandler and Walter stationed in the corner. As Dennis’ defender loses contain, Walter’s man rotates over to help on the drive, creating a gap for Walter to attack when the ball is swung to him. Unlike the last closeout attack vs Cincinnati where Walter was provided a direct driving path towards the basket, this time Dennis’ defender rotates over from the topside. Despite the added variable Walter is able to quickly pro-hop to navigate the dig, and get to a balanced floater off two feet.

Take notice that as the screen is set Walter and his teammate on the wing, Jalen Bridges, exchange. While this may seem insignificant this is a microcosm of shooters having different levels of gravity. While on the surface Bridges may seem to be the better shooter than Walter, as he boasts a 40.6% 3-point shot compared to Walter’s 34.5%. But Walter is a much more reliable release valve for an offense because of plays just like this.

Synthesizing the information gathered from the tape and available databases like Synergy shows Walter to have a more impressive shot versatility than Ajinca. The table below displays three-point shooting efficiency over the past 2 seasons off handoffs and screens, showing how Walter has actually been more efficient in the most common playtypes for their presumed archetype.

Granted this a small sample, but this lends support to the theory of Ajinca’s shooting efficiency being drastically boosted by shots which don’t generate “gravity” as it is commonly understood.

Walter is not without his faults as a shooter, however, as while he surpasses Ajinca in versatility there is a limiting factor in his shot speed. If you notice in the clips above Walter is able to get downhill because he is operating off substantial advantages created by others and he has the respect to draw hard closeouts. Neither of these are factors can be relied on at the next level, where closeouts lie on more of a spectrum.

To demonstrate the relationship between shot speed and long versus short closeouts, I have pulled a few clips shown below. In the first clip, Moses Moody attacks a mismatch after Golden State gets an offensive rebound, and kicks the ball out to Brandin Podziemski after drawing Pascal Siakam as the help defender. Take notice of the depth of Siakam’s closeout; instead of closing out with reckless abandon or crowding Podziemski to prevent him getting a shot off, he stops a few feet short.

This short closeout is informed by Podziemski’s reputation as a shooter, where despite shooting 38% from 3 on the season and a blistering 44.7% as a collegian this past season, his discomfort shooting over contests and in tighter windows dissuades him from attempts with a high degree of difficulty. And when Podziemski does attempt shots over length, his lower release point makes contesting shots an easier task for defenders, as demonstrated in the clip below.

Podziemski runs off an Iverson cut to receive the entry pass and from here the Warriors attempt to flow into an empty corner PNR. However, the Raptor’s matchup zone clogs up any driving/passing lanes for this action, forcing Dario Saric to flash to the middle of the floor and find Podziemski sinking into a pocket of space left vacant by the zone. Notice again, despite the space a recovering Gary Trent Jr. is forced to cover, he stops a few feet short and is able to well contest the shot. Understandably this may seem like a harsh judgement of an ostensibly quality NBA shooter, however capitalizing on these margins is what separates shooters at the next level.

Contrast the treatment Podziemski receives as a spacer versus a player like Tim Hardaway Jr., for example. Hardaway’s high and quick release, paired with the bordering irrational confidence he has in his shot. When the shooting windows shrink, Walter will need to prove he can consistently get his shot off. Examining his previous tape shows how this will need to be an area of improvement for Walter.

Take the clip below. After Baylor runs some disjointed early offense they flow into a Spread PNR. Walter’s defender, Jameer Nelson Jr., is forced to tag the roller early due to TCU’s big hedging the ballscreen and RayJ Dennis swings the ball to Walter on the wing. Nelson Jr. closes-out on Walter with balanced footwork, and most importantly short. The short closeout allows Walter space to get up an attempt from 3 which Nelson Jr., listed at 6’2, is able to emphatically block.

This play does a great job of capturing the gradient which closeouts lie on. Walter is a dangerous enough shooter to demand some sort of closeout and is proficient driving against hard closeouts, meaning an option teams will exercise is the short closeout where Walter is forced to shoot over a moderate contest. While this block can be seen as an aberration, a single play not indicative of more than a bad decision from Walter, I’m of the belief this represents a wider trend and a weakness which Walter could struggle improving upon at the next level.

First of all, it is not just spot-up attempts Walter struggles getting up quickly, he also frequently had issues getting up shots off-the-dribble up against smaller defenders. Take the clip below, for example. Baylor runs a Get-77 action which is blown-up, and in response Walter lifts up from the corner and runs an empty corner PNR with Jordan Pope as his primary defender. Pope, listed at 6’2, blocks the shot AFTER going under the screen.

I’ve avoided discussing shot mechanics up until now because I don’t think there’s a platonic ideal to what a shot should look like, and often judgements in shot mechanics are more informed by aesthetics than functionality. In Walter’s case however, his struggles transitioning into his shot quickly run downstream from his mechanics. The clip below demonstrates two ways Walter compensates for this mechanical inefficiency.

Walter has a lower release point, to compensate for his struggles generating power from his lower body. This is evident from the valgus collapse in his knees shown more clearly below.

Another idiosyncrasy of Walter’s shot, potentially limiting his shot speed, is an inelastic set-point, also apparent in this clip. Notice how Walter gathers for this shot well outside his frame in order to position his shot so that it is set with his elbow pronated. This elbow pronation is more clearly displayed in the picture below.

Typically a shooter’s elbow is much tighter to his body, and more closely aligned with the shooter’s feet. The elbow pronation makes the set-point rigid, causing the shooter to take another split second to transition from their set-point to release. Both of these deficiencies are a result of Walter lacking general strength, which can be alleviated with time spent in an NBA strength program. However, when he doesn’t have the hair-trigger release speed to be consistently effective off horizontal shooting actions like ghost screens and flares, Walter’s defender can go under the flare screen and still credibly contest the shot, as in the clip below.

For a shooting prospect who cannot draw the hard closeouts necessary to create unambiguous driving opportunities, and who doesn’t necessary have the handle to capitalize on less pronounced advantages, the application of their shooting prowess can be significantly narrower than previously anticipated.

I found the parallels in these two plays and between these two players striking. Both Kevin Huerter and Walter are run off double staggers and neither is able to gain a significant amount of separation from the trailing defender. And when the decision is forced upon them by the defense, neither has the self organization skills to quickly transition into a shot off the dribble or drive to maintain the advantage, so in both cases the play results in a turnover.

This is not to say Walter is a one-to-one comp to Huerter, more so to illustrate the struggles a shooting specialist in his mold may encounter when his jumpshot is lacking in certain qualities. What we want to avoid is a shooting prospect whose draft slot warrants heavy investment of developmental resources, but who ultimately possesses a fungible skillset which I believe is the case with Walter.

Rob Dillingham

Up to this point the focus has been on parsing shooting aptitude based on which conditions prospects FAILED to meet, however, I wanted to delve into 6’2 Kentucky guard Rob Dillingham’s game as an example of what constitutes a high level shooting prospect on tape and by the numbers.

In order to understand what makes Dillingham’s potential as a shooter so appealing, it is necessary to look at his shooting profile over the past two seasons just as we had with Melvin Ajinca and Ja’Kobe Walter.

What immediately stands out about Dillingham’s shot profile is the difference in volume of off-the-dribble 3’s as well as catch-and-shoot 3’s compared to Walter and Ajinca. Dillingham over the exact same time frame and comparable total number of games played (Dillingham played 71 games over this stretch, compared to 75 and 80 for Ajinca and Walter respectively), managed to shoot more 3’s off the bounce than Walter and Ajinca COMBINED while shooting significantly less Catch-and-Shoot 3’s than both players (193 C&S 3’s versus 315 and 353). Some of the discrepancy in shot distribution can definitely be explained by their positional distinctions, but seeing how quickly Dillingham adapted to more of an off-ball role, when his responsibilities more closely aligned with Ajinca and Walter’s, was a revelation. When deployed as an off-ball player and asked to run off screens, Dillingham created space by utilizing the burst and understanding of tempo which made him such a potent scorer off the bounce.

Take the play below for example. Kentucky runs Floppy initially, with Dillingham being defended well on the catch. After Dillingham swings the ball back to Reed Sheppard at the top of the key, he runs towards Aaron Bradshaw on the left block, setting what seems to be the first screen of a baseline double stagger set. However, with Dillingham’s defender going over the top of Bradshaw’s screen, Dillingham recognizes this, reroutes and turns this into a ‘Ricky’ action, where the screener rescreens for the cutter but going in the opposite direction of the initial screen.

While Dillingham was used sparingly as a movement shooter (only 12 3’s off screens this season, on which he went 5/12), this play exemplifies how quickly Dillingham can self-organize and get into his shot off a variety of footwork patterns. Dillingham’s shooting numbers this season for Kentucky were obviously stellar, however a deeper look into the degree of difficulty on these shots quells any concerns I have on the translatability of Dillingham’s jumper. In the clip below for instance, Dillingham breaks convention not by taking a transition 3, but taking it as the primary ballhandler dribbling full speed down the court.

Willingness to shoot in these suboptimal situations, like the plays below where Dillingham comes off a pindown and takes a one dribble 3 with Tre Mitchell splayed at his feet..

…and over a tight contest from Armando Bacot, bodes well for maintaining his shot volume at the next level.

As I watched Dillingham over the course of the season I found there to be interesting parallels between him and a rookie from this past year’s class, Keyonte George. While there are drastic differences between the two in certain respects, there are/were similar concerns in their shot selection as prospects. During his tenure at Baylor, George had been much maligned for a perceived inability to operate within a team construct and even labeled a ‘chucker’ by some draft analysts. I would argue what was considered a weakness has actually been essential to George outperforming expectations in his rookie year.

Take this play from early in the season, for example, where Utah attempts to run Horns Out for Jordan Clarkson in early offense, but when the entry is denied George receives a Flare screen from Clarkson. Notice the apathy the defense displays towards a George three point attempt: if we are judging the value of George as a shooter by the aforementioned Knee-Jerk Reflex Test, it would be pretty low.

What I found so interesting about George’s rookie season was that despite how pedestrian his shooting splits were (38.6% from the field and 32.8% from 3), the coverages he saw over the course of the season transformed in large part because of how consistent he was with his volume. In fact, George saw his 3-point volume steadily increase over the course of the season. In the 2023 calendar year (games played from October-December) George averaged 5.1 attempts/game, and in 2024 George averaged 6.3 attempts/game. The Jazz were intentional in exploring the upper limits of George’s capabilities offensively and he consistently answered the bell. He now demonstrates his comfort shooting in simple flow actions like the DHO from John Collins below, where the sliver of space provided by Steph going under the screen is enough for George to pull the trigger.

George also displayed utility as an off-the-dribble shooter when provided more opportunities on-ball. In the play below Utah flows into a spread PNR as the secondary action and George, without a moment’s hesitation, pulls up for 3 when Bam Adebayo begins to backpedal into drop coverage.

George’s willingness to take these 3’s under duress resulted in him eventually receiving the kind of coverage which stands as the benchmark for offensive players, forcing the defense to place two on the ball.

Later in the same game as the play above, Utah runs Pistol Flare Zoom, a well schemed staple of their offense. Despite the fluid transitions from one action to the next, Miami stifles the offense and the ball finds Keyonte George in the corner. As with most NBA offenses, when Utah’s designed offensive options are taken away they resort to a simple spread PNR. However, because of the threat George presents as a shooter off the bounce, Miami’s big (Orlando Robinson) hard hedges the PNR, triggering the low-man (Haywood Highsmith) to tag the roller and leave Lauri Markannen open in the corner. When George diffuses the pressure of the hedge he quickly finds Markannen for 3.

This is an optimal shot for the Jazz, and Utah was able to create this in spite of Miami playing almost 20 seconds of good defense BECAUSE of George’s off-the-dribble shooting ability. While George isn’t seeing two to the ball with a high frequency yet, per Synergy all 8 of the times he’s been trapped as the PNR ballhandler have come since February 11th, which coincides with George’s rise in shooting volume.

Before revisiting Dillingham’s evaluation, I’d like to reiterate the comparison between George and Dillingham is not being drawn as a 1-to-1 comparison, rather as an example of how a seldom sought after archetype (smaller guards who are high volume shooters) can be extremely valuable if they meet certain criteria.

Dillingham showed himself more than capable of diagnosing coverages where he could utilize his off the dribble shooting prowess. Dillingham, like George in the previous clips, was decisive and consistent in punishing drop coverages which is integral to success for his archetype. In the clip below, Dillingham rejects the first screen in a 77 action (Double Drag) and finds the pocket of space left occupied by the trailing point-of-attack defender and the drop big man, and from there he decisively takes the pull-up 3 with a right-handed gather.

Even as scouting reports became more robust over the course of conference play, Dillingham was still able to get to his pull-up 3 against drop coverage. Like in the play below where Kentucky runs Horns, the POA defender is better able to stay attached to Dillingham and the drop defender is slightly closer to the level of the screen than Hunter Dickinson in the previous clip, however Dillingham is still able to get up an attempt, this time with a left-handed gather.

Even when defenders were playing at the level, like in this play against Oakland in the tournament, Dillingham was undeterred. Kentucky once again is running 77 and Dillingham seizes the space given to take a deep 3 early in the shot clock, despite Zvonimir Ivisic’s defender actually quickly showing at the level.

What makes Dillingham’s shooting ability so enticing is how rare it is to find a prospect who’s not only capable of drawing aggressive coverages with the ball in his hands, but also capitalizing on the attention they draw as shooters off the ball. As previously discussed in Ja’Kobe Walter’s evaluation, attacking closeouts as a shooting threat is of upmost importance. And while Walter’s shot mechanics could limit his effectiveness drawing and attacking closeouts, Dillingham has no such concerns mechanically, along with having an even better process attacking closeouts.

Dillingham was deployed off-ball this season more than any point in his career and shot an astounding 42/88 (47.7%) on Catch and Shoot 3’s. Even more impressive was Dillingham’s ability to parlay the hard closeouts his shooting efficiency attracted into high percentage shots for himself or teammates.

In this clipped play Florida switches the spread PNR placing the big, Thomas Haugh, on Dillingham. Eventually the ball is swung to Antonio Reeves, who drives, causing Haugh to provide gap help. On Haugh’s recovery Dillingham quickly ‘punches’ the gap, drives, and hits a runner. In this play Haugh executes scheme perfectly by funneling Dillingham towards help, but the nuance in Dillingham’s game off the catch renders this advantage.

Dillingham has a wonderful habit of running through the catch, or ‘stampeding’, on closeouts. This creates the finishing angle in the play above, and can be seen even more clearly in the play below. Kentucky flows into a double Zoom action for Antonio Reeves after they’re unable to create a quality look out of the empty corner PNR. When Reeves is stonewalled on his drive he kicks it back out to Dillingham at the top of the key, and Dillingham’s stampede allows him to create the quick separation to finish high off the glass.

Dillingham’s game off the catch can best be described as kinetic in my opinion, whether the possession ends in a Dillingham shot or not, he is able to keep the offense in motion and the defense shifting with his keen sense of court mapping.

In the following clip, Kentucky runs through two hapless spread PNRs with Reed Sheppard as the primary ballhandler. On the 2nd PNR Sheppard rejects the screen and dribbles to the right side of the floor where Dillingham is stationed. As Dillingham lifts from the wing, his defender pressures the ball, prompting a switch onto Dillingham. The switch demands urgency, and Dillingham is able to weaponize this brief advantage on a subpar closeout from an otherwise excellent defender in Cam Matthews.

Dillingham’s drive is an expert display of manipulating defenders with your eyes and tempo, as he waits for both Matthews and the primary rim protector here (Tolu Smith) to commit before eventually making the dumpoff pass to Aaron Bradshaw for a dunk. While some may see this as a combination of bad defense from Smith and solid passing vision from Dillingham, Dillingham’s arsenal of pullups, runners, and floaters, necessitates Smith lifting from his position closer to the basket.

Dillingham’s technical refinement operating off-ball, when paired with high volume off the dribble shooting, amounts to an offensive weapon which could potentially change the entire complexion of a team’s offense. Instead of having a shooter who can only force the defense to react when placed in a set of ideal conditions, a shooter with the depth of tools Dillingham possesses can activate defensive pressure points simply by participating in the play.

An example of this effect can be seen below. Miami runs Iverson 77 Shallow, where Nijel Pack receives the entry pass as he’s cutting across the opposite wing (the Iverson component of the action), and the two elbow screeners flip to initiate the 77 Shallow phase of the action. As previously discussed, 77 consists of double drag screens, however 77 Shallow is a variation where the screens are staggered so the 2nd screener can make a shallow cut to the 3 point line. As Pack takes the 1st screen, the Pitt big man quickly shows to disrupt the rhythm of Pack, a respected off the dribble 3-point shooter. Ideally this should place Blake Hinson in a situation where he’s forced to cover the roller and the shallow cutting shooter, but George is a tick late to lift which kills the window for the advantage to be created. Pack continues dribbling towards the right wing and the gap help from Jaland Lowe carves open a driving lane for AJ Casey who finishes on the drive.

This play encapsulates the interplay between actions designed to get shooters open on the East-West plane, to create North-South gaps for drivers to attack. And shooters who are prolific off the bounce and off the catch function as queens on the chessboard, in how they activate defensive pressure points in either manner.

These versatile shooters also serve as force multipliers for other shooters effectiveness. Take the play below for example, Dallas intends to run ‘Motion Strong Zoom’, where Tim Hardaway Jr. runs off double staggers from the corner (Motion Strong), swings the ball to Dereck Lively, and screens away to initiate the Zoom action for Kyrie Irving. However, as Irving approaches THJ to receive the first screen he is denied, or ‘top-locked’, by Jalen Suggs. This prompts Hardaway to take a handoff from Lively as his (Hardaway Jr’s) initial defender, Anthony Black, and Suggs simultaneously switch their assignments. Suggs switching onto Hardaway Jr. and Black switching onto Irving.

This sequence is so important because with Suggs and Black switching the Mavericks essentially have them dead to rights, as seen in the frame below.

Suggs has lost the battle of leverage, with the switch placing him on Hardaway Jr’s outside shoulder, and Hardaway Jr. being a respected shooter in his own right forces Goga Bitadze to lift slightly out of his drop coverage. This rotation creates the angle for Hardaway to make the short skip pass to Irving, effectively inverting the floor and creating a window for Irving to continue the advantage with a pass to the rolling Lively.

This sequence is a perfect distillation of the synergy between a dynamic off-the-dribble shooting threat and a dynamic, albeit more conventional, shooter. And plays like these are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to manufacturing offense between these two archetypes. Utilizing shooters as screeners has come into vogue in a major way recently, and perhaps there’s no team better at combining these elements within their offense than the recent NCAA champion UConn Huskies.

In the following clip, UConn runs a wildly intricate action I could only term as ‘Pistol Motion Strong Ghost Flex Screen the Screener’. Despite the overly verbose terminology, this core concept of this action is quite simple, UConn taking their best and most versatile shooter in Cam Spencer and weaponizing him by involving him in as many phases of the offense as possible. As Spencer fakes the Cross Screen for the player in the weakside corner and receives the down screen (Ghost Flex), his defender tightly trails, attempts to deny the curl, and funnel Spencer into Alex Karaban’s defender so they can switch. Switching being the preferred defensive scheme because of Marquette’s similarly sized lineup and the lack of off the dribble scoring threat UConn’s players possess. UConn uses this perceived weakness against Marquette here by having Spencer set a down screen for Karaban as he’s curling towards the basket, springing Karaban open for 3.

I find these clips relevant to Rob Dillingham’s projection because these are the ways his offensive skillset can manifest not only in scoring opportunities for himself, but for others as well. The confluence of Dilling

Conclusion

In summation, I think all these players have viable skillsets as shooters, however my general philosophy when it comes to the draft is to pick for scarcity. Especially when it comes to a team using a high pick, players who provide unique skillsets allow teams to pivot stylistically and adapt to changes in the NBA meta. When it comes to the three prospects previously discussed, I chose them specifically because it was my belief these prospects main value proposition was their shooting talent. Each possess strengths and weaknesses compared to the others in the other facets of their game, but ultimately if a team is picking any of the three it should be for what their shooting ability unlocks within the team’s offense. And in my estimation Robert Dillingham is the only prospect of the three whose shooting and shooting adjacent skillset warrant a high, lottery level, pick because of the previously discussed attributes. Ja’Kobe Walter, who has an interesting profile as a shooter and scorer, doesn’t meet certain thresholds specifically as a shooter to warrant a higher pick, and Melvin Ajinca is too deficient in certain shooting adjacent qualities to be useful outside of the conventional shooting specialist role.

Prior to delving into these prospect’s games I hadn’t considered shooting ability holistically, I’d previously weighed shot mechanics as most essential to projecting shooting. Having worked through this evaluation I realized early on assessing shooting from a purely mechanical perspective naturally introduced aesthetic bias because there’s no idealized shooting form. Ultimately, recognizing this implicit bias lead to a clearer perspective of other flaws in my shooting criteria, flaws which didn’t lie in the characteristics being accounted for, but instead how rigid my philosophy had been overall.

As I dug deeper and deeper into these prospects I realized scouting shooting talent is as much about evaluating evidence which is absent from a player’s shot profile as evaluating the data currently available. The less variables I was able to see a player interact with, the less confident I was in how their shooting ability would translate to the next level. And finally, perhaps even more importantly with prospects who are shooters first and foremost, recognizing there may be no greater impediment to an offense than a player with an unwarranted reputation as a shooter. This is in reference to the ‘active’ vs ‘passive’ spacer dichotomy previously mentioned, as the narrower a player’s shooting can be applied, the less space they are providing an offense.

The days of conventional shooting specialists are long gone, and avoiding spending valuable draft capital on a player who may fall into this category is an imperative.

The post 2024 Draft Shooting Heuristic appeared first on Swish Theory.

Lately, I have been dissatisfied with using a big board as a means of properly reflecting my thoughts on a given draft class. I would target certain players in each range of the draft. The rest are just red herrings who are decent to good prospects, but I am fine missing out on them. That’s why forming a big board is so challenging. There are guys like Jalen Slawson and Kobe Brown who I have strong conviction about as second round fliers. Conversely, there are some projected first round guys who I am lower on such as Nick Smith and Jalen Hood-Schifino. I have spent too many hours staring at my big board spreadsheet asking myself how to rank these guys. The objectively correct move is likely to rank the young high RSCI guy above Slawson, a 23-year old wing from Furman. But, that feels weird to me! I like Slawson a lot and I’m not a Nick Smith fan. Shouldn’t my board reflect that? 

The obvious phenomenon at hand is that I am anchoring my perception of these players to their projected draft ranges. We all do it, and that is completely fine. But, translating this into a big board proves difficult, muddying the waters of my actual thoughts on the draft class. I would rather articulate my overarching strategy, isolate the prospects I have conviction about, and leave the rest be. That’s exactly what the piece will cover: the best way of attacking the 2023 NBA Draft, as I see it. 

I will be providing a big board closer to draft day as well, if for no other reason than it is fun. But, I feel that this will be a great accompanying piece that better articulates my thoughts on the draft class. Here goes: 

The Spurs Have Already Won the Draft

Victor Wembanyama is the prize of this draft. He is the prize of the past ten drafts, and probably the next ten drafts. Nothing any other team does in this draft will have the impact that the Spurs winning the lottery will have on them. As the saying goes, sometimes it’s better to be lucky than good, and the Spurs lucked into this guy: https://youtu.be/L33JKYc1ZKA

Anything else the Spurs do on draft day in the second round or with some sort of trade is icing on the cake. Additionally, nothing they do in other areas of the draft will tarnish their night. As far as I am concerned, they can take it easy on draft prep and make sure they get their beauty sleep in the nights leading up to the draft. It’s Victor Wembanyama. Not much more to say there. 

Once Wemby is off the board, I am not drafting anyone else if Scoot Henderson is still on the board. 

I see the Brandon Miller chatter just like everyone else does. I can tell you right now that passing on Scoot Henderson with the number 2 pick would be a huge mistake. Trading away your pick when you have a chance to pick Scoot would also be a mistake (I’m looking at you, Portland). While he isn’t perfect, he is by far the next-best bet to become a star this year. 

A powerful 6’2 guard, Scoot is a walking paint touch who uses his speed/power combination to get to the rim better than anyone in the class – when he wants to. Many scouts observed that Scoot phoned in his rim attacks in favor of midrange jumpers as the season progressed. Sam Vecenie of The Athletic wrote an excellent article on this problem with Scoot where he suggested that Scoot was trying to be careful and avoid injury as soon as he locked up a high draft pick. Everything I’ve read about Scoot’s leadership, poise, maturity, and work ethic is outstanding, so I highly doubt this was a reflection of his character. Also, he can do this: https://twitter.com/nbagleague/status/1610446654796173324?s=20

I think he’s going to be more than fine generating paint touches and getting the most out of his athletic tools.  

Additionally, Scoot is already advanced at everything required of a primary offensive initiator with his athleticism. He is comfortable shooting off the dribble, and has a two year sample of advanced passing in the G-League. For my money, Scoot Henderson is as easy of a bet to be a primary offensive initiator that I have evaluated. He will be an amazing consolation prize for whoever ends up with him. If the team is not Charlotte, that will be the first major inefficiency at play in this draft. 

Successful teams are littered with 6’6+ wing players with two way impact. Draft strategy should be geared towards finding such players

Watch any high level NBA game, and you’ll find versatile and skilled wing sized players filling out every rotation. You can’t have enough of these guys. Luckily, the top of this draft has plenty to choose from. Cam Whitmore, Jarace Walker, Brandon Miller, Taylor Hendricks, Leonard Miller, and Gradey Dick are perfect options in the 3-14 range for teams. All bring youth, smarts, versatility, and a wide-ranging skill set that will allow them to contribute in a multitude of ways. Some are more ready to contribute than others, but all have upside and are likely to play in many high-stakes games. 

There are also a collection of smart and versatile wing-sized players down the board that will likely be underdrafted. Colby Jones is a potential first rounder that teams should be targeting. If he shoots, Sidy Cissoko is quietly a very complete prospect who also has time on his side with an April 2004 birthday. Jett Howard has plenty of flaws, but he can dribble, pass, and shoot at 6’8. Using this criteria, there is a large collection of sleepers that can be had for an inconsequential draft pick or maybe none at all: Jaime Jaquez Jr, Kobe Brown, Jordan Miller, Jalen Slawson, Ben Sheppard, Toumani Camara, Anton Watson (please teach this man how to play offense), even someone like Justyn Mutts is very overlooked by NBA teams right now. There are plenty of fliers that can and should be taken by teams. Not all of these guys are going to hit, but if they do, that is a potential playoff contributor acquired for extraordinarily cheap. I’d rather do that than pick Drew Timme in the 40s. 

Notice I didn’t mention the Thompson twins. Let’s have that discussion now. 

I am fine letting other teams bet on the Thompson twins, given where they are projected to go. 

Amen and Ausar Thompson are perhaps the toughest evaluations I have had in my time scouting NBA Draft prospects. After all, before we even get into the Thompsons as players, there is the league that the Thompsons play in: Overtime Elite. Overtime Elite is an enigma to say the least, as we don’t really have an idea of how players translate to the NBA from that league. Last year, Dom Barlow and Jean Montero both went undrafted. Barlow played some garbage time minutes for the Spurs and was introduced into the rotation when the ultimately successful tank for Wemby was fully on. He does have some functional athleticism to his game and could maybe turn into something. But, that remains to be seen. He’s certainly not someone I want to project the Thompsons based on. 

The other guy, Jean Montero, is actually doing quite well in the Spanish ACB. He’s averaging 17/3/4 on 54% true shooting for Real Betis. It’s possible that he’s able to come over and contribute as a backup point guard for an NBA team someday. I had Montero 40th on my board last year, so I definitely think there is some talent there. But again, hardly a needle-moving development case, at least right now. Thus, I simply do not feel comfortable with the amount of data points that we have to properly project talent from Overtime Elite into the NBA.

Then, there is the actual evaluation of the Thompson twins. They were the best of the bunch in Overtime Elite, no doubt about it. But once again, we really have no idea how that dominance is going to project to the NBA. Another one of the best players in Overtime Elite, Jazian Gortman, was invited to the NBA combine, where he did not pop in any meaningful way. Scouts are projecting here, and most are erring on the side of optimism. However, I think using a top five pick on one of the Thompsons is an extremely dicey proposition. They are quite old, as both will comfortably be 20 on draft day. At roughly the same age, Brandon Miller was a first team All-American and arguably the best perimeter player in college basketball. Looking at things in those terms, I think you could argue the Thompsons should have been a bit more dominant to earn a high spot on draft boards. I THINK. Again, I don’t know. Nobody really knows. I fully see the vision for them being good NBA players. They flash a combination of elite athleticism and passing ability that we don’t see too often. They seem like wonderful people as well with strong work ethic and maturity. But, the level of competition factor is a bit too much of a hurdle for me. 

I have also mentioned some one and done prospects who fit exactly what I am looking for in the lottery. Wemby and Scoot are obvious. But, Cam Whitmore, Jarace Walker, Brandon Miller, Taylor Hendricks, Leonard Miller, Cason Wallace, and Gradey Dick are all surefire NBA guys to me whose avenues to strong positive contribution are very attainable. Once all those guys are off the board, that’s probably when I would roll the dice on the Thompsons. The reality is that both twins will be taken before several of the guys I mentioned above, and because of that I’ll take the safer guys who also have plenty of avenues to upside. 

I recognize that this is a controversial take, so I want to say that this is only one man’s strategy, and that yours might look quite different, and that’s okay. For those who would prioritize a Thompson twin in the draft, I will say that Ausar seems like the one to target. Amen seems to be the preferred twin, but Ausar was better statistically pretty much across the board (assists, steals, blocks, impact metrics, usage, turnovers, etc.). Name a statistic; chances are Ausar came out on top. Plus, Ausar is further along as a ball handler and shooter, which bodes well for his development. Amen is projected to go top five, and rumor has it Ausar is projected to fall a bit. So the smarter move to me is to get Ausar further down the board. 

Always be on the lookout for players with a “compounding skills” profile

In the 2020 draft cycle, I wrote a detailed article about why I had Anthony Edwards as my number one prospect. It’s easy to forget, but a lot of people had Edwards at two or even lower throughout that cycle. I remained steadfast that he was the guy everyone should be after at the top. Why? He had what I called a “compounding skills” profile: essentially, the evolution of a raw, fluid athlete who scores in volume into a complete offensive player. I’ll link that article here. I’d urge you to at least read the introduction to get a better idea of my thought process here. 

I used the same logic to rank Jalen Green high on my board in 2021, as well as Jaden Ivey last year. This year, Cam Whitmore jumps out as the compounding skills candidate of choice. He heavily prefers jumping off two feet and winning with strength. That style of finishing generally has some trouble translating, but I am not sure it’s going to matter with Whitmore. I have also not seen a speed/power athlete moving towards the rim quite like Whitmore since Anthony Edwards. His flashes getting downhill, moving defenders off their spots, getting his shoulder past them, and finishing through contact are special. He also shows shooting touch and flashes versatility in terms of shot type and location which screams three-level scorer. He also has all the tools you could possibly want on defense, already boasting a high steal rate and some eye-popping weak side rim protection.  

There are also plenty of concerns. He had more than two turnovers for every assist, and his off the dribble game is much more theoretical at this stage – as was the case with many compounding skills prospects before Whitmore. When you look at guys with athleticism this special who flashed real perimeter skill, the fail rate is basically zero, and they often become All-Star caliber players. Whitmore also has plenty of time to develop, as he doesn’t turn 19 until July 8th. 

We often underestimate the upside of freshman-aged prospects who are billed as guaranteed role players. 

In the past, myself and others have referred to these types of guys as “false-ceiling” prospects. These prospects are rightfully considered good basketball players who are likely to contribute early, but their avenues to greater upside are ignored. My favorite recent example of a false ceiling prospect is Franz Wagner, who I had as my 12th ranked prospect in 2021. Franz is the prospect who forced me to internalize the lesson of false ceiling prospects in the first place. Many, including me, thought of him as someone who could become a quality role player in the NBA. But, I missed the point entirely. Franz was a freshman-aged prospect with some pro experience in Europe and was highly impactful at Michigan. Because he was already great at basketball, I moved him down in favor of guys with more upside (translation: they were worse at basketball and had more room to improve). I vowed not to make the same mistake. 

In my mind, there are two false ceiling prospects in the 2023 class: Jarace Walker and Taylor Hendricks. Both are advanced defenders, which raises the floor and ceiling of any prospect. Defense gets rookies on the floor quickly, and it means that they don’t have to reach the highest heights offensively to hit a high-upside outcome. Walker and Hendricks also project to undergo significant development offensively, which will make playoff starter impact very attainable, and possibly more than that. 

Jarace Walker is an advanced processor of the game on both ends of the floor, and he will immediately contribute as a connector. I also believe that he is going to shoot, as he has dramatically improved his mechanics from high school to college. This mechanical improvement, combined with his processing speed, indicates that Jarace has the neuroplasticity required for outlier skill development. Thus, self-creation is not out of the question for Jarace. 

Hendricks is a more typical offensive development bet. He is a good athlete who can already shoot it off the catch, and he looks more polished than Jarace at hitting tough looks in the midrange at this stage. The drawback with him is the handle and playmaking ability. What’s encouraging is that guys with Hendricks’ size, defensive ability, athleticism, and scoring ability often improve as playmakers as their careers progress. The degree of improvement in these areas will dictate how good Hendricks can become. 

Personally, I prefer Jarace as a development bet, as I think he is in a better position to contribute immediately, but both are great. Take your pick. 

The other G-League Ignite guys are extremely underrated

As I am writing, Leonard Miller is ranked 19th on Rookie Scale’s consensus big board, and Sidy Cissoko is ranked 31st. That is too low. As a 19 year old, Leonard Miller put up a per 100 statline of 28.0 points, 17.1 rebounds, 2.5 assists, 1.4 steals, and 1.2 blocks. You could argue he’s had the best statistical season of any G-League Ignite prospect in the team’s history, including Scoot and Jalen Green! This was all as a raw prospect who was playing his first real stint of high level basketball coming off of an enigmatic high school career. But wait, it gets better. He was efficient (64 TS%) and he only averaged 2.3 turnovers per 100, putting his AST:TO ratio on the right side of one. 

What’s crazy is that when you watch Miller play, it seems like there is so much he can improve upon. This is what made me high on Tari Eason last year. He was able to have a highly productive season while still leaving a lot of meat on the bone for skill development. By the way, that should be another point of emphasis: always look for “raw” prospects who are highly productive against good competition. These guys are always good bets because they are often among the best functional athletes in their draft class, which gives them a nice baseline as the rest of their game develops. Miller is no different. I think he’s a no-brainer top ten guy in this class. 

Cissoko, as I mentioned earlier in this article, is a quietly complete wing prospect. In most of my public work, I make sure to mention the checklist for the ideal draft prospect, courtesy of the original Stepien group: a 6’6+ player who can dribble, pass, shoot, make decisions, and defend. As a 6’7 wing with an April 2004 birthday, Cissoko reliably demonstrated every single skill in that list except shooting, and I don’t think it’s crazy to project him as a shooter either. 30 percent from three and 64.5 percent from the line does not initially induce optimism. But, closer inspection leads me to believe that Cissoko is going to shoot. The mechanics themselves look a lot more fluid than you would guess, and he even had some cogent flashes of versatile shotmaking in the midrange and from three. When I watch him shoot off movement and hit stepbacks, I can’t help but believe those flashes are going to become more consistent. I have Cissoko in my late lottery, and as I type this out, I am wondering if even that might be too low. In any case, Cissoko is someone teams should be targeting with a mid-late first. If he slips into the second round, that would be a massive oversight. 

Non-primary initiator guard prospects who do not project to play NBA-level defense should be outside your lottery. 

Go back however far, and the ideal redraft of any given class usually looks like this: 

• Primary offensive initiators OR 2nd/3rd offensive options who provide defensive value (often the players we consider stars)
• Starters with two-way ability OR DPOY level defenders without much of an offensive game (guys who usually round out championship-quality lineups)
• Everyone else

Of course, there are some cases where that structure doesn’t perfectly capture how a draft should have gone. But, the point still stands. Usually, the players who return lottery value contribute defensively in some way. At the very least, they don’t detract on that end. Thinking about player impact through a plus/minus framework, this makes sense. A -2 on defense has to do a lot on offense (basically be a primary offensive initiator) to be a high-impact player. If you project that a prospect will be a neutral defender, that is almost guaranteed to be a better proposition than an at best secondary creator guard who does not defend. Secondary creators usually top out as roughly +2-3 offensive players in impact metrics. This implies that bad defending virtually negates their impact. 

Using examples makes this idea clearer. There are notably few guards of this ilk who have been a part of deep playoff runs. Jordan Poole and Tyler Herro are the two that jump to mind who were in rotations that made it to the championship. But, both these players’ utility wanes in the playoffs. Poole went from 30 minutes per game in the 2021-22 regular season to 27.5 in the postseason. That’s not a huge dropoff, but it’s worth noting that Poole played only 20, 14, and 17 minutes respectively in the last three games of the Finals. The Warriors won all three of those games to close out the series. Additionally, Herro’s secondary creation has not proven necessary for the Heat’s success. He has missed all but one game of the Heat’s run to the finals this year. 

The problems with this archetype don’t stop on the court. Despite their negligible impact, these players command a lot of money. Jordan Poole is owed $128 million over the next four years, and Herro is owed $120 million over the same time interval. So, at best you’re getting a player of negligible impact who you have to turn around and pay a boatload of money for. The only way these players can provide value is through a trade, likely during their rookie contract. That can be quite useful, but I would not draft a player for the sole purpose of their hypothetical trade value. 

So, who is being mocked in the lottery that might fall into this category? Nick Smith is the main one for me. Defensively, he has a bit of a motor, but I really worry about his frame and technique on that end. His footwork often gets messed up, and his skinny frame likely prevents him from making a huge impact. There is a physical tools threshold for impactful defense which Smith does not project to hit. For instance, I liked Blake Wesley’s effort on defense a lot last year, but that effort hasn’t translated up a level. Bones Hyland graded out as one of the worst defenders in the league last season despite being a pest at VCU. To make matters worse, I liked Hyland and Wesley significantly more as defenders in college. 

Another guy that I’ve steadily soured on throughout the cycle is Keyonte George. I was really high on him at the start of the season, and I still see a high upside scorer if everything comes together. But, I don’t think I properly considered the low end or even median outcomes for Keyonte, which look worryingly like this archetype. Again, I see the upside vision a lot more with Keyonte than I do with Nick Smith, so I wouldn’t hate it if a team picked him in the late lottery or mid-first. 

3&D Guards Matter

I wrote earlier in this article about 6’6+ players populating successful NBA teams, but 3&D guards have been crucial in these playoffs as well. Last offseason, Denver acquired Kentavious Caldwell-Pope and Bruce Brown, and it completely transformed their defense. Gabe Vincent impresses me more and more every time I watch him. Marcus Smart has been perhaps the most prevalent 3&D guard in the last few years; he continues to be an integral part of the Celtics’ playoff runs. Smart’s teammate Derrick White, DeAnthony Melton, and Quentin Grimes are several others who’ve also contributed at a high level as 3&D guards. I’m sure important players are missing from that list, but the point is that these players can be difference makers down the stretch of the season. To loop in the last section, I’d rather have a great 3&D guard than a meh secondary creator/poor defending guard. 

Cason Wallace and Kobe Bufkin are two candidates for 3&D guards who also have some upside to exceed that archetype (especially Wallace). Both are in my lottery. Brandin Podziemski is a highly skilled guard who projects to contribute to playoff rotations. The concern here is Podz’s athleticism and what that means for his defensive projection. However, I am betting on his brain. I just think he is so damn smart he’s going to figure out how to meaningfully contribute one way or another. 

Marcus Sasser is another player who is going to provide shooting and dogged defense as an off-ball guard. I think he has enough ball handling and playmaking chops that he can provide some second unit ball handling as well. The aforementioned Gabe Vincent might not be a bad reference point for Sasser. 

If you wanted to swing for a potential 3&D guard in the late 2nd/UDFA. UCLA’s Jaylen Clark and Wichita St guard Craig Porter Jr would be good names to target. Clark is an elite perimeter defender who is a jump shot away from being a perfect 3&D guard. I wish I felt better about him developing that shot though. Clark is also in the middle of rehabbing a torn Achilles, which makes his projection even fuzzier. But, I still like him as a top 45 guy, as his “if he shoots” outcome will return top 30 value from this class. Porter Jr is a stock machine (career 4.7 BLK% as a 6’2 guard!) who could absolutely hold his own as a table setting point guard at the next level. The issue is his lack of touch might prevent him from seeing the floor in the NBA. 68.5% from the line this past season is very worrying for a point guard prospect. However, if you can get Craig Porter Jr in UDFA, you make that bet every time. If he shoots, he can be an impactful NBA player. 

Penn State’s Jalen Pickett seems underrated as well. He’s a great three-level unassisted shotmaker, 11.2 assist per 100 to only 3.9 turnovers, and he has the tools to at least passably guard smalls on the perimeter. He deserves to be drafted. Another guy I like in UDFA is D’Moi Hodge from Missouri. He turns 25 in December, so if he’s going to make an impact in the NBA, he needs to do so quickly. But, it’s hard to argue with 40 percent from three on high volume, 5.1 steals per 100, and only 1.5 turnovers per 100 as a starting point. 

Some Quick Hitters: 

Drafting GG Jackson would be using a 2023 pick on a guy who likely won’t contribute until at least 2025

I am generally wary of drafting raw and unproductive guys whose high-end outcomes likely won’t give you a star, especially in the first round. It’s why I was lower on Ziaire Williams in 2021, and he had considerably more tangible skill than GG Jackson does. I get the age + height + isolation scoring argument for Jackson. But, he isn’t close to being a positive contributor at this stage. That sort of bet is just not my cup of tea. He could very well end up being a decent player, but I would rather use a mid-late first on someone who is closer to contributing now (or trade that pick for future assets) than draft GG. 

Jalen Hood-Schifino scares me 

Johnny Davis PTSD is really affecting me here. Offensively, JHS reminds me of Davis in a lot of ways. He is a midrange specialist on offense, he’s very inefficient, and he can’t generate enough rim pressure for a NBA primary ball handler. On top of that, JHS isn’t in the same stratosphere as prospect Johnny Davis defensively. A 0.7 BPM does not ease concerns either. I get the idea of JHS as a prospect, but the reality is that he just is not that great right now. He has to become an otherworldly tough shot maker to turn into a valuable player. That is not a bet I’d be inclined to make. 

Trayce Jackson-Davis is my kind of big man bet in the second round

I tend to fade traditional centers on my board, as such players can usually be acquired for cheap in free agency, if desired. However, if a high-feel and/or coverage versatile big man is available in the second round, take them. Last year, Jaylin Williams was my high-feel and coverage versatile big of choice. I was also high on Xavier Tillman in 2021 for the same reasons. He’s still probably my favorite big of this type I have evaluated. Trayce Jackson-Davis is that big for me this year. Both Williams and Tillman were drafted in the 30s. If Jackson-Davis is available in that range, he’d be a great pick. 

You could do a lot worse than targeting proven wing shooters in the late 2nd/UDFA

There are plenty of prospects who will be available in the late 2nd/UDFA who profile as old, one-dimensional shooters. We often push these guys down the board, but look at the undrafted guys contributing for Miami right now. They can shoot the cover off the ball. Duncan Robinson and Caleb Martin in particular fit this exact profile in college. Sam Hauser (Go Hoos!) is another recent successful UDFA in this mold. In this draft, it would not surprise me if Seth Lundy or Hunter Tyson stuck around in the NBA. Both are older prospects who are primarily shooters on offense. But, they take care of the ball well enough to suggest that they can hang in an NBA offense. Lundy and Tyson would be my picks for wing shooters in UDFA. He’s more of a guard/wing combo, but D’Moi Hodge could qualify here as well.

Putting It All Together

To close, I want to make a simple list of which players I would target in each range of the draft using the ideas I have put forth in this article. 

• Pick 1: Wemby
• Picks 2-4: Scoot if available; Cam Whitmore or Jarace Walker if not. Trading down if Scoot is unavailable could also be an enticing proposition. 
• Picks 5-9: Whitmore or Jarace if available. Taylor Hendricks next preference. If those three are gone, Cason Wallace and Gradey Dick are next up. 
• Picks 10-14: Jarace Walker, Taylor Hendricks, Cason Wallace, or Gradey Dick if available. If not, this is Leonard Miller territory. 
• Picks 15-30: Leonard Miller if available. Sidy Cissoko, Kobe Bufkin, or Jett Howard next. If the G-League and Michigan guys are unavailable, Colby Jones, Brandin Podziemski, Marcus Sasser, and Jaime Jaquez Jr are my preferences, in that order. 
• Picks 31-45: Sidy Cissoko if available. The above list of preferences for picks 15-30 carries over. Trayce Jackson-Davis is in play here too. I didn’t discuss them, but Maxwell Lewis, Noah Clowney, and Julian Phillips are worthy “raw prospect” gambles here too, should any of them be available. Jalen Slawson, Kobe Brown, or Ben Sheppard would be good gets in this range as well. 
• Picks 46-60: Everything above carries over here. Slawson, Brown, or Sheppard would be my preference. Beyond them, Jaylen Clark, Seth Lundy, Hunter Tyson, Jalen Pickett, Craig Porter Jr, Toumani Camara, and Jordan Miller are all worthy of consideration. 
• UDFA: Ditto picks 46-60. Plus, D’Moi Hodge, Anton Watson, and Justyn Mutts would be priority signings for my summer league team. They are excellent Exhibit-10 candidates. If you’re looking for a big, Chattanooga’s Jake Stephens put up an absurd 39.7 points, 17.6 rebounds, 6.2 assists, 1.7 steals, 4 blocks, and 5.1 turnovers per 100 on 67 percent true shooting. He also shot 40 percent from three on 9.4 attempts per 100, in addition to an 82 FT%. UConn’s Adama Sanogo is another coverage versatile guy with excellent touch around the rim. I wouldn’t necessarily target him over the wing bets I mentioned in the 2nd. But, if he goes undrafted, Sanogo is someone I’d look to bring in. 

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So, that is my 2023 draft strategy. I hope this paints a clear picture of my convictions in this class and the principles which informed them. Increasingly, NBA basketball is a game for functionally athletic, smart individuals who bring tangible skill on both ends of the floor. Such players can be found in every range of the draft, and every player I positively discussed in this piece is someone I believe can satisfy these requirements.

The post One-Size Fits All Draft Strategy appeared first on Swish Theory.

The sample for NBA draft prospects is tiny. Even if we have perfect data for a player’s prep and pro careers, the top draft prospects are typically aged 18-22, undergoing massive changes to their games and lives over the span of mere months, over and over in evolving environments and around new personnel.

Combing through that limited data, we search for narratives, precedents, guys that “just have it,” from a scout’s perspective.

In search for a method to the madness this cycle, I’m splitting my draft analysis pieces into three:

• “Whiteboard” Prospects: those whose stats improve as they play worse competition, declining, then, against the top teams
• “Green Flags Only” Prospects: those whose stats exceed certain thresholds regardless of level of competition
• Everyone Else

This, first of two pieces, looks at what I’m calling Whiteboard prospects. Their top-end traits are obvious, but for that reason can be prepared for by the better opponents. As I watch this group, I seek to answer two questions:

• Do they struggle against increasing competition in a way that would be a problem in the NBA?
• Do they simply dominate lower-ranked competition that much?

Definition

I defined Whiteboard Prospects as having a certain set of traits decline against good competition, increase against bad competition:

• Box Plus-Minus
• Percentage of teammates’ FGM assisted
• True shooting percentage
• Steal rate.

As long as these decline from all competition to games against top-100 teams, then again against top-50 teams, and are also on Swish Theory’s Big Board 1.0, they’re a Whiteboard Prospect.

Let’s get to it.

Brandin Podziemski, Santa Clara

• vs. all competition: 10.0 BPM
• vs. top 100 teams: 6.5 BPM
• vs. top 50 teams: 3.9 BPM

Podziemski I thought was going to be an easy read, especially given the severity of decline, the single largest from overall comp to top-50 in our sample. But it was far from that.

Against bad competition, “Podz” did everything. Shooting at a 66% effective field goal percentage and 28% usage, he also maintained a 25% assist rate, 21% defensive rebound rate and 3% steal rate. His stats were heavily buoyed by, simply, never missing from three, where he took over half his shots and made over half of those attempts. That is basically impossible to stop, especially if you are a team ranked in the 200-400 range.

Against better competition, the athletic limitations showed, as expected. He struggles to create much distance on his dribble moves, leading to forced tough angle floaters, but those still go in at decent rates. Truly, Podz put up a historically efficient scoring season.

Projecting that at the next level is tricky. 80-179 (45%) from three, 62-146 (42%) from midrange, 75-121 (62%) at the rim is tough to argue with, but 8-17 (47%) from three, 7-25 (28%) from midrange and 7-19 (37%) from close range is what he tallied against top-50 teams. Another reminder of the inherent uncertainty in percentages.

However, Podziemski is armed with a mighty weapon to limit this downgrade against better competition: he plays really hard, and processes the game very quickly. There is one type of game processing that is Chris Paul-like, setting up one play to set up the next, and then there is Podz’s sharklike approach, always advantage-seeking from all angles. He goes for the kill with his hit-ahead passes or finding cutters, which leads to some sloppy turnovers, but, when coupled with his nose for the ball, means Podziemski will pick up change wherever it comes loose.

Finally, his pull-up three is legit. The release is low, but he needs little room to get it off and has enough 1-2 release patterns to get there.

Results: Primary odds fade, but secondary and especially tertiary shine. He’ll find a way to contribute, I’m sure

Brandon Miller, Alabama

• vs. all competition: 11.0 BPM
• vs. top 100 teams: 9.9 BPM
• vs. top 50 teams: 6.5 BPM

We move from Brandin to Brandon, first to second largest decline in overall production as NCAA competition increases. This exercise was less kind to Alabama’s Miller, placed in a cushier position and, given he is a 6’9’’ ballhandler projected to go in the top 5, the light is naturally a bit harsher.

The obvious knock on Miller this season was his rim finishing. He shot 74% at the rim against teams ranked 50-400, an elite figure that fits a top scorer prospect. But only 44% at the rim against teams in the top 50, representing about half of his possessions. Considering Brandon is also old for a freshman, this is a bit concerning for a player with his level of touch and fluidity with the ball.

Miller’s drives tend to develop slowly. His handle is strong, as are his ball custodian instincts, making him a decent point forward option to kick off an offense with a pull-up threat. But, while he can create initial separation, he lacks the flexibility to lower his shoulder to turn angles to the rim or burst to hit those openings, and his vertical takes long to load. Both of these factors combine to mean forced difficult finishes, which he figured out to some extent but will remain a problem in the NBA.

Perhaps more concerning, however, was the defensive tape as competition increased. Alabama is full of rangy, athletic wings who can handle tough matchups. This allowed them to let Miller, with his team-leading usage, take easier assignments. One of the main consequences of going up in competition is stronger worst option, and this showed with Miller’s defense. The same lack of flexibility and burst that limits his finishing also make Miller a worse chaser from interior to perimeter. His help was often too conservative into the paint, with not enough burst to then close out effectively.

His long wingspan and overall solid instincts mediate this, but I would not be surprised if Miller would be targeted significantly in a playoff series in his prime. That may be an aggressive take, again considering his feel for the game is strong overall, but I think it is more representative of his ability than the current top 3 talk.

Miller has a lot to like, especially how good he is at locating shooters off the dribble while he probes for his shot, or how he gets set off the move into his three. But the overall state of his game reads more like a #10 pick than top 5.

Results: some rust to the star shine

Judah Mintz, Syracuse

• vs. all competition: 1.5
• vs. top 100 teams: -0.2
• vs. top 50 teams: -2.5

Judah Mintz has a space creation and space maintenance problem. His touch is legit, but opponents know it, and with limited volume from three point range for a guard, he can be predictable in how he gets into it.

Mintz is young and has time to build counters for this, as there are plenty, but I would not feel comfortable rolling him out on an NBA court next season until there is much more evidence of that. He shot 43% on 67 runners, a figure I’d be comfortable penciling in as Mintz’ floor for the shot type. The average degree of difficulty, particularly as competition ramped up, was sky high.

He has built his game around a shot that will always be available to him – tough floaters – but that is still unlikely to be very efficient offense on its own, particularly with a lack of strong acceleration. But, Mintz is also blessed with an advantage-seeking type of passing creativity. Not necessarily the best at setting up an offense, Mintz has a keen eye for brief moments of openings, and also how his shotmaking creates them.

That is a potent combination for a scorer, but the scoring needs more supports. The easiest solution, by far, is to up the three point volume. Judah took more midrange attempts (189) than any freshman with so few three point attempts (66). When factoring in his strong FTA and rim attempt counts, that puts him in the company of De’Aaron Fox and Tony Wroten as far as previous draft picks, Elfrid Payton when including sophomore seasons. Mintz’s burst is certainly closer to that of Payton than Fox or Wroten, and we saw what happened to Elfrid without credible three point volume.

Mintz shot 6 of 24 (25%) from catch and shoot and 11 of 35 (31%) from pull-up threes. Not great. He seems hamstrung by a lack of strength, a lanky build but time to add on. Adding core strength should be Judah’s priority #1, helping both with his burst and ability to launch when opponents go under on pick and roll.

Suffice it to say, Mintz has a strength issue on defense as well. He has good passing lane instincts, once again making up for his lack of consistent presence with timely high-value plays.

Mintz has a route to being a very potent scorer, but I think it would benefit him to spend either another year in college or significant time in NBA weight rooms to get there.

Results: Potential end of shotclock star, with a 1-2 year path to get there

Terrence Shannon Jr., Illinois

• vs. all competition: 6.1 BPM
• vs. top 100 teams: 5.1 BPM
• vs. top 50 teams: 2.1 BPM

I was a bit shocked the degree to which Shannon’s stats declined as competition increased, given his athletic profile and semblance of shotmaking, playmaking on both ends. But the tape revealed clear limitations to TSJ’s handle in particular that make me concerned for his ability to fit into an NBA team quickly.

Terrence Shannon Jr. is fast, perhaps the burstiest player in all of college basketball. That is an extremely, often underrated quality for an NBA player to have, one I just complained about lacking in Judah Mintz’ game currently. If you give the ball to TSJ as he gets downhill, he’s gonna get downhill. He can hit any straight line gap and keep the space with his strength. He will get open court NBA steals this way.

However, the cupboard is a bit bare when it comes to options for maximizing this advantage. In particular, Shannon is extremely left-handed, and with few handle counters beyond his pull-up if opponents sit on it. Another fortunate trait of Shannon’s, though, is his touch is indeed good. I’d bet he shoots among the best in the class for those with shortest load time into pull-up threes: a hand-tracked stopwatch estimate places him often around 0.4 seconds from plant to release, about a tenth of a second quicker than Mintz.

On defense as well, I hope for more from TSJ. I’ve long been a fan of his versatility as a big guard, but on this watch found myself having doubts on his ability to handle difficult matchups in the NBA. He knows how to be physical when engaged, but often floats near his mark and gives up space he shouldn’t. Perhaps with NBA-level training this can improve, but still disappointing for an upperclassman who could have been more of a stalwart for the Illini.

TSJ is a Whiteboard prospect, but likely shouldn’t be at this point in his career. He has had success with his pull-up (88th percentile) but at the cost of refining his catch and shoot mechanics (29th percentile), the latter of which will be more important for his life as an NBA role player. Without the star equity that a developed driving game (0.8ppp) would enable, his inconsistent presence on defense becomes a greater concern as well.

Results: NBA athlete, but the skills development has to continue

Maxwell Lewis, Pepperdine

• vs. all competition: 1.2
• vs. top 100: -2.2
• vs. top 50: -2.4

First of all, we have to address the baseline of production. That degree of negative box plus-minus – a box score measure meant to estimate plus-minus – is extremely concerning for a prospect mocked in the first round. I have wanted to believe in Max as even a lottery level prospect, as his tools are that enticing, particularly his stride length, length for position and shotmaking abilities. The combination of qualities he has is rare. Extremely rare. And a good star predictor too. But having 13 games against top 100 competition and only shooting an effective field goal percentage of 46% and turning the ball over at a 23% clip to 14% assist rate, only 1.3% steal rate despite those tools is a major red flag.

To my dismay, this showed up in the tape. To be fair to Lewis, he has not been in organized basketball for as long as many he faced and Pepperdine had many flaws in the roster. He often faced completely stacked defenses, so that when the shot clock dwindled, he would face endless help. But that is the archetype he will be expected to succeed in, and the numbers when under pressure (0 shooting fouls to 8 turnovers in late shot clock situations) showed up in the tape as he often stepped out of bounds when rushed.

But, man, he has such creativity in finding his shots I almost don’t want to care. When we write about Whiteboard prospects, this is exactly the prototype. I believe Lewis has as good of instincts as any his age at finding a gap to attack automatically as he drives, it’s just cleaning up the rough edges around that which need a lot of work.

The reward here is high, and tangible: Max can hit difficult shots with the best of them. But a team needs to be keenly aware of what to expect as far as his year one usage. He will be targeted on screens. He will turn the ball over if help takes him by surprise. But he’ll teleport across the floor with the ball before gracefully dropping it in, too.

Results: Whiteboard prospect embodied, elite shotmaker potential but little faith in being a consistent foundation piece without major improvements

Adem Bona, UCLA

• vs. all competition: 5.0 BPM
• vs. top 100 teams: 4.6 BPM
• vs. top 50 teams: 2.8 BPM

Bona is a bit surprising to be found on this list, by all accounts a solid rim protector who does his dirty work and doesn’t overextend elsewhere. That remained the case during my tape watch, but I see why his stats changed so much, as well.

A big factor is his role in UCLA’s system. They have elite wing defenders in Jamie Jacquez Jr. and Jaylen Clark to rack up stocks, and Tyger Campbell, while not imposing in size, is a ball demon to create transition offense. Against bad teams, adding Bona into the mix is simply not fair. UCLA rarely lets up clean paint touches against sub-100, even opponents in the 50-100 range. And when they do, Bona is ready to pounce.

Against the top 50 squads, where UCLA faces more of a challenge, Bona was used in many different ways. This is his genius: you can throw Bona in a full blitz, in a hedge, drop, man on the perimeter, helpside rotator, whatever, and he’ll be useful. Bona understands how to use his length, strength and speed as instruments in whatever task, an ability that will benefit playoff teams in particular with his defensive versatility.

There are cracks that form, however, particularly in his often overzealous rotations, throwing off the timing in sync with the team defense a bit, and I think his timing on blocks is more very good than top 1% among shotblockers. This can mean having to recover from distances longer than he needs, and not being quite able to pull it off. That can be developed, but does mean I could see him struggling a bit to kick off his NBA career even if playing even harder.

Then, there’s the offense. I struggle to see him ever been a true positive offensive player, but can make it work with constant screens and vigilance to look for lobs. His box outs are spectacular, as well, using his body to create space as well as anyone I’ve seen this draft cycle. However if he gets the ball and doesn’t know immediately what to do with it, things can get ugly, as he is simply not comfortable doing things beyond catch and finish.

With his special defensive versatility, he’ll find his way to NBA relevance at some point. Keeping things simple would help him fit neatly into a very valuable type of rim protector.

Result: NBA-ready rim protector, just needs to slow things down

Taylor Hendricks, UCF

• vs. all competition: 7.1 BPM
• vs. top 100 teams: 6.4 BPM
• vs. top 50 teams: 5.1 BPM

Being further down this list means “less dynamic,” or, most consistent across components, and that is exactly what I discovered in watching Hendricks’ tape. The primary trend being picked up, I believe, is that as a member of a #63-ranked team by barttorvik.com, UCF was a cuspy NCAA team that could take out lower ranks with ease but struggle against the top 20s.

An interesting phenomenon took me by surprise, though: as his teammates struggled increasingly against future professional basketball players, Hendricks’ uniqueness popped. After all, his 5.1 BPM against top 50 teams is still second best on this list so far.

Hendricks has two traits that will serve him very well early in his career. First, his shot has an automatically stabilizing quality to it, as if a string goes directly through his shot pocket. It is light into the loading and skies maximizing Hendricks’ seemingly over seven-foot wingspan. Second, he has unbelievable lateral movements combined with elite hand-eye placement on blocks or steals. Physically, I feel like he is one of the more underrated athleltes, even as he is considered universally a very good athlete. Behind Wemby, Scoot, Amen and Ausar, Hendricks provides instantaneous movements and blankets entire sections of the court.

His help rotations need some work, too often pinching in too far or struggling with the complexity of multiple screens, but seemed to do increasingly well as his responsibilities increased. He always plays hard and is ready to be challenged. He does not let up easy layups, as he has the tools to make plays at the rim from distance.

The biggest issue with Hendricks is his lack of any real craft inside on offense, defaulting to a quick jumper instead of trying to solve those problems. But mitigating that is that fact that, well, his quick jumpers are really good. He has displayed some passing creativity, if not consistent advantage creation, but also hunts drive angles and is able to get his body lower to the ground than you’d think to maximize angles.

I came into this watch considering Taylor Hendricks an easy top 20 but probably not top 10, certainly not top 8 prospect. Now I think he could finish top 5 in the class eventually, and his warts are maybe not as bad as those talked around him, given the flashes of sky-high upside.

Results: a top 10-worthy pick

Keyonte George, Baylor

• vs. all competition: 4.7
• vs. top 100 competition: 3.9
• vs. top 50 competition: 2.9

Keyonte George’s projection is complicated by unusual usage, often the third guard on Baylor parked in the slot. At IMG Academy he had more clearcut combo guard duties, where he had more priority in the offense to take advantage of above-the-break spacing. George, as well as upperclassmen Adam Flagler and LJ Cryer, took turns initiating, and with little interior threat, often had to do so within single possessions.

A more fluid offense will benefit George mightily at the next level, where his combination of skills is compelling. In particular, Keyonte has lightning quick processing off the catch, able to whip the ball to open teammates in a flash or rise into his smooth, technically sound release. That optionality, in addition to proficiency out of the pick and roll, where Synergy ranks him in the 81^st percentile on possessions that ended in his shots or passes, give him a valued skillset at the NBA level.

Where the tape turns against George, however, is placing his athleticism against NBA athletes, a major part of the story when his production drops against better competition. First, it’s simply easy to get Keyonte out of frame by targeting him on defense. At 6’4’’ and more SG than PG, Keyonte does not have the lateral quickness or length to contest after being screen or on distance close-outs.

On offense, again we see the combination of short for position and slow-footed for position reflect poorly on his ability to create much distance off the dribble. His side step into a three is very good, an important sign of developing counters to otherwise lackluster space creation. In particular, if he can develop a stampede step or heavy crossover into a Harden-style double-stepback (first onto one foot, then two), those types of menu items could launch him into stardom.

Right now, however, I see an extremely useful offensive player who could grease the wheels regardless of landing spot.

Results: The elite is elite and obstacles are obvious; what level of starter could he be remains a major question mark

GG Jackson, South Carolina

• vs. all competition: -0.5 BPM
• vs. top 100 teams: -1.6 BPM
• vs. top 50 teams:  -1.9 BPM

GG’s numbers were ugly no matter how you sliced the competition, but saw his assist and steal rates deteriorate the most as the opponents improved. Jackson was in a rare spot for a freshmen, with only Collin Sexton, Markelle Fultz, Jabari Parker, RJ Barrett, Jaylen Brown and D’Angelo Russell taking on greater usage all over the court as high major freshmen. That entire crew had over 100 attempts from the rim, midrange, three and free throw line in their sole NCAA season with usage at 30% or higher, an astronomical task for a freshman-aged player. Factor in how GG was not just young, but the youngest player in all of college basketball, and you get an even more unusual burden. Then, put on top of that the context of South Carolina being not just bad, but not even a top 200 team, and I understand if you’re throwing up your hands in confusion.

GG has earned a reputation as a chucker with low feel for the game, descriptions that may be correct at cursory glance but I believe to not hold up to further inspection. First of all, the context around him really is that bad. Factoring into how tight he was covered, his efficiency for both guarded and unguarded catch and shoot is both exactly league average.

Jackson’s efficiency was worst in isolation possessions, as, on a team with no other advantage creators outside of him, opponents could send as much help as they wanted. Lack of entry passing ability meant early seals or hard cuts would go unrewarded, though Jackson still kept making them. So he not just leaned on isolation possessions, but ended up #15 in the NCAA in iso possessions at 103.

When South Carolina’s lone traditional big sat, Jackson’s efficiency improved a significant degree (). It is true his passing creativity and vision is poor, but he is still able to zip establishing passes to keep an offense in rhythm (when he’s not in iso). An off-ball role would benefit him tremendously, as his turnover rate dropped significantly and efficiency was average to excellent in all of off-screen, roll man, putback, cut and spot up opportunities.

I believe in Jackson as a lottery bet on his ability to even take up this amount of offense on his shoulders, built with broad shoulders and a lightning quick second leap to make his presence consistently felt. His shooting form looks great to me, and ability to execute complex footwork at his size is often shocking. Those traits are what are valuable in isolation, with an inevitably better team context giving him upside we likely cannot yet discern.

Results: the most unusual context, but I see a future NBA scorer

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First, they dive into Nick Smith’s limited college sample and how his skill set translates to the NBA level before discussing Keyonte George’s spectacular shotmaking from beyond the arc and potential as an offensive engine. They wrap the episode with the overwhelming defense of Cason Wallace and his inevitable success in the NBA.

The post Ep 10: Combo Crazy: Nick Smith Jr, Keyonte George, and Cason Wallace appeared first on Swish Theory.

Keyonte George ended his high school career as a consensus five-star recruit and Top 10 prospect. He started this scouting cycle off with a bang during an electric run of performances playing with Baylor at GLOBL JAM over the summer. Keyonte is one of the premier guard scorers of this draft class and his entire bag was on display with crafty finishes, handle fluidity, off ball movement and pull-up shot creation beyond the arc. Paired with a defensive intensity rarely seen in star guard scorers, George has all the makings of a lottery pick entering his freshman year.

Offense

Keyonte is a shooter, first and foremost. His form is clean and compact both off the catch and off the bounce. Extending out to the college and NBA three point line should not be an issue, he has confidence pulling up from well beyond the arc without needing to drastically change his form. With his quick release and elevated set point George should be a formidable shooter even with a strong contest. Shooting is George’s signature skill and he has real star upside if he can continue to add to his repertoire.

While Keyonte has thrived as a shot maker, most of his looks come off the catch or out of the pick and roll, where he can step into his jumper. He has flashes of creativity handling the ball and getting downhill but does not yet possess the bevy of step-backs and space creation tricks you see in star shot creators. The mechanics of his jumper off the bounce are promising and should pay dividends as he grows more confident and creative getting to his spots. 

George is strong with solid short-area quickness but is not an incredibly explosive vertical athlete. He is able to get into the paint with his nimble handle and well timed cuts but struggles to finish through size and length at the rim. He does a good job absorbing contact both on the drive and in the air but could stand to be a little more creative as a finisher. He wasn’t asked to create much for others in high school but he showed flashes of vision and accuracy. Reading the defense and finding open teammates more consistently would help to counteract some of his difficulties finishing in traffic.

Defense

Defensively Keyonte is a fiery competitor. He has a strong build and thrives guarding in isolation, walling of ball handlers and playing with his chest. There are few guards in this class with George’s combination of tenacity and strength as a defender. He uses his power and quickness well fighting through screens and should be a formidable option at the point of attack. There are occasional lapses in technique and awareness, but those are things that should clean up with time. George has the tools and aptitude to be an impact defender moving forward. 

As an off-ball defender Keyonte has moments of brilliance rotating from the wing to pick off passes but has recurring moments of disengagement. He does a good job fighting through screens off-ball but often reacts late, left chasing his man well behind the play despite his efficient screen navigation. Remaining engaged both in help and tracking his man off-ball would go a long way towards shoring up his defensive output.

There may not be a better college situation for George to clean up around the edges of his defensive game. With the help-heavy scheme Baylor deploys under the defensive minded Scott Drew, Keyonte should have plenty of opportunity for growth. Scott Drew and his staff at Baylor have done an excellent job developing two-way guards in recent history and Keyonte should fit like a glove.

Overview

Keyonte George kicked off draft season before most of his counterparts and did so in spectacular fashion at GLOBL JAM. Entering the year he feels like a safe bet to go in the lottery, fueled by flashes of brilliant shot-making and voracious defense. If he can remain engaged defensively and improve his rim pressure, the sky is the limit. Every year of development is of the utmost importance for teenage prospects and Keyonte could not have chosen a better fit for this upcoming season. If the summer was any indication of what’s to come, George may find his way into the top five.

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