We are in the middle of the greatest era of parity in NBA history. With the Oklahoma City Thunder crowned champions, there have been seven different Finals winners in seven years, a new record; only once have we had five consecutive new winners. The days of the superteam and big market dominance are fading as chaos rules the contender circles. Projecting who is up next feels extremely difficult.

Even after a surprise Eastern Conference Finals run, the Pacers were not expected to come within one game of a championship. And they’re not the only surprise story in recent memory. The fifth-seeded Mavericks made it through the West last year. Everyone remembers the eighth-seeded Heat making it the year before, the third-seeded Warriors the year before that, the third-seeded Bucks the year before that, and the fifth-seeded Heat the year before that.

Granted, the line of delineation is strong. Four teams seeded fourth or lower have made the finals in the past six years, and all four lost. But we came so close to the exception this year. The point is that you can’t predict the future as you used to. Penciling in the Warriors and Cavaliers is no more. A surprise Conference Finals or Finals team is waiting out there, unknown to all.

I’m here to make the case that the Atlanta Hawks are the next surprise team.

The Aerial View

Okay, breathe. If you didn’t close the tab, you’re probably still laughing at me. I get it. The Atlanta Hawks? Contenders? In the National Basketball Association? It sounds ludicrous.

How soon we forget that these Hawks came within two wins of making the Finals just four years ago, when Trae Young scored 48 points on the road in Milwaukee to steal home court advantage in Game 1 of the ECF. I don’t blame you for writing that off as a blip: assuming Clint Capela walks in free agency, only two Hawks from that team remain: Trae Young and Onyeka Okongwu.

The slate has been cleaned for a new iteration of that squad. The premise back then was simple: Trae’s ability to shoulder a colossal offensive load makes life easier for all the role players, allowing them to focus on defending hard and hitting shots. That premise hasn’t changed. But it comes with a new twist.

Bayou Bailout

Before getting into the construction of this team, it’s essential to acknowledge how we’ve gotten here in the last year. At this time last year, Atlanta was coming off a 36-win season. It was the third straight year their winning percentage had declined since that ECF appearance. Dejounte Murray hadn’t made the desired impact next to Trae Young one year into a four-year, $114 million extension. Things looked dire.

Then the New Orleans Pelicans stepped in.

Dejounte Murray was shipped to the Bayou in a package that included Dyson Daniels, Larry Nance Jr., Cody Zeller, EJ Liddell, and two first-round picks. The first pick was a 2025 Lakers choice that ended up 22nd overall, the second least favorable of New Orleans and Milwaukee in 2027. The last three players are all off the roster, but Dyson Daniels is going nowhere.

He finished second in DPOY voting in his first year with the Hawks. His breakout changed Atlanta’s fortunes significantly (if only someone had seen it coming!) That alone would make the Murray trade worth it. The way Atlanta used the picks afterwards only makes it look worse for New Orleans.

At the past trade deadline, Atlanta traded Bogdan Bogdanović for Terance Mann, Bones Hyland, and three second-round picks. That left them with Mann starting his three-year, $47 million veteran extension, an overpay for a low-impact wing. Packaging Mann and Georges Niang with that 22nd pick from New Orleans landed them Kristaps Porzingis earlier this week. Now they’ve gotten two impact starters for Murray, and still have a pick in 2027 to play with.

And, it may not be the worst trade for New Orleans between the two. During the 2025 NBA Draft’s first round, the Pelicans sent a 2026 unprotected pick and the 23rd pick to the Hawks for the 13th pick. Atlanta ended up taking Georgia forward Asa Newell at 23, who they were rumored to be eyeing at 13. And now they have a pick almost sure to be a lottery choice in next year’s loaded class at the top. The Hawks still came away with a useful rotation player and now own one of the most valuable assets any playoff-hopeful team owns.

To sum it up: by trading with the Pelicans, Atlanta turned Murray and the 13th pick into Dyson Daniels, Kristaps Porzingis, Asa Newell, a 2026 unprotected New Orleans first, a 2027 first from New Orleans or Milwaukee, and a second-round pick from the Celtics. That’s the rock upon which this Hawks team is built. The fallout from these two trades will echo for these franchises throughout the next decade or more.

Offseason Additions

Kristaps Porzingis was Atlanta’s big domino. I’d be surprised if they got a bigger name or impact player. That’s no knock on Kristaps; his +3.6 EPM last season was a 96th-percentile mark. He’s been in the 96th or 97th percentile four years running. But their powder remains dry, with many avenues for addition. But more on why he is a great fit later.

Atlanta had three primary weapons at their disposal this offseason: a $25M trade exception (from the Dejounte deal – gift that keeps giving), a $13M trade exception (Bogdan deal), and the non-taxpayer mid-level exception for $14M. They used those financial weapons to make some significant additions.

First and foremost, Atlanta used the Murray exception to pick up Nickeil Alexander-Walker. I’m not saying the Hawks read my writing, but that’s two straight offseasons where they’ve picked up one of my Finding a Role breakout candidates. Hawks, I’m on to you. The terms of the sign-and-trade are window dressing to fit him into the exception. They sent a far-off second-round pick. Well worth it to add a high-level rotation player without counting against the cap.

NAW fits so perfectly into the vision Atlanta is outlining. He is a confident shooter who is lights out from the corners and is passable from above the break. While turnover-prone, he is an aggressive passer who can make reads above expectation for an off-ball wing. I love his floor sense and the way he moves around to find spots offensively. And that’s not where his value comes from.

2025 was something of a down year statistically, but he is an elite perimeter defender. NAW had 94th and 98th defensive EPM marks in 2023 and 2024. He’s one of the best screen navigators in the league and gives Atlanta another exceptional perimeter defense option alongside Dyson Daniels. Atlanta hit it out of the park getting Alexander-Walker, and they weren’t done there.

Since this deal folds into a trade exception, they retained the full mid-level exception. That gave them room to add another rotation player, and they did so in getting Luke Kennard. Part of my offseason wishlist was getting a genuine shooter; few are better than Kennard. Few players are better at high-volume above-the-break three-point shooting than Kennard. He’s not much of a defender, but Atlanta has the infrastructure to insulate him, even as a bench piece.

It’s wise to get him on a one-year deal. Trade exceptions are significant, but the bill comes due the following year. Trae Young has a player option after the upcoming season, and Dyson Daniels also needs to get paid. Between Porzingis and Kennard, that’s over $40 million in expiring money. If this team doesn’t meet expectations, they have avenues to retool with or without Trae Young. But I am entirely sold on this team, and let’s get into why.

Pulling Elements from Contenders

Atlanta is pulling pieces together, but what is the vision? When I see the NBA Finals teams, I see two formulas the Hawks are trying to emulate. Let’s get into how they’re trying to imitate the Thunder first.

We all know the Thunder won a championship with elite defense. But the elements building that defense are interesting. They have tons of depth, going from an incredible defensive starting lineup to bench pieces like Cason Wallace and Alex Caruso. These players have size, enormous wingspans, and are super athletic. Most importantly, they steal the ball like crazy. OKC led the league in steals per game, fueling their transition offense where those athletes could get out and run.

You know who was second in steals? The Atlanta Hawks. Almost a third of those came from Dyson Daniels alone, who had the best pilfering season of the 21st century. This isn’t some gimmick one-off. Look at their new projected starting lineup next to Trae Young: 6’8″ Dyson Daniels, 6’8″ Zaccharie Risacher, 6’9″ Jalen Johnson, and 7’2″ Kristaps Porzingis. That unit averaged a combined 7.2 steals per game last season. Together, and healthy, I’d expect that number to go up.

The big element is how this benefits Trae. He’s a better defender than people give him credit for, but still not great. If your weak link can get steals on the ball or work in passing lanes off the ball while the other four cover up for him, that’s an additive value. It’s the same thing Shai Gilgeous-Alexander does for the Thunder. Granted, he’s about half a foot taller, but that’s the tradeoff for what Trae brings offensively. And that’s where the Pacers’ formula comes into play.

If you want to find the next team to win with pace, look at the Hawks. They were third in pace this past season. Trae Young’s presence will always boost your speed and playmaking; Atlanta also finished second in total assists per game. But it’s not about having one high-level ball mover; it’s about others that keep that flow in motion. After their offseason moves, Atlanta can have as many as nine players who averaged multiple assists per game.

Jalen Johnson and Dyson Daniels are good secondary ball movers. Nickeil Alexander-Walker and Luke Kennard both find the right swing passes. Kristaps Porzingis and Onyeka Okongwu have above-average feel for the center spot. The new additions can multiply this team’s collective court feel to create a Pacers-esque environment where everyone can pass in a pinch. Coach Quin Snyder should push this team to keep the ball moving after Trae or Jalen create advantages.

The secret to the Pacers was ball movement without carelessness. Indiana as a team finished third in assists per game with the third-lowest turnover rate. The Thunder were the same; though they didn’t share the ball movement prowess of the Pacers, they had the ball stolen from them less than any NBA team.

This leads to the problems the Hawks have to solve to attempt to emulate these contenders. They coughed the ball up a LOT last year. Trae Young is a very risky passer, and while it often pays off, it leads to a lot of transition going the other way. Atlanta needs to build an environment of smarter ball handlers so they can tip the transition scales in their favor. As I wrote about a few weeks ago, steals are only increasing in their value. If Atlanta can keep a top-five steal rate while getting an average turnover rate, they’ll have a huge advantage.

Atlanta checked every box on the wishlist. Kristaps gives them elite center size, will stretch the floor in high PNR, and can swing the ball. Nickeil Alexander-Walker gives them multiple elite perimeter defenders, increasing their depth and lineup optionality. Kennard gives them a lights-out shooter. And they did all this while staying under the tax and adding future assets. It’s an absurd coup of an offseason to get significantly better in the short AND long term.

Draft Additions

Luckily for me, we have a Hawks and draft expert on hand at the Swish Theory. Why talk about things I’m not as qualified to discuss as our own Ahmed Jama? So, here are Ahmed’s thoughts on the Asa Newell addition.

My favorite aspect of the Asa Newell pick (besides the additional draft capital the team acquired in the process) is that the team already has proof of concept with the role Asa projects to play. Newell is a relentless rebounder who finishes extremely well at the rim, projects to be a credible lob threat, and should be able to guard every frontcourt position.

For Hawks fans, this sales pitch should sound familiar and reminiscent of a recently departed Hawk, John Collins. Although the tail end of Collins’ tenure may have left a bitter taste in the mouth of fans who’d expected a more linear development in Collins’ finishing and decision making, Collins undeniably outperformed his draft position. And if Asa Newell could contribute close to Collins’ level during his Hawks tenure, this would be an undeniable win for the team.

However, a few roadblocks are standing in the way of Newell achieving the level of success John Collins was able to reach during his time with the Hawks. First, we must begin with what defined Collins’ tenure with the Hawks: rim-running. Even though Newell finished 19th in the country in total dunks (3rd amongst freshmen), he was far from an effective rim-runner this past season. Newell finished the season scoring 0.931 PPP (points per possession) on rolls to the basket, and was in the 23rd percentile in efficiency in the ‘P&R Roll-Man’ playtype.

When considering these numbers, discussing the context of the team Newell played in the past season is essential. Georgia had some of the worst guard play of any high-major team. Their guards were both ineffective as scorers and inconsistent as facilitators. This personnel, paired with a highly congested and stagnant offense this past season, erased clean rolls to the basket for Newell and drastically affected the degree of difficulty on these plays. But despite Newell’s inefficiency as a roller, he still managed to finish over 70% at the rim, which is truly impressive for someone who wasn’t a full-time big. Newell was so effective as a finisher because of his persistence on the glass.

Newell’s offensive rebounding prowess could also be a boon to the Hawks’ defense. While the Hawks finished as the 18th-ranked defense by Defensive Rating, they were tied for 21st in fastbreak points allowed. Opponents, not fearing the Hawks’ mediocre offensive rebounding unit, predicated on an undersized frontcourt, could leak out and rack up easy baskets in transition. Newell’s presence on the offensive glass should limit these easy fastbreak opportunities for teams and establish a more physical identity in the frontcourt.

Overall, while Asa Newell may not be the flashiest player for the Hawks’ long-term future, I believe he can be an integral member of a frontcourt rotation, becoming increasingly capable of augmenting Trae Young’s strengths and compensating for his deficiencies. Although the Hawks are still lacking in size compared to most NBA frontcourts, Newell’s range defensively and ability to play in the open court add to the identity of a team that finished 3rd in pace this past season, even without Jalen Johnson and his grab-and-go talents for a large swath of the season. Asa Newell is the rare draft pick who fits into both the best player available AND best fit categories for the Hawks. And putting my draft analyst cap aside for a moment, it is truly refreshing to see the front office make such a shrewd move.

Internal Growth

One crucial element to remember here: the youth of this team. Kristaps Porzingis is now the oldest Hawk at 30 years old. Kennard is 29, NAW and Trae are 27, Okongwu is 25, Jalen is 24, Dyson is 22, and Risacher is 20. The vast majority of this rotation is on the upswing.

Sure, Porzingis is getting bogged down by injury. Trae has remained at a fringe All-NBA level for years. Kennard is what he is. But the rest of this team has more meat on the bone. I am bullish on more offensive growth for Dyson Daniels and NAW. Jalen Johnson should compete for an All-Star spot as his explosive development continues. Risacher now has a year under his belt and can get more bench minutes. Onyeka Okongwu continues to get better as he shifts to a backup role.

If these players stopped developing, this would still be a strong team. And I’d be willing to bet that more of them will progress than regress. Development isn’t linear, but they have a great core that’s young and flexible.

I love how the Hawks have positioned themselves to make a deep run in the upcoming season and, if they’re lucky, for years to come. Get on the hype train now before it leaves the station.

The post Atlanta Hawks: The NBA’s Next Sneaky Contender appeared first on Swish Theory.

This may sound like I’m being critical, but I’m not. Long-term star injuries for contenders are rightfully watershed moments in NBA thinking, especially regarding team building. How can you not? The same moment happened when Kevin Durant grabbed his leg in Toronto during the 2019 Finals. And given the cascading effect of that injury, we were right to speculate wildly.

Although the Celtics are unlikely to experience the catastrophic post-injury season that Golden State went through, many of the same assumptions apply. The team won’t be contending this upcoming season. Their immediate window is over. Tough questions will have to be asked of the roster. The question for me becomes, can the Boston Celtics use this tragic injury to their benefit in the long run?

Key Assumptions

Those reading this most likely fall under the umbrella of NBA sicko-dom. You follow Keith Smith, you’ve opened Spotrac to check on contracts, and you can list CBA rules off the top of your head. You know, normal people stuff. The average NBA fan has some idea of how the salary cap works, but the motivations of NBA front offices/ownership groups and the avenues to accomplish their goals may be more of a mystery. My first assumption is that most people who wear Celtics hats don’t understand the ramifications of the salary cap.

The worst-kept secret in the NBA is that everybody fears the consequences of the luxury tax. Even Warriors owner Joe Lacob, with a franchise seemingly doubling in value yearly and a line of minority investors in Patagonia quarter-zips around the block, feared the tax. The Boston Celtics hit their tax window perfectly, setting up a two-year run of having Jayson Tatum, Jaylen Brown, Jrue Holiday, Kristaps Porzingis, and Derrick White all paid their worth. That first season resulted in a championship. The second, as we know, was a tragedy. My second assumption is that no matter how these playoffs went, the bill was coming due, and a slash-and-burn salary dumping was coming this offseason.

But the dollar figure is secondary here. What matters most are the restrictions associated with salary cap overages. New ownership will want a clean slate upon which to build a new team instead of being beholden to the transactions of the old regime. This leads us to the number that will define Boston’s offseason.

$19,959,873

The second apron is the word you’ll hear a lot this offseason. That amount you see above is the projected dollar amount Boston needs to cut to get below that figure. The second apron is extremely restrictive for a team that will need to be nimble over the next few seasons.

First and foremost, it stops you from aggregating multiple outgoing salaries together in trades or taking in more money than you send out. As long as they’re above the apron, Boston cannot send out multiple players in a single trade, and their cap number can only decrease in any trade. This, by itself, is very limiting. On top of that, if you spend three out of five years in the second apron, your first-round pick automatically becomes the 30th overall pick. It also limits the future draft picks you can trade.

The goal of this new CBA was to promote parity around the league, spread the talent out, make dynasties harder to form over years, and engage every fan base. When you’re the Boston Celtics, having five players making $28+ million is like walking into a bear den with your pockets full of beef jerky.

Boston’s championship team was $5 million above the second apron, and this year’s team was $4.4 million over. Don’t just take this prediction from me: Wyc Grousbeck, the newly former Celtics owner, said it himself. Since the draft pick penalty rolls over five years, the Celtics would have their first-round picks moved to #30 in several upcoming seasons. They would need to duck the second apron for three consecutive seasons to avoid further penalties.

In short, if the Celtics don’t find a way to shed this money, they’ll be strung up by their ankles trying to improve this roster in the coming years. Jayson Tatum is 27 years old, Jaylen Brown is 28 years old, and the two project to have many great years of basketball ahead of them. This limitation on their roster-building capabilities would be tough to overcome. Now, let’s figure out how Boston can get under this.

One last number to consider here: 13. Boston has to enter the season with at least 13 players to meet the league minimum requirement. As things stand, they have 12 under contract for next year. So all moves will need to keep that target number in mind.

The Jrue Holiday Issue

Jrue is the first and foremost player in these conversations. This season was the first year of a four-year, $134 million extension Holiday signed after the championship run. They wanted to take care of him for the chance at back-to-back titles, but it has been clear he would be one of the first to go, especially as he declines going into his age-35 season.

This article isn’t about speculating who Boston can acquire; you’re all adults capable of working a trade machine. This is about the math needed for a route to cap relief. So here’s the breakdown on what Boston can do to whittle down that $20 million tax overage, starting with Jrue’s $32.4M salary.

Boston must take back at least 80% of Jrue’s salary in a two-team deal. Assuming they can find a deal to take back the minimum, whether one player or multiple, that would be $6.48M in savings. That’s roughly a third of the number needed. It gets even more interesting when you take three-team deals into account. The 80% rule doesn’t have to go all the way around. Boston can send Jrue to one team, then that team can send the 80% of Jrue’s salary to a third team, who can in turn send 80% of THAT salary back to Boston.

If GM Brad Stevens can make a three-team deal work at the minimum amount, Boston could take back a minimum of $20.74M. That would be $11.66M in total savings, more than half of the number needed. Assuming this gets done by acquiring two or more players, that would also put Boston at or above the 13 minimum required players. Now, we’re left with some flexibility and several ways to get the remaining $8.3M off the books.

Remaining Options

I will take a leap here and assume that neither Jayson Tatum nor Jaylen Brown will be dealt. That leaves a few avenues for the remaining money.

First, and most obviously, they can move on from Kristaps Porzingis and his expiring $30.7M salary. If Boston again takes back the minimum salary in a two-team deal, that’s $6.14M in savings. Expanding to a three-team deal, the Celtics could save up to $11M; only taking back $19.7M in the exchange. That could cover the tax amount needed, but something else comes into play: the upcoming draft. Boston owns the 28th and 32nd overall picks, and assuming they draft and keep players at both those slots, that salary would put them back into the apron.

There are avenues to overcome this. Neemias Queta, Xavier Tillman, and Jordan Walsh all have minimum-level deals that could be salary dumped into the cap room of another team, or traded for non-guaranteed contracts that Boston can then waive. But it would be tight and would cut into their 13-player roster minimum.

Another option would be Sam Hauser and his $10M salary. His contract is small enough to be traded into an exception or cap room for teams with cleaner salary sheets. That and some trades involving the minimum deals above would accomplish the task. This would be even tougher to navigate with the player minimums, however. Turning Hauser and one or more others into zero returning players would put extra pressure on a Jrue Holiday trade to include three or more players coming back.

I lean towards Porzingis being the solution here. His expiring deal and dip in play this year make him an obvious candidate. Hauser did have a down year, but he fits the system well and is on the books for four more years. Trading Hauser for other players wouldn’t accomplish much due to the tax problems. So, of the more obvious solutions after Jrue, Kristaps makes the most sense.

However, Porzingis and Hauser aren’t the only solutions to this.

The Nuclear Option

One assumption I’ve made up until this point is that Boston is making these moves with the intention of returning to the fray with the same core after Tatum is healthy. Their star wing pairing, plus Derrick White and Payton Pritchard, can all stay on the roster while they duck the second apron. That would almost certainly make them a playoff team in a weak East next year with Brown, White, Pritchard, and whatever they get back for the above trades.

But there are alternatives. What if Boston looks at Derrick White, about to turn 31 and begin a four-year, $118 million extension, as a potential negative asset by the time Tatum returns? After all, defense-first guards tend to fall off cliffs sooner than expected. Perhaps Boston thinks it can get out of the casino before going bust by trading White to a more immediate contender, getting a big haul of picks, and truly re-tooling.

Pritchard is another question. His four-year, $30 million extension is an absolute steal for the Sixth Man of the Year. His upcoming $6.7M salary wouldn’t solve the tax problems by itself, but that low salary would certainly up his price in a potential deal.

Perhaps Boston thinks it can trim the fat on declining or less essential players and try to run it back in 2026-27. An alternative would be to trade White, Pritchard, and Hauser in addition to Holiday for short-term deals and let Porzingis stick around. That would clear a whopping $83.8 million, and open up nearly $60 million in cap room for the season when Tatum returns.

It would be a whole lot of uncertainty. That level of teardown could rip apart the fabric of Boston’s culture. Even if the internal promises to Tatum/Brown indicate this isn’t a true rebuild, it’s hard to trust someone on their word if the results are poor. There is the risk that if you break things apart you may be unable to build them again. But it could potentially raise the ceiling of the team once Tatum is back in the fold.

Which Way, Butler Man?

If you’ve taken anything away from this, know that Boston will be saying some tough goodbyes this offseason. And that general manager Brad Stevens will have many ways to accomplish this.

The fans’ goodwill after this injury effectively buys you a season to do what is needed. The title expectations are on hiatus. Stevens could trim salary, retain the core, and acquire some flexibility. Or he can take significant steps to reload Boston’s draft picks and try to fill as many rotation spots as possible with draft picks, enabling them to take a chance on acquiring more star talent.

There are so many variables at play here. Does the core want to stay? Will Al Horford wish to come back to a team that won’t be able to contend next season? Can stud head coach Joe Mazzulla coach a 45-win team the same way he can coach a 60-win team? Is Boston willing to risk getting Milwaukee’d by seeing one of their outgoing players end up on a team they’ll have to face in coming years, as Jrue Holiday did with their team? Most variable of all, does Boston believe that Tatum can come back strong after such a devastating injury?

I’d be surprised if any team is more active in trade calls this offseason. It’s an unusual position for a high-profile team to be quasi-sellers with two All-Stars on the roster, but thems the breaks. When that Shams Charania notification about Boston trading a piece away hits your phone this summer, you’ll know why these deals are being done.

The post The Boston Celtics Rebuild Window appeared first on Swish Theory.

The youth are here to take over, yes. The old gods are dead and buried. There is no James, Curry, or Durant in this year’s final four. Even as their powers diminished, those four appeared in four of the last five conference finals. There’s not even a Jimmy Butler, who has made three of the last five.

Parity is another word looming large over this postseason. Since the Warriors dynasty broke apart, the 20 conference finals representatives have been comprised of 12 different teams. Much of the repetition comes out East, by far the weaker conference: the Celtics and Heat have 7 of the 10 ECF showings. Out West, the Nuggets, Mavericks, and Lakers have repeatedly appeared. Yet two conference finals in 5 years don’t scream dominance. More than ever, it feels like everyone has a shot.

That sentiment plays into an even more important theme in my eyes. When you look at the teams that have made deep runs, this year most of all, they took huge swings in acquiring talent. In this era of parity, those who push their chips in first are being rewarded. I want to explore the importance of forcing the window open and the rewards of temerity vs. the cost of timidness.

Dallas Swings, Thunder Go Down Looking

The Mavs-Thunder series is the clearest example of this idea. It’s frankly incredible how directly the trade ties between these two teams caused this series to shift.

Go back to the draft. Dallas owned a lottery choice but seemed intent on moving it to shed salary, and landed on sending Davis Bertans (and most importantly his $17M salary) with the 10th pick to Oklahoma City for the 12th pick. It’s hard to argue with the selections both teams made – OKC taking Cason Wallace while Dereck Lively II fell to Dallas – but the large trade exception Dallas created was huge. Sam Presti was handing an undeserved bailout to the Mavericks.

That exception was used to acquire Richaun Holmes, not exactly a game-changing acquisition, but it enabled them to do several things. After creating extra cap room, Dallas was able to acquire Grant Williams via sign-and-trade with Boston. Williams and Holmes did not pan out but became important salary ballast at the deadline. And this is where Oklahoma City only made things harder on themselves.

On February 8th, Dallas shipped out Holmes and Williams along with salary and picks for Daniel Gafford and P.J. Washington. Not only would these trades have been impossible without OKC’s draft night deal, but they helped even further by exchanging 2028 picks with Dallas to open up a 2024 first Dallas could use in these deals. It gave them the ammo needed to make two big deadline swings.

Meanwhile, Oklahoma City made calls but ultimately settled on a bunt single of a trade in acquiring Gordon Hayward at the deadline. Now fast forward to the conference semifinals to see the impact of those deals.

Gafford recorded 11/7.5/1.3 with 2 blocks per game across 6 matchups with OKC. P.J. Washington was murder for the Thunder, recording 18/8/2 averages while hitting a ridiculous 47% of his 8.2 threes per game. Fittingly, Washington’s free throws at the end of Game 6 closed out the series. Gordon Hayward managed 15 inconsequential minutes in the series. Sam Presti effectively sold the Mavericks a pair of knives only to watch his team be stabbed to death by said knives. One team swung, another watched, and the swinging team ended up moving on.

And they weren’t the only team undone by their own mistakes.

Minnesota Pays Up, Denver Counts Coins

If you follow the NBA on a deeper level, you’re probably aware of the Kroenke vibe. They’re willing to cut checks for big players when necessary but will always find a way to cut costs in the end. This loss to Minnesota felt like a culmination of the pitfalls that philosophy comes with.

Minnesota threw a contract at GM Tim Connelly that Denver did not want to match, and it seemed prudent after last season as GM Calvin Booth helmed a championship team. Yet it was clear to all that it was Connelly who had his prints all over the squad. The entire starting lineup, one that dominated the 2023 playoffs, was drafted or acquired by Connelly before his departure. The Timberwolves saw what he could do and put unequivocal faith in him to build a team that could dismantle his creation.

The Rudy Gobert trade was unfairly maligned at the time and took only a year to prove everyone wrong as he anchored the best defense in the league. While Minnesota took more swings to improve on this Gobert team (acquiring Mike Conley, signing Nickeil Alexander-Walker, and extending their stars) Denver was content with what they had after the title. Calvin Booth told Bruce Brown not to let the door hit him on the way out. They acquired more picks to try and hit through the draft instead of getting proven talent to augment a championship roster.

When these two teams faced off, it was clear what kind of impact these moves made. Minnesota had more depth, more athleticism, and a feeling of confidence that Denver could not match. The stars performed, yes, but the role guys made the difference in the series. NAW’s defense and shooting confidence played a role. Mike Conley hit timely shot after timely shot. And on Denver’s side, guys like Christian Braun and Peyton Watson could not affect the series when the stars sat. If only there was a playmaking and defending wing Denver had in their grasp.

The throughlines of this between the two squads aren’t quite as clear as Dallas and OKC, but you can see how aggression from Minnesota’s front office won over Denver’s complacency. That’s why Minnesota is fighting for its deepest run in franchise history while Denver hits the racing track.

Knicks, Pacers Going Out On Their Shields

Regardless of who won that series, nobody could argue the Pacers or Knicks were withholding chips. Both teams went pedal to the metal during this season and reaped the rewards.

Indiana took perhaps the biggest swing of the entire deadline in acquiring Pascal Siakam, and he responded by powering them through the first two rounds of the playoffs as their leading scorer. Much hand-wringing was done when the deal was made, yet nobody can argue with the results as Indiana reaches their first conference finals in a decade.

The Knicks took an even larger amount of swings. They made moves for OG Anunoby, Bojan Bogdanovic, Alec Burks, Precious Achiuwa, and Donte DiVincenzo over this past year. Donte and OG were among the primary reasons why the Knicks could win a street fight-type series against the Sixers despite the absence of Julius Randle. Had they not completely fallen apart with injuries (I am looking at you with malice, Tom Thibodeau) it feels like they would be playing Boston right now.

Sure, you could argue trading Obi Toppin to the Pacers this offseason burned them. But Toppin was buried on the depth chart at the time and would have likely fallen further behind after that bevy of acquisitions. And a 10 PPG role player who is generally heinous on defense isn’t going to be the one who got away.

Both teams swung, and both teams reaped huge rewards. And it gave them a puncher’s chance against the beasts of the East, another team not shy to make moves.

Boston Doesn’t Back Down

As previously mentioned discussing the parity of the league, only the Heat could match Boston in conference finals appearances over the previous four seasons. Yet those three showings had resulted in zero titles. In this era of “what have you done for me lately?”, many questions were being asked. Is Jayson Tatum the kind of guy who can lead a title winner? Can Jaylen Brown be his #2? At what point do we shake this up?

Instead of caving to those notions, Brad Stevens doubled and tripled down. He boldly chose to trade Marcus Smart for a better-fitting star in Kristaps Porzingis, needing little draft capital to do so. Then he went even further by taking advantage of the Damian Lillard trade to add Jrue Holiday. Instead of breaking this team apart, he only fortified their chances and was rewarded with a 64-win team that is stampeding through the Eastern Conference.

Even with Porzingis injured and unlikely to return until late in the conference finals, Boston holds a 3-0 series lead over the upstart Pacers and are overwhelming favorites to come out of the East, perhaps fully healthy. Jrue has been the playoff chess piece they needed, taking on important defensive matchups while canning 43% of his 4.7 threes per game. The role players don’t need to hit as hard when you boast Jayson, Jaylen, Jrue, Derrick White, Porzingis, and Al Horford. No team in this league can even hold a candle to that top 6.

Boston chose to push in every chip they could and are being thoroughly rewarded.

What Does This Tell Us?

Yes, young stars are indeed playing a major role. One of these four teams will represent a new title winner. All four are led by a star who is 26 years old or younger.

That only enhances the point here. All four teams could have sat back and gone “Well their primes haven’t even started yet, so we can wait” and chose instead to make short-term moves. The 2024 championship winner will be a team led by young stars whose management chose to force the window open instead of waiting for it to open naturally. The teams that have gone home already by and large chose to sit on their hands and wait.

Contention windows don’t stay open as long as you expect. Sometimes they don’t open at all. If you have the stars capable of delivering a deep run toward the Larry O’Brien trophy, take the swings now before your chance passes. It may pass sooner than you think.

The post Real Contenders Go Down Swinging appeared first on Swish Theory.

On pace to win 65 games, they are running laps around the Eastern Conference. They hold the best net rating in the league and have established themselves as clear title favorites yet again. Boston has not reached these heights in the Jayson Tatum era, which is especially impressive for a team that has played at a 53-win pace since he was drafted.

But the whole regular season is treated as one big “yeah, but” due to their recent playoff failings. Four conference finals appearances in six years have produced just one Finals trip, a gut-punch loss to a Warriors team that was objectively inferior. Not even this level of regular season success can erase that from the minds of observers.

Their search for answers led to the acquisitions of Kristaps Porzingis and Jrue Holiday in the offseason, moving on from reigning 6MOY Malcolm Brogdon and fan icon/former DPOY Marcus Smart. Jrue fills in a lot of what Smart did (and didn’t) do, but Porzingis is a new element entirely for this team. Easily the most well-rounded Celtics big since Kevin Garnett, Porzingis is a player destined to be the swing factor in this title chase.

A major element of change he brings is the post-up game. Porzingis is why Boston has jumped from 24th in post-up frequency last season to 2nd this year. The efficiency has also jumped from 13th to tops in the league. Boston has struggled in the playoffs in large part due to massive offensive droughts, ones in which the team banks on 3-point reliance and fails to generate looks inside the arc. KP’s skills in the post may be the kind of slump-breaker they need when these droughts hit.

Let’s explore how Porzingis’ post-up skills have thrived in Boston.

The Numbers

Porzingis posts up 3.1 times per game, placing him 8th in the entire league. It’s the efficiency that stands out: his 1.40 points per possession leads all players averaging at least one post-up. Elite efficiency and high frequency add up to 4.3 points per game in the post, a mark eclipsed only by Joel Embiid, Nikola Jokic, and Anthony Davis. Not a bad list to be on.

I was curious about what fueled this success before I dove into the film. I tracked every possession by shot type to see where his strengths lie and it blew me away.

Leading the league in post-up efficiency when 70% of the shots are jumpers? Unbelievable. He’s making a remarkable 64% of those looks in addition to a 72% mark on his shots around the rim. How did Porzingis become so dangerous?

Lethal Shooting

This is the real lethal shooting. No moving rims covered in knives, just cold-blooded buckets.

The face-up jumper is the best weapon in his arsenal at a frightening 77.3%. His blend of body control, timing, and touch makes it nearly unguardable. Of course, being taller than every NBA player not named Victor Wembanyama is a huge boon.

Though not as deadly as the face-up shot, the turnaround is his preferred weapon. Porzingis is especially adept at turning over his left shoulder, often needing only one hand for a sort of turnaround push shot. At 56.3% it’s a high-quality part of his bag as well.

Seldom used, the step-back represents only 4.8% of his post-up shots, but it’s still something he can go to when needed. A little variety never hurts.

He’s a lot more than just a pretty jumper when it comes to his efficiency.

Prolific Foul Drawing

Of the 56 players posting up at least once per game, Porzingis has the top free throw rate at 31.7%. His positioning skills, quick release, and Inspector Gadget arms make it extremely difficult for opposing players to avoid contact. It’s very common for defenders to wrap him up when he is posting a mismatch. In addition to the wrap-ups, Porzingis draws plenty of fouls on his jump shot attempts.

There’s a lot more to his post game than just shooting the cover off the ball and drawing fouls. KP is a master of putting himself in positions to succeed, and I want to highlight how he generates optimal post-up chances.

A Master of Opportunism

Kristaps is quick to recognize his opportunities to post up, especially against mismatches. It’s not that teams are comfortable putting smaller defenders on him and living with the result. Porzingis works hard to force the opposing defense into giving him the mismatches he wants to take full advantage of.

Transition leakouts and cross-matching with early seals are a favorite trick of his:

This is how he gets the majority of his rim looks from the post. Get into deep position in transition, seal, then turn and finish before the rest of the defense can organize itself. Simple as that.

In the halfcourt, Porzingis loves to punish switching with his post game. A switch out of the pick and roll is his bread and butter:

Dribble handoffs are another way for Porzingis to force these switches and an equally effective one at that:

If teams are foolish enough to soft switch preemptively, he will feast:

Boston’s proclivity for a 5-out alignment means switching is inevitable, or else they will blow teams out of the water. They can try to take other things away come playoff time but the KP post-ups will be a constant threat. And though most of these looks are generated organically by the flow of the offense, coach Joe Mazzulla loves to sprinkle in some clever backscreen plays to open up chances, utilizing Derrick White‘s superior guard screening:

Come playoff time, these looks will be extremely difficult to take away from Porzingis, and the elite efficiency means a dependable source of offense is present even when all else fails. Not only does it serve to get him repeatable high-value looks, but it can kickstart the offense for the rest of the team.

Quality Post Playmaking

I don’t have access to assist numbers from the post (Second Spectrum, I want you.), but he is a quality post passer while keeping the turnovers down. He’s in the better half of turnover percentage among the aforementioned high-frequency post-up group. There are instances of poor reads or pass placement from the post, to be sure:

Porzingis is pretty good at recognizing opportunities, and even the basic passing reads can lead to easy offense for his teammates:

What impressed me the most was how he manipulated help shifting from the weak side to find shooters or cutters:

He’s no Jokic, but it’s playmaking that will suffice. It’s also an extremely important layer to safeguard his scoring. If you choose to double, he’ll make the right reads to get his teammates involved. If not, he’ll fry you with his jump shot or force a foul. A true pick-your-poison situation.

How Does This Change Boston’s Playoff Outlook?

Even if he scales up slightly in the postseason, the post-up offense he generates represents roughly 5% of their offensive output. It’s not suddenly going to be one of their primary methods of scoring.

What is crucial is when these touches come. When Boston inevitably hits a cold streak from deep, they have a reliable scoring option inside that doesn’t require a drive. They can also play inside-out from their 5-out alignments through his post-ups, generating better looks to help break their slump. It also presents an interesting late-game option. As an alternative to Jayson Tatum’s crunch time “Hey look at me I’m Kobe!” moments, a Porzingis post-up is a viable high-quality look.

As previously mentioned, it’s extremely hard to take post-ups out of the equation entirely. Boston will have an attainable and efficient look at their disposal even in the most dire cold streaks. Margins are thin in the postseason as we know. A timely post jumper here, a kickout there, and a cold streak ended now and then could be the difference in a game, a series, or a title run. You never know.

The post Kristaps Porzingis’ Post-Up Excellence appeared first on Swish Theory.

Wes Unseld Jr. isn’t a coach who receives much national credit, or even attention. But over the past season he put the Wizards in a position to succeed, running one of the more creative offensive schemes in the entire NBA. This is while having a completely flawed roster lacking of high efficiency players and guys who are high-volume from either beyond the arc, or at the rim.

Though I believe ‘location based Field Goal Percentage’ to be a flawed way to analyse what a good offense is, the Wizards roster simply wasn’t built with the ability to generate shots at important areas. They were bottom five in the Cleaning The Glass ‘Location eFG’, a measure of shot location. Generally the teams that rank lowly here are teams with star players who are funneled off the three-point line and walled off from the rim, why Phoenix and Brooklyn are the bottom two; the Wizards certainly do not fit this category.

With this in mind, it may be reasonable to suggest that Unseld’s work with this Wizards offense has been nothing short of spectacular. It’s creative, well oiled and mixes in some absolutely incredible ATO plays at the right times. The numbers may not show this, but the process is excellent and made a completely flawed roster not be a complete eyesore to watch.

Stack Out

The Wizards’ main starting point to get Bradley Beal his touches was out of ‘Stack Out’. Here is the most basic outline of Stack Out.

It’s a screen in the middle of floor to get Beal ‘out’ of the arc. Horns Out would be a more rigid outline but they are admittedly similar. They often have an empty side pick-and-roll as the go-to option out of stack out. It’s an easy way to get Bradley Beal an advantageous position and a way the Wizards can force the ever-popular empty-side actions.

They’ll also use this to get Beal isolation opportunities, especially if a defender is playing tight to him like Matisse Thybulle does below.

This concept isn’t particularly groundbreaking or dripping with creativity, but some of their counters and wrinkles from Stack Out are excellent. This one is their most common- ‘Stack Out Elbow Chicago’.

Porzingis sets the screen for Beal to exit the play. Notice how the Hornets are tight to him. Jordan Goodwin instead pitches the ball to Porzingis and sets a screen for Beal to come off for a Dribble Handoff (Chicago Action). The Hornets switch it and the Wizards get a wide open corner three. The initial stack out entry didn’t really generate anything so they flipped into something else. It’s a great counter and wrinkle to a very simple core play.

Below, they run it for Kyle Kuzma in interesting circumstances.

The Knicks are ready for the action, with Randle essentially top locking Kuzma. Kuzma manages to wriggle free for a more horizontal cut than this action normally would have. But they once again flow into the elbow Chicago counter and get a great look for Kuzma from the mid-range. Good offenses can function when stuff doesn’t go to plan.

On this occasion, the Golden State Warriors scout every part of this play. The Stack Out is covered. The Chicago Action gets top locked. So the Wizards flow into a normal spread pick-and-roll. This is still excellent practice: every potential nail help defender was somewhat occupied trying to stop the initial action. It shows the importance of running creative plays and thinking every step through when installing your offense.

They also like to use stack out to set up double drags, usually with the initial passer being a screener.

Kuzma comes off the screen, and with Anthony Gordon trying to execute ‘No Middle’ Kuzma goes into a give-and-go with Daniel Gafford for an easy look at the rim. Double Drags often force opposition defenders to gather at the top of the key, and they execute an excellent counter.

Delay

Washington runs one of the more creative Delay packages in the NBA. They have a lot of size on the wings so they can execute a variety of counters. Porzingis’ natural exterior spacing and Daniel Gafford’s interior spacing also made the actions fruitful and make a great deal of sense. The Wizards’ Delay package is full of counters, interesting reads and these were ran smoothly by the players, which is something I look at when analysing offenses.

Delay is a five-out concept. It is defined by a big handling the ball at the top, with two players on either side of him. Below is the basic outline of delay.

The most common read from this is Delay Chicago. This involves a player coming off a screen before receiving a handoff from the player at the top of the key. They run it below to get Kendrick Nunn an easy driving lane.

This isn’t a particularly exotic read, every team in the NBA runs it. But it is generally the starting point for any Delay package. Washington probably runs this between 5-6 times a game if not more. What is more interesting is some of their direct counters from Delay Chicago.

Teams like to try and get ahead of Chicago action. Washington’s off-ball players are good at knowing when to cut backdoor.

Here, Anthony Gill cuts backdoor as Jonathan Kuminga tries to get ahead of the game. It seems simple but the speed with which it’s done is impressive.

Washington also ‘rejects’ the Delay Chicago action to push empty side actions for Bradley Beal, such as below.

Beal fakes a screen for Anthony Gill and punishes the pair of them punish the Nets trying to pre-switch it. Gill clears out and Beal darts to take the handoff. His speed of thought and action creates a switch and they end up with a good shot based off the threat of the Empty Side Action.

Below they create the empty side from Delay in a slightly different way.

Gafford initiates the action. The Clippers switch the action so Gafford keeps the handoff to himself and instead runs it through Monte Morris. They again get a great look on empty side actions. Pushing for the best actions when you have limited personnel is always a great strategy and this is another simple and well-oiled way Washington gets to it.

They also mix Delay-Chicago action into their Sideline Out of Bounds (SLOB) plays. Here they get into it through their Zipper SLOB series.

Gafford is a non threat moving away from the basket in out-of-bounds possessions to any defense, but they turn him into one by running a highly effective action. I’ll have more on Washington’s out-of-bounds plays later on.

Washington also regularly runs an action similar to Chicago called ‘Delay Weakside Flip’. This is run a lot by the Philadelphia 76ers. Here’s what it looks like.

Instead of the action happening on the sideline, a player cuts from the corner and flips themselves to set a screen for the nearest player to come towards the ball. The main reason this is effective is because it can be confusing for the low-man as most will be expecting a traditional Chicago Action out of a Delay formation.

Look at Doncic when this screen is set. Most teams would switch in this scenario because neither Avdija or Kispert are particularly scary on-ball players. Doncic is guarding no one because of the speed of action from Washington, and the advantage is hammered home by a great roll from Kyle Kuzma and a nice seal from Monte Morris to create the open three. It’s the type of attention to detail and off-ball execution that stands out when watching the Wizards.

On occasion, they’ll have their Delay-ball handler just keep the ball. This is more common with Porzingis or Kuzma, but below you can see Daniel Gafford do it.

I like the Wizards’ incorporation of flare screens into their Delay/5-out offense early in the shot clock. Teams often try and get ahead of the action and push high and wide in half-court defense. Flare screens can punish that.

Notice how high and engaged Zach LaVine and Patrick Williams are. They are expecting potential Chicago action and stacking bodies high is a good deterrent for running it. A simple flare screen punishes this and gets Avdija into space and creates an advantage for him which ends in an easy look at the rim.

Corey Kispert’s off-ball activity jumps off the screen and he is a legitimate difference maker in their Delay Package. Here he fakes a flare screen and then clears to the weak side which allows Kyle Kuzma an opportunity at an Empty-Pick-And-Roll.

Empty Side Actions are coveted by every NBA Team, but the Wizards do a good job generating them out of their base motion offense and it arguably makes the play even more effective.

Though the two final plays I have in this section aren’t technically in the Delay package, I’d argue they can be considered part of it just because of the outline and how potent Washington is from this outline. Here they run ‘Motion Weak Twirl’.

They open in the 5-out outline. Porzingis passes it to the strong side and cuts to the weak side which is why this is motion weak. They even mix in the weakside flip to manufacture the Twirl Action, which involves a player cutting off the first of two double stagger screen, and then the first screener coming off the second screener.

The play below is much easier, I’d just label it Pistol Strong. But they get into it in their five-out offense.

They get into an empty side action while also having a double stagger screen on the other side. Combining two of the most effective actions into the same play is always a good idea, and the simplicity of the play makes it surprising other teams don’t run it. Though this stuff isn’t Delay, I believe the potency of their Delay sets allows Unseld to be creative and add to the playbook as the year goes on.

Blind Pig

The Wizards do a great job of using ‘Blind Pig’ action to punish aggressive defense. Teams often feel the need to play up high against the Wizards because of their good early offense and also because of Porizngis’ outside spacing. Here, they get into it out of their Delay Package.

You can see the Suns switch the action on the perimeter. Deni reacts to this by flipping to the elbow and creating a wide open side for Bradley Beal to cut backdoor. This action punishes teams playing up on the perimeter. I’ve mentioned before this is a common deterrent to Chicago Action. I’d consider this a must-add action for any Head Coach running five-out offense.

They also mesh Blind Pig into other aspects of their offense such as below.

Washington are in a very loose outline with Porzingis and Beal at the elbows. Beal ghost screens onto an empty side. Dejounte Murray plays high and tries to deter the pass to Beal. Porzingis lifts and they go into Blind Pig action. I noted earlier Blind Pig action also works because of how high people play Porzingis. This play is an example of this. Porzingis will often just catch and shoot inside the arc and teams don’t want that as he’s a 79th percentile mid-range scorer.

The Wizards show a desire to run some of their core counters out of plays they don’t normally run.

Here they run ‘weave’ action which is a variety of handoffs above the key. Beal is aggressively pursued by Matisse Thybulle. The Wizards have Porzingis lift and run blind pig. On this occasion he is given cushion by PJ Tucker and takes it to the rim.

They also have used Blind Pig as a quick hitter when plays go stagnant. Below their initial action doesn’t achieve much so they try and run Beal off a Wide Ball Screen. When the defense denies they go straight into the Blind Pig.

Something I look for in offenses is how they cope when plays break down, and whether they are able to execute core counters out of normal motion offense. A popular coach speak is ‘you can stop plays but you can’t stop principles’. This is an example of this. Their principles are being well oiled off-ball and it’s why their plays work quite often. Talent limits the Wizards offensive ceiling overall but the Coaching Staff are providing solutions.

Gut

The Wizards love Gut action and get into it from many different scenarios. Gut action involves bringing an off-ball player through the paint, sometimes off a screen. It’s simple but extremely effective. It’s common for teams to have the player receive a hand-off (Gut DHO), but the handoff doesn’t need to occur for it to be labelled Gut action. Here’s what it looks like without a DHO at the end of it.

Beal comes up through the paint and goes into a pick and roll with Taj Gibson. It’s effective because it inverts the floor. Beal isn’t threatening inside the paint without the ball, so you can catch the defense off guard with them in positions they’re not traditionally expected to be in. Corey Kispert also lifts at the right time to disrupt the nearest nail help and they get an easy look at the rim. This is the most basic premise of Gut Action but it’s extremely effective.

They’ll also use this as a counter if Beal is being defended aggressively, such as below.

Utah defends Beal tightly and locks him from coming towards the ball. He responds by entering the paint and coming off a re-screen from Daniel Gafford in Gut Action. It’s the kind of quasi-offensive set in the midst of disrupted plays that shines out when watching the Wizards.

Here’s the more Traditional ‘Gut DHO’ that other teams around the league run.

The Wizards also run a set I’d argue to be their most proficient, ‘Fist Ghost Gut (Elbow) Chicago’. I have genuinely never seen them not create an insanely high percentage look on this play. I’d say it’s one of the most money sets in the entire NBA. Here’s what it looks like.

The Wizards go into a pick-and-roll, Daniel Gafford ghosts the ball screen while Bradley Beal cuts through the paint off a screen to take the handoff (Chicago Action). They end up with a really good look at the rim for their best player on this occasion. They’ll generally go to this if they’re desperate for a bucket.

Here against the Lakers, they mesh it with Stack Out for Kyle Kuzma and end up getting Daniel Gafford a lob. They also mix in an exit screen to occupy the low-man defenders even further. Get the defense off balance then give them something else to think about as they recover. It’s amazing offense.

Even when defenses play a part of it really well, it still scores. Here Josh Hart sticks to Beal, but Beal sells him with some off-ball movement and they get another easy look.

Sometimes NBA defenses will know what you want to do, so you need to have counters ready.

The Wizards hold up their fists to signal ‘strong’. This would be a double stagger screen. It is however a ploy to run their coveted gut action for Bradley Beal. The disguise just about generates him an extra step against Andrew Wiggins. You can see Monte Morris end up with a great look from beyond the arc. This particular read isn’t one I saw often but it’s an example of the off-ball prowess and attention to detail of the players and coaching staff.

They’d also sometimes mesh the gut concept as part of an off-ball action. On the play below they run an empty side pick-and-roll while simultaneously having Beal run gut action.

Sometimes naming can be a debate, but I’ll include some of the elbow touches they generate for Porzingis in this section because they come out of a very similar concept to gut. Here they run Porzingis off a screen to get him an elbow catch which he turns into two-points. He shot around 45 percent on these pull up twos this year.

The Wizards do a good job meshing some of their core concepts into their stars touches, though. I liked this ATO play they ran involving Porzingis at the elbow.

I’d label this ‘Gut/Pin Elbow Rip DHO’. It involves Porzingis getting one of his inside touches. They’d generally push him to mid-range because he has a very limited post game. They combine his touch with Delon Wright setting a back-screen then taking a hand-off (Rip DHO). It again ends in a good bucket. It’s another example of the Wizards mixing their core concepts and best options into other parts of their playbook.

Flip

The Wizards also like to use flip action at the top of the key. It’s probably their easiest way to generate easy driving angles for Kyle Kuzma and some of their other secondary guys. Here’s the most basic premise of it.

It’s a simple flip from one player to another while above the break like this. Generally the pitch almost creates some downhill momentum for the ball-handler. Here they do just enough to get Luka to bite and get an easy look at the rim. As you may expect, the Wizards can be more exotic out of this simple action. They have two plays specifically they will run, the first is below ‘Flip 77 Empty’.

They run this a little closer to the arc than they do with other actions, but it’s a good way to get Kyle Kuzma to an empty side and put his man through 2 screens. Empty side double drags are extremely difficult to defend and this is a way they can get into one out of their motion offense.

My personal favourite extension of Flip comes in ‘Flip Spain Empty’.

Delon Wright flips the ball to Deni Avdija and they run a pick-and-roll with the first screeners man getting backscreened (Spain). The initial flip gets Avdija some separation which messes up Doncic’s angles. Reggie Bullock isn’t even expecting to be back screened and they get the defense in rotation and eventually get a good look. The fact it’s run at an angle makes it even more effective.

And as a counter or wrinkle, they’ll sometimes run it with the back-screener occupying the weak-side dunker spot before darting across to set the backscreen, such as below.

Empty Side Actions

I have clipped empty-side actions on numerous occasions in this article. But this playbook is so diverse and there are more strategies they have to push for these. Empty-side actions are so fruitful because there isn’t a help defender or tag-man, so they can be very tough to defend.

They love to run double-drags to empty sides. This was common for them because they were an easy way to use Porzingis’ spacing. The most common way this is run is to have one screener roll and one pop, here’s what that looks like.

You can see when Kuzma pops, there isn’t a low-man there to help on the pick-and-roll. Delon Wright snakes the action and gets a clean look at the rim.

The Wizards will also mix guards into the action as screeners. They will sometimes do this to hunt certain switches, but generally they are more open to using guards as screeners than most teams.

Here against Portland they use Beal as one of the screeners. Using guards as screeners can be labelled as ‘Small’. Portland’s fear of his off-ball prowess means that when Drew Eubanks traps and Lillard goes to Beal, Gafford has a wide open roll. Using guards as screeners in these actions is a very effective wrinkle.

An effective way Washington stacks extra stuff on top of this action is to have an exit-action on the other side.

This iteration makes the responsibilites even more difficult as Will Barton comes off an exit screen to the corner while the double drag is being run. On this occasion Washington hits Barton for a wide-open corner three. Reggie Bullock gets frozen by the action as he needs to also stop the guard from turning the corner which is generally the defensive goal when defending a double drag.

For comparison’s sake, here’s what they play looks like if the Exit action occurs too early in the play.

Though the Wizards do score on the play, you can see that the exit action happens too early and doesn’t really disrupt the duties of the low-man like it does in the Mavericks clip.

They can also get into this action out of Pistol in early offense, with the play being called ‘Pistol Nash’. It’s Pistol with the initial ball handler becoming the first screener in a double drag.

Final Thoughts

Overall, the 2022-23 Washington Wizards taught me a lot about basketball. Though it may seem strange to praise the playbook of the 18th ranked half-court offense and the 21st ranked offense in the NBA, I really feel that Wes Unseld Jr. and his staff did a great job crafting this playbook. The roster was extremely flawed lacking rim pressure and consistent three-point threats. It was piled up with players with mismatching skillsets.

The job of a Head Coach isn’t just to win games, it’s never that simple. It’s to provide answers and solutions to problems. The Wizards staff certainly did this on the offensive end, designing a well-crafted offense with multiple reads and well executed counters. Some may suggest the offense was too cute at times. It’s a critique I understand but vehemently disagree with. Running simplistic stuff works when you have incredible offensive talent that fits easily. But it wouldn’t work with a Wizards roster that lacks on-ball consistency. Unseld frankly could have ran a bland offense, but he chose to try and answer some of the questions this questionable Wizards roster proposed to him.

The plays he designed worked well around the roster he had. He didn’t merely try and install stuff that looked good on a whiteboard. The stuff answered real questions.

This team are a great example of why I value process over results. Players can get results on their own, there is that much talent in the modern game. But a great coaching staff can install good processes that don’t always get results, for one reason or another.

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