And it got the wheels spinning. We all remember the Warriors’ two-timeline plan: one championship core supplemented with a cast of young players being asked to fill in as role players, with the eventual goal of that young talent forming a new future for the team once the core retires or moves on. It was brimming with hubris but somehow worked with the 2022 championship.

The Utah Jazz are running two timelines of tanking, and I’m not fond of it on principle. I want to explain how Utah got here, their process, why I fundamentally disagree, and what should be done differently.

The Prelude

Let’s go back to 2017 to properly tell the story. The Jazz hit things big in their buildup of a contending squad. Rudy Gobert was ready to anchor an elite defense, coming off a DPOY runner-up season. Gordon Hayward was coming off his first All-Star appearance and provided strong offense from the wing. They were filling in gaps well with quality starters like George Hill, Derrick Favors, Alec Burks, and Joe Ingles. It was a squad that managed to win 51 games before running into the juggernaut Warriors in the conference semifinals, ending in a prompt sweep.

They encountered the problem many a small market team has encountered. You draft well, you hit moves on the margins, and you retain who you need to. Then you find yourself up against a team with a true superstar and it all falls apart. Gordon Hayward is not the kind of #1 option that can get you over the hump against championship-level teams.

Then Utah hit it big.

In the 2017 draft, they acquired the 13th overall pick for Trey Lyles and the 24th pick, using that selection on Donovan Mitchell. With Gordon Hayward leaving for his ill-fated Boston sojourn, Utah desperately needed an infusion of star talent. Mitchell immediately became the #1 option and the team hardly lost a step.

Despite the crushing blow of losing Hayward, Utah managed their most sustained run of success since the Stockton/Malone days. With Mitchell at the helm of the offense and Gobert anchoring the defense, Utah averaged 48.6 wins over their five seasons with Mitchell, including the Covid-shortened season. They managed a #1 seed in the west for the first time in over 20 years. Yet they could never get over the hump, crashing out 3 times in the first round and twice in the conference semifinals. New faces, familiar story.

One fated hire seemed to indicate where this was headed. Before the 2021/22 season, general manager Dennis Lindsey stepped down amid allegations of inappropriate racial comments. Assistant GM Justin Zanik was promoted, but not before they added Danny Ainge of trade crime fame to run the show.

The Breakup

Utah won 49 games in that final season of the Mitchell and Gobert tandem, but rumors flew about their discontent with the organization and alleged inability to get along together. A first round loss to the upstart Luka Doncic-led Mavericks spelled doom. Utah traded Mitchell away to Cleveland, seemingly against his wishes to make his way to New York, and Gobert was sent to the Minnesota Timberwolves.

As far as blowing up cores go, Utah made off like bandits as Ainge maximized their position. The two brought back a haul of draft capital including seven first-round picks, three pick swaps, rookie Walker Kessler, plus recent draftees Ochai Agbaji and Leandro Bolmaro. Just as importantly, Utah also acquired Collin Sexton and Lauri Markkanen from Cleveland, two former lottery picks in desperate need of a new situation. From the Timberwolves, Utah netted Malik Beasley, Jarred Vanderbilt, and Patrick Beverley.

The rebuild was on, the assets were acquired, and the strategic teardown was in motion. But with all of the players acquired, Utah didn’t quite have the look of a team ripping things down to the studs. 35-year-old Mike Conley was in the fold. Collin Sexton had flaws but could still run an offense. And Lauri Markkanen, arguably the crux of this entire article, broke out in a major way. With new coach Will Hardy looking like a budding star behind the bench, Utah managed to win 37 games and flirted with a play-in appearance.

This is where the issues with the process begin to show.

Limbo State

It’s not the worst thing in the world to be somewhat competent in a rebuild. What is frustrating about Utah’s process was the timing.

That 2022-23 team could have ripped the roster to shreds, been as bad as possible, and gotten a legitimate shot at the Wembanyama sweepstakes. Instead, they retained Conley, Sexton, Malik Beasley, and other positive contributors who kept the team from a true tank. That took them from Wemby/Scoot/Brandon Miller territory into drafting Taylor Hendricks with their No. 9 choice. I have nothing against Hendricks, but nobody will argue that his potential isn’t coming close to that top three.

Their three total choices in that draft are fine in a vacuum. Hendricks was always a project, Brice Sensabaugh has interesting potential, and Keyonte George looks like one of the steals of the class. But now a logjam is beginning to form, and the two timelines of bad are appearing.

To their credit, Utah un-jammed some of the logs this past offseason by dealing away Conley, Beasley, and Vanderbilt in a three-team deal that netted a 2027 Lakers first-round choice. Yet some of the holdovers remained. Lauri Markkanen and his budding star potential occupied a forward spot, Collin Sexton still demands minutes, and Jordan Clarkson has somehow stayed through the entire teardown, the last remnant of the Mitchell/Gobert teams.

In the spirit of beating the analogy to death, Utah inexplicably added giant log John Collins to the jam, albeit for next to nothing. Collins has flaws but is a quality piece in his own right. That’s not a move that tanking teams with a massive cache of draft capital make, even if they believe Collins can be flipped at a later date.

Going into the 2023/24 season, Utah had two distinct groups of players. There’s the group of players that belong on playoff-caliber teams in Markkanen, Sexton, Clarkson, Collins, and Kelly Olynyk. Behind them is the true rebuild group: George, Hendricks, Sensabaugh, Kessler, Agbaji, and an assortment of other lottery tickets. The quality of that first group led to another season of “not quite bad enough or good enough”, winning 31 games and being equally as far away from a top draft choice as the play-in tournament.

This sets them on a tough path.

The Crossroads

Being outside looking in at the top of this 2024 draft isn’t the worst thing ever. There was nobody worth truly bottoming out a roster for. That all changes with the upcoming 2025 and 2026 drafts, where premiere talents like Cooper Flagg, Ace Bailey, Cam Boozer, and AJ Dybantsa will be ripe for leading a rebuild.

Therein lies the problem. Utah has rebuffed multiple offers for the 27-year-old extension-eligible Markkanen, including a rumored offer from the Oklahoma City Thunder that would have netted 3 more first-round picks. There has been little reported movement on dealing Sexton or John Collins. Clarkson seems likely to go, but that still leaves some quality players at the top of the depth chart, players good enough to once again push Utah into limbo. The first part of the tanking timeline is being pearl-clutched by Ainge.

Then comes the second part of the issue. Utah added Cody Williams at 10th overall, Isaiah Collier at 29th, and Kyle Filipowski at 32nd overall, leaving them with 7 total players on their rookie-scale contracts. The logjam only becomes jammier next year, with potentially 3 more first-round picks incoming next season. That second timeline is full of talent but is starting to become muddy as more and more players are added and minutes become scarce.

How Can This Be Fixed?

There is a clear path here in my opinion. Whether or not Utah’s brain trust realizes this is the problem.

First, addressing the primary timeline. Markkanen, Sexton, and Clarkson should have been traded yesterday. If all three of them are on the roster come opening night, Utah has made a mistake. Even if they’re moved at the deadline, that might hamper their chances of securing a top choice in 2025. Ideally, they should be moved for more future picks or rookie-scale developmental prospects without taking on the salary of older players who would demand minutes and be a part of the rotation.

That opens things up for the second tanking timeline. Utah’s pick is top 10 protected this year and top 8 protected in 2026, and risking that pick by being a 30-35 win team would be a massive mistake. It also clears the way for a total free-for-all of young players competing for roles and playing time in the upcoming season. A final teardown has the dual purpose of improving Flagg-to-Utah chances and improving the developmental chances of their existing prospects.

Ripping things down to the studs sets Utah up well for pole position to wrangle a franchise-altering prospect in the next two drafts. It also means the 3 players they may add through next year’s class will have a better path to real playing time. They need that genuine shot at a star instead of continuing to sit at the end of the lottery. Lightning rarely strikes twice in quick succession, and Donovan Mitchell was their lightning strike. It’s time for them to get serious about the chances of getting another superstar.

The alternatives make little sense. Extend Lauri, who is unlikely to remain in his prime before Utah can contend? Hold on to Clarkson and Sexton to take minutes from George and Collier? Keep nibbling at the draft and collecting more prospects with longer developmental curves? What happens when the 2027 draft rolls around, when Utah has a whopping four first-round picks?

Utah needs to take a hard look at themselves and around the league. The Spurs rebuild changed entirely with Wembanyama. They’re armed with a budding superstar, a relatively clean cap sheet, and a haul of draft picks they can use to accelerate the rebuild by consolidating around their young stars. If the Jazz can snag Flagg, Boozer, or any of the other blue-chippers, things begin to come into focus. Those future picks can be used to accelerate things around that new star. Roles and outlooks of the current prospect crop they possess begin to solidify. They could find themselves with a core of players and picks that would make other rebuilding franchises jealous.

Or they could stay on this path, stick in limbo, and make this rebuild even more difficult. Your call, Mr. Ainge.

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