It must also be said that these teams have just the right amount of neanderthal DNA to, sure, probably get curb-stomped by OKC in round 2, but to put on a show in the meantime. Through two games, WTF moments in the clutch and jagged edges — like Jokić’s defense and Dunn’s offense…Ben Simmons — have not subtracted intrigue, but added character. With a 1-1 split heading into Thursday’s game 3, each team has lost the game they played better in. These teams are weird! Anyway, let’s get to it.

Denver’s incomplete defense on Kawhi

Let’s start with the big stuff. Kawhi Leonard dropped 39 points in Game 2 after a poor Game 1, and the Denver Nuggets didn’t really adjust how they defended him when he got it going. Though he melted their face off with absurd shot-making, I’ve actually liked Denver’s overall philosophy vs. Kawhi. He got going early in Game 2 by feasting on cross-matches in semi-transition, but the Nuggets didn’t panic because they’ve been conceding switches and loading help toward him anyway.

That’s a fine plan, and they’ve been able to execute it without allowing Kawhi to create easy shots for his teammates, though Kawhi shoulders a chunk of the credit/blame there too. He has not made quick decisions with the ball in his hands.

But that didn’t save Denver in Game 2 because they didn’t finish possessions against Kawhi, hence the “incomplete” tag. The man is inhuman, and has proven that, with healthy legs, he can win series by performing how he did in Game 2, where he shot 15-of-19 from the floor. So Denver has to finish possessions, there is no point in showing help against him if it is indeed just for show (sound on):

Denver shouldn’t fear the possibility of Kawhi putting on a passing clinic by throwing cross-court lasers and manipulating defenders with his eyes. Over his 13 NBA seasons, that’s never been his M.O., and it still isn’t. That’s why LAC stays away from pick-and-roll led by Kawhi, given a near-turnover like this…

Just as important, the Clippers are always playing a poor 3-point shooter. Every single one of Kawhi’s minutes through two games have seen Kris Dunn, Derrick Jones Jr., or Ben Simmons on the floor with him, and occasionally two of those guys. Furthermore, any strategy geared toward forcing turnovers and speeding up the Clippers plays to Denver’s advantage.

They recorded the 7th-fastest pace in the NBA this year (PBP Stats) and had, by miles, the lowest 3PA rate. That’s a formula that limits randomness/shooting variance; playing at a slow pace and allowing Kawhi to get up 16 jumpers is not.

The idea of attacking Kawhi is frightening in any context, but in Game 3, Denver just might have to. They’ve thrown a lot his way thus far, but the kitchen sink remains in their back-pocket.

Limiting LAC’s two-man game

Let’s keep it on this end of the floor, where the Harden/Zubac pick-and-roll feasted in Game 1. Harden, looking quite spry, looked to get all the way to the basket, and in the first half, Nikola Jokić often did little more than escort him there…

Since then, Denver has played Jokić much higher up the floor, if not outright trapping or hedging ball-screens. (An awesome, very minor subplot of this series is Harden finding every angle possible to hit Zubac on the roll while Jokić tries to deflect those passes, just about the best hand-eye coordination battle you’ll find.)

The major subplot is what happens once Zu catches the ball, and it feels like both teams have left something on the table here. Zubac can make rudimentary reads quickly enough, and has gotten Kris Dunn a few layups off baseline cuts. However, they’re nobody’s idea of Draymond Green and Gary Payton II. Dunn has struggled to finish under any defensive pressure, and if they can take away his cut, Zubac has struggled to snap to the next read, a kick-out for three. In fact, his best offense has been simply going to work against whoever steps up to meet him.

Harden is key here, too. The more downhill pressure he applies, the deeper Zu’s catch inevitably is, and these two can play pitch-and-catch as well as any tandem…

After that play in Game 2, Jokić played even higher up the floor, and Denver produced the desired effect: Harden largely stopped trying to get downhill, whether by splitting a screen or by attacking Jokic’s outside hip. Can he dial up the pressure in Game 3 if Denver opens in the same coverage?

How much room do Harden, Zubac, and Dunn have to improve from game 2? To me, it’s a reasonable chunk. If Denver feels the same way, they should try to deny Zubac on the roll altogether. In this first play. Michael Porter Jr. helps off of Dunn to deny Zu, and Norm Powell promptly turns the ball over. In the second play, MPJ doesn’t leave DJJ, Zu catches it, and it leads to a wide-open three:

Yes, DJJ is on the strong-side in play #2, but perhaps gambling off him is worth preventing any sort of deep catch for Zubac.

The Harden/Zubac two-man game that so much of LAC’s offense is built around is in a fascinating spot entering Game 3. Each team has reason to adjust; for the Clips it could be setting the screen higher up the floor or making sure a 3-point threat is weak-side corner. Still, “play better” could simply be the adjustment.

If Denver believes the Clippers will indeed play better, they could get funky and put Aaron Gordon on Zubac, Jokić on Dunn, and switch screens. They’ve tried that on a single possessions so far, and it didn’t end well…

They could send more early help to take away Zu’s roll, but they might just feel confident where they’re at. We’ll soon see.

Will Jokić start launching?

As for that infamous two-man game on the other side, the Clippers have done fairly well defending Jamal Murray and Nikola Jokić so far. Kris Dunn deserves the lion’s share of the credit, as he’s been responsible for chasing Murray into tight, mid-range spaces, but then switching back out onto Jokić when he pops, otherwise known as a veer-switch. It looks something like this:

Jokić hands him three points, but this is the coverage the Clippers opened with in Game 1, and, 101 minutes of hoop later, they’re still leaning on it. Though Jokić shot 4-of-8 from deep in Game 2, it felt like he ignored five or six clean looks, many coming on pick-and-pops like this.

There are other ways for the Nuggets to counter this defense from the Clippers. Jokić simply rolling to the basket and posting Dunn or Derrick Jones Jr. has led to some favorable isolations for him. It also leads to confusion for Dunn and Zubac, when/if they actually commit to the late switch.

But the nuclear code Jokić could push at any time is something he’s always reluctant to do, and that’s to just let it fly. This coverage seems like a bet from the Clippers that, even if goaded into it, Jokić will not launch 12-15 threes in a game, even if he’s shooting just under 42% from deep, like he did in the regular season.

Late in Game 1, the Clippers went another route, pressuring Jamal Murray while meeting Jokić early on his catches. Nekias Duncan did a great job explaining how the Nuggets roasted that coverage; essentially, the Clips were spread too thin, unable to prevent open looks for capable if not elite shooters, and even less able to grab rebounds…

Have the Clippers already found their favorite answer to the Murray/Jokić love affair? Perhaps. The more juice you can squeeze out of Kris Dunn’s defense, the better. But this strategy also keeps them in their shell, keeps Zubac near the rim, and limits the opportunities for James Harden and Norm Powell to get caught ball-watching as cutters sneak behind them.

The real danger is that Jokić melts the Intuit Dome with a 3-point barrage on Thursday night. Does he want to?

Where’s the other two-man game?

Let’s end with a couple quick bites. In Game 1, the Nuggets targeted James Harden on defense by consistently involving Aaron Gordon with Nikola Jokić, either in off-ball screens or inverted pick-and-roll. Perhaps it’s Gordon’s limp calf, but rookie head coach David Adelman went to those actions far less in Game 2.

Why? Perhaps because Harden is the Clippers’ worst defender.

Let me explain: Per Cleaning the Glass, the Nuggets turned it over on a whopping 21.7% of their possessions on Monday, their second-worst mark of the season. Jokić had a rough game with seven of them, and frequently, it was Dunn, Nic Batum, or Kawhi jumping his passing lanes. In other words, the further L.A.’s best defenders were from the ball, the more havoc they wreaked.

The same could not be said of Harden and Powell, who did not provide much help in rotation:

So, with Harden on Gordon, is that why we didn’t see much of Denver’s front-court chemistry in Game 2, or was it an injury? Either way, the Nuggets have to get back to that two-man game, and find Gordon some easy rolls to the rim. The team that shot the highest percentage in the league on shots at the rim (Cleaning the Glass) is shooting just 57% at the rim through two games, which would have ranked as the worst mark in the NBA by light years.

I may know an all-time dunker that can help with that.

Please, Norm

The Clippers will not win this series if Norm Powell and Bogdan Bogdanović continue to struggle so mightily. However, Powell not only hit some huge shots late in the second half on Monday, but was the recipient of an (unscripted) play that stuck in my mind…

It was a rare instance of Norm directly benefiting from the attention his co-stars get, rather than simply trying to emulate them by creating from a stand-still. Even if Jokić isn’t in much drop coverage, the concept still works, getting Norm the ball on the second side with the defense ever-so-slightly out of whack.

There are many more wrinkles to this matchup we could discuss. (Please go look up Kris Dunn’s defensive highlights from this series.) Tyronn Lue has not remotely settled on a substitution pattern, and in Game 2 Ben Simmons was the game’s first sub. Harden also played a chunk of minutes without Kawhi or Zubac, which felt off at the time. The Nuggets are battling injury and fatigue across the board, and seem unsure whether to devote much energy to getting Michael Porter Jr. going.

No matter which of these storylines takes center stage in Game 3 and beyond, we do know that this series has been, and will continue to be awesome.

Prediction: Clippers in 6

The post Round One: Nuggets vs. Clippers appeared first on Swish Theory.

The NBA draft may be over, but for teams across the league, the development process has just begun. Contrary to what most think, success in the draft is more than just making the ‘right’ pick. What happens after draft night is where the real magic starts to begin. Through this article, I hope to illuminate what this looks like for both the best and worst drafting teams in the league, as we take an up-close and personal look at the cultures, habits, and infrastructures that makes each NBA organization unique.

The Price of a Pick

To understand how teams have performed in the draft relative to expectations, we have to first understand the value of a pick in each draft range. Luckily Seth Partnow from The Athletic has seemingly already done that for us.

Now that we have a rough idea of how players in a certain pick range turn out, let’s see which teams have been able to consistently outperform these pick expectations. To keep my sample size large enough while also accounting for more modern team infrastructures, I’ll be looking at data from 2010-2018.

Right away, we can see some rather obvious underperforming and overperforming teams. Across the board, it’s very clear that average draft position has been nowhere near a guarantee for success, but we’ll get into more of that later.

In an attempt to recreate Partnow’s plot in a more team-specific way, I hand-tracked draft pick outcomes for each team. While teams like the Kings are easy to spot as obvious underperformers, it’s not as simple to see how others have fared. To combat this, I reordered teams based on a very rough ‘relative draft value’ metric shown above. I set up a point system for teams where they were rewarded set points for each outcome they drafted, where they got the most points for drafting a franchise/core player and less for each outcome below that, all the way down to the bust outcome where points were actually subtracted. These values were chosen based on a similar method to the one used in my draft model, which you can read more about here. While it is a pretty rough metric, it gets the job done.

As a caveat, there are some limitations to this exercise due to its imperfect nature. I tried to match Partnow’s process to assign outcomes as much as possible (outlined in more detail here), but it’s impossible to do so completely. As addressed earlier, my sample size is also smaller than his to try to account for modern/current front offices, but some teams didn’t draft enough in the time period to confidently say whether they did well or not. Another important note is that some of these players were developed by teams other than the teams that drafted him (this doesn’t apply to draft day trades, these are accounted for accordingly), but the original drafters received credit. While this might impact results, I don’t think it was severe enough to make a truly big difference. Finally, I didn’t include undrafted players in this exercise, so teams that traditionally do well with undrafted players didn’t shine as brightly (looking at you Miami, and, to a lesser extent, Dallas). With that out of the way, let’s dive into the results.

Is It Good Drafting or Good Developing?

This question is tricky. Are teams that are finding themselves successful in the draft better at identifying talent or developing it? In all likelihood, it’s a mixture of both and varies from team to team, but my aim is to examine different teams’ infrastructures to try and answer this. As a reminder, this is more a review of a team’s past rather than an indictment of their future. Some of the poorly performing teams have recently made the necessary steps to improve their draft strategy and player development infrastructure.

The Best of the Best

Denver Nuggets

Total Picks: 23

Average Draft Pick: 35

Pick Outcomes: 47.83% Bust, 8.7% Just a Guy, 21.74% High Rotation, 13.04% Top Starter, 4.35% Borderline All-Star, 4.35% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 6

Total Data Analysts: 1

G-League Team Affiliation: 2021-Present

Though the Nuggets’ draft success extends past drafting one of only two second-round MVPs in league history, let’s start there for a moment. Nikola Jokic was the least known prospect within a very strong 2014 Nuggets draft class that included both Jusuf Nurkic and Gary Harris. Jokic represents one of the earliest cases I’ve seen of what draft twitter likes to call ‘pre-drafting’. As PD Web explains in the linked article, the practice is essentially selecting a player a year before they become a more ‘mainstream’ prospect. Interestingly enough, according to an article from The Athletic, this practice is a pillar in the foundation of the Nuggets’ draft strategy, with a clear emphasis to draft prospects before their true breakout season.

However, the Nuggets’ draft work doesn’t stop after they identify talent. For former head of basketball operations, Tim Connelly, and the rest of the front office, player development is where they can really gain an edge. Player development for the Nuggets starts and ends with assistant coach John Beckett. Beckett is a former video coordinator with the Hawks who was initially hired by Denver as a player development coach in 2015 before quickly working his way to his current position on Michael Malone’s staff. For Beckett and the Nuggets, game-like situations are the bread and butter of their player-curated development workouts. This means getting a lot of threes up for Jamal Murray and a lot of off-ball work for Michael Porter Jr. Approaching player development through this lens has paid dividends for the Nuggets, helping improve Malik Beasley and Monte Morris in addition to those already mentioned.

With the return of Jamal Murray and Michael Porter Jr. this season, we’ll finally get to see the complete vision of a homegrown Nuggets team shaped by the player development habits and proactive draft strategy cultivated throughout the past decade.

Los Angeles Lakers

Total Picks: 21

Average Draft Pick: 37

Pick Outcomes: 47.62% Bust, 9.52% Just a Guy, 23.81% High Rotation, 14.29% Top Starter, 4.76% Borderline All-Star, 0% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 7

Total Data Analysts: 4

G-League Team Affiliation: 2006-Present

Somewhat to my surprise, the Lakers have done an excellent job of finding value in the draft relative to their average position. Despite picking 37th on average in the draft, the second lowest average selection, the Lakers have managed to find a large number of guys that have stuck in the league. So, how have they done it? The Lakers simply optimized G-League player development quicker than other teams. They were the first NBA franchise to own a G-League (then known as the D-League) team, gaining ownership with their current affiliate, the South Bay Lakers, way back in 2006. Since then, the Lakers have used South Bay as a place for rookies and young players without a path to minutes on the NBA roster to gain valuable game time, experience, and development. As of 2021, a staggering 36 former South Bay Lakers players had been called up to the NBA, with two trips to the G-League finals (2012, 2016) under their belt. Notable South Bay Lakers alumni in the time frame (2010-2018) include Alex Caruso, Ivica Zubac, Mo Wagner, Gary Payton II, Josh Hart, and Thomas Bryant.

Philadelphia 76ers

Total Picks: 28

Average Draft Pick: 26

Pick Outcomes: 46.43% Bust, 14.29% Just a Guy, 25.00% High Rotation, 3.57% Top Starter, 7.14% Borderline All-Star, 3.57% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 8

Total Data Analysts: 5

G-League Team Affiliation: 2013-Present

The Philadelphia 76ers fielded what is probably the most infamous bad team in modern sports history in the early stages of our selected timeframe. The Process Sixers weren’t just known for being bad, they were known for embracing it. Before delving deeper, my first thoughts on the 76ers draft success were “Oh, they just had more opportunities to give their rookies as a historically bad team”. After a little bit of research, I found this could not be the only explanation.

The 76ers do, in fact, play their rookies a lot, to the tune of fourth most in the league over the chosen time period. However, many other franchises that prioritized rookie playing time have not had close to the same level of success. Similarly, there were teams that played their rookies a lot less, on average, yet have had great success in drafting and development. Upon closer inspection, it seems that in addition to giving their rookies ample opportunities, the 76ers are just better at talent identification than most teams. Sometimes, it really is that simple. A lot of their success in the draft has simply come from hitting on almost every single lottery pick they’ve had. From Joel Embiid to Ben Simmons to even Dario Saric, the Sixers have generally nailed that portion of the draft. This outperformance even includes two instances of unusually bad injury luck from the selections of Markelle Fultz and Zhaire Smith. The Sixers are no slouch when it comes to drafting in the second round either, drafting both Jerami Grant and Richaun Holmes before they blossomed on other teams. Not every team has a winning formula when it comes to developing young players, but luckily for the Sixers, they’ve already won half the battle with their excellent eye for talent.

Utah Jazz

Total Picks: 18

Average Draft Pick: 32

Pick Outcomes: 44.44% Bust, 22.22% Just a Guy, 22.22% High Rotation, 0% Top Starter, 0% Borderline All-Star, 11.11% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 20

Total Data Analysts: 1

G-League Team Affiliation: 2014-Present

The most apparent thing about the Jazz is they realize the importance of the draft. They have what can only be described as an army of professional scouts, 20 to be exact, more than any other team I’ve looked at for this exercise. The immediate conclusion to draw here is that the Jazz are just great at talent identification, similarly to the Sixers, but in this case, there’s more to it than what meets the eye.

There is one man arguably more responsible for the Jazz’s draft success than any other and that man is Johnnie Bryant. Similarly to John Beckett with Denver, Bryant was hired as a player development coach back in 2012 by the Jazz before being promoted to assistant coach in 2014. Prior to his hiring, he had gained a reputation for his independent skill development program (Bryant Sports Academy) and worked with multiple NBA players, including All-Stars Damian Lillard and Paul Millsap. His first success story with the Jazz came by working with former Jazz player Gordon Hayward on his way to becoming an All-Star. Since then he’s helped develop many Jazz players, most notably Rudy Gobert and Donovan Mitchell, the latter of which he helped scale to a primary option after being drafted with the expectation of having a smaller role.

For Mitchell, Bryant reportedly conducted “individual workouts, pregame shooting routines and film sessions — scouting opponents, reviewing games, watching other stars to try to learn their tricks.” Bryant’s help with playmaking and capitalizing on shooting gravity quickly made Mitchell one of the more dynamic guards in the league. According to Donovan, Bryant obsessively watches film, combing over hours of footage and taking notes to find ways his players can improve.

Off the court, Bryant develops a close relationship with his players, giving them a member of the staff they know they can trust. This aspect of the game is often overlooked but is of the utmost importance. The more mentally comfortable a player is, the easier it is for them to perform at their highest levels. With Bryant having departed recently to the Knicks, we’ll soon see if the Jazz’s reliance on him was as great as I expect.

San Antonio Spurs

Total Picks: 17

Average Draft Pick: 40

Pick Outcomes: 52.94% Bust, 17.65% Just a Guy, 11.76% High Rotation, 5.88% Top Starter, 5.88% Borderline All-Star, 5.88% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 5

Total Data Analysts: 5

G-League Team Affiliation: 2007-Present

We’ve all heard it a thousand times, but it needs to continue to be said. The San Antonio Spurs are the golden standard. Bar none. The success they were able to maintain for so long without dips in form is nothing short of incredible and a lot of it has been thanks to their success in the draft. Despite having on average the lowest draft position in the whole league and no lottery picks throughout the entire time period, the Spurs managed to draft Kawhi Leonard, Dejounte Murray, Derrick White, Kyle Anderson, and countless other quality NBA players. It goes without being said that development had to be a part of their success with these later draft picks, and after examining the Spurs’ philosophy, it is clearly the main driver.

With many teams, player development is mainly focused on key young players. The Spurs take it to a whole ‘nother level. To put it simply, if you are on the Spurs, your development will be prioritized, all the way down to the end of the bench. Take, for example, Davis Bertans, who, entering the 2017-18 season, was a 25-year-old former 42nd overall pick coming off of a season in which he put up 4.5 points per game in only 12.1 minutes per game. You’d think Bertans would be the last person the Spurs would be focusing on in the 2017 offseason. You’d also be wrong. According to an ESPN report by Michael C. Wright, the Spurs went as far as to send a player development coach all the way to Europe to monitor and work out Bertans as he competed with Latvia in Eurobasket 2017. One $80 million contract later, I’m sure Bertans is glad he landed with the Spurs. This commitment to the development of every last player on the roster, along with ace-in-the-hole shooting development coach, Chip Engelland (the person responsible for revamping Kawhi Leonard’s shot), has allowed the Spurs to continue to win along the margins and keep themselves a leg up over the rest of the teams in the Association. With Engelland recently moving on to OKC, we have the opportunity to see how the Spurs adapt to losing arguably the most important figure to their player development operation as they embark on their first true rebuild in over twenty years.

The Worst

Sacramento Kings

Total Picks: 19

Average Draft Pick: 16

Pick Outcomes: 63.16% Bust, 15.79% Just a Guy, 0% High Rotation, 5.26% Top Starter, 10.53% Borderline All-Star, 5.26% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 8

Total Data Analysts: 5

G-League Team Affiliation: 2016-Present

*Sigh*Roll the video.

Ahhh, the Sacramento Kings. You know we have to start with them. To be blunt, the Kings have been terrible for the better part of two decades now and their inability to draft and develop their lottery picks has left them drowning underwater. On top of that, the Kings have, whether intentionally or not, fostered a culture of instability and uncertainty. Since 2006, the last time the Kings made the playoffs, the franchise has gone through twelve different coaches, alienated two star players in Boogie Cousins and Tyrese Haliburton, and attempted to relocate the franchise to another city. Now, to be this organizationally inept, a lot of things need to have gone wrong, but it all starts at the top. While he should be commended (by Kings fans at least) for fighting to keep the team in Sacramento, Vivek Ranadive’s inability to keep himself out of sporting decisions has led to years of basketball failure. According to the Sacramento Bee, Ranadive has contributed to what has been described as “a ‘toxic’ work environment in which ‘people don’t trust each other’”. The last thing you want from an owner is them meddling in sporting decisions or creating an environment as bad as what’s been described. Luckily, the same report mentioned that Ranadive has backed off somewhat since the hiring of new GM Monte McNair in September 2020, so hopefully greener pastures are ahead for those oh-so-loyal Kings fans.

Dallas Mavericks

Total Picks: 14

Average Draft Pick: 31

Pick Outcomes: 71.43% Bust, 7.14% Just a Guy, 0% High Rotation, 14.29% Top Starter, 0% Borderline All-Star, 7.14% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 12

Total Data Analysts: 4

G-League Team Affiliation: 2009-Present

As a Mavs fan myself, I’ve had a front-row seat view of the bad (and good) decisions they’ve made this past decade. Now, I think there are a couple of things in play here when it comes to their past draft failures. Starting off with what has bothered me the most as a fan, the Mavs simply don’t seem to give their rookies enough opportunities. Looking back at the visual from earlier, they’ve played their rookies a lot less than most other NBA teams, a possible symptom of a team coached by renowned vet-lover Rick Carlisle.

One of my biggest gripes recently has been how they’ve handled Josh Green’s development, at least early on. Coming off a covid-shortened offseason in which he was unable to play in Summer League or have a normal training camp, Green, the last first-round pick the Mavs would have while Luka was on a rookie deal, played 11.4 minutes per game in only 39 total games. This wouldn’t have been much of a problem had he been sent down to the G-League to get meaningful reps, yet the Mavs only briefly sent him down for 5 games. Squandering that much time in a player’s development is inexcusable, especially for a player that clearly needed confidence as Green did. Instead, he played sparing minutes for the Mavs, getting pulled after every mistake, dropping his confidence lower and lower. Luckily, this past year Jason Kidd instilled a little more faith in him and sure enough, Green’s confidence grew and he convincingly solidified himself as a rotation player in the regular season.

Similar to the Kings, the Mavs have also suffered somewhat from owner meddling. These incidents have been well documented with Mark Cuban admitting to being the reason the Mavs passed on Giannis (GM Donnie Nelson wanted him) and the Haralabos Voulgaris situation in 2021 which resulted in a complete overhaul of the Mavs front office, where, like Randadive, Cuban has reportedly ceded a little more control to current GM Nico Harrison and special advisors Michael Finley and Dirk Nowitzki.

Los Angeles Clippers

Total Picks: 16

Average Draft Pick: 36

Pick Outcomes: 75.00% Bust, 0% Just a Guy, 6.25% High Rotation, 6.25% Top Starter, 12.50% Borderline All-Star, 0% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 11

Total Data Analysts: 7

G-League Team Affiliation: 2017-Present

The Clippers’ draft shortcomings seem to be easily explained. At the top of the draft, they haven’t performed too poorly, selecting players like Eric Bledsoe, Reggie Bullock, Al-Farouq Aminu, and Shai Gilgeous-Alexander with their first-round picks. Their issues, instead, come from whiffing on almost every single second-round pick in the same time period which appears largely attributable to under-investment in player development.

Unlike their Los Angeles counterparts, the Clippers didn’t have their own G-League affiliate until 2017 as the Ballmer era got underway, previously sharing the Bakersfield Jam with the Phoenix Suns from 2009-2014. As such, most of these second-rounders either received little to no minutes riding the bench, or were sent to another team’s affiliate where they weren’t developed by members of the Clippers organization. Now with their own G-League team, officially the Ontario (previously Agua Caliente) Clippers as of July 2022, they should be able to flip the script on their second-round success. In fact, we may already be seeing the results of these improvements taking place, with 2019 second-rounder Terance Mann becoming a valuable rotation player after playing 20 games with their new affiliate. In a similar way, Amir Coffey, an undrafted second-rounder in 2019, has been a positive player, contributing 12 points, four rebounds, and three assists per game in 30 games as a starter. Coffey was Agua Caliente’s leading scorer in 2020-21.

Trending in the Right Direction

Memphis Grizzlies

Total Picks: 18

Average Draft Pick: 33

Pick Outcomes: 77.78% Bust, 5.56% Just a Guy, 5.56% High Rotation, 11.11% Top Starter, 0% Borderline All-Star, 0% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 5* (some basketball ops guys are functionally scouts)

Total Data Analysts: 4

G-League Team Affiliation: 2014-Present

Although the Grizzlies were awful at drafting and developing talent in the time period I looked at (2010-2018), the organization has turned a corner since. This change has coincided with executive Zach Kleiman’s rapid ascension to his current position as “lead basketball operations executive and personnel decisionmaker” in 2019 and the subsequent hiring of new basketball ops personnel with fresh ideas (over 30 new hirings to be exact). Since then, the Grizzlies have nailed almost every draft pick they’ve made, drafting franchise cornerstone Ja Morant and surrounding him with a plethora of quality homegrown/drafted talent, including Desmond Bane, Brandon Clarke, Xavier Tillman, and Ziaire Williams. With 2022 draft selections Jake LaRavia, David Roddy, Kennedy Chandler, and Kenny Lofton Jr. already showing promising flashes in preseason, it seems like the Grizzlies have struck gold again.

In regards to player development and infrastructure, the Grizzlies have utilized their Memphis Hustle G-League team well since its inception in 2017, with five members of their 2021-22 roster (including former G-League Player of the Month Kyle Anderson) having spent time in the development league. They rely on their former players’ expertise as well, with Tony Allen hired as a player development coach for the Hustle in January 2020.

What We’ve Learned

When we discuss draft success, talent identification seems to be the main focus, with Bleacher Report redrafts constantly making the rounds on social media. In reality, draft success is the confluence of numerous organizational factors, of which 4 key pillars have emerged: organizational stability/clarity, talent identification, opportunity allocation, and, most importantly, a strong developmental infrastructure. Teams need to be hiring more player development coaches, as the secret to a lot of these good drafting teams is that the players they draft get to work with somebody like Johnnie Bryant, John Beckett, or Chip Engelland the second they arrive in town. Right now, there are simply not enough player dev coaches on most teams to sit down individually with every single player and help them with their development.

The focus tends to mainly be on high-profile prospects like Donovan Mitchell, but so much value could be added by focusing on the others too. The Spurs have perfected this science, using developmental success to sustain a 22-year playoff streak. On the other end of the spectrum, we have the Kings, where organizational instability amongst other things has led to 16 years of playoff despair. Can they close the gap? It’ll be hard, but in a copycat league, the roadmap to success is there for all to follow.

The post Fountain of Youth appeared first on Swish Theory.