The story of how the Hartenstein deal came about is just as sweet. Right before free agency opened up at 6 PM Eastern on June 30th, Presti and members of the Thunder organization made their way to Eugene, Oregon, to meet with Hartenstein in his hometown. Immediately, this is reminiscent of when they did the same for Mike Muscala in 2019, flying to his hometown in Minnesota to pitch why he should sign with them (that too ended in a success).

The meeting lasted just over 2 hours before they boarded their plane and flew back to Oklahoma City, around 40 minutes later than it was reportedly initially scheduled to depart, which one can only romanticize to be because of how well the meeting went. Sometime after landing, Presti and Hartenstein’s agents Aaron Mintz and Andrew Morrison began finalizing the details overnight until reaching an agreement the next morning. Shams Charania was the first to break the news of his decision at 9:58 AM Eastern on July 1st.

Hartenstein is the most non-traditional yet traditional ‘Thunder player’ Presti has brought in thus far. While he lacks the prerequisite shooting and silky ball-handling abilities they often covet, he brings the positional size, touch, processing ability, and defensive playmaking they always look for in their players. He brings a brand new element of rebounding the Thunder lacked last season, too, but the key here is how he does it without entirely compromising the identity they’ve been building since 2020.

But how exactly does he fit into Oklahoma City’s scheme on both ends of the floor? Does he start next to Chet Holmgren or come off the bench? Just how impactful can he be? With those and other questions in mind, I try my best to predict what he’ll look like in a Thunder jersey during the course of the 2024-25 season.

Additive Skills

Before breaking down how he may fit into the Thunder’s scheme, let us look into the additive skills he brings to OKC — the skills he unequivocally brings to the table that they didn’t have much of last year that will add new wrinkles to their offense.

A DHO Superhub — An Intersection of Screening and Court Mapping

Screening

Screening is one of the biggest things the Thunder lacked last season.

The team’s lone rotation bigs were Chet Holmgren, 7-foot-1 but only 207 lbs, and Jaylin Williams, 240 lbs but 6-foot-9, neither of whom had outstanding technique that made them effective screeners. This played a role in their offense bogging down against Dallas in the second round (118.3 offensive rating in the regular season -> 111.8 offensive rating versus Dallas). No screen created much separation for OKC’s ballhandlers, Shai Gilgeous-Alexander and Jalen Williams, and Dallas simply switched everything to keep the ball in front of them. This stagnated their offense and led to a lot of iso-ball (8.2% isolation frequency in the regular season -> 13.1% versus Dallas).

Shai remained unfazed as he’s one of the greatest iso scorers this game has ever seen. But Jalen Williams (a.k.a. ‘JDub’) really struggled to create in isolation on volume and that led to a drop-off in his scoring rate (22.0 PTS/75 -> 16.6 PTS/75) and efficiency (62.1% TS -> 50.8% TS).

Enter Isaiah Hartenstein.

A bruising 7-foot, 250 lbs big with excellent screening technique, Hartenstein had to fight for each minute on an NBA floor early on in his career by doing the dirty work like setting hard screens to free up teammates. Now, he’s proven to be one best screeners the league has to offer: he was first in the playoffs in screen assists per 36 minutes (6.1).

His feel for screening and rescreening is potent and creates tons of separation for the ballhandler, either creating space to pullup or a runway to get downhill. Here he creates a wide open pullup three for Deuce McBride just from his feel and ability to screen and rescreen:

His feel and timing when flipping the angle of the screen is unreal. Jalen Brunson acts as if he’s accepting the screen to set up a crossover, and as he’s crossing over to reject the screen, Hartenstein recognizes this and flips the angle of the screen to seal off Batum completely.

Not just being a big body who can set hard screens but also having the ability to flip screening angles, rescreen, and seal defenders as needed is a huge differentiator between Hartenstein and other screeners around the league, and it’s hard to overstate how much this will make life easier for Shai and JDub. Shai shot 50.8% on midrange jumpers and JDub shot 51.3%, which ranked 5th and 4th respectively among the top 20 in midrange shooting volume. Being this efficient on such a difficult shot diet of self-created, contested shots is remarkable and Hartenstein levels the playing field for them.

Take a look at how freely Brunson steps into an open midrange pullup in the first clip, similar to Shai doing the same in a March game versus Phoenix thanks to a Bismack Biyombo screen in the second:

I’d bet on Hartenstein’s screening leading to an increase in Shai and JDub’s pullup three-point shooting volume next season too:

Court Mapping

Anyone who’s watched New York Knicks games or is generally present on NBA Twitter probably knows about Hartenstein’s passing. Whether it’s passing on the short-roll, as a post hub, or in dribble handoffs (DHOs), he’s one of the best bigs in the league at recognizing the opening in defenses and passing it to an open man.

But DHOs are relatively simple. Of course, you have to be able to process actions and being a nice passer is a plus. But most athletic rim-running bigs with above-average processing abilities are able to be used in DHO actions at volume (see DeAndre Jordan with the Clippers, Clint Capela with the Hawks right now). So what makes Hartenstein’s DHO ability so special for it to be deserving of its own section?

His court mapping.

Hartenstein’s court mapping manifests in two main ways on the court. One is his constant will to find advantageous space in the paint. He’s always moving around to find open space — either to receive a dumpoff or just to clear space for a driving ballhandler — and never lets the defense rest. See below, as he moves around in the paint and finds an opening to receive a dumpoff before finishing with his world-class 61% floater.

His ability to find open space for dumpoffs and punish his defender as an interior scorer serves as a release valve when defenses load up on drives. And this tendency to constantly move around and find open space is a clear manifestation of his court mapping abilities.

The other manifestation is in the way he executes DHOs.

Hartenstein isn’t just your standard top-of-the key DHO big who runs a standstill handoff and rolls to the rim. He can connect an offense to a secondary play after an initial drive or action fails with his DHO ability. This is made possible by his court mapping and knowing where his teammates are and will be at any given moment.

The clip below is a great example. Hartenstein relocates to an advantageous spot near the perimeter to receive a kickout pass. But the pass to him isn’t for him to catch and score. Instead, the pass to him serves as a connection for Donte DiVincenzo to then run a handoff with him, where Hartenstein’s screening can then create an open three for DiVincenzo.

Everything that makes Hartenstein’s DHO ability so special is on display there — his court mapping to position himself in the best place to catch and run a DHO immediately, and since a DHO is essentially a moving version of a PnR, his 7’0/250 lbs frame serves as screen that makes it difficult for Kyle Lowry to navigate around and get a good contest.

This is how Hartenstein’s screening coincides with his court mapping to make him a DHO superhub.

And this DHO ability serves as another release valve alongside his interior scoring. If an initial drive fails and Hartenstein is nearby, just pitch it to him and he’ll initiate a DHO. Alongside his court mapping and screening, he covers so much ground which makes it easy for him to transition a failed initial drive/action into a secondary DHO. This ground coverage is yet another trait that makes his DHO ability so valuable in unison with his other traits.

The ability to be a release valve around the paint with his interior scoring and connective DHO ability is something that’ll bring a lot of value to the Thunder. OKC’s drive-and-kick offense was somewhat predictable, which allowed Dallas to know when and where to send help on drives, and where and how to recover to the perimeter on the kickout. As @polarfall pointed out on Twitter, this disrupted the rhythms of OKC’s players attacking off the catch which further stagnated their offense.

While Hartenstein doesn’t fully solve this issue (volume shooting and shooting over contests is still a concern for the team as a whole) he does help fix it. Being a simple release valve in the paint with his combination of movement and floater excellence adds another wrinkle to their driving game that makes their offense harder to guard. Being able to transition the offense into secondary plays after the initial drive fails also inherently rectifies some of the stagnation issues as it adds movement to their offense. This movement brings chaos, chaos brings unpredictability, and unpredictably is what the Thunder lacked versus Dallas.

Hartenstein thrives under movement and unpredictability as that’s where his quick processing and passing abilities as a big man shine. Knicks players were constantly moving and cutting, since if you just move enough around Hartenstein, he’ll find you. Players in OKC’s offense moved and cut a lot last season too, but they were mostly systematic cuts. Hartenstein should encourage more free-flowing, read-and-react movement that would add more unpredictability to their offense.

His passing will also generally bloom so many more diverse options for the Thunder next season. So often did OKC fail to make cross-court skip passes to break down Dallas’ defense. Either because their ballhandlers couldn’t make that pass or wouldn’t because by the time a loopy, cross-court pass reached the player in the weakside corner, the Mavericks’ athletic and rangy wings (Derrick Jones Jr., PJ Washington) would’ve recovered by then.

The Knicks had a somewhat similar problem in the playoffs versus the Pacers but not exactly. Indiana ICE’d the ballscreen, forcing Brunson towards the sideline, and then trapped the ballscreen, forcing him to pass over the trap. Brunson being 6-foot-2 with a 6-foot-4 wingspan and having to pass over a trap involving a 6-foot-11 Myles Turner with a 7-foot-4 wingspan is a tough task. So the Knicks’ solution was one Isaiah Hartenstein.

Brunson would hold his dribble long enough to pull Turner far away from the perimeter. He would then sling a pass to the strongside corner while Hartenstein flashed middle. The pass would then find Hartenstein, who could make a play from the middle of the floor with a 4-on-3 advantage.

What made that play happen is the Knicks players’ quick passes and decision making, from McBride’s connective pass to Hartenstein to his pass to DiVincenzo. Not every player can sling cross-court skip passes as effortlessly as Luka can, but there are always other ways to exploit aggressive defensive coverages. The Thunder too excel in connective passing all throughout the roster, but lack the range in passing versatility to make such skip passes.

This isn’t a direct copy-and-paste solution for OKC’s issue with making those skip passes. Rather, the point here is that Hartenstein’s quick processing and passing abilities as a big present unique problem-solving solutions in any situation if a coach is willing to get creative. And Presti mentioned that Coach Mark Daigneault is always willing to try things out in his press conference for the Hartenstein signing.

In that conference, he also said Hartenstein takes them from an unorthodox offense to a versatile offense. And that’s exactly what he does. Whether it’s with his deadly interior movement and scoring, his screening in PnR, his screening in unison with his court mapping in DHOs, his quick processing as a passer, or all the ways these different skills coincide to make him a release valve, Hartenstein makes the Thunder’s offense more diverse and more versatile. And versatility reigns supreme in today’s NBA.

Scheme Fit

Now that I’ve laid out Hartenstein’s unique and additive skillset, it’s time to look into how fits within OKC’s scheme. The Thunder ran a 5-out alignment last year and finished 1st in 3PT% during the regular season. While Hartenstein has been a non-shooter thus far in his NBA career, his presence doesn’t require a major shift in the Thunder’s 5-out scheme. Rather, minor tweaks.

“Delay” Series

NBA teams have long run 5-out offense with a non-shooting big on the floor, namely the Golden State Warriors. Whether it was with Andrew Bogut in the early years of the dynasty or with Draymond Green in the later years as his shooting declined, the Warriors consistently ran 5-out alignment while playing a non-shooting big. This was achieved by placing the big at the top of the key, where the big could then run spread pick-and-rolls and DHO actions with a ballhandler and roll to the rim in what was essentially 5-out spacing.

One series the Warriors ran a lot and have continued to run ever since Steve Kerr took over in 2014-15 is “Delay” also known as “Open.” Popularized by Mike D’Antoni in his time with the New York Knicks, Delay is a variation of 5-out and involves a big positioned at the top of the key. It’s initiated with a pass to the big at the top of the key and actions then run between the other 4 players off the ball. Many and multiple actions can be run at the same time out of Delay.

Pindowns are often used in Delay for a player to come off a screen and either shoot or dribble and drive.

If they don’t shoot coming right off the pindown, they could also flow into PnR with the big. This is especially good when the big’s defender (x5) at the top of the key is sagging as it’s essentially playing PnR versus drop coverage.

Or a player could just come off a screen and flow right into a DHO with the big, which is called ‘Chicago’ action. This is also useful when x5 is sagging, as a DHO with the big in that scenario is once again basically PnR versus drop coverage. If x5 is playing more aggressive — playing up to the big in the DHO (equivalent of playing at the level of the screen in PNR) or hedging the DHO to prevent a pullup jumper — the ballhandler can take advantage by finding the rolling big.

The player could also curl the pindown screen.

Or curl the screen to then allow the screener to flow into a DHO with the big.

Flare screens are common in Delay as well.

The pindown screener can slip the screen, which is a common switch beater.

Or the flare screen itself can act as a decoy for the screener to come up and run a DHO with the big — ‘Flare DHO.’

Rip screens, or back screens, can also be used in Delay. Below, Nickeil Alexander-Walker is overplaying Jaime Jaquez Jr. to prevent a clean look for him to catch the ball. So, Duncan Robinson sets a rip screen on Alexander-Walker that frees up Jaquez Jr. on the cut.

General backdoor cutting opportunities also open up out of so many actions and so much movement, especially when a player rejects a pindown screen.

These are just a few of the actions that can be run within Delay. From Elevator, to Floppy, to Split, there are dozens more actions that can be run through a big at the top of the key. With so many actions, there’s tons of movement and tons of reads in Delay, so having a big who can process the floor and make the right reads quickly is key. And having one allows a team to run 5-out offense with a non-shooting big outside of just high pick-and-roll offense, a la, a way to preserve OKC’s 5-out philosophy.

The great news is that:

1. The Knicks already utilized Hartenstein at volume in Delay last season, where his intersection of screening and quick processing makes for an elite offensive hub at the top of the key. Here’s a minute and a half of him passing out of Delay.
2. OKC already used Jaylin Williams in Delay a good bit too, who also possesses great passing and size to see over the defense. Here’s just under a minute of him passing out of Delay.

This means that the foundation to integrate Hartenstein and a higher volume of Delay series into the Thunder’s offense has already been laid out. More Delay also inherently means more motion offense which, once again, helps rectify the stagnation issues they faced against the Mavericks.

I already detailed one reason why Hartenstein’s defender can’t just simply sag and negate the 5-out nature of having him on the perimeter: it leads to easy flips to DHOs that create easy opportunities to score. But Hartenstein is also talented as a driver and capable of attacking slower-footed bigs that sag off him. This is what completes his offensive arsenal and makes him a true hub on the perimeter.

He attacked both Nikola Jokic and Joel Embiid off-the-dribble out of Delay last season, who couldn’t handle his combination of movement skills, strength, and touch when giving him a runway of space to attack.

Strength is something he utilized on drives in space even against bigs who move well but lack the strength to absorb his bumps. He can create separation with speed + strength and finish with touch as he did against Rudy Gobert, or just transition the drive into a backdown as he did against Nicolas Claxton where his combination of strength and touch wins (he was in the 96th percentile in post-up efficiency).

And even on drives where he can’t beat a big with speed or strength, he has a decelerating “slow step” that catches his defenders off guard and creates a finishing window. This is a move usually reserved for guard and wing ballhandlers, so his defender isn’t prepared for it.

These diverse methods are how Hartenstein found ways to win as a driver when given space to attack, even against some of the best defenders in the world in Embiid, Gobert, and Evan Mobley. He scored 1.08 points per possession on 40 drive possessions last season according to Synergy, including shooting 16-of-24 (66.7%) on field-goal attempts out of drives.

This intersection of screening, passing, driving, and finishing is what enables offense to be run at a high level through Hartenstein and Delay series while maintaining 5-out alignment — try and break that 5-out alignment and the defense will be punished with DHOs and drives. And that’s how OKC retains their 5-out offense with the addition of a non-shooting big while also adding motion offense to fix their stagnation issues in the playoffs.

And this is exactly how Hartenstein can fit in and find success within the Thunder’s system and why they pursued him aggressively. He’s as good of a fit as it’ll get with a non-shooting big thanks to that specific intersection of skills that I mentioned.

That specific intersection of skills also blossoms versatility in the role that Hartenstein can perform in; a size-feel-touch intersection is by far the chain of skills that offers the most versatility in the amount of different ways a player can produce. What this means more simply is that Delay series isn’t that only way to maximize Hartenstein in the Thunder’s offense. Especially when he shares the floor with Holmgren, there are other ways to integrate him in double-big lineups and still maintain one of the best offenses in the NBA.

4.5 Out Offense

One of those ways to integrate double-big lineups is with the use of the “4.5 Out” offensive alignment.

While I don’t think Hartenstein will end up starting a majority of the regular season games at the 5 next to Holmgren at the 4, finding the best ways to make double-big lineups work is a huge part of maximizing Hartenstein’s $29 million AAV, and more importantly, maximizing the potential of their lineup optionality depending on opponent.

4.5 Out is simply an alignment that combines 4-out and 5-out offense; it’s 4-out but with an empty weakside corner (weakside is the opposite side of the ballhandler, ex: a ballhandler on the right wing means the left side is the weakside, vice versa). Usually in 4-out, there’s a center in the weakside dunker spot with a player also occupying the weakside corner. In 4.5 out, though, there’s a center in the weakside dunker spot but the next closest player to that center is the weakside wing. The simplest way to describe this is that it’s a traditional 5-out offense but with one of the players in the corner pinching in to the dunker spot.

While this offensive alignment has been around for a long time, @Bowser2Bowser on Twitter first gave it the nickname ‘4.5 Out’ in late December of 2022 and made an entire podcast video on the alignment with Evan Gualberto in April 2024.

I’d highly recommend watching the podcast episode if you’re interested in learning more about the alignment itself (that’s where I first learnt about it) as I’ll be talking moreso about how it applies to the context of Oklahoma City here.

To summarize what they and the Tweet linked above talk about, the advantage of 4.5 Out compared to traditional 4-out is that it makes it harder for defenses to help the helper.

When the center defending the dunkers spot (x5) has to step up and help on a drive, the absence of a player in the weakside corner makes it difficult for someone to help the helper, or in this case, help x5. If there was someone in that corner, that’s an easier rotation to the dunkers spot to prevent a lob or dumpoff.

But with the closest player on the wing, that’s a more difficult rotation to make for two reasons. One, because it’s more distance to cover on a rotation. Two, a defender helping from the wing allows that offensive player on the wing to relocate and move closer towards that empty weakside corner once his defender roams off him. So even if the wing defender rotates over and prevents a lob or dumpoff pass to the dunker spot player, it leaves a kickout pass to a relocating shooter wide open.

With the right lineups, this leads to very high-octane offense with an ideal combination of rim attempts and open 3s. Rim pressure is something this alignment can especially improve with the negation of traditional help-the-helper techniques, and something OKC could use as they finished 16th in rim frequency during the regular season despite being 1st in drives. They can have Hartenstein as the big in the corner cheating in towards the dunker spot, while still keeping Chet on the perimeter for spacing purposes.

Chet would have to make improvements to his shot to make 4.5 Out work effectively, though. While he shot 37.0% from three during the regular season, that number dipped to 26.0% in the postseason due to a slow shooting release and a lack of shooting versatility. Of his 349 three-point attempts in the regular season, a whopping 334 of them were categorized as open jumpshots per NBA.com. That means only 4% of his attempts came with a contesting defender within 4 feet of him. Even when accounting for the natural wonkiness of tracking data, that’s a strikingly low number.

Defenses in the playoffs recognized this tendency and targeted it ruthlessly. They closed out hard to his three-point attempts with fast, lengthy, athletic defenders like Herb Jones, Derrick Jones Jr., PJ Washington, and Daniel Gafford, challenging him to convert over contests that was made difficult due to his slow shooting release. This is how his shot was neutralized and his 3PT% took a 9-percent dip.

The encouraging sign here is that, less than a week ago on media day, he talked about tweaking his jumpshot over the offseason in order to maximize shot versatility, likely hinting at speeding up his release:

If he indeed does come into the season with a sped-up release, allowing him to shoot over tighter contests while maintaining efficiency, that makes double-big lineups with Hartenstein that much more dangerous offensively and a 4.5 Out offense specifically much more viable. A faster release and shooting over contests also inherently means taking a higher volume of threes, fixing the issue of Holmgren’s middling shooting volume at 7.0 three-point attempts per 100 possessions.

5 Slot Offense

Another way to utilize double-big lineups is with “5 Slot,” another variation of 5-out that puts the center in the far slot (the slot opposite to the ballhandler’s side). The name “5 Slot” too was something given by @Bowser2Bowser, as he was the first one to publicly catch onto Quinn Snyder debuting it during the Atlanta Hawks’ 2023 preseason.

Along with the annotated video linked above, he’s published an article about 5 Slot on his website, The Basketball Action Dictionary.

To summarize, 5 Slot compromises opposing defenses’ rim protection and rotations. Compromising opponents’ rim protection intrinsically bumps an offense’s rim attempts (Atlanta saw a 20% leap in rim FGA from 2022-23 to 2023-24) and thus rim pressure, which also leads to more open kickout 3s. Similar to 4.5 Out, this is another alignment that promotes a healthy balance of rim attempts and open 3s if executed well. With the creation and use of 5 Slot, Atlanta’s shot diet jumped from 27th in 2022-23 to 5th in 2023-24, per Cleaning The Glass.

5 Slot unlocks all this just by placing the center at the far slot instead of the top of the key — like in traditional 5-out — or the dunker spot — like in 4-out. This accomplishes a number of things, all stemming from one thing: placing your center at the far slot also places the opposing team’s center (their primary rim protector) there, meaning they’re a few steps away from their normal help position. This delays their help defense by a just a fraction, which is enough time to compromise a defense’s traditional rim protection techniques.

With their primary rim protector a few steps away from help defense, the defense now has to either:

• Send their low man (the defender guarding the corner) over to rotate and help at the rim, usually a guard or wing that is significantly worse at rim protection.
• Ask their center to just make the longer rotation and live with the results.

But it’s not even as easy as just having the center make the long rotation and live with the result at the rim. Even if they do make the rotation and successfully protect the rim from a ballhandler, that leaves a wide open “45 Cut” for x5 to stampede into.

All this is how Boston used 5 Slot in the playoffs to de-emphasize Mobley’s rim protection, as the video below details:

A defensive 3-second violation prevents Mobley from pre-rotating in the paint, meaning he can only begin his rotation once a paint touch occurs. By that time, it’s already had an impact on the effectiveness of his rim protection. But even if he were able to make the rotation and successfully protect the rim, that leaves Al Horford open for a kickout 3 or Luke Kornet open on a 45 Cut. This is where that ideal combination of rim attempts and open 3s comes from.

The Thunder can use 5 Slot in double-big lineups to do so similarly. They can run actions on the ball involving Shai Gilgeous-Alexander/Jalen Williams and Chet Holmgren on one slot (a PG/SG and PF PnR, for example) while placing Isaiah Hartenstein on the opposite slot. Now, they have an entire side to work with and generate a high-quality shot at the rim. If they do so, and the opponents’ center helps off Hartenstein to protect the rim, Hartenstein can simply stampede into a 45 Cut and finish in the paint. We saw how dangerous he is as an off-the-dribble driver in Delay — he’d only be more effective cutting into open space and stampeding into a catch-and-drive finish.

Hartenstein in the far slot can also be used to give Chet a higher role on offense — he has an entire side of the floor to work with as a self-creator away from any other big clogging the paint. This would allow him to work on one of his other weaknesses, attacking crossmatches, as the opponents’ 4 would automatically be matched up on him. Chet struggled with this in the playoffs as well, where he was unable to punish Dallas for crossmatching their tall wings (Derrick Jones Jr., PJ Washington, Josh Green) onto him and neutralizing the speed advantage he has off-the-dribble vs. bigs.

Chet already publicly mentioned working on punishing cross-matches on a Podcast P appearance earlier in the offseason. This gives him the chance to work on it in-game.

Some may criticize double-big lineups for this simple fact that Chet is matched up onto 4s instead 5s, where he’s at his best attacking slower-footed bigs. An opposing perspective is that this forces him to learn to win off-the-dribble versus tall wings and forwards, bumping his development at age-22. It’s not like defenses would’ve stopped crossmatching defenders onto him if Hartenstein weren’t there and he was the lone big. It didn’t stop Dallas. Hartenstein’s presence just forces Chet to develop these skills now instead of later.

The Defensive Floor Raising

Everything I’ve talked about thus far details how Hartenstein raises the Thunder’s ceiling on only the offensive side of the ball. He accomplishes this by improving their overall offense (adding a connective DHO piece and motion offense to fight stagnation), making life easier for Shai and JDub as creators (screen-setting), and accelerating Chet’s development (forcing him to shoot quicker and punish crossmatches).

The scary part is that Oklahoma City didn’t just pursue Hartenstein because he’s some elite offensive player. He’ll add immense value with his screening and perpetual motion, but at the end of the day, he averaged 11.6 points per 75 possessions and had a +0.7 Offensive Estimated Plus-Minus (82nd percentile) last season. The offensive impact of non-volume scorers will always be capped.

Rather, the main reason OKC brought him in was with the vision of fixing their poor non-Chet minutes and offering flexibility versus specific opponents (ex: opponents who rebound the ball especially well).

One of the Thunder’s biggest issues last season was their non-Chet minutes. During the regular season, the Thunder had an 8.6 net rating with Holmgren on the floor and a 5.2 net rating with him off, a +3.4 swing. That dropoff was exacerbated in the playoffs and especially against Dallas where they had a 4.4 net rating with him on the floor and a -15.2 without, a +19.6 swing. Sure, it was a small six-game sample size. But it was a playoff series that showed how vulnerable they were without Chet on the floor and Jaylin Williams as the lone big. That’s since Jaylin Williams is neither a good shooter nor a vertical threat on offense while being a liability on defense.

With Hartenstein carrying the load in the non-Holmgren minutes instead, they’ll have a better bench offense but also at least one dominant paint defender on the floor for all 48 minutes. There should be no reason for neither of them to be on the court outside of garbage time and injuries.

Last season, Hartenstein was:

• 7th in defensive field-goal percentage on shots defended in the restricted area (56.7%)
• 3rd in points per possession allowed defending the pick-and-roll as a big (0.946 PPP)
• 2nd in defensive estimated plus-minus (+3.9)

At 6-foot-9, it’s not even Jaylin Williams’ fault he’s a poor defender. He has really solid technique as a pick-and-roll defender, especially on hedge and recovers, and draws charges at a historic rate. But as an undersized big who lacks vertical pop, he’s extremely limited. Not Hartenstein though.

Hartenstein is one of the best paint defenders in the NBA thanks to his elite drop coverage and rim protection, and will be able to play more aggressive ball screen coverages consistently now with OKC’s elite secondary rim protection in Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, Jalen Williams, Alex Caruso, and even Cason Wallace there to cover for him. He’s a very capable defensive anchor by himself, which significantly raises the Thunder’s defensive floor. But it becomes even scarier in the minutes paired with Holmgren.

Either of them can act as the pick-and-roll big defender while the other plays the role of a ‘roamer’ who protects the backline second layer of defense. A ballhandler somehow managed to get to the rim past an Alex Caruso-Isaiah Hartenstein defended PnR? Cool. Have fun meeting Chet Holmgren at the rim as a reward.

Double-big lineups with Hartenstein and Holmgren also means you can’t completely remove primary rim protection with offensive scheme. See 5 Slot, where a defense’s center is placed at the far slot to neutralize the impact of their rim protection. In that case, Holmgren is just the low man, and he rotates over from the corner to protect the rim while Hartenstein is agile enough to closeout towards the corner. Or vice-versa.

The amount of versatility and optionality Hartenstein tabs for Oklahoma City is truly hard to overstate. Whether or not he’ll start has been a big discussion point since his initial signing. I think it just depends on who the opponent is. He may start on some nights and he may come off the bench on some nights, that’s not what really matters. It’ll be matchup-dependent — dependent on what the opponent entails on any given night.

What matters is that the Thunder even have the flexibility to be able to adapt to opponents like this. Last year, they had a strict selection of skillsets and a strict selection of players that made it tough for them to adapt from matchup-to-matchup. They were superb at what they were excellent at, like forcing turnovers where they led the league (15.8 turnovers forced per game, 0.9 more than second place), but were unable to effectively go big against heavy-rebounding units (i.e. Dallas Mavericks) or heavy-post up units (i.e. Denver Nuggets) since Jaylin Williams-Chet Holmgren double-big lineups just didn’t accomplish much.

Now, Hartenstein brings a fresh dose of rebounding (87th percentile defensive rebounding, 98th percentile offensive rebounding) and 1-on-1 post defense, all while maintaining OKC’s year-over-year focus on turnover-generation as he ranked fourth among qualifying centers in steals per game (1.2) and steal percentage (2.3%, 89th percentile overall). This is what enables the newfound optionality for Oklahoma City to tweak lineups depending on opponent strengths and weaknesses, which is far more useful than setting in stone the five starters for all 82-plus games.

At the end of every conversation surrounding Hartenstein’s transition to Oklahoma City, they all circle back to one thing: versatility. The addition of Hartenstein makes OKC more versatile. Whether it’s the connective DHO hub he is that adds another release valve, the motion offense he can bring that fights stagnation, the defensive floor raising he provides as a 1-man bench anchor, or the rebounding and additional size that he brings as a starter, he does all of these things very additively and without taking anything away from what the Thunder have been building for the past four years. This creates lineup optionality and lineup versatility. And versatility is what wins championships.

For that reason alone — how Hartenstein plugs holes that needed fixing without creating new ones, thus, making them more versatile — he’s worth every penny that he was paid and will be the difference-maker for the Oklahoma City Thunder during the 2024-25 season.

The post Inserting Some Hart Into The Thunder appeared first on Swish Theory.

The upcoming series between the Cleveland Cavaliers and the New York Knicks is projected to be one of the closer ones. In this series, I do schematic deep dives on either team, and explore the hypothetical questions that I believe to be the key points of interest for the opponents.

Cleveland Cavaliers Offensive Scheme

Empty Side

The Cavaliers run a three-out two-in offense with heavy motion from their guards. They push empty side pick-and-rolls as much as any other team in the NBA. They’ll push these early in transition.

Part of optimising their two inside big men is by rotating them as the empty side screener, though you’re more than likely going to see Mobley as the screener and Jarrett Allen in the dunker spot when they run this. Their overall philosophy in early offense is optional ball screens, giving Mitchell and Garland structure but not robbing them of freedom. The presence of Jarrett Allen at the dunker spot gives them easy buckets if the defense is collapsed. He’s in the 90^th percentile for half-court scoring efficiency.

Wedge Action

One of the Cavs’ most common actions out of their base offense is running wedge actions. This is simply an angled screen to the baseline. They run these for Evan Mobley to give him a chance to post-up or attack off the catch. Here they run Wedge Action to generate a look for Evan Mobley. He turns the ball over on this play (I’ll get to those issues later), but they get him in space on an empty side with ease.

The Cavaliers don’t do this as a one-shot type play though, they have many other options and counters from it. Here they run ‘wedge roll’ which is as it sounds. They then flow straight into a pick-and-roll.

Sometimes the mere threat of the option is enough to give them more cushion on pick-and-rolls. Here Darius Garland flows straight into a pick-and-roll and essentially ignores Okoro attempting to set the wedge screen for Allen, with the help defense occupied by the potential of this action.

Teams are hyper aware of the Cavaliers’ wedge actions and they fear them because empty side actions are the main way they try and ease spacing concerns. The play below illustrates a nice counter the Cavs have for it.

You see the Pacers sitting under Okoro for two reasons. One is because they don’t really respect him as a shooter, but the premiere reason is that they expect the wedge roll action to come. Garland sees this and pitches it to Mobley and Okoro screens Garland’s man as they flow into Delay Chicago action. It’s great offense and shows JB Bickerstaff’s attention to detail.

Flex and Rip Concepts

I’ve labelled this “flex concepts” because the Cavs don’t run the entirety of the flex offense, but they like to move their guards through the paint in screen-the-screener type actions which is the absolute epitome of what the flex offense is all about.

On this play, the Cavaliers don’t create an advantage out of the wedge action I mentioned above…

…so they pitch to the screener and go into a pick-and-roll with Darius Garland eventually setting a flex screen to get Evan Mobley to the low block. They initially didn’t get Mobley good post position but showed a multi-faceted approach to get it on a counter.

Such things don’t exist in Basketball analysis to my knowledge, but if there was a heat map that tracked players movements, I’m almost certain that the Cavaliers guards would touch the paint off-ball more than any other team due to their flex and rip concepts. These guards are deployed off-ball moving through the paint very regularly.

I enjoyed this play shown below.

They pitch to Isaac Okoro, but watch Donovan Mitchell and Darius Garland. They flow into an initial ‘floppy’ action (a double screen set for someone to emerge from the paint). After it doesn’t get an opening, Garland cuts to the other side on the flex scissors action and Okoro hits Evan Mobley for the dunk.

If one play summarised Cleveland’s Philosophy it’s this: these guards work for their touches out of flex concepts. This ties in with Bickerstaff’s overall philosophy. He loves the chin offense which is why he’s a perfect fit to coach a team with two bigs.

They often run these plays to try and alleviate spacing concerns. Mobley-Allen isn’t a great perimeter spacing duo as of now. So basic spread concepts aren’t really going to reap rewards. Here the Cavaliers run some flex action before flowing into an empty side pick and roll.

If you’re trying to get a big line-up to work, your guards have to do their due diligence off the ball as you ideally want to maximise the big men as elbow hubs. The Cavaliers do a great job of this when they run ‘Rip’ Action such as below. Rip action is merely a player back screening then receiving the ball.

With Ricky Rubio healthy, these sets have even more of a ceiling for the Cavaliers because his processing speed is borderline generational. Here they set up a Cross Screen for Lamar Stevens and Donovan Mitchell comes off a pindown after setting the cross screen, but Rubio sees the defense tilt away from Caris Levert in the corner and they get an easy look.

Pistol

Any team with two elite guards is going to run pistol action. While I wouldn’t call this Cleveland’s absolute staple, it’s another way they can create empty side actions and give high value touches to their lead guards. Below is the absolute most basic luck and their typical structure out of it.

Both of their lead guards in the same action. They go into a pick-and-roll. The opposite side spacing has their small forward and then Jarrett Allen at the dunker spot. They bail out to him on this play and he hits the floater. He’s in the 62^nd percentile for efficiency on these shots so it will be intriguing if teams live with this one and possibly sell out elsewhere.

They also use pistol to flow into delay action and to generate empty side actions like in the play below.

They look as if they’re going to flow into Delay Chicago after the initial pistol exchange. Instead, Levert cuts all the way to the weakside and they go into an empty-side pick and roll. Teams often blitz these so Mobley’s rolling can be highly fruitful on these actions.

Here things get a little more exotic, as they run Pistol Rip Empty Hawk.

Garland receives the ball from Mitchell. Mobley backscreens for Mitchell then comes up to set the screen (this creates the same advantage as ram action). They flow into an empty-side pick and roll and Mitchell cuts through the paint and comes off a double stagger which is Hawk action. It’s another illustration of Cavs guards moving off-ball, but also creating empty side actions out of multiple scenarios.

They run the same play against the Blazers here. This time Garland dribbles towards the empty side when he sees Nurkic in drop. The Hawk action occupies the defense and Garland scores the layup.

They also mix some ‘veer’ action into their pistol offense. This involves a screen for a ball handler, with the screener then darting elsewhere to set an off-ball screen in the same action or motion. Here they run it against the Orlando Magic.

On this occasion they do it to try and attack Bol Bol on the empty side pick-and-roll with a step up screen. Sometimes though they just do it to free up a shooter and create an advantage for Garland or Mitchell such as here.

Good offenses mesh all of their concepts together. I noted earlier how the Cavs like to use their guards on flex and rip concepts, here they tie this together with pistol.

They have the initial pistol action with Mitchell then going straight in a double drag action. This is deception for ‘rip’ action for Darius Garland who comes off a screen, then sets a backscreen of his own before darting for an open three. It’s a great example of how the Cavaliers Empty Side and Inside to out guard cutting concepts all meshing.

Ram

The Cavs also like to run ‘ram’ action, where a screener comes off a screen before screening for the ball-handler. They like to do this mixed with different secondary actions as a way of trying to freeze or occupy defenders. This is as they don’t have natural outside spacing with Mobley and Allen. They’ll often run this more against teams who play drop coverage. They run it here against the Rockets.

Mitchell is the initial screener for Jarrett Allen, and then exits to the perimeter off an Evan Mobley screen. The execution will need to be more flawless in the playoffs but the logic is to occupy the defense in a way Evan Mobley just being stationary on the perimeter wouldn’t occupy it.

They’ll often run it if they have smaller line-ups too such as here against the Orlando Magic.

This time, the exit action occupies the help defense the whole way, and Darius Garland essentially walks into an easy bucket when his man gets caught on Evan Mobley’s screen. It’s one of their most common concepts.

Here, they run a ‘small’ variant of Ram action with more inverted philosophy.

Donovan Mitchell this time receives a screen from Jarrett Allen and then Ghost Screens for Darius Garland. Allen chases it immediately and Garland once again walks into a wide-open bucket. They’ll use this ‘Ram Short 77 Ghost’ to try and force switches.

On the play below, they use it in a way that raises hypothetical questions about the action.

They have Jarrett Allen be the on-ball screener, and Evan Mobley executes ‘Short’ Action which is a cut to the strongside. Notice how it freezes the defender and Allen can get a free lane because of this as the Ram gave him some extra room at the beginning of the play.

The hypothetical question they will have to answer in the Knicks series is whether they’re better with Allen or Mobley as the on-ball screener. Allen is more likely to have Mitchell Robinson on him and he may feel comfortable playing free safety in that scenario. But Robinson is extremely disruptive at the level of the screen so having Allen as the screener might create more difficulties for the offense. They’ll likely mix things up, but this will be interesting to monitor.

My good friend Bowser also clipped another play similar to ram, known as ‘New Zealand’ Action.

This involves a ram screening action on the empty side. This may be something they go to in the playoffs if things stagnate with their more common actions.

Double Drags and Horns

Like any team trying to maximise a big frontcourt, the Cavaliers optimise Double Drags, and I think they’ll run these more in this series than usual. This is largely because a double screening action can put real strain on Tom Thibodeau’s defensive scheme as they prioritise defending the paint so may leave shooters open if the Cavs opt to use a guard in the action. They also quite commonly switch 4-5 so the Cavaliers may get some matchups they like. Here, they run ’77 Small’ with Donovan Mitchell ghost screening. Darius Garland then puts Dillon Brooks in the torture chamber.

The Cavaliers have done a great job mixing in these ghost screens. Here on this play against the Heat, Mitchell ghosting creates chaos.

Though the Knicks may be organised at the point of attack than Miami, they can still get beneficial switches and potentially get bigger defenders off Garland. It’s essentially they run these ‘small’ variants of double drag.

I love how high they set some of these double drag screens like they do here against Memphis.

The Cavs routinely have the second screener roll pretty quickly. Look how tough it is to defend. The Knicks will defend it in a similar way with trying to contain the drive. Expect to see the Cavs run a load of these.

As I’ve mentioned throughout this article, counters are important. On this play the Grizzlies try and get ahead of the action so Mobley rolls quickly and Darius Garland executes ‘get’ action which is receiving your own pass on a dribble handoff.

A key theoretical of the double drag comes with regards to Evan Mobley. The Knicks will almost certainly leave him open. They do with just about any popper in a double drag set. But Mobley needs to be aggressive. This is what will swing the series for Cleveland. Here against the Knicks he pops and takes Obi Toppin off the catch.

Though Toppin won’t see the floor often, it’s still an important play. He has to be willing to be decisive. Indecision kills offense more than inability at times. The Knicks will defend these double drags high and likely have Mobley’s man tag the roller. Hartenstein and Robinson will be containing the drive. He has to be decisive.

Cleveland also mixes in Horns Sets as a way of trying to keep the opposition center outside of the paint. Here they run a classic- Horns Ghost Flare.

Horns concepts are good because they can generate quick hitters for their elite guards while creating matchup problems. Using the gravity of their star guards early in actions just creates some incredible moments such as here where they mesh Horns and turn it into a Spain-Pick-And-Roll.

Spain Pick-And-Rolls are nightmarish anyway, and the Cavaliers mixing it with Horns is just excellent offense. It maximises the gravity of their guards and keeps bigs at the level. Spain PNRs can be particularly fruitful against the Knicks because it tests Tom Thibodeau’s philosophy of always having his low man tag the roller instead of defending the corner shot.

Cleveland also likes to use Ghost screens out of a Horns outline to generate favourable switches.

This will be particularly relevant in the Knicks series because Darius Garland can definitely get bothered by size, though it’s not a gigantic concern for me. Ghost screens in general are very good and they hold a big purpose for the Cavaliers.

The New York Knicks Defense

Now that I’ve looked at the Cavaliers diverse scheme, we should look at the New York Knicks defense. Per a source with Second Spectrum, the Knicks are 7th in the NBA in drop coverage frequency, and 2nd in at the level coverage. They rarely hedge or trap or play zone. They are aggressive at helping from the nail which is a staple of Tom Thibodeau’s defensive scheme. He prioritises defending the paint with a 5-man wall and expects his wings and guards to rotate to open shooters. The strong side defense looks something like this.

Note both corner defenders aggressively helping towards the paint. Hartenstein being up towards the level. Immanuel Quickley helping off his man to try and disrupt the roller. Some teams run teams off the three-point line with aggressive and close rotations. The Knicks escort you off of it at the top of the key then make your driving path as miserable as possible.

Here’s what the defense looks like in video form. Note how they’re in drop coverage on this occasion.

Note Julius Randle tag the roller, and then making RJ Barrett responsible for ‘splitting the difference’ between the two perimeter guys. Thibodeau’s wing defenders need to be instinctive, reactive and aggressive. Here the Knicks recover out to Darius Garland and force a shot they’re comfortable with from a structural perspective.

My general Hypothesis for this series is that empty side actions will decide the series. The Knicks love Empty Side Pick-And-Rolls for Jalen Brunson because the ‘counter punch’ out of it is baseline fadeaway jumpers, which might be Brunson’s strongest shot as his offensive ability off the planted pivot foot is elite.

Above I’ve mentioned how the Cavs love empty side actions and how the majority of their core actions can be to set up these empty side actions. It makes sense to explore how the Knicks defend these actions and ponder how fruitful they might be.

If the empty side action takes place on the right side and the screen is taking the guard towards the open side, they’ll generally be in ‘ICE Coverage’. This means they’re funnelling the play towards the sideline and essentially using the out of bounds line as an extra defender. It looks like this.

If the screen is set to the left side of the guard, the Knicks will mix up coverages. Here against the Wizards, they have Hartenstein drop so Kyle Kuzma just takes his man into the paint and hits the fadeaway.

Against the Cavaliers, empty side coverages can be complex and tricky because Garland and Mitchell are both incredibly shifty, and Allen and Mobley are such good screeners. Their ability to be unpredictable with the personnel can make a one size fits all scouting report difficult. I expect the Knicks to mix in some at the level coverages simply because Darius Garland is incredibly shifty off the dribble against drop coverage. Like what do you do with this?

Randle tries to drop and deal with Mobley, Barrett has to help away from Donovan Mitchell. Brunson isn’t active, and Jericho Sims is concerned about Jarrett Allen. Weirdly, Allen’s allergy to the perimeter can actually benefit the Cavs against Thibodeau’s strong side defense. He’s more concerned with Allen at the dunker spot than he would be with a corner shooter, philosophically.

This time, Hartenstein starts at the level of the screen. But once Garland gets a step on his man it’s close to over. Hartenstein is juggling being in the driving lane with mirroring the roll-man.

Note in this play how Quentin Grimes doesn’t really help off of Donovan Mitchell. Their approach to this will be intriguing because if you do help, even momentarily, you risk Mitchell being able to create off the catch and go like he does here. It’s generally clear though that a smaller guard on Garland without any nail help probably isn’t going to end well.

The Little Things- What the Cavaliers Can Do

Playoff series come down to micro adjustments more often than you might think. Here are a few things I think Cleveland can do to potentially make life easier for them.

The first, is setting higher screens. Given the Knicks like to be in ICE Coverage on these empty side actions, you can really cause havoc by setting the screens higher.

Note here that the entire empty side is genuinely empty. It’s because Randle has much more ground to cover in order to enforce the ‘No Middle’ ideology. Mobley also has more rolling room. I think high screens can genuinely really cause the Knicks problems in this series. I’d also attempt to get Randle and Brunson in actions as much as possible. Neither are awful defenders but they’re a step slower than their team-mates.

Here, the Cavaliers do the same with their ‘ram’ action.

Look at the gap between Grimes and his teammates before the action even happens. You could park a car in there. Mitchell makes Randle dance by faking the right drive, then makes Grimes dance before hitting the pull-up three. A good way to delegitimise nail help is to just set the action really far away from it.

Putting Donovan Mitchell or Garland in the actions as an off-ball threat should prove fruitful. I think their wedge set in particular could be a nice way to test if the Knicks want to trap. Here against Portland, the Blazers run wedge roll with Anfernee Simons setting the wedge screen for Nurkic.

Thibodeau wants to maintain structure above all else. No middle at all costs. Putting your best players in the action really tests this because your nearest help defender has to worry about a star moving off-ball. They could walk into good jump shots or just generally get the defense on the back foot with how they position guys.

Generally, I think pre-action is needed to really get at the Knicks. Make them work and force them to make quick decisions. Thibs wants teams to play slow against his defense. Something as simple as what Minnesota do here, would suffice.

The Wolves trigger the ICE Coverage with a quick pass to Mike Conley on the empty side. Gobert rolls, and when Randle tags, Conley hits Kyle Anderson who is able to manipulate the help defense to create a wide open three. Generally, forcing these nail help guys to be as reactive as possible is a good way of winning games. Generally, their target should be to get these with pre-action and higher screens.

In Summary

Overall, this might be the most interesting first round series of the NBA Playoffs. The Cavaliers offense is diverse and fluid, and the Knicks defense is really tough. Evan Mobley needs to be aggressive, and the Knicks help defense will need to be on point. The battle of the nail help defenders likely decides this series. I’m not meaning to underestimate the Knicks defense, it’s an immense unit. I just think there are ways Cleveland can attack it and that’s what I’ve tried to explore in this series. I hope you enjoyed.

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