A tight game in the third quarter, this Western Conference Finals rematch is hotly contested. Luka, who was demoralizingly great against the Wolves in the playoffs last season, is currently working off the ball to get open. 

Tough situation here as a referee.

Luka and Jaden McDaniels are grabbing and pushing and grappling each other with both arms. Who is fouling who in this moment? No whistle on the play, play on.

Due to his devastating nature, Luka has the Wolves desperate to keep him away from the ball and force preferably anyone else to try and make a play. McDaniels is on the top-side of Luka, hoping to deter him from the ball.

Lively is the trigger man here…

…and his ability to make quality reads from the center position adds dimension to the Mavericks offense. In the rare instance Luka doesn’t have the ball, like in this instance, Lively can set Luka up with a handoff and subsequent screen, but Lively can also counter coverage like this by finding Luka on a basket cut. 

He can also do neither if neither are open, to stay as close to error-free as possible. Dallas overall was top 5 in taking care of the ball last season (12.5 turnovers a game), and their entire center rotation of Lively, Gafford and Powell all carried an AST/TO above 1 (1.2, 1.55 and a whopping 2.63 respectively – Powell landing top 5 in the league amongst centers). When Luka is on your team, no need to try to do too much. Hand the ball off, and roll hard. If it’s not a dunk, give the ball back to Luka and Kyrie. Rinse, repeat.

Lively’s ratio was more reflective of his actual decision-making aptitude, as his playoff AST/TO maintained at 1.29 while Gafford’s fell off to 0.79. Some at the time were clamoring for more Lively playoff minutes so the Mavericks could benefit from his passing chops. Here, Lively has the chance to ignite a play.

Another piece of credit on this setup should be given to the Dallas coaching staff and scheme; Lively operating from the top of the key brings Rudy, the Wolves primary rim protector, right up to the 3-point line and far, far away from the rim. 

At this point, Luka has had enough of McDaniels, and will not spend any more energy breaking through this coverage to get to the ball. Instead, Luka plants his right foot down…

…to head to the rim. McDaniels, as long and fast as he is, cannot fully cover both denying him a path to the ball and a path to the basket. But that is the concession of the coverage. 

Lively will need to recognize this slight lean towards the basket in a timely manner (right at this moment) so that the pass can begin to be delivered into space while that space exists. The paint is open at this very moment, but NBA time and space can close quickly.

Gobert’s arms are active here applying ball pressure on Lively…

…because the passing angle for a leading pass into the paint is a prominent and threatening possibility. If Gobert’s peripheral vision is able to capture the Luka lean, he can preemptively have his hands ready to shoot up and deflection a potential entry pass down the middle.

Naji Marshall screening for Kyrie occupies the attention of half of the Wolves’ off-ball defenders.

Donte DiVincenzo cannot be concerned with anyone else’s assignment; his hands are full guarding Kyrie. Naz Reid sits back on the Marshall screen, at the ready to pick up Kyrie if he breaks loose to the basket. 

Meanwhile, the most important defender on the play at this moment is Ant. 

The low-man here, Anthony Edwards appears keyed in on Luka and Lively’s intent. It will be his responsibility to help on Luka, break up the potential pass, or even better, pick it off. 

If the ball is successfully entered to Luka on this cut, Luka will be ahead of McDaniels and the Mavericks will have a momentary 2-on-1 numbers advantage…

…with McDaniels trailing, leaving Dinwiddie unguarded in the corner if Ant slides over. Perhaps if the defensive cohesion is good enough, McDaniels can hand Luka duty off to Ant, and McDaniels can peel off to pick up Dinwiddie. But that is a tough task to pull off fluidly, and it might take a defensive beat or two to get out there otherwise. 

The Mavericks should be slightly favored to score in this moment, granted the pass is executed to access the 2-on-1 advantage. It should be simple math, but in an athletically dynamic arena like NBA basketball, the decisions have to be made instantaneously while windows of opportunity are open, and it may require an intense series of quick decisions. Otherwise windows will close because defensive length and athleticism will close the space, and the offense will again have to spend effort to create. 

In a process of defensive elimination, Luka delivered a dazzling behind-the-back pass. Knowing that Ant had committed with his jump (good verticality by Ant) and feeling that McDaniels was still within arms length, Luka could infer the corner pocket was open. He either had peripheral vision of Dinwiddie in the corner while he was cutting, and/or Dallas will generally have those corners filled. Credit McDaniels with his effort to still make a considerable closeout and contest, but Luka had drawn him all the way to the restricted area, making the closeout just about as long as it could be. 

October 30th, San Antonio at Oklahoma City 

It’s hard not to highlight frames with Chris Paul at the helm. I’ll try not to include him in every edition, it’s just outstanding how he continuously makes the most of the studio space.

Wemby isn’t in the picture, but he’s on the floor. Just a couple seconds prior, he was setting a really high ball screen…65 feet from the basket. The Thunder’s full court pressure can be unrelenting with its personnel and defensive talent. They had just deployed a casual amount of it after a made basket, not allowing Paul to walk it up the floor at his own tempo and coordinate the Spurs’ attack to close the quarter heading into halftime. 

Chris Paul opted to use the screen and speed up into the half-court, getting ahead of his defender Cason Wallace, who has switched onto the absent Wembyana. Jalen Williams has picked up Paul.

A moment prior, Paul was met with some legal opposition from Williams. Jalen had stayed physically disciplined and within his body, not extending any hands out onto CP (who is liable to automatically draw that contact at a moment’s notice). And in anticipation, Jalen had moved to slide his feet in front of Paul’s direction of choice (right), and his physicality was entirely passive contact, absorbing and resisting the strength of the drive to chip off a lot of CP’s downhill momentum as Paul rammed into his chest. Slowed down by the bump and now with the hang dribble, Chris Paul is considering his current array of choices. 

Eight seconds into the possession, OKC’s stout point-of-attack defense has induced Chris Paul to change speeds twice already (the backcourt screen usage ramp up and the bump to slow down), one of which was more elective and the other being more of a hearty, physical welcome upon dribbling inside the 3-point line. 

OKC’s team defense is also looking tight at the moment as well, with all other defenders unassociated with the point-of-attack switch positioned fairly.

Since Chris Paul has not yet entered the paint and his momentum has been severely halted, the Thunder can stay home on their assignments. Jalen has it well-handled at this moment. The stagnancy of Harrison Barnes in the nearside corner and Keldon Johnson on the opposite side…

…does not do Chris Paul any favors here. 

However, the ever-cutting Sochan volunteers. 

Sochan is aware of his value-add as a cutting finisher (and certainly less so as a spacer for Paul’s drive), and here he catches onto the pace that Chris Paul was coming down the floor with. He is trying to at least give Paul the option of a potential wizardly pass somewhere through Jalen Williams and Caruso and Shai. 

Caruso is in a great gap position, further discouraging Paul’s path forward, on top of staying in the middle of an imaginary string between Paul and Sochan, impeding possible passes. 

Caruso had caught onto Sochan’s off-ball change of pace, and is keeping himself in the same depth to the rim as Sochan’s cut, which he knows is a prominent part of Sochan’s half-court game. 

The conceivable deliveries to Sochan are unclear at the moment, and passes to Barnes or Keldon leave the defense mostly indifferent, with Shai and Dort very capable of closing down the space on their respective closeouts here, especially since their off-ball defensive positioning has yet to be strained or even budged on the possession. Wemby is still making his way down the floor. 

In addition to being one of the best passers of all time, Chris Paul is in my opinion one of the most underrated scorers in league history. With the body control of an abrupt stop and gather, Chris Paul gained slight separation from the lightly back-pedaling Jalen Williams, which granted himself another moment to collect. And in the beat between those moments, he found himself at the right elbow, one of his favorite spots, with space to rise up quick. 

The post NBA Freeze Frame: Volume 2 appeared first on Swish Theory.

A picture is worth a thousand words, but I will keep it to less than that per picture.

At this point, Anthony Edwards has obliterated the point-of-attack defense for a 2-on-1 situation with Rudy Gobert vs Rui Hachimura, encroaching on the restricted area. The gather has been made, and his momentum is downhill. A moment in time for Ant to make his decision, with several options at his disposal. 

Ant has done so much good work to this point. What originated as a handoff from Gobert out of a sideline inbounds, Ant has already left his immediate defenders Austin Reaves and AD dusted.

(Also wanted to note that Ingles set an off-ball screen that put Reaves a half step or more behind the handoff to begin with, to Ingles’ credit)

But for all intents and purposes, Ant has created a full advantage, overcoming both point-of-attack defenders. Rui steps up in help, as he should.

And that leaves Gobert wide open at the rim. The Wolves are one pass away from an open rim finish, one of the best results attainable on any given possession. Rudy is even starting to point up and call for the lob.

Per NBA.com/stats, Rudy was 73/78 on alley-oop dunk attempts last season, good for a 93.6% completion percentage and 1.87 points per shot (PPS). Pretty good. However, when Rudy was forced to adjust to the pass or was unable to easily and securely dunk it, his alley-oop layup numbers fall off dramatically: 6/14 on alley-oop layup attempts (42.9%, 0.86 PPS), cutting expected points down by over a whole point. 

This could be an easy alley-oop dunk. Does Gobert’s notoriously clumsy hands influence Ant’s decision? With a moment to decide, is there trust for the passer to execute the delivery, and the receiver to cap it off?

What defenders have a path to making any sort of play on the potential lob pass? Both Reaves and Knecht are at a huge size and positioning disadvantage to cover Gobert here, and it would be uncharacteristic for either one of them, so it’s safe to count them out on this play. Otherwise the Lakers would need a spectacular recovery to the rim by AD, who does not look like he’s in any heat seeking missile-style stance to explode back into the play.

Think Giannis recovering to block Ayton’s alley-oop in the 2021 Finals. That level of play is rare. Don’t expect AD to summon that in the first game of a long season, but he is one of the handful of players in the league capable of it. 

Another passing option is the corner.

But seeking corner 3’s when you have a 2-on-1 advantage converging on the rim is not the best process. Having the vision and awareness of an open corner shooter is still ideal here, but it would really have to come down to (situation and) convincing shooting personnel – Randle is the one wide open in the corner in this instance. He shot 35.4% on catch-n-shoot 3-pointers last season – 1.06 PPS. This calculus changes when it’s Donte DiVincenco standing there – 40.7% on catch-n-shoot 3’s for 1.22 PPS, but the decision should still be the rim. 

Rui is the one meeting Ant at the rim. It might not matter who is at the rim, Ant will remain undeterred. 

Ant has already created so much expected value at this point, where his uncontainable athleticism has awarded him three great options: the lob to an open Gobert, his own finish at the rim against a rotating defender, and an open corner catch-n-shoot for Randle. 

Ant ends up loading up and rising around Rui for a finish with the foul, and-1. As a 69% finisher in the restricted area last season (1.38 PPS), it’s hard to blame Ant for taking it himself, and credit must be given for the finish. Also have to note that the extra free throw tacked on probably does not happen with the lob, and Ant carries a healthy free throw rate over from last season (0.325 FTr). But there is a higher chance of missing the field goal compared to a pin-point lob.

The decision might not matter – if the shot misses, it appears likely Rudy can mop up the mess since he is best-positioned for a roll off the rim.

Contingent on misses, this naturally dependent facet of Gobert’s game can help prop up team efficiency during poor shooting stretches. But while Gobert’s putback efficiency from last season was strong (67.5 FG% – 1.35 PPS), it is not as potent as a lob dunk.

At the same time, the potential second shot efficiency on this play should be partially credited to Ant, since the defense was beaten so badly, and they were so far out of position for a defensive rebound as well. In this specific instance with no one else around the basket to contest the board, Rudy could comfortably finish a hypothetical miss. 

Ultimately, Ant gets two points on the play, with a chance at a third (which he got). No need for Gobert’s involvement. But over the course of the season, over the course of a playoff series, or even over the course of an individual game, the accumulation of the quality of decisions add up. The margins stack up, so the process of finding the most optimal shots possession-by-possession has to be a concerted, conscientious effort, and a developed habit over time. 

Orlando is starting to pull away from the Heat in the second half. Anthony Black faces an aggressive Miami point-of-attack defense in this instance. With Paolo releasing freely on the roll, the conventional read is available.

AB’s height gives him the ability to simply dump this pass off over the top of Jimmy and Jaquez to Paolo, giving Paolo a rotating defender to attack, and a numbers-advantage on the weakside to potentially make a pass and keep the defense in rotation. 

Bam is the backline defender responsible here for rotating to Paolo. 

Coming over from guarding Wendell Carter Jr., Bam is just beginning to lean towards Paolo for a routine rotation to the short-roller. 

However, AB zigs here where most would zag. Sensing the momentum of Bam – slight as it is towards Paolo in an entirely valid defensive decision by Bam – AB subverts this reasonable intuitive defensive expectation, and zips a pass into WCJ at the elbow.

While Paolo would have received a 2-on-1 situation with WCJ vs Bam (and possibly a 3-on-2 situation if Highsmith rotates to WCJ in a timely manner), WCJ is now the one receiving the pass and the 2-on-1 scenario vs Bam with Paolo the one cutting to the rim. What’s the difference? 

Per NBA.com/stats, Paolo’s points per shot on cuts was 1.28, while WCJ’s was 1.39, the better bet in a vacuum. Last season, Paolo led Orlando with 10.2 potential assists per game, and WCJ had 2.9, not bad for a center. Point being, no matter who here receives the advantage from Anthony Black out of the pick-n-roll, both players are capable of being the one to make the next pass, or the one to finish at the rim off a cut. It speaks to the versatility of the Magic’s frontcourt and their overall play-making ability.

If a hypothetical interior rotation by Highsmith subsequently occurred and the rim was covered, the Heat’s perimeter rotations would then be tested, as KCP in the corner would be the next conventional open read

and then Harris above-the-break following that.

Since the Heat decided to put two defenders on the ball at the point-of-attack off the jump, this is the defensive path they have chosen for themselves. After Highsmith, Herro would need to be on the way to the corner to KCP, with Jimmy or Jaquez heading to Harris. When the rotations are tight, it’s definitely doable.

But the play-making chain never got that far. It didn’t need to – the dominos quickly fell into what resulted in a jam by Paolo.

Bam was caught off-balance by this alternative chain of advantages. Disoriented for a moment and left scrambling, Adebayo could not catch up on the play, as a quick connective pass by WCJ to Paolo resulted in the secure flush (80/88 on dunks last season – 90.9%, and this one was even two-handed), only desperately contested by Bam.

AB was presented with an obvious choice for the standard play, and thus predictable links in the play-making chain, but he used a little imagination and ingenuity to mix things up. AB successfully getting off the ball vs two defenders and following the natural stem of decisions out of this situation is the perfectly right play to make. Credit to him for creating another way though, puncturing the middle of the floor with the pass and giving WCJ great access to options, where he instantly found Paolo flowing to the rim.

AB’s knowledge of defensive assumptions, his size, vision and manipulation all played a factor in what culminated in a dependable two-handed dunk for the Magic’s best scorer. Pretty good. 

Beginning of the fourth quarter and the Spurs are down by double-digits. While double-digit comebacks are becoming more frequent in today’s league, it is still a steep challenge as less than a quarter of teams successfully overcome that type of deficit. San Antonio will need to make the most out of every offensive possession down the stretch, on top of getting stops, to get back into this one. With 21 seconds on the shot clock, Chris Paul is leading the Spurs into their early offense. Expected points on any given possession fall precipitously every second that ticks off the shot clock, and Paul is looking for an early opportunity to strike. 

For the Spurs’ attack, their fifth player Keldon Johnson, who had inbounded the ball, has yet to even cross half-court, let alone enter this snapshot. Still, there is advantage to be had by getting into this drag screen action quickly; the lowest defender three seconds into this possession is Maxi Kleber on the weakside elbow,

which is not particularly low for a low-man. But that is how far back he was able to get in three seconds. Looking further into the paint as a whole, Maxi’s left foot is the only defensive establishment the Mav’s have in the paint at the moment. No other Maverick is near the paint, and all are even further from the rim. 

Chris Paul is already highly aware of the entire defense’s positioning, and the subtle offensive dynamics in motion. The Mavericks are in the middle of switching the Chris Paul-Jeremy Sochan screen.

Klay was up on the screen initially, so his switch assignment becomes more challenging here on out; he has to catch up to the cutting Sochan while simultaneously closing the pocket pass window. Meanwhile Sochan has the head start, slipping out of this screen and diving into the open waters of the current paint. 

Sochan has only just placed his left foot inside the arc,

but he’s already the most dangerous threat for a rim attempt in this moment. Jeremy has turned his hips out of the screen, and he’s now facing the rim as he makes his cut. Klay, now his primary defender, is positioned on the top-side of Sochan, trailing the cut. In a race to the rim, Sochan will beat Klay, and last season Sochan made 72.7% of his finishes stemming from cuts. Pretty good. 

All Chris Paul has to do now is deliver the ball. A temporary, momentary passing window, and perhaps a tight window for many players, but this is Chris Paul. 

Luka could probably do more here to obstruct the passing window. He knows better. 

The Spurs should already be favored to score this possession, even as soon as this moment, but the play is not over. A quick strike on a leading bounce pass by the pick-n-roll maestro to Sochan would threaten a defensive concession and test the recoverability of the Mavericks’ weakside. Kleber, who is not facing the rim like Sochan, and also does not have momentum towards the rim like Sochan, must catch up in a race to the rim for any chance to thwart the Spurs.

Incredibly, Kleber was able to close the gap and make a spectacular block at the rim. 

After receiving the pass, players in Sochan’s position should understand the speed of recovery required by Kleber here to make a play, as well as the instinctual desperation to catch up to the play, and use that momentum against the late, frenzied rim protector. A simple shot fake for Sochan would do the trick to send Kleber out of the picture and/or send himself to the free throw line. 

In the end, the Spurs were not able to string together enough buckets or stops in this one, falling to Dallas 109-120.

The post NBA Freeze Frame: Volume 1 appeared first on Swish Theory.

The youth are here to take over, yes. The old gods are dead and buried. There is no James, Curry, or Durant in this year’s final four. Even as their powers diminished, those four appeared in four of the last five conference finals. There’s not even a Jimmy Butler, who has made three of the last five.

Parity is another word looming large over this postseason. Since the Warriors dynasty broke apart, the 20 conference finals representatives have been comprised of 12 different teams. Much of the repetition comes out East, by far the weaker conference: the Celtics and Heat have 7 of the 10 ECF showings. Out West, the Nuggets, Mavericks, and Lakers have repeatedly appeared. Yet two conference finals in 5 years don’t scream dominance. More than ever, it feels like everyone has a shot.

That sentiment plays into an even more important theme in my eyes. When you look at the teams that have made deep runs, this year most of all, they took huge swings in acquiring talent. In this era of parity, those who push their chips in first are being rewarded. I want to explore the importance of forcing the window open and the rewards of temerity vs. the cost of timidness.

Dallas Swings, Thunder Go Down Looking

The Mavs-Thunder series is the clearest example of this idea. It’s frankly incredible how directly the trade ties between these two teams caused this series to shift.

Go back to the draft. Dallas owned a lottery choice but seemed intent on moving it to shed salary, and landed on sending Davis Bertans (and most importantly his $17M salary) with the 10th pick to Oklahoma City for the 12th pick. It’s hard to argue with the selections both teams made – OKC taking Cason Wallace while Dereck Lively II fell to Dallas – but the large trade exception Dallas created was huge. Sam Presti was handing an undeserved bailout to the Mavericks.

That exception was used to acquire Richaun Holmes, not exactly a game-changing acquisition, but it enabled them to do several things. After creating extra cap room, Dallas was able to acquire Grant Williams via sign-and-trade with Boston. Williams and Holmes did not pan out but became important salary ballast at the deadline. And this is where Oklahoma City only made things harder on themselves.

On February 8th, Dallas shipped out Holmes and Williams along with salary and picks for Daniel Gafford and P.J. Washington. Not only would these trades have been impossible without OKC’s draft night deal, but they helped even further by exchanging 2028 picks with Dallas to open up a 2024 first Dallas could use in these deals. It gave them the ammo needed to make two big deadline swings.

Meanwhile, Oklahoma City made calls but ultimately settled on a bunt single of a trade in acquiring Gordon Hayward at the deadline. Now fast forward to the conference semifinals to see the impact of those deals.

Gafford recorded 11/7.5/1.3 with 2 blocks per game across 6 matchups with OKC. P.J. Washington was murder for the Thunder, recording 18/8/2 averages while hitting a ridiculous 47% of his 8.2 threes per game. Fittingly, Washington’s free throws at the end of Game 6 closed out the series. Gordon Hayward managed 15 inconsequential minutes in the series. Sam Presti effectively sold the Mavericks a pair of knives only to watch his team be stabbed to death by said knives. One team swung, another watched, and the swinging team ended up moving on.

And they weren’t the only team undone by their own mistakes.

Minnesota Pays Up, Denver Counts Coins

If you follow the NBA on a deeper level, you’re probably aware of the Kroenke vibe. They’re willing to cut checks for big players when necessary but will always find a way to cut costs in the end. This loss to Minnesota felt like a culmination of the pitfalls that philosophy comes with.

Minnesota threw a contract at GM Tim Connelly that Denver did not want to match, and it seemed prudent after last season as GM Calvin Booth helmed a championship team. Yet it was clear to all that it was Connelly who had his prints all over the squad. The entire starting lineup, one that dominated the 2023 playoffs, was drafted or acquired by Connelly before his departure. The Timberwolves saw what he could do and put unequivocal faith in him to build a team that could dismantle his creation.

The Rudy Gobert trade was unfairly maligned at the time and took only a year to prove everyone wrong as he anchored the best defense in the league. While Minnesota took more swings to improve on this Gobert team (acquiring Mike Conley, signing Nickeil Alexander-Walker, and extending their stars) Denver was content with what they had after the title. Calvin Booth told Bruce Brown not to let the door hit him on the way out. They acquired more picks to try and hit through the draft instead of getting proven talent to augment a championship roster.

When these two teams faced off, it was clear what kind of impact these moves made. Minnesota had more depth, more athleticism, and a feeling of confidence that Denver could not match. The stars performed, yes, but the role guys made the difference in the series. NAW’s defense and shooting confidence played a role. Mike Conley hit timely shot after timely shot. And on Denver’s side, guys like Christian Braun and Peyton Watson could not affect the series when the stars sat. If only there was a playmaking and defending wing Denver had in their grasp.

The throughlines of this between the two squads aren’t quite as clear as Dallas and OKC, but you can see how aggression from Minnesota’s front office won over Denver’s complacency. That’s why Minnesota is fighting for its deepest run in franchise history while Denver hits the racing track.

Knicks, Pacers Going Out On Their Shields

Regardless of who won that series, nobody could argue the Pacers or Knicks were withholding chips. Both teams went pedal to the metal during this season and reaped the rewards.

Indiana took perhaps the biggest swing of the entire deadline in acquiring Pascal Siakam, and he responded by powering them through the first two rounds of the playoffs as their leading scorer. Much hand-wringing was done when the deal was made, yet nobody can argue with the results as Indiana reaches their first conference finals in a decade.

The Knicks took an even larger amount of swings. They made moves for OG Anunoby, Bojan Bogdanovic, Alec Burks, Precious Achiuwa, and Donte DiVincenzo over this past year. Donte and OG were among the primary reasons why the Knicks could win a street fight-type series against the Sixers despite the absence of Julius Randle. Had they not completely fallen apart with injuries (I am looking at you with malice, Tom Thibodeau) it feels like they would be playing Boston right now.

Sure, you could argue trading Obi Toppin to the Pacers this offseason burned them. But Toppin was buried on the depth chart at the time and would have likely fallen further behind after that bevy of acquisitions. And a 10 PPG role player who is generally heinous on defense isn’t going to be the one who got away.

Both teams swung, and both teams reaped huge rewards. And it gave them a puncher’s chance against the beasts of the East, another team not shy to make moves.

Boston Doesn’t Back Down

As previously mentioned discussing the parity of the league, only the Heat could match Boston in conference finals appearances over the previous four seasons. Yet those three showings had resulted in zero titles. In this era of “what have you done for me lately?”, many questions were being asked. Is Jayson Tatum the kind of guy who can lead a title winner? Can Jaylen Brown be his #2? At what point do we shake this up?

Instead of caving to those notions, Brad Stevens doubled and tripled down. He boldly chose to trade Marcus Smart for a better-fitting star in Kristaps Porzingis, needing little draft capital to do so. Then he went even further by taking advantage of the Damian Lillard trade to add Jrue Holiday. Instead of breaking this team apart, he only fortified their chances and was rewarded with a 64-win team that is stampeding through the Eastern Conference.

Even with Porzingis injured and unlikely to return until late in the conference finals, Boston holds a 3-0 series lead over the upstart Pacers and are overwhelming favorites to come out of the East, perhaps fully healthy. Jrue has been the playoff chess piece they needed, taking on important defensive matchups while canning 43% of his 4.7 threes per game. The role players don’t need to hit as hard when you boast Jayson, Jaylen, Jrue, Derrick White, Porzingis, and Al Horford. No team in this league can even hold a candle to that top 6.

Boston chose to push in every chip they could and are being thoroughly rewarded.

What Does This Tell Us?

Yes, young stars are indeed playing a major role. One of these four teams will represent a new title winner. All four are led by a star who is 26 years old or younger.

That only enhances the point here. All four teams could have sat back and gone “Well their primes haven’t even started yet, so we can wait” and chose instead to make short-term moves. The 2024 championship winner will be a team led by young stars whose management chose to force the window open instead of waiting for it to open naturally. The teams that have gone home already by and large chose to sit on their hands and wait.

Contention windows don’t stay open as long as you expect. Sometimes they don’t open at all. If you have the stars capable of delivering a deep run toward the Larry O’Brien trophy, take the swings now before your chance passes. It may pass sooner than you think.

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