I’ll also touch on my misses from last year, and how I hope to correct for shortcomings next cycle. Let’s waste no more time and dig in.

2023 Values

This section covers the players I ranked highest relative to the actual draft results, utilizing Kevin Pelton’s draft selection value table. Is there a common theme, am I missing or onto something?

Drafting with One Eye Closed

GG Jackson (my #12, drafted #45), Trayce Jackson-Davis (my #26, drafted #57), Leonard Miller (my #9, drafted #33), Jalen Slawson (my #28, drafted #54)

My biggest difference this cycle from last was trying to have a more holistic approach to a player’s own role curve. That is to say, comfort with a role (particularly in the NCAA) is not automatic, unlikely chosen by a player and often different than presented in recruiting efforts. College teams need players to win, development systems need player to develop, players just want to be selected as high as they can while balancing the goals of stakeholders around them. It can be messy, and often is.

The group I’m discussing here did not all have sub-optimal roles, but perhaps ones that masked their appeal as prospects, or distorted viewpoints of how they might contribute.

My single greatest difference to actual draft results was one Gregory Jackson the Second. At #12 on my board, Jackson was not selected until the second round by the Memphis Grizzlies. While rumors abound of immaturity from GG during team workouts, I’m less bothered given the substantial talent, obvious at his young age.

The most significant obstacle to draft analysis, in my view (beyond not knowing ball) is to make a one-to-one connection between items you notice and items of significance. Watching GG, it is not difficult to spot places where he could do better. Passing is the most obvious, often tunnel-visioned in his scoring approach, amplified at South Carolina by few other legitimate options but still clearly present in Summer League play as well. But if one were to ding Jackson for each and every missed pass, one might come away with a more negative view than is accurate in consideration of his star power, and that’s really what we’re here for.

It is more damaging to not take major swings than it is to have the occasional bust. If a player busts, his on-court impact simply goes to zero – there is a natural downside limit in that you’re not forced to give a player playing time, nor does it necessarily hurt your odds of acquiring more talent. But if he hits, and I mean truly hits, as in worth a max contract, that changes your franchise’s profile over a decade or more. This asymmetry runs up against basic human intuition: risk aversion means we are naturally suited to play it safe. But for that exact reason can be the source of extreme value in the NBA draft.

GG was third in usage of all freshmen as the youngest player in all of college basketball. He never looked overwhelmed athletically, consistently hitting the boards (17% defensive rebound rate) while using up a mega amount of iso (100), PNR (107) and spot up (143) possessions. Simply put, senior year HS aged players are not built like GG, not often. While a scout may see a sea of red marking up his execution on complex plays, he is able to put himself in those scenarios over and over with the flexible tank that is his hulking 6’9’’, 215 pound frame.

GG has a combination of traits I view highly in combination: when he has his nose in a play, he is determined to finish it (dawg factor); a frame to play power forward or small-ball center; the flexibility to get low into drives; an elite second jump; good shooting mechanics. Those are the traits of a scoring engine – as I put it in my scouting report of Jackson early in the season, “GG wants to be your team’s leading scorer,” and he has the mold for it. There are simply not many people in the world who have that combination of traits at an NBA level, and it takes two seconds watching GG move in Summer League to see how easily he belongs, physically.

Moving on to the rest of the group, the theme remains of swinging into uncertainty, where you have tangible evidence of NBA player-ness. By that last term I mean a collection of base skills that would be surprising to find in a non-NBA player. Let’s go through them quickly.

• Trayce Jackson-Davis: production, production and production; second jump; balance; sparks of creativity and touch at size
• Leonard Miller: dawg factor; production at age and competition; elite flexibility; sparks of creativity and touch at size
• Jalen Slawson: production and athletic versatility; team success; sparks of creativity and touch at size

The common trait for these remaining three is having some passing and some shooting touch but also defensive creativity, capable of picking up unexpected assists, steals or blocks in ways that took their opponents by surprise. Being two steps ahead of processing at lower levels, or even just hanging in at a higher level (in Miller’s case) is a good sign of being able to pick up NBA schemes, and the size of all three makes it easier to get the reps to showcase that. The flashes of touch and passing are simply compounding benefits as different areas of value on the court and expanding number of schemes in which they fit.

All four of the players here have role questions. “Can GG play off-ball?” (Summer League answer: yes); “Does Lenny fit cleanly into the 3, 4 or 5?” (Summer League answer: yes); “Can Trayce Jackson-Davis protect the rim as a 5?” (tbd); “Can Jalen Slawson shoot well enough to be a 3?” (tbd). But I also think these questions oversimplify what is a chaotic process in scouting. As Avinash said in his stellar Leonard Miller piece, “since when can we effectively project roles to begin with?”

That is not to say we shouldn’t try to project role, but we certainly shouldn’t let confusion in the exercise stop us from ranking a prospect highly.

I call this section “Drafting with One Eye Closed” as drafting is foremost an act of imagination, but that includes some willful optimism at times. The balance of cost relative to benefit of trying to make an unusual player work is lopsided, assuming the talent is indeed there. We draft players to try to alter the path of franchises, and the only way to do that is to try where others do not. Role occlusion, whether established upperclassmen or molds-of-clay youngsters, can be an opportunity masked by the same risk that drives people away.

To put the concept in more human terms, the game of basketball evolves in unexpected ways, and you need unexpected players to fit that evolving vision. The talent and effort side is the player’s job; fitting them onto the basketball court is the role of those around them.

Make Something Happen

Nick Smith Jr. (my #13, drafted #27), Amari Bailey (my #19, drafted #41), Sidy Cissoko (my #25, drafted #44)

Decision-making can be the most maddening NBA skill to dissect, making it all the more important in our evaluation of guards specifically. Guards typically survive on being nimbler, better handlers, shooters than their taller brethren, but this also means they have to make a greater number of decisions with or near the ball. If their decision-making is sound, they will make the product better, scheme running smoothly each time; if poor, the whole system can collapse. Repeat the process not once or a few times but dozens of times per game, thousands over a season. Despite having only middling 17% usage (7^th on his own team), Kyle Lowry still touched the ball over a thousand times in the 2023 playoffs, as an example. Whether or not a guard is a true lead initiator, they are going to be making countless decisions for your team.

Nick Smith Jr., Amari Bailey and Sidy Cissoko all make decisions in vastly different ways, which mixes differently for each of them with their differentiated skillsets. Sidy Cissoko is tall and strong for a guard but a poor shooter, Nick Smith Jr. is shorter and very skinny but a great shooter, Amari Bailey falls in between for all three traits.

Their playing cadences are vastly different, with NSJ being an elixir, playing like white blood cells seeking out weaknesses; Sidy is a maniac, unpredictable-squared; Amari Bailey is consistent in effort first and last. All are deviants from the expected in their own ways: given Nick Smith’s elite touch and handle creativity, one would expect him to be a pure hooper. Sidy one could easily cast aside as an unreliable project. Amari’s consistency of effort could prevent an analyst from noticing the flairs of upside.

My source of comfort in ranking them highly varies for each of them, as well. But it is consistent in one thing: the route-making of offensive schemes has always been a jagged line rather than a straight one. The ideal basketball play is a run to the basket and dunk, or run to the three point line and swish. But with the constancy of movement and ten athletes making decisions simultaneously, the way forward is rarely straight through.

This section is a dedication to the basketball weirdos, or irregularities in subtle ways. Amari Bailey may seem like the outlier in his inclusion, as Sidy and NSJ’s funkiness jump off the page. But Amari covers a ridiculous amount of ground as an athlete, both laterally and vertically, the type of athlete which would thrive as a cornerback or an outfielder or tennis player or…really anything. But Bailey plays subtly, workmanlike to the point of nearly hiding this fact. One is used to athletes of Bailey’s versatility taking up usage wherever they can, testing the limits of the dynamic fun that it must be to have those tools at one’s disposal. But Bailey, for whatever reason, does not seem to care about all of that, or else finds such enjoyment from applying them, not bluntly nor florid, but simply so. That aspect is maybe the easiest to look over: someone simply doing their job for its own sake. Especially in a freshman one-and-done, highly touted from a celebrity program. Don’t miss it with Amari.

Role Reducers: Priority UDFAs

Craig Porter Jr. (my #33), Adama Sanogo (#38), Terquavion Smith (#36), Justyn Mutts (#42), Ricky Council IV (#43), Taevion Kinsey (#45), D’Moi Hodge (#46)

Here we have a group of undrafted players I had ranked in my top 50. I’m not sure if there’s a common thread here beyond role players who I believe have a shot of being starters, even if miniscule.

All have their quick pitches as NBA role players: Porter Jr. makes sense as a defensive play-maker and creative passer next to a high usage guard. Sanogo if a team wants to run a five-out scheme on either end with a hybrid big. Terq is the obvious, nuclear pull-up shooting threat. Mutts is one of the best passing big wings in the country. Council had perhaps the best slashing tools in college hoops. Kinsey may be the most unusual, a stellar athlete ball custodian type with funky shot. D’Moi Hodge the cleanest role fit, and the most surprising undrafted for that reason as a steals & threes maven.

I mention the concept of “false ceiling” prospects, a term I coined to mean prospect commonly seen as low ceiling but with tougher-to-see avenues to outperform those expectations. I believe this entire group qualifies, let’s run through the list again. Porter Jr. does not make sense as a shotblocker, at 6’2’’ putting up a 5% block rate (one of every 20 opponent two pointers) while only fouling 2.3 times per 40(!!!). Sanogo has rare touch, shooting 77% at the rim on gigantic volume and above average everywhere else. Terq has become underrated as a passer, improving his A:TO from 1.2 to 1.9 and assist rate from 14% to 23%, all while shooting 14 threes per 100 possessions. Mutts is a rare breed, a strength-based wing with soft passing touch, perfect for motion-based, precise systems. Council’s athleticism shines in transition where he can improvise to the hoop for an acrobatic finish, at 1.2ppp on 114 transition attempts. Kinsey played in a lower conference, but that may mask his NBA athleticism, dunking over 200 times across his five college seasons. Hodge is underrated in his aggressiveness, with over 100 rim attempts finished at a 72% rate this past season.

The entire group are sophomores or older and non-premium selections as UDFAs, as it is safe to say you won’t build your team around this group. But if I were to bet on anyone undrafted ending up a useable starter at some point in their careers, it would be from this crew. The avenue to that happening has been laid out roughly in their previous spots, but amplified by further conforming to a reduced role and playing with greater talent around them.

Lessons of the Past

The 2022 draft cycle I spent obsessed with archetypes, attempting to break down the roles on the court into four: 1. Rim Protectors, 2. Connectors, 3. Shotmakers and 4. Engines. As I felt already by the time that draft day arrived, this approach had clear shortcomings. Prospects are not fully formed into their archetypes yet, and flashes of potential can be more important than fully fleshed out skills.

My three biggest misses all came from this too narrow of a sorting process. For Walker Kessler, I zoomed in too far on his inconsistent rim protection footwork technique, missing how he was blocking a gargantuan quantity of shots despite it due to advanced hand-eye coordination, size and effort. He also was able to quiet my mobility concerns by slimming down some, bringing us to another point of analysis: at the ages of prospects, they are still getting used to their athletic bodies.

Jalen Williams is another illustration of this, showcasing a major athletic leap from Santa Clara to the pros. The tape transformed almost overnight, as before when his closeouts lagged and he may have settled as a table-setter, now he looks a full power primary. The signal here was the Combine scrimmages, where J-Dub adapted to a more off-ball slashing role the second he hit the floor, using his plus wingspan to dunk in traffic with ease. The archetypes system over-fit for his Santa Clara role, not adaptive enough to appreciate his flashes of elite versatility.

Finally, a player I was too high on: Johnny Davis. At the risk of reacting too early, Johnny appears at the nexus of both of these points as well. From an archetype approach, JD is interesting. He was super physical in college, capable of some dribbling, passing, shooting, if not dominant anywhere. But he looked like he could carry a large load, and had enough clips of looking like a dynamic athlete, all the while fighting hard on the defensive end. The script has completely flipped between him and J-Dub, as Davis has been losing on the margins at the first line and without tools to salvage missteps. Where before he looked like a potential to hit in multiple archetypes, now he looks more like a mediocre prospect for each. The difference in athletic and skill profile from NCAA to NBA makes previous roles potentially untenable while also opening up new avenues for what were only flashes before.

Lessons for the Future

My goal this past cycle was to take a more holistic approach to a player’s basketball narrative. Where are they in their own cycle? A draft cycle involves only 6-8 months of new tape to indicate what a player might be for an entire career, and we need to imbue that with the appropriate lack of certainty. Imagination is the name of the game for draft work, something I’ve reminded myself constantly this past year, and helped me to be more comfortable with the one-eye-closed upside swings. Similarly, I have been keener to extrapolate those flashes out, as a player’s developmental trajectory can be as dynamic as their playing style.

The one item that remains elusive to me is projecting athletic profiles to the future. Already in Summer League I see a potential miss in Keyonte George, adapting quickly to weight loss with a more explosive playing style than we saw at Baylor or IMG. Athletic projection, again, a source of my miss on all of Kessler, J-Dub and (in the other direction) Johnny Davis, requires a technical level of biomechanical knowledge I have not attained. We have in our sights a theme for the 2024 cycle: how does the body develop amid intense athletic demands, and how can you tell who can incorporate these changes better than others? Stay tuned.

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There has not since been a men’s college basketball team as electrifying as their 2016-17 Wildcats, also featuring Bam Adebayo. Thanks to Fox and Monk sprinting the ball up the floor on every possession, UK played at a breakneck pace that thrust some classic battles upon us. Lonzo Ball went into Rupp Arena, amidst all the Ball v. Fox hype of the 2017 NBA draft cycle, and shushed the crowd in a 97-92 UCLA win. Three months later, Fox hung 39 on his head to knock UCLA out of the NCAA Tournament. There was also the time Monk dropped 47(!) on UNC in a 103-100(!!) win in late December. Yet, three months later, Luke Maye got it back in blood, hitting his famous buzzer beater to send Kentucky home in an Elite 8 all-timer.

Fox sat in the locker room after that loss, hugging Adebayo and sobbing during an interview. That intimate moment, where Fox continually repeats how much he loves his guys, is one of the more touching moments college basketball has produced, for me, and emblematic of what made that Kentucky team so magnetic. Monk punched air and screamed after every big play, whether by him or a teammate. Fox, whose competitiveness was a tad more reserved, showing up in ways like guarding Ball full-court in their matchups, would only join Monk in outward celebration during their most euphoric moments. The many that argued that college basketball was losing its soul in a one-and-done era nearing the creation of NIL clearly weren’t watching Fox and Monk at Kentucky.

The reunion of De’Aaron Fox and Malik Monk in Sacramento isn’t just one of this postseason’s best storylines because it feels nice, though. They’re hooping. The same two hair-raising athletes that arrived in Kentucky when Kevin Durant arrived in Golden State are now looking to drive a stake through the heart of a basketball dynasty. You grow up fast.

The league’s best regular season offense has an ORTG of only 111.9 over their first four games against the Warriors, just a 40th percentile mark. However, when Fox and Monk share the court, that number balloons to 121.7 without much defensive slippage. (Monk in particular has some ridiculous on/off splits, SAC’s offense has been 18 points/100 better with him. 18!)  Overall, Fox/Monk lineups have played just fewer than half of this series’ possessions, but are out-scoring the Dubs by nearly nine points/100. 

Some of this is due to the non-Monk Kings, particularly Kevin Huerter and Harrison Barnes, missing just about every 3-pointer they take. But Monk’s only shooting a mediocre 35% from deep against the Dubs himself. In a beautiful, full-circle moment, the questions Fox and Monk have answered from their Kentucky days has turned them into a dynamic, complementary backcourt, one that Sacramento is depending on.

Monk has always been an explosive athlete with outside shooting touch, the question for him was if he could turn those skills into halfcourt creation reps. The perennial demand of his archetype: Can he slow down and incorporate some craft into his game? The answer, clearly, is yes.

The fun part about Monk’s growth as a creator is not that he’s overhauled his offensive game, rather the opposite. By playing with varied pace and then refining the details of that pace – screen usage as a guard, eye manipulation, etc. – Monk allows his athleticism and touch to shine, and now we’re wowed again.

The screen usage, specifically, is popping vs. Golden State. At this rate, there may not be a more feared screen rejector in the league by the start of next season. Monk has seemingly rejected as many ball-screens as he’s actually, you know, used in this series, but the results have been fantastic.

Fantastic…and fun! Cross-spin, pound-cross, killer cross, Monk is cooking the only way he knows how. Yet, as those clips evidence, Golden State can’t throw their best perimeter defender on the court, whoever that may be at the time, on him. Why? Well, that guy has to worry about De’Aaron Fox.

Fox always did and still does face questions as an outside shooter, and therefore, an off-ball player. But his 32% mark from deep on the year belies the quality of shooter he’s really turned into. Forget the Game 2 dagger to give the Kings a late, insurmountable 107-101 after being 1-9 from deep up to that point. How about standing up to a vintage Steph Curry bomb with a catch-and-shoot off of, of course, a Monk drive-and-kick:

Fox and Monk are now largely interchangeable, or at least capable, as offensive creators and spacers. Late in the first quarter of Game 4, Andrew Wiggins was guarding Fox, forcing Moses Moody to knuckle up and stay in front of Monk. He, somewhat predictably, could not avoid the inevitability of Monk successfully rejecting a screen. Meanwhile, on the weak side, Fox slyly lifted from the corner to the wing, creating a more open but more functionally difficult pass for Monk to make off of his drive. He made it anyway:

Fox and Monk have each done the work to make this backcourt work once again, this time in an NBA setting, six years later, without even knowing it. This is, after all, Monk’s first season in SacTown, and each of their first playoff appearances. Not only have they covered the holes in their games, but they’ve covered each other too, allowing for more classic Fox and Monk magic.

With the ex-Wildcats, the Kings can push the ball up court with either one, just like we saw at Kentucky. Having two speedy ball-handlers on the court, rather than just one release valve, makes a world of difference for Sacramento.

• Transition points/100, total: 106.6
• Transition points/100 (Fox/Monk minutes): 126.7

In transition, the fellas play the classics. Here, Fox sprints the ball up court, even after the Kings have to take the ball out of the net. No problem. He collapses the defense severely on his jaunt toward the paint, and the Warriors are out of whack immediately in the possession, to the point where nobody notices Monk relocating along the perimeter. Well, nobody besides Fox:

This isn’t (just) small sample size theatrics, or a case of streaky shooting from Monk. He and his point-guard-for-life have developed into such a cohesive backcourt that they are not only working on an NBA floor, a thought that would’ve brought a tear to my eye six years ago, but they might be Sacramento’s best answer for the defending champions. Of course, things aren’t all rosy in the City of Trees. Fox, in a monumental Game 5, plans on playing through an avulsion fracture in his dominant index finger. Monk, for all his chaotic brilliance in this series to date, dipped into some poor, old habits late in Game 4 by being a little overzealous early in the shot-clock and kamikaze-ing Kings possessions. Head Coach Mike Brown alluded to it in his post-game presser after Game 4, saying his guys were “driving into two, sometimes three guys, in transition and begging for a call, and we can’t continue to do that.”

Regardless, what Fox and Monk are doing in Sacramento must be appreciated, even if their season may be as little as two days away from over. Their Kentucky days, which will live on in highlights and quick winks to the real NBA fans for knowing they existed, were so much more than just that. Their Sacramento days are becoming the perfect epilogue to that era. As basketball players, their improvements have made this pairing possible once again; their current synergy is deeper than it was, improved in the ways that every 19-year-old hopes to improve in by the time they’re 25. They can no longer be pigeon-holed, limited to specific functions; their relationship is fuller, more complex and meaningful because of it. Kings basketball has been dripping in that incalculable ‘something special’ all season long, and for it, they owe a big thank you to De’Aaron Fox and Malik Monk. As basketball fans, so do we.

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But the first two games felt like the Warriors stood in the same spot and dug a 15-foot hole straight down and became shocked when they couldn’t climb out.

Despite out-shooting the Kings for two games on the road, a seemingly impossible feat considering Golden State’s road shooting splits, they couldn’t stop tripping over themselves. The advantage from deep (30% on 70 attempts for SAC vs. 32% on 90 attempts for GSW) has been negligible, but the advantage inside the arc has been a major surprise. GSW is making 65% of their twos, compared to 54% from Sacramento.

What’s really killing them is the volume of high-value shots they are allowing to Sacramento. Not only are they taking 50% more shots inside the arc than Golden State by total volume, but they are also getting high-value short midrange shots that GSW has traditionally allowed. De’Aaron Fox especially is able to take advantage of that:

The shooting percentage on twos and from deep has also been completely negated by the Kings pummeling the undersized and under-hustling Warriors on the offensive glass. A 17-9 margin in Game 1 and 12-9 in Game 2 only furthers Golden State’s deficit in shot totals. It’s no coincidence the Kings got 8 more shot attempts in a three-point Game 1 victory, and 10 more in Game 2. But the losses on the glass are only half the equation.

Unsurprisingly, Golden State has also lost the turnover battle in both games. That feeds right into the Kings’ high-powered transition game, and it’s absolutely murdering them.

Oh, did I mention the Kings also won the free-throw battle in both games because of their superior rim pressure and point-of-attack defense? And that Golden State’s defensive fulcrum will be missing for Game 3 after stomping out Domantas Sabonis like a Mortal Kombat finishing move?

So, Are We Cooked?

Maybe. It’s possible that Golden State is gearing up to charge out of the gates into death and glory like Theoden and Aragorn at Helm’s Deep. And though they don’t have reinforcements coming at dawn of the fifth day, they have one thing neither Sacramento nor Saruman possesses: Wardell Stephen Curry II.

Through the course of his playoff career, Curry has played in 12 do-or-die games while down 2-1 or 3-2 in the series. He averages 27.9 points, 5.8 rebounds, and 6.9 assists per game while the team has posted an astounding 8-4 record with their backs against the wall. He’s at his most dangerous when threatened, and I fully expect him to go nuclear tonight to try to avoid the first 3-0 series deficit of his career. Never having been down 2-0 is an incredible feat by itself, and Steph will do all he can to hold the tide. The increased PNR frequency will be on full display tonight: expect a good 50 ball screens for Curry tonight.

But against the best offense in the league, he won’t be enough by himself.

Supporting Cast is Called To Action

Without Draymond Green, lots of other players will need to step up. Even if Jonathan Kuminga joins the starting lineup, the Warriors will need a Herculean effort from future Chase Center statue-haver Kevon Looney. The league leader in offensive rebounds needs to put on a one-man glass-cleaning show to negate Sacramento’s advantage on the glass.

They’re also going to rely heavily on the off-ball rotations from Andrew Wiggins and Klay Thompson. So much of their first-ranked opponent rim percentage mark is predicated on getting the right rotations from Draymond Green, and without him, someone will need to step in to help Kevon Looney when dealing with Sabonis in the post, trying to contain De’Aaron Fox drives, or tracking and erasing their cutting wings.

Extra reliance on Jonathan Kuminga is perhaps a necessity tonight. Jordan Poole is not playing up to his pedigree, and Golden State is in dire need of a positive contributor on defense who can switch and stay engaged off the ball. Kuminga is also capable of filling Poole’s rim pressuring via cuts, rolls, slips, and drives without all the silly extra stuff that comes with Poole’s recent offensive performance.

The point-of-attack defense also needs to step up, especially if Poole is seeing diminished minutes. With less defensive mistakes to cover up, they’ll have to buckle down on Fox, Malik Monk, and Kevin Huerter to stop the endless purple tide of rim pressure, midrange mastery, and perimeter shooting.

How Can They Pull It Off?

We’ve seen the how. In the first quarter of Monday’s game, they showed crisp offense and a hustling defense that forced Sacramento into far more threes and turnovers than they would have liked while controlling the glass to boot. Then the effort faded, the defense collapsed, and so did the lead.

Effort is first and foremost. Fight for every inch on the glass. Guard the ball with necessary caution. Fly off every screen, cut and roll hard, and rotate with a purpose. They’re capable of out-talenting the Kings on a bad night, but they need to win games by outworking them. Another stale effort will find them at a point of no return.

They need to stay committed to blowing up Sacramento’s handoff actions, forcing Sabonis into double teams, and keeping De’Aaron Fox out of the middle at all costs. And offensively even a few minutes of stagnated movement and lack of cohesion can put them under against the best offense in the league. A full 48 minutes of crisp effort will win them this game, even without Draymond Green.

It’s entirely in the hands of the players now. If they don’t bring effort and execution to tonight’s matchup, they should start looking at flights to Cabo.

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The NBA draft may be over, but for teams across the league, the development process has just begun. Contrary to what most think, success in the draft is more than just making the ‘right’ pick. What happens after draft night is where the real magic starts to begin. Through this article, I hope to illuminate what this looks like for both the best and worst drafting teams in the league, as we take an up-close and personal look at the cultures, habits, and infrastructures that makes each NBA organization unique.

The Price of a Pick

To understand how teams have performed in the draft relative to expectations, we have to first understand the value of a pick in each draft range. Luckily Seth Partnow from The Athletic has seemingly already done that for us.

Now that we have a rough idea of how players in a certain pick range turn out, let’s see which teams have been able to consistently outperform these pick expectations. To keep my sample size large enough while also accounting for more modern team infrastructures, I’ll be looking at data from 2010-2018.

Right away, we can see some rather obvious underperforming and overperforming teams. Across the board, it’s very clear that average draft position has been nowhere near a guarantee for success, but we’ll get into more of that later.

In an attempt to recreate Partnow’s plot in a more team-specific way, I hand-tracked draft pick outcomes for each team. While teams like the Kings are easy to spot as obvious underperformers, it’s not as simple to see how others have fared. To combat this, I reordered teams based on a very rough ‘relative draft value’ metric shown above. I set up a point system for teams where they were rewarded set points for each outcome they drafted, where they got the most points for drafting a franchise/core player and less for each outcome below that, all the way down to the bust outcome where points were actually subtracted. These values were chosen based on a similar method to the one used in my draft model, which you can read more about here. While it is a pretty rough metric, it gets the job done.

As a caveat, there are some limitations to this exercise due to its imperfect nature. I tried to match Partnow’s process to assign outcomes as much as possible (outlined in more detail here), but it’s impossible to do so completely. As addressed earlier, my sample size is also smaller than his to try to account for modern/current front offices, but some teams didn’t draft enough in the time period to confidently say whether they did well or not. Another important note is that some of these players were developed by teams other than the teams that drafted him (this doesn’t apply to draft day trades, these are accounted for accordingly), but the original drafters received credit. While this might impact results, I don’t think it was severe enough to make a truly big difference. Finally, I didn’t include undrafted players in this exercise, so teams that traditionally do well with undrafted players didn’t shine as brightly (looking at you Miami, and, to a lesser extent, Dallas). With that out of the way, let’s dive into the results.

Is It Good Drafting or Good Developing?

This question is tricky. Are teams that are finding themselves successful in the draft better at identifying talent or developing it? In all likelihood, it’s a mixture of both and varies from team to team, but my aim is to examine different teams’ infrastructures to try and answer this. As a reminder, this is more a review of a team’s past rather than an indictment of their future. Some of the poorly performing teams have recently made the necessary steps to improve their draft strategy and player development infrastructure.

The Best of the Best

Denver Nuggets

Total Picks: 23

Average Draft Pick: 35

Pick Outcomes: 47.83% Bust, 8.7% Just a Guy, 21.74% High Rotation, 13.04% Top Starter, 4.35% Borderline All-Star, 4.35% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 6

Total Data Analysts: 1

G-League Team Affiliation: 2021-Present

Though the Nuggets’ draft success extends past drafting one of only two second-round MVPs in league history, let’s start there for a moment. Nikola Jokic was the least known prospect within a very strong 2014 Nuggets draft class that included both Jusuf Nurkic and Gary Harris. Jokic represents one of the earliest cases I’ve seen of what draft twitter likes to call ‘pre-drafting’. As PD Web explains in the linked article, the practice is essentially selecting a player a year before they become a more ‘mainstream’ prospect. Interestingly enough, according to an article from The Athletic, this practice is a pillar in the foundation of the Nuggets’ draft strategy, with a clear emphasis to draft prospects before their true breakout season.

However, the Nuggets’ draft work doesn’t stop after they identify talent. For former head of basketball operations, Tim Connelly, and the rest of the front office, player development is where they can really gain an edge. Player development for the Nuggets starts and ends with assistant coach John Beckett. Beckett is a former video coordinator with the Hawks who was initially hired by Denver as a player development coach in 2015 before quickly working his way to his current position on Michael Malone’s staff. For Beckett and the Nuggets, game-like situations are the bread and butter of their player-curated development workouts. This means getting a lot of threes up for Jamal Murray and a lot of off-ball work for Michael Porter Jr. Approaching player development through this lens has paid dividends for the Nuggets, helping improve Malik Beasley and Monte Morris in addition to those already mentioned.

With the return of Jamal Murray and Michael Porter Jr. this season, we’ll finally get to see the complete vision of a homegrown Nuggets team shaped by the player development habits and proactive draft strategy cultivated throughout the past decade.

Los Angeles Lakers

Total Picks: 21

Average Draft Pick: 37

Pick Outcomes: 47.62% Bust, 9.52% Just a Guy, 23.81% High Rotation, 14.29% Top Starter, 4.76% Borderline All-Star, 0% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 7

Total Data Analysts: 4

G-League Team Affiliation: 2006-Present

Somewhat to my surprise, the Lakers have done an excellent job of finding value in the draft relative to their average position. Despite picking 37th on average in the draft, the second lowest average selection, the Lakers have managed to find a large number of guys that have stuck in the league. So, how have they done it? The Lakers simply optimized G-League player development quicker than other teams. They were the first NBA franchise to own a G-League (then known as the D-League) team, gaining ownership with their current affiliate, the South Bay Lakers, way back in 2006. Since then, the Lakers have used South Bay as a place for rookies and young players without a path to minutes on the NBA roster to gain valuable game time, experience, and development. As of 2021, a staggering 36 former South Bay Lakers players had been called up to the NBA, with two trips to the G-League finals (2012, 2016) under their belt. Notable South Bay Lakers alumni in the time frame (2010-2018) include Alex Caruso, Ivica Zubac, Mo Wagner, Gary Payton II, Josh Hart, and Thomas Bryant.

Philadelphia 76ers

Total Picks: 28

Average Draft Pick: 26

Pick Outcomes: 46.43% Bust, 14.29% Just a Guy, 25.00% High Rotation, 3.57% Top Starter, 7.14% Borderline All-Star, 3.57% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 8

Total Data Analysts: 5

G-League Team Affiliation: 2013-Present

The Philadelphia 76ers fielded what is probably the most infamous bad team in modern sports history in the early stages of our selected timeframe. The Process Sixers weren’t just known for being bad, they were known for embracing it. Before delving deeper, my first thoughts on the 76ers draft success were “Oh, they just had more opportunities to give their rookies as a historically bad team”. After a little bit of research, I found this could not be the only explanation.

The 76ers do, in fact, play their rookies a lot, to the tune of fourth most in the league over the chosen time period. However, many other franchises that prioritized rookie playing time have not had close to the same level of success. Similarly, there were teams that played their rookies a lot less, on average, yet have had great success in drafting and development. Upon closer inspection, it seems that in addition to giving their rookies ample opportunities, the 76ers are just better at talent identification than most teams. Sometimes, it really is that simple. A lot of their success in the draft has simply come from hitting on almost every single lottery pick they’ve had. From Joel Embiid to Ben Simmons to even Dario Saric, the Sixers have generally nailed that portion of the draft. This outperformance even includes two instances of unusually bad injury luck from the selections of Markelle Fultz and Zhaire Smith. The Sixers are no slouch when it comes to drafting in the second round either, drafting both Jerami Grant and Richaun Holmes before they blossomed on other teams. Not every team has a winning formula when it comes to developing young players, but luckily for the Sixers, they’ve already won half the battle with their excellent eye for talent.

Utah Jazz

Total Picks: 18

Average Draft Pick: 32

Pick Outcomes: 44.44% Bust, 22.22% Just a Guy, 22.22% High Rotation, 0% Top Starter, 0% Borderline All-Star, 11.11% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 20

Total Data Analysts: 1

G-League Team Affiliation: 2014-Present

The most apparent thing about the Jazz is they realize the importance of the draft. They have what can only be described as an army of professional scouts, 20 to be exact, more than any other team I’ve looked at for this exercise. The immediate conclusion to draw here is that the Jazz are just great at talent identification, similarly to the Sixers, but in this case, there’s more to it than what meets the eye.

There is one man arguably more responsible for the Jazz’s draft success than any other and that man is Johnnie Bryant. Similarly to John Beckett with Denver, Bryant was hired as a player development coach back in 2012 by the Jazz before being promoted to assistant coach in 2014. Prior to his hiring, he had gained a reputation for his independent skill development program (Bryant Sports Academy) and worked with multiple NBA players, including All-Stars Damian Lillard and Paul Millsap. His first success story with the Jazz came by working with former Jazz player Gordon Hayward on his way to becoming an All-Star. Since then he’s helped develop many Jazz players, most notably Rudy Gobert and Donovan Mitchell, the latter of which he helped scale to a primary option after being drafted with the expectation of having a smaller role.

For Mitchell, Bryant reportedly conducted “individual workouts, pregame shooting routines and film sessions — scouting opponents, reviewing games, watching other stars to try to learn their tricks.” Bryant’s help with playmaking and capitalizing on shooting gravity quickly made Mitchell one of the more dynamic guards in the league. According to Donovan, Bryant obsessively watches film, combing over hours of footage and taking notes to find ways his players can improve.

Off the court, Bryant develops a close relationship with his players, giving them a member of the staff they know they can trust. This aspect of the game is often overlooked but is of the utmost importance. The more mentally comfortable a player is, the easier it is for them to perform at their highest levels. With Bryant having departed recently to the Knicks, we’ll soon see if the Jazz’s reliance on him was as great as I expect.

San Antonio Spurs

Total Picks: 17

Average Draft Pick: 40

Pick Outcomes: 52.94% Bust, 17.65% Just a Guy, 11.76% High Rotation, 5.88% Top Starter, 5.88% Borderline All-Star, 5.88% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 5

Total Data Analysts: 5

G-League Team Affiliation: 2007-Present

We’ve all heard it a thousand times, but it needs to continue to be said. The San Antonio Spurs are the golden standard. Bar none. The success they were able to maintain for so long without dips in form is nothing short of incredible and a lot of it has been thanks to their success in the draft. Despite having on average the lowest draft position in the whole league and no lottery picks throughout the entire time period, the Spurs managed to draft Kawhi Leonard, Dejounte Murray, Derrick White, Kyle Anderson, and countless other quality NBA players. It goes without being said that development had to be a part of their success with these later draft picks, and after examining the Spurs’ philosophy, it is clearly the main driver.

With many teams, player development is mainly focused on key young players. The Spurs take it to a whole ‘nother level. To put it simply, if you are on the Spurs, your development will be prioritized, all the way down to the end of the bench. Take, for example, Davis Bertans, who, entering the 2017-18 season, was a 25-year-old former 42nd overall pick coming off of a season in which he put up 4.5 points per game in only 12.1 minutes per game. You’d think Bertans would be the last person the Spurs would be focusing on in the 2017 offseason. You’d also be wrong. According to an ESPN report by Michael C. Wright, the Spurs went as far as to send a player development coach all the way to Europe to monitor and work out Bertans as he competed with Latvia in Eurobasket 2017. One $80 million contract later, I’m sure Bertans is glad he landed with the Spurs. This commitment to the development of every last player on the roster, along with ace-in-the-hole shooting development coach, Chip Engelland (the person responsible for revamping Kawhi Leonard’s shot), has allowed the Spurs to continue to win along the margins and keep themselves a leg up over the rest of the teams in the Association. With Engelland recently moving on to OKC, we have the opportunity to see how the Spurs adapt to losing arguably the most important figure to their player development operation as they embark on their first true rebuild in over twenty years.

The Worst

Sacramento Kings

Total Picks: 19

Average Draft Pick: 16

Pick Outcomes: 63.16% Bust, 15.79% Just a Guy, 0% High Rotation, 5.26% Top Starter, 10.53% Borderline All-Star, 5.26% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 8

Total Data Analysts: 5

G-League Team Affiliation: 2016-Present

*Sigh*Roll the video.

Ahhh, the Sacramento Kings. You know we have to start with them. To be blunt, the Kings have been terrible for the better part of two decades now and their inability to draft and develop their lottery picks has left them drowning underwater. On top of that, the Kings have, whether intentionally or not, fostered a culture of instability and uncertainty. Since 2006, the last time the Kings made the playoffs, the franchise has gone through twelve different coaches, alienated two star players in Boogie Cousins and Tyrese Haliburton, and attempted to relocate the franchise to another city. Now, to be this organizationally inept, a lot of things need to have gone wrong, but it all starts at the top. While he should be commended (by Kings fans at least) for fighting to keep the team in Sacramento, Vivek Ranadive’s inability to keep himself out of sporting decisions has led to years of basketball failure. According to the Sacramento Bee, Ranadive has contributed to what has been described as “a ‘toxic’ work environment in which ‘people don’t trust each other’”. The last thing you want from an owner is them meddling in sporting decisions or creating an environment as bad as what’s been described. Luckily, the same report mentioned that Ranadive has backed off somewhat since the hiring of new GM Monte McNair in September 2020, so hopefully greener pastures are ahead for those oh-so-loyal Kings fans.

Dallas Mavericks

Total Picks: 14

Average Draft Pick: 31

Pick Outcomes: 71.43% Bust, 7.14% Just a Guy, 0% High Rotation, 14.29% Top Starter, 0% Borderline All-Star, 7.14% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 12

Total Data Analysts: 4

G-League Team Affiliation: 2009-Present

As a Mavs fan myself, I’ve had a front-row seat view of the bad (and good) decisions they’ve made this past decade. Now, I think there are a couple of things in play here when it comes to their past draft failures. Starting off with what has bothered me the most as a fan, the Mavs simply don’t seem to give their rookies enough opportunities. Looking back at the visual from earlier, they’ve played their rookies a lot less than most other NBA teams, a possible symptom of a team coached by renowned vet-lover Rick Carlisle.

One of my biggest gripes recently has been how they’ve handled Josh Green’s development, at least early on. Coming off a covid-shortened offseason in which he was unable to play in Summer League or have a normal training camp, Green, the last first-round pick the Mavs would have while Luka was on a rookie deal, played 11.4 minutes per game in only 39 total games. This wouldn’t have been much of a problem had he been sent down to the G-League to get meaningful reps, yet the Mavs only briefly sent him down for 5 games. Squandering that much time in a player’s development is inexcusable, especially for a player that clearly needed confidence as Green did. Instead, he played sparing minutes for the Mavs, getting pulled after every mistake, dropping his confidence lower and lower. Luckily, this past year Jason Kidd instilled a little more faith in him and sure enough, Green’s confidence grew and he convincingly solidified himself as a rotation player in the regular season.

Similar to the Kings, the Mavs have also suffered somewhat from owner meddling. These incidents have been well documented with Mark Cuban admitting to being the reason the Mavs passed on Giannis (GM Donnie Nelson wanted him) and the Haralabos Voulgaris situation in 2021 which resulted in a complete overhaul of the Mavs front office, where, like Randadive, Cuban has reportedly ceded a little more control to current GM Nico Harrison and special advisors Michael Finley and Dirk Nowitzki.

Los Angeles Clippers

Total Picks: 16

Average Draft Pick: 36

Pick Outcomes: 75.00% Bust, 0% Just a Guy, 6.25% High Rotation, 6.25% Top Starter, 12.50% Borderline All-Star, 0% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 11

Total Data Analysts: 7

G-League Team Affiliation: 2017-Present

The Clippers’ draft shortcomings seem to be easily explained. At the top of the draft, they haven’t performed too poorly, selecting players like Eric Bledsoe, Reggie Bullock, Al-Farouq Aminu, and Shai Gilgeous-Alexander with their first-round picks. Their issues, instead, come from whiffing on almost every single second-round pick in the same time period which appears largely attributable to under-investment in player development.

Unlike their Los Angeles counterparts, the Clippers didn’t have their own G-League affiliate until 2017 as the Ballmer era got underway, previously sharing the Bakersfield Jam with the Phoenix Suns from 2009-2014. As such, most of these second-rounders either received little to no minutes riding the bench, or were sent to another team’s affiliate where they weren’t developed by members of the Clippers organization. Now with their own G-League team, officially the Ontario (previously Agua Caliente) Clippers as of July 2022, they should be able to flip the script on their second-round success. In fact, we may already be seeing the results of these improvements taking place, with 2019 second-rounder Terance Mann becoming a valuable rotation player after playing 20 games with their new affiliate. In a similar way, Amir Coffey, an undrafted second-rounder in 2019, has been a positive player, contributing 12 points, four rebounds, and three assists per game in 30 games as a starter. Coffey was Agua Caliente’s leading scorer in 2020-21.

Trending in the Right Direction

Memphis Grizzlies

Total Picks: 18

Average Draft Pick: 33

Pick Outcomes: 77.78% Bust, 5.56% Just a Guy, 5.56% High Rotation, 11.11% Top Starter, 0% Borderline All-Star, 0% Franchise/Core

Total Scouts: 5* (some basketball ops guys are functionally scouts)

Total Data Analysts: 4

G-League Team Affiliation: 2014-Present

Although the Grizzlies were awful at drafting and developing talent in the time period I looked at (2010-2018), the organization has turned a corner since. This change has coincided with executive Zach Kleiman’s rapid ascension to his current position as “lead basketball operations executive and personnel decisionmaker” in 2019 and the subsequent hiring of new basketball ops personnel with fresh ideas (over 30 new hirings to be exact). Since then, the Grizzlies have nailed almost every draft pick they’ve made, drafting franchise cornerstone Ja Morant and surrounding him with a plethora of quality homegrown/drafted talent, including Desmond Bane, Brandon Clarke, Xavier Tillman, and Ziaire Williams. With 2022 draft selections Jake LaRavia, David Roddy, Kennedy Chandler, and Kenny Lofton Jr. already showing promising flashes in preseason, it seems like the Grizzlies have struck gold again.

In regards to player development and infrastructure, the Grizzlies have utilized their Memphis Hustle G-League team well since its inception in 2017, with five members of their 2021-22 roster (including former G-League Player of the Month Kyle Anderson) having spent time in the development league. They rely on their former players’ expertise as well, with Tony Allen hired as a player development coach for the Hustle in January 2020.

What We’ve Learned

When we discuss draft success, talent identification seems to be the main focus, with Bleacher Report redrafts constantly making the rounds on social media. In reality, draft success is the confluence of numerous organizational factors, of which 4 key pillars have emerged: organizational stability/clarity, talent identification, opportunity allocation, and, most importantly, a strong developmental infrastructure. Teams need to be hiring more player development coaches, as the secret to a lot of these good drafting teams is that the players they draft get to work with somebody like Johnnie Bryant, John Beckett, or Chip Engelland the second they arrive in town. Right now, there are simply not enough player dev coaches on most teams to sit down individually with every single player and help them with their development.

The focus tends to mainly be on high-profile prospects like Donovan Mitchell, but so much value could be added by focusing on the others too. The Spurs have perfected this science, using developmental success to sustain a 22-year playoff streak. On the other end of the spectrum, we have the Kings, where organizational instability amongst other things has led to 16 years of playoff despair. Can they close the gap? It’ll be hard, but in a copycat league, the roadmap to success is there for all to follow.

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