The youth are here to take over, yes. The old gods are dead and buried. There is no James, Curry, or Durant in this year’s final four. Even as their powers diminished, those four appeared in four of the last five conference finals. There’s not even a Jimmy Butler, who has made three of the last five.

Parity is another word looming large over this postseason. Since the Warriors dynasty broke apart, the 20 conference finals representatives have been comprised of 12 different teams. Much of the repetition comes out East, by far the weaker conference: the Celtics and Heat have 7 of the 10 ECF showings. Out West, the Nuggets, Mavericks, and Lakers have repeatedly appeared. Yet two conference finals in 5 years don’t scream dominance. More than ever, it feels like everyone has a shot.

That sentiment plays into an even more important theme in my eyes. When you look at the teams that have made deep runs, this year most of all, they took huge swings in acquiring talent. In this era of parity, those who push their chips in first are being rewarded. I want to explore the importance of forcing the window open and the rewards of temerity vs. the cost of timidness.

Dallas Swings, Thunder Go Down Looking

The Mavs-Thunder series is the clearest example of this idea. It’s frankly incredible how directly the trade ties between these two teams caused this series to shift.

Go back to the draft. Dallas owned a lottery choice but seemed intent on moving it to shed salary, and landed on sending Davis Bertans (and most importantly his $17M salary) with the 10th pick to Oklahoma City for the 12th pick. It’s hard to argue with the selections both teams made – OKC taking Cason Wallace while Dereck Lively II fell to Dallas – but the large trade exception Dallas created was huge. Sam Presti was handing an undeserved bailout to the Mavericks.

That exception was used to acquire Richaun Holmes, not exactly a game-changing acquisition, but it enabled them to do several things. After creating extra cap room, Dallas was able to acquire Grant Williams via sign-and-trade with Boston. Williams and Holmes did not pan out but became important salary ballast at the deadline. And this is where Oklahoma City only made things harder on themselves.

On February 8th, Dallas shipped out Holmes and Williams along with salary and picks for Daniel Gafford and P.J. Washington. Not only would these trades have been impossible without OKC’s draft night deal, but they helped even further by exchanging 2028 picks with Dallas to open up a 2024 first Dallas could use in these deals. It gave them the ammo needed to make two big deadline swings.

Meanwhile, Oklahoma City made calls but ultimately settled on a bunt single of a trade in acquiring Gordon Hayward at the deadline. Now fast forward to the conference semifinals to see the impact of those deals.

Gafford recorded 11/7.5/1.3 with 2 blocks per game across 6 matchups with OKC. P.J. Washington was murder for the Thunder, recording 18/8/2 averages while hitting a ridiculous 47% of his 8.2 threes per game. Fittingly, Washington’s free throws at the end of Game 6 closed out the series. Gordon Hayward managed 15 inconsequential minutes in the series. Sam Presti effectively sold the Mavericks a pair of knives only to watch his team be stabbed to death by said knives. One team swung, another watched, and the swinging team ended up moving on.

And they weren’t the only team undone by their own mistakes.

Minnesota Pays Up, Denver Counts Coins

If you follow the NBA on a deeper level, you’re probably aware of the Kroenke vibe. They’re willing to cut checks for big players when necessary but will always find a way to cut costs in the end. This loss to Minnesota felt like a culmination of the pitfalls that philosophy comes with.

Minnesota threw a contract at GM Tim Connelly that Denver did not want to match, and it seemed prudent after last season as GM Calvin Booth helmed a championship team. Yet it was clear to all that it was Connelly who had his prints all over the squad. The entire starting lineup, one that dominated the 2023 playoffs, was drafted or acquired by Connelly before his departure. The Timberwolves saw what he could do and put unequivocal faith in him to build a team that could dismantle his creation.

The Rudy Gobert trade was unfairly maligned at the time and took only a year to prove everyone wrong as he anchored the best defense in the league. While Minnesota took more swings to improve on this Gobert team (acquiring Mike Conley, signing Nickeil Alexander-Walker, and extending their stars) Denver was content with what they had after the title. Calvin Booth told Bruce Brown not to let the door hit him on the way out. They acquired more picks to try and hit through the draft instead of getting proven talent to augment a championship roster.

When these two teams faced off, it was clear what kind of impact these moves made. Minnesota had more depth, more athleticism, and a feeling of confidence that Denver could not match. The stars performed, yes, but the role guys made the difference in the series. NAW’s defense and shooting confidence played a role. Mike Conley hit timely shot after timely shot. And on Denver’s side, guys like Christian Braun and Peyton Watson could not affect the series when the stars sat. If only there was a playmaking and defending wing Denver had in their grasp.

The throughlines of this between the two squads aren’t quite as clear as Dallas and OKC, but you can see how aggression from Minnesota’s front office won over Denver’s complacency. That’s why Minnesota is fighting for its deepest run in franchise history while Denver hits the racing track.

Knicks, Pacers Going Out On Their Shields

Regardless of who won that series, nobody could argue the Pacers or Knicks were withholding chips. Both teams went pedal to the metal during this season and reaped the rewards.

Indiana took perhaps the biggest swing of the entire deadline in acquiring Pascal Siakam, and he responded by powering them through the first two rounds of the playoffs as their leading scorer. Much hand-wringing was done when the deal was made, yet nobody can argue with the results as Indiana reaches their first conference finals in a decade.

The Knicks took an even larger amount of swings. They made moves for OG Anunoby, Bojan Bogdanovic, Alec Burks, Precious Achiuwa, and Donte DiVincenzo over this past year. Donte and OG were among the primary reasons why the Knicks could win a street fight-type series against the Sixers despite the absence of Julius Randle. Had they not completely fallen apart with injuries (I am looking at you with malice, Tom Thibodeau) it feels like they would be playing Boston right now.

Sure, you could argue trading Obi Toppin to the Pacers this offseason burned them. But Toppin was buried on the depth chart at the time and would have likely fallen further behind after that bevy of acquisitions. And a 10 PPG role player who is generally heinous on defense isn’t going to be the one who got away.

Both teams swung, and both teams reaped huge rewards. And it gave them a puncher’s chance against the beasts of the East, another team not shy to make moves.

Boston Doesn’t Back Down

As previously mentioned discussing the parity of the league, only the Heat could match Boston in conference finals appearances over the previous four seasons. Yet those three showings had resulted in zero titles. In this era of “what have you done for me lately?”, many questions were being asked. Is Jayson Tatum the kind of guy who can lead a title winner? Can Jaylen Brown be his #2? At what point do we shake this up?

Instead of caving to those notions, Brad Stevens doubled and tripled down. He boldly chose to trade Marcus Smart for a better-fitting star in Kristaps Porzingis, needing little draft capital to do so. Then he went even further by taking advantage of the Damian Lillard trade to add Jrue Holiday. Instead of breaking this team apart, he only fortified their chances and was rewarded with a 64-win team that is stampeding through the Eastern Conference.

Even with Porzingis injured and unlikely to return until late in the conference finals, Boston holds a 3-0 series lead over the upstart Pacers and are overwhelming favorites to come out of the East, perhaps fully healthy. Jrue has been the playoff chess piece they needed, taking on important defensive matchups while canning 43% of his 4.7 threes per game. The role players don’t need to hit as hard when you boast Jayson, Jaylen, Jrue, Derrick White, Porzingis, and Al Horford. No team in this league can even hold a candle to that top 6.

Boston chose to push in every chip they could and are being thoroughly rewarded.

What Does This Tell Us?

Yes, young stars are indeed playing a major role. One of these four teams will represent a new title winner. All four are led by a star who is 26 years old or younger.

That only enhances the point here. All four teams could have sat back and gone “Well their primes haven’t even started yet, so we can wait” and chose instead to make short-term moves. The 2024 championship winner will be a team led by young stars whose management chose to force the window open instead of waiting for it to open naturally. The teams that have gone home already by and large chose to sit on their hands and wait.

Contention windows don’t stay open as long as you expect. Sometimes they don’t open at all. If you have the stars capable of delivering a deep run toward the Larry O’Brien trophy, take the swings now before your chance passes. It may pass sooner than you think.

The post Real Contenders Go Down Swinging appeared first on Swish Theory.

I’ll also touch on my misses from last year, and how I hope to correct for shortcomings next cycle. Let’s waste no more time and dig in.

2023 Values

This section covers the players I ranked highest relative to the actual draft results, utilizing Kevin Pelton’s draft selection value table. Is there a common theme, am I missing or onto something?

Drafting with One Eye Closed

GG Jackson (my #12, drafted #45), Trayce Jackson-Davis (my #26, drafted #57), Leonard Miller (my #9, drafted #33), Jalen Slawson (my #28, drafted #54)

My biggest difference this cycle from last was trying to have a more holistic approach to a player’s own role curve. That is to say, comfort with a role (particularly in the NCAA) is not automatic, unlikely chosen by a player and often different than presented in recruiting efforts. College teams need players to win, development systems need player to develop, players just want to be selected as high as they can while balancing the goals of stakeholders around them. It can be messy, and often is.

The group I’m discussing here did not all have sub-optimal roles, but perhaps ones that masked their appeal as prospects, or distorted viewpoints of how they might contribute.

My single greatest difference to actual draft results was one Gregory Jackson the Second. At #12 on my board, Jackson was not selected until the second round by the Memphis Grizzlies. While rumors abound of immaturity from GG during team workouts, I’m less bothered given the substantial talent, obvious at his young age.

The most significant obstacle to draft analysis, in my view (beyond not knowing ball) is to make a one-to-one connection between items you notice and items of significance. Watching GG, it is not difficult to spot places where he could do better. Passing is the most obvious, often tunnel-visioned in his scoring approach, amplified at South Carolina by few other legitimate options but still clearly present in Summer League play as well. But if one were to ding Jackson for each and every missed pass, one might come away with a more negative view than is accurate in consideration of his star power, and that’s really what we’re here for.

It is more damaging to not take major swings than it is to have the occasional bust. If a player busts, his on-court impact simply goes to zero – there is a natural downside limit in that you’re not forced to give a player playing time, nor does it necessarily hurt your odds of acquiring more talent. But if he hits, and I mean truly hits, as in worth a max contract, that changes your franchise’s profile over a decade or more. This asymmetry runs up against basic human intuition: risk aversion means we are naturally suited to play it safe. But for that exact reason can be the source of extreme value in the NBA draft.

GG was third in usage of all freshmen as the youngest player in all of college basketball. He never looked overwhelmed athletically, consistently hitting the boards (17% defensive rebound rate) while using up a mega amount of iso (100), PNR (107) and spot up (143) possessions. Simply put, senior year HS aged players are not built like GG, not often. While a scout may see a sea of red marking up his execution on complex plays, he is able to put himself in those scenarios over and over with the flexible tank that is his hulking 6’9’’, 215 pound frame.

GG has a combination of traits I view highly in combination: when he has his nose in a play, he is determined to finish it (dawg factor); a frame to play power forward or small-ball center; the flexibility to get low into drives; an elite second jump; good shooting mechanics. Those are the traits of a scoring engine – as I put it in my scouting report of Jackson early in the season, “GG wants to be your team’s leading scorer,” and he has the mold for it. There are simply not many people in the world who have that combination of traits at an NBA level, and it takes two seconds watching GG move in Summer League to see how easily he belongs, physically.

Moving on to the rest of the group, the theme remains of swinging into uncertainty, where you have tangible evidence of NBA player-ness. By that last term I mean a collection of base skills that would be surprising to find in a non-NBA player. Let’s go through them quickly.

• Trayce Jackson-Davis: production, production and production; second jump; balance; sparks of creativity and touch at size
• Leonard Miller: dawg factor; production at age and competition; elite flexibility; sparks of creativity and touch at size
• Jalen Slawson: production and athletic versatility; team success; sparks of creativity and touch at size

The common trait for these remaining three is having some passing and some shooting touch but also defensive creativity, capable of picking up unexpected assists, steals or blocks in ways that took their opponents by surprise. Being two steps ahead of processing at lower levels, or even just hanging in at a higher level (in Miller’s case) is a good sign of being able to pick up NBA schemes, and the size of all three makes it easier to get the reps to showcase that. The flashes of touch and passing are simply compounding benefits as different areas of value on the court and expanding number of schemes in which they fit.

All four of the players here have role questions. “Can GG play off-ball?” (Summer League answer: yes); “Does Lenny fit cleanly into the 3, 4 or 5?” (Summer League answer: yes); “Can Trayce Jackson-Davis protect the rim as a 5?” (tbd); “Can Jalen Slawson shoot well enough to be a 3?” (tbd). But I also think these questions oversimplify what is a chaotic process in scouting. As Avinash said in his stellar Leonard Miller piece, “since when can we effectively project roles to begin with?”

That is not to say we shouldn’t try to project role, but we certainly shouldn’t let confusion in the exercise stop us from ranking a prospect highly.

I call this section “Drafting with One Eye Closed” as drafting is foremost an act of imagination, but that includes some willful optimism at times. The balance of cost relative to benefit of trying to make an unusual player work is lopsided, assuming the talent is indeed there. We draft players to try to alter the path of franchises, and the only way to do that is to try where others do not. Role occlusion, whether established upperclassmen or molds-of-clay youngsters, can be an opportunity masked by the same risk that drives people away.

To put the concept in more human terms, the game of basketball evolves in unexpected ways, and you need unexpected players to fit that evolving vision. The talent and effort side is the player’s job; fitting them onto the basketball court is the role of those around them.

Make Something Happen

Nick Smith Jr. (my #13, drafted #27), Amari Bailey (my #19, drafted #41), Sidy Cissoko (my #25, drafted #44)

Decision-making can be the most maddening NBA skill to dissect, making it all the more important in our evaluation of guards specifically. Guards typically survive on being nimbler, better handlers, shooters than their taller brethren, but this also means they have to make a greater number of decisions with or near the ball. If their decision-making is sound, they will make the product better, scheme running smoothly each time; if poor, the whole system can collapse. Repeat the process not once or a few times but dozens of times per game, thousands over a season. Despite having only middling 17% usage (7^th on his own team), Kyle Lowry still touched the ball over a thousand times in the 2023 playoffs, as an example. Whether or not a guard is a true lead initiator, they are going to be making countless decisions for your team.

Nick Smith Jr., Amari Bailey and Sidy Cissoko all make decisions in vastly different ways, which mixes differently for each of them with their differentiated skillsets. Sidy Cissoko is tall and strong for a guard but a poor shooter, Nick Smith Jr. is shorter and very skinny but a great shooter, Amari Bailey falls in between for all three traits.

Their playing cadences are vastly different, with NSJ being an elixir, playing like white blood cells seeking out weaknesses; Sidy is a maniac, unpredictable-squared; Amari Bailey is consistent in effort first and last. All are deviants from the expected in their own ways: given Nick Smith’s elite touch and handle creativity, one would expect him to be a pure hooper. Sidy one could easily cast aside as an unreliable project. Amari’s consistency of effort could prevent an analyst from noticing the flairs of upside.

My source of comfort in ranking them highly varies for each of them, as well. But it is consistent in one thing: the route-making of offensive schemes has always been a jagged line rather than a straight one. The ideal basketball play is a run to the basket and dunk, or run to the three point line and swish. But with the constancy of movement and ten athletes making decisions simultaneously, the way forward is rarely straight through.

This section is a dedication to the basketball weirdos, or irregularities in subtle ways. Amari Bailey may seem like the outlier in his inclusion, as Sidy and NSJ’s funkiness jump off the page. But Amari covers a ridiculous amount of ground as an athlete, both laterally and vertically, the type of athlete which would thrive as a cornerback or an outfielder or tennis player or…really anything. But Bailey plays subtly, workmanlike to the point of nearly hiding this fact. One is used to athletes of Bailey’s versatility taking up usage wherever they can, testing the limits of the dynamic fun that it must be to have those tools at one’s disposal. But Bailey, for whatever reason, does not seem to care about all of that, or else finds such enjoyment from applying them, not bluntly nor florid, but simply so. That aspect is maybe the easiest to look over: someone simply doing their job for its own sake. Especially in a freshman one-and-done, highly touted from a celebrity program. Don’t miss it with Amari.

Role Reducers: Priority UDFAs

Craig Porter Jr. (my #33), Adama Sanogo (#38), Terquavion Smith (#36), Justyn Mutts (#42), Ricky Council IV (#43), Taevion Kinsey (#45), D’Moi Hodge (#46)

Here we have a group of undrafted players I had ranked in my top 50. I’m not sure if there’s a common thread here beyond role players who I believe have a shot of being starters, even if miniscule.

All have their quick pitches as NBA role players: Porter Jr. makes sense as a defensive play-maker and creative passer next to a high usage guard. Sanogo if a team wants to run a five-out scheme on either end with a hybrid big. Terq is the obvious, nuclear pull-up shooting threat. Mutts is one of the best passing big wings in the country. Council had perhaps the best slashing tools in college hoops. Kinsey may be the most unusual, a stellar athlete ball custodian type with funky shot. D’Moi Hodge the cleanest role fit, and the most surprising undrafted for that reason as a steals & threes maven.

I mention the concept of “false ceiling” prospects, a term I coined to mean prospect commonly seen as low ceiling but with tougher-to-see avenues to outperform those expectations. I believe this entire group qualifies, let’s run through the list again. Porter Jr. does not make sense as a shotblocker, at 6’2’’ putting up a 5% block rate (one of every 20 opponent two pointers) while only fouling 2.3 times per 40(!!!). Sanogo has rare touch, shooting 77% at the rim on gigantic volume and above average everywhere else. Terq has become underrated as a passer, improving his A:TO from 1.2 to 1.9 and assist rate from 14% to 23%, all while shooting 14 threes per 100 possessions. Mutts is a rare breed, a strength-based wing with soft passing touch, perfect for motion-based, precise systems. Council’s athleticism shines in transition where he can improvise to the hoop for an acrobatic finish, at 1.2ppp on 114 transition attempts. Kinsey played in a lower conference, but that may mask his NBA athleticism, dunking over 200 times across his five college seasons. Hodge is underrated in his aggressiveness, with over 100 rim attempts finished at a 72% rate this past season.

The entire group are sophomores or older and non-premium selections as UDFAs, as it is safe to say you won’t build your team around this group. But if I were to bet on anyone undrafted ending up a useable starter at some point in their careers, it would be from this crew. The avenue to that happening has been laid out roughly in their previous spots, but amplified by further conforming to a reduced role and playing with greater talent around them.

Lessons of the Past

The 2022 draft cycle I spent obsessed with archetypes, attempting to break down the roles on the court into four: 1. Rim Protectors, 2. Connectors, 3. Shotmakers and 4. Engines. As I felt already by the time that draft day arrived, this approach had clear shortcomings. Prospects are not fully formed into their archetypes yet, and flashes of potential can be more important than fully fleshed out skills.

My three biggest misses all came from this too narrow of a sorting process. For Walker Kessler, I zoomed in too far on his inconsistent rim protection footwork technique, missing how he was blocking a gargantuan quantity of shots despite it due to advanced hand-eye coordination, size and effort. He also was able to quiet my mobility concerns by slimming down some, bringing us to another point of analysis: at the ages of prospects, they are still getting used to their athletic bodies.

Jalen Williams is another illustration of this, showcasing a major athletic leap from Santa Clara to the pros. The tape transformed almost overnight, as before when his closeouts lagged and he may have settled as a table-setter, now he looks a full power primary. The signal here was the Combine scrimmages, where J-Dub adapted to a more off-ball slashing role the second he hit the floor, using his plus wingspan to dunk in traffic with ease. The archetypes system over-fit for his Santa Clara role, not adaptive enough to appreciate his flashes of elite versatility.

Finally, a player I was too high on: Johnny Davis. At the risk of reacting too early, Johnny appears at the nexus of both of these points as well. From an archetype approach, JD is interesting. He was super physical in college, capable of some dribbling, passing, shooting, if not dominant anywhere. But he looked like he could carry a large load, and had enough clips of looking like a dynamic athlete, all the while fighting hard on the defensive end. The script has completely flipped between him and J-Dub, as Davis has been losing on the margins at the first line and without tools to salvage missteps. Where before he looked like a potential to hit in multiple archetypes, now he looks more like a mediocre prospect for each. The difference in athletic and skill profile from NCAA to NBA makes previous roles potentially untenable while also opening up new avenues for what were only flashes before.

Lessons for the Future

My goal this past cycle was to take a more holistic approach to a player’s basketball narrative. Where are they in their own cycle? A draft cycle involves only 6-8 months of new tape to indicate what a player might be for an entire career, and we need to imbue that with the appropriate lack of certainty. Imagination is the name of the game for draft work, something I’ve reminded myself constantly this past year, and helped me to be more comfortable with the one-eye-closed upside swings. Similarly, I have been keener to extrapolate those flashes out, as a player’s developmental trajectory can be as dynamic as their playing style.

The one item that remains elusive to me is projecting athletic profiles to the future. Already in Summer League I see a potential miss in Keyonte George, adapting quickly to weight loss with a more explosive playing style than we saw at Baylor or IMG. Athletic projection, again, a source of my miss on all of Kessler, J-Dub and (in the other direction) Johnny Davis, requires a technical level of biomechanical knowledge I have not attained. We have in our sights a theme for the 2024 cycle: how does the body develop amid intense athletic demands, and how can you tell who can incorporate these changes better than others? Stay tuned.

The post Lessons from the Draft Cycle appeared first on Swish Theory.

The upcoming series between the Cleveland Cavaliers and the New York Knicks is projected to be one of the closer ones. In this series, I do schematic deep dives on either team, and explore the hypothetical questions that I believe to be the key points of interest for the opponents.

Cleveland Cavaliers Offensive Scheme

Empty Side

The Cavaliers run a three-out two-in offense with heavy motion from their guards. They push empty side pick-and-rolls as much as any other team in the NBA. They’ll push these early in transition.

Part of optimising their two inside big men is by rotating them as the empty side screener, though you’re more than likely going to see Mobley as the screener and Jarrett Allen in the dunker spot when they run this. Their overall philosophy in early offense is optional ball screens, giving Mitchell and Garland structure but not robbing them of freedom. The presence of Jarrett Allen at the dunker spot gives them easy buckets if the defense is collapsed. He’s in the 90^th percentile for half-court scoring efficiency.

Wedge Action

One of the Cavs’ most common actions out of their base offense is running wedge actions. This is simply an angled screen to the baseline. They run these for Evan Mobley to give him a chance to post-up or attack off the catch. Here they run Wedge Action to generate a look for Evan Mobley. He turns the ball over on this play (I’ll get to those issues later), but they get him in space on an empty side with ease.

The Cavaliers don’t do this as a one-shot type play though, they have many other options and counters from it. Here they run ‘wedge roll’ which is as it sounds. They then flow straight into a pick-and-roll.

Sometimes the mere threat of the option is enough to give them more cushion on pick-and-rolls. Here Darius Garland flows straight into a pick-and-roll and essentially ignores Okoro attempting to set the wedge screen for Allen, with the help defense occupied by the potential of this action.

Teams are hyper aware of the Cavaliers’ wedge actions and they fear them because empty side actions are the main way they try and ease spacing concerns. The play below illustrates a nice counter the Cavs have for it.

You see the Pacers sitting under Okoro for two reasons. One is because they don’t really respect him as a shooter, but the premiere reason is that they expect the wedge roll action to come. Garland sees this and pitches it to Mobley and Okoro screens Garland’s man as they flow into Delay Chicago action. It’s great offense and shows JB Bickerstaff’s attention to detail.

Flex and Rip Concepts

I’ve labelled this “flex concepts” because the Cavs don’t run the entirety of the flex offense, but they like to move their guards through the paint in screen-the-screener type actions which is the absolute epitome of what the flex offense is all about.

On this play, the Cavaliers don’t create an advantage out of the wedge action I mentioned above…

…so they pitch to the screener and go into a pick-and-roll with Darius Garland eventually setting a flex screen to get Evan Mobley to the low block. They initially didn’t get Mobley good post position but showed a multi-faceted approach to get it on a counter.

Such things don’t exist in Basketball analysis to my knowledge, but if there was a heat map that tracked players movements, I’m almost certain that the Cavaliers guards would touch the paint off-ball more than any other team due to their flex and rip concepts. These guards are deployed off-ball moving through the paint very regularly.

I enjoyed this play shown below.

They pitch to Isaac Okoro, but watch Donovan Mitchell and Darius Garland. They flow into an initial ‘floppy’ action (a double screen set for someone to emerge from the paint). After it doesn’t get an opening, Garland cuts to the other side on the flex scissors action and Okoro hits Evan Mobley for the dunk.

If one play summarised Cleveland’s Philosophy it’s this: these guards work for their touches out of flex concepts. This ties in with Bickerstaff’s overall philosophy. He loves the chin offense which is why he’s a perfect fit to coach a team with two bigs.

They often run these plays to try and alleviate spacing concerns. Mobley-Allen isn’t a great perimeter spacing duo as of now. So basic spread concepts aren’t really going to reap rewards. Here the Cavaliers run some flex action before flowing into an empty side pick and roll.

If you’re trying to get a big line-up to work, your guards have to do their due diligence off the ball as you ideally want to maximise the big men as elbow hubs. The Cavaliers do a great job of this when they run ‘Rip’ Action such as below. Rip action is merely a player back screening then receiving the ball.

With Ricky Rubio healthy, these sets have even more of a ceiling for the Cavaliers because his processing speed is borderline generational. Here they set up a Cross Screen for Lamar Stevens and Donovan Mitchell comes off a pindown after setting the cross screen, but Rubio sees the defense tilt away from Caris Levert in the corner and they get an easy look.

Pistol

Any team with two elite guards is going to run pistol action. While I wouldn’t call this Cleveland’s absolute staple, it’s another way they can create empty side actions and give high value touches to their lead guards. Below is the absolute most basic luck and their typical structure out of it.

Both of their lead guards in the same action. They go into a pick-and-roll. The opposite side spacing has their small forward and then Jarrett Allen at the dunker spot. They bail out to him on this play and he hits the floater. He’s in the 62^nd percentile for efficiency on these shots so it will be intriguing if teams live with this one and possibly sell out elsewhere.

They also use pistol to flow into delay action and to generate empty side actions like in the play below.

They look as if they’re going to flow into Delay Chicago after the initial pistol exchange. Instead, Levert cuts all the way to the weakside and they go into an empty-side pick and roll. Teams often blitz these so Mobley’s rolling can be highly fruitful on these actions.

Here things get a little more exotic, as they run Pistol Rip Empty Hawk.

Garland receives the ball from Mitchell. Mobley backscreens for Mitchell then comes up to set the screen (this creates the same advantage as ram action). They flow into an empty-side pick and roll and Mitchell cuts through the paint and comes off a double stagger which is Hawk action. It’s another illustration of Cavs guards moving off-ball, but also creating empty side actions out of multiple scenarios.

They run the same play against the Blazers here. This time Garland dribbles towards the empty side when he sees Nurkic in drop. The Hawk action occupies the defense and Garland scores the layup.

They also mix some ‘veer’ action into their pistol offense. This involves a screen for a ball handler, with the screener then darting elsewhere to set an off-ball screen in the same action or motion. Here they run it against the Orlando Magic.

On this occasion they do it to try and attack Bol Bol on the empty side pick-and-roll with a step up screen. Sometimes though they just do it to free up a shooter and create an advantage for Garland or Mitchell such as here.

Good offenses mesh all of their concepts together. I noted earlier how the Cavs like to use their guards on flex and rip concepts, here they tie this together with pistol.

They have the initial pistol action with Mitchell then going straight in a double drag action. This is deception for ‘rip’ action for Darius Garland who comes off a screen, then sets a backscreen of his own before darting for an open three. It’s a great example of how the Cavaliers Empty Side and Inside to out guard cutting concepts all meshing.

Ram

The Cavs also like to run ‘ram’ action, where a screener comes off a screen before screening for the ball-handler. They like to do this mixed with different secondary actions as a way of trying to freeze or occupy defenders. This is as they don’t have natural outside spacing with Mobley and Allen. They’ll often run this more against teams who play drop coverage. They run it here against the Rockets.

Mitchell is the initial screener for Jarrett Allen, and then exits to the perimeter off an Evan Mobley screen. The execution will need to be more flawless in the playoffs but the logic is to occupy the defense in a way Evan Mobley just being stationary on the perimeter wouldn’t occupy it.

They’ll often run it if they have smaller line-ups too such as here against the Orlando Magic.

This time, the exit action occupies the help defense the whole way, and Darius Garland essentially walks into an easy bucket when his man gets caught on Evan Mobley’s screen. It’s one of their most common concepts.

Here, they run a ‘small’ variant of Ram action with more inverted philosophy.

Donovan Mitchell this time receives a screen from Jarrett Allen and then Ghost Screens for Darius Garland. Allen chases it immediately and Garland once again walks into a wide-open bucket. They’ll use this ‘Ram Short 77 Ghost’ to try and force switches.

On the play below, they use it in a way that raises hypothetical questions about the action.

They have Jarrett Allen be the on-ball screener, and Evan Mobley executes ‘Short’ Action which is a cut to the strongside. Notice how it freezes the defender and Allen can get a free lane because of this as the Ram gave him some extra room at the beginning of the play.

The hypothetical question they will have to answer in the Knicks series is whether they’re better with Allen or Mobley as the on-ball screener. Allen is more likely to have Mitchell Robinson on him and he may feel comfortable playing free safety in that scenario. But Robinson is extremely disruptive at the level of the screen so having Allen as the screener might create more difficulties for the offense. They’ll likely mix things up, but this will be interesting to monitor.

My good friend Bowser also clipped another play similar to ram, known as ‘New Zealand’ Action.

This involves a ram screening action on the empty side. This may be something they go to in the playoffs if things stagnate with their more common actions.

Double Drags and Horns

Like any team trying to maximise a big frontcourt, the Cavaliers optimise Double Drags, and I think they’ll run these more in this series than usual. This is largely because a double screening action can put real strain on Tom Thibodeau’s defensive scheme as they prioritise defending the paint so may leave shooters open if the Cavs opt to use a guard in the action. They also quite commonly switch 4-5 so the Cavaliers may get some matchups they like. Here, they run ’77 Small’ with Donovan Mitchell ghost screening. Darius Garland then puts Dillon Brooks in the torture chamber.

The Cavaliers have done a great job mixing in these ghost screens. Here on this play against the Heat, Mitchell ghosting creates chaos.

Though the Knicks may be organised at the point of attack than Miami, they can still get beneficial switches and potentially get bigger defenders off Garland. It’s essentially they run these ‘small’ variants of double drag.

I love how high they set some of these double drag screens like they do here against Memphis.

The Cavs routinely have the second screener roll pretty quickly. Look how tough it is to defend. The Knicks will defend it in a similar way with trying to contain the drive. Expect to see the Cavs run a load of these.

As I’ve mentioned throughout this article, counters are important. On this play the Grizzlies try and get ahead of the action so Mobley rolls quickly and Darius Garland executes ‘get’ action which is receiving your own pass on a dribble handoff.

A key theoretical of the double drag comes with regards to Evan Mobley. The Knicks will almost certainly leave him open. They do with just about any popper in a double drag set. But Mobley needs to be aggressive. This is what will swing the series for Cleveland. Here against the Knicks he pops and takes Obi Toppin off the catch.

Though Toppin won’t see the floor often, it’s still an important play. He has to be willing to be decisive. Indecision kills offense more than inability at times. The Knicks will defend these double drags high and likely have Mobley’s man tag the roller. Hartenstein and Robinson will be containing the drive. He has to be decisive.

Cleveland also mixes in Horns Sets as a way of trying to keep the opposition center outside of the paint. Here they run a classic- Horns Ghost Flare.

Horns concepts are good because they can generate quick hitters for their elite guards while creating matchup problems. Using the gravity of their star guards early in actions just creates some incredible moments such as here where they mesh Horns and turn it into a Spain-Pick-And-Roll.

Spain Pick-And-Rolls are nightmarish anyway, and the Cavaliers mixing it with Horns is just excellent offense. It maximises the gravity of their guards and keeps bigs at the level. Spain PNRs can be particularly fruitful against the Knicks because it tests Tom Thibodeau’s philosophy of always having his low man tag the roller instead of defending the corner shot.

Cleveland also likes to use Ghost screens out of a Horns outline to generate favourable switches.

This will be particularly relevant in the Knicks series because Darius Garland can definitely get bothered by size, though it’s not a gigantic concern for me. Ghost screens in general are very good and they hold a big purpose for the Cavaliers.

The New York Knicks Defense

Now that I’ve looked at the Cavaliers diverse scheme, we should look at the New York Knicks defense. Per a source with Second Spectrum, the Knicks are 7th in the NBA in drop coverage frequency, and 2nd in at the level coverage. They rarely hedge or trap or play zone. They are aggressive at helping from the nail which is a staple of Tom Thibodeau’s defensive scheme. He prioritises defending the paint with a 5-man wall and expects his wings and guards to rotate to open shooters. The strong side defense looks something like this.

Note both corner defenders aggressively helping towards the paint. Hartenstein being up towards the level. Immanuel Quickley helping off his man to try and disrupt the roller. Some teams run teams off the three-point line with aggressive and close rotations. The Knicks escort you off of it at the top of the key then make your driving path as miserable as possible.

Here’s what the defense looks like in video form. Note how they’re in drop coverage on this occasion.

Note Julius Randle tag the roller, and then making RJ Barrett responsible for ‘splitting the difference’ between the two perimeter guys. Thibodeau’s wing defenders need to be instinctive, reactive and aggressive. Here the Knicks recover out to Darius Garland and force a shot they’re comfortable with from a structural perspective.

My general Hypothesis for this series is that empty side actions will decide the series. The Knicks love Empty Side Pick-And-Rolls for Jalen Brunson because the ‘counter punch’ out of it is baseline fadeaway jumpers, which might be Brunson’s strongest shot as his offensive ability off the planted pivot foot is elite.

Above I’ve mentioned how the Cavs love empty side actions and how the majority of their core actions can be to set up these empty side actions. It makes sense to explore how the Knicks defend these actions and ponder how fruitful they might be.

If the empty side action takes place on the right side and the screen is taking the guard towards the open side, they’ll generally be in ‘ICE Coverage’. This means they’re funnelling the play towards the sideline and essentially using the out of bounds line as an extra defender. It looks like this.

If the screen is set to the left side of the guard, the Knicks will mix up coverages. Here against the Wizards, they have Hartenstein drop so Kyle Kuzma just takes his man into the paint and hits the fadeaway.

Against the Cavaliers, empty side coverages can be complex and tricky because Garland and Mitchell are both incredibly shifty, and Allen and Mobley are such good screeners. Their ability to be unpredictable with the personnel can make a one size fits all scouting report difficult. I expect the Knicks to mix in some at the level coverages simply because Darius Garland is incredibly shifty off the dribble against drop coverage. Like what do you do with this?

Randle tries to drop and deal with Mobley, Barrett has to help away from Donovan Mitchell. Brunson isn’t active, and Jericho Sims is concerned about Jarrett Allen. Weirdly, Allen’s allergy to the perimeter can actually benefit the Cavs against Thibodeau’s strong side defense. He’s more concerned with Allen at the dunker spot than he would be with a corner shooter, philosophically.

This time, Hartenstein starts at the level of the screen. But once Garland gets a step on his man it’s close to over. Hartenstein is juggling being in the driving lane with mirroring the roll-man.

Note in this play how Quentin Grimes doesn’t really help off of Donovan Mitchell. Their approach to this will be intriguing because if you do help, even momentarily, you risk Mitchell being able to create off the catch and go like he does here. It’s generally clear though that a smaller guard on Garland without any nail help probably isn’t going to end well.

The Little Things- What the Cavaliers Can Do

Playoff series come down to micro adjustments more often than you might think. Here are a few things I think Cleveland can do to potentially make life easier for them.

The first, is setting higher screens. Given the Knicks like to be in ICE Coverage on these empty side actions, you can really cause havoc by setting the screens higher.

Note here that the entire empty side is genuinely empty. It’s because Randle has much more ground to cover in order to enforce the ‘No Middle’ ideology. Mobley also has more rolling room. I think high screens can genuinely really cause the Knicks problems in this series. I’d also attempt to get Randle and Brunson in actions as much as possible. Neither are awful defenders but they’re a step slower than their team-mates.

Here, the Cavaliers do the same with their ‘ram’ action.

Look at the gap between Grimes and his teammates before the action even happens. You could park a car in there. Mitchell makes Randle dance by faking the right drive, then makes Grimes dance before hitting the pull-up three. A good way to delegitimise nail help is to just set the action really far away from it.

Putting Donovan Mitchell or Garland in the actions as an off-ball threat should prove fruitful. I think their wedge set in particular could be a nice way to test if the Knicks want to trap. Here against Portland, the Blazers run wedge roll with Anfernee Simons setting the wedge screen for Nurkic.

Thibodeau wants to maintain structure above all else. No middle at all costs. Putting your best players in the action really tests this because your nearest help defender has to worry about a star moving off-ball. They could walk into good jump shots or just generally get the defense on the back foot with how they position guys.

Generally, I think pre-action is needed to really get at the Knicks. Make them work and force them to make quick decisions. Thibs wants teams to play slow against his defense. Something as simple as what Minnesota do here, would suffice.

The Wolves trigger the ICE Coverage with a quick pass to Mike Conley on the empty side. Gobert rolls, and when Randle tags, Conley hits Kyle Anderson who is able to manipulate the help defense to create a wide open three. Generally, forcing these nail help guys to be as reactive as possible is a good way of winning games. Generally, their target should be to get these with pre-action and higher screens.

In Summary

Overall, this might be the most interesting first round series of the NBA Playoffs. The Cavaliers offense is diverse and fluid, and the Knicks defense is really tough. Evan Mobley needs to be aggressive, and the Knicks help defense will need to be on point. The battle of the nail help defenders likely decides this series. I’m not meaning to underestimate the Knicks defense, it’s an immense unit. I just think there are ways Cleveland can attack it and that’s what I’ve tried to explore in this series. I hope you enjoyed.

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