And it got the wheels spinning. We all remember the Warriors’ two-timeline plan: one championship core supplemented with a cast of young players being asked to fill in as role players, with the eventual goal of that young talent forming a new future for the team once the core retires or moves on. It was brimming with hubris but somehow worked with the 2022 championship.

The Utah Jazz are running two timelines of tanking, and I’m not fond of it on principle. I want to explain how Utah got here, their process, why I fundamentally disagree, and what should be done differently.

The Prelude

Let’s go back to 2017 to properly tell the story. The Jazz hit things big in their buildup of a contending squad. Rudy Gobert was ready to anchor an elite defense, coming off a DPOY runner-up season. Gordon Hayward was coming off his first All-Star appearance and provided strong offense from the wing. They were filling in gaps well with quality starters like George Hill, Derrick Favors, Alec Burks, and Joe Ingles. It was a squad that managed to win 51 games before running into the juggernaut Warriors in the conference semifinals, ending in a prompt sweep.

They encountered the problem many a small market team has encountered. You draft well, you hit moves on the margins, and you retain who you need to. Then you find yourself up against a team with a true superstar and it all falls apart. Gordon Hayward is not the kind of #1 option that can get you over the hump against championship-level teams.

Then Utah hit it big.

In the 2017 draft, they acquired the 13th overall pick for Trey Lyles and the 24th pick, using that selection on Donovan Mitchell. With Gordon Hayward leaving for his ill-fated Boston sojourn, Utah desperately needed an infusion of star talent. Mitchell immediately became the #1 option and the team hardly lost a step.

Despite the crushing blow of losing Hayward, Utah managed their most sustained run of success since the Stockton/Malone days. With Mitchell at the helm of the offense and Gobert anchoring the defense, Utah averaged 48.6 wins over their five seasons with Mitchell, including the Covid-shortened season. They managed a #1 seed in the west for the first time in over 20 years. Yet they could never get over the hump, crashing out 3 times in the first round and twice in the conference semifinals. New faces, familiar story.

One fated hire seemed to indicate where this was headed. Before the 2021/22 season, general manager Dennis Lindsey stepped down amid allegations of inappropriate racial comments. Assistant GM Justin Zanik was promoted, but not before they added Danny Ainge of trade crime fame to run the show.

The Breakup

Utah won 49 games in that final season of the Mitchell and Gobert tandem, but rumors flew about their discontent with the organization and alleged inability to get along together. A first round loss to the upstart Luka Doncic-led Mavericks spelled doom. Utah traded Mitchell away to Cleveland, seemingly against his wishes to make his way to New York, and Gobert was sent to the Minnesota Timberwolves.

As far as blowing up cores go, Utah made off like bandits as Ainge maximized their position. The two brought back a haul of draft capital including seven first-round picks, three pick swaps, rookie Walker Kessler, plus recent draftees Ochai Agbaji and Leandro Bolmaro. Just as importantly, Utah also acquired Collin Sexton and Lauri Markkanen from Cleveland, two former lottery picks in desperate need of a new situation. From the Timberwolves, Utah netted Malik Beasley, Jarred Vanderbilt, and Patrick Beverley.

The rebuild was on, the assets were acquired, and the strategic teardown was in motion. But with all of the players acquired, Utah didn’t quite have the look of a team ripping things down to the studs. 35-year-old Mike Conley was in the fold. Collin Sexton had flaws but could still run an offense. And Lauri Markkanen, arguably the crux of this entire article, broke out in a major way. With new coach Will Hardy looking like a budding star behind the bench, Utah managed to win 37 games and flirted with a play-in appearance.

This is where the issues with the process begin to show.

Limbo State

It’s not the worst thing in the world to be somewhat competent in a rebuild. What is frustrating about Utah’s process was the timing.

That 2022-23 team could have ripped the roster to shreds, been as bad as possible, and gotten a legitimate shot at the Wembanyama sweepstakes. Instead, they retained Conley, Sexton, Malik Beasley, and other positive contributors who kept the team from a true tank. That took them from Wemby/Scoot/Brandon Miller territory into drafting Taylor Hendricks with their No. 9 choice. I have nothing against Hendricks, but nobody will argue that his potential isn’t coming close to that top three.

Their three total choices in that draft are fine in a vacuum. Hendricks was always a project, Brice Sensabaugh has interesting potential, and Keyonte George looks like one of the steals of the class. But now a logjam is beginning to form, and the two timelines of bad are appearing.

To their credit, Utah un-jammed some of the logs this past offseason by dealing away Conley, Beasley, and Vanderbilt in a three-team deal that netted a 2027 Lakers first-round choice. Yet some of the holdovers remained. Lauri Markkanen and his budding star potential occupied a forward spot, Collin Sexton still demands minutes, and Jordan Clarkson has somehow stayed through the entire teardown, the last remnant of the Mitchell/Gobert teams.

In the spirit of beating the analogy to death, Utah inexplicably added giant log John Collins to the jam, albeit for next to nothing. Collins has flaws but is a quality piece in his own right. That’s not a move that tanking teams with a massive cache of draft capital make, even if they believe Collins can be flipped at a later date.

Going into the 2023/24 season, Utah had two distinct groups of players. There’s the group of players that belong on playoff-caliber teams in Markkanen, Sexton, Clarkson, Collins, and Kelly Olynyk. Behind them is the true rebuild group: George, Hendricks, Sensabaugh, Kessler, Agbaji, and an assortment of other lottery tickets. The quality of that first group led to another season of “not quite bad enough or good enough”, winning 31 games and being equally as far away from a top draft choice as the play-in tournament.

This sets them on a tough path.

The Crossroads

Being outside looking in at the top of this 2024 draft isn’t the worst thing ever. There was nobody worth truly bottoming out a roster for. That all changes with the upcoming 2025 and 2026 drafts, where premiere talents like Cooper Flagg, Ace Bailey, Cam Boozer, and AJ Dybantsa will be ripe for leading a rebuild.

Therein lies the problem. Utah has rebuffed multiple offers for the 27-year-old extension-eligible Markkanen, including a rumored offer from the Oklahoma City Thunder that would have netted 3 more first-round picks. There has been little reported movement on dealing Sexton or John Collins. Clarkson seems likely to go, but that still leaves some quality players at the top of the depth chart, players good enough to once again push Utah into limbo. The first part of the tanking timeline is being pearl-clutched by Ainge.

Then comes the second part of the issue. Utah added Cody Williams at 10th overall, Isaiah Collier at 29th, and Kyle Filipowski at 32nd overall, leaving them with 7 total players on their rookie-scale contracts. The logjam only becomes jammier next year, with potentially 3 more first-round picks incoming next season. That second timeline is full of talent but is starting to become muddy as more and more players are added and minutes become scarce.

How Can This Be Fixed?

There is a clear path here in my opinion. Whether or not Utah’s brain trust realizes this is the problem.

First, addressing the primary timeline. Markkanen, Sexton, and Clarkson should have been traded yesterday. If all three of them are on the roster come opening night, Utah has made a mistake. Even if they’re moved at the deadline, that might hamper their chances of securing a top choice in 2025. Ideally, they should be moved for more future picks or rookie-scale developmental prospects without taking on the salary of older players who would demand minutes and be a part of the rotation.

That opens things up for the second tanking timeline. Utah’s pick is top 10 protected this year and top 8 protected in 2026, and risking that pick by being a 30-35 win team would be a massive mistake. It also clears the way for a total free-for-all of young players competing for roles and playing time in the upcoming season. A final teardown has the dual purpose of improving Flagg-to-Utah chances and improving the developmental chances of their existing prospects.

Ripping things down to the studs sets Utah up well for pole position to wrangle a franchise-altering prospect in the next two drafts. It also means the 3 players they may add through next year’s class will have a better path to real playing time. They need that genuine shot at a star instead of continuing to sit at the end of the lottery. Lightning rarely strikes twice in quick succession, and Donovan Mitchell was their lightning strike. It’s time for them to get serious about the chances of getting another superstar.

The alternatives make little sense. Extend Lauri, who is unlikely to remain in his prime before Utah can contend? Hold on to Clarkson and Sexton to take minutes from George and Collier? Keep nibbling at the draft and collecting more prospects with longer developmental curves? What happens when the 2027 draft rolls around, when Utah has a whopping four first-round picks?

Utah needs to take a hard look at themselves and around the league. The Spurs rebuild changed entirely with Wembanyama. They’re armed with a budding superstar, a relatively clean cap sheet, and a haul of draft picks they can use to accelerate the rebuild by consolidating around their young stars. If the Jazz can snag Flagg, Boozer, or any of the other blue-chippers, things begin to come into focus. Those future picks can be used to accelerate things around that new star. Roles and outlooks of the current prospect crop they possess begin to solidify. They could find themselves with a core of players and picks that would make other rebuilding franchises jealous.

Or they could stay on this path, stick in limbo, and make this rebuild even more difficult. Your call, Mr. Ainge.

The post Utah’s Two Timelines of Bad appeared first on Swish Theory.

The rise of the Steph Curry Warriors was an evolutionary earthquake, changing the nature of the sport quicker than a leather ball rips through a polyester net. Overnight, perimeter shotmaking became en vogue and the focus of the sport continued its way from the confines paint and out beyond the perimeter. 

Somewhere along the way, we lost the plot. A new environment meant new conditions for growth and with that came modernized valuations for incoming draft prospects. While score-first point guards and versatile forwards shot up draft boards (for good reason), that rise coincided with a dramatic decline in the valuation of traditional bigs. 

In some cases, that change was needed. Slow-footed post hubs are all but a thing of the past as the athletic requirements for the position have grown. On the other hand, some of the most valuable defensive big men in the league were drafted well below their actual value. 

From Bam Adebayo to Robert Williams or Jarrett Allen (and Walker Kessler and Jalen Duren for the brave of heart), many of the most impactful young big men in the league were drafted out of the top ten, if not the lottery entirely. 

More important than the missed opportunity of drafting said player is the gaping cavern their absence leaves within a team’s defensive identity. As you look at the best defenses across the league in Cleveland, Milwaukee, Boston or Memphis, great defensive big men continue to lead great defenses. 

Dereck Lively II represents an incredibly interesting thought experiment within this construct. If you are interested in a breakdown of his on-court strengths and weaknesses there is a scouting report released in companion with this piece. What I will be doing here is digging deeper into his concept as a player, how his season fares historically within that archetype, and what developmental context can best maximize his existing skill set. 

Reality can be hard to find when the very earth beneath your feet is constantly changing, but one thing has remained true. It is a blue world trying to contend in the NBA without a playoff-durable big man to own the paint, and that player is harder to find than you might think.

Concept: Rim Running Shotblocker

Walker Kessler, Steven Adams, Nerlens Noel, Robert Williams

The general concept of the “defense first” center is by no means a new one. Since the inception of the sport the largest person on the court has shouldered the largest defensive burden. When it comes to protecting the basket, size is always going to matter. It is not the fool-proof rule of thumb that it used to be, but its value is inherent: the larger you are the more imposing you are in contesting shots and attacking the glass.

Finding proof of concept for a player like Lively is both incredibly easy and downright impossible. The first place to start feels pretty straightforward in Walker Kessler. Kessler embodies the very hope of what Lively could be, and why it is a fairly easy bet to make. Much like Lively’s first half of the year, Kessler’s freshman season at UNC saw him struggle to earn a consistent role despite his dominating per-possession stats while on the court. 

Kessler’s meteoric rise the following season at Auburn and this year in Utah is a picture-perfect data point on why to be excited. Despite a poor context and role, Kessler’s low-minute dominance at UNC foretold genuine upside that was just a little harder to see. While Lively’s block rate didn’t re-write record books like Kessler did last year, he was incredibly impactful defending the paint and anchored one of the best defenses in college basketball. 

Offensively, the comparison becomes much trickier. Kessler’s freshman and sophomore campaigns saw a significantly larger volume of shots attempted with relatively similar efficiency. Lively’s usage rate of 12.8 would be the lowest of any first round pick in history and is genuinely without precedent. While there is no 1 for 1 comparison, there are a few players that represent a potential development path for Lively in the league. 

The first name that comes to mind when I think of steady-handed competence from the big position is Steven Adams. There was little hope for “star” upside when Adams was drafted in the lottery by the Oklahoma City Thunder, but he did grow to become a star in his role while playing a major part on some of the best teams of the 2010s. Giving your young star guard a competent and reliable roll option they can grow alongside is generally good business, for the guard, the big and the organization as a whole.

That value equation is the same for Lively, albeit in a more mobile physical package. Lively is a better vertical athlete, but a worse finisher around the basket (49% vs 58% on non-dunk rim attempts) with about ⅔ of the total scoring volume. The offensive threshold between valuable and unplayable is an incredibly thin line, and Adams just barely crossed it. Lively was a much better passer as a freshman and that skill should translate well to the next level, but for that to happen he will need to be a threat to score.

The other side of that line is Nerlens Noel, drafted with the hopes he would become the perfect modern day rim runner. He was mobile, blocked shots, got steals, had a solid assist rate with the vertical athleticism to draw fouls and dunk everything around the hoop. An ACL injury sapped a little of that high-end athleticism, but ultimately it was his lack of offensive value that derailed the lofty expectations of his career. 

Noel’s hands were an issue as a prospect and against NBA level competition that was only exacerbated. He can struggle to catch and score efficiently as a roll man and when that isn’t working there are few other places to turn. Teams aren’t going to give up five pick-and-roll alley-oops a game. 

This is where the ultimate floor for Lively resides. Noel was a significantly higher 57% on non-dunk rim attempts and his assist rate was nearly identical. Lively dunked the ball slightly more often and at least attempted to take a few threes (a surprisingly encouraging indicator for bigs who can one day kinda shoot), but the concerns are legitimate. 

If Lively isn’t able to provide a genuine threat to score as a roller there is no offensive foundation to grow upon. His defense is too good to wash out of the league, I believe that firmly, but the idea he is a sure-fire starter or even high-end rotation piece is lacking some important nuance.

On the other extreme, Robert Williiams II shows what this archetype can be if they are able to provide genuine rim pressure. Williams is an incredible defensive big that provides the Celtics real versatility as a primary rim protector or weak side rotator. 

Robert Williams is one of two big men drafted since 2017 to make an All-Defense team, but what separates him from his peers is his offensive value. Williams is a ferocious athlete with the strength to dunk through people in a way few prospects have, but it is his touch around the rim that is the foundation for his success. 

He has good hands and easily exceeds the lower requirement for touch as a roll man, which is in essence simply scoring efficiently against your typical pick and roll defense. With a proper ball handler Williams has the tools, touch and tough screen setting to tear apart traditional coverages, and that efficiency is what opens up his game as a passer. 

His offensive value is what keeps him on the court in crunch time or playoff settings, providing the foundation of minutes needed to have an All-Defense caliber season. Staying on the court is half the battle for defensive bigs these days, and that is the battle Lively will need to survive in order to truly hit his ceiling. 

That feels like an impossible task from a macro view. William’s freshman year usage was double Lively’s (23.4 vs 12.8) and touch around the rim significantly higher (61.6 vs 48.8). While that is true, the bar required for scoring volume or offensive value is not that of Robert Williams, but rather somewhere between the two. The game isn’t about finding the best possible offensive center, it is about finding one with the foundational skill required to remain on the court long enough to truly impact the course of games. Lively will do that defensively, but offensively is another question. 

Lively thrives above the rim and his 3.2 dunks per 40 minutes is an incredibly encouraging mark for someone in a spacing deprived offense. Beyond above-rim pressure there was very little substance to Lively’s scoring package. As a comparison to Williams he not only had a smaller volume of rim attempts but, more starkly, took eight (!!) shots in the midrange, compared to Williams with 105. 

That difference in assertiveness and usage is incredibly stark with both parties irreconcilably affected by their on-court context. That isn’t to say Lively would have had a similar offensive season with the 2017 Texas A&M team, but maybe the difference wouldn’t be as stark and the developmental hill to climb wouldn’t seem so steep. Lively doesn’t have to reach Williams’ level of offensive impact, but his developmental journey and on-court roll represents the path for Lively to truly hit on his upside.

Context: On-Ball Creation, Spacing, Secondary Rim Protection

Oklahoma City Thunder, Houston Rockets, Toronto Raptors, Indiana Pacers

Dereck Lively entered this college basketball season with a mountain of expectations. Lively, ESPNs #1 ranked recruit in the class of 2022, enrolled at Duke with other highly touted freshmen in Dariq Whitehead, Kyle Filipowski, Mark Mitchell and Tyrese Proctor to form one of the most decorated recruiting classes in recent memory. 

Duke began the year ranked as a top 10 team in the country on the backs of their newly-minted blue-chip freshmen, but the year quickly turned sour. It was immediately apparent that the team did not have enough spacing to survive (particularly in the absence of Dariq Whitehead), nor the on-ball creation necessary to truly maximize Lively’s skillset. 

The good news is that he will have better spacing and on-ball creation on the roster surrounding him next year regardless of which team selects him, and that should help open up some of his offensive game. But what situations give him the best chance at hitting the higher end of his potential?

Oklahoma City is the first team that comes to mind and the longer I think about it the more excited I become. SGA is a legit, A1 creator for the future and with Josh Giddey next to him they should have 48 minutes of good point guard play every night. Factor in the emergence of Jalen Williams as a true-blue wing scorer and the presence of the greatest shooting coach of all time in Chip Engelland (silent weeping), OKC has all the offensive ingredients needed to insulate and maximize Lively’s development.

Defensively, it is hard to not get excited about a frontcourt pairing of Chet Holmgren and Dereck Lively. Both have the mobility needed to play a variety of defensive schemes and switch out on the perimeter (in moderation) while being two of the best freshman shot blockers in college basketball history. I am floored as I type this, a spiritual embodiment of Ryan Reynolds’ character in The Big Short. Chet is going to shoot it (you can carve that into the streets of Bricktown, it’s happening), and in turn may be the ideal frontcourt pairing for Lively now and in the future. 

Houston offers another intriguing fit later in the teens, but comes with a caveat. There needs to be a point guard of the future in place for this to have any chance of working. This team desperately needs someone to bring a sense of structure offensively. Drafting Scoot would immediately assuage those fears, and suddenly a supporting cast of future All-Star scorer Jalen Green and complimentary two-way forwards in Jabari Smith and Tari Eason starts to look a whole lot more enticing. 

The Jabari/Tari combo is what really draws me to Houston above other fits as they, in tandem, provide all of the helpside rim protection, perimeter defense, shooting and rim pressure you could ask for next to Lively. If Houston is able to find a real point guard of the future, you would be hard pressed to find a better realistic fit in this upcoming draft. 

The fit in Toronto has, in a way, already been proven. Jakob Poeltl’s mid-season re-addition provided a backbone to their defense and a much needed safety valve for their pick and roll operators. Given time Lively’s impact could be largely similar with a tilt towards the defensive end of the floor. Poeltl is an incredibly sound defensive big with remarkable instincts, but lacking the plus length and athleticism to reach All-Defense levels consistently. Lively is not the scorer around the rim Poeltl was, but his defensive impact and potential is higher. 

This isn’t to say Lively is going to be a better player than Poeltl, that outcome would be an incredibly positive one for Lively. Even if he never reaches that level, he may provide more value to the Raptors simply by being younger with seven years of guaranteed team control. Poeltl is going to be expensive this summer and I would be shocked to see him sign elsewhere after Toronto paid such a hefty price to acquire him. Still,  it would be prudent to have a potential replacement waiting in the wings for when Scottie Barnes, OG Anunoby and Pascal Siakam all begin to negotiate new deals and the cost of Poeltl’s contract becomes prohibitive. 

Finally, Indiana is an intriguing fit for a few different reasons. The presence of Tyrese Haliburton guarantees a competent floor general for Lively to learn and grow with, particularly one that is both reliant-on and remarkable-in operating a pick and roll. Rick Carlisle’s approach in catering offensive sets to Mathurin this year is a sign his feelings toward playing rookies may have finally thawed. To help the  warming process, Lively fits incredibly cleanly into the style of basketball Carlisle teams like to play: fast pace, ball screen oriented attack with a true rim running big. 

Myles Turner may be on a new contract, but I for one would not be surprised to hear rumors he’s on the trade market by next deadline. When there is smoke there must be fire, and half a decade of burning embers don’t go out overnight. Adding a big in Lively that is both cost controlled and more befitting of their coaches game plan seems like an obvious win. I would even be intrigued to see them play together, at least initially. In the long run, his potential fit with Haliburton and Mathurin is about as clean as it gets.

Content:

How good of a defensive prospect is Lively? What is the minimum threshold of scoring volume needed to leverage short roll passing? What is the offensive value of a rim runner?

As a precursor to this piece, I spent an enormous amount of time this season combing through old prospect stat profiles, trying to figure out what indicators are actually valuable in projecting defensive success in the NBA. When it came to bigs, I came away with four specific metrics that appeared to have substantive value:

• Defensive Box +/- (DBPM)
• Block Rate (BLK%)
• Offensive Rebound Rate (OREB%)
• Age

Relatively basic statistical data points that, when used in conjunction, do a surprisingly successful job at identifying big man prospects with the potential to be impactful defenders in the league. 

Historically, Lively’s draft age of 19.33 is young for a freshman and his DBPM of 6.5 is a remarkable outlier. Lively’s DBPM ranks in the top 25 of all college players since 2008, regardless of experience or class. It is only once you factor in his relative youth, the company surrounding him on that list and the difficulty of competition he faced at Duke that the magnitude of his success begins to come into focus.

Big men take time to become impactful defenders. That is a tried and true fact, something you will hear evaluators say a thousand times every draft cycle. It’s an incredibly nuanced and difficult job that takes  preternatural feel and anticipation to reach the highest levels of impact. 

Being not just a good, but a great defensive center as an 18 year old freshman playing for a high major school simply doesn’t happen. When someone is drastically ahead of their age curve in any aspect of development, that tends to be an indicator of outlier potential. 

Lively may not be an excellent defensive big man next year in the NBA, but his macro-level production and in-season improvement defending ball screens and reading the floor defensively make me incredibly confident in his ability to solve problems over the course of his development. 

The focus then turns to the opposite side of the court. When you are as talented of a defensive prospect as Lively, playing a position where defense is your primary avenue to impact, the equation for offensive success changes. You are no longer looking for the most dominant offensive player, but simply a player with potential avenues of contributing to effective offense. 

For Lively, his rim pressure as a lob threat and in the dunker spot should be immediately translatable. He will need to add significant size and strength, but that feels like an incredibly easy bet to make for someone with his age and frame. The non-dunk finishing will need to improve greatly, but playing in an offense with a dynamic creator on-ball and spacing on the wings would go a long way in opening up the court and providing Lively easier looks around the rim. 

When looking at previous big man prospects with poor non-dunk rim efficiency, Jalen Duren (53.3%) and Bam Adebayo (48.8%) were two that stuck out. Yes, both of those guys took a lot more shots and drew fouls at a much higher rate than Lively. 

With that said, all three were incredibly effective and proficient above-rim finishers. That is where their gravity comes from, vertical spacing and relentless strength attacking the rim. Lively is much thinner than both at this age but is strong for his frame and markedly taller than both. If he is able to catalyze that strength as he grows into his frame, most of these problems will fix themselves.  

The key point here is magnitude: Dereck Lively does not need to become an elite finisher to succeed. He simply needs to be good enough, when accounting for his above-rim finishing, to be a legitimate threat to score as a roller. That feels like a reasonable projection to make and one that could pay major dividends down the line. 

The offensive value of an effective rim runner is a nuanced thing, but something that can play a large role in creating a positive environment for developing creators. A good screener can be used in a variety of ways. Screens are set in just about every single possession, be it in a high pick and roll or to free an off ball shooter or to screen the man defending the screener of a different action. NBA teams love to set screens and despite how opaque it sounds, powerful and timely screen setting combined with quick processing and the sight-lines of a seven-footer make for a sneakily impactful offensive player to complement the defensive fireworks. 

That isn’t going to require some outlandish skill development or unlikely improvement. Lively was a much better passer than the numbers suggest, and the numbers were actually solid! Being able to put the ball on the deck out of a DHO, score in the post or stretch the floor would be an incredible development, none are a necessary one for Lively to truly hit as a prospect. Improved foul drawing, the strength to finish through contact, a reliable push shot in the paint: those are what will determine Lively’s success.

Like all good things in life development isn’t going to come easily, but it is far from an unreasonable task. There aren’t a multitude of areas that need to see vast development. The scope is much more narrow, and in turn the spotlight is that much brighter. 

Cultivating an environment suitable for that kind of growth will require structures in place to support him throughout the process. Those supports aren’t permanent, they are just meant to help guide the process during its most vulnerable phases. Dereck Lively has the foundation of skills to one day withstand even the most violent of earthquakes, he just needs time to establish his roots. 

The post Dereck Lively II and the Big Man Blues appeared first on Swish Theory.