It happens to all of us: you’re excited about a player and end up ranking him far too high, or dismiss a player too quickly who turns into a star. But in those NBA draft misses are also valuable lessons that make us better scouts moving forward.
In this piece, Swish Theory contributors look at exactly that. We reflect on our “favorite” misses, those who have taught us the most along our various hoops journeys.
Matt Powers
Jayson Tatum.
While I was much less tuned into the draft, mostly highlight scouting until 2020, I still took pride in making a quick board or a friendly wager with friends regarding prospect outcomes. Jayson Tatum has a lot that I look for in a prospect, a smart defender with skill, green flag production and a great athlete. But, reader, I did not buy the shot. The aesthetics of the Duke motion got under my skin in a way I could not explain, a two-motion release that involved often violent gathers and flaring out on release. I let this issue cloud my overall opinion of the now consensus star for the Boston Celtics, and, while I did not make an official board this season, had major concerns about him as a top 3 draft pick. If the shot doesn’t fall, I expected the rest of the game to crumble…or else was just so distracted by the aesthetics – not even that bad, but enough to trigger a massive red flag in my analysis.
That all was fixed within the first week of Summer League. A 34% shooter from deep in college, Tatum smoothed out his motion and generally has excelled as an athlete where, even if it didn’t improve, he likely would still be an All-Star anyways. But a career 38% on heavy volume (including 43% as a rookie) I never could have imagined. That all made the rest of his game, already strong, even easier, the undisputed leader for a consistent title contender at a young age. Better shooting meant lower thresholds for innovation in the rest of his game, exploring the studio space as a handler and passer to make consistent leaps in skill. That taught me a harsh lesson about the uncertainties of shooting, the dangers of aesthetics, the value of compounding flashes of skill and, well, sometimes it just happens.
A maxim I’ve developed is that with draft research, someone will always be higher or lower than you on every aspect of a player’s game. It’s not worth staking out ground as the guy who doesn’t believe in a player’s shot, or, on the other end, convinced they are guaranteed to be 40%+ from deep. Every scale is fluid and incremental, and a change in trajectory for one skill or trait has downstream impacts on every other one. In overanalyzing a single item, it’s likely you’re too narrow in your imagination.
Josh Url
Willie Cauley-Stein.
Before the 2015 draft I was excited by the defensive potential of Willie Cauley-Stein (WCS). He seemed destined to be a switchable rim protector and lob threat at 7’0” 240 lbs with crazy athletic tools. Of all the centers in NBA Draft Combine history at the time WCS posted:
- The fastest lane agility drill time (better than the average score for pgs).
- The 2nd fastest ¾ sprint time.
- The highest max vertical reach (tied for 1st).
On top of the ELITE athleticism WCS looked defensively dominant for the 38-1 Kentucky Wildcats. An NBA executive even told me that WCS was THE best defensive prospect he had seen over his long career. Unfortunately, Willie’s NBA career did not play out as expected.
Missing on WCS taught me two lessons:
- Even top 1% athleticism is not guaranteed to translate to NBA defensive dominance. Now, I prioritize decisive defensive decision-making over athletic tools.
- Most players do not get a bigger role in the NBA so it’s important to know if the player will embrace their NBA role. WCS said “The story on me going into this draft is that I’m an elite defender with a raw offensive game. In my head I’m thinking, how would you even know what I’m capable of offensively?” Self-belief is good but so is self-awareness.
Charlie Cummings
Jerome Robinson.
Okay, take a moment to laugh. I deserve it.
I learned two hard lessons with Jerome Robinson. First, don’t place stock in a couple of big games above the overarching body of work (in this case, his 24 points in Boston College’s upset of #1 ranked Duke and 46 points against Notre Dame). Before “that dawg in him” was on the radar, let alone criminally overused, that’s what I thought Jerome had.
I also failed to see how the athleticism would (or wouldn’t) translate. He simply did not have the physical tools to keep up defensively or create consistent rim pressure, and the perimeter scoring alone was not strong enough to keep him on the field. So a player I ranked 7th when draft Twitter consensus had him 39th unsurprisingly flopped. The career 4.5 PPG on a 43.9% eFG hit me like a shotgun to the chest.
Now I know to balance the good games scouted with the bad ones, and to value athletic tools as the ultimate “make or miss” aspect of a prospect profile. Thank you, Jerome, for the brutal lesson.
Dennis Janßen
LaMelo Ball.
Sounds weird, because I had LaMelo #1 on my board as of the draft, but it took me a long time and some outside influence to come around on him. Everybody remembers the Ball-led Chino Hills teams and especially the skinny, blonde-dyed haired LaMelo pulling up from halfcourt, scoring 90+ points in a high school game (including accusations of opposite coaches to ruin basketball in its entity). I had my fair share of reservations about LaMelo, including being heavily biased from the media coverage I got living overseas, which was mostly on the negative side.
Inefficient, broken shot, selfish, showboating without any hope he could guard anyone on an NBA floor was my broad takeaway from watching him in high school and the NBL and I missed the forest for the trees. What happened?
I started draft scouting with the 2020 cycle, was extremely clueless contextualizing player development and growth of youth players. What really opened my eyes in regard to LaMelo Ball was a piece about him from PD Web:
The look behind the curtain revealed that LaMelo actually is an outer-worldly, instinctual basketballer that maybe just needs some further polish in his game. Like PD said, “All Ball all the time has not really allowed for jumper surgery, the similarities from when I first saw Melo in middle school to Chino to overseas to now are striking.” His youth career was unique in a sense of really pushing his feel and decision-making development, whilst not establishing the typical “old school” baseline of things like a constant defensive motor or visually appealing jumper. Melo is a unique prospect that required a different look at his tape I wasn’t able to have at the time. It didn’t take long for him to really beat off most of my concerns about his shot and overall efficiency, whilst being one of the most promising young ball handlers of the league.
Oscar
Sharife Cooper.
In my time as a draft scout, I’ve encountered few prospects as tempting to proclaim support for as Sharife Cooper. Coming out of Auburn, Rife presented the perfect storm of factors that made his hill one worth dying on: a wildly exciting player with several exceptionally rare traits and statistical indicators, plus with a crowd of bad faith detractors pointing to a 12 game college 3pt shooting sample as evidence of his bust potential.
Sharife’s combination of handling ingenuity, virtuosic passing acumen and advanced finishing toolbox fueled my belief that he could be the exception to the rule for small guards making the leap to the league. His stint at Auburn was statistically unprecedented in a variety of ways: his free throw rate (.560, more than 10 FTs/40 mins), assist rate (52%!), and touch indicators (83% from the line, consistent pinpoint accuracy as a high volume lob thrower) were all gargantuan green flags for an offensive engine prospect. Many evaluators were scared off by Cooper’s poor 3pt shooting at Auburn (13/57 for a ghastly 23% mark), but I never saw this as a big issue considering his solid pre-college shooting track record and career-long proficiency from the line. Indeed, Cooper has shot a rock solid 137/379 (36%) from deep on about 7 attempts/100 possessions in his 76 G-League games to date, a mark that many of his doubters swore he would never reach only 2 years ago.
The more legitimate critique of Cooper’s game to me was always whether he could overcome the razor-thin margin for error that small guards get as inside-the-arc scorers and defenders. Two years into his NBA career, it seems like the answer to this question is a no (though I’m holding out hope that he’ll flourish in bench minutes if given the chance!).
Ultimately, my mistake was zeroing in on what most people pointed to as Sharife’s weakest skill: his touch is good, it was always good, and any evaluator using a holistic shooting projection would have told you so at the time of the draft. But I was too quick to earmark Cooper as a lottery lock simply because I didn’t buy the primary argument of the scouts who were fading him. This is a fairly intuitive thought process: everyone seems to agree that Player X’s swing skill is shooting, I have no doubt that this player will shoot, therefore I must be higher on him than the public and should move him up my board. This is one of the pitfalls of allowing the shadow of consensus to creep into personal evaluation: perhaps if I wasn’t so familiar with Cooper’s prospect narrative as an alleged non-shooter, I would’ve examined the other potential pitfalls in his skillset with a closer eye.
Nick
Tyrese Haliburton.
As someone who was young and just getting into scouting at the time, Haliburton slipped past my mind as a real guy in his 2020 NBA Draft Class and I believe this miss ultimately made me a better evaluator in the long run. I had major reservations with Haliburton compared to people who had him top 10 or even top 5 in that draft class. This was also the most chaotic draft cycle with the pandemic limiting games and delaying the draft until November, and also there being nearly no consensus within draft twitter. With there being no consensus as far as rankings for this draft cycle, you really had to know your stuff and if you saw a guy you really believed in, there was pretty much free reign to move him up where ever you saw fit.
When the people that knew their stuff saw Haliburton, they saw the elite advanced stats, high feel and IQ, plus a great 3PT shooter and passer. When I saw Haliburton it was the weird jumpshot, average handle and below average ability to get to the rim that concerned me. My thinking at the time was in his best outcome, Haliburton would be a player similar to Lonzo Ball. Elite role player, good 3PT shooter and passer, great IQ but those flaws would hinder him from becoming anything above that and boy was I wrong: I knew I underrated him from just watching him his rookie year.
Some key attributes I missed on that led him to being better than I anticipated was his shot versatility and him being a 41% 3PT shooter off the bat in his rookie year. I thought he would at least need some type of adjustment with his slow load up type and having somewhat of a set shot but nope. And he was also able to get those threes off in a variety of ways that clearly showed he could handle more of an offensive load than I projected. Another key trait of Haliburton’s that I slept on was his ability to be a true point guard. While I thought he was a PG before, I projected him to be more of an off-ball PG where he would be best with a jumbo creator. Tyrese instantly showed he can handle the ball effectively and had a great deal of passing versatility that let him be more of a real creator than I anticipated.
By missing on Haliburton: I learned to trust funky jumpshots if the touch was clearly there and if they got their shots off in a variety of ways; I learned to ease up on the comps because they can limit your view of the prospect and lead you thinking one way when you should’ve been thinking the other way; and also just to trust the feel and IQ every time. This last part helped me in the next draft class to believe in Josh Giddey and Franz Wagner, when you combine superb mental reading/understanding of the game with great skill, you get special players, simply put.
Emiliano
Robert Woodard II.
Even though I hung out in Draft Twitter circles since 2018, the 2020 Draft was probably the first one I followed very closely.
In that class, there was a guy I had relatively high on my board (early 20s) compared to the main stream and I was pretty convinced he would have become a decent NBA player. That player was Robert Woodard II.
Standing at 6’7, with a 7’1.5 wingspan, a bulky frame and a shiny 42.9% from three he was a catchy prospect for a relatively inexperienced viewer that was trying to build and affirm his own thinking. In hindsight, that really was a youthful mistake. Woodard had interesting skills and traits but he was more of a solid 2nd round bet than a sure first rounder.
I didn’t see (or I pretended I didn’t see?) some red flags and the overall process was chaotic. I learned some meaningful lesson from that misevaluation:
Archetype isn’t everything
At the time I let the “3&D wing” label single-handedly convince me that he was “NBA ready” and deserved greater attentions.
Archetypes are easy to identify but actual skills and their level are what matters.
Don’t rely on small samples
The 42.9% from three was a really appealing component of Woodard’s profile. However, he attempted only 70 threes in his sophomore season at Mississippi State. This sample wasn’t reliable, nor was it even indicative.
Indeed, he never really find his shot at the next level: he made just the 30.4% of his threes in G League through 3 seasons (116/381, considering Regular Season and Showcase)
Scoring talent matters
In hindsight, it’s hard to find good NBA 3&Ds that were strictly low usage 3&Ds at the college level. Generally it seems easier for players with a decent offensive talent to scale down to reduced roles where they can excel. Woodard had some indicators of a certain lack of scoring talent, but his low usage (18.2%), poor free throw shooting (61.7% college career) and obvious lack of shooting volume were red flags I missed.
@BeyondTheRK
Mo Bamba.
What ultimately separated the two unicorns of the 2018 NBA Draft were the little things that are hard to catch without watching the film. One player showed ball skills, control, instincts, traits that could realistically develop a talented prospect into a primary versatile scorer and defensive anchor rather than merely a secondary rim-rolling pick-and-pop play-finisher.
The first player flashed nearly every fundamental skill in the book: ambidextrous baby hook soft touch finishing at the rim; ISO dribble moves on the perimeter; pristine post-up footwork; deep shooting range with a unique shot release that made pull-up threes an option for a fringe seven-footer; the awareness to rotate, switch, and protect the rim on a whim. Maybe most importantly, he looked like he gave a sh*t hustling out there on both ends.
The second player impressed with improbable shooting touch for his size, rebounding well and swatting endless shots in help defense, before decompressing when it came to effort plays like setting screens, hard rim-rolls, or simply sprinting down the floor.
For these two prospects, the measurables and defensive stats left evaluators seeing similarly positive signs on paper pointing to similar signs of success:
Heights of 6’11” and 7’
Wingspans of 7’5” and 7’9”
Neither big man prospect was a strong post-up defender against bigger opposition on the block., yet Jaren Jackson Jr. and Mo Bamba finished 1st and 2nd in BLK%, DBPM, and overall BPM, while helping their collegiate teams rank Top-15 in defensive rating.
Jaren: 14.2 BLK% | 5.9 Stocks | .414 3PAr | 39.6 3pt% — 64.7 TS% — 79.7 FT%
Bamba: 13.0 BLK% | 5.2 Stocks | .189 3PAr | 27.5 3pt% — 59.3 TS% — 68.1 FT%
Mo Bamba ranked 7th in PIPM (+7.24) among all college players measured in 2017-18 and 2018-19, rating just behind Mikal Bridges (5th, +7.57) and Jaren Jackson Jr. (6th, +7.54), via Jacob Goldstein’s Player Impact Plus Minus metric.
Jaren’s main statistical profile advantages were shown in efficiency.
On top of averaging more STL+BLK (5.9) than every top big prospect in his 2018 NBA Draft class (Bamba, Carter, Ayton, Bagley), JJJ scored as efficiently across the board (65% TS%), shooting as well or better on three-point volume (.414 3PAr) and efficiency from beyond the arc (39.6% 3P%) and at the pinstripe. (79.7% FT%)
A historically impressive shot-blocker was also the best 3PT and FT shooter in his class, revealing clean postup footwork, soft finishing touch, developable ball-skills, and effective awareness to know where to be to do the little things asked of a big. While feel for the game can’t be measured, it felt like JJJ’’s feel was off the charts.
My Final 2018 Orlando Magic centric Big Board (drafting with that team in mind)
- Luka Doncic
- Jaren Jackson Jr.
- DeAndre Ayton
- Mo Bamba
- Shai Gilgeous-Alexander
- Mikal Bridges
- Trae Young
- Wendell Carter Jr.
- Michael Porter Jr.
Ranking Jaren 2nd overall in a tier with Luka atop my big board feels like my best draft hit ever, yet one of my worst draft misses comes soon after with Bamba at 4th and Ayton at 3rd over a star-studded lottery.
While Ayton’s offensive game creates midrange mismatches and his defensive rotational effort improves when motivated, letting consensus bias win out in my thought process over the more tantalizing high-potential two-way wing and perimeter playmakers is another misevalutation here by me: A month or so before the draft, I rankted Mikal Bridges 4th, Michael Porter Jr. 5th, Mo Bamba 6th, and Shai Gilgeous-Alexander 8th.
By the time draft night rolled around, I talked myself into Bamba’s best case 3&D anchor upside over tall dynamic two-way wings Bridges’s and Porter’s instinctual versatile big wing defense, tough shot making, and outside shooting, also leaving all-star scoring creator guards Shai and Trae behind Mo as well. My Final Magic Big Board bumped Bamba up to 4th (bad) and Shai up to 5th (good), moving down Bridges to 6th (bad) and Porter to 9th (bad, partly due to back concerns).
In defense of Bamba, this Orlando Magic team was never invested in him as a starter, removing majority of opportunity for playing with starting-caliber playmakers; Mo did not log one minute on the floor with the young core of Fultz, Gordon, and Isaac. Touches were sparse as long as the offense ran through the high-usage post-up hub in Nikola Vucevic; on the other hand, any playing time Mo received tended to go to other bigs who brought more energy running the floor like Khem Birch and Mo Wagner.
I have had more glaring draft misses, as I too am waiting on the Sharife Cooper league takeover tour. I was unimpressed by the safe choice of Cole Anthony over prospects I viewed with higher ceilings, tweeted loudly about Maxey, Bane, and Poku next to Fultz and Isaac on draft night.
Drafting the wrong prospect at the top of any draft could set a team back for years; doing so in a class as historically talented as 2018 could be extremely detrimental. While 2018 remains my favorite draft class to have scouted to this day, this slight, late-process change of opinion moving a prospect up the board too late in the game based on “what-if” potential could have major consequences to a team-building process. Orlando seemingly could have moved out of their 6th pick draft slot in 2018, but rumors say they were just as excited as I was about the possibility of selecting Bamba in hopes of him reaching his ceiling as “Gobert with a three point shot”.
Mo Bamba leaves Orlando ranked 1st All-Time in BLK% (6.8%); 6th All-Time in Blocks (364); 13th All-Time in Rebounds (1,556); 37th All-Time in Points (2,037). A seven-foot play-finishing plus-rebounding help-side shot-blocking three point floor-stretcher should have a long career if offered a defined role in this league, in theory. Can Mo Bamba find a playmaker to fully unlock his game, the Chris Paul to his Deandre Jordan? The James Harden to his Ryan Anderson/Serge Ibaka?
Bamba’s Career-High 32 PTS arrived in Philadelphia against his current team, the 76ers, after dropping 5 3PM & 3 BLK in the second quarter. Could Mo still fill a shot-swatting pick-and-pop role similar to Myles Turner in the right situation?
Evidence exists for Mo to succeed in a baseline 3&D role; it’s the little things in and out of his control like effort, consistency, fit, team investment and opportunity that must align. Not living up to some hypothetical potential ceiling doesn’t mean a prospect can’t succeed as the player they end up being as long as they compete, develop, and learn winning habits to carve out a lengthy career. While Bamba’s path to “Gobert with a three point shot” grows narrower by the day, there’s hope he can stick around this league for awhile longer with the right role.
Until then, kids, please stand for the national anthem.
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