The Road to Nowhere

NBA Articles
November 16, 2023
chicago-bulls-road-to-nowhere

On a recent episode of ESPN’s The Hoop Collective podcast, host Brian Windhorst quipped that “the Chicago Bulls are in a rebuild and they don’t even know it.” This sentiment is one I shared following the conclusion of the Bulls’ 2022-23 season.

However, the truth of the matter goes much further and is far more damning: the Bulls never left their rebuild in the first place. In fact, it may be giving the Bulls too much credit to definitively say that they have actively been rebuilding since trading Jimmy Butler in June 2017.

While every path is a little different, there’s certain principles that guide every successful rebuild. Unsurprisingly, these principles also apply as the foundation to most successful basketball franchises. I’ve chosen four of those principles to focus on:

  • Acquiring high value assets to maximize the chances of obtaining and/or retaining star-quality players
  • Investing in talent evaluation and player development
  • Creating the right environment for players to succeed
  • Patience and consistency

Examining the Bulls’ decisions and whether they have followed these principles is highly instructive in explaining why, after nearly 7 years, they find themselves in perhaps an even worse position than when they started their rebuild. This synopsis and analysis is meant to serve as a guide for rebuilding, a cautionary tale to other NBA teams and, hopefully, a wake-up call to a storied franchise whose glory days are but a distant memory to even the oldest of its fans.

Acquire Assets

The most crucial principle for any successful team is to acquire and retain the best players. Very few teams have won a championship without a top-10 or even top-5 player in the league. There are three ways to obtain superstar players: draft them yourself, trade for one, or sign one in free agency.

The free agency path has almost completely disappeared in the last decade, as superstars rarely ever make it to free agency because the cost to the team is much too large to let them walk for nothing. The alternatives both require the accumulation of assets. To maximize a team’s chances to draft a superstar, they need to acquire as many draft picks as possible to improve their chances of finding one. To trade for a superstar, quality young players and a bevy of picks are required. Some common ways to improve a team’s asset base:

  • Maintain cap space and trade exceptions in order to take on bloated contracts or problem players with draft picks attached
  • Trade veteran talent to teams in need
  • Trade back in the draft to acquire additional picks or players
  • Lose a lot of basketball games to raise the value of the team’s own picks
  • Sign players to deals that are easy to move or can be aggregated
  • Develop the team’s own players to raise trade value
  • Improve the team’s record to attract superstar talent

The “Process” Philadelphia 76ers and the Oklahoma City Thunder are prime examples of maximizing the acquisition of assets. As of today, the Thunder have 15 1st round picks and 22 2nd round picks available to them in the next 7 years. The vast majority of their talent acquisition has been through the draft, and they have given themselves multiple bites at the apple every single year since they started their rebuild.

In less than 3 seasons, the Thunder developed a young superstar talent in Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, promising talent around him, clean books, and dozens more chances to acquire complementary help. Sam Presti has developed a systematic approach to sustainable asset acquisition and he’s stuck to it.

The Thunder have had misses in their draft record, but the importance of each pick is mitigated by the number they have acquired. They have diversified their asset base so that no single bad choice will sink them. They have never overpaid for a free agent during this time, were never tempted by an agitated star looking for a new team, and never prioritized instant financial gains over their vision for the future. As a result, the Thunder only had two sub-40 win seasons during the entirety of their rebuilding process.

The Chicago Bulls’ track record of asset acquisition over the 5-year period in which they had held the league’s worst overall record is stark in comparison. Their total asset acquisition during that period: one 1st round pick. They never took on any contracts for picks, never traded back in the draft, or never developed their own players enough to get assets back in a trade.

The Jimmy Butler trade did not net the Bulls a single 1st round pick – the Bulls moved their own 16th pick to move up to 7th and select Lauri Markkanen, in addition to acquiring Kris Dunn and an injured Zach LaVine. After drafting Markkanen, the Bulls kicked off their rebuild by selling their 2nd round pick to the Golden State Warriors for $3.5 million in order to build “equity” with the Reinsdorfs.

The Bulls acquired their first and only asset of the 5-year stretch when they traded Mirotic to the New Orleans Pelicans for a late 1st round pick.

The Bulls drafted the following players during the last 7 cycles:

The Bulls drafted 10 players over 7 years. Considering each team gets two draft picks a year, the Bulls were 4 short of their own allotted picks. These players have one All-Star appearance between them, and it didn’t occur until Markkanen got to the Utah Jazz in his 3rd stop. None of the remaining picks project to be All-Stars.

In the last 2 years of their 7-year stretch, the Bulls sent out three 1st round picks while acquiring one from the Portland TrailBlazers that will likely never convey. Two of those 1st round picks have already been conveyed in the lottery to the Orlando Magic, and the San Antonio Spurs have the Bulls’ top-10 protected pick for the 2025 draft. The Bulls also have traded several 2nd round picks, lost another one in a tampering fine, and do not own any 2nd round picks until 2028.

The Bulls’ continual failure to value asset acquisition has been the single largest contributing factor to their unsuccessful rebuild. During the years they intentionally built bad teams, they never picked higher than 7th. And because the Bulls did not acquire more darts to throw, each pick had outsized importance to the team’s success. Bulls fans have agonized over Lauri, Wendell, Coby, and Patrick’s every developmental setback and shortcoming because too much was laid to rest on their shoulders. The lack of quantity of draft assets made every draft pick’s job that much harder. Lauri and Wendell have both been on record about how their Bulls tenure was one of mental hardship, failure, and frustration, and given the current state of the team, it’s undoubtedly been Patrick’s experience as well. The fanbase has called for all four of these lottery picks to be traded at different points during their rookie contracts. And while none of these players should be free from fair criticism, the organization bears significant responsibility for it through failure to maximize their assets.

Invest in Evaluation and Development

It’s not enough for an NBA team to just acquire assets; the team needs to make each pick count. Investing in talent evaluation is a crucial way to improve a team, because the NBA is a zero-sum game: if one team doesn’t find the diamonds in the rough, the competition will. NBA teams are constantly on the lookout for the next big thing and employ scouts to scour the world at large as well as every high school gym to get the edge on their competition. By and large, they do a decent job: over the last 30 years, the higher the pick, the better the chance of becoming All-Star players.

Higher selections also have an element of self-fulfilling prophecy: teams are likely to invest more time, energy, and money into the 1st pick of the draft versus the 60th, and that investment tends to improve the odds that the player will reach their potential.

That investment in the development of players goes hand in hand with selecting the right players in the first place. If evaluators are doing their jobs right, the team is bringing in players that have NBA-level talent that can be honed through technique and repetition into consistent production. Once that player arrives, the honing begins. Player development staff should know how a player can contribute now, what he needs to improve upon, and should have developed a plan for doing so that is in concert with the coach’s on-court strategies and executives’ vision for the team. In addition, the existence of a viable G-League team is extremely useful for providing on-court opportunities and targeted development for young players. To properly develop multiple players over years of a rebuild, a team of development staff is required.

The Chicago Bulls founded their G-League affiliate team in 2016, becoming the 20th NBA team to do so. On the staffing front, however, until the 2020-21 season, the Bulls employed only one (1) person responsible for player development. Until this season, the Bulls did not employ a shooting coach (the Bulls ranked 29th and 30th in 3-point rate the last two seasons, per Cleaning The Glass). Most team observers were not even aware that an analytics department existed within the Bulls until 2020, which demonstrates its lack of importance to the franchise. The Bulls even skipped out on a scouting event in 2018 attended by every other team because they didn’t want to pay the entry fee. It is inexcusable that one of the richest franchises in the world decided to penny pinch instead of fully investing in their players’ success and development during a rebuild.

Creating The Right Environment

Also crucial to the success of player development is creating an environment that is conducive to each player’s growth. This includes important aspects such as:

  • Hiring the right coaching staff
  • Creating opportunities for in-game reps
  • Signing veteran mentors
  • Assembling a complementary roster of players
  • Developing strategies and lineups that build on a player’s strengths and maximize their production
  • Allowing for playing through mistakes
  • Fostering the right habits
  • Ensuring good nutrition and exercise
  • Building camaraderie

For all but the most talented and driven NBA athletes, fit and opportunity dictate much of a player’s career trajectory. Understanding a player’s talents and properly utilizing them is essential to helping him find minutes on the court and making those minutes productive. Some teams have a strong track record of unearthing talent and then maximizing that player’s production on the court. One that immediately comes to mind is the Miami Heat, who has consistently found and developed great players relative to their draft position. Their strong organizational cohesion, great coaching, infectious culture, and high expectations of performance have consistently produced higher than average results.

Taking a look at the Chicago Bulls’ environment during the last 7 years, however, instability has been the most prominent feature. Starting with coaching, the Bulls fired Tom Thibodeau in 2014-15 and hired Hoiberg as the new coach, citing his ability to communicate with players and bring the offense into line with modern NBA standards. This proved to be a difficult transition that ultimately led to Jimmy Butler’s exit. Hoiberg only got one season to oversee the rebuild before being replaced for “lack of spirit” by Jim Boylen, who was, admittedly, full of spirit.

Unfortunately, Boylen proved to be very unpopular in the locker room, including an almost-mutiny within one week of assuming head coaching duties. During his tenure, Boylen discouraged players from taking mid-range shots, made wholesale substitutions for perceived failures, forced his team to use a punch clock, threw his players under the bus in the media, and consistently failed to take accountability for his coaching.

It’s hard to overstate how devastating Boylen’s tenure was on player development. Here are just a few examples:

  • Wendell Carter, a young versatile big who could shoot, pass, defend, screen, and rebound all fairly well as a rookie, was used exclusively as a screener and rim finisher during Boylen’s tenure, being told not to take 3s and not included as a hub passer. Carter’s confidence as a player consistently got worse over time, and his mental struggles were widely documented by the media until being traded in 2021.
  • Lauri Markkanen, a sweet-shooting 7-foot forward, saw his usage and role fluctuate wildly from his time under Hoiberg to under Boylen, being used mostly as a spot-up shooter by the latter. Lauri saw his efficiency dip both years he was under Boylen, only resurging after Billy Donovan was hired in 2020-21. Markkanen too was traded at the end of that season.
  • Coby White only had one year under Boylen, but he was specifically told not to take any mid-range shots, despite that being an important part of his game.
  • Even veteran Thaddeus Young was relegated to a corner 3-point shooting role; Young felt strongly that the way Boylen used him did not lend itself to his strengths, and even caused Young to consider retirement because basketball had lost its joy for him. He had a huge resurgence in production after Billy Donovan replaced Boylen.

The difference in quality between Boylen and Donovan was stark; Donovan put Coby, Lauri, and Wendell in positions that fit their basketball skills and complemented the team structure, challenged them privately but supported them publicly, and provided detailed analysis on his coaching philosophies. Rookie Patrick Williams was allowed to start and learn on the fly, playing through mistakes and taking on tough defensive assignments all year.

The only fly in the ointment was that the new duo of Karnisovas and Eversley came in with promises to bring a championship to Chicago and, after a few short months of actual development for the Bulls’ young core of players, unilaterally and prematurely decided that the rebuild was over.

As a result of that decision, Carter and Markkanen were traded, veteran contributors brought in, and White and Williams were relegated to support roles. Both immediately had expectations placed upon them to take big leaps in development, despite the heavily reduced roles available to them. Despite better coaching and teammates, both saw their ability to play through mistakes and to their strengths immediately diminished and their featured development sidelined in exchange for more immediate wins.

Williams’ tenure has been especially tenuous. The big wing who likes to protect the rim, play on-ball, and get to his mid-range pull-up found that there were too many on-ball mouths to feed between LaVine, DeRozan, and Vucevic, and that his preferred area of the floor was already crowded. His new role: shoot open 3s and defend the perimeter. To his credit, he improved in both areas significantly in his 3rd year after missing most of his 2nd with injury, doubling his 3-pt volume while knocking down 41%, and becoming an extremely effective isolation defender. 

The 4th pick has had a very atypical situation for a player picked so highly in the draft, however. Rather than being featured in the offense and allowed to play through his mistakes, Williams is expected to be a role player and to simply take advantage of the opportunities he can. And because the franchise’s decisions have effectively capped the team’s ultimate aptitude otherwise, Williams reaching his full potential immediately has become all the more imperative.

With the franchise unwilling to sacrifice current wins to focus on Williams’ and White’s development, the young players find themselves in a situation where their improvement is impatiently expected and actively stifled. Each criticism, even when fair game, has been heightened and made all the more dire because of the situation the Bulls have placed themselves in, and the ones paying the price are consistently the players.

Patience and Consistency

Developing a clear vision for the franchise, implementing those objectives, and being fully committed to them are hallmarks of successful rebuilds. Executives sweat over which players to draft, which star players might become available on the market, when to cash in their chips, and when to fold. Strong basketball executives understand that their guiding principles, along with good timing and a bit of luck, are crucial to executing their visions effectively.

Sam Presti and Darryl Morey immediately come to mind as executives that have put their stamp on organizations as shrewd negotiators and clear communicators. Although it’s fun to poke fun, Morey’s comfortability with being uncomfortable gives him a tactical advantage in negotiations, and Presti’s consistency and commitment to his goals have put the Thunder in great position moving forward. Of course, executives across the league enjoy different levels of time, finances, market, and ownership involvement, but those who have a proven track record of building competitive squads share the foregoing hallmarks.

The Chicago Bulls operate a little bit differently. John Paxson started as a Bulls’ front office executive in 2003, finally relinquishing his duties in 2020 (only to stay on as a senior advisor). Gar Forman started as a scout in 1998 and held the general manager title from 2009 to his firing in 2020. That’s a long time in executive years compared to most franchises, and “GarPax” enjoyed seeming full support from ownership throughout their full tenure. Their jobs were so safe, in fact, that Paxson had to proactively ask for a change to the front office to be made. Yes, that’s right: Paxson ultimately fired himself.

As only the third person to hold the title since 1985, Executive VP of Basketball Operations Arturas Karnisovas had long latitude from ownership to run basketball operations as he saw fit. Both ownership and Karnisovas have said as much throughout his tenure. Given the consistently cold seats both GarPax and “AKME” sat in, they had more opportunity than most to fully execute their visions for the franchise. However, both of their tenures have been marked by inconsistency and impatience.

After moving on from Derrick Rose and Joakim Noah in the off-season prior to the 2016-17, GarPax vowed to get “younger and more athletic” in order to put complementary pieces next to Butler and provide 2nd-year coach Fred Hoiberg with a roster more suited to his coaching preference. Neither happened. Instead of putting shooting and defense around Butler, the Bulls’ brass were distracted by the chance to put butts in seats and instead signed Rajon Rondo and Dwyane Wade. This deviation from their own stated goals armed Hoiberg’s squad with maybe the worst spacing in the entire league that year. That season’s failure ultimately led to the Butler trade and decision to rebuild in the first place.

As previously stated, once the Bulls decided to rebuild, they failed to fully commit to it. They didn’t acquire draft picks, sold another off, did not hire development staff, hired arguably the worst coach of the decade, etc. The Bulls were indeed bad over a 5-year period, but their suffering went mostly in vain as a result because all of the principles that go in to successful rebuilding were notably absent.

To their credit, when AKME replaced GarPax, they started implementing many of those principles. However, Karnisovas vowed not to skip any steps in the process of building a championship team. Instead, the Bulls started skipping steps almost immediately. After just 4 months of actually focusing on player development for the first time in 5 years, the Bulls decided they’d had enough.

Over the next few months, they shipped out young players Wendell Carter, Lauri Markkanen, Daniel Gafford, Chandler Hutchison, 3 lightly protected 1st round picks, and multiple 2nds to bring in a win-now squad that peaked as a 46-win, 1st round playoff exit. AKME promised in consecutive off-seasons to bring in shooting and rim protection and change the shot profile of the team. Neither happened.

The results of the Bulls’ lack of patience and their inconsistency between what they said they would do and what they did has gone exactly how you’d expect. They topped out as a sad 1st-round exit in their best season, watched Carter and Markkanen ultimately find success elsewhere, failed to develop their young players, and gave up valuable picks to the Orlando Magic and San Antonio Spurs.

Both GarPax and AKME failed to fully commit to their stated goals. For GarPax, they failed to take the necessary steps to acquire assets, invest in player development, and put their players in position to succeed. In AKME’s case, they went all-in too early without having even the hint of a franchise player on their roster, sacrificing promising young players and draft picks in order to raise their floor, but installing a hard ceiling on the team’s future outlook.

The Road to Nowhere

The Bulls show no signs that they have learned from their mistakes. With three specialist, ill-fitting stars on the roster, they’ve depended too heavily on finding the perfect 2-way role players in order to have any chance of success. With Lonzo Ball and Alex Caruso in tow, they found lightning in a bottle for a few months, a fact AKME desperately cite as justification for continuing with this charade.

However, the Bulls are building backwards. Teams are supposed to find 2-way stars as their franchise pieces and then build around them with complementary role players. The Bulls have done the opposite, and it continues to blow up in their face.

Even now, the Bulls continue to double down on their flawed process. Longstanding rumors of the Bulls looking to trade Zach LaVine finally came to a head this week, with LaVine’s camp also reportedly now open to a trade. But the Bulls reportedly have no plans to take their medicine by beginning a proper rebuild. Not even close. The Bulls instead want to extend DeMar DeRozan, stick with Vucevic through his new 3-year deal, and from what I’m hearing, they intend to use any return in a LaVine trade to bolster their current roster and “remain competitive,” if they even trade LaVine at all.

Karnisovas stated in his initial press conference: “This is my dream. Our ultimate goal is clearly to bring an NBA championship to the city of Chicago. … A firm foundation is absolutely vital. I will build that here in Chicago. No skipping steps. There is a systematic approach to success.” If that is truly the goal, then it is impossible to reconcile that goal with AKME’s current actions and future plans.

The Bulls do not even have a top-30 player on their roster, let alone a superstar. They do not have the assets to acquire one. And they have no developing players who project to get there. AKME boldly repeated the same mistake, with the same reasoning, that GarPax made when they assembled the “3 Alphas,” only this time with “3 Betas” (h/t Zach Lowe) and a lot less draft capital.

The Chicago Bulls are further from a championship now than when they started the rebuild in June 2017, and every day they delay the inevitable only makes the path back to relevance that much more difficult. If building a championship team in Chicago has any hope of becoming a reality, the Bulls need to embrace the principles that provide the foundation for sustainable, winning franchises. Until they do, there’s no reason to expect different results.

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