A tight game in the third quarter, this Western Conference Finals rematch is hotly contested. Luka, who was demoralizingly great against the Wolves in the playoffs last season, is currently working off the ball to get open. 

Tough situation here as a referee.

Luka and Jaden McDaniels are grabbing and pushing and grappling each other with both arms. Who is fouling who in this moment? No whistle on the play, play on.

Due to his devastating nature, Luka has the Wolves desperate to keep him away from the ball and force preferably anyone else to try and make a play. McDaniels is on the top-side of Luka, hoping to deter him from the ball.

Lively is the trigger man here…

…and his ability to make quality reads from the center position adds dimension to the Mavericks offense. In the rare instance Luka doesn’t have the ball, like in this instance, Lively can set Luka up with a handoff and subsequent screen, but Lively can also counter coverage like this by finding Luka on a basket cut. 

He can also do neither if neither are open, to stay as close to error-free as possible. Dallas overall was top 5 in taking care of the ball last season (12.5 turnovers a game), and their entire center rotation of Lively, Gafford and Powell all carried an AST/TO above 1 (1.2, 1.55 and a whopping 2.63 respectively – Powell landing top 5 in the league amongst centers). When Luka is on your team, no need to try to do too much. Hand the ball off, and roll hard. If it’s not a dunk, give the ball back to Luka and Kyrie. Rinse, repeat.

Lively’s ratio was more reflective of his actual decision-making aptitude, as his playoff AST/TO maintained at 1.29 while Gafford’s fell off to 0.79. Some at the time were clamoring for more Lively playoff minutes so the Mavericks could benefit from his passing chops. Here, Lively has the chance to ignite a play.

Another piece of credit on this setup should be given to the Dallas coaching staff and scheme; Lively operating from the top of the key brings Rudy, the Wolves primary rim protector, right up to the 3-point line and far, far away from the rim. 

At this point, Luka has had enough of McDaniels, and will not spend any more energy breaking through this coverage to get to the ball. Instead, Luka plants his right foot down…

…to head to the rim. McDaniels, as long and fast as he is, cannot fully cover both denying him a path to the ball and a path to the basket. But that is the concession of the coverage. 

Lively will need to recognize this slight lean towards the basket in a timely manner (right at this moment) so that the pass can begin to be delivered into space while that space exists. The paint is open at this very moment, but NBA time and space can close quickly.

Gobert’s arms are active here applying ball pressure on Lively…

…because the passing angle for a leading pass into the paint is a prominent and threatening possibility. If Gobert’s peripheral vision is able to capture the Luka lean, he can preemptively have his hands ready to shoot up and deflection a potential entry pass down the middle.

Naji Marshall screening for Kyrie occupies the attention of half of the Wolves’ off-ball defenders.

Donte DiVincenzo cannot be concerned with anyone else’s assignment; his hands are full guarding Kyrie. Naz Reid sits back on the Marshall screen, at the ready to pick up Kyrie if he breaks loose to the basket. 

Meanwhile, the most important defender on the play at this moment is Ant. 

The low-man here, Anthony Edwards appears keyed in on Luka and Lively’s intent. It will be his responsibility to help on Luka, break up the potential pass, or even better, pick it off. 

If the ball is successfully entered to Luka on this cut, Luka will be ahead of McDaniels and the Mavericks will have a momentary 2-on-1 numbers advantage…

…with McDaniels trailing, leaving Dinwiddie unguarded in the corner if Ant slides over. Perhaps if the defensive cohesion is good enough, McDaniels can hand Luka duty off to Ant, and McDaniels can peel off to pick up Dinwiddie. But that is a tough task to pull off fluidly, and it might take a defensive beat or two to get out there otherwise. 

The Mavericks should be slightly favored to score in this moment, granted the pass is executed to access the 2-on-1 advantage. It should be simple math, but in an athletically dynamic arena like NBA basketball, the decisions have to be made instantaneously while windows of opportunity are open, and it may require an intense series of quick decisions. Otherwise windows will close because defensive length and athleticism will close the space, and the offense will again have to spend effort to create. 

In a process of defensive elimination, Luka delivered a dazzling behind-the-back pass. Knowing that Ant had committed with his jump (good verticality by Ant) and feeling that McDaniels was still within arms length, Luka could infer the corner pocket was open. He either had peripheral vision of Dinwiddie in the corner while he was cutting, and/or Dallas will generally have those corners filled. Credit McDaniels with his effort to still make a considerable closeout and contest, but Luka had drawn him all the way to the restricted area, making the closeout just about as long as it could be. 

October 30th, San Antonio at Oklahoma City 

It’s hard not to highlight frames with Chris Paul at the helm. I’ll try not to include him in every edition, it’s just outstanding how he continuously makes the most of the studio space.

Wemby isn’t in the picture, but he’s on the floor. Just a couple seconds prior, he was setting a really high ball screen…65 feet from the basket. The Thunder’s full court pressure can be unrelenting with its personnel and defensive talent. They had just deployed a casual amount of it after a made basket, not allowing Paul to walk it up the floor at his own tempo and coordinate the Spurs’ attack to close the quarter heading into halftime. 

Chris Paul opted to use the screen and speed up into the half-court, getting ahead of his defender Cason Wallace, who has switched onto the absent Wembyana. Jalen Williams has picked up Paul.

A moment prior, Paul was met with some legal opposition from Williams. Jalen had stayed physically disciplined and within his body, not extending any hands out onto CP (who is liable to automatically draw that contact at a moment’s notice). And in anticipation, Jalen had moved to slide his feet in front of Paul’s direction of choice (right), and his physicality was entirely passive contact, absorbing and resisting the strength of the drive to chip off a lot of CP’s downhill momentum as Paul rammed into his chest. Slowed down by the bump and now with the hang dribble, Chris Paul is considering his current array of choices. 

Eight seconds into the possession, OKC’s stout point-of-attack defense has induced Chris Paul to change speeds twice already (the backcourt screen usage ramp up and the bump to slow down), one of which was more elective and the other being more of a hearty, physical welcome upon dribbling inside the 3-point line. 

OKC’s team defense is also looking tight at the moment as well, with all other defenders unassociated with the point-of-attack switch positioned fairly.

Since Chris Paul has not yet entered the paint and his momentum has been severely halted, the Thunder can stay home on their assignments. Jalen has it well-handled at this moment. The stagnancy of Harrison Barnes in the nearside corner and Keldon Johnson on the opposite side…

…does not do Chris Paul any favors here. 

However, the ever-cutting Sochan volunteers. 

Sochan is aware of his value-add as a cutting finisher (and certainly less so as a spacer for Paul’s drive), and here he catches onto the pace that Chris Paul was coming down the floor with. He is trying to at least give Paul the option of a potential wizardly pass somewhere through Jalen Williams and Caruso and Shai. 

Caruso is in a great gap position, further discouraging Paul’s path forward, on top of staying in the middle of an imaginary string between Paul and Sochan, impeding possible passes. 

Caruso had caught onto Sochan’s off-ball change of pace, and is keeping himself in the same depth to the rim as Sochan’s cut, which he knows is a prominent part of Sochan’s half-court game. 

The conceivable deliveries to Sochan are unclear at the moment, and passes to Barnes or Keldon leave the defense mostly indifferent, with Shai and Dort very capable of closing down the space on their respective closeouts here, especially since their off-ball defensive positioning has yet to be strained or even budged on the possession. Wemby is still making his way down the floor. 

In addition to being one of the best passers of all time, Chris Paul is in my opinion one of the most underrated scorers in league history. With the body control of an abrupt stop and gather, Chris Paul gained slight separation from the lightly back-pedaling Jalen Williams, which granted himself another moment to collect. And in the beat between those moments, he found himself at the right elbow, one of his favorite spots, with space to rise up quick. 

The post NBA Freeze Frame: Volume 2 appeared first on Swish Theory.

If your answer is “Nothing, Charlie. What the hell are you talking about?” congratulations—you know as much as I did when I wrote this. Nothobranchius furzeri, known as the turquoise killifish (fire name alert), is a small fish native only to Zimbabwe and Mozambique. It’s known for two distinct reasons.

One, this killifish has the shortest lifecycle of any vertebrate kept in captivity and is a major source of studies regarding lifecycles amongst vertebrates. Thank you, Wikipedia. Two, nothobranchius furzeri reaches maturity faster than any known vertebrate on Earth. It takes each one only 14 days from hatching to become a fully mature killifish. I think you can see where this is going.

Bilal Coulibaly is on a growth trajectory that would make the turquoise killifish raise its eyebrows, if it had any. A veritable ball of French clay as a draft prospect, Coulibaly has (in my mind) solidified himself as the premier prospect in the Washington Wizards system and should compete for the Most Improved Player award. That is nothing short of an astounding leap from his rookie year. He’s gone from a questionable offensive talent with lots of defensive potential to a legitimate All-Defense candidate in the near future with a budding offensive game, nearly doubling his scoring output from his rookie year with a massive jump in efficiency.

How did he do it? This is the part where we find out.

Defensive Overview

If you try sifting through defensive stats to find the goods on Bilal, it’s tough sledding. This Wizards team is 30th in defensive rating after a second-to-last finish this past year and it shows on the tape. Shockingly, 3 rookies and Jordan Poole starting is a bad defensive equation. And when you’re watching a car careen off the side of the road, you’re probably not noticing the nice rims it has. The level to which Coulibaly is overtasked defensively is hard to overstate.

Yet the 20-year-old has shown a lot, and it’s starting to become evident statistically. He’s one of the premier shot-blocking forwards in the league already and continues to grow as a defensive event-creator. The rebounding numbers should be a lot better (more on that later) but second-year players rarely make this kind of impact so early. Let’s dig into how he does it.

On-Ball Defense

One thing I have appreciated about Washington’s development plan is the willingness to throw Coulibaly to the wolves defensively. His rookie year, the coaching staff asked him to take on all kinds of #1 options. That is no different this year as the 20-year-old continues to deal with the best of the best on a nightly basis.

Steph Curry. Jayson Tatum. Jaylen Brown. Trae Young. Donovan Mitchell. In only 10 games he’s been thrown at MVPs and All-NBA talents of varying heights and styles, and acquitted himself well.

If you come at him on an island or in the post, it’s likely to be a problem for you.

Screen navigation has been an issue at some times, something I will be keeping an eye on for future check-ins on Bilal. Even if it’s not perfect, his physical tools and commitment to stick to the play have produced some wonderful recoveries and rear-view contests.

Switching and communication are another thing I’ll be monitoring closely. It’s no surprise that the worst defense in the league struggles to communicate on the whole. Still, Bilal will have to be better given the kind of defensive personnel coach Brian Keefe has at his disposal.

Rookie year Bilal showed defensive promise, and sophomore Bilal is delivering on the promise. The blend of defensive technique and awareness flashes brightly considering his age, and the physical tools speak for themselves. 6’8″ tall and with a 7’3″ wingspan, there is no limit to how high he can climb as a perimeter defender.

Off-Ball/Rotational Defense

With his primary responsibilities coming against the top options, Coulibaly’s responsibilities off the ball start with ball denial. Keep the danger man away from the danger areas. By and large he’s solid at it, and has outright been ludicrous at ball denial in flashes:

There are plenty of lapses and moments of unawareness, however. I want to see those tighten up as the season progresses.

It sounds harsh to expect the 20-year-old to be on the balls of his feet and aware for every second of every game, but Bilal has changed the equation of his expectations in my eyes. I see a great defender blooming so I expect to see greatness. Some of that has certainly showed when given a chance to protect the rim:

If he’s showing these kinds of technical skills, staying vertical and letting his size do the talking, that is promising for his future as a help defender. That fake charge into the block on a veteran wing? Now we’re really cooking.

Gap Filling

Beyond some rotation responsibilities and the ball denial, Coulibaly isn’t relied on as a rebounder in these Washington lineups. Their size dictates that responsibility as well. As you can see with Coulibaly’s top ten lineups this season, he’s more likely to be found playing the 2 guard than the 4:

Still, for a wing, his rebounding numbers could look better considering his prolific wingspan and leaping ability. Even with his on-ball tasks I think Coulibaly could contribute more on the glass. The Wizards are 29th in rebounding rate despite the presence of known board inhaler Jonas Valanciunas, and somebody else has got to help.

These areas to clean up are important but do not come close to overshadowing the on-ball prowess Coulibaly has put on display. The rotational defense flashes put him even further in the green as a defensive presence. This kind of showing from a 20-year-old has me thinking about future All-Defensive teams to come and I can’t wait to see more.

Offense Overview

Okay, so Charlie is writing about another young and exciting defensive wing, right? Surely this offense is going to be a “work in progress.”

Yes, and no. A lot of wings I have written about – Dyson Daniels, Aaron Nesmith, Peyton Watson – had only begun to lay foundations offensively. One, maybe two reliable skills, and lots of question marks. I would have said the same of Bilal last year; foundations were being laid.

Now he’s truly building. I found myself shocked at the array of skills the Frenchman is showing so far this year, and it’s not just showing on the tape. From 8.4 PPG on 50/35/70 splits, he’s leapt to 15.3 PPG on 65/38/77 splits in this young season. There has been a jump in assists too despite a meager usage spike (13.7% to 16.3%). So how has this increase in production happened?

The simple and true answer is Bilal has just improved at everything.

On-Ball Creation

Much like his defensive development, Washington seems comfortable with letting Bilal get uncomfortable. He’s given free reign by Brian Keefe to create on the ball; his self-creation possessions have jumped from 18% of his offense last year to 35% this year. And somehow he’s increased the efficiency, going from 31% on PNR/handoff/isolation shots to 51% to start this year. The usage shift is deliberate and should continue, but can Coulibaly maintain this efficiency?

The isolation drives have been excellent. He can beat bigger players with speed, use his floater and midrange over guards, and the finishing and footwork have popped.

There are iffy moments, to be sure. He struggles with decision-making out of structure and how to manipulate help when it’s sent. This much help on his drives is new to Bilal and adjustment will include some rough patches.

There are reasons why Bilal’s rim finishing has seen drastic increases, and the willingness to drive on anyone is a huge factor. So far, Coulibaly is 28/31 at the rim this season, up from a 62% mark last year. The drives within the structure of pick-and-roll and handoffs have played a role as well.

Not only is Coulibaly able to beat people with straight-line speed and strength, but he’s also starting to show off a nice set of mixed-speed moves. His touch on floaters opens up plenty of tough looks and it’s hard not to foul someone that big who can throw the right fake or slow down when you least expect it.

His short midrange finishing (between 4 and 14 feet) has doubled from 25% to 50% this season. The overall bump in midrange confidence and efficiency is a very welcome sign for someone trying to open up his downhill looks.

I’ve also enjoyed some of the reads he can make on these handoff and ball screen looks. There’s reason to think the uptick in his assist percentage is a development of skill rather than luck.

He can break the defense down at the rim, get into his floater, and make enough of the right passes to keep defenses on their toes. Another way he does this is with the pull-up midrange counters.

There have been some bad drives as well. Can’t throw a guy in the fire and be surprised when he gets hot sometimes.

Based on the jump in his feel over the past year, I expect him to smooth out the decision-making errors in time. Especially given how everything has developed so rapidly for Coulibaly despite only minor changes in team personnel and competitive circumstances.

I’m stoked to see what he can produce over the rest of the season as he grows accustomed to the two rookies, Kyshawn George and Alexandre Sarr, plus a new roll and cut big in JV. And it’s not the only area of offense where he’s grown.

Off-Ball Usage

As a stationary shooter when off the ball, Coulibaly has one main job: fire when open. He shows little hesitancy to take the right looks, especially when stationed in the corners, where he’s shot well over 40% for his career.

The above-the-break looks have been iffy, coming in at 26% and 29% over the last two years, respectively. It can look fluid at times but you can tell he doesn’t quite trust it yet based on the release speed.

That difference in release speed makes it easier to close out and discourage, even earning him blocks on what should be open looks.

I do enjoy the promise Bilal shows when attacking closeouts. The combination of the floater and finishing skill at the rim make him deadly once he’s past the defender against a rotating defense. If the shot is confident and accurate enough, he will be able to create more opportunities like these with consistency:

His status off the ball last year produced some good cuts off the ball, and that hasn’t changed this season. He’s got the awareness to pick his spots and the explosive finishing to capitalize on those chances.

Brian Keefe has even thrown in some experimentation with Coulibaly as a handoff hub, screener, and designed off-ball looks. Though limited in volume, the results look fun so far and I hope for more to come.

And hey, when you’re as tall and long as Bilal, you will find yourself gobbling up offensive rebounds with good positioning and effort.

It’s exciting to see Coulibaly threaten the defense more without the ball in his hands. An uptick in shooting numbers can open up more opportunities and more designed sets. Based on what I’ve seen with his development, I wouldn’t be shocked to see him dabbling in some movement three looks before the year is up. He’s smashing expectations faster than we can set them, so why not?

Transition Offense

As an excellent run-and-jump athlete, it’s no surprise that Coulibaly thrives in transition. His defensive role guarding perimeter players leaves him tons of chances for leakouts and rim runs, with the odd grab-and-go mixed in just through sheer speed with the ball. A healthy mix of hard fouls and exciting finishes generates him plenty of points in the open floor.

Filling those lanes also gives him plenty of chances to clean up for others on the break. Plenty of opportunities have been there; Washington may have a middle-of-the-pack transition frequency as a team, but their 49.6% field goal percentage in the open floor is one of the worst marks in the league.

Though the decision making in transition could improve a bit, Bilal has flashed some fun passes in transition with the kind of ball placement that gets you excited.

The opportunities in the open floor will always be there for Bilal, and the finishing/athleticism combo already creates a high transition floor. Once the decision-making is ironed out, he could be a top-tier weapon in the open floor. He just needs a defense and a set of playmakers capable of maximizing his tools.

Wrap-Up

If you’re going to break a rule you set for yourself, I suppose it’s best to break it quickly. Get the self-criticism out of the way.

In my last Finding a Role article about Tre Mann, I said I’d avoid career projections for players and let the skills, growth, and stats speak for themselves in a way. But I simply cannot help myself when it comes to projecting Bilal Coulibaly’s future.

He made me take a hard look at the prospects of the last three drafts looking to prove their worth on a second contract and think about how I would rank them. Over those three classes, I’d firmly place Coulibaly in 5th. There’s a top tier of proven franchise player talents (Wemby, Chet, Paolo) and right behind them are the proven talents with tons of upside to tap into. Jalen Williams is at the top of that group in my mind, with Coulibaly trailing, shortly followed by Keegan Murray.

That got take-y. But to try to place the potential outcomes for a player, looking closely at comparable prospects is important. And when looking at the under-the-radar star bets in this league, Bilal is at the top for me. He has so much more to show in the coming months as his development continues on the upward trajectory. It takes a real diehard fan (or a weirdo like myself) to endure the masochism that is watching all Wizards games, but Bilal will make them worth watching for years to come.

The post Bilal Coulibaly: A Star is Born appeared first on Swish Theory.

Watson showed himself to be a potent defensive weapon, on and off the ball, and the toolsy 21-year-old proved himself worthy of the defending champs as they sought to replace a departing Bruce Brown. Offensive struggles were there to be sure, to put it mildly; Watson’s -3.4 offensive estimated plus-minus was the worst mark in the league. A year later, Kentavious Caldwell-Pope is gone, and Aaron Gordon is sidelined for at least a month with a calf injury. More than ever the Nuggets need Watson to step into his own.

The move into the starting lineup will be an inflection point for how Denver views Watson’s long-term potential. The thrifty Nuggets front office will look closely at how he responds before an extension-eligible offseason. Is Watson proving himself as a potential starting-type piece, or just another defensive wing struggling to find an offensive niche?

We will focus heavily on the offensive skills here to see how Watson can justify his spot on the floor and prove himself as a capable cog in the machine.

Defense Check-In

Guess what – it’s still great!

At the end of the day, this is a development-based series, so I place very little value in “guy who kicks ass at X skill still kicks ass”. If things had changed, I would indicate otherwise, but Watson is again showing why he is one of the most exciting defensive wings in the league.

The underlying stats are very good. Watson’s 2.4% block rate, a 98th percentile mark amongst forwards, is somehow a career-low for the third-year UCLA alum. The steal rate has increased to an 83rd percentile mark as Watson continues to grow as an event creator. Film backs up what has been an impressive season in rotation, making impact plays all over the floor.

I’ll have my eye on some underlying numbers concerning his off-ball defense; the foul rate is once again troublesome and he’s failing to make a consistent impact as a rebounder. But that’s for another time – we are here to focus on Watson trying to find himself offensively.

Offense Check-In

Cutting

The change over to the starting lineup has placed even more emphasis on this facet of Watson’s offensive game. If you play off Nikola Jokic and you can’t shoot (3/16 from deep this year), you’d better be moving around. Peyton has done a pretty solid job at finding open space and can take advantage of being ignored by the defense.

Consistently finding the right space is already an issue, however. I expect this to improve during his stint as a starter while playing with better spacing and off Nikola but it’s iffy at times. What’s more concerning are the bad finishes at the rim once he finds the space.

Watson is finishing only 43% of his looks at the rim this year, a brutal mark especially when factoring in his size and athleticism. He needs to work on staying within himself as a finisher by not trying to do too much. A little slow-down now and then to draw some fouls would be a boost as well.

An interesting wrinkle to his offensive game has developed over the past few games, one that could help alleviate some of his rim-finishing concerns.

Screening

In 80 games last year, Watson acted as a screen-and-roll option on 15 total possessions. Now through 8 games, he’s been the screener on 5 possessions. For #onpace math-doers, that would put him well on pace to triple that number from the previous season.

There’s been some experimentation with Watson as a guard screener for Russell Westbrook and Jamal Murray early in the season.

What interests me more is the 5-4 screening actions with Jokic. Nikola’s two-man game with Aaron Gordon is a crucial part of the offense, and coach Michael Malone is trying to incorporate those elements in Gordon’s absence with Watson as a substitute.

By no means will Watson screen actions become a focal point of the offense anytime soon, but anything and everything should be tried to overcome his woeful half-court offense.

At least there is one area of the offense he can make a real difference in.

Transition

Watson still looks quite good as a transition weapon, and his bounce has led to most transition defenders hacking him hard to prevent finishes – provided they can catch him.

What concerns me about Watson’s development as a transition weapon is his failure to make the right passing reads. Forcing teams to foul is great, but too often he flies into a crowd while missing easy passes.

He’s made some decent reads out there to be sure, and looks pretty good when keeping his head up to find his passing lanes.

The open floor may be the best way for Watson to contribute to this offense in the short term while finding ways to be useful in the halfcourt. But like his halfcourt game, the lack of overall feel shows.

Here’s hoping Watson can use this time in the starting lineup to further develop his offensive game and find ways he can help his teammates by cutting, screening, rebounding, and filling every gap he can. He shows so much promise on the defensive end of the floor, and much like the Nuggets, I am hoping he can show enough offensively over the next month to warrant his place as a rotation fixture.

The post Finding a Role Check-In #1: Peyton Watson appeared first on Swish Theory.

In the bigger sense of the word, transition applies to the whole organization. It’s the first year without Klay and year two of a new GM. It’s the decision period for the rookies on the 2022 title team. New role-player acquisitions have marked a system-wide transition back to defense and shooting endless threes. But the basketball word transition applies in equal measure.

Last year’s Warriors hated that word. You could argue they were the worst transition team in the league—they were in the bottom three in transition frequency and efficiency. Fast-forward to this year and the Warriors have flipped that on its head. It’s small sample size theater here (it’s that time of year), but Golden State generates 23% of its offensive looks from transition, up from 15% last year. That frequency is a top-three mark in this young season while posting a 57th-percentile efficiency.

A few things drive this – the increase in defensive efficiency and turnover creation chief amongst them, along with the new personnel leaning more towards athleticism from the wing and big spots. Yet one man finds himself at the center of this transformation, and his name is Chavano Rainer Hield, better known as Buddy Love.

Running and Gunning

For some statistical context on Hield’s transition importance, Golden State has 132 total transition chances through their first 5 games. Hield leads the team with 23 of those chances, with Jonathan Kuminga close behind at 20 and Steph pacing the team in opportunities per game (16 in 3 games). What stands alongside the usage is efficiency as the other two biggest contributors are struggling, to be generous. Steph and Kuminga are both 5/18 shooting in transition, numbers that will even out eventually.

Hield will regress to the mean eventually, but a 15/22 mark with a scorching 86.4% eFG certainly catches the eye. Shockingly, the NBA’s leader in threes made over the past 5 years (take a shot for every time you hear Fitz say that on broadcast) is killing teams with his perimeter runs in transition.

He’s not new to this. The 31 year old veteran knows his spots, and you can see him in the first clip call out the lanes to open the corner for his shots. With Golden State’s collection of heady veterans and athletic wings/guards who can push the rim in transition, these looks will be open all year long.

I was impressed that Hield’s transition scoring wasn’t limited to hitting threes. He’s damn good at recognizing leakout chances and capable of creative finishes on the break.

Hield’s 1.7 points per possession in transition is 96th percentile amongst all players. That’s right, stand and applaud the small sample size theater.

So, he’s a great play-finisher in transition. What else can he do?

Chance Creation

The defensive infrastructure of Golden State comes into play now. There is no permutation of Warriors lineups you can create where Buddy is anything other than the worst defender on the floor. Staying in front of guys is not his thing. Looking at the rest of the team, that’s not the end of the world. They have more than enough guys to clean up his messes, and this enables Buddy in multiple ways on the defensive end of the floor to accentuate the transition game.

Again, sample size caveat, be warned. Hield’s stock creation has been on a whirlwind pace by his standards. The steal and block rates amongst wings are both 66th percentile on the nose, and the combined 2.6% rate of defensive event creation would be the highest mark of his career. The second-highest mark came last year in Indiana, in a “same same but different” scenario.

Indiana was an offense-first team with a Ponzi scheme of a defense designed to juice transition as much as possible by gambling for stocks. If we miss the chance, oh well, we will still outscore you. If the gamble works, our offensive talent will surely capitalize. Hield is allowed that same freedom to gamble in Golden State to trigger transition, only this time they have the defenders alongside him to back it up. And when it works, it REALLY works.

What’s key here is that Hield is free to take these chances and run out in transition. Hield is likely being stationed on a weak offensive point for the opponent, so if he takes off and the other team gets the ball back it’s less likely to burn them than, say, Andrew Wiggins taking off.

Hield also shows off some decent playmaking in transition. The guy loves to throw a lob and is adept at negotiating the passing lanes and tic-tac-toe game to find the best looks for his teammates.

What I’m looking for here are the sustainable things. Is Hield going to keep up his 86.4% eFG mark all year? Absolutely not. Can he keep up this gambling and chance-taking to boost transition? I think so.

The Warriors have made big changes to their philosophy based on the new personnel. This new emphasis on transition offense is here to stay, and Buddy Love will be at the center of that all year long. Keep an eye on Hield in the corner of your eye during defensive possessions. See how he picks his chances and puts himself in a position to run and gun. It’s going to be a fun year of strength in numbers and joy in buckets out in the open court.

The post Buddy Hield’s Transformative Transition Play appeared first on Swish Theory.

A picture is worth a thousand words, but I will keep it to less than that per picture.

At this point, Anthony Edwards has obliterated the point-of-attack defense for a 2-on-1 situation with Rudy Gobert vs Rui Hachimura, encroaching on the restricted area. The gather has been made, and his momentum is downhill. A moment in time for Ant to make his decision, with several options at his disposal. 

Ant has done so much good work to this point. What originated as a handoff from Gobert out of a sideline inbounds, Ant has already left his immediate defenders Austin Reaves and AD dusted.

(Also wanted to note that Ingles set an off-ball screen that put Reaves a half step or more behind the handoff to begin with, to Ingles’ credit)

But for all intents and purposes, Ant has created a full advantage, overcoming both point-of-attack defenders. Rui steps up in help, as he should.

And that leaves Gobert wide open at the rim. The Wolves are one pass away from an open rim finish, one of the best results attainable on any given possession. Rudy is even starting to point up and call for the lob.

Per NBA.com/stats, Rudy was 73/78 on alley-oop dunk attempts last season, good for a 93.6% completion percentage and 1.87 points per shot (PPS). Pretty good. However, when Rudy was forced to adjust to the pass or was unable to easily and securely dunk it, his alley-oop layup numbers fall off dramatically: 6/14 on alley-oop layup attempts (42.9%, 0.86 PPS), cutting expected points down by over a whole point. 

This could be an easy alley-oop dunk. Does Gobert’s notoriously clumsy hands influence Ant’s decision? With a moment to decide, is there trust for the passer to execute the delivery, and the receiver to cap it off?

What defenders have a path to making any sort of play on the potential lob pass? Both Reaves and Knecht are at a huge size and positioning disadvantage to cover Gobert here, and it would be uncharacteristic for either one of them, so it’s safe to count them out on this play. Otherwise the Lakers would need a spectacular recovery to the rim by AD, who does not look like he’s in any heat seeking missile-style stance to explode back into the play.

Think Giannis recovering to block Ayton’s alley-oop in the 2021 Finals. That level of play is rare. Don’t expect AD to summon that in the first game of a long season, but he is one of the handful of players in the league capable of it. 

Another passing option is the corner.

But seeking corner 3’s when you have a 2-on-1 advantage converging on the rim is not the best process. Having the vision and awareness of an open corner shooter is still ideal here, but it would really have to come down to (situation and) convincing shooting personnel – Randle is the one wide open in the corner in this instance. He shot 35.4% on catch-n-shoot 3-pointers last season – 1.06 PPS. This calculus changes when it’s Donte DiVincenco standing there – 40.7% on catch-n-shoot 3’s for 1.22 PPS, but the decision should still be the rim. 

Rui is the one meeting Ant at the rim. It might not matter who is at the rim, Ant will remain undeterred. 

Ant has already created so much expected value at this point, where his uncontainable athleticism has awarded him three great options: the lob to an open Gobert, his own finish at the rim against a rotating defender, and an open corner catch-n-shoot for Randle. 

Ant ends up loading up and rising around Rui for a finish with the foul, and-1. As a 69% finisher in the restricted area last season (1.38 PPS), it’s hard to blame Ant for taking it himself, and credit must be given for the finish. Also have to note that the extra free throw tacked on probably does not happen with the lob, and Ant carries a healthy free throw rate over from last season (0.325 FTr). But there is a higher chance of missing the field goal compared to a pin-point lob.

The decision might not matter – if the shot misses, it appears likely Rudy can mop up the mess since he is best-positioned for a roll off the rim.

Contingent on misses, this naturally dependent facet of Gobert’s game can help prop up team efficiency during poor shooting stretches. But while Gobert’s putback efficiency from last season was strong (67.5 FG% – 1.35 PPS), it is not as potent as a lob dunk.

At the same time, the potential second shot efficiency on this play should be partially credited to Ant, since the defense was beaten so badly, and they were so far out of position for a defensive rebound as well. In this specific instance with no one else around the basket to contest the board, Rudy could comfortably finish a hypothetical miss. 

Ultimately, Ant gets two points on the play, with a chance at a third (which he got). No need for Gobert’s involvement. But over the course of the season, over the course of a playoff series, or even over the course of an individual game, the accumulation of the quality of decisions add up. The margins stack up, so the process of finding the most optimal shots possession-by-possession has to be a concerted, conscientious effort, and a developed habit over time. 

Orlando is starting to pull away from the Heat in the second half. Anthony Black faces an aggressive Miami point-of-attack defense in this instance. With Paolo releasing freely on the roll, the conventional read is available.

AB’s height gives him the ability to simply dump this pass off over the top of Jimmy and Jaquez to Paolo, giving Paolo a rotating defender to attack, and a numbers-advantage on the weakside to potentially make a pass and keep the defense in rotation. 

Bam is the backline defender responsible here for rotating to Paolo. 

Coming over from guarding Wendell Carter Jr., Bam is just beginning to lean towards Paolo for a routine rotation to the short-roller. 

However, AB zigs here where most would zag. Sensing the momentum of Bam – slight as it is towards Paolo in an entirely valid defensive decision by Bam – AB subverts this reasonable intuitive defensive expectation, and zips a pass into WCJ at the elbow.

While Paolo would have received a 2-on-1 situation with WCJ vs Bam (and possibly a 3-on-2 situation if Highsmith rotates to WCJ in a timely manner), WCJ is now the one receiving the pass and the 2-on-1 scenario vs Bam with Paolo the one cutting to the rim. What’s the difference? 

Per NBA.com/stats, Paolo’s points per shot on cuts was 1.28, while WCJ’s was 1.39, the better bet in a vacuum. Last season, Paolo led Orlando with 10.2 potential assists per game, and WCJ had 2.9, not bad for a center. Point being, no matter who here receives the advantage from Anthony Black out of the pick-n-roll, both players are capable of being the one to make the next pass, or the one to finish at the rim off a cut. It speaks to the versatility of the Magic’s frontcourt and their overall play-making ability.

If a hypothetical interior rotation by Highsmith subsequently occurred and the rim was covered, the Heat’s perimeter rotations would then be tested, as KCP in the corner would be the next conventional open read

and then Harris above-the-break following that.

Since the Heat decided to put two defenders on the ball at the point-of-attack off the jump, this is the defensive path they have chosen for themselves. After Highsmith, Herro would need to be on the way to the corner to KCP, with Jimmy or Jaquez heading to Harris. When the rotations are tight, it’s definitely doable.

But the play-making chain never got that far. It didn’t need to – the dominos quickly fell into what resulted in a jam by Paolo.

Bam was caught off-balance by this alternative chain of advantages. Disoriented for a moment and left scrambling, Adebayo could not catch up on the play, as a quick connective pass by WCJ to Paolo resulted in the secure flush (80/88 on dunks last season – 90.9%, and this one was even two-handed), only desperately contested by Bam.

AB was presented with an obvious choice for the standard play, and thus predictable links in the play-making chain, but he used a little imagination and ingenuity to mix things up. AB successfully getting off the ball vs two defenders and following the natural stem of decisions out of this situation is the perfectly right play to make. Credit to him for creating another way though, puncturing the middle of the floor with the pass and giving WCJ great access to options, where he instantly found Paolo flowing to the rim.

AB’s knowledge of defensive assumptions, his size, vision and manipulation all played a factor in what culminated in a dependable two-handed dunk for the Magic’s best scorer. Pretty good. 

Beginning of the fourth quarter and the Spurs are down by double-digits. While double-digit comebacks are becoming more frequent in today’s league, it is still a steep challenge as less than a quarter of teams successfully overcome that type of deficit. San Antonio will need to make the most out of every offensive possession down the stretch, on top of getting stops, to get back into this one. With 21 seconds on the shot clock, Chris Paul is leading the Spurs into their early offense. Expected points on any given possession fall precipitously every second that ticks off the shot clock, and Paul is looking for an early opportunity to strike. 

For the Spurs’ attack, their fifth player Keldon Johnson, who had inbounded the ball, has yet to even cross half-court, let alone enter this snapshot. Still, there is advantage to be had by getting into this drag screen action quickly; the lowest defender three seconds into this possession is Maxi Kleber on the weakside elbow,

which is not particularly low for a low-man. But that is how far back he was able to get in three seconds. Looking further into the paint as a whole, Maxi’s left foot is the only defensive establishment the Mav’s have in the paint at the moment. No other Maverick is near the paint, and all are even further from the rim. 

Chris Paul is already highly aware of the entire defense’s positioning, and the subtle offensive dynamics in motion. The Mavericks are in the middle of switching the Chris Paul-Jeremy Sochan screen.

Klay was up on the screen initially, so his switch assignment becomes more challenging here on out; he has to catch up to the cutting Sochan while simultaneously closing the pocket pass window. Meanwhile Sochan has the head start, slipping out of this screen and diving into the open waters of the current paint. 

Sochan has only just placed his left foot inside the arc,

but he’s already the most dangerous threat for a rim attempt in this moment. Jeremy has turned his hips out of the screen, and he’s now facing the rim as he makes his cut. Klay, now his primary defender, is positioned on the top-side of Sochan, trailing the cut. In a race to the rim, Sochan will beat Klay, and last season Sochan made 72.7% of his finishes stemming from cuts. Pretty good. 

All Chris Paul has to do now is deliver the ball. A temporary, momentary passing window, and perhaps a tight window for many players, but this is Chris Paul. 

Luka could probably do more here to obstruct the passing window. He knows better. 

The Spurs should already be favored to score this possession, even as soon as this moment, but the play is not over. A quick strike on a leading bounce pass by the pick-n-roll maestro to Sochan would threaten a defensive concession and test the recoverability of the Mavericks’ weakside. Kleber, who is not facing the rim like Sochan, and also does not have momentum towards the rim like Sochan, must catch up in a race to the rim for any chance to thwart the Spurs.

Incredibly, Kleber was able to close the gap and make a spectacular block at the rim. 

After receiving the pass, players in Sochan’s position should understand the speed of recovery required by Kleber here to make a play, as well as the instinctual desperation to catch up to the play, and use that momentum against the late, frenzied rim protector. A simple shot fake for Sochan would do the trick to send Kleber out of the picture and/or send himself to the free throw line. 

In the end, the Spurs were not able to string together enough buckets or stops in this one, falling to Dallas 109-120.

The post NBA Freeze Frame: Volume 1 appeared first on Swish Theory.

When Peter Gabriel left Genesis in 1975, confusion abounded. A highly successful band’s frontman striking out on his own was a common enough occurrence, but the timing was odd. Ten years later, Gabriel had four No. 1 albums and ended his career as one of British history’s most prolific and successful solo artists.

Okay, I suppose Tre Mann isn’t a 1:1 comparison. He was by no means the frontman of the Oklahoma City Thunder, nor do I project him to have the success of Peter Gabriel. I can’t even call him Phil Collins in good conscience. I guess this makes him Morrissey to the Thunder’s Smiths, but (hopefully) minus the inexplicable racism? This is going off the rails.

Anyways, leaving the Thunder shone a new light on Tre Mann’s ability. The talent was there, but opportunities faded quickly as Oklahoma City acquired more capable role players and kept piling up draft picks. The rookie emergence of Cason Wallace seemed to be the last straw. The Genesis 1975 tour appearance in Cleveland, if you will.

Now Mann finds himself in Charlotte, the polar opposite in regards to team expectations and opportunities to play. After his inclusion in the Gordon Hayward/Davis Bertans deal, Mann arrived in Charlotte to find a 10-41 team that had lost LaMelo Ball for the season. After being a DNP-CD for ~60% of his games in OKC, he was suddenly a starting point guard through the rest of the year. Opportunity presented itself, and Mann seized it.

I want to explore how Mann showed serious offensive juice over the final stretch of the year. Without further ado (read: ham-fisted Britpop references), let’s dig in. Starting with the defense; might as well rip the Band-Aid off.

On-Ball Production

Man. Look.

I had to think long and hard about how I wanted to frame this. It was a godawful team with nothing to play for. The coach was doing multiple press conferences a week that sounded like a cry for help. At times it was tempting to wave my hand and say “Hey, this is terrible, but is it Tre’s fault?”. Like most things, the answer fell somewhere in a gray area.

There are the schematic points to start. Shoutout to X’s and O’s god/unrepentant Seahawks fan Joe Hulbert for sharing his insight on Steve Clifford’s defensive principles, and a video of Clifford himself explaining these tactics. In short, Clifford wants to take away the valuable looks (threes, layups/dunks, free throws) and force players into the midrange. It involves point-of-attack defenders overplaying screen-based actions to force ballhandlers off the 3-point line and into the helpers. Here’s an easy example:

You can see the way Mann is shading Darius Garland on this drive. He’s giving him the angle for his strong hand and discouraging Garland from using a potential Jarrett Allen screen. The goal is to force Garland into an isolation possession with Miles Bridges stepping up to deter the drive and Vasilije Micic sinking to the dunker spot in Bridges’ place. Ideally, this forces two outcomes: a skip to the far corner and Isaac Okoro taking a three, or a midrange attempt.

Unfortunately, Miles Bridges is picking daisies in front of the drive (as he is wont to do) and allows an easy floater for DG. Hardline defensive principles are fine if you have execution. This team had little interest in execution. You can see a lot of possessions where Mann did his job on the intentional overplays and was let down by his helpers.

There are nits to pick with how drastic his angles are at times, often eliminating the opportunity to get himself back in the play. Regardless, his job is to buy into the scheme. When the scheme isn’t working you need to look critically at who is letting the team down. Clifford, yes. The rotational defenders, yes. Mann, not so much.

Referring back to the gray area, there were possessions where the blame almost squarely fell on Mann and not the scheme/surrounding personnel. Getting caught flat-footed, ill-timed unders on screens, failing to recognize switch opportunities, so on and so forth.

Yet there are moments of good. I was surprised to see Mann showing anticipation in blend with his athleticism and size by skinnying over screens at a decent enough pace. If encouraged to do actual screen navigation instead of comically overplaying screens to force a direction, he could do some things.

Mann has flashed some moments of quick hands to force steals. Despite an even wingspan (6’4″) relative to his height, his wide base and quickness make him a solid enough threat to pilfer a hung dribble.

Most importantly in my eyes are the possessions where he shows the right instincts and commitment to deny the easy looks. This is the NBA; most point-of-attack defenders have physical tools and look good when making the right gambles. That doesn’t impress me. Making a series of correct decisions regarding switches, sticking on drives to force tough shots, and contesting perimeter shots after denying drives stand out the most. Mann has flashed all of those things.

These flashes of effort, decision-making and consistency are especially important when you look at the other side of his defense.

Off-Ball “Defending”

There’s no scheme issues to pick on here. When it came to Mann’s on-ball defense, letdowns from his help defenders caused a lot of problems. Mann was often the one causing the problems when not directly guarding the handler.

Overhelping on the glass and allowing open threes. Uninspired and slow closeouts. Wandering off the ball when opponents are driving. Lackadaisical nail help. There’s a lot of rough stuff in here, and I left plenty on the cutting room before.

This isn’t a unique problem. White dudes in mesh trucker hats have problematic political takes, Chicago Bears quarterbacks refuse to throw for 4,000 yards, and young offense-first guards are more engaged on the ball than off it. Life is full of constants.

What frustrates me with Mann more than most is that the flashes of awareness and engagement are there. He can make structured rotations, digging off the perimeter at the right times and especially rotating over to bigs to deny post entry passes.

Even more impressive, Mann makes the unstructured reads. He’s damn good at anticipating the next pass and beating his man to the ball. Surprisingly for a young guard, the good gambles outweighed the bad.

The numbers bear out his growing defensive impact. He posts strong defensive rebounding numbers (90th percentile amongst combo guards per Cleaning the Glass), and though it belies his overcommitment to impact the glass while trading the aforementioned open second-chance threes, it’s still a positive. Mann also posted a 91st percentile steal rate while keeping the fouls to an 80th percentile mark. Catch-alls back up his growth: Mann’s defensive EPM according to dunksandthrees.com has risen from -4.0 to -3.5 to -1.4 this past season, a perfectly acceptable 53rd percentile mark.

Reading between the numbers is important here. Mann can continue to be a positive rebounder if he cleans up his decision making on when to crash and when to stick to his man. Continuing to create steals based on hustle and a healthy mix of gambling on-off the ball will be huge, and works in tandem with his transition prowess (more on that later). A high steal rate and low foul rate indicates cautious yet deadly hands, but he could be a bit more physical and toe the line of blocking fouls a bit more often.

On the whole with Mann’s defense, I am cautiously optimistic. Head coach Charles Lee has championship experience as a top assistant with the Milwaukee Bucks and Boston Celtics. Read: the man has coached Jrue Holiday a lot. He’s seen firsthand for years what makes great point-of-attack defense and impactful guard rotations. When LaMelo Ball plays, Mann gets to work on his defensive craft against bench guards instead of starters, and will see plenty of minutes alongside defensive stud Josh Green. If he can continue his personal development while the context improves from “everything is on fire” to “this feels manageable”, don’t be surprised to see him climb towards above-average defender territory.

We’ve had our appetizer. Now it’s time for the main course.

On-Ball Creation

Let’s start with the simple and move towards the complex, because there are many layers to Mann’s on-ball talent. Drives are a good place to start.

If you put a guard who is anything less than a top-tier point of attack guy on Tre, he’s going to coast right past them. His blend of balance, speed, and agility is difficult for most to deal with.

Maybe you think hey, let’s try some wings out on him. Strength and length should deter him, right? Right??

Couldn’t be more wrong! Tre has unlimited confidence in his ability to create good looks on the drive, so much so that he’ll go at the head of anyone at any time. Like this guy:

Mann finished with a solid 64% mark at the rim while showcasing some decent off-hand finishing, largely driven by his ability to get clean wins against all comers in isolation. This talent is accentuated by his set of midrange counters, which is prolific to say the least.

Simply put, a plethora of midrange counters opens up a lot of ways for Mann to create an effective shot on the drive. It gives him ways to counter if the rim is being denied by his defender or by the rotations. Selling out to stop his drives allows more space for him in the intermediate areas, which helps the rim pressure, and on and on in an endlessly frustrating cycle for defenders.

Mann isn’t limited to self-creation on his drives either. He showed a lot of promise as a drive-and-spray guy, collapsing the defense and kicking out to his shooters for open looks or closeout attack chances.

For a 23 year old, Mann is surprisingly timely at kicking behind help. Throw a tag on his roller and the ball is going behind the tagger. Show some nail help on his drives and guess what, the ball is suddenly in the shooting pocket of the help point.

When his teammates felt inclined to cut and move off of his drives, Mann was pretty adept at finding them with good lob touch and some crafty layoff passes.

It wasn’t all pretty on the drive. Mann at times is prone to wild finish attempts, especially when favoring his right hand in situations that call for a lefty finish. There were some missed opportunities for a pass that turned into bad finishes as well. Yet on the whole, his ability to create for himself and others without needing a screen is valuable.

You may be wondering at this point if Tre has any juice on the perimeter if the drives/midrange counters are cut off. Boy, does he.

His flexibility and balance stand out the most on his pull-up threes. He can bend so low on his crossovers without losing momentum and balance that it’s impossible to close the gaps he generates on step-backs.

So, we have the makings of a three-level isolation scorer here. That’s fantastic, but this is the modern NBA. What you do in screen-based actions defines your game, not 1v1 cooking. We’ll build up his PNR game in a similar fashion, working inside-out like any good offense does.

Pick-and-Roll Creation

As he does in isolation, Mann loves mashing the accelerate button on his drives, creating plenty of good rim chances.

That’s ho-hum at this point. Oh look, I can go fast. Good for you. The real question in ball screen reps is how do you manipulate defenders with that speed, more specifically changing pace on the drive. Mann showed a lot of encouraging tape in that respect.

Of course, the pull up twos were a steady presence, as they were with his isolation game.

Then we have the pull-up three point game. When facing an athletic driver like Mann, going under on the screen is often the right move. He responds by raining threes with good efficiency and deep range. Even if you go over the screen, he’s adept at finding windows to get his shot off.

In traditional pick-and-roll without a switch or Mann rejecting the screen, the playmaking popped in a lot of ways. The live dribble passing was especially impressive. Keep an eye on how Mann mixes his speeds and strategically slows down at the right times, especially when trying to let his roller find the best window for lobs and layoff passes.

Mann thrived against mixed coverages, especially as a playmaker. If they threw two at the ball, he was particularly adept at opening windows for his rollers or finding the help points and kicking to open shooters.

A key aspect of Mann’s playmaking that impresses is the blend between improvisational reads and “academy brain” type reads. A lot of passing decisions are taught in a binary manner. If they send a double, hit the roller or skip to the far corner. Mann does this often, yet sometimes he will continue the dribble to draw further help and find other reads. Often he extends to make the help withdraw then finds his roller again with nifty wrap passes. Making reads in and out of structure is the key to any high-level playmaker.

Things get a bit iffier when Mann is faced with a switch. Sometimes he would fail to take advantage of that switch by taking pull-up shots or passing out of the mismatch entirely.

But there were plenty of good attacks here. More often than not, Mann saw red on his switches and went right downhill with malice. A few of the dunk attempts looked hilarious yet spoke to his confidence in the burst and jumping explosion.

It veered into borderline concerning territory with how Mann relentlessly went for the cup when getting switches. He hardly passed out of these looks, despite the advantages that a switch creates by putting the defense in uncomfortable rotations. The switched defender is usually a key rim protecting component, making the defense susceptible to second-side drives, yet Mann often failed to take advantage. But we had some glimpses of this advantage creation.

The first read impressed me the most when noting how Mann strung his decision making together. Getting the switch on Kleber, who is acting as the small-ball 5, is the first step. He drives Kleber middle to force nail help by PJ Washington off of Miles Bridges, a strong driver. After Mann makes the pass, he spaces himself back out to the perimeter, forcing Kleber to shade towards him and away from the Bridges drive. This allows his teammate to take his time with the advantage Mann created for him and find a good shot. It seems minute, but chaining together multiple good decisions to benefit your teammate is important for a young lead guard.

Stop me if you’ve heard this before: a young guard really likes rejecting screens. Even when there’s little advantage to be created by doing so, Mann loves to reject a screen and go hero ball against his man. Yet Mann often found ways to create good shots without creating an advantage by rejecting.

To be sure, there were plays where Mann rejected, created no advantage from doing so, and compounded the mistake with bad shots. He can’t touch shot/contort his way out of everything.

To my surprise, the majority of Mann’s screen rejects were advantageous. He waited for his defender to commit to the screen then quickly broke downhill, creating paint touches and buckets for himself or his teammates. Some of these improvisational reads were exceptional.

Oddly enough, his playmaking after rejects was the polar opposite of his switch playmaking. Instead of going full bore to the rim every time, he was looking to make plays first after creating legitimate advantages. I hope to see that blend become more equitable between paint scoring and drive & kick playmaking on his switch possessions this coming year.

I’d be remiss if I finished the section on his PNR reads without the “what the hell were you thinking?” possessions. Mann was prone to over-seasoning his looks, especially when it came to behind-the-back passing attempts.

But hey. If you have unlimited confidence in yourself, some weird stuff is going to happen. I’d rather have the guy who tries audacious stuff and fails from time to time than the guy who stays in the pocket and is afraid to get a little wild.

Confidence was the name of the game with Mann’s driving game. There is a reason his rim frequency nearly doubled in his switch over to Charlotte, posting an 88th percentile rim rate amongst combo guards. Role change and confidence go hand in hand. A new team hands you the keys and says do what you do best. Mann doesn’t have to be asked twice.

Obviously, pick and roll/pop looks are the main way Mann creates his on-ball looks. But what about his handoff game?

Dribble Handoffs

Charlotte wasn’t exactly a handoff-heavy squad. Compared to their pick-and-roll frequency, second highest in the league, the Hornets only generated 4.1% of their offense from handoffs. That was good for 10th lowest in the league (all numbers per Synergy).

When they did run handoffs, it was largely pitch/delay action looks. Pitch looks are often conducive to picking a direction. The pitch allows the guard receiving the handoff to generate extra momentum before the screen, momentum best used going downhill in the reverse direction of the pitch. Mann was pretty damn good on the drive whether going right or left off these looks.

It wasn’t often when the handoff led to an outright switch, but Mann created a couple of good looks out of them.

The handoffs are a great way for a downhill-first guy like Mann to create quality looks. What interests me for this season is what the usage looks like there.

Charlotte was already a low-frequency handoff team; Charles Lee comes from a Boston system that ran the third-lowest volume of handoffs this past season. But going back further in Lee’s assistant coaching tenure to Milwaukee, he was part of teams that ran handoffs at higher rates. Those Milwaukee squads had 53rd, 43rd, 27th, 70th, and 50th percentile handoff frequency rankings over Lee’s 5 seasons by the lake. Where that usage falls this upcoming year will be of great interest to me.

Creating on the ball is of the utmost importance for a player with Mann’s skill set. Yet that LaMelo Ball fella is still in town as long as his ankles are working. How does a combo guard like Mann coexist with a heavy usage guard like Ball?

Off-Ball Creation

So much about off-ball creation is shooting, especially for guards. When the ball is in the hands of his teammates, Mann is more often than not stationed above the break evaluating his chances for a catch-and-shoot look. Opportunity calls, and Mann answers with unlimited confidence in his catch-and-shoot jumper.

Not only is he unfazed by the prospect of taking a catch-and-shoot three, he will happily extend his range well beyond the arc.

Another thing that speaks to his confidence is experimenting with no-dip jump shots. It’s not the most important or useful skill, yet any shooter willing to try it has enough belief in their touch to overcome conventional mechanics. Sure, he went 0/2 trying it, but it’s the trying that counts here.

Mann took 80% of his threes above the break and hit at a 35% clip, 44th percentile amongst combo guards. That represented a career-high above the break percentage for Tre. The corner three chances were few and far between, but a career-high 43% won’t hurt. Competent spacing off the ball is a boon to his teammates, namely the drivers and bigs, but should help him to coexist with LaMelo Ball if/when the two share the floor.

The spacing he provides opens up chances for Mann as well in the form of closeout attacks.

Tre isn’t just a shooter and driver when working off the ball. As a player with lots of off-ball experience in Oklahoma City, Mann showed a solid sense of when to cut, not only to score himself but to create for others.

It’s a little skill to watch out for, but Mann anticipates his perimeter swing passes well and delivers with some zip. If you’re going to swing to your teammates, do so before the closeouts can arrive and put it in the pocket.

Mann’s 1.14 assist/usage rate in Charlotte speaks to his skill as an off-ball playmaker. Making timely reads when the ball finds you and the defense is in rotation expands your utility without the ball in his hands. And with the aforementioned LaMelo Ball returning to the lineup, oscillating between shooting, cutting and playmaking off the ball will help keep Mann on the floor.

And hey, for a 6’4″ guard, that athleticism sure as hell makes him a threat on the offensive glass.

Your combo guard being a 48th percentile offensive rebounder isn’t going to be some massive swing for the team, but Mann’s increased projected use off the ball may lead to more production on the glass. His hustle for the boards could make him an exciting possession-extending tool in the backcourt.

Is it possible that there are other ways Mann contributes to an offense?

Transition

Yes, there are!

Mann’s speed, athleticism, playmaking sense and ballhandling skill makes him an ideal transition weapon out of the backcourt. The main way this shows itself is the sense of pushing in semi-transition against an unsettled defense.

If given a true open floor to run, the scoring potential brings a charge into the building, and specifically Eric Collins.

It’s not contained to creating chances for himself. Mann is more than willing to use his scoring threat before finding layoff passes to rim runners or trailing shooters.

My only nitpick with his transition game is a lack of recognizing chances early with quick outlet passes. Mann has great placement on his throws, and not even Tre can run faster than the ball. Rip down those rebounds and get your eyes up. Let the ball do the work sometimes, not the legs.

Looking Forward

The first dozen or so games for Charlotte should be very interesting when it comes to Mann.

Charlotte plans on Tre controlling the bench unit scoring. Mann was seated for the opening tipoff in the five preseason games, with Josh Green, Seth Curry, and Tidjane Salaun all getting starts. Green projects as the starting option (insert opening night thought). This leaves us with questions.

How many minutes will Mann play alongside LaMelo? How does he balance on/off ball usage when playing with him? On the bench lineups, will Mann be a primary point-of-attack player along with his heavy offensive usage? Does Josh Green play with him often to take some of the defensive assignments? Most importantly, will he retain his seemingly limitless confidence when coming off the bench?

Opening night began to answer some of these questions. Despite coming off the bench, Mann played most of his minutes alongside LaMelo, closing out Houston in a wild late comeback. Confidence was no issue as Mann played most of his possessions off the ball, scoring 24 on 8/16 shooting and 4/8 from deep. There were several clutch buckets down the stretch of last night’s game:

I’ll be watching for a few specific areas of improvement and potential scheme changes. How can Mann better attack switches and choose rejection opportunities? Can he keep up the high free throw rates for consistent offense? Will the same playmaking chances be there with the bench lineups?

On a scheme level, I’ll be monitoring his handoff usage and catch-and-shoot rates under new coach Charles Lee. I would assume anyone who has been in the Celtics locker room knows the benefits of getting up as many threes as you can.

Don’t expect any predictions on future stardom in these articles going forward. I’ll show you the water and lead you to it, but won’t make you drink. You, dearest reader, must decide what you think of Mann’s potential for yourself.

We’ll check back in on Mann this year as he seeks to prove his worth in Charlotte, on the floor, and (most importantly for Tre) in the cap sheet.

The post Finding a Role – Tre Mann appeared first on Swish Theory.

But it’s far from exclusively the case. In contrast, players like Steve Nash, Giannis Antetokounmpo, Kevin Durant, Russell Westbrook, Devin Booker, Jimmy Butler, Jaylen Brown, Pascal Siakam, Kobe Bryant, Draymond Green…I could go on…were all negative basketball players on an NBA court their rookie season (per DARKO).

I watched prospect tape for every name on that list, in addition to some other steep development arc players, to try to ascertain commonalities. But, importantly, the roads are complex, winding and opaque. This is not a comprehensive articulation on what makes players improve.

This is a piece on Cason Wallace. Wallace was indeed a negative basketball player as a rookie NBA player, but not dramatically so. His -0.3 rating on DARKO’s all-in-one indicator is similar to that of other developmental stories Kyle Lowry, Jalen Brunson or Shai Gilgeous-Alexander as rookies. But does he have the same kind of potential to improve?

That’s what we hope to answer. This article will go through five steep development curve characteristics I discovered during my historical improvers tape watch to see how he scores. Through that lens we can better benchmark Wallace’s room to improve, and learn about the nature of development as we go.

Trait #1: Willingness to Initiate Physicality

Cason Wallace’s physicality is inconsistent but overall a positive. On the defensive end, there is no question that Wallace is accepting of physicality. The play above is a prime example, as Wallace can eat up drives into his body with perfect positioning. This is valuable as there is little risk of Wallace bailing out of a play, in fact entrenching himself as he blocks a path.

Physicality is a sign of potential development due to basketball being a physical sport; it’s not much more complicated than that. But more specifically, physicality allows you to execute plays to their fullest extent. What good is effort if, at the critical moment, the player decides to play it safe?

That is the question we face with Cason Wallace’s offense. Wallace, despite all his strength and physicality on the defensive end, is highly prone to settling away from the rim for any semi-closed path. When he has a clear runway, Wallace can look downright imposing attacking the rim:

While Wallace’s off-the-dribble non-rim two rate (pull-up twos and floaters divided by total 2PA) is almost exactly league average, you still get the sense he is leaving money on the table given his strength and driving ability. The flashes make you wonder why his free throw rate was only 0.22 at Kentucky or a miniscule 0.08 his rookie season. The latter was within the twenty lowest free throw rates in the league, a concerning sign.

Wallace’s proclivity for floaters is a vicious cycle: due to stopping his drives short, he loses the opportunity to develop rim finishing craft; because he lacks finishing craft, he has to settle for more floaters.

Wallace gets a resounding half of a check mark for the physicality question, and there are three reasons for optimism. One is Cason’s overall sense of technique, which we’ll get to later in this piece. The second is role, as Wallace was used as a wheel greaser in a lot of ways, but rarely schemed to attack the tin aggressively. That could change as of game one this coming season, with a paint pressure gap left in Josh Giddey‘s absence. Third, which combines with the other two, is how Wallace is very good at taking what’s given to him. Perhaps with more confidence in his body (he reportedly put on 15 pounds this offseason) the offensive physicality will catch up with the defense.

Trait #2: Motor

Watching the greatest development curve players in succession alerted me to one blindingly clear fact: to improve a lot, you have to play hard. This both sounds obvious and like an old school, pre-analytics scout. But it’s a characteristic I may have been underappreciating, no less. Having a low motor does not preclude improvement, nor does having a high motor guarantee it. But to develop from a role player to a star it is basically impossible to not play a little like a maniac.

While it is not surprising that a high motor would show up on tape, the consistency was surprising. Even Devin Booker, not widely considered a high motor player, proved to be a defensive pest as a prospect. Wallace is somewhere in between the high motor players like Booker, Durant and Shai Gilgeous-Alexander and the All-Time motor players like Russell Westbrook and Kyle Lowry, and likely closer to the latter.

Motor is the cousin of physicality: it not just permits play execution, but creates plays out of thin air. Cason has no business having an effect on the play above, one of the few in the league who could get this steal. Below he shows consistency of focus (and indeed, physicality) to track the ball down and secure it.

Motor contributes to development by giving a player more bites at the apple. The higher the motor the more likely you’ll be found in transition or cutting to the basket, or relocating for a three. For a player low in usage, finding these opportunities is essential. As is having the drive to finish the play.

Even though it ends in a made basket, I love the activity from Wallace in the clip below. Motor here means boxing out, nearly stripping the ball and closing out over ~25 feet in an instant.

One more example of physicality meeting motor: the below box out on Adem Bona.

Motor equals opportunity, and Wallace makes sure he takes all he can get. Likely stuck in a low usage role given the Thunder’s higher profile options, Wallace needs to maximize his motor in the share he does get. I have little doubt he will do so.

Trait #3: Small Space Coordination

The above clip, in combination with a few others, are as compelling signs of Wallace’s star upside as you can find. At this point, it is fairly clear Wallace has defensive upside, even just tying together the points on physicality and motor above. But offense is where you can really strike gold, as the impact of the best offensive players exceeds the impact of the best defenders. The ball travels faster than you can move, and can also fly higher than you can reach (with a Wemby-sized caveat). But you need to put yourself in position to have that impact with the ball, and that’s how we arrive at small space coordination.

Basketball is a high-movement sport: according to NBA.com, the typical player ran ~150 feet per 24 seconds on offense, ~130 feet on defense this past playoffs. In fact, Wallace ran 10% faster than the average player on defense while about average speed on offense. All of this movement volume only emphasizes the importance of movement quality. Cason Wallace has plenty of the former, what about the latter?

On offense, small space coordination not only means being nimble enough to create an initial advantage, but, arguably more important, the ability to dance through traffic. We return to a similar concept as the previous sections – the ability to finish a play. Wallace is, decidedly, a question mark on this front.

There are plays like the above where Wallace is able to create a unique footwork cadence in combination with sleek ballhandling. Or even the below from his AAU days:

But those moments are far from consistent. At Kentucky he had 60 drives, comparing favorably to fellow rim-shy Kentucky Wildcat Reed Sheppard at only 49, but far below Rob Dillingham at 93. Watching the tape, Wallace is often able to get that first step with pretty good burst, but never plays around in the midrange. He is either kicking out safely after an initial probe, conceding for a pull-up/floater or, far less common, throwing his body into the rim protector. More small space coordination would mean more complex playmaking, such as biding time handling a pick and roll, dribbling to the soft zones of the defense to draw help, or foul-grifting by dragging your man along with you.

Wallace may have access to moments of small space coordination, but the lack of applied coordination means less practice hitting those spots. Reps are essential to getting one’s footing, literally. Will the Thunder allow him to initiate these dances? Time will tell.

Trait #4: On-Ball Experimentation

These concepts continue to go hand-in-hand, as small space coordination would dramatically expand one’s on-ball opportunities. Wallace’s shy nature in attacking once again holds him back, but not without flashes here as well.

Wallace’s primary way of experimenting is with his pull-up, but even here there is little by way of complexity. Rather, where the flashes are most promising are with his passing.

Beautiful, effective, and more proof that Wallace has access to small space coordination. Wallace uses the screen and then eats up the middle space between his man and the big. He does this with a left hand in-and-out into an accelerated cross to then reset backwards and sling a one-handed pass to the corner. The play is only possible through Wallace’s unusual movement pattern over the two second period.

The value of on-ball experimentation is clear: trying more things allows you to do more things. We’re returning to the importance of creating one’s own opportunity. Experimentation is not Wallace’s favorite way of going about things. His whole thing is reliability, with an assist-to-turnover ratio of 2.0 with Kentucky and 2.6 with Oklahoma City, which shows up in a heavy preference for making the simple read. Most of the time he’s on the court with the Thunder, Wallace is doing mundane tasks.

But Wallace is still capable of deception here and there. In particular, he is able to manipulate by passing against momentum, drawing in help with his eyes and accelerating into gaps.

This is not the most interesting way to experiment with the ball, but it still may be effective. The important thing is that Wallace has options. If the runners and pull-ups drop at a more efficient clip (as I expect…Wallace’s touch is very good), Wallace will have larger margins in which to operate, and maybe the pull to experiment becomes stronger. But right now, partly by scheme but partly by preference, Wallace conducts himself like he wants to remain a role player. An elevated one at that, as Wallace comes off as a perfectionist, but perhaps not significantly adding to the star equity like our huge development leap stories.

Trait #5: Technique

We saved the best for last. Technique is only this low on the list due to how long it took to click for me that’s what I was seeing. In particular, watching the tape of Steve Nash made me keen to this issue. Could it be? Have I really been underrating the most basic, fundamental aspects of basketball? I think so.

The tape of freshman Steve Nash shows crumbs if not large bites of all the elements listed above, but most of all it shows technique.

If you’re sorting through highlights or exclusively watching Synergy clips, you might miss it. Nash’s triple threat is as sound as any I’ve seen, ripping through menacingly while constantly changing his elbow posture to keep dribble, pass and shoot all as options at once. He sets shoulder-wide screens and can take the contact (physicality). He runs routes with intention. When he makes his move, it is decisive and with little wasted motion.

Here is where Cason shines.

As you can see from the above clips, there are a few areas where Wallace shines from a technique standpoint. First, his spot up technique is very strong. While he prefers to one-two into looks off the catch he is also able to load quickly from a stationary position. Wallace was in the 90th percentile as a spot up shooter as a rookie, shooting a blistering 43% on catch and shoot threes. But he’s capable of attacking closeouts relying on technique, too. His pumps are exaggerated in a good way, and he takes a long initial stride, swinging the ball in front of him.

Wallace’s technique is also strong from a physicality point of view. He sets sharp screens, extremely valuable in the OKC offense as he often began a possession with a screen for SGA near the logo.

The technique jumps off the screen on defense. Wallace is particularly adept at mirroring ballhandlers, enabled by a discipline to rely on footwork to block off any path in an instant.

Watch Cason Wallace and you’re watching someone who pays attention to the little things in the lab. He concerns himself with the details many young players gloss over, which speaks volumes to his ability to improve.

Technique is, perhaps most of any of these traits, an indication of latent value. A technically sound player is able to apply that technique to any basketball action, assuming tied to a minimum level of athleticism. Technique is the bedrock of basketball success, and Wallace will only further refine his methods with time.

Conclusion

Cason Wallace is a boring watch for a potential star, but only if you don’t know where to look. Even where he does not completely check the box for a developmental trait, there are flashes. The key will be where Wallace’s on-ball usage settles, where he needs reps the most to realize the most upside. Perhaps there is a plan there involving bench units.

Wallace will undeniably become a star defender. In defensive DARKO Plus-Minus, he is ahead of the curve compared to Jrue, White, Smart and Caruso.

Grading out excellently in advanced metrics as a rookie is a great reason to believe in this story, but it is also embedded in the details. Wallace employs technique with physicality to dodge through screens (already an area where we’ve seen improvement) or to cover the right zone in a scramble.

The offense is the question mark. Wallace is likely a slightly negative to neutral offensive player in 2024-25, but the degree of involvement will tell us a lot. Wallace’s strength is again technique, which enables him to play on or off ball, as a screener or screen-recipient. Should he use the technique to buffer his small space coordination, problem-solving in a different way, Wallace’s offensive upside could be quite high.

I wrote this about Cason Wallace ahead of the 2023 draft:

“…you can become a star through the lack of mistakes as well. Cason has that path. It’s not common to reach it through simply doing every little thing on the court you’ve asked well without a truly dominant area, but maybe that’s exactly where Cason Wallace’s dominance lies.“

One year later, I only believe this more to be the case.

The post Cason Wallace’s Star Potential appeared first on Swish Theory.

The story of how the Hartenstein deal came about is just as sweet. Right before free agency opened up at 6 PM Eastern on June 30th, Presti and members of the Thunder organization made their way to Eugene, Oregon, to meet with Hartenstein in his hometown. Immediately, this is reminiscent of when they did the same for Mike Muscala in 2019, flying to his hometown in Minnesota to pitch why he should sign with them (that too ended in a success).

The meeting lasted just over 2 hours before they boarded their plane and flew back to Oklahoma City, around 40 minutes later than it was reportedly initially scheduled to depart, which one can only romanticize to be because of how well the meeting went. Sometime after landing, Presti and Hartenstein’s agents Aaron Mintz and Andrew Morrison began finalizing the details overnight until reaching an agreement the next morning. Shams Charania was the first to break the news of his decision at 9:58 AM Eastern on July 1st.

Hartenstein is the most non-traditional yet traditional ‘Thunder player’ Presti has brought in thus far. While he lacks the prerequisite shooting and silky ball-handling abilities they often covet, he brings the positional size, touch, processing ability, and defensive playmaking they always look for in their players. He brings a brand new element of rebounding the Thunder lacked last season, too, but the key here is how he does it without entirely compromising the identity they’ve been building since 2020.

But how exactly does he fit into Oklahoma City’s scheme on both ends of the floor? Does he start next to Chet Holmgren or come off the bench? Just how impactful can he be? With those and other questions in mind, I try my best to predict what he’ll look like in a Thunder jersey during the course of the 2024-25 season.

Additive Skills

Before breaking down how he may fit into the Thunder’s scheme, let us look into the additive skills he brings to OKC — the skills he unequivocally brings to the table that they didn’t have much of last year that will add new wrinkles to their offense.

A DHO Superhub — An Intersection of Screening and Court Mapping

Screening

Screening is one of the biggest things the Thunder lacked last season.

The team’s lone rotation bigs were Chet Holmgren, 7-foot-1 but only 207 lbs, and Jaylin Williams, 240 lbs but 6-foot-9, neither of whom had outstanding technique that made them effective screeners. This played a role in their offense bogging down against Dallas in the second round (118.3 offensive rating in the regular season -> 111.8 offensive rating versus Dallas). No screen created much separation for OKC’s ballhandlers, Shai Gilgeous-Alexander and Jalen Williams, and Dallas simply switched everything to keep the ball in front of them. This stagnated their offense and led to a lot of iso-ball (8.2% isolation frequency in the regular season -> 13.1% versus Dallas).

Shai remained unfazed as he’s one of the greatest iso scorers this game has ever seen. But Jalen Williams (a.k.a. ‘JDub’) really struggled to create in isolation on volume and that led to a drop-off in his scoring rate (22.0 PTS/75 -> 16.6 PTS/75) and efficiency (62.1% TS -> 50.8% TS).

Enter Isaiah Hartenstein.

A bruising 7-foot, 250 lbs big with excellent screening technique, Hartenstein had to fight for each minute on an NBA floor early on in his career by doing the dirty work like setting hard screens to free up teammates. Now, he’s proven to be one best screeners the league has to offer: he was first in the playoffs in screen assists per 36 minutes (6.1).

His feel for screening and rescreening is potent and creates tons of separation for the ballhandler, either creating space to pullup or a runway to get downhill. Here he creates a wide open pullup three for Deuce McBride just from his feel and ability to screen and rescreen:

His feel and timing when flipping the angle of the screen is unreal. Jalen Brunson acts as if he’s accepting the screen to set up a crossover, and as he’s crossing over to reject the screen, Hartenstein recognizes this and flips the angle of the screen to seal off Batum completely.

Not just being a big body who can set hard screens but also having the ability to flip screening angles, rescreen, and seal defenders as needed is a huge differentiator between Hartenstein and other screeners around the league, and it’s hard to overstate how much this will make life easier for Shai and JDub. Shai shot 50.8% on midrange jumpers and JDub shot 51.3%, which ranked 5th and 4th respectively among the top 20 in midrange shooting volume. Being this efficient on such a difficult shot diet of self-created, contested shots is remarkable and Hartenstein levels the playing field for them.

Take a look at how freely Brunson steps into an open midrange pullup in the first clip, similar to Shai doing the same in a March game versus Phoenix thanks to a Bismack Biyombo screen in the second:

I’d bet on Hartenstein’s screening leading to an increase in Shai and JDub’s pullup three-point shooting volume next season too:

Court Mapping

Anyone who’s watched New York Knicks games or is generally present on NBA Twitter probably knows about Hartenstein’s passing. Whether it’s passing on the short-roll, as a post hub, or in dribble handoffs (DHOs), he’s one of the best bigs in the league at recognizing the opening in defenses and passing it to an open man.

But DHOs are relatively simple. Of course, you have to be able to process actions and being a nice passer is a plus. But most athletic rim-running bigs with above-average processing abilities are able to be used in DHO actions at volume (see DeAndre Jordan with the Clippers, Clint Capela with the Hawks right now). So what makes Hartenstein’s DHO ability so special for it to be deserving of its own section?

His court mapping.

Hartenstein’s court mapping manifests in two main ways on the court. One is his constant will to find advantageous space in the paint. He’s always moving around to find open space — either to receive a dumpoff or just to clear space for a driving ballhandler — and never lets the defense rest. See below, as he moves around in the paint and finds an opening to receive a dumpoff before finishing with his world-class 61% floater.

His ability to find open space for dumpoffs and punish his defender as an interior scorer serves as a release valve when defenses load up on drives. And this tendency to constantly move around and find open space is a clear manifestation of his court mapping abilities.

The other manifestation is in the way he executes DHOs.

Hartenstein isn’t just your standard top-of-the key DHO big who runs a standstill handoff and rolls to the rim. He can connect an offense to a secondary play after an initial drive or action fails with his DHO ability. This is made possible by his court mapping and knowing where his teammates are and will be at any given moment.

The clip below is a great example. Hartenstein relocates to an advantageous spot near the perimeter to receive a kickout pass. But the pass to him isn’t for him to catch and score. Instead, the pass to him serves as a connection for Donte DiVincenzo to then run a handoff with him, where Hartenstein’s screening can then create an open three for DiVincenzo.

Everything that makes Hartenstein’s DHO ability so special is on display there — his court mapping to position himself in the best place to catch and run a DHO immediately, and since a DHO is essentially a moving version of a PnR, his 7’0/250 lbs frame serves as screen that makes it difficult for Kyle Lowry to navigate around and get a good contest.

This is how Hartenstein’s screening coincides with his court mapping to make him a DHO superhub.

And this DHO ability serves as another release valve alongside his interior scoring. If an initial drive fails and Hartenstein is nearby, just pitch it to him and he’ll initiate a DHO. Alongside his court mapping and screening, he covers so much ground which makes it easy for him to transition a failed initial drive/action into a secondary DHO. This ground coverage is yet another trait that makes his DHO ability so valuable in unison with his other traits.

The ability to be a release valve around the paint with his interior scoring and connective DHO ability is something that’ll bring a lot of value to the Thunder. OKC’s drive-and-kick offense was somewhat predictable, which allowed Dallas to know when and where to send help on drives, and where and how to recover to the perimeter on the kickout. As @polarfall pointed out on Twitter, this disrupted the rhythms of OKC’s players attacking off the catch which further stagnated their offense.

While Hartenstein doesn’t fully solve this issue (volume shooting and shooting over contests is still a concern for the team as a whole) he does help fix it. Being a simple release valve in the paint with his combination of movement and floater excellence adds another wrinkle to their driving game that makes their offense harder to guard. Being able to transition the offense into secondary plays after the initial drive fails also inherently rectifies some of the stagnation issues as it adds movement to their offense. This movement brings chaos, chaos brings unpredictability, and unpredictably is what the Thunder lacked versus Dallas.

Hartenstein thrives under movement and unpredictability as that’s where his quick processing and passing abilities as a big man shine. Knicks players were constantly moving and cutting, since if you just move enough around Hartenstein, he’ll find you. Players in OKC’s offense moved and cut a lot last season too, but they were mostly systematic cuts. Hartenstein should encourage more free-flowing, read-and-react movement that would add more unpredictability to their offense.

His passing will also generally bloom so many more diverse options for the Thunder next season. So often did OKC fail to make cross-court skip passes to break down Dallas’ defense. Either because their ballhandlers couldn’t make that pass or wouldn’t because by the time a loopy, cross-court pass reached the player in the weakside corner, the Mavericks’ athletic and rangy wings (Derrick Jones Jr., PJ Washington) would’ve recovered by then.

The Knicks had a somewhat similar problem in the playoffs versus the Pacers but not exactly. Indiana ICE’d the ballscreen, forcing Brunson towards the sideline, and then trapped the ballscreen, forcing him to pass over the trap. Brunson being 6-foot-2 with a 6-foot-4 wingspan and having to pass over a trap involving a 6-foot-11 Myles Turner with a 7-foot-4 wingspan is a tough task. So the Knicks’ solution was one Isaiah Hartenstein.

Brunson would hold his dribble long enough to pull Turner far away from the perimeter. He would then sling a pass to the strongside corner while Hartenstein flashed middle. The pass would then find Hartenstein, who could make a play from the middle of the floor with a 4-on-3 advantage.

What made that play happen is the Knicks players’ quick passes and decision making, from McBride’s connective pass to Hartenstein to his pass to DiVincenzo. Not every player can sling cross-court skip passes as effortlessly as Luka can, but there are always other ways to exploit aggressive defensive coverages. The Thunder too excel in connective passing all throughout the roster, but lack the range in passing versatility to make such skip passes.

This isn’t a direct copy-and-paste solution for OKC’s issue with making those skip passes. Rather, the point here is that Hartenstein’s quick processing and passing abilities as a big present unique problem-solving solutions in any situation if a coach is willing to get creative. And Presti mentioned that Coach Mark Daigneault is always willing to try things out in his press conference for the Hartenstein signing.

In that conference, he also said Hartenstein takes them from an unorthodox offense to a versatile offense. And that’s exactly what he does. Whether it’s with his deadly interior movement and scoring, his screening in PnR, his screening in unison with his court mapping in DHOs, his quick processing as a passer, or all the ways these different skills coincide to make him a release valve, Hartenstein makes the Thunder’s offense more diverse and more versatile. And versatility reigns supreme in today’s NBA.

Scheme Fit

Now that I’ve laid out Hartenstein’s unique and additive skillset, it’s time to look into how fits within OKC’s scheme. The Thunder ran a 5-out alignment last year and finished 1st in 3PT% during the regular season. While Hartenstein has been a non-shooter thus far in his NBA career, his presence doesn’t require a major shift in the Thunder’s 5-out scheme. Rather, minor tweaks.

“Delay” Series

NBA teams have long run 5-out offense with a non-shooting big on the floor, namely the Golden State Warriors. Whether it was with Andrew Bogut in the early years of the dynasty or with Draymond Green in the later years as his shooting declined, the Warriors consistently ran 5-out alignment while playing a non-shooting big. This was achieved by placing the big at the top of the key, where the big could then run spread pick-and-rolls and DHO actions with a ballhandler and roll to the rim in what was essentially 5-out spacing.

One series the Warriors ran a lot and have continued to run ever since Steve Kerr took over in 2014-15 is “Delay” also known as “Open.” Popularized by Mike D’Antoni in his time with the New York Knicks, Delay is a variation of 5-out and involves a big positioned at the top of the key. It’s initiated with a pass to the big at the top of the key and actions then run between the other 4 players off the ball. Many and multiple actions can be run at the same time out of Delay.

Pindowns are often used in Delay for a player to come off a screen and either shoot or dribble and drive.

If they don’t shoot coming right off the pindown, they could also flow into PnR with the big. This is especially good when the big’s defender (x5) at the top of the key is sagging as it’s essentially playing PnR versus drop coverage.

Or a player could just come off a screen and flow right into a DHO with the big, which is called ‘Chicago’ action. This is also useful when x5 is sagging, as a DHO with the big in that scenario is once again basically PnR versus drop coverage. If x5 is playing more aggressive — playing up to the big in the DHO (equivalent of playing at the level of the screen in PNR) or hedging the DHO to prevent a pullup jumper — the ballhandler can take advantage by finding the rolling big.

The player could also curl the pindown screen.

Or curl the screen to then allow the screener to flow into a DHO with the big.

Flare screens are common in Delay as well.

The pindown screener can slip the screen, which is a common switch beater.

Or the flare screen itself can act as a decoy for the screener to come up and run a DHO with the big — ‘Flare DHO.’

Rip screens, or back screens, can also be used in Delay. Below, Nickeil Alexander-Walker is overplaying Jaime Jaquez Jr. to prevent a clean look for him to catch the ball. So, Duncan Robinson sets a rip screen on Alexander-Walker that frees up Jaquez Jr. on the cut.

General backdoor cutting opportunities also open up out of so many actions and so much movement, especially when a player rejects a pindown screen.

These are just a few of the actions that can be run within Delay. From Elevator, to Floppy, to Split, there are dozens more actions that can be run through a big at the top of the key. With so many actions, there’s tons of movement and tons of reads in Delay, so having a big who can process the floor and make the right reads quickly is key. And having one allows a team to run 5-out offense with a non-shooting big outside of just high pick-and-roll offense, a la, a way to preserve OKC’s 5-out philosophy.

The great news is that:

1. The Knicks already utilized Hartenstein at volume in Delay last season, where his intersection of screening and quick processing makes for an elite offensive hub at the top of the key. Here’s a minute and a half of him passing out of Delay.
2. OKC already used Jaylin Williams in Delay a good bit too, who also possesses great passing and size to see over the defense. Here’s just under a minute of him passing out of Delay.

This means that the foundation to integrate Hartenstein and a higher volume of Delay series into the Thunder’s offense has already been laid out. More Delay also inherently means more motion offense which, once again, helps rectify the stagnation issues they faced against the Mavericks.

I already detailed one reason why Hartenstein’s defender can’t just simply sag and negate the 5-out nature of having him on the perimeter: it leads to easy flips to DHOs that create easy opportunities to score. But Hartenstein is also talented as a driver and capable of attacking slower-footed bigs that sag off him. This is what completes his offensive arsenal and makes him a true hub on the perimeter.

He attacked both Nikola Jokic and Joel Embiid off-the-dribble out of Delay last season, who couldn’t handle his combination of movement skills, strength, and touch when giving him a runway of space to attack.

Strength is something he utilized on drives in space even against bigs who move well but lack the strength to absorb his bumps. He can create separation with speed + strength and finish with touch as he did against Rudy Gobert, or just transition the drive into a backdown as he did against Nicolas Claxton where his combination of strength and touch wins (he was in the 96th percentile in post-up efficiency).

And even on drives where he can’t beat a big with speed or strength, he has a decelerating “slow step” that catches his defenders off guard and creates a finishing window. This is a move usually reserved for guard and wing ballhandlers, so his defender isn’t prepared for it.

These diverse methods are how Hartenstein found ways to win as a driver when given space to attack, even against some of the best defenders in the world in Embiid, Gobert, and Evan Mobley. He scored 1.08 points per possession on 40 drive possessions last season according to Synergy, including shooting 16-of-24 (66.7%) on field-goal attempts out of drives.

This intersection of screening, passing, driving, and finishing is what enables offense to be run at a high level through Hartenstein and Delay series while maintaining 5-out alignment — try and break that 5-out alignment and the defense will be punished with DHOs and drives. And that’s how OKC retains their 5-out offense with the addition of a non-shooting big while also adding motion offense to fix their stagnation issues in the playoffs.

And this is exactly how Hartenstein can fit in and find success within the Thunder’s system and why they pursued him aggressively. He’s as good of a fit as it’ll get with a non-shooting big thanks to that specific intersection of skills that I mentioned.

That specific intersection of skills also blossoms versatility in the role that Hartenstein can perform in; a size-feel-touch intersection is by far the chain of skills that offers the most versatility in the amount of different ways a player can produce. What this means more simply is that Delay series isn’t that only way to maximize Hartenstein in the Thunder’s offense. Especially when he shares the floor with Holmgren, there are other ways to integrate him in double-big lineups and still maintain one of the best offenses in the NBA.

4.5 Out Offense

One of those ways to integrate double-big lineups is with the use of the “4.5 Out” offensive alignment.

While I don’t think Hartenstein will end up starting a majority of the regular season games at the 5 next to Holmgren at the 4, finding the best ways to make double-big lineups work is a huge part of maximizing Hartenstein’s $29 million AAV, and more importantly, maximizing the potential of their lineup optionality depending on opponent.

4.5 Out is simply an alignment that combines 4-out and 5-out offense; it’s 4-out but with an empty weakside corner (weakside is the opposite side of the ballhandler, ex: a ballhandler on the right wing means the left side is the weakside, vice versa). Usually in 4-out, there’s a center in the weakside dunker spot with a player also occupying the weakside corner. In 4.5 out, though, there’s a center in the weakside dunker spot but the next closest player to that center is the weakside wing. The simplest way to describe this is that it’s a traditional 5-out offense but with one of the players in the corner pinching in to the dunker spot.

While this offensive alignment has been around for a long time, @Bowser2Bowser on Twitter first gave it the nickname ‘4.5 Out’ in late December of 2022 and made an entire podcast video on the alignment with Evan Gualberto in April 2024.

I’d highly recommend watching the podcast episode if you’re interested in learning more about the alignment itself (that’s where I first learnt about it) as I’ll be talking moreso about how it applies to the context of Oklahoma City here.

To summarize what they and the Tweet linked above talk about, the advantage of 4.5 Out compared to traditional 4-out is that it makes it harder for defenses to help the helper.

When the center defending the dunkers spot (x5) has to step up and help on a drive, the absence of a player in the weakside corner makes it difficult for someone to help the helper, or in this case, help x5. If there was someone in that corner, that’s an easier rotation to the dunkers spot to prevent a lob or dumpoff.

But with the closest player on the wing, that’s a more difficult rotation to make for two reasons. One, because it’s more distance to cover on a rotation. Two, a defender helping from the wing allows that offensive player on the wing to relocate and move closer towards that empty weakside corner once his defender roams off him. So even if the wing defender rotates over and prevents a lob or dumpoff pass to the dunker spot player, it leaves a kickout pass to a relocating shooter wide open.

With the right lineups, this leads to very high-octane offense with an ideal combination of rim attempts and open 3s. Rim pressure is something this alignment can especially improve with the negation of traditional help-the-helper techniques, and something OKC could use as they finished 16th in rim frequency during the regular season despite being 1st in drives. They can have Hartenstein as the big in the corner cheating in towards the dunker spot, while still keeping Chet on the perimeter for spacing purposes.

Chet would have to make improvements to his shot to make 4.5 Out work effectively, though. While he shot 37.0% from three during the regular season, that number dipped to 26.0% in the postseason due to a slow shooting release and a lack of shooting versatility. Of his 349 three-point attempts in the regular season, a whopping 334 of them were categorized as open jumpshots per NBA.com. That means only 4% of his attempts came with a contesting defender within 4 feet of him. Even when accounting for the natural wonkiness of tracking data, that’s a strikingly low number.

Defenses in the playoffs recognized this tendency and targeted it ruthlessly. They closed out hard to his three-point attempts with fast, lengthy, athletic defenders like Herb Jones, Derrick Jones Jr., PJ Washington, and Daniel Gafford, challenging him to convert over contests that was made difficult due to his slow shooting release. This is how his shot was neutralized and his 3PT% took a 9-percent dip.

The encouraging sign here is that, less than a week ago on media day, he talked about tweaking his jumpshot over the offseason in order to maximize shot versatility, likely hinting at speeding up his release:

If he indeed does come into the season with a sped-up release, allowing him to shoot over tighter contests while maintaining efficiency, that makes double-big lineups with Hartenstein that much more dangerous offensively and a 4.5 Out offense specifically much more viable. A faster release and shooting over contests also inherently means taking a higher volume of threes, fixing the issue of Holmgren’s middling shooting volume at 7.0 three-point attempts per 100 possessions.

5 Slot Offense

Another way to utilize double-big lineups is with “5 Slot,” another variation of 5-out that puts the center in the far slot (the slot opposite to the ballhandler’s side). The name “5 Slot” too was something given by @Bowser2Bowser, as he was the first one to publicly catch onto Quinn Snyder debuting it during the Atlanta Hawks’ 2023 preseason.

Along with the annotated video linked above, he’s published an article about 5 Slot on his website, The Basketball Action Dictionary.

To summarize, 5 Slot compromises opposing defenses’ rim protection and rotations. Compromising opponents’ rim protection intrinsically bumps an offense’s rim attempts (Atlanta saw a 20% leap in rim FGA from 2022-23 to 2023-24) and thus rim pressure, which also leads to more open kickout 3s. Similar to 4.5 Out, this is another alignment that promotes a healthy balance of rim attempts and open 3s if executed well. With the creation and use of 5 Slot, Atlanta’s shot diet jumped from 27th in 2022-23 to 5th in 2023-24, per Cleaning The Glass.

5 Slot unlocks all this just by placing the center at the far slot instead of the top of the key — like in traditional 5-out — or the dunker spot — like in 4-out. This accomplishes a number of things, all stemming from one thing: placing your center at the far slot also places the opposing team’s center (their primary rim protector) there, meaning they’re a few steps away from their normal help position. This delays their help defense by a just a fraction, which is enough time to compromise a defense’s traditional rim protection techniques.

With their primary rim protector a few steps away from help defense, the defense now has to either:

• Send their low man (the defender guarding the corner) over to rotate and help at the rim, usually a guard or wing that is significantly worse at rim protection.
• Ask their center to just make the longer rotation and live with the results.

But it’s not even as easy as just having the center make the long rotation and live with the result at the rim. Even if they do make the rotation and successfully protect the rim from a ballhandler, that leaves a wide open “45 Cut” for x5 to stampede into.

All this is how Boston used 5 Slot in the playoffs to de-emphasize Mobley’s rim protection, as the video below details:

A defensive 3-second violation prevents Mobley from pre-rotating in the paint, meaning he can only begin his rotation once a paint touch occurs. By that time, it’s already had an impact on the effectiveness of his rim protection. But even if he were able to make the rotation and successfully protect the rim, that leaves Al Horford open for a kickout 3 or Luke Kornet open on a 45 Cut. This is where that ideal combination of rim attempts and open 3s comes from.

The Thunder can use 5 Slot in double-big lineups to do so similarly. They can run actions on the ball involving Shai Gilgeous-Alexander/Jalen Williams and Chet Holmgren on one slot (a PG/SG and PF PnR, for example) while placing Isaiah Hartenstein on the opposite slot. Now, they have an entire side to work with and generate a high-quality shot at the rim. If they do so, and the opponents’ center helps off Hartenstein to protect the rim, Hartenstein can simply stampede into a 45 Cut and finish in the paint. We saw how dangerous he is as an off-the-dribble driver in Delay — he’d only be more effective cutting into open space and stampeding into a catch-and-drive finish.

Hartenstein in the far slot can also be used to give Chet a higher role on offense — he has an entire side of the floor to work with as a self-creator away from any other big clogging the paint. This would allow him to work on one of his other weaknesses, attacking crossmatches, as the opponents’ 4 would automatically be matched up on him. Chet struggled with this in the playoffs as well, where he was unable to punish Dallas for crossmatching their tall wings (Derrick Jones Jr., PJ Washington, Josh Green) onto him and neutralizing the speed advantage he has off-the-dribble vs. bigs.

Chet already publicly mentioned working on punishing cross-matches on a Podcast P appearance earlier in the offseason. This gives him the chance to work on it in-game.

Some may criticize double-big lineups for this simple fact that Chet is matched up onto 4s instead 5s, where he’s at his best attacking slower-footed bigs. An opposing perspective is that this forces him to learn to win off-the-dribble versus tall wings and forwards, bumping his development at age-22. It’s not like defenses would’ve stopped crossmatching defenders onto him if Hartenstein weren’t there and he was the lone big. It didn’t stop Dallas. Hartenstein’s presence just forces Chet to develop these skills now instead of later.

The Defensive Floor Raising

Everything I’ve talked about thus far details how Hartenstein raises the Thunder’s ceiling on only the offensive side of the ball. He accomplishes this by improving their overall offense (adding a connective DHO piece and motion offense to fight stagnation), making life easier for Shai and JDub as creators (screen-setting), and accelerating Chet’s development (forcing him to shoot quicker and punish crossmatches).

The scary part is that Oklahoma City didn’t just pursue Hartenstein because he’s some elite offensive player. He’ll add immense value with his screening and perpetual motion, but at the end of the day, he averaged 11.6 points per 75 possessions and had a +0.7 Offensive Estimated Plus-Minus (82nd percentile) last season. The offensive impact of non-volume scorers will always be capped.

Rather, the main reason OKC brought him in was with the vision of fixing their poor non-Chet minutes and offering flexibility versus specific opponents (ex: opponents who rebound the ball especially well).

One of the Thunder’s biggest issues last season was their non-Chet minutes. During the regular season, the Thunder had an 8.6 net rating with Holmgren on the floor and a 5.2 net rating with him off, a +3.4 swing. That dropoff was exacerbated in the playoffs and especially against Dallas where they had a 4.4 net rating with him on the floor and a -15.2 without, a +19.6 swing. Sure, it was a small six-game sample size. But it was a playoff series that showed how vulnerable they were without Chet on the floor and Jaylin Williams as the lone big. That’s since Jaylin Williams is neither a good shooter nor a vertical threat on offense while being a liability on defense.

With Hartenstein carrying the load in the non-Holmgren minutes instead, they’ll have a better bench offense but also at least one dominant paint defender on the floor for all 48 minutes. There should be no reason for neither of them to be on the court outside of garbage time and injuries.

Last season, Hartenstein was:

• 7th in defensive field-goal percentage on shots defended in the restricted area (56.7%)
• 3rd in points per possession allowed defending the pick-and-roll as a big (0.946 PPP)
• 2nd in defensive estimated plus-minus (+3.9)

At 6-foot-9, it’s not even Jaylin Williams’ fault he’s a poor defender. He has really solid technique as a pick-and-roll defender, especially on hedge and recovers, and draws charges at a historic rate. But as an undersized big who lacks vertical pop, he’s extremely limited. Not Hartenstein though.

Hartenstein is one of the best paint defenders in the NBA thanks to his elite drop coverage and rim protection, and will be able to play more aggressive ball screen coverages consistently now with OKC’s elite secondary rim protection in Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, Jalen Williams, Alex Caruso, and even Cason Wallace there to cover for him. He’s a very capable defensive anchor by himself, which significantly raises the Thunder’s defensive floor. But it becomes even scarier in the minutes paired with Holmgren.

Either of them can act as the pick-and-roll big defender while the other plays the role of a ‘roamer’ who protects the backline second layer of defense. A ballhandler somehow managed to get to the rim past an Alex Caruso-Isaiah Hartenstein defended PnR? Cool. Have fun meeting Chet Holmgren at the rim as a reward.

Double-big lineups with Hartenstein and Holmgren also means you can’t completely remove primary rim protection with offensive scheme. See 5 Slot, where a defense’s center is placed at the far slot to neutralize the impact of their rim protection. In that case, Holmgren is just the low man, and he rotates over from the corner to protect the rim while Hartenstein is agile enough to closeout towards the corner. Or vice-versa.

The amount of versatility and optionality Hartenstein tabs for Oklahoma City is truly hard to overstate. Whether or not he’ll start has been a big discussion point since his initial signing. I think it just depends on who the opponent is. He may start on some nights and he may come off the bench on some nights, that’s not what really matters. It’ll be matchup-dependent — dependent on what the opponent entails on any given night.

What matters is that the Thunder even have the flexibility to be able to adapt to opponents like this. Last year, they had a strict selection of skillsets and a strict selection of players that made it tough for them to adapt from matchup-to-matchup. They were superb at what they were excellent at, like forcing turnovers where they led the league (15.8 turnovers forced per game, 0.9 more than second place), but were unable to effectively go big against heavy-rebounding units (i.e. Dallas Mavericks) or heavy-post up units (i.e. Denver Nuggets) since Jaylin Williams-Chet Holmgren double-big lineups just didn’t accomplish much.

Now, Hartenstein brings a fresh dose of rebounding (87th percentile defensive rebounding, 98th percentile offensive rebounding) and 1-on-1 post defense, all while maintaining OKC’s year-over-year focus on turnover-generation as he ranked fourth among qualifying centers in steals per game (1.2) and steal percentage (2.3%, 89th percentile overall). This is what enables the newfound optionality for Oklahoma City to tweak lineups depending on opponent strengths and weaknesses, which is far more useful than setting in stone the five starters for all 82-plus games.

At the end of every conversation surrounding Hartenstein’s transition to Oklahoma City, they all circle back to one thing: versatility. The addition of Hartenstein makes OKC more versatile. Whether it’s the connective DHO hub he is that adds another release valve, the motion offense he can bring that fights stagnation, the defensive floor raising he provides as a 1-man bench anchor, or the rebounding and additional size that he brings as a starter, he does all of these things very additively and without taking anything away from what the Thunder have been building for the past four years. This creates lineup optionality and lineup versatility. And versatility is what wins championships.

For that reason alone — how Hartenstein plugs holes that needed fixing without creating new ones, thus, making them more versatile — he’s worth every penny that he was paid and will be the difference-maker for the Oklahoma City Thunder during the 2024-25 season.

The post Inserting Some Hart Into The Thunder appeared first on Swish Theory.

After signing a 1-year, $62.6M extension, the maximum allowable amount on top of his existing 2-year/$115M remaining, Stephen Curry is locked in through his age 39 season. That money can buy a lot of popcorn. It also feels the closest thing to a guarantee that Curry will finish his illustrious career in the Golden State, the dream of all Warriors fans. In a recent interview with Marc Spears, Steph clarified that he’ll be in blue and gold as long as the team isn’t a “bottom feeder”. Considering this past offseason, that seems to be a rather unlikely future.

This new deal also brings a good deal of clarity to the future of this team by aligning their contracts, an interesting wrinkle I want to explore.

The New Cap Sheet

Per Spotrac, my GOAT sports contract tool, this is how the Warriors’ future cap sheet lines up with the new extension:

You’ll notice a few things from the jump. Assuming all player options are picked up, a main veteran group of Steph, Draymond Green, Andrew Wiggins, Kyle Anderson, and Buddy Hield will run through 2026-27. Hield does have an option that will run through 2027-28, but that’s tied to a deal that is non-guaranteed in the 26/27 season, so it’s far from a lock.

Another important detail lies with the young players. Jonathan Kuminga and Moses Moody have yet to be extended, despite their eligibility this offseason. I’m not Mike Dunleavy Jr., but something tells me that extending Curry and making moves for veteran pieces was the priority. A fully actualized future and organized cap sheet gives them a better idea of what numbers they can reach, especially with Kuminga.

Assuming Kuminga were to reach a 4-year max extension, he’d be the only player locked in beyond the 2026/27 season. The same can probably be said for rising star Brandin Podziemski, someone the Warriors would be silly to let go of. That creates some interesting options for that offseason.

The 2027 Fork in the Road

Let’s assume a Kuminga deal gets done this offseason and Podziemski signs a new deal in the 25/26 offseason. That locks in their core young pieces, who would be 26 and 25 years old respectively, for a possible post-Steph future. Trayce Jackson-Davis would also be locked in through 2026/27 assuming his extremely cheap options are picked up. This also gives them a chance to keep a relatively clean cap sheet for what could be a final run together in 2026/27.

Steph will be locked in. Unless Draymond Green wants to opt out of $27.7M at age 36, he will be there. Andrew Wiggins would need a massive turnaround back to his 2022 standards to consider opting out of $30M in his age 31 season. Those deals, plus Anderson and Hield on non-guaranteed years, line up a three-year window for this team.

There’s some wiggle room here too. Moses Moody extension talks have been as quiet as the grave, and he may find himself on a new team by this time next year. Gary Payton II, Kevon Looney, and new signing De’Anthony Melton represent $30M in expiring money next offseason. If this current team falls short of expectations, the brain trust can try to re-tool or make trades to reshape its image.

Let’s tease out a few scenarios here, from the optimistic to the realistic.

Where Is This Headed?

Here’s the ideal option. The veteran group stays locked in for the next few years and builds themselves a competitive playoff team. The young players develop while working toward new contracts. A trade here, a signing there, you might even have a contender on your hands. Then comes the 2027 offseason, and the veterans can return at lower cap numbers if they’re not ready to hang up the sneakers. Crazier things have happened but Steph Curry probably won’t be worth $62 million at age 39, nor Draymond worth $27 million at age 36. Maybe 2027/28 is the final swan song, vets surrounding the young core of Kuminga/Podziemski/Jackson-Davis. Hell, maybe Moses Moody is still around.

A more realistic option is this team spends the next few years fighting to stay relevant in the perpetual knife fight known as the Western Conference. No more jewelry, just a battle against the inexorable march of time. To some absolutist fans, that’s the nightmare scenario, and I can understand it on some level. 2K brain has us thinking you need to contend or stink out loud and anything in between is nothing short of criminal.

Ask yourselves: with no rings coming, would it be the worst thing ever to watch the greatest point guard of all time finish out his career where it started? On a team that should be playing April basketball? With some exciting young players in tow? Many things are worse.

Let’s say that is the realistic course. Steph, Draymond, and Kerr have three more years before retirement. Wiggins comes off the books, Hield and Anderson expire, and suddenly the youth are in charge. Golden State also owns all their first-round picks through the 2030 season, so one would assume another exciting player or two can be added between now and that 2027 offseason. We can sing the swan song and move into a new era with a well-laid path.

Some teams tank outright and find themselves with young prospect groups worse than Kuminga, Podz, Moody, and TJD. They’ll have a few more years of seasoning and will all be 27 or younger by the time this potential exodus of franchise legends occurs. It’s not a bad spot to find yourself in after the greatest core in franchise history moves from the court to the rafters and statues outside Chase Center.

So keep that 2027 number in mind. For all the yelling and whining many fans have done about this front office, they have set up a clear runway into this decision point. What happens now is for the players to decide.

The post Warriors Create Contract Alignment appeared first on Swish Theory.

The usual issue with pumping up a young player that scored a lot on a terrible team is that they often only know how to contribute as an on-ball scorer. When they start playing with better talent, their time spent on-ball shrinks and so does their impact/production. The good news about GG is that he’s already a good off-ball player. He was solid as a spot up option both as a shooter (37% on C&S 3s) and attacking closeout. His combination of size and body control lets him overwhelm smaller players at the rim while slithering around larger rim protectors.

His analytics look great for a first year player. Jackson was a slightly above average offensive player in O-LEBRON (58th% in Basketball Index’s offensive all-in-one metric). He was a good scorer at the basket, posting above average grades in Rim Shot Creation and Rim Shot Making (Shot making metrics look at how you shoot versus expectations via shot quality). He quickly garnered respect off-ball finishing 73rd% in Off-Ball Gravity (This metric looks at how much defensive attention you get). He was lethal on cuts (97th% in Cut PPP) and respectable as a C&S 3pt option (68th% in C&S 3PT Shot Making). 

What makes all this insane is that he’s only 19 years old. Here is the same graph looking at 19 year olds over the last 10 years in the same stats. (Devin Booker and Jayson Tatum for reference)

The metric that put GG on my radar as a potential star is his Drive Foul Rate Drawn%. This stat does exactly what it sounds like, it looks at how often a player is fouled when they drive to the basket. This number is a good proxy for dominance when coupled with a high drive rate. He not only has the highest Drive Foul Rate Drawn% for a 19 year old over the last decade (seven Drives/75 to qualify), only four players posted a better rate this season: Jayson Tatum, Joel Embiid, and Paolo Banchero. Elite company for the young forward.

His off-ball skills combined with his elite foul drawing on drives paint’s a bright future for Jackson. The former 5 star recruit was able to put together a lengthy highlight tape in only 48 games as a rookie. Next season he will benefit from playing alongside elite playmaker Ja Morant, which will hopefully boost his shot quality (35% in Overall Shot Quality). The physical tools are there and the analytics highlight some extreme bright spots. With some more seasoning and improved roster around him, GG Jackson II could soon find himself on his way to an All-Star game.

The post GG Jackson: The Next Second Round Star appeared first on Swish Theory.