I will say the two unnameable words around the Golden State Warriors.
No, it’s not “fire Kerr”, “trade Klay”, “European bigs” or “affordable housing”. It’s two timelines.
We know it didn’t work. The youth gave a minimal boost at best to the 2022 championship team, and the sheer volume of developmental roster spots arguably cratered the 2022-23 season. Trades were made, roster spots were consolidated, but still, the Warriors struggled to get production from the youth.
This season marks a turning point, all from the back of one man. Jonathan Kuminga‘s breakout as a legitimate second scoring option. That breakout stems from one word: drive.
I wanted to explore what has…driven this breakout, the only way I know how: watching every drive of Jonathan Kuminga’s career and tracking his development in four key areas: handling, finishing craft, midrange counters, and creating for teammates. I’ll work through each category in chronological order, starting from his rookie year up until the present day. So, let’s get going.
Handling
If you watched rookie year Kuminga, you can probably guess where this starts.
He was legitimately one of the worst handlers I’ve seen. Dribbling off his foot, failing to read help, losing the ball when the momentum got away from him. All that could go wrong did go wrong.
The turnover numbers certainly could have been worse: his 7.2% turnover rate on drives was in the range of James Harden, LeBron James, Luka Doncic, and many other stars. It’s the context of the turnovers that hurts: Kuminga was a low pass percentage player on the drive, and wasn’t creating a lot of offense for himself either. One turnover for every 4 baskets made is not ideal.
He had one handle play he could count on: the spin move. It was the one thing he had some semblance of control over, and he used it so often it would make Pascal Siakam blush.
You can see the flashes of advantage creation with his handle. Driving with the intent to draw help and spin away is huge, and he thrived while doing it at full speed. These were still simple reads and handle plays on the whole, and it wasn’t all sunshine and roses when he went into the spin cycle:
The slow spins were pretty rough. He failed to create advantages and was often trapped into bad shots or turnovers. Even with the majority of the spin results being positive, one good move does not a solid driver make.
Beyond the spins, most of his handle successes were 2-3 dribbles in a straight drive. There’s something to be said for a lack of wasted movement, but when that’s just about all you can do, it’s concerning.
But I did want to note one particular play, a foreshadowing of sorts for his handle development:
That body control and awareness combination – a running stop without traveling AND the well-timed fake – was a small sign of what was to come.
Moving to his sophomore season, his bag of tricks grew exponentially. To be sure, he still used the spin move to a high degree:
You can see the development in his methods with the spin. Incorporating fakes, changes of pace, a drop step on the finish. All of this requires a higher level of footwork and ball control in addition to the fast processing speed as he reads the defense.
Other tendencies remained. His propensity for travels contributed to an increased turnover rate on the drive, up 2.1% from his rookie season:
Despite this, the good in his handling started to outweigh the bad. Kuminga began to challenge himself, chaining multiple moves to create better advantages while cutting down on the careless lost ball turnovers. He created an impressive set of dribbling highlights in comparison to what he produced in that first season.
There were still the “oh no” moments, to be sure, but they were fewer and further between.
It’s also worth noting that the quality of his straight-line drives increased. He powered through digs and nail help, even bigs being placed on him, to get the looks he wanted.
With the handle tightening up, we got to see more of his power/speed combination on display. Put too slow or too weak of a wing/forward on him and he can dust them. Put a big on him daring him to shoot, he goes right around them. It’s the beginning of a serious defensive conundrum; all he needs is to add consistency.
Year three brought that longed-after handle consistency. Chaining moves, mixing up his looks and speeds, and keeping the handle-based turnovers way down.
The sheer volume of unguardable drives also increased. He began to exert his will over opposing defenders, some of whom are known for their defense:
There are still issues, to be sure. He has cut down on the travels this season but they remain, and he’ll lose his handle from time to time or have a rough gather affect his finish.
The development in this department cannot be ignored. He went from simple 2-3 dribble drives and constant, predictable spin moves to move combinations, maintaining balance with good footwork, and manipulating defenders with his dribble. By and large, Kuminga will be able to physically overwhelm defenders with his athletic tools. There will be situations where more advanced dribbling is called for to create advantages, and he is beginning to seize those opportunities.
Getting yourself to the rim is one thing. What happens when he gets there?
Finishing Craft
This is another area in which Kuminga has grown by leaps and bounds. Much like his rookie-year handling, the finishing was generally ugly and inconsistent.
Jumping off the wrong foot, using the wrong hand, not aligning himself into the shot leading to bad mechanics. A lot of major red flags. It only got uglier when he tried more complex footwork patterns in his finishing, like drop steps or drag steps.
Finishing with the left was a clear issue. Too often he tried to force it with his right hand in situations that called for the left or tried to adjust a drive to get to his right when the left presented the better option. But he did have some solid flashes with his right, showcasing a baseline level of coordination on the move.
Kuminga managed a solid 58.4% finishing rate on his drives, but if anything this was a reflection of how easy the majority of his drives were. 2-3 dribbles and a dunk were prevalent outcomes, especially when considering the bigs or slower wings that were tasked with guarding him. It’s not to take away from his skill – excelling at the easy stuff is important – but it left lots of wanting.
Going into his sophomore season, the finishing numbers dropped tremendously to 51.3%. This, however, is not an indication of a decline in finishing skill. It was a sign of pushing harder to get tough finishes.
The volume of his straight-line drives went down, replaced with tougher finishing angles after more complex dribble moves. As covered earlier, his turnover rate also rose during this season – another confirmation of the increased difficulty present in the film.
In a strange twist, the disparity between his righty and lefty finishing grew larger – in favor of the left. He displayed a lot of good touch with the left throughout the season:
A greater control over his body was leading to better results. His momentum was contained, he could pick better angles off the glass, and slow himself just enough to get soft finishes instead of clunkers.
It was the strong hand finishes dragging him down. Some of this was a product of the defense; at times they would dare him to finish left in single coverage, but sent major weak side help if he managed to penetrate the paint going right:
A major part of that increased difficulty on his drives was the increase in finishing moves he applied. Instead of spamming the spin button repeatedly, Kuminga mixed a healthy set of drop steps, drag steps, pump fakes and hesitation moves to unsettle his defenders.
Of course, some spins were still mixed in.
You’re probably wondering “Hey, this all looks great, but why the drastic drop in production?”. Well, there were a LOT of finishes that didn’t quite work out despite his best efforts.
What was important to me was that he was trying things. Development isn’t a process of doing the same things over and over until they’re perfect. Development is polishing those things that are good while working on those that are bad. So, you have to power through a LOT of bad to get to the good.
This process of trying things led to another important development: serious foul-drawing potential. With Kuminga putting together more consistent drives and drawing the attention of the defense, on-ball and help defenders alike chose to hack him down instead of allowing a finish. For the second straight season, Kuminga finished tops on the deal in percentage of fouls on the drive amongst rotation players with more than 2 drives per game.
Those final two clips are the most important to me. Pressing an advantage on a line drive and getting hacked is one thing. Using fakes and hesitations to get defenders off-balance or in the air and forcing the contact? That’s an important tool in the bag of an elite driver.
Now that we’ve seen the increase in difficult finishing tries and foul-drawing techniques, let’s see how he has put it together this season.
In the current season, Kuminga has risen to new heights of efficiency mixed with increased difficulty. His 57% finishing mark on the drive is not only a 6% increase from the previous season, but it also leads all Warriors players who get at least one drive per game. He’s also second on the team in personal fouls drawn per drive, with only Dario Saric beating him there.
Another important mark is the rise of his right-handed finishing. It jumped over 6% to sit at 50% for the year, nearly equaling his 51% mark with the left. It’s been great to see him power through increased defensive help on his stronger side and convert tough finishes.
Kuminga’s growing awareness has led to better finishing outcomes in many ways. His quick floor reads have led to an increase in “catch and go” possessions, where JK scans the floor to see an opportunity to drive off the catch and poises himself to take off as soon as the ball hits his hands. That gives extra fractions of a second before his defenders can turn to contain the drive.
It’s all coming together from a finishing and foul-drawing standpoint. You can see the complex moves to draw contact mixed with tough finishes:
His points percentage on the drive has reflected this. His rookie season, full of easy line drives, recorded a 77.4% mark. That dipped to 60.2% in his sophomore year, yet another reflection of the increased difficulty and defensive attention he garnered. Now, with all of those strenuous factors still at play, he has risen back to 77.2%.
To put that in context, 116 players in the league match or exceed his mark of 5.6 drives per game. Kuminga places ninth of all those players. Here’s a snapshot of who has him beat:
That’s your last 3 MVPs, another former MVP, and a whole bunch of All-NBA/All-Star players in front (Alpie, you were robbed!). I’d say that’s good company.
We covered the development in his handle, and the finishing has risen to match it. He went from struggling with complex dribbles and finishes to pulling them off with relative ease in only two years. Now he finds himself as one of the elite players at generating points off the drive.
But there is more to this than how you get to the rim, or what happens when you get there.
Midrange Counters
This has always been a very important aspect of driving to me, even if less so for wings/bigs.
Once a player gets past the three-point line on a drive, there are essentially three ways it can go: rim attempt, midrange attempt, or pass attempt. Knowing what the driving player is capable of dictates how the defense will play them. If only a rim attempt is likely, the whole defense will load up the paint. The midrange as a counter move can buy extra time for the driver to read the help. It also offers an alternative to the rim if the paint is loaded and no passing options are available.
(We will get to the importance of the passing aspect later; don’t fret.)
I don’t think it is reductive to say Jonathan Kuminga is a rim-first driver. He should be, in all honesty; what midrange attempt or kickout pass brings more value than a guy finishing 75% of his rim looks? But if that’s the *only* thing he threatens to do off the drive, it makes things quite difficult to generate those shots. Therefore the midrange is a necessity for the development of his rim pressure.
You could probably guess that the midrange was a bit ugly in his rookie season. Results were poor overall – 34% in the short midrange (26th percentile) and 5/11 on long twos. To be sure, there were some decent-looking possessions and he had confidence in his shot:
Ugliness was the dominant result, however, especially when it came to floaters. He simply did not have the touch for one-handed shots on the move, and the majority of his movement twos looked similar:
But the signs of life were there. He was willing to try and understood to some degree that a balance between the rim and the midrange had to be found. Even without good results, Kuminga rated in the 42nd percentile of midrange frequency in that rookie season. It was a threat, but not a convincing one. Compared to his rim looks, the midrange was a dull knife next to a katana.
The knife was sharpened a bit during his sophomore year. The confidence remained and the results looked a bit better; his short midrange jumped up 9 points to 43%, a 58th percentile mark. A rise in frequency was a welcome sign to boot – midrange shots went from a 24% to 29% share of his total shot profile, while three-point attempts dropped. Increased volume and efficiency is tough to pull off for *any* shot type, but especially the midrange since they are nearly all self-created.
He especially got comfortable with the turnaround over his right shoulder. It was an easily repeatable and often available shot. Kuminga seemed to be more settled physically when shooting the midrange; it felt less forced and more mechanically sound. This led to more soft-touch rolls on his shots, contributing to better results.
However, the floater still refused to come along for the ride. There were makes, but they looked awkward and with poor footwork/body alignment. The vast majority of the looks ended up looking like this:
Still, he tried much harder for those shots. Floater attempts became a bigger part of his game. He was on a similar track to his rookie season: take a lot of attempts and process the failures to deliver better results later on. He wasn’t just missing shots, he was collecting data in the process.
Now, the current season. Once again we see a huge jump in frequency, this time from 29% to 36%. That is an 86th percentile frequency amongst all wings. Paired with his 85th percentile rim frequency, you’re now looking at a player seeking to dominate at the first two levels.
Another important development in frequency is the number of long twos. 11 attempts in his rookie year were followed by 20 in his sophomore season. You could call it an increase, but at that level, it could have been a simple scaling up in shot attempts. He’s up to 38 attempts in this current season and still has 29 games left to add to it. Now we have a trend.
He took major steps in the variety of his midrange looks as well while seeing comparable success in terms of his makes (42% last year to 43% this year). There was a lot more variety beyond the right shoulder turnaround. He could comfortably pull up left and right, use the step-back, put defenders in jail, turnaround left, whatever you wanted.
It’s becoming a thing of beauty. He’s mixing increased volume, solid efficiency, and a deepening arsenal of moves to greatly advance his scoring profile.
Here’s a snapshot of forwards that can match Kuminga’s midrange frequency (35+%) and efficiency (43+%) with more than 200 midrange attempts: Kevin Durant, DeMar DeRozan, Tobias Harris, Paul George, Jimmy Butler, Julius Randle, and Mikal Bridges. That’s some damn good company for midrange success.
This success has enabled him to add further layers: drawing/baiting fouls in the midrange, using pump fakes and step-throughs to get himself to the line.
It never hurts to snatch some reliable points by getting your defender up in the air. His processing speed has grown by leaps and bounds in so many respects this season.
In addition to the massive gains in his midrange success, the floater showed real signs of life:
The additional confidence (and success) with his floater has done a lot for his midrange success, especially around the restricted area. Not only does it enable his short midrange frequency, but boosts the array of moves he can pull to keep defenders off-balance when anticipating his finishes.
As we saw with his handling and finishing development, Jonathan Kuminga was already a tough cover. Adding this level of prolific midrange shotmaking brings him to a new level of danger. The only forwards in the league that can match his driving and midrange efficiency? Kevin Durant and Kawhi Leonard. End list.
There is a last category, however; one that brings him down a rung.
Creating for Teammates
This part gets ugly. We’ll just rip the Band-Aid off.
Only one player posted a worse rate of passing out of drives (3+ per game) and assist percentage than rookie Jonathan Kuminga: Jaren Jackson Jr. The film asserts what the stats say. He couldn’t handle more than the most obvious reads, and even many of those were a struggle.
Here are his best plays made off the drive that season:
No, really. Highlights.
Then, you have the lowlights:
Bad footwork. Late reads, or entirely missed ones. Poor pass placement and body control. He checked all the telltale signs for a player struggling to catch up with the speed of the game. Picking up two turnovers for every assist on the drive was a tough scene.
It got somewhat better in his sophomore year. The passing rate on the drive increased (27.4% to 33.7%) and the assist rate jumped (3.4% to 11.0%) while the turnover rate increased modestly (7.2% to 9.3%). Much like his driving to the rim and midrange, he scaled in volume with increased success while not letting some bad results get in the way of him trying.
There were still plenty of bad turnovers on the drive and processing issues, to be sure:
This was balanced with better execution of simple reads: kicks to the near and far corner/wing, dunker spot finds, reading cutters or open shooters in space. It’s not impressive playmaking, but beats the hell out of no playmaking.
So it would seem his playmaking is on the up and up. But as I’ve stressed in previous articles, development is not linear, and his playmaking off the drive has crashed back out in the current season.
This season, he’s back at the bottom of pass rate (26%) and assist rate (2.8%) with – guess who! – Jaren Jackson Jr. To some credit, he’s cut down on the turnover rate (9.3% to 8.3%) but it’s nothing to write home about with that playmaking drop.
The bad pass placement could have been expected, but it seemed like he was less active in reading the help and has been prone to lazy turnovers. Despite the scoring heights he has reached the current season, the playmaking on the drive has clearly regressed.
Another problem with his drive playmaking has cropped up: running into an excessive amount of charges. Failing to read the help and carelessly running into turnovers feels like rookie-year behavior, not the player we have seen this year.
The most frustrating part is that he still put on the flashes of a solid passer, and even showed a better sense of how to manipulate the help on the drive to get higher-quality looks for teammates:
It was a question of consistent effort on Kuminga’s part, not a true regression of skill. If anything, the gap between his good and bad playmaking widened. The problem is that the bad once again outweighed the good.
This lack of consistent playmaking for others, especially considering the driving gravity he will draw, could become a major limitation of his star status. It’s something I’ll keep a close eye on as we track his trajectory.
Wrapping Up
It’s clear through the tape and stat mix that Kuminga’s development in handling, finishing, and midrange scoring has taken a major leap, all contributing to huge success on the drive. There are obvious playmaking concerns that loom large over this, but he has all the time in the world. He won’t turn 22 until next season. And don’t forget he went from utterly inept on the drive to borderline dominant in the span of 2.5 seasons.
Parts of this article may come off as overly critical and expectant for a player his age. That was partially my intent. He has put himself into a stratosphere of offensive performance that demands expectations for further development. When your game grows this quickly, why would it stop? We (the fans, the analysts, the team, Kuminga himself) all want the same thing. To see his game kick into an even higher gear, and the next one after that. And the next one. And the next one…
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